Xuanzang’s proof of idealism (vijñapti-mātratā): The Origin and Controversies

by Shigeki Moro

(Hanazono Univ.)

1. Dignagean logic in Japan


• Gakuryo (scholar monk)
• Rongi-e limsi? (Buddhist service with Discussion)
> Oral examination for learned priests chanting/a kind of recital (public reading)
> Both Buddhist philosophy and Buddhist logic
> November 13: Jion-e at Kofukuji or Yakushiji temple
> December 16: Hogo-e at Hokke-do, Todaiji temple
• Numerous studies on Nyaya-pravesa and the commentary of Ji M
• Popular subjects:
> Four fallacies due to contradictions with the reason
> Xuanzang's proof of idealism (vijnapti-matrata)


2. Form of Dignagean logic


• Sample:
> Thesis (paksa): That mountain has fire.
> Reason (hetu): Because [it has] smoke.
> Example (drstanta): Like a kitchen.


Similar example: [Whatever has smoke has fire,] like a kitchen.


Negative example: [Whatever doesn't have fire doesn't have smoke, like a lake.]


• General form:
> Thesis: P has S.
> Reason: Because [P has] H.
> Similar example: [Whatever has H has S,] like D.
> Negative example: [Whatever doesn't have S doesn't have H, like V.]


3. Undervaluation of East Asian Buddhist Logic in Japan


• Japanese modern scholars of Indian logic including NAKAMURA Hajime 11 'HtL
> East Asian Buddhist logic is incomplete and/or partial (?)
• « Active studies in modern China
• « Re-evaluation in international meetings


4. Proof of Idealism


• Based on Ji's M Yinming-ruzhengli-lun-shu (YRLS; Commentary on Nyaya-pravesa)
> Fallacy of contradiction to common sense (lokaviruddha, ®^^^)
> At Siladitya's iplll: Buddhist service in Kanyakubja (Kanauj) |II|^"M
> For Non-Buddhists and Hinayana Buddhists



After traveling around India and completing his study, our master [i.e. Xuanzang], wanted to return to China. At that time, Siladitya, who was the king of India, held a large and uninterrupted Buddhist service that lasted for eighteen days and asked our master to spread his interpretation of Yogacara all over India. The king chose those who have wisdom and goodness, called them to the service. He sent non-Buddhists and Hinayana Buddhists to dispute with Xuanzang. Our master had made the following inference and no one could make an argument against it:
Thesis: In truth (Mfe, *paramarthatah), colors and forms (fe, *rupa), which are mutually accepted [by proponent and opponent] (ffi^, *lokaprasiddha), are not separate from the visual consciousness.

Reason: Because, [based on the ground] I accept (I’liif), they are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhatus], but are not included in the eye.
Example: Like as the visual consciousness.


4.1. Historical doubt of the Proof


• No records in Xuanzang's biographies
> Variation of the biographies
• Introduction in YRLS after Xuanzang's death
• Xuanzang's Biographies
> Record of Travels to Western Lands
> Further Biographies of Eminent Monks (ll'ti'i r'j'iu'fe; XGZ)


Old manuscripts version (Nanatsudera Kongoji etc...)


<• Printed version (e.g. Taisho ver.)
> A Biography of the Tripitaka Master of the Great Ci’en Monastery of the Great Tang Dynasty №fe; DDSFZ)
• Differences between biographies
Buddhist Service in Kanauj Debate with Non-Buddhists
and/ or Hinayäna Buddhists The Proof

Record of Travels to Western

Lands Yes No No

Old Mss of XGZ Yes (very short) No No

Taisho Edition of XGZ Yes Yes No

DDSFZ Yes Yes No

YRLS Yes Yes Yes

• Development of the biography

Old Mss. of XGZ Taisho ver. of XGZ + DDSFZ

Arrival at Nalanda Arrival at Nälandä

18-day Debate with Nalanda scholar monks
]
rh> Silabhadra s teaching

Debate with Simharasmi of Madhyamaka

Debate with Prajnägupta of Sämmitiya

Debate with a scholar of Lokayata / / Debate with a scholar of Lokäyata
Debate with non-Buddhist scholars 1 / Debate with non-Buddhist scholars
Buddhist Service in Kanauj / / Buddhist Service in Kanauj


/ —* 18-day Debate with Non-Buddhists and/or Hinayäna Buddhists


Silabhadra's teaching '
Return to China Return to China


> The record of debate in Kanauj was rewritten from the record in Nalanda
> the change of plot, or the change of the role of Silabhadra
> More debates were added to the newer versions
<• Based on the three turnings of the wheel of dharma (dharmacakra) from the Samdhinirmocana-sutra?


4.2. Logical Problems


• Bhaviveka's logic
> A Revision of Dignagean logic for the proof of emptiness
> Characteritsitcs:
<• Use of the restriction phrase “from the point of view of absolute truth (paramarthatah)"


All negative sentences must be non-implicative negation (prasajya-pratisedha). No negative examples.


• Bhaviveka's proof of emptiness (in Dacheng-zhangzhen-lun A^'Y'f^iim)


Thesis: In truth (M'I4; *paramarthatah), conditioned phenomena are empty.


Example: Like an illusion.

Reason: Because they are produced by causal conditions.

Thesis: [In truth,] unconditioned phenomena have no substances.

Reason: Because they don't arise.

Example: Like flowers in the sky.


• Relationship with Bhaviveka's logic
> Effective only on the subject or the whole fomula?
> Meaning of the term “truth (* paramartha)”
<• Four types of twofold truth
• Ji's inconsistency ?
> In YRLS, Ji introduces Bhaviveka's proof as a valid formula
> In his commentary of Cheng-weishi-lun (Cheng-weishi-lun-shuji; Ji severely criticizes
Bhaviveka's proof


'Many discussion have occurred in East Asia.

• Ji's interpretation of “In truth”
> Exclude rüpa peculiar to common sense (=non-Buddhist)
> Exclude rüpa peculiar to Hinayana
<• e.g. rüpa separate from the visual consciousness
• Ji's interpretation of “mutually accepted”
> Exclude rüpa peculiar to Hinayana
e.g. Buddha's contaminated body
> Exclude rüpa peculiar to Mahayana
e.g. The bodies of Buddhas in other worlds


A “In truth” U “mutually accepted” ' Rüpas which are accepted both Hinayana and Mahayana
= rüpa not separate from the visual consciousness


Tautology?

> Thesis: In truth, colors and forms (*rüpa), which are mutually accepted [by proponent and opponent], are not separate from the visual consciousness.
' rüpas which are accepted both Hinayana and Mahayana are not separate from the visual consciousness.
= rüpas not separate from the visual consciousness are not separate from the visual consciousness.


4.3. Relationship*with*other*theoretical*disputes


• Debates regarding emptiness and existence
> Dharmapala vs. Bhaviveka


Dharmapala's commentary of Catuhsataka has a formula very similar to Bhaviveka's proof of emptiness

• Are they same formula?

• Confrontation between Sanron school and Hosso school in Japan
> The big debate between Saicho and Tokuitsu
> Debates whether all sentient beings can attain Buddhahood or not
> Buddha nature theory vs. Five gotra theory