Śrīlāta 's Anudhātu Doctrine

Śrīlāta (circa 4century C.E.), a senior contemporary of both Vasubandhu and Saṃghabhadra, was a leading Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika master. According to Xuan Zang, he composed the [Sautrāntika-vibhāṣā]] (經部毘婆沙論)in ancient Ayodhyā.

Saṃghabhadra as well mentions his writing(s), though unfortunately without giving any title. In the *Nyāyānusāra (= Ny), Saṃghabhadra calls him “the Sthavira”, and, when refuting the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika tenets, makes him his main target of attack.

室利邏多（約公元4世紀）為世親（Vasubandhu）及眾賢（Saṃghabhadra）兩人的一位年長同時代人物1，他是一位領導的譬喻經量部（Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika）論師。依據玄奘所記載，他在古阿逾陀（Ayodhyā）撰寫《經部毘婆沙論》（Sautrāntika-vibhāṣā）2。眾賢亦同樣提及他的著作，雖然很可惜未有留下任何其著作的名稱。3在《順正理論》（*Nyāyānusāra）中，眾賢稱他為「上座」（the Sthavira），而當破斥譬喻經量部的宗義時，將他視為主要的評擊對象。

One of the most important and interesting doctrines of Śrīlāta is the “pursuant element” (隨界; *anudhātu), also called the “old pursuant element” (*purāṇa-anudhātu; 舊隨界). But unfortunately, the Ny is the only available original source for this doctrine, and we can only derive our understanding of it through the direct or indirect quotations by Saṃghabhadra when he refutes it. Vasubandhu's exposition on the seed theory in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (= AKB) is also helpful to some extent. As regards modern discussion, I have been able to see only a handful of them, the earliest of which being most probably by Venerable Yin Shun (1944).

室利邏多其中一個最重要及最有趣的義理是「隨界」（*anudhātu; pursuant element），亦稱為“舊隨界”（*[purāṇa-anudhātu]]; old pursuant element）

。然而，很可惜，《順正理論》是對於這義理唯一現存原文資料，而我們只能藉由眾賢破斥它時直接或間接的引文以衍生出我們對它的理解。3在《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośabhāṣya）中，世親對種子理論的闡釋亦某程度上有幫助的。關於現代的討論，我只能見到它們的一小撮，最早的討論最可能是印順法師（1944）。4

1. Signification of the terms anudhātu and *purāṇa-anudhātu As for my reconstructions of anudhātu and *purāṇa-anudhātu, they are untraced thus far in the extant Sanskrit Abhidharma texts, but whatever the original terms might have been, they seem to have been Śrīlāta's own coinage. Saṃghabhadra makes the criticism that these doctrinal terms have no backing in the Sutra. Śrīlāta, however, cites as scriptural support the Buddha's mention of the accompanying (anusahagata) roots of skilfulness that continue to exist in a person who is generating an unskilful thought. (See quotation in §2.[II]). From this, we know at the outset that the *anudhātu is fundamentally a doctrine of causal efficacy in the potential form.

1. 「隨界」與「舊隨界」兩詞的涵義 至於我對「隨界」及「舊隨界」兩詞的重組，它們迄今於現存的梵文阿毘達磨文獻中找不到，但無論原本的術語是怎樣，它們似乎是室利邏多自己的新造詞。眾賢作出批評，指出這些義理術語是在契經中是沒有支持。5然而，室利邏多引用佛陀提及“補特伽羅善法隱沒，惡法出現，有隨俱行（anusahagata）善根未斷”作為經證。（見於§2.[II]的引文）。由此，我們得知從一開始「隨界」根本地是一種以潛在形式的因果功能。

i. anu-: The adjective anusahagata, in the above-mentioned passage, is rendered by Xuan Zang as隨俱行, meaning “accompanied” or “following along”; this, coupled with the context, suggests that the original for in 隨 (i.e., the Chinese for what I restore as anudhātu) should be “anu-“. As ain additional evidence, we may note that in the context of dormant or potential defilements, Śrīlāta in fact equates anuśaya with *anudhātu:

i. 隨（anu-） 在上述段落中，“anusahagata”這形容詞被玄奘翻譯為“隨俱行”，意思為“伴隨”（accompanied）或“跟隨”（following along）；併同文脈，這表示出「隨界」（我將其漢語復原為anudhātu）的「隨」原字應為“anu-”。作為附加的證據，我們可注意到在眠伏或潛在煩惱的情況中，室利邏多事實上將「隨眠」（anuśaya）等同於「隨界」：

The Sthavira (=Śrīlāta) here asserts that the Buddha himself speaks of the paryavasthāna ("enwrapments") being different from the anuśaya ("proclivity"). That is: when a defilement becomes manifest, it is called a paryavasthāna because it manifests and enwraps the serial continuity. The *anudhātu of a defilement (煩惱隨界) is called anuśaya, for the causal nature constantly pursues (隨) and lies dormant. 上座（=室利邏多）於此謂佛世尊自說諸「纏」（paryavasthāna; enwrapments）與「隨眠」（anuśaya; proclivity）異。謂諸煩惱現起名「纏」，以能現前縛相續故。「煩惱隨界」（*anudhātu of a defilement）說名「隨眠」，因性恒隨而眠伏故。6

In the same context, he describes anuśaya as that which always pursues (隨逐) the serial continuity of a sentient being, and the Chinese term there, 隨逐, clearly suggests anu-√gam ("pursuing along"), which we know is one of the terms defining anuśaya. The above quotation further suggests that anu- conveys the sense of subtlety, just as anuśaya qua dormant defilement is subtle and difficult to detect, and indeed in this context anu- is glossed as “aṇu-” (“fine”, “subtle”). (See also passage quoted in §3. where Saṃghabhadra sarcastically suggests that the *anudhātu should be named *anudoṣa.) 在相同的情況中，他描述「隨眠」為恒時隨逐有情的相續，這裏的中文術語「隨逐」很清楚為anu-√gam（pursing along），而我們知道這是定義「隨眠」的其中一個術語。7以上的引文進一步表示“隨”表達出細微的意思，正如「隨眠」作為眠伏的煩惱是微細及難知的，而確實，在這文脈下，“anu”被注解為“aṇu”（細致、微細）。8（亦見§3所引段落，眾賢諷刺地表示“隨界名應言隨過(*anudoṣa)”）

ii. dhātu:

As to the original for界in隨界, it is equally evident to have been “dhātu”. Firstly, we already have seen that Śrīlāta explains anudhātu as a dormant causal efficacy. In any case, the Sanskrit dhātu does have the meaning of being cause. That it signifies causal efficacy is also a common understanding within the broad Sarvāstivāda tradition since ancient time. It is one among the various meanings given in the MVŚ for the term: ii. 界（dhātu）

至於「隨界」中「界」的原字，它同樣地明顯是“dhātu”。首先，我們已經看到室利邏多解釋「隨界」為眠伏的因果功能。無論如何，梵文dhātu是具有作為因的涵義。它表示因果功能的意義，這亦是自古以來在廣泛的說一切有部傳統之內的一個共同理解。它是《大毘婆沙論》中對於這一詞所提及各種不同意義之一：

The meaning of dhātu is distinctive cause (種種因) . That is: When this serves as the cause for the coming into being of the visual element (cakṣur-dhātu), it is not the case that this very one is the cause for the coming into being of [any other element - the auditory element] up to the mental consciousness element.

種種因義是「界」義者，謂因此故有眼界（cakṣur-dhātu, visual element），非即因此［有其他界－－耳界］乃至有意識界。9

The above definition also becomes aligned with other important meanings given therein for dhātu. These include: “demarcation/delineation” －the scope of each of the 18 dhātu-s is specifically demarcated, the meanings of “clan” (gotra) in the sense of “specific species”, and “sustain/hold” (任持; this is attributed to the grammarians) －the dhatu-s sustain their intrinsic natures (svabhāva). Thus, we may now render anudhātu as “pursuant element” and understand it to signify the potential causal efficacies which continuously lie dormant.

以上定義亦與這裏對於「界」的其他重要意義成為一致。它們包括：「分齊」（demarcation/delineation）義－－十八界中每一範疇是各別地劃分的、「種族」（gotra, clan）義10、異類」義（specific species）、「任持」義（sustain/hold, 這說為是聲論者）－－諸界任持自性（svabhāva, instrinsic nature）。11 故此，我們現在可以翻譯anudhātu為「隨界」，並將它理解為表示潛在的因果功能並相續不斷地眠伏的涵義。

iii. purāṇa-: As to the occasional prefix (“old”, “previous”), we cannot be so certain regarding its original. La Vallée Poussin has briefly suggested舊隨界as “purāṇa-anudhātu”, which seems reasonable in view of such usages as paurāṇa-karma (舊業), etc. Another possible candidate, as suggested by Katō Junshō, is “pūrva-”. We shall see below that this prefix signifies that these causal efficacies have been in phenomenal existence since beginningless time and are not newly acquired. It appears that Śrīlāta tends to emphasize this term, “old pursuant element” (舊隨界), in the context of a sentient being's serial continuity, referring to the causal efficacies in it that have been continuously transmitted throughout his saṃsāric faring. But in general, we may regard “pursuant element” and “old pursuant element” as being interchangeable. (See infra, §4.) iii. 舊（purāṇa-）

至於並非經常出現的字首「舊」（old, previous），我們不能太肯定其原字。La Vallée-Poussin簡略地表示「舊隨界」為purāṇa-anudhātu，12鑒於「舊業」（paurāṇa-karma）這樣的用法等，這似乎是合理的。如加藤純章所提出，另一個可能的選擇是“pūrva-”。13我們以下將看到這字首是表示這些因果功能於現象存中從無始時來已有而非新獲得的涵義。似乎室利邏多傾向著重這「舊隨界」一詞於有情相續的情況，它是指在「舊隨界」中的因果功能於有情生死旅程中持續地傳遞。然而，一般來説，我們可將「隨界」與「舊隨界」兩者視為可互換的。（見下§4）

In this connection, Saṃghabhadra's definition below, on “dhātu”, in his explanation of the Buddha's power of knowledge concerning the diverse dhātu-s (nāna-dhātu-jñānabala) cited by Yaśomitra, is extremely informative: According to Ācārya Saṃghabhadra, dhātu is the inclination accumulated through habitual perfuming from the past (pūrvābhyā savāsanā-samudāgata āśayaḥ). 對此，由稱友（Yaśomitra）所引述眾賢對佛陀的「種種界智力」（nāna-dhātu-jñānabala, power of knowledge concerning the diverse dhātu-s）

的解釋中，眾賢以下對於「界」的定義是非常地詳盡的： 依據眾賢論師，「界」是從過去由所習的熏習的志性（pūrvābhyā savāsanā-samudāgata āśayaḥ, the inclination accumulated through habitual perfuming from the past）。

This definition is found in a more elaborate form in Ny: The unhindered knowledge which knows the diverse inclinations (志性; āśaya) and proclivities (anuśaya) accumulated through habitual practice from the beginningless past and the nature of dharma-s is called the power of knowledge of diverse elements. ... It should be understood that here, dhātu, inclination, proclivity and dharma-nature (法性) are synonymous.

這定義以更詳盡闡述的方式見於《順正理論》中： 前際無始數習所成「志性」（āśaya, inclination）、「隨眠」（anuśaya, proclivities）及諸法性種種差別無罣礙智名「種種界智力」。...應知此中「界」與「志性」、「隨眠」、法性」名之差別。15

To begin with, the Sanskrit quotation glosses dhātu as āśaya (ā-√śi), which connotes an inclination that lies dormant within. This connotation is even more explicit in the term anuśaya occurring in the Ny, which - even for the Vaibhāṣika - conveys the sense of subtlety and “pursuing along” (anu-√gam). Moreover, dhātu is described as the result from accumulated perfuming (vāsanā) “from the past” (pūrva-), or “from the beginningless past”(前際無始), indicating the understanding that the dhātu-s that pursue a sentient being have been perfumed into his serial continuity since the beginningless past. Thus, interestingly enough, this Vaibhāṣika definition is quite in keeping with what we have understood above as the doctrinal signification of Śrīlāta's *purāṇa-anudhātu.

首先，梵文引文注解「界」為「志性」（ā-√śi），這是有内在潛伏的傾向的涵義。於《順正理論》出現的「隨眠」一詞中，這個涵義甚至更明確，它――甚至對毘婆沙師來説――表達出微細及隨逐」（anu-√gam）的意義。16此外，「界」被描述為從「過去」（pūrva-, from the past）或「前際無始」（from the beginningless past）熏習（vāsanā, accumulated perfuming）所成的結果，這顯示出隨逐有情的「界」從無始時來已被熏習於有情的相續這樣的理解。故此，很有趣，這毘婆沙師的定義與我們如上所理解室利邏多「舊隨界」的義理涵意是相當一致的。

Yin Shun in fact quotes this definition from the Ny and concludes that the Sarvāstivādins as well acknowledge the sense of dhātu as being derived from perfuming from beginningless time. He further suggests that “from the perspective of the vijñaptimātra teachings, the old pursuant element is related to ‘the dhātu from beginningless time’.” This, no doubt, alludes to the following well-known stanza ascribed to the *Mahayāna-abhidharma-sutra (大乘阿毘達磨經) cited in Asaṅga's *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha: The dhātu from beginningless time (anādikāliko dhātuḥ) is the complete support-basis of all dharma-s. It being, the totality of existence-plane—as well as the attainment of Nirvāṇa—[comes to be].

事實上，印順從《順正理論》引述這定義，而得出的結論是“「界」有無始以來數習所成的意義，也是有部共許的”。他進一步提出“依唯識學的見地來說，這舊隨界與「無始以來界」有關”。17毫無疑問，這提到以下被說為是《大乘阿毘達磨經》（*Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sutra）著名的偈頌，並引用於無著（Asaṅga）的《攝大乘論》（*Mahāyāna-saṃgraha）： 無始時來界（anādikāliko dhātuḥ），一切法等依。由此有諸趣及涅槃證得。18

This stanza, quoted by Asaṅga as a scriptural support for the ālayavijñāna, could indeed be understood to share some major doctrinal features with the purāṇa-anudhātu: dhātu has been existing from beginningless time and is the source of the whole of phenomenal existence as well as the basis for emancipation.

這偈頌被無著所引為「阿賴耶識」（ālayavijñāna）的教證，它確實可被理解為與「舊隨界」共同具有一些主要義理特點：「界」從無始時來已存在，而它是一切現象存在的本源，以及亦是解脫的依據。

Mitomo Kenyo also quotes the definition from the Ny, and suggests likewise the doctrinal resemblance between the *purāṇa-anudhātu and the *Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra’s “anadikāla-dhātuḥ”. But he thinks that Saṃghabhadra's definition of dhātu cannot be considered his own, but that it is clearly influenced by Śrīlāta's doctrine, current at the time, that dhātu is a perfuming. However, such a conception of dhātu is attested, in the same context of explaining the nānādhātu-jñānabala, in various texts both antedating and post-dating the Ny. The following are some examples:

三友健容亦從《順正理論》引述這定義，並同樣地提出「舊隨界」與《大乘阿毘達磨經》“無始時來界”之間的相似性。然而，他認為眾賢對「界」的定義不能被考量為他自己提出的，而卻清楚地是受到當時室利邏多「界」為熏習的義理所影響。20然而，當解釋「種種界智力」相同的情況時，在先於或晚於《順正理論》的各不同論典中，這樣一個「界」的概念被證實到。以下是一些例子：

• Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (大智度論): “By dhātu is meant accumulated perfuming (*samudāgatā vāsanā). Characteristics arise from the dhātu; ... the dhātu is deep inclination (性名深心為事);*adhyāśaya ) ...”

大智度論》（*Prajñāpāramitopadeśa）：「性」（「界」）名積習（*samudāgatā vāsanā, accumulated perfuming）。「相」從「性」生；...「性」名深心為事（*adhyāśaya; deep inclination21）... 22

Bodhisattva-bhūmi (in the *Maulyo Bhūmayaḥ of the Yogācarabhūmi): The Tathāgata, by means of the nānādhātu-jñānabala, having analyzed the different natures in terms of dhātu — lowly, medium and excellent — understands truly. Through instructions, he properly places sentient beings in the particular gateways of entry, as is appropriate in respect of indriya, āśaya and anuśaya. 菩薩地〉（《瑜伽師地論》(Yogācarabhūmi)的〈本地份〉(*Maulyo Bhūmayaḥ)）

：如來所有「種種界智力」，於諸有情――劣中妙――「界」部分差別，如實了知。於諸有情能如其根、如其意樂（āśaya）、如其隨眠，依於彼彼趣入門中。23

In the Mahāprajñāpāramitā-sūtra, the jnāna-s in which a bodhisattva is to be trained also include that which “penetrates into sentient beings’ diverse dhātu-s, āśaya-s and anuśaya-s. ” 大般若波羅蜜多經》：若菩薩摩訶薩能學如是諸道相智，於諸有情種種界性、意樂、隨眠皆能悟入。24

Abhidharmadīpa-prabhāvṛtti, 385: And those perfumings accumulated are the dhātu-s. The perfumings which are [formed] from the repeated practice in the previous lives, of the karma-s of virtues, vices, sciences and arts, are here to be specifically known as dhātu-s.

阿毘達磨燈論》（Abhidharmadīpa-prabhāvṛtti）, 385： 過去熏習是「界」。熏習是由過去生功德、過失、工巧明業數習所成，於此應知差別名為「界」。25

At the earlier stage, the Sarvāstivādins conceived of vāsanā as the “traces” posited by repeated actions, but devoid of karmic efficacies. They are in fact not real entities, even though one can designate a cluster of citta-caitta-s by such a term — as for instance, those conjoined with the non-defiled ignorance (aklṣṭa-ajñāna). Such a conception continued to be seen in the later Sarvāstivāda works such as the Ny (and also in the Pāli sub-commentaries). In this conception, there is no doubt already the implication that a perfuming entity brings about some change in that which is perfumed. (See also §3). However, it was the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas who subsequently developed the notion of perfuming in their seed theory, arriving at such an articulated form as in Śrīlāta's doctrine of the pursuant element.

在較早階段，說一切有部論師將「熏習」構想為由重復的行為所留下的痕跡，但缺乏業力功能。它們事實上不是實體，雖然能以這術語施設心心所的聚合――例如這些與不染無知（aklṣṭa-ajñāna, non-defiled ignorance）相應的心心所。這樣的概念繼續可見於後期的說一切有部論典如《順正理論》（亦於巴利註書）。26這概念無疑是已經具有能熏習者對所熏習者引起一些改變這樣的涵義。（亦見§3）然而，是譬喻經量部論師隨後將熏習的概念建立於他們的種子學説，而得出如室利邏多的「隨界」義理一個這樣明確的形式。

2. A major textual basis for the anudhātu doctrine

Before we proceed any further, let me translate below, as literally as possible, a lengthy discussion in the context of the condition qua cause (hetu-pratyaya). This will provide us with an important major textual basis for our investigation into the anudhātu doctrine:

2. 「隨界」義理主要文獻依據

在進一步討論前，先讓我在「因緣」（hetu-pratyaya, condition qua cause）的範圍内，盡可能直譯以下長篇的討論。對於「隨界」義理的考察，這將為我們提供重要的主要 文獻依據：27

[I] The Sthavira (=Śrīlāta) states that the nature of the condition qua cause (hetu-pratyayatā) is the old pursuant element: the nature of being the cause, successively, in the serial continuity of a sentient being. ...

[I] 然上座言（=室利邏多）：因緣性（hetu-pratyayatā, the nature of the condition qua cause）者，謂「舊隨界」，即諸有情相續展轉能為因性。...

[II] The Fortunate One says in the sūtra: “It should be understood that in such a person, the skilful dharma-s are concealed and the unskilful dharma-s become manifest (saṃmukhībhūta). There exist the accompanying roots of skilfulness which have not yet been cut off. On account of their not having yet been cut off, there is still the possibility of other roots of skilfulness arising from these roots of skilfulness.”28

The accompanying roots of skilfulness are the old pursuant elements, the nature of being the cause, successively, in the serial continuity (展轉相續能為因性). Such kinds of [causal efficacy] are known as “condition qua cause”.

[II] 世尊契經中說：「應知如是補特伽羅，善法隱沒，惡法出現（become manifest, saṃmukhībhūta）。有隨俱行善根未斷；以未斷故，從此善根，猶有可起餘善根義」。28

隨俱善根，即「舊隨界」，相續展轉，能為因性。如斯［因果功能］等類說名「因緣」。

[III] [[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] This old pursuant element is just another name for bīja... When we examine this pursuant element, we see that it is only an empty word and [that] its intrinsic nature (體) cannot be apperceived. Thus, he (the Sthavira) cannot claim that it is of the nature of being the cause, successively, in the serial continuity.

[III]［眾賢：］此「舊隨界」，即彼「種子」（bīja）名差別故...觀彼「隨界」，但有虛言，推徵其體都不可得。故［上座］亦不可即說此為相續展轉能為因性。

[IV] If the old pursuant element is an existent and serves as the cause, successively, in the serial continuity, it should be an entity apperceivable like rupa, etc. What is its characteristic?

[Śrīlāta:] It has the characteristic of being the elements (dhātu) formed from the perfuming by various dharma-s.

[IV]　若「舊隨界」是有，相續展轉為因，應如色等有體可得。此為何相？

室利邏多：］是種種法所薰成「界」以為其相。

[V] [[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] This, too, is difficult to understand as to whether it is an entity qua rūpa, etc, up to vijñāna (i.e., any of the 5 skandha-s). Since the old pursuant element is described as being “old”, it ought to be conditioned. Whatever is conditioned is subsumable under the 5 skandha-s. Thus, if it is an existent, it ought to be of the nature of one of the 5 skandha-s. Or, he would have to explain how there can be a conditioned [[[dharma]]] not subsumable under the 5 skandha-s, rūpa, etc, but nonetheless is universally acknowledged (prasiddha) as an existent. ...Moreover, the nature of this old pursuant element cannot be known, just as that of a compounded existent derived from compounded conditioning forces (saṃskāra), etc, [cannot be known].

[V]［眾賢：］此亦難知，體為是色，為乃至識（即任何五蘊之一）？「隨界」名「舊」，應是有為。一切有為皆五蘊攝。故若是有，應於色等五蘊性中隨是一種。或彼應說何有有為［法］非是色等五蘊所攝，然體是有，可為極成。...又「舊隨界」無體可知，猶如合行（saṃskāra, conditioning forces）和合有29等［不可知］。

[VI] [Śrīlāta:] The nature of this old pursuant element is ineffable. One can only speak of it as being the six āyatana-s (i.e, the serial continuity of a sentient being) perfumed by karma-s and defilements, productive of the fruit in another life

(業煩惱所薰六處感餘生果). [VI]［室利邏多：］此「舊隨界」體不可說。但可說言是業、煩惱所薰六處（即有情的相續），感餘生果。

[VII] [[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] This element is not only ineffable, it is insisted that it is an existent — this is illogical. It is not the case that, its nature being ineffable (不可說; avaktavya), one can make it a universally acknowledged existent. For, such conventional existents as the pudgala, a vase, etc, are effable (可說; vaktavya) as being devoid of a distinctive/separate nature (ie., they are not dravya-antara); and each of the truly existent dharma-s, rūpa, vedanā, etc, is effable as possessing a distinctive/separate nature. It is not the case that the old pursuant element is effable like the conventional existents, pudgala, a vase, etc, nor is it truly existent like the dharma-s, rūpa, etc. Hence, it should not be insisted that it is an existent. This being so, how can it be claimed aś the condition qua cause?

[VII]［眾賢：］此界非唯體不可說，但執為有――與理相違。非體不可說（avaktavya, ineffable）可為極成有。以諸假有補特伽羅、瓶等可說（vaktavya, effable）為無別體（即它們不是別體）。若諸實有色、受等法一一可說為有別體。非「舊隨界」可說猶如補特伽羅、瓶等假有，亦非實有如色等法。是故不應執此為有。既爾，何得執為因緣？

[VIII] Moreover, the term, “pursuant element”, is not mentioned in the Noble Teaching; it is only a name arbitrarily designated by the Sthavira and others.

[VIII]又隨界言非聖教說；但上座等擅立此名。

[IX] Moreover, what kind of six-āyatana-s are conceded by him that are perfumed by karma and defilements, productive of fruit in another life? [a] Are they the ones co-existent with the karma and defilements? Or [b] are they those serially arisen subsequent to these [[[karma]] and defilements]? Or [c] are they the retribution (vipāka) which arises immediately (samanantaram)?

[IX]又彼許何諸業、煩惱所薰六處感餘生果？[a]為業、煩惱俱生滅者？[b]為此［業、煩惱］後時相續生者？[c]為是無間（samanantaram, immediately）生異熟者？

[a] If it is the six-āyatana-s co-existent with the kama and defilements which are productive of fruit, then the subsequent six āyatana-s are devoid of the efficacy of producing fruit. The same should be true for the co-existent ones — how can they be capable of producing fruit? It ought to be that the karma and defilements alone possess the efficacy of producing fruit; what is the need to insist that the six āyatana-s produce a fruit in another life? Moreover, he should not insist that the eyes, etc. (ie. the 6 āyatana-s), serve as the assisting causes, co-nascent with karma and defilements. For, even a person who is blind, etc, can produce the eyes, ears, etc, in another life by depending on karma and defilements alone as conditions. Moreover, he concedes that the cause-effect [relationship] can be established through a [[[Wikipedia:temporal|temporal]]] gap. What is the need to assert the old pursuant element?

[a] 若業、煩惱俱生六處能感果者，則後六處無感果能。俱亦應然――豈能感果？應唯業、煩惱有感果能；何須執六處感餘生果？又彼不應定執眼等（即六處）為業、煩惱俱起助因。盲等唯託業、煩惱緣，亦感餘生眼、耳等故。又因與果［的關係］許［時間］隔越成，何用執斯為「舊隨界」？

[b] If it is the case that the subsequent six āyatana-s which serially continue are capable of producing fruit, then, there being no connection/relationship (*sambandha) with the karma and defilements, how can [the latter] perfume [the subsequent āyatana-s] to form the pursuant elements? There cannot be the possibility of connection between an existent and a non-existent.

[b]若此後時相續六處能感果者，與業、煩惱都不相應（*sambandha, connection/relationship），如何［後者］薰彼［後時六處］可成「隨界」？非有與無有相應義。

[Śrīlāta:] Isn't there a connection between the cause and its effect? For, [the cause,] being similar to its (the effect's) characteristic, constitutes its causal condition.

室利邏多：］豈不因果得有相應？［因］與彼［果的］相同，令成緣故。

[[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] His words, “similar to its characteristic” is not logically valid; for, “its characteristic” refers to “the characteristic of that”. He should have said: “the characteristic of this is similar to the characteristic of that”; but he has here omitted the words “the characteristic of this”. This karma and defilements [on the one hand] and the subsequent six āyatana-s that serially continue [on the other], are different species; how is it that “the characteristic of this is similar to the characteristic of that”? How can there be a connection so that [one] constitutes the causal condition [for the other]?

眾賢：］彼“相同＂語，理不相應；以“彼相＂言目 “彼之相＂。應言：“此相與彼相同”；然於此中，略“此相＂語。此業、煩惱與彼後時相續六處性類各別，如何“此相與彼相同＂？豈得相應令成［另一者的］緣性？

r, he might have meant: At the time when the six āyatana-s co-existent with the karma and defilements are about to cease, they are similar in characteristic to the subsequent six āyatana-s, so that they constitute [the latter's] causal condition. But this too is illogical. At the time when [the preceding six āyatana-s] are about to cease, their subsequent existence has not been acquired and hence their characteristic too is non-existent — how is there a similarity in characteristic so that [the preceding āyatana-s] constitute the causal condition [for the succeeding]? ...

或彼意謂：業、煩惱俱六處將滅，與後六處其相是同，令成［後者的］緣者，亦不應理。前六處相於將滅時，後體未有，體未有故彼相亦無——何有相同令［前六處］成［後六處的］緣性？...

[c] If it is the case that the six āyatana-s immediately productive of the retribution are the cause producing the fruit, then there would not be karma experiencible in a life subsequent to the next (aparaparyāya-vedanīya), since it is only an immediately preceding cause that produces a retribution.

[c]　若是無間能生異熟六處為因能感果者，是則應無順後受（aparaparyāya-vedanīya, experiencible in a life subsequent to the next）業，唯無間因生異熟故。

[X] [Śrīlāta:] There is no such fallacy, for a fruit can be projected either immediately/directly (sākṣāt) or through a succession (pāraṃpayeṇa). This is like the case of a flower and a seed, which, [respectively,] projects a fruit directly and through a succession. [X]［室利邏多：］無斯過失。隣近（sākṣāt, immediately/directly）展轉（pāraṃpayeṇa, through a succession）、能牽果故。如花、種等隣近、展轉［各別地］能引果生。

[XI] [Sarmghabhadra:] If this is so, it leads to an even more serious fallacy. There would be a confounding between karma experiencible in the next life (upapadya-vedanīya) with that in a life subsequent to the next, since your school concedes that the six-āyatana serial continuity, which is perfumed by a single karma, projects (ākṣepati) a single fruit. Moreover, the seed and the sprout, etc, belong to a single serial continuity; although they have ceased, a subsequent fruit can arise. The karma-s, the defilements and the six āyatana-s pertain to different serial continuities; after the karma-s and defilements have ceased, how is it possible that subsequently the six āyatana-s serially continue in their own species and come to generate the fruit in the final moment? Hence, there is no [[[logical]]] correspondence between the dharma and the dṛṣṭānta.

[XI]［眾賢：］若爾，更招尤重過失。順生（upapadya-vedanīya, experiencible in the next life）、後受業應雜亂，汝宗自許一業所熏六處相續牽（ākṣepati）一果故。又種、芽等一相續攝；種、芽等雖滅，而後果可生。業、煩惱、六處相續各別，業、煩惱滅已，何容後時六處自類展轉相續至最後時能生彼果？30故彼法、喻義［邏輯上］不相應。

[XII] Moreover, he should not concede that the six āyatana-s co-nascent with the karma-s and defilements are perfumed by the karma-s and defilements, lest there be the acknowledgement that cause and effect are simultaneous [— a doctrine that he utterly rejects]. How is it then that, there being no other conditions, subsequently there suddenly arise the six āyatana-s perfumed by the karma-s and defilements from those [preceding] six āyatana-s which were not perfumed by the karma-s and defilements?

[XII]又業、煩惱俱生六處，彼不應許業、煩惱熏，勿許同時有因果故［――一個他全然否定的義理］。如何從彼非業、煩惱所熏［的前］六處更無別緣而於後時欻復生起諸業、煩惱所熏六處？

3. The anudhātu doctrine as a bīja theory Śrīlāta's anudhātu doctrine is essentially a form of bīja (“seed”) theory, the best known version of which is found in Vasubandhu’s AKB. Saṃghabhadra, for one, certainly subsumes it under the general seed doctrine expounded by the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas and decides to focus mainly on Srilāta’s version in his refutation, probably finding it most challenging to the Vaibhāṣikas: The various Dārṣṭāntikas herein assert their own versions of the seed(s) of dharma-s.... There are also masters who, with regard to this seed, designate it differently in different cases, calling it anudhātu, perfuming (vāsanā), efficacy (功能; sāmarthya), non-perishing (avipranāśa) dharma, or accumulation (增長, *saṃvṛddhi)

3. 「隨界」義理作為「種子」學説 室利邏多的「隨界」義理實質上是一種「種子」（bīja）學説的形式，而最著名的版本可於世親的《俱舍論》看到。舉例來説，眾賢的確實將它包攝於譬喻經量部論師所闡釋的一般「種子」義理之中，並在他的破斥中決定主要集中於室利邏多的版本，而很可能是認為它對毘婆沙師最具挑戰： 諸譬喻者31多分於中申自所執諸法種子。...復有諸師於此種子處處隨義建立別名，或名「隨界」、或名「熏習」（vāsanā, perfuming）、或名「功能」（sāmarthya, efficacy）、或名「

不失」（avipranāśa, non-perishing）、或名「增長」（*saṃvṛddhi, accumulation）。32

In the lengthy discussion I have translated above, Saṃghabhadra reiterates that the old pursuant element is just another name for seed (bīja) (§2.[III] ) and proceeds to point out various doctrinal fallacies that it entails. The essential constituents of the seed theory are (i) perfuming (vāsanā) and (ii) a continuous process of progressive transformation in which the causal efficacy can be transmitted up to the stage when the corresponding effect is generated (see also §5, and particularly the discussion on saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa in §7).

在以上所翻譯的長篇討論中，眾賢重申「舊隨界」只不過是「種子」（bīja）的另一名稱（§2.[III]），並繼續指出它們所導致各種義理上的過失。「種子」學説的是主要構成是（i）熏習（vāsanā, perfuming）及（ii）一個逐漸轉變的相續不斷的過程中因果功能傳遞至一個階段當生起相對應的果的時候（亦見§5，對相續轉變差別的詳細討論見§7）。

a. The notion of vāsanā

As to vāsanā, the Dārṣṭāntikas and Vibhajyavādins have transformed the original notion of its being a trace left behind by a defilement (infra, §1) but in itself not of the nature of defilement, to that of causal conditioning: A dharma, X as the cause, “perfumes” another dharma, Y as the effect, when X partly or wholly transfers its characteristic to Y or brings about a corresponding change in the latter. The early Dārṣṭāntika masters, such as Aśvaghoṣa (circa early 2nd C.E.), etc, had already formulated before or around the time of the compilation of the MVŚ — of the seed theory in which these constituents some explicit versions were fairly evident.

a. 熏習的概念 至於熏習，譬喻師及分別論師（Vibhajyavādin）將它作為煩惱所留下的習氣而本身卻不是煩惱性質這原本概念，33轉變為因果條件：當X部分或全部地將其特性傳遞至Y或對後者引起相對應的改變時，作為因的X法“熏習”另一個作為果的Y法。早期的譬喻師，如馬鳴（Aśvaghoṣa, 公元二世紀初）等，在大約或早於《大毘婆沙論》的彙篇時期已經建構――「種子」學説，而對於這些構成，一些明確的版本已相當顯著。34

Such a developed notion of perfuming is also attested in the MVŚ itself, albeit, interestingly enough, it is not attributed to the Dārṣṭāntikas. In a discussion on the practice of mixing (vy-ava-√kṛ) meditations — intercalating outflow-free (anāsrava) meditations with the with-outflow (sāsrava) ones — an explanation is offered in terms of perfuming:

這樣一個已發展的「熏習」概念亦於《大毘婆沙論》本身證實到，雖然，很有趣，它並沒有說為是譬喻師提出的。在對於雜修（vy-ava-√kṛ, practice of mixing）靜慮的討論中35――加插無漏（anāsrava）定與有漏（sāsrava）定――這解釋是依據「熏習」提出：

Why is it called a mixed meditation (vyavakīrṇam dhyānam)? What is intended by the word “mixed”?

問：何故名為雜修靜慮（vyavakīrṇam dhyānam, mixed meditation）？彼「雜修」言欲何所顯？

It is “mixed” in respect to its being fully perfumed (*paribhāvita), in respect to its being perfumed by combining, in respect of being rendered well-adorned, in respect to its being rendered purified. The Dārṣṭāntikas assert that it is called “mixed” in respect to its taking that as cognitive object.

答：遍熏（*paribhāvita, being fully perfumed）故名「雜修」。合熏故名「雜修」。令嚴好故名「雜修」。令明淨故名「雜修」。譬喻者說緣彼故名「雜修」。

In respect to its being fully perfumed — this is like placing a garment inside a case and fully perfuming it with fragrance. A yogācāra likewise fully perfumes a moment of with-outflow [[[thought]]] with two moments of outflow-free [[[thought]]] one before and one after.

遍熏故名「雜修」者――如衣置於一篋以香遍熏。諸瑜伽師亦復如是，以前後二剎那無漏［心］遍熏中間一剎那有漏［心］。

In respect to its perfuming by combining — this is like combining flowers with sesame seeds and perfuming the latter to make them fragrant. Likewise a yogācāra perfumes one moment of with-flow with two adjacent moments of outflow-free.…

合熏故名「雜修」者――如花與苣蕂合熏令發香。彼瑜伽師亦復如是，以二剎那無漏隣雜熏發一剎那有漏。…

In respect to its taking that as object — they say that it is called “mixed” because with two moments of outflow-free, one moment of with-outflow is taken as cognitive object.

緣彼故名「雜修」者――彼說以二剎那無漏緣一剎那有漏故名「雜修」。

In the above passage, the original term for “perfuming” is probably (pari)bhāvita/bhāvanā rather than vāsita/vāsanā. Nevertheless, such examples as the perfuming of sesame seeds by fragrant flowers do indicate that the notion of perfuming — at least in the sense of one dharma conditioning another, causing a partial transformation in the latter — is well-accepted by even the Sarvāstivāda ābhidharmikas in the period of the MVŚ. Unfortunately, the Dārṣṭāntika explanation here is not sufficiently elaborated. But it seems possible to assume that by taking “that as cognitive object” in the said manner, a with-outflow thought comes to be perfumed by the two moments of intercalating outflow-free thoughts. 在以上段落中，「熏習」的原語很可能是(pari)bhāvita/bhāvanā而非vāsita/vāsanā。儘管如此，如“苣蕂合熏令發香”這樣的例子36顯示出「熏習」的概念――至少以一法為另一法的條件，令後者有部分的轉變這意義――甚至已被《大毘婆沙論》時期的說一切有部阿毘達磨論師廣泛地接受。很可惜，譬喻師的解釋在這裏沒有被充分地闡釋。然而，這似乎是有可能假定以上述方式理解“緣彼”，即“以二剎那無漏緣一剎那有漏”。

In Śrīlāta's doctrine, the pursuant elements are the elements (dhātu) — causal efficacies — formed from the perfuming by various dharma-s. When the citta is so perfumed, it is endowed with diverse and yet specific efficacies. These efficacies, however, are not distinct from the citta itself. Such a description provokes criticism from Saṃghabhadra:

在室利邏多的義理中，「隨界」是「界」（dhātu）――因果功能――由種種界熏習。當心如是被熏習時，它具有多種卻是特有的功能。然而，這些功能不是離於「心」本身。這樣的描述逼使眾賢作出批判：

How can the Sthavira (=Śrīlāta) claim that the one citta possesses the perfumings of various elements? For, it is not logically valid that a single citta has multiple elements. The Noble Teaching does not concede that a dharma in the absolute sense (paramārtha) as a single entity is formed by a multiplicity of entities. If it is asserted that, although a citta exists as a single entity, it possesses numerous elements within it, then the numerous elements, not being distinct from the citta, ought to become a single entity. [Likewise], the citta, not being distinct from the elements, ought to be multiple. The elements not being distinct vis-à-vis one another, there ought to be a confounding of the one and the all. The “pursuant elements” should be termed “pursuant faults” (隨過; *anu-doṣa), since there are innumerable faults pursuing (隨逐; *anu-√gam) it.

又彼上座（=室利邏多）如何可執言一心具有種種界熏習？一心多界，理不成故。非聖教中許勝義（paramārtha, absolute sense）法有唯一體多體集成。若言有心其體雖一，而於其內界有眾多，多界與心體無異故界應成一。［同樣地，］心與多界，體無異故，心應成多。諸界相望，體無異故，一與一切體應相雜。…然「隨界」名應言「隨過」（*anu-doṣa, pursuant faults），無量過失所隨逐（*anu-√gam）故。37

Since the diverse dharma-s are each distinctive in nature, the pursuant elements derived from their perfuming must also be distinct — and indeed Śrīlāta intends them to be so — but, from the Ābhidharmika perspective, this is simply incomprehensible: Does it mean that the pursuant elements are at once real and unreal entities? These are in fact among some of the main criticisms that any form of seed theory has to face.

由於種種不同的諸法各自有其獨有性，從它們所衍生出來的「隨界」亦必定是獨有——確實室利邏多亦打算將它們作為這樣――然而，從阿毘達磨師的觀點，這簡直是難以理解的：它的意思是指「 隨界」是同時為實體及假體？事實上，這些為其中一些主要批評是任何形式的「種子」理論都須面對的。

b. The relation of the seed and the pursuant element theories to “acquisition”

The analogical nature of the seed and the pursuant element theories is also discernible in the debate on their relation to the disjoined conditioning (viprayukta-saṃskāra) called “acquisition” (prāpti). In the AKB, the Sautrāntikas argue that acquisition cannot be a real entity (dravya) since its intrinsic nature cannot be known, unlike the visibles, audibles, etc, nor can its function be known, unlike dharma-s such as the eyes, the ears, etc. (Compare this to Saṃghabhadra’s questioning on the pursuant element in §2[V]). The Vaibhāṣikas maintain that acquisition must exist as a real force, for without it, one cannot distinguish between a noble one (ārya) and an ordinary worldling (pṛthagjana): A noble one has been disconnected from the acquisitions of defilements; an ordinary worldling still possesses their acquisitions. The Sautrāntikas, instead, explain this in terms of the seed theory: This is established on account of the difference in regard to the basis (āśraya). By virtue of the efficacy of the paths of vision and cultivation, the basis of a noble one comes to be transformed (paṛāvrtta) in such a way that it is no longer capable of shooting forth defilements to be abandoned through these [[[two paths]]]. Hence, like a rice grain burnt by fire, the basis being non-seed (abījībhūte āśraye), [the noble one] is said to have abandoned the defilements. Or, when the seed-nature [of the basis] has been damaged through a mundane path, one is also said to have abandoned the defilements. Contrary to this, [the ordinary worldling] is one who has not abandoned the defilements. ...

b. 「種子」及「隨界」與「得」之間的關係 「 種子」及「隨界」學説的類比性質亦可於它們與稱為「得」（prāpti, acquisition）的不相應行（viprayukta-saṃskāra, the disjoined conditioning）之間的關係的爭論中可辨識到。在《俱舍論》中，經量部論師論證「得」不能是一個實體（dravya, real entity），由於其自性不能被知，非如色、聲等，而其作用亦不能被知，非如眼、耳等。（將它與眾賢於§2[V]對「隨界」的問難作對比）毘婆沙師主張「得」必定存在為實法，因為沒有它便不能將聖者（ārya, noble one）與凡夫（pṛthagjana, ordinary worldling）作區別：聖者已從煩惱「得」離繫；凡夫仍然有煩惱「得」。而經量部論師卻依據「種子」學説解釋它： 此由所依（āśraya, the basis）有差別故，煩惱已斷、未斷義成。謂諸聖者見、修道力，令所依身轉變（paṛāvrtta, transformed）異本。於彼二道所斷惑中，無復功能令其現起。猶如種子火所焚燒，轉變異前，無能生用（abījībhūte āśraye, the basis being non-seed）。如是聖者，所依身中無生惑能名煩惱斷。或世間道損所依中煩惱種子，亦名為斷。與上相違， 凡夫］名為未斷。...38

In the Ny, the pursuant element and acquisition are discussed in connection with the topic of avidyā (“ignorance”). For the Vaibhāṣikas, avidyā is a real force in itself, not just a mere absence of vidyā (“knowledge”, “understanding”); it is the very cause that obstructs the arising of vidyā. For Śrīlāta, “it is that on account of the existence of which, vidyā does not exist, for this fact cannot occur without a cause”. Saṃghabhadra objects to this, since this would mean that all defilements should be named avidyā, for when any one defilement exists, vidyā does not manifest. In fact, he maintains, only the Ābhidharmikas can assert so, not Śrīlāta who denies that avidyā is a real dharma.40 在《順正理論》中，「隨界」及「得」是與「無明」（avidyā,ignorance）的主題聯繫一起來討論。對毘婆沙師來說，「無明」本身就是實法，而非僅僅是「明」（vidyā, knowledge/understanding）的不存在；「無明」就是因，並障礙「明」的生起。對室利邏多來說，“由有此故令「明」非有是謂「無明」，不可無因而有是事”。39 眾賢反對這說法，由於這即是說一切煩惱應稱為「無明」的意思，因為當任何一個煩惱存在時，「明」不會現行。事實上，他斷言只有阿毘達磨師才能這樣主張，而非室利邏多，因為他否定「明」是實法：

According to his tenets, even in the absence of avidyā, it is acknowledged that sometimes vidyā is also non-existent; he should not decisively say that avidyā obstructs vidyā. If he says that there is the pursuant element of avidyā, this too is not true, for [the pursuant element] is not [the avidyā] itself. Even if the pursuant element and the avidyā are the self-same entity, when this entity exists, vidyā can still arise; hence it should not be said to be able to obstruct vidyā

彼宗義雖無「無明」，而許有時「明」亦非有，不應定說「無明」障「明」。若謂彼有「無明隨界」，理亦不然，「隨界」非「無明」自體故。設許「隨界」體亦「無明」，此體有時，「 明」亦得起，故不應說能障於「明」。

[Śrīlāta] might say that the pursuant element is just like acquisition [in this respect]: “Just as in your tenets, the acquisition of avidyā is not the same entity as the avidyā itself. Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that although avidyā ceases, vidyā, being obstructed by the force of the acquisition of avidyā, cannot arise; or, sometimes even though this acquisition exists, vidyā can still arise by virtue of preparatory effort. Likewise, in our tenets, the pursuant element of avidyā is not avidyā itself. Nevertheless, it happens sometimes that although avidyā ceases, vidyā, being obstructed by the pursuant element, cannot arise; or, sometimes, it can arise. So, what fault is there? ” ...

室利邏多］若謂如「得」，「隨界」［在這方面］應然：謂如汝宗，諸「無明得」非「無明」體。然或有時「無明」雖滅，由「無明得」勢力所障，「明」不得生；或復有時，雖有此「 得」，由加行力「明」亦得生。如是我宗，「無明隨界」非「無明」體。然或有時「無明」雖滅，由「隨界」障，「明」不得生；或時得生。斯有何過？...41

[Śrīlāta:] In the Ābhidharmika tenets, avidyā can still arise even in the absence of the acquisition of avidyā. In our tenets, when one is freed from the pursuant element, avidyā necessarily cannot arise. Thus, the pursuant element is different from their acquisition.

室利邏多：］以對法宗，雖「無明得」無，而「無明」容起。我宗離「隨界」，「無明」必不生。故此，「隨界」非同彼「得」。

[[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] No,...acquisition must exist in order that the acquired dharma can arise. ... Moreover, the theory of pursuant element is also like [that of] acquisition; for, separated from its pursuant element, a dharma can still arise: An ordinary worldling, without the pursuant element of the noble dharma-s (ārya-dharma), can generate the noble dharma-s while exerting the preparatory efforts...

［眾賢：］無如是失...謂要有「得」，所得法可生故。...「隨界」論亦同「得」故，以離「隨界」法亦可生，謂：諸異生無聖法（ārya-dharma, noble dharma-s）「隨界」，正修加行，聖法容得生。又前已說差別言故。...42

It would thus seem that from the Vaibhāṣika perspective, Śrīlāta’s pursuant element is in some essential ways comparable in function to the Sarvāstivādins’ acquisition. On the other hand, while the Sautrāntikas in the AKB and Śrīlāta offer, respectively, explanations in terms of seed and pursuant element, in lieu of the Vaibhāṣika mechanism through acquisition (even though they themselves as well occasionally allude to some conceptual resemblance between the pursuant element and acquisition) — and in this process are also betraying some similarities between the two notions (seed and pursuant element) on the one hand and acquisition on the other — they are keen to fundamentally differentiate their respective doctrines from that of acquisition.

故此，這似乎是，從毘婆沙師的觀點來看，室利邏多的「隨界」某些實質方面在功能上是與說一切有部論師的「得」可比擬的。另一方面，《俱舍論》的經量部論師及室利邏多各自依據「種子」及「隨界」作為解釋，以替代由「得」而建立的毘婆沙師機制（即使他們自己亦偶爾提到「隨界」與「得」之間的一些概念上的相似性）－－在這過程中，一方面顯示出兩個概念（「種子」及「隨界」）之間的一些相似性，而另一方面亦顯示出這兩個概念與「得」之間的一些相似性－－他們都熱衷於從「得」的義理，根本地區分出他們各自的義理。

4. The existential nature of the pursuant element

In §2 above, we saw that Saṃghabhadra presses Śrílāta as to the ontological status of the “old pursuant element”: The adjectival prefix, “old”, implies that it is conditioned (since it implies temporality); yet it is not apperceptible as an existent subsumable under the aggregates (skandha), each characterizable, hence effable. It is not even a conceptually real since this too is effable as being not distinct in nature from the reals qua its basis of conceptualization. (§§ 2.[IV], 2.[V])

4. 「隨界」的實有性 在以上§2中，我們看到對於「舊隨界」的本體論的狀態，眾賢向室利邏多進逼：形容性的字首「舊」是指有為的涵義（由於它有時間性的涵義）；但作為攝於五蘊（skandha, aggregate）的一個存在法，它是不被知的，而每一蘊有其特徵，故它卻是可言說的。它甚至不是概念上實有，由於它本質上不是有別於作為其分別的依據的實有性質，故亦是可言說的。(§§ 2.[IV], 2.[V])

Śrīlāta states that its ontological nature is indeed ineffable; but it is nonetheless not a mere concept. It can only be described as the causal efficacy perfumed into the six-āyatana-s. More precisely, it is “the six āyatana-s perfumed by the karma-s and defilements, productive of the fruit in another life” (§2.[VI]). This would imply that it is or they are neither identical with nor totally different from the person’s serial continuity: It is dynamically real, given the existence of the sentient serial continuity. In fact, this dynamic reality is not confined to sentient existence: For an (any) existent dharma (有法; *sat, *bhāva,), even after it has ceased for an aeon, its serial continuity continues to serve as the cause successively [from one moment to the next].

室利邏多説明其本體論的性質確實是不可說；然而它不只是一個概念。它只能被描述為因果功能被熏於六處。更精準來説，它是“業、煩惱所薰六處，感餘生果”（§2.[VI]）。這是指它/它們與有情的相續是不一不異：鑒於有情相續的存在，它是動態地實有。事實上，這動態的實有性並不局限於有情的存在。 ［ 任何］有法（*sat, *bhāva, existent dharma）體，雖經劫滅而［刹那刹那］自相續展轉相仍猶為因性。

Saṃghabhadra criticizes this:

If an existent dharma continues to serve as cause even after having ceased for an aeon, then it itself is causally sufficient to generate a dharma — why fabricate the pursuant element as the cause? Moreover, if that dharma, even without being a distinct entity（雖無有體） is capable of serving as the cause to generate a dharma, then one must concede that even a barren woman is capable of serving as the cause to produce offspring.

眾賢批評這説法： 若有法體雖經劫滅猶能為因，即彼為因足能生法――何勞虛構「隨界」為因？又若彼法，雖無有體而能為因生所生法，是則應許諸石女兒亦能為因生餘子息。43

However, it must be borne in mind that for Śrīlāta, what is real is what is causally efficacious, and from this perspective the only phenomenological reals are the dhatu-s qua causal efficacies. Towards the end of the “what sees” debate in the AKB (chapter I), the Sautrāntikas (Saṃghabhadra calls them here the Dārṣṭāntikas ) declare that there is neither the agent that sees nor that which is seen. “For, it is without any activity — it consists of mere dharma-s and mere cause-effects” (nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātram hetuphalamātraṃ ca). This is completely in keeping with the following position of Śrīlāta:

然而，必須緊記的是，對室利邏多來説，真實的事物是指具有因果功能性的，從這觀點，只有現象學上的真實事物是以「界」作為因果功能。在《俱舍論》（第一品）對於 “何法見？”的爭論臨近結束時，經量部論師（眾賢在這裏稱他們為譬喻部師44）宣稱並無能見的主體或無所見事物。“唯法、［唯］因果，實無作用”（nirvyāpāraṃ hīdaṃ dharmamātram hetuphalamātraṃ ca, For, it is without any activity — it consists of mere dharma-s and mere cause-effects）。45這與室利邏多一下立場完全一致的。

Just as each blind person singly is devoid of the function of seeing visibles and a multitude of blind people assembled as well are devoid of the function of seeing. Likewise, each atom singly is devoid of the function of being a support-basis (āśraya; i.e, an indriya) or a cognitive object (ālambana), and an assemblage of numerous [[[atoms]]] as well are devoid of such a function. Hence, the āyatana-s (the “subjects” and “objects” in a cognitive process) are unreal; the dhātu-s alone are real

(故處是假，唯界是實). 如盲一一各住無見色用，眾盲和集，見用亦無。如是極微一一各住，無依（āśraya; support-basis即根）、緣（ālambana, cognitive object）用，眾多［極微］和集，此用亦無。故處（ 認知過程中的“主體”與“客體”）是假，唯界是實。46

The cognitive “objects” and “subjects” (— the 12 āyatana-s) in our experience of phenomenal existence are ultimately unreal. But underneath these unreal phenomena are the ultimately real causal efficacies. These are the 18 dhātu-s generating the 18 distinctive species of experienced phenomena. Yin Shun compares this to the “ineffable instrinic nature” (nirabhilāpya-svabhāva) — distinct for each phenomenon —of the early Yogācāra, which finds it a sine qua non for the establishment of the fact of cause-effect conditioned co-arising (pratītya-samutpāda).

在我們對現象存在的經驗中，認知的「主體」與「客體」（――12處）是究竟假的。而然，在這些假的現象下是究竟真實的因果功能。這些都是由十八「界」而生起所經驗到的現象界的十八種獨特的類別。印順將它與早期瑜伽行派的「離言自性」（nirabhilāpya-svabhāva, ineffable instrinic nature）――每一現象都是特有的――作比較，並認為它是建立因果緣起

pratītya-samutpāda, conditioned co-arising）不可或缺的條件。47

To some extent at least, the existential nature of the pursuant element is somewhat like the ineffable pudgala of the Vātsīputrīyas who complain that their pudgala is neither an ontological existent (dravya) nor a non-existent qua mere concept (prajñapti), in the manner proposed by their critics, but is a dynamic real given (derived from) the appropriated skandha-s existing as a sentient being in the present moment, and is ineffable as to its being identical with or different from these skandha-s.

至少在某程度上，「隨界」的存在性質與犢子部（Vātsīputrīya）的不可說補特伽羅（pudgala）有多少相似，犢子部控訴補特伽羅非如他們的批評者所說，它非是本體論的實體（dravya）亦非唯施設（prajñapti, mere concept）的假體，然而，它是動態地真實，這是由於現在世攝有執受諸蘊（所衍生）作為有情存在， 而它與諸蘊為非一非異所以是不可說。48

In Vasubandhu’s doctrine of the seed as expounded in the AKB, we see the seed sometimes spoken of as if it is a single entity (in which case one can speak of the “Seed”), and at other times, a plurality (“seeds”). The following definition is rather similar to Śrilata's description of the pursuant element above: And what is this so-called seed? It is that psycho-physical complex (nāma-rūpa) which is efficacious in generating a fruit, either directly or through a succession.

如世親於《俱舍論》所闡釋的「種子」義理，我們看到「種子」有時候被說為是單一體（在這情況可說為Seed），而其他時候為複數（seeds）。以下的定義與以下室利邏多對「隨界」的描述頗為相似： 此中何法，名為「種子」？謂名與色（nāma-rūpa, psycho-physical complex），於生自果所有展轉、隣近功能。49

This definition clearly speaks of the whole causally efficacious psycho-physical complex as the seed/Seed — just as the whole causally efficacious six āyatana-s of a person are called the pursuant element. The issues raised by Saṃghabhadra in this context— in the dialogue that follows—apply equally to the doctrine of pursuant element:

這定義清楚地提及以整個因果功能的名色作為「種子」——正如有情整個因果功能的六處被稱為「隨界」。眾賢於這情況提出各種問題――在以下對答中――同樣地應用於「隨界」的義理：

[[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] What is this nāma-rūpa?

眾賢：］名色者何？

[Sautrāntika/Vasubandhu:] The five skandha-s.

經部/世親：］謂即五蘊。

[[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] Why do you assert that this is of the seed-nature (種子性; bīja-bhāva)?

眾賢：］如何執此為「種子性」（bīja-bhāva, seed-nature）？

[[[Sautrântika]]:] It can serve as the cause generating dharma-s which are skilful, etc.

［經部：］能為善等諸法生因。 [[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] Do [the skandha-s exercise this seed-nature] [i] as a whole, or [ii] individually, or [ii] with respect to the specific species? Your assertion entails only these [options].

眾賢：］如［五蘊為「種子性」］[i]為總（as a whole）？[ii]為別(or individually)？[ii]為自種類。且汝所執唯應爾所。

[i] If [they do so] as a whole, then the seed should be a non-real (since a whole is a mere concept); it is illogical that a non-real serves as a truly existent cause.

i]若言［它們］是總，「種」體應假（由於總是唯是概念），假為實因不應正理。

[ii] If [they do so] individually, then how can you assert that the non-defined material seeds can be the generative cause for the skilful and unskilful dharma-s?

[ii]若言［它們］是別，如何可執無記色種為善、不善諸法生因？

[iii] If [they do so] with respect to the specific species (i.e, a material seed generates a material dharma, etc), then when immediately after a skilful dharma an unskilful dharma arises, or conversely — [in such a case,] which serves as the seed?

[iii]若［它們是］自種類（色種子生起色法），善法無間不善法生；或復相違――［這樣的情況］以何為「種」？

[[[Sautrantika]]:] My dear! The seed-nature is not as it is understood by you. On account of a specific volition (cetanā-viśeṣa) co-nascent with the preceding thought, there arises [correspondingly] a specific efficacy in the succeeding thought. This very specific efficacy in the succeeding thought is called seed. At a distinctive [culminating] point in the process of the [progressive] transformation of its serial continuity (saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa), a future fruit is generated. The meaning here is as follows: in an unskilful thought, there exists a specific efficacy projected by a skilful [[[mental factor]], which is exercised] either directly or through a succession. This serves as the seed, and immediately afterwards a skilful dharma comes to arise. [Likewise for the arising of an unskilful immediately after a skilful.]

［經部：］天愛）！非汝解「種子性」。前心俱生思差別（cetanā- viśeṣa, specific volition）

故［相對應的］後心功能差別而起。即後心上［的］功能差別說為「種子」。由此相續轉變差別（

saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa, a distinctive [culminating] point in the process of the [progressive] transformation of its serial continuity）

當來果生。此中意說：不善心中，有善［心］所引展轉鄰近功能差別，以為「種子」，從此無間善法得生。［不善法無間善法生亦爾。］

[[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] Now, the seed asserted by you as a specific efficacy — does it or does it not exist as an entity distinct from the skilful or unskilful thought?

眾賢：］今汝所執功能差別「種子」與彼善、不善心――為有別體？為無別體？

[[[Sautrāntika]]:] It does not exist as a distinct entity. ...［經部：］此無別體... [[[Saṃghabhadra]]:] [In addition to the various faults which I have pointed out regarding your theory,] it has never been observed that dharma-s of different species, differing in their natures, are not distinct entities.

眾賢：對於你的學説，除了我已指出的種種過失外，］又曾未見異種類法性有差別而無別體。

Hyōdō Kazuo points out that Xuan Zang translated bīja-bhāva (“seed nature”, “seed state”) and bīja (“seed”) in the AKB discussion indiscriminately as “種子” (“seed”) — and a similar understanding is also reflected in the commentaries by Yaśomitra and Sthiramati— and adduces several examples from the AKB to show that Vasubandhu actually uses the two terms differently. As one of these examples, he cites Vasubandhu's Sautrāntika distinction between proclivity (anuśaya) and enwrapment (paryavasthāna) as two different stages of a defilement: the former is the defilement asleep, the latter is the defilement in actual manifestation. Here bīja-bhāva (and not bīja) is defined as “a personal being’s potency (śakti) itself born of a defilement of generating defilement” . We must not, however, adhere too rigidly to and judge exclusively by such literal expressions, and we should also consider the larger context of the general Sautrāntika-Yogacāra tradition of the understanding of the bīja theory. Thus, at least as far as this explanation of Vasubandhu is concerned, the well known correspondence in the Yogācārabhūmi suggests that the general tradition understands bīja and bīja-bhāva as being interchangeable:

兵藤一夫指出，在《俱舍論》玄奘無差別地翻譯bīja-bhāva（「種子性」）及bīja（「種子」）為「種子」――而相似的理解亦反映於稱友（Yaśomitra）及安慧（Sthiramati）的註釋――並從《俱舍論》舉出數個例子以顯示出世親實際地將這兩詞不同地使用。51以其中一個例子來說，他引述世親對於「隨眠」（anuśaya, proclivity）與「纏」（paryavasthāna, enwrapment）作為煩惱兩個不同階段之間的區別：前者是睡着的煩惱，而後者是煩惱的實際現行。在這裏，「種子性」（而不是「種子」）被定義為“自體上功能（śakti, potency）差別從煩惱生能生煩惱” 52。然而，我們不應太過死板地遵循這樣的字面表達，以及不應只限於以它來做判斷，對於「種子」學説的理解，我們亦應考量一般經量部-瑜伽行派傳統更廣的範圍。故此，至少關於世親的解釋而言，在《瑜伽師地論》中熟識的相對應段落表示出一般傳統理解「種子」及「種子性」為可互換的：

(I) 梵文《俱舍論》, 278: prasupto hi kleśo’nuśaya ucyate / prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam / kā ca tasya prasuptiḥ / asammukhī bhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ / kaḥ prabodhaḥ sammukhībhāvaḥ / ko’yaṃ bījabhāvo nāma / ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ

/ (II) 《阿毘達磨俱舍論》, 99a：煩惱睡位說名「隨眠」，於覺位中即名「纏」故。何名為睡？謂不現行「種子」隨逐。何名為覺？謂諸煩惱現起纏心。何等名為煩惱「種子」？謂自體上差別功能，從煩惱生能生煩惱。 (III)《瑜伽師地論》, 623a：現行現起煩惱名「纏」。即此「種子」未斷未害名曰「隨眠」亦名「麁重」。又不覺位名曰「隨眠」；若在覺位說名為「纏」

。 (IV) Yogācāra-bhūmi (Tibetan edn), Peking edn, zi, 118bl-b3: de la nyon mongs pa kun tu byung ba mngon du gyur pa ni kun nas dkris pa zhes bya o // de nyid kyi sa bon ma spangs shin yang dag par ma bcom pa ni bag la nyal shes bya ste / gnas ngan len kyang de yin no //ma sad pa'i phyir ni bag la nyal yin la sad pai gnas skabs kyi phyir ni kun nas dkris pa yin no //

I. AKB: anuśaya is klesa asleep. This state is the pursuing by the bīja-bhāva (which is present) which has not become manifested.
II. Xuan Zang's tr. of AKB: anuśaya is kleśa asleep. This state is the pursuing by the seed (種子) which has not become manifested.
III. Xuan Zang's tr. of the Yogācārabhūmi: when it (the kleśa) is non-awakened, it is called anuśaya. This is the state when the bīja (種子) of this very kleśa has not yet been abandoned and destroyed.
IV. Tib. version of Yogācārabhūmi: being non-awakened, it (the kleśa) is called anuśaya. This is the state when its bīja (sa bon) has not been abandoned and fully destroyed.

I. 梵文《俱舍論》：「隨眠」是睡着的煩惱。這狀態是被「種子性」（bīja-bhāva）（為現在）隨逐，它未現行。
II.玄奘《俱舍論》翻譯：煩惱睡位說名「隨眠」。不現行「種子」隨逐。
III.玄奘《瑜伽師地論》翻譯：（煩惱）不覺位名曰「隨眠」。此「種子」（bīja）未斷未害名曰「隨眠」 。
IV. 藏翻本《瑜伽師地論》：為不覺位，它（煩惱）被稱為「隨眠」。這狀態是當它的「種子」（sa bon）未被斷除及未被破壞。

To summarize: All the sources cited above convey the sense that anuśaya is kleśa in its dormant state. This is said to be the state when the bīja-bhāva is still continuously present, pursuing (anubandha) the sentient being (I), or when the bīja has not yet been abandoned (III and IV; sa bon in IV would indicate that種子, in III, actually translates bīja). Thus, bīja-bhāva and bīja seem interchangeable.

總結：所有以上所引資料表達出「隨眠」是煩惱於其睡眠狀態。這被說為是當「種子性」仍然相續不斷地存在，隨逐（anubandha）有情的狀態（即I），或當「種子」仍未被斷除時（即III及IV；IV sa bon表示種子，III實際翻譯為種子）。故此，「種子性」（bīja-bhāva）與「種子」（bīja）似乎是可互換的。

Hyōdō believes that Vasubandhu's employment of the term bīja-bhāva represents an attempt to harmonize two notions of bīja: (i) the common sense understanding that a seed is a real entity possessing the efficacy of generating fruit; (ii) the Sautrāntika notion that a seed is not a real entity but refers to the efficacy of generating an effect, and such an efficacy/seed is preserved by the psycho-physical serial continuity. However, Hyōdō might have read too much into Vasubandhu's exposition. And if so, his exercise of adducing Vasubandhu’s different usages of the two terms would seem a little superfluous, inasmuch as the mere grammatical difference —bīja-bhāva is an abstract noun (rightly so-explained in Vy, 147: tad-bījasya bhāvas tad-bījabhāvaḥ), whereas bīja is a simple noun — does not seem to necessarily signify the type of implications asserted by Hyōdō. At any rate, as Hyōdō himself rightly observes, Vasubandhu, Yaśomitra and Xuan Zang agree fundamentally on the point that the sentient body preserves the efficacy of generating fruit.

兵藤相信，世親對「種子性」一詞的使用代表着調和兩個「種子」概念的一個嘗試：(i)一般常理的理解，「種子」是實體並具有生果的功能；(ii)經量部論師的概念，「種子」不是實體而是指生果的功能，這樣的功能/「種子」是由有情的名色相續所保存。53然而，兵藤或許是過分解讀世親的闡釋。若是這樣，他舉出世親對兩詞的不同用法似乎有點多此一舉，因為僅僅是文法上的差異――bīja-bhāva是一個抽象名詞（《俱舍論疏》正正是這樣解釋, 147：tad-bījasya bhāvas tad-bījabhāvaḥ），而bīja是一個簡單名詞――似乎不是必定具有如兵藤主張的這種涵義。無論如何，如兵藤自己正確地觀察到，世親、稱友及玄奘基本上都同意的一點是有情身體保存着生果功能。54

More importantly, I believe that Xuan Zang and others have understood the bīja doctrine of the Sautrāntika (and it would seem also that of the early Mahāyāna Yogācāras) correctly: bīja is the nature of being efficacious in generating fruit, and this nature is exhibited in a sentient being’s serial continuity —bīja is therefore interchangeable with bīja-bhāva and both can be described in terms of the sentient being’s psycho-physical complex.

更重要的是，我相信玄奘以及其他人已正確地理解經量部（以及亦似乎是大乘瑜伽行派）的「種子」義理：「種子」是對於生果有功能上的性質，而這種性質是展示於有情的相續中――故此，「 種子」與「種子性」是可互換的，兩者都可依據有情的名色來描述。

From the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika perspective, bīja is not ontologically real entity, nor is bīja-bhāva absolutely nothing more than a mere concept. If they must be forcibly fitted into the Sarvāstivāda scheme of understanding the “reals”, then they must be said to be “neither real nor unreal”. For this same reason, one can speak of seed/Seed in the singular when one refers to the efficacy as such, possessed by the serial continuity, or seeds in the plural when one needs to differentiate among the different specific species of efficacies. This point, I believe, is borne out in Vasubandhu’s response to Saṃghabhadra’s questioning in the above-quoted discussion. Katō, however, regards Hyōdō’s discovery of Vasubandhu’s different usages of bīja and bīja-bhāva as being of great significance, and summarizes thus: Whereas bīja-bhāva refers to what are specifically perfumed by the individual dharma-s (skilful, unskilful, etc) on the mental serial continuity, bīja refers to the nāma-rūpa comprising the combined mental and physical serial continuity. In Śrīlāta's case, dhātu refers to what are perfumed on the citta by the individual past dharma-s, anudhātu refers to the six āyatana-s, viz., the psycho-physical complex as a whole.

從譬喻經量部論師的觀點來説，「種子」並不是本體論地真實，而「種子性」亦非只僅僅是絕對地唯施設而已。若它們必須強行地納入說一切有部對理解“實有”的架構内，那麽他必須說它為“非實非假”。正是由於相同原因，當提到這樣的功能時，我們可以以「種子」/單數「種子」（Seed）表達，並由有情的相續來持有，而當從不同特有種類的功能作區分時，我們可以以複數 種子」（Seed）表達。我相信這一點是可從以上所引世親對眾賢問難的回應中印證到。然而，對於兵藤有關世親「種子」及「種子性」兩者不同用法是具有重大意義的發現，加藤這樣總結：種子性」是指被各別的法（善、惡等）特有地熏習於心相續中，而「種子」是指由結合身相續與心相續所構成的。室利邏多的情況來説，「界」是指被各別的過去法所熏習於心中，而「隨界」是指六處，即名色為一個整體。55

However, I would prefer to apply the same consideration as I have made above on bīja and bīja-bhāva to the relationship between anudhātu and dhātu, on the one hand, and the two in turn in relation to the sentient being’s psycho-physical complex on the other.

然而，我比較傾向將如我上述對「種子」與「種子性」的相同考量，一方面應用於「隨界」與「界」之間的關係，而另一方面，反過來應用於兩者與有情名色之間的關係。

When it is stated that the old pursuant element (*purāṇa-anudhātu) “has the characteristic of being the elements (dhātu) formed from the perfuming by various dharma-s” (§2.[IV]), it does not necessarily mean that anudhātu is singular in contrast to the pluralistic dhātu-s. Here, anudhātu is given in the singular because it conveys the doctrinal notion of these dhātu-s (causal efficacies) continuously and subtly pursuing (anu-) the serial continuity. The following will demonstrate that anudhātu-s can also occur in the plural: [The Sthavira] should explain: if within the one citta, numerous species of citta-dhātu-s (多品類心界) pursue, how is it that from these numerous citta-anudhātu-s (多心隨界), there arises subsequently a citta of a single species?

當説明「舊隨界」（*purāṇa-anudhātu）“是種種法所薰成「界」（dhātu）以為其相”（§2.[IV]）時，它並不一定指「隨界」是單數與複數「界」作為對比的意思。在這裏，「隨界」是以單數表示，因為它表達出這些「界」（因果功能）的義理概念是相續不斷地及微細地隨逐（anu-）有情的相續。以下展示出「隨界」亦可以複數形式出現： 上座：］應說：若一心中有多品類心界隨逐。何緣（How is it that）從此多心隨界，後時但起一品類心？56

We may also note that in §§2[V]-[VI] above, when Śrīlāta claims that the old pursuant element is ineffable, Saṃghabhadra in his response refers to it as “the element” — i.e., the (old) anudhātu and dhātu are taken to be interchangeable.

我們或許亦注意到在以上§§2[V]-[VI]中，當室利邏多宣稱「舊隨界」是不可說時，眾賢在他的回應中指它作為「界」——即「（舊）隨界」與「界」是理解為可互換的。

Moreover, as we have seen above, the anudhātu of a defilement is called anuśaya, and the latter is undoubtedly pluralistic for the various defilements: rāga-anuśaya, pratigha-anuśaya, avidyā-anuśaya, etc. In addition, we have also just seen the avidyā-anudhātu above. Moreover, the partially analogous natures of anudhātu and prāpti — acknowledged by both Saṃghabhadra and Śrīlāta — also indicates that anudhātu can be pluralistic just as prāpti is: there are different prāpti-s for different dharma-s. In brief, “anudhātu” and “dhātu” seem to me to be interchangeable; it is only that the former is more pregnant in meaning

此外，如上所見，煩惱的「隨界」是稱為「隨眠」，而後者無疑是各種煩惱的多元性：欲貪隨眠（rāga-anuśaya）、瞋隨眠（pratigha-anuśaya）、無明隨眠（avidyā-anuśaya）等。另外，我們以上亦剛看到「無明隨界」。57此外，「隨界」與「得」的部分類比性質――為眾賢及室利邏多兩者所許――亦顯示出「隨界」如「得」一樣可以是多元性的：對於不同的諸法有不同的得」。簡言之，「隨界」與「界」在我看來似乎是可互換的；而只不過前者在意義上更意味深長。

5. The problems of perfuming and serial continuity

All elements are perfumed into the sentient serial continuity. For Śrīlāta who vehemently denies the possibility of simultaneous causality (sahabhū-hetu), the operation of perfuming can only be a before-after process: the present pursuant element necessarily is the effect of perfuming in the preceding moment. But from the Vaibhāṣika perspective, for a dharma X to perfume a dharma Y, there must be a necessary connection/relationship between the two dharma-s, and such a connection is possible only when the two are existing simultaneously. (Same requirement in the Yogācāra). Śrīlāta responds that there is indeed a connection between the preceding cause and the succeeding effect inasmuch as there is a similarity between their characteristics. Saṃghabhadra rejects this: Given the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika denial of the tri-temporal existence (sarvāstitva) of dharma-s, if X precedes Y, then no connection is possible since X would be a non-existent, and Y, an existent. (§[IX], [b] see also §2[XI] where Saṃghabhadra also points out the difficulty of perfuming without accepting simultaneous causality.)

5. 熏習與相續的問題

所有的「界」是熏習於有情的相續。室利邏多強烈地否定俱有因（sahabhū-hetu, simultaneous causality）的可能性，58熏習的運作只能是前後的過程：現在的「隨界」必定是前一刹那熏習的果。然而，從毘婆沙師的觀點來看，X法熏習Y法，兩法之間是必須有必然的聯繫/關係，而只有當兩法都是同時地存在時，這樣的聯繫才有可能。（瑜伽行派亦是相同的條件）。59室利邏多回應，前刹那因與後刹那果之間確實是有聯繫，因為它們之間的特性是有相似性的。眾賢否定這見解：鑒於譬喻經量部對諸法三世實有（sarvāstitva）的否定，若X先於Y，那麽，聯繫是無可能的，這是由於X是不存在而Y是存在。（§[IX], [b]；亦見§2[XI]，眾賢亦指出熏習的困難若不接受俱有因。）60

The Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas explain that causal efficacy is transmitted successively in a serial continuity. Particularly in the process of karmic retribution, it is stressed that the karma does not serve as the cause directly (sākṣāt) in generating its fruit but as a force [transmitted] through a succession (由展轉力).61 Saṃghabhadra points out that even the very notions of “serial continuity” and successive causation are invalid in their system which denies sarvāstitva, and accordingly, one would have to say that the pursuant elements come into existence without any cause: If they assert that the past [[[cause]]] is a successive cause (see also below), it amounts to nothing but empty words without any true significance — what is absolutely a non-existent can nonetheless be made a successive cause?! ... Moreover, what is successive is what is serially continuous (or: “a succession is a serial continuity”); it is not logical that a dharma in a given [[[state]]] is continuous in this very [same state]. Since the past and future do not exist and there is only the present, there is therefore definitely no successive cause. 62

譬喻經量部論師解釋，因果功能是於相續中展轉地傳遞。尤其是在業異熟的過程中，特別強調業並不作為親（sākṣāt, directly）因生起其果，但由展轉力［傳遞］。61眾賢指出，在他們的系統中，即使「相續」及展轉因果這概念亦是不無效的，因為其系統否定一切有，故此，可說「隨界」是沒有任何因而成為存在： 若謂過去［因］是展轉因（亦見下），此有虛言都無實義──如何過去全無有體而可成立為展轉因？...又展轉者是相續言（或“展轉於相續”）？不應此法即［狀態］續於此［相同的狀態］。既無去、來唯有現在，故應決定無展轉因。62

Elsewhere, Saṃghabhadra argues that for the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas “who hold that only the present [[[dharma-s]]] exist, serial continuity cannot be established for dharma-s in a single moment of thought”.63 Moreover, as to their notion of causal succession, what does “cause-effect succession” signify? For them, there are no previous period and subsequent period outside the present moment, how can they speak of “succession” with regard to the past and the future? It is not the case that a non-existent and another non existent can be said to be in a succession. 64

在別處，眾賢論證由於譬喻經量部論師“所宗唯現在［諸法］有，於一念法相續不成。” 63此外，至於其「因果展轉」的概念， 又「因果展轉」名何所詮？非越現剎那有前、後際。如何過、未立「展轉」名？非無與無可名「展轉」。64

In a discussion on Conditioned Co-arising, Rāma, a follower of Śrīlāta’s school of thought, suggests that the two sentences in the Buddha’s statement, “this being, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises” (asmin sati’daṃ bhavati | asyo’pādād idam utpadyate)65 are intended to show, respectively, the direct and successively transmitted causes.66 The AKB (without attributing it to Rāma), and the Vy which attributes it to Vasubandhu himself, provide some explanations of this view: 在對於緣起的討論中，室利邏多學系的門人邏摩（Rāma）表示佛陀宣說“依此有彼有及此生故彼生”（asmin sati’daṃ bhavati | asyo’pādād idam utpadyate, this being, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises）這兩句子是為了個別顯示親、傳二因。66《俱舍論》（沒有說是邏摩）及《俱舍論疏》將它說為是世親，並提供一些對於這見解的解釋：

AKB: Direct (sākṣāt) ― sometimes, the saṃskāra-s come to arise immediately after avidyā. Through succession (pāraṃparyeṇa) ― sometimes, they do so through a succession. 67

sākṣāt pāraṃparyeṇa ca pratyayabhāvaṃ darśayati / kadāciddhi samanantaram avidyāyāḥ saṃskārā bhavanti kadācit pāramparyeṇeti/ Vy: Direct ― as when, immediately after avidyā, defiled conditioning forces arise. Through succession — as when [through a succession after avidyā], the skilful conditioning forces are arisen; this is because avidyā is absent in a skilful state.68 sākṣāt pāraṃparyeṇa saṃtatyāvidyādīnāṃ pratyayabhāvaṃ darśayituṃ paryāyadvayam āha / asmin satīdaṃ bhavatīti sākṣāt pratyayabhāvaṃ darśayati / asyotpādād idam utpadyata iti pāraṃparyeṇa / tatra sākṣād yadāvidyāyāḥ samanaṃtaraṃ kliṣṭāḥ saṃskārā utpadyante / pāraṃparyeṇa tu yadā kuśalā utpadyaṃte / kuśalāvasthāyām avidyāyā abhāvāt /

俱舍論》：親（sākṣāt, direct）――有無明無間生行，傳（pāraṃparyeṇa, through succession）――展轉力諸行方生。67 俱舍論疏》：親――當無明無間生起染污諸行。傳――當［無明之後由展轉］，生起善諸行；這是因為在善位中，無明是沒有的。68

Saṃghabhadra refutes this explanatiorn:

For the Dārṣṭāntikas, the past and the future are non-existent; how can they designate the two causes, direct and successively transmitted? Firstly, because a karma cannot directly produce a retribution, karma cannot be the direct cause for the retribution. Neither is it a successive cause, for there is no possibility of a succession. It is not the case that after the karma has ceased there is subsequently another cause which, by virtue of the previous karma, brings into effect the retribution fruit. A successively transmitted cause can be so called only when, after a previous cause has ceased, another cause produces the fruit through the force of the previous force that has existed far back in time. These false theories such as the old pursuant element, etc, have been refuted [before]. But even for those who concede such a successive transmission, the “distant”and “proximate” causes still cannot be established since they both have ceased and cannot be differentiated. Should they assert that “successively transmitted” is from the perspective of “having been”, it is also not logically valid. For, when one [[[cause]]] is existing, the other is non-existent, and a non-existent dharma cannot be said to have transmitted through a succession. 69

眾賢進一步破斥這解釋： 又譬喻宗，過、未無體；如何可立親、傳二因？且非業無間能生異熟故，業望異熟親因不成。亦非傳因，傳義無故。非業滅已後有餘因，由先業力招異熟果。要先因滅已，餘因感果時，遠由先因力，方名傳因故。諸有橫計「舊隨界」等思擇因中，［前］已廣遮破。設許有彼傳，亦不成“遠”、“近”二因，滅無異故。依何而說“彼遠此近”據 “曾有”說，理亦不成。隨一［因］有時，隨一無故，無法無容說為傳故。69

Saṃghabhadra further argues that it is in fact only the Sarvāstivādins who can legitimately speak of change in a serial continuity: For, although a conditioned dharma always exists in its intrinsic nature, it undergoes a difference in state (位差別; avasthā-anyathātva),70 and there is change. The difference in state arises from conditions (pratyaya) and necessarily cannot stay for more than one moment. On account of this, the intrinsic nature of the dharma (or: “the dharma itself”, 法體) is also impermanent, being not distinct from the different [[[state]]]. It is only in an existent dharma that a change is realizable; there cannot be change in a non-existent.71

眾賢進一步論證，事實上只有說一切有部論師是能夠合理地説明在相續中有轉變： 以有為法，體雖恒存而位差別（difference in state, difference in state），有變異故。此位差別，從緣（pratyaya, condition）而生，一剎那後必無有住。由此，法體（或“法本身”, the intrinsic nature of the dharma）亦是無常，以與［位］差別體無異故。要於有法，變異可成；非於無中可有變異。71

Another problem in Śrīlāta’s doctrine underscored by Saṃghabhadra concerns the perfuming of a causal efficacy ― a pursuant element ― that generates a skilful thought, when the preceding moment of the serial continuity is unskilful, and conversely. Likewise, it requires explanation as to how an efficacy for a non-defined (avyākṛta) dharma can be perfumed into existence when the preceding moment of the series is morally defined. We have seen above that Śrīlāta claims that the specific causal efficacy for the generation of an existent dharma, even long after it has perished, is preserved in its own serial continuity (§4). In this context, Saṃghabhadra questions thus:

對於室利邏多的義理，眾賢強調另一問題是有關因果功能的熏習――「隨界」――生起善心，當前一刹的相續那是不善，以及反過來的情況。同樣地，這需要一個解釋是對於這功能如何將無記（avyākṛta, non-defined）法熏習，當前一刹那的相續是有善惡性。從以上所見，室利邏多宣稱，對於生起有法的特有因果功能，即使它滅後過了很久，仍保存於其相續中（§4）。對這情況，眾賢如是問難：

If the Sthavira concedes that the condition qua cause can be decisively established in nothing more than its generating a specific serial continuity, why does he further concede that a skilful or unskilful dharma serves as the condition qua cause to generate a non defined retribution (vipāka)? It is not the case that a skilful or unskilful pursuant element as the cause can generate a non-defined dharma, the serial continuities being different. If what is skilful or unskilful can immediately generate a non-defined retribution, then he must explain here why and how a skilful or unskilful serves as the cause to generate a non-defined retribution.

若上座許唯自相續生起決定得為因緣，云何復許善、不善法為因緣，生無記異熟（vipāka, retribution）？非善、不善「隨界」為因可生無記，相續異故。若善、不善無間能生無記異熟，此中應說：何故云何善、不善為因生無記異熟？。

[i]Should he say a non-defined perfumes a skilful or unskillful, and thus a skilful or unskilful becomes the cause for a non-defined this is also illogical, as we have repeatedly argued that what he calls “perfuming” has no true significance. Moreover, how is it that a skilful or unskilful dharma, through being perfumed by a non-defined, becomes the cause of the retribution?

[i]若言無記熏善、不善故善、不善為無記因，此亦非理，前已數辯彼“熏習”言無實義故。又彼云何善、不善法，無記熏故成異熟因？

[ii] Should he say that it is because of the perfuming by the previous retribution, then it is the retribution that ought to be the cause of the retribution. [On the other hand,] when a retribution fruit is generated through a skilful or unskilful cause, and he asserts that this does not involve the function of a condition qua cause (hetu-pratyaya) but only a generic conditionality (唯增上攝; lit: “only subsumable as a case of ādhipatya”), then it is extremely illogical. For, a skilful or unskilful, serving as cause, can project that fruit [but] why then is it not the cause for that fruit? 72

[ii]若謂先時異熟熏故，則應異熟為異熟因。［另一方面，］若異熟果，善、不善法為因故生，而言此中無因緣（hetu-pratyaya, condition qua cause）用，唯增上攝，甚為非理。善、不善為因能牽起彼果，［但］此於彼果，何故非因？72

We have seen a similar kind of objection to Vasubandhu’s seed theory and how he answered the critics: A causal efficacy (whether called seed or pursuant element, etc.) is not an ontological entity distinct from the thought. When an unskilful thought is perfumed by a skilful dharma, a corresponding causal efficacy, which is exercised either directly or through a succession, is posited in the former. And it is from this efficacy that a skilful dharma is generated (§4). Thus, from Śrīlāta’s perspective, it is not a case of an ontologically real unskilful efficacy, through being perfumed, turning into a skilful efficacy, another ontologically real of a totally opposite or different nature. The same should apply to the case of a skilful/unskilful thought becoming efficacious for generating a non-defined thought.

我們已看到對世親「種子」學説的類似反對，以及他如何回應這些批評：因果功能（不論稱為「種子」或「隨界」等）並不是一個離於心的本體論實體。當不善心被善法熏習時，相對應的因果功能，無論是直接或透過展轉，是被安置於前者。正正是由這功能，善法可被生起（§4）。故此，從室利邏多的觀點來説，這並非是一個本體論地真實的不善功能透過被熏習而轉變為善功能，即它不會轉變為另一完全相反或不同性質的本體論實體。相同的觀點亦適用於是善/不善心成為有功能生起無記心的情況。

6. Manifestation of the whole of phenomenal existence

According to Śrīlāta and other Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas, all dharma-s arise immediately.73 In Śrīlāta’s theory, it is from these causal efficacies, called elements or pursuant elements, that there comes to be the experience of a personal existence (the serial continuity) as well as of all the phenomena that the person experiences. This implies that pursuant elements obtain in the sentient as well as non-sentient domains. This position is consistent with Śrīlāta’s view that the Buddha’s teaching of conditioned co-arising in the statement “this being, that comes to be; from the arising of this, that arises” applies to both the sentient and the non-sentient, and “is intended to show generically that all conditioned [[[phenomena]]] without exception arise from an assemblage of conditions”.74 As to the momentary perishing of a dharma, it is held that it takes place without any cause, immediately after acquiring its existence in the present moment. Already in the MVŚ, this position is said to have been held by the early Dārṣṭāntikas: “The arising [of a conditioned dharma] requires causes and conditions not so when it perishes.”75 In the AKB, Vasubandhu also asserts that the perishing of a conditioned dharma, not being an effect, does not depend on a cause.76 Saṃghabhadra refutes him along with the Dārṣṭāntikas: Even in their tenet, perishing presupposes a prior arising; how is it not acknowledged as an effect? They might say that perishing is non-existence and is therefore a non-entity (/non-existent), hence not an effect. But if so, how can it serve as a cause generating a consciousness?77 The Vaibhāṣika position is that a dharma arising in the present moment perishes without depending on a foreign cause (客因), but solely on the host cause (主因; i.e, the cause internal to it)78 —namely the disjoined conditioning (viprayukta-saṃskāra) called “perishing” (vyaya/anityatā), one of the characteristics of the conditioned (saṃskṛta- lakṣaṇa) which are necessarily co-nascent with the conditioned dharma.

6. 一切現象存在的顯現 依據室利邏多及其他譬喻經量部論師，一切諸法無間生起。73在室利邏多的學説中，這是從稱為「界」或「隨界」這些因果功能而成為個人存在（相續）的經驗以及一切現象的經驗，並能夠被有情所經驗得到。這含有「隨界」村在於有情以及非情範疇的涵義。這立場與室利邏多的見解是一致的，佛陀宣導緣起道理所説明的“依此有彼有；此生故彼生”適用於有情及非情兩者，並“總顯示一切有為［現象］無一不從眾緣起者”。74至於諸法刹那滅，他主張這是沒用任何原因，並於現在刹那無間獲得其存在性。在《大毘婆沙論》已經記載這立場，並說為是早期譬喻論師所主張：“［有為法］生待因緣，滅則不爾”。75在《俱舍論》中，世親亦主張有為法的滅是沒有果故不待因。76眾賢將他與譬喻論師一併破斥：汝宗滅盡亦有為先；必有為先後方無故；如何不許是果有因？…若謂滅無，…非有體（/無法），如何為因發生識等？77毘婆沙師的立場是，現有法滅是不待客因（foreign cause），但是只依據主因（host cause, 為其内在的因）78——即心不相應性（viprayukta-saṃskāra，the disjoined conditioning）稱為「滅」（vyaya/anityatā, perishing），為其中一個有為相（saṃskṛta-lakṣaṇa, characteristics of the conditioned）並必定與有為法俱生。

We have already seen above that a sentient being’s present serial continuity is said to be generated by that in the preceding moment. “Those who hold the pursuant element theory assert that there always exist in the present the generative causes of immeasurable dharma-s.”79 In fact, Śrīlāta and the Dārṣṭāntikas claim that all dharma-s arise immediately.80 For them, just as the arising of a mental dharma is necessarily preceded by its “equal-immediate condition” (samanantara- pratyaya) - the citta that has ceased in the immediately preceding moment- so a rūpa dharma too must be generated from its equal immediate condition.81 That this manner of arising applies not just to the internal rūpa-s of a sentient serial continuity, but also to all the external rūpa-s, is clear from the examples they give:

The Dārṣṭāntikas assert that rūpa-dharma-s, just as citta-caitta dharma-s, possess the equal-immediate condition. It is seen that from milk, crude spirits, seed and flower, there arise [respectively] curd, vinegar, sprout and fruit; just as in the case of the citta-caitta-s, a succeeding one arises immediately after a preceding one has ceased. We therefore know that this condition also obtains among rūpa-s.82

我們以上已經看到，有情的現在相續被說為是由前一剎那所生起。“妄執有隨界論者，彼執恒現有無量法生因”。79事實上，室利邏多及譬喻論師宣稱諸法從無間生。80對他們來說，正如心法的生起必定以其「等無間緣」（samanantara-pratyaya, equal-immediate condition）為先－－心法於無間前剎那已滅－－色法同樣亦必定有「等無間緣」。81這樣生起的方式不只適用於有情相續的內色，亦適用於一切外色，這從他們給予例子清楚可見： 譬喻論師說：諸色法如心、心所法有等無間緣。見乳、醅、種、花［各別地］生酪、酢、芽、果，如心、心所前滅後生。故知諸色有此緣義。82

In Śrīlāta’s explanation, “the equal-immediate condition is a preceding dharma, [whether mental or physical] which enables an immediately succeeding dharma to acquire its individual existence (ātmabhāva), (ie., to come into being)”.83 This applies even to the case where the succeeding rūpa serial continuity pertains to a species different from that of the immediately preceding rupa serial continuity.84

室利邏多的解釋是“「等無間緣」謂前生法，［不論是心法或色是，］令無間法獲得自體（ātmabhāva, individual existence）（即誕生）”。83這甚至適用於後剎那色相續繫屬一個種類是不同於無間前剎那色相續這情況。84

Saṃghabhadra, besides refuting at length the claim that the equal immediate condition obtains among the rūpa-dharma-s,85 raises several other objections among which are the following:

除了長篇地破斥色法有等無間緣這宣稱外，85眾賢亦提出數個其他反對，其中一些如下：

1. If all dharma-s arise immediately, then the equal-immediate condition will suffice as a causal principle for the arising of any dharma, and the Buddha’s teaching of the condition qua cause would have been in vain.

Śrīlāta responds － apparently not to the satisfaction of Saṃghabhadra － that the power of the equal-immediate condition and that of the cause of generation are different. In the generation of a dharma, both exercise their functions.86

1. 若諸法無間生起，那麽「等無間緣」便足作為緣起法則以生起任何法，以及佛陀宣導因緣便成為無用。

室利邏多回應――明顯不能令眾賢滿意――「等無間緣」力與「生因」有不同。在生起法方面，兩者都具有功用。

2. When a rūpa-citta series arises immediately after a preceding rūpa-citta series, according to Śrīlāta’s definition of the equal immediate condition, does it mean that rupa and citta are mutually equal-immediate conditions to each other? But this is not legitimate since the rūpa and the citta pertain to different serial continuities, and thus cannot be conditions for each other. Moreover, “a single　citta cause generates numerous rūpa fruits, and immediately after a multitude of rūpa-s there do not arise two consciousnesses ―how can they be equal-immediate conditions for each other? ”87

在前色心相續無間生起色心相續，依據室利邏多對「等無間緣」的定義，那麽這是否說色、心可互作等無間緣？然而，這是不合理的，由於色與心相續各別，所以不能互作為緣？此外，“一心因起多色果，多色無間無二識生――何得相望為「等無間」？” 87

3. For one who holds the pursuant element theory, the condition qua cause and the equal-immediate condition would be identical since the support-basis (āśraya) for the pursuant element is not different in either case. 88

3.「隨界」論者，因、等無間二緣應同，「隨界」所依（āśraya, support-basis）體無別故。88

Although Saṃghabhadra points out the implication of the mutual perfuming between rūpa and citta in Śrīlāta’s doctrine, this does not seem to be Śrīlāta’s own position. On the question of the re-arising of citta immediately after the cessation meditative attainment (nirodha-samāpatti), Vasubandhu ascribes this position to the “ancient masters” (pūrvācārya).89 Another view, ascribed to Vasumitra, author of the Paripṛcchā, is that citta arises from the citta which continues in this meditation. Śrīlāta,90 as well as his follower, Rāma,91 also shares this latter position. It is thus that even in a situation like the cessation meditative attainment, the pursuant elements－ and hence karma and memory －can be preserved.

雖然眾賢指出室利邏多的義理對於色、心互相熏習的涵義，但這似乎不是室利邏多自己的立場。對於出滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti, cessation meditative attainment）無間生起心這問題，世親將這立場說為是「軌範師」（pūrvācārya, ancient masters）。89另一個見解說為是世友，即《問論》（Paripṛcchā）的作者，他說在這禪定中，心從前心相續生起。室利邏多90以及他的門人邏摩91亦同意後者的立場。故此，即使如滅盡定這樣的情況，「隨界」――故業及記憶――能被保存。

7. Retribution-born (vipākaja) and retribution fruit (vipāka-phala)

For Śrīlāta, not only do all dharma-s arise immediately from the pursuant elements, they are all describable as being “retribution-born”(vipākaja): With respect to the 12 āyatana-s, the Sthavira holds that they are, in all ways, retribution-born.... The sound-āyatana too should be retribution-born, for it is conceded that its cause is a retribution. Furthermore, a retribution is projected by a cause abruptly. It continues to arise freely, without the need of repeated preparatory effort (prayoga, abhisaṃskāra) ...92

7. 異熟生（vipākaja）與異熟果（vipāka-phala） 對室利邏多來説，不只是一切法從「隨界」無間生起，它們全部亦被描述為「異熟生」（vipākaja, retribution-born）： 上座此中依十二處立一切種，皆「異熟生」。...又彼聲處應「異熟生」，以許彼因是「異熟」故。又「異熟」者，因頓引發，任運隨轉，不須數數重起加行（prayoga, abhisaṃskāra, preparatory effort）... 92

This position contrasts with the Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmika doctrine that dharma-s are classifiable in terms of “retribution-born”, “accumulative” (aupacayika), and “emanational” (naiḥsyandika).93 Sound is a good example to illustrate the different standpoints: For the Sarvāstivādins, sound is accumulative and emanational but not retribution-born. Reason: it is made just as a person so wishes[隨欲轉]; it can be interrupted and resumed subsequently; etc. ― all this is contrary to the nature of a retribution.94 The Sarvāstivāda definition of “retribution-born” is: “Those born from the retribution cause are retribution-born”.95 Thus, a retribution-born would mean the same as a retribution fruit (vipāka-phala) born of a retribution cause (vipāka-hetu). From this perspective, Saṃghabhadra criticizes Śrīlāta’s position as amounting to the fatalistic doctrines of the heretics: “all is retribution-born” means that everything is completely determined by karma.96 Moreover, if the 12 āyatana-s are all retribution-born, it would mean that even the non-sentient phenomena too are retributions.97

這立場可與說一切有部阿毘達磨的義理作對照，一切法可依據「異熟生」、「所長養」（aupacayika, accumulative）及「等流性」（naiḥsyandika, emanational）作分類。93聲是一個好例子以説明不同的立場：對說一切有部論師來説，聲是「所長養」及「等流性」但不是「異熟生」。原因：它隨有情的意願生起；它可被打斷以及之後再發起；等等――這些全部與「異熟」的性質相違。94說一切有部對「異熟生」的定義是：“「異熟因」所生名「異熟生」”。95故此，「異熟生」是指它與「異熟果」（vipāka-phala, retribution fruit）一樣是從「異熟因」（vipāka-hetu, retribution cause）的意思。從這個觀點，眾賢批評室利邏多的立場是相當於外道的宿命論學説：“一切唯異熟生”的意思指一切完全是由業所決定。96此外，若十二處皆是「異熟生」，那麽，這是說即使是非情的現象亦是「異熟」。97

Śrīlāta, of course, clarifies that by “retribution-born” he means: “born of a retribution”.98 Although one could perhaps regard such a retribution-born as a kind of “secondary derivative” retribution fruit (i.e retribution fruit derived from a retribution fruit), it obviously cannot have the same significance as “a retribution fruit born of a retribution cause”. In a discussion on the different types of fruits corresponding to the different categories of causes, Saṃghabhadra mentions a view that “a retribution is generated from a retribution”.99 But he does not ascribe it to Śrīlāta or to the Dārṣṭāntikas, and explains it as a case of the preceding retribution qua homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu) generating the succeeding retribution qua an emanational fruit (niṣyanda-phala).100 In Śrīlāta’s view, “all is projected exclusively by the force of retribution” ―and thus there can be serial continuity or interruption depending on the strength of the force.101 Accordingly, even sound ― and for that matter, any non-sentient phenomenon ― is “retribution-born”. This is because only the present moment of phenomena exists and these existents can only be retributions from the past karmic perfumings.

當然，室利邏多釐清「異熟生」，他意思是指：從「異熟」生。98雖然，或許可將這樣的「異熟生」視為一種“次級衍生的”「異熟果」（即「異熟果」從「異熟果」所衍生出來），但這很明顯不能有“「異熟因」所生是「異熟果」”相同的義意。在對不同種類的果相對應於不同種類的因的討論中，眾賢提及一種見解是“「異熟」從「異熟」生”。99然而，他沒有說為是室利邏多或譬喻論師，並解釋它為“前「異熟」為同類因（sabhāga-hetu, homogeneous cause）生後「異熟」為等流果（niṣyanda-phala, emanational fruit）”。100室利邏多的見解是“一切皆唯異熟勢力所引――隨力勝劣故有相續或有間斷”。101故此，即使聲――就此而言，任何非情現象――亦是「異熟生」。這是因為唯有現在刹那的現象是存在，而這些存在只能夠是從過去業的熏習而來的「異熟」。

According to the above-cited description on the retribution-born, a retribution (as the fruit of a retribution cause) is projected abruptly by a previous cause, and, once projected, it continues to arise freely (任運隨轉, *anabhisaṃskāreṇa vartate) without the need for repeated effort. Thus, the continuous manifestation in the present moment of a sentient being’s serial continuity, together with the totality of phenomena that he experiences, is an existential given qua retribution which arises without effort. However, this does not necessarily imply absolute determination, since, on the basis of each present given, there are moral choices of the individual which will perpetuate various retributive series. Moreover, as Śrīlāta argues, it is not fatalistic determination because it is acknowledged that the coming into being of these karmically given is also dependent on the assistance of the efficacies of the conditions that exist in the present moment.102 To summarize: in Śrīlāta’s conception, there is a clear distinction between the “retribution-born” and a “retribution fruit of a retribution cause”.

依據對於「異熟生」上所引的描述，「異熟」（作為「異熟因」的果）是由前因頓然引生，而一旦被引生，它繼續自在地轉起（任運隨轉, *anabhisaṃskāreṇa vartate, arise freely）而不須重複的力量。故此，在現在刹那的有情相續中的持續顯現，連同他所經驗到的現象總體，是存在論的狀況作為「異熟」毫不費力地生起。然而，這並非必定是絕對決定論的涵義，這是因為在每一現在刹那為依據的狀況下，是有個人的道德選擇而它將存續於不同的「異熟」相續之中。此外，如室利邏多論證，這並非是宿命決定論，因為它認許這些業力狀況的出現亦依據存在於現在眾緣功能的幫助而生起。102總結：在室利邏多的概念中，「異熟生」與“「異熟因」的「異熟果」”之間是有清楚的區別。

In the case of a retribution fruit produced from a retribution cause, the process requires time for maturation; but even for such a fruit, once it reaches full maturation, it too is projected abruptly/immediately. For Śrīlāta and others who hold that only the present exists, the key notion required in this process is “transformation in a serial continuity” (saṃtati-pariṇāma). The karmic efficacy is continuously transmitted through the series, and each present moment is different from the preceding one. At the culminating point when the maturation process is completed ―a point distinguished from those that precede and hence called a “distinction” (viśeṣa) ― the corresponding retribution fruit is projected immediately/directly (sākṣāt). We have, however, seen above that Śrīlāta speaks of the “causal efficacy through a succession”. (§5). This clearly shows that Śrīlāta never intends the fruit of retributive cause to be generated in an instant without first having gone through a process of maturation. When Saṃghabhadra makes the criticism that if his definition of the old pursuant element implies that a retribution is produced immediately, then there would be no aparaparyāya-vedanīya-karma (“karma experiencible in a life subsequent to the next”), Śrīlāta replies:

A fruit can be projected either immediately/directly (sākṣāt) or through a succession (pāraṃparyeṇa). This is like the case of the flower and seed, which, [respectively,] projects a fruit directly and through a succession. (See above, §§[IX].[c], [X])

在「異熟果」從「異熟因」生的情況中，這過程是需要時間成熟；然而，即使是這樣的果，一旦它達到完全成熟，它亦是無間所引生。對於室利邏多及其他主張現在實有的人來説，在這過程中的關鍵概念是「相續轉變」（saṃtati-pariṇāma, transformation in a serial continuity）。業力的功能是持續地透過相續而傳遞，而每一現在刹那是不同於前一刹那。在達到極點時，成熟的過程完成――這點是從其他之前的刹那點區別出來，故被稱為「差別」（viśeṣa, distinction）――相對應的「異熟果」被無間/直接（sākṣāt, directly）引生。然而，如上所見，室利邏多提及“因果功能由展轉力”。（§5）這清楚顯示室利邏多未曾打算將「異熟因」的果視為是未有先經歷成熟的過程而於一瞬間生起。當眾賢作出批評說，若他「舊隨界」的定義是指「異熟」無間生起的涵義，那麽便不會有順後次受業（aparaparyāya-vedanīya-karma, karma experiencible in a life subsequent to the next），室利邏多回應： 隣近（sākṣāt, immediately/directly）展轉（pāraṃparyeṇa, through a succession）

能牽果故。如花、種等［個別地］隣近展轉能引果生。（見上, §§[IX].[c], [X]）

We have also seen that his pupil, Rāma, too speaks of an effect as arising either directly or through a succession in the context of conditioned co-arising (§5). In any case, Śrīlāta’s reply here is no different from Vasubandhu’s description in terms of the bīja doctrine:

我們同樣看到他的門人邏摩亦在解釋緣起的情況中，提及果是由親、傳二因而生起（§5）。無論如何，室利邏多在此的回應與世親依據「種子」義理的描述是沒有不同的：

[i] AKB, 64: kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma / yannāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samarthaṃ sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā/ (see tr. in §4) [ii] AKB, 477: Just as it is said [in the world], “a fruit arises from the seed”. But it does not arise from the perished seed nor does it arise immediately. How then? It [arises] from the distinctive [culminating moment] in the serial transformation (saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa) of that [seed] (underlining is for the convenience of cross-referencing below): from the final stage of the flower, generated successively from the sprout to the stem to the leaves, etc. But that which is generated from the flower － why is it said to be the fruit of the seed? Because the efficacy [for generating the fruit] existing in the flower was induced by it through a succession from it....It is thus that the fruit is said to arise from the karma. And it is not the case that it arises from the karma that has perished, nor [does it arise] immediately [after the karma].... It is from the distinctive [culminating moment] in the serial transformation of that [[[karma]]].103

[i]《俱舍論》,64: kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma / yannāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samarthaṃ sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā/ （翻譯見§4） [ii] 《俱舍論》, 477: 如世間說“果從種生”。然果不隨已壞種起，亦非從種無間即生。若爾，從何？從種相續轉變差別［刹那］（saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa）（劃底線以方便下面互相對照）果方得生，謂：種次生芽、莖、葉等，花為最後方引果生。若爾，何言從種生果？由種展轉引起花中生果功能。...如是雖言從業生果。而非從彼已壞業生，亦非從業無間生果。但從業相續轉變差別［刹那］生。103

Katō, J., however, claims that the karma doctrine in terms of the pursuant element is completely different from that proposed by the Sarvāstivāda or by Vasubandhu.104 He seems to have arrived at this conclusion partly on account of misunderstanding Śrīlāta’s and Vasubandhu’s descriptions and misinterpreting Saṃghabhadra’s criticism. When Śrīlāta states that all dharma-s arise immediately and that the specific serial continuity of an existent dharma continues to serve as the cause, through a succession, for its arising even after that dharma has long perished (§4), Katō takes them as constituting the claim that a vipāka-hetu and its vipāka-phala continuously arise in a successive manner.105But, firstly, as we have seen above, this is not a proposition that a vipāka-phala is immediately generated from a vipāka-hetu without the need of a saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa. Secondly, even though an effect － and for that matter, any existent － is said to arise immediately, this effect admits of two cases: (i) a retribution effect projected at the culminating point (viśeṣa) of the serial continuity, (ii) an effect which is an emanational fruit from the preceding moment of a homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu).106 As a matter of fact, such an understanding is equally acceptable by the Vaibhāṣikas. Saṃghabhadra explains that there are emanational fruits from a retribution fruit, but the signification of the emanational cause and the retribution cause are to be distinguished: That which is born from a homogeneous cause and that which is born from a retribution cause are different. A preceding retribution qua homogeneous cause generates a succeeding retribution qua emanational fruit. The succeeding retribution is derived from a previous karma. The karma from which [the retribution] is derived is called the retribution cause; the retribution derived therefrom is the retribution fruit. 107

然而，加藤宣稱依據「隨界」的業論是完全不同於說一切有部或世親所主張的業論。104他得出這結論，似乎部分是由於他誤解室利邏多及世親描述的，以及誤釋眾賢的批評。對於室利邏多說明“有法體雖經劫滅而自相續展轉相仍猶為因性”（§4），加藤將它理解為構成「異熟因」及其「異熟果」以展轉的方式持續地生起這宣稱。105然而，首先，如上所見，這並非是「異熟果」從「異熟因」無間生而不須「相續轉變差別」這樣的主張。其次，雖然果――就此而言，任何存在――被說為無間生，這個果有兩個可能的情況：（i）「異熟果」在達到相續的極點（viśeṣa）時所引生，（ii）果即是「等流果」從前一刹那「同類因」（sabhāga-hetu）所生。106事實上，這樣的理解同樣被毘婆沙師接受。眾賢解釋，有「等流果」是從「異熟果」所生，但「等流因」與「異熟因」的涵義應區別： 「同類」、「異熟」二因所生義各別故，謂前「異熟」為「同類因」生後「異熟」為「等流果」，即後「異熟」由先業成。［「異熟」］能成諸業名「異熟因」；所成「異熟」即「異熟果」。107

In the context of explaining saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa, Vasubandhu distinguishes the retribution cause from the homogeneous cause thus: The efficacy of giving a retribution fruit projected by a retribution cause comes to cease after having given its retribution fruit. In the case of the efficacy of giving an emanational fruit projected by a homogeneous cause, it does not cease upon giving its fruit: a defiled one ceases only when its counteragent (pratipakṣa) arises; a non-defiled one ceases only when one’s mental serial continuity (citta-saṃtāna) ceases absolutely upon the attainment of parinirvāṇa.108 It is to be noted that in citing this explanation, Saṃghabhadra includes the doctrine of the pursuant element as subsumable under this mechanism.109 In very clear terms, the saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa is described as being projected by both the retribution cause and the homogeneous cause. In the former case, a retribution fruit is finally generated at which stage the efficacy ceases. In the latter case, an emanational fruit is continuously generated, and the efficacy ceases either when the counteragent (pratipakṣa) is acquired or when one attains parinirvāṇa:

在解釋「相續轉變差別」的情況中，世親將「異熟果」從「同類因」區別出來：「異熟因」所引與「異熟果」功能，與「異熟果」已即便謝滅。「同類因」所引與「等流果」功能：若染污者，對治（pratipakṣa, counteragent）起時即便謝滅；不染污者般涅槃時方永謝滅，以心相續（citta-saṃtāna, mental serial continuity）爾時永滅故。108值得注意的是，在引述這解釋時，眾賢亦包括「隨界」義理並將它歸納為這機制之中。109「相續轉變差別」以非常清楚的用語被描述為由「異熟因」及「同類因」兩者所引生。在前者的情況，「異熟果」在功能謝滅的階段最終被生起。而在後者的情況，「等流果」持續地生起，當獲得對治（pratipakṣa, counteragent）

或般涅槃時，功能才謝滅

108 tatra vipākahetvāhitaṃ tu vipākaphaladāna-sāmarthyaṃ vipākaṃ dattvā vinirtate | sabhāgahetvāhitaṃ tu niṣyandaphaladāna-sāmarthyaṃ kliṣṭānāṃ pratipakṣodayād vinivartate| akliṣṭānāṃ cittasantānātyantavinivṛtter yadā parinirvāti| In the case of a saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa projected by a retribution cause, the efficacy for giving fruit (which is the viśeṣa) ceases after giving a retribution fruit. In the case of a saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa projected by a homogeneous cause, if the efficacy for giving fruit is a defiled one, the efficacy for giving emanational fruit ceases when the absolute counteragent is acquired; if non-defiled, the efficacy for giving emanational fruit accompanies the serial continuity of thought and ceases completely only at the stage when the parinirvāṇa without the remainder of substratum (nirupadhiśeṣa) is attained.

Such a doctrine is none other than [that of] the old pursuant element, etc, which I have repeatedly refuted before. 110 諸「異熟因」所引「相續轉變差別」與果功能，與「異熟果」已，此功能便息。諸「同類因」所「引相續轉變差別」與果功能，若染污者，至得畢竟對治道時，與「等流果」功能便息；不染污者，隨心相續至無餘依（nirupadhiśeṣa, without the remainder of substratum）般涅槃位，與「等流果」所有功能方畢竟息。

如是所說，即是前來我所數破「舊隨界」等。110

Concerning the first underlined clause in the earlier quotation above, Katō remarks that the commentaries are silent on it and its background has never been made clear. He asserts that this is clearly a refutation of Śrīlāta’s pursuant element doctrine － a doctrine known to Vasubandhu at the time of composing the AKB. He believes that “saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa” in the second underlined sentence may represent an innovation by Vasubandhu or the Yogācāra of Asaṅga and others.111 In Katō’s opinion, whereas Śrīlāta speaks of a vipāka-hetu generating its vipāka-phala immediately and in every moment, Vasubandhu’s — and for that matter, the Sarvāstivādin’s — description is a position which restricts a specific karmic retribution to arise only once and necessarily through a temporal lapse. And this, to him, is the big difference. However, Śrīlāta too actually speaks of a single karma projecting only a single vipāka (§2.[XI]). More importantly, Śrīlāta, like all other Dārṣṭāntikas, also describes the process of karmic retribution as one involving the successive transmission of the karmic efficacy, analogous to the seed-fruit process. Both Śrīlāta and Vasubandhu equally employ this analogy.

有關較早引文中第一個劃底線分句，加藤評註，論釋對它保持沉默而其背景從未被釐清。他主張這清楚是對室利邏多「隨界」義理的破斥――這義理在撰寫《俱舍論》時已為世親所知。他相信第二個劃底線句子中「相續轉變差別」可代表為世親或無著（Asaṅga）及其他瑜伽行派論師的一個創新。111加藤的見解是，室利邏多提及「異熟因」於每一刹那無間生起其「異熟果」，而世親的——就此而言，說一切有部論師的——描述卻是限制特有的業果只生起一次並必須經歷時間流動的立場。而對他來説，這是一個很大的差別。然而，室利邏多實際上亦提及一業只能引生一果（ §2.[XI]）。更重要的是，如所有其他譬喻論師一樣，室利邏多亦將業果感赴的過程描述為一個涉及業功能的展轉傳遞，並與“種-果”的過程作類比。室利邏多及世親兩者都使用這比喻。

We learn through Saṃghabhadra that in fact all Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas describe this process in similar terms. The Sāṃmitīya and others, who deny that all conditioned dharma-s are momentary (kṣaṇika), question this explanation in terms of the seed-fruit analogy: If all conditionings (saṃskāra) are momentary, how can the fact of karmic retribution be established?

How is it not established?

Because there is no mutual connexion (不相及; lit.: “not mutually reached”). Ie., it has never been observed that a seed that has perished is still capable of generating sprouts.... It is not the case that karma is like the seed which generates the sprouts, and gives the retribution fruit at the time when it is perishing. Nor is it the case that a non-existent dharma is capable of serving as a cause. Hence, karmic retribution ought to be impossible. This is the fallacy of their tenet i.e., the tenet of the Dārṣṭāntikas....112

我們透過眾賢了解到事實上所有譬喻經量部論師以相似的説法描述這過程。正量部（Sāṃmitīya）及其它部派否定一切有為法是刹那性（kṣaṇika），他們依據“種-果”的比喻問難這解釋： 既一切行皆剎那滅，如何業果感赴理成？

如何不成？

不相及故，謂曾未見種體已滅猶能生芽。...然非諸業如種生芽於正滅時與「異熟果」。又非無法可能為因。是故，應無業果感赴。是彼宗過！...謂譬喻宗。...112

Saṃghabhadra then proceeds to further expose the fallacy of the seed-fruit model of karmic retribution for the “present only exists” school of thought: Even assuming that they can establish the principle of succession through a serial continuity, [the process] does not correspond to [that of] a seed [producing] a fruit. It is observed that a serial succession of the seed, [sprout], etc., must be uninterrupted in order to generate a fruit. [On the other hand], a citta can generate a fruit [despite] there being interruption. Hence, their seed-fruit analogy is unable to establish [the principle of] karmic retribution as proposed by their school, because when one enters into the two meditative attainments devoid of citta — the asaṃjñā-[and nirodha-samāpatti] —citta does not operate. . Thus it is not the case that the one karma continues serially uninterrupted up to the point of generating its fruit. Their school only acknowledges volition (cetanā) as the true karma; this is none other than the doctrines of...anudhātu, vasanā, bīja, etc.113

對於「現在有」的部派，眾賢之後進一步繼續揭露業果感赴的“種-果”模型的過失： 設許相續展轉理成，彼［過程］不應如種［生］果道理。現見種［、芽］等展轉相續必無間絕方能生果。［另一方面，］心能生果［儘管］相續有間。故種果喻，於彼所宗業果感赴［的道理］無能證力，以入無想［、滅盡的］二無心定——心等不行。...非至果生，一業相續恒無間斷。彼宗唯許思（cetanā, volition）是實業。此即...「隨界」、「習氣」、「種子」論等。

In the debate on the tri-temporal existence of dharma-s, Śrīlāta explains how a past karma can also be said to exist, despite the fact that the past and future dharma-s do not exist as real entities (dravya): The past karma can also be said to exist. This is because there is the condition qua cause, because there is the pursuant element, because there is not yet an obstruction to its serial continuity, because its retribution fruit is not yet matured, because it can only project the retribution in the final moment.114

在諸法三世實有的爭論中，室利邏多解釋過去如何亦能說為是存在，儘管事實上過去、未來法不是以實體（dravya, real entities）存在： 彼過去業亦可說有，有因緣故、有「隨界」故、未有能遮彼相續故、彼「異熟果」未成熟故、最後方能牽「異熟」故。114

This is yet another clear testimony that in his doctrine a karmic retribution is not immediate. But, of course, at the culminating point of the maturation process, the fruit is generated immediately. In brief, like Vasubandhu’s bīja theory, Śrīlāta’s karma theory in terms of the pursuant element also necessarily involves a process of continuous transformation in the person’s serial continuity (more precisely, in his mental series) through which the karmic efficacy is transmitted. For both Vasubandhu and Śrīlāta, karma cannot mature immediately. The proposition that all dharma-s arise immediately and are retribution-born is not a doctrine of immediate karmic retribution; these momentarily manifesting dharma-s may be either emanational fruits or retribution fruits whose retribution causes have fully matured.

這可是另一個清楚的證據説明在他的義理中業果感赴並不是無間的。當然，在成熟過程的極點時，果是無間生起。簡言之，世親的種子學説以及室利邏多依據「隨界」的業學説，對於業功能的傳遞亦必定涉及透過有情相續（更準確來説，在其心相續）中持續轉變的過程。對於室利邏多及世親兩者來説，業不能夠立即成熟的。一切法是無間生起及為「異熟生」這主張並不是無間業果感赴的義理；這些刹那顯現的諸法可以是「等流果」或「異熟果」，其「異熟因」已完全成熟。

In Śrīlāta’s doctrine, one could speak of retribution fruit “in the proper sense”, i.e, as a final production from a previous karmic cause, to be distinguished from the “retribution-born”. Although it is stated that his “retribution-born” means “born from a retribution”, it is clear that among the retribution-born dharma-s — which for him comprise the totality of phenomenal existence — some of them obviously arise in the present moment as retribution fruits. Interestingly enough, the *Maulī-Bhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi speaks explicitly of “retribution-born” as being twofold in meaning, i.e., as (i) referring to the arising of a retribution entity, and (ii) in the sense of being born from a retribution.115 It appears that such a distinction came to be further developed in the relatively later textual material such as the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi 116 and Asaṅga’s Abhidharma-samuccaya,117 where only the ālayavijñāna ― together with the dharma-s conjoined with it ― qualifies as the retribution fruit in the true sense. All other phenomena are called retribution-born because they are born from the seeds of the ālayavijñāna ― and the seeds and the ālayavijñāna are neither identical with or different from each other.118

在室利邏多的義理中，他可“如理地”論及「異熟果」，即作為從先前業因而來的最終結果，並從「異熟生」區別出來。雖然其「異熟生」的意思是指從「異熟」生，但很清楚是在「異熟生」的諸法中――對他來説是構成現象存在的總體――其中有些明顯是於現在刹那生起為「異熟果」。很有趣，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi）的〈本地分〉（*Maulī-Bhūmi）明確地提及「異熟生」為兩種意思，即（i）「異熟」體生，及（ii）從「異熟生」。115似乎這樣的區別於相對較後期的文獻資料進一步發展，例如在《瑜伽師地論》的〈攝抉擇分〉（Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī）116以及無著的《大乘阿毘達磨集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）117中，只有「阿賴耶識」（ālayavijñāna）――與它相應的法一切――在真正意義上有資格作為「異熟果」的。一切其他現象被稱為「異熟生」因為它們都是從「阿賴耶識」的「種子」所生――而「阿賴耶識」與「種子」是非一非異的。118

8. The role of the pursuant element in cognition

i. The role of the pursuant element in the context of the knowledge of the external world Given that everything is momentary and Srilāta’s denial of simultaneous causality, the inevitable conclusion is that a sensory consciousness can only arise in the second moment, after the initial moment of the sensory faculty and object. From the Vaibhāṣika perspective, this means that direct perception (pratyakṣa) is impossible, and hence true knowledge of the external world is impossible. One cannot even argue that knowledge is derivable from inference, for the validity of inference necessarily depends on the fact of direct perception.

8. 「隨界」在認知上的角色 i. 「隨界」於外在世界的知識範圍中的角色 鑒於一切都是刹那性以及室利邏多對同時因果的否定，必然的結論是，感官五識只能在五根與五境接觸的初刹那之後才於第二刹那生起。從毘婆沙師的觀點來看，這是指現量（direct perception, pratyakṣa）是沒有可能的，故此對外在世界的真實知識亦是沒有可能。這甚至不能論證知識是由比量而衍生出來的，因為比量的有效性必須依據現量。

a. Saṃghabhadra: Śrīlāta’s doctrine entails that there is no cognitive object Saṃghabhadra argues that Śrīlāta’s doctrine entails that there is no “condition qua object” (ālambana-pratyaya) in the arising of consciousness: The Dārṣṭāntika tenet [amounts to that] the condition qua object is not the object-domain (viṣaya) and the object-domain is not the condition qua object. This is because, according to him, visibles, etc, which serve as conditions for the generation of visual consciousness, etc, necessarily arise in the preceding moment. [But] if when a visible exists, visual consciousness has not arisen; then, since there is not yet any consciousness, what takes the cognitive object? When visual consciousness exists, the visible is no more existent; then, the visible being non-existent, what serves as the cognitive object (ālambana)?

a.眾賢：室利邏多的義理會導致沒有「所緣緣」 眾賢論證室利邏多的義理會導致識的生起是沒有「所緣緣」（ālambana-pratyaya, condition qua object）： 譬喻者宗...謂「所緣緣」非「所緣境」（viṣaya ,object domain）...「所緣境」非「所緣緣」...彼說色等，若能為緣生眼等識，如是色等，必前生故。［然而，］若色有時，眼識未有；識既未有，誰復能緣？眼識有時，色已非有，色既非有，誰作所緣（ālambana ,cognitive object）？

Visual consciousness ought not to take a non-existent object-domain as its cognitive object, since a sensory consciousness is said to take a present cognitive object, and since his school acknowledges that the present is not non-existent. The visible being cognized in the present is not the cognitive object, since it is co-nascent with the present visual consciousness. The same objection applies to [the other sensory consciousnesses] up to bodily consciousness. It would not be possible for the five sensory consciousnesses to have cognitive objects.

眼識不應緣非有，以說五識緣現在故，彼宗現在非非有故。現所緣色非「所緣緣」，與現眼識俱時生故，［由其他識］乃至身識。...五識應無「所緣緣」義。

For their school, the same objections ought to hold for a mental consciousness which cognizes a present [[[object]]], as in the case of a sensory consciousness. For one which cognizes the past, the present, or the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), it is definitely not possible to have a cognitive object since they hold that the past, the future and the unconditioned are all non-existent, and since it is not the case that a non-existent can be made a condition, lest it be a fallacy of over-generalization (atiprasaṅga; i.e, a non-existent would be the causal condition for anything; anything would arise without a real condition).119

彼宗意識，緣現在［所緣］者，應同五識進退推徵。若緣去、來及無為（asaṃskṛta, the unconditioned）者，決定無有「所緣緣」義，彼執去、來及無為法皆非有故，非非有體可立為緣，太過失故（atiprasaṅga, 即不存在的事物對任何事物可作為因緣；任何事物在無實緣亦可生起）。119

Saṃghabhadra points out that if this is the case, then it blatantly contradicts the principle (niyama) laid down in the Buddha’s teaching that the arising of any consciousness has a twofold requisite, namely, the cognitive faculty (indriya) and the cognitive object.120

眾賢指出，若是這樣的情況，那麽便相違了佛陀所說二緣能生「識」的決定（niyama, principle）判言，二緣即根（indriya, cognitive faculty）及境。120

b. Śrīlāta: Consciousness has a cognitive object, though it need not be an existent Śrīlāta answers that a consciousness does necessarily have a cognitive object, even though the latter may not be an existent. One’s consciousness knows a past or future object through a process of successive effect－＞ cause or cause－＞effect inference, respectively, into the past or the future, and this is possible only after one has grasped a present object. In such a successive looking into the corresponding past/future causes, one acquires knowledge of the object “just as one has directly realized it, without any topsy-turviness (如現證得,皆無顛倒)”. Thus, although at the present moment the previous object is no more, the arising of its knowledge is not without a cognitive object. In this way, the twofold requisite taught by the Buddha is not violated.121

b. 室利邏多：識有「所緣緣」，雖然它不需是實有 室利邏多回答是，「識」必須有「所緣緣」，即使後者未必是實有的。有情的「識」是透過連續的“果（現在）－＞因（過去）”或“因（現在）－＞果（未來）”各別的過程而推尋至過去或未來，故能夠認識到過去或未來的「所緣」。這樣展轉地觀察相對的過去/未來因，他獲得對於「所緣」的認識是“如現證得，皆無顛倒”。故此，雖然在現在刹那，前一刹那的「所緣」已不存在，但對其認識的生起不是沒有「所緣」的。以這樣的方式，佛陀所說的二緣並沒有被違反。121

Concerning a mental consciousness that cognizes a past(/future) object, Śrīlāta explains that when it arises in the present moment with the preceding sensory consciousness as its equal-immediate condition － called the manas (the thought that has just ceased), serving as its support-basis (āśraya) － it is capable of experiencing (anu-√bhū) the sensory object of the preceding moment. And since this preceding sensory consciousness arose taking the external object-domain as its cognitive object, the mental consciousness comes to have the knowledge of the same external object-domain. He elaborates further{復作是言}:

有關「意識」能認知過去（/未來）的「所緣」，室利邏多解釋，當它於現在刹那生起時以前五識為「等無間緣」――稱為「意」（manas, 剛已滅的識），作為其所依（āśraya, support-basis）――能領受（anu-√bhū, experience）前刹那的五境。由於這前五識生起是以外五境作為其「所緣」，故「意識」亦有相同的外境的認識。他進一步闡釋：

Such a mental consciousness has as its cause the manas, and its condition qua object is none other than the [external] object-domain of the [[[corresponding]]] sensory consciousness. [The preceding manas (=the sensory consciousness) is the cause] because it must have existed first in order that this [[[mental consciousness]]] can arise; and [the sensory object is the cognitive object of this mental consciousness] because the existence or non-existence of this [[[consciousness]]] follows the existence or non-existence of that [object-domain] However, this mental consciousness does not exclusively have an existent as its object, since at this time [of its arising] that object has already perished. Neither is it without a cognitive object, since the existence or non-existence of this mental consciousness follows the existence or non-existence of that [object-domain].122

如是「意識」以「意」（manas）為因，此「所緣緣」即五識［相應的外］境。［前「意」（=五識）是因，］要彼為先此［「意識」］得生故；［而五境是此「意識」的認知「所緣」，因為］隨彼［境的］有、無，此［「意識」］有、無故。然此意識非唯緣有，［其生起的］爾時彼境已滅壞故。非無「所緣」，由此「意識」隨彼［境的］有、無，此有、無故。122

ii. Pursuant element and knowledge-form (jñāna-ākāra) in the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika doctrine The tenet that an object that has existed in the preceding moment can be grasped by the succeeding moment of consciousness is also reported as a doctrine of Dharmakīrti, the Buddhist logician: If it is asked how [an object] different in time can be grasped, we would say that the essence of being a graspable (grāhyatā) [― i.e, an object of cognition ―] is none other than the fact of being the cause of [its] distinctive appearance (/manifestation), capable of transferring its knowledge-form (jñāna-ākāra).123

ii. 譬喻經量部的義理中的「隨界」與「智行相」（jñāna-ākāra） 前刹那已存在的「所緣」是能夠由後刹那的「識」所取這宗義亦說為是佛家因明大師法稱（Dharmakīrti）的義理： 若問［一個「所緣」］如何能於不同的時間為所取，我們說是所取性（grāhyatā, a graspable）［――即認知的「所緣」――］即是作為［其］差別相（/顯現）的因，能傳遞其「智行相」（jñāna-ākāra, knowledge-form）。123

In Mādhavācārya’s Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha, it is clear that this is presented as a Sautrāntika doctrine. In Vācaspatimiśra’s Nyāyakaṇikā as well, it is explicitly mentioned as a Sautrāntika statement (yathāha sautrāntikanaye...).124 I have rendered ākāra here as “form” because, unlike the Vaibhāṣikas who take the term to mean a mode of understanding (ākāra is prajña), which can be correct or incorrect, the Sautrāntikas take it here to mean the form/image of the object cognized .125 For them, it is an exact copy of the image in the cognizer’s mind ― or, we can say that this knowledge-mode consists of the form/image of the object ―and it is by virtue of this fact that an external object in the first moment can be grasped by consciousness arising in the second moment. It is thus that the Sautrāntikas insist that the existence of external reality can be inferred and they came to be known in later time as

“those holding the theory of the inferability of the external object” (bāhyārthānumeyavāda).126 But of course, as to how exactly the mechanism is through which an external object does the transferring or delivering (arpaṇa) of its own form to the mind, the Sautrāntikas do not seem to have given any satisfactory explanation. This much, though, is sufficiently clear: It is an explicit tenet of the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas that, in a cognition, the object has an intrinsic capacity to effectuate a knowledge of itself. Or, as Mokṣākaragupta puts it: “The knowledge which grasps an object (artha) is the effect of the object. For, the object, on account of being grasped, is the cause of the knowledge.” 127In terms of the pursuant element theory, we can understand that the external object, as it is perishing, leaves behind a perfuming in the mind. We may say that the object’s ākāra is “stored” in the pursuant element ―or perhaps more correctly, is perfumed as a pursuant element―by virtue of which the knowledge of this object arises in the next moment. 在摩陀婆論師（Mādhava-ācārya）的《攝一切見》（Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha）

中，很清楚看到它被表示為經量部的義理。同樣地，在瓦卡帕提米拉（Vācaspatimiśra）的Nyāyakaṇikā中亦明確地提及它為經量部所說的（yathāha sautrāntikanaye ...）。124非如毘婆沙師將ākāra一詞作為是一種理解方式（ākāra即是prajña, 慧）的意思，於此我將ākāra翻譯為“form”（「相/行相」）因為它可以是正確或是錯誤的，而經量部論師於此將它作為是被認知的「所緣」的「相/影像」。125對他們來説，它是認知者心中的影像一模一樣的複本――或我們可說這「智行相」是由「所緣」的「相/影像」所構成――而正正是憑藉這事實，在第一刹那的外境可被第二刹那生起的「識」所取。故此，經量部論師堅持外在真實的存在是可推論得知的，而他們於後期被認為是“主張外境可推論性的學説”（bāhyārthānumeyavāda）。126當然，至於這究竟是透過怎樣的機制將外境傳遞或傳送（arpaṇa）其「相」至「識」，經量部論師似乎沒有給予任何令人滿意的解釋。雖然，就這點是十分清楚：它是譬喻經量部論師的明確宗義，在認知的過程中，「所緣」具有一種内在功能以引起其自身的智。或者如Mokṣākaragupta所說：“取境（artha）的「智」就是境的果。因為由於境被取，它是「智」的因。” 127依據「隨界」學説，我們可理解到外境正在滅時，它在「識」中留下熏習。我們或可說「所緣」的「行相」被“儲存”於「隨界」中――或者更正確來説，被熏習為「隨界」――憑藉這方式故「所緣」的「智」可於下一刹那生起。

It is noteworthy that both Śrīlāta and Dharmakīrti speak of the knowledge-form, jñānākāra. In a discussion on memory (smṛti), the Vaibhāṣikas maintain that recollection is possible thanks to a real force called memory which co-nascent with all mental factors (it is a mahā-bhūmika). This force remembers the object which is being directly perceived ― and this is possible thanks to simultaneous causality ― so that subsequently one can recollect the object. Śrīlāta denies memory as an ontological entity and explains recollection as being due to “the knowledge-mode’s (智行相: jñānākāra) operation of remembering the object-domain”.128 His main stress here seems to be that remembering is a mode of knowledge, and not the activity of a distinct entity called memory as conceived by the Vaibhāṣikas. But the point is also conveyed that the said knowledge-mode (in this case the same as knowledge-form) is efficacious in effectuating a recollection. This is possible by virtue of the fact that the object’s image/mode has been perfumed into that knowledge from the initial stage of the perceptual act and has been successively passed down in the mental serial continuity. Elsewhere, Śrīlāta explains thus:

值得注意的是，室利邏多及法稱兩者都提及「智行相」，jñānākāra。在對於「念」（smṛti, memory）的討論中，毘婆沙師主張憶念成為可能是由於稱為「念」的實法，它是與一切心所俱生的（它是一個大地法, mahā-bhūmika）。這個「念」能憶念被直接認知的「所緣」――而這成為可能是由於同時因果――因此，之後能夠憶念「所緣」。室利邏多否定「念」為一個本體論的實體，並解釋「念」為“於彼境即「智行相」（jñānākāra, knowledge- mode）明記而轉”。128他在這裏主要強調的重點似乎是，憶念是「智行相」而非如毘婆沙師所構想一個別體的作用稱之為「念」。然而，這一點亦表達出所說的「智」的「行相」（這情況與「智相」一樣）在引起憶念上是有功能的。這是可能的，憑藉從認知活動的最初階段開始，「所緣」的「影像/行相」被熏習於「智」中，並且於心相續中展轉地傳遞下去。在別處，室利邏多這樣解釋：

When one recollects a long perished object-domain, the previous consciousness of that object-domain serves as the condition generating the recollecting consciousness (*anusmaraṇa-vijñāna) of the present moment. This is because the recollecting consciousness belongs to the same serial continuity [of which this former consciousness is a member] and arises through a succession. Although there are other conditions in the generation of the recollecting consciousness, it can only arise after the former object domain has been perceived.129

隨憶念久滅境時，以於彼境前識為緣生於今時隨憶念識（*anusmaraṇa-vijñāna, recollecting consciousness）。［前識］墮一相續，傳相生故。雖有餘緣起隨念識，而要緣彼先［前的］境方生。129

In explaining the process of recollection, Śrīlāta actually alludes to the role of the pursuant element: At the time when a particular cause-knowledge (hetu-jñāna) arises, there exists the hetu-pratyaya (因緣) [―the pursuant element―] in one’s serial continuity. That is: there was formerly produced such a knowledge; through a causal succession (pāraṃparyeṇa), it gives rise to a present knowledge of such a form. Since this present knowledge has as its cause the former knowledge, the result is that this present knowledge arises with an understanding conforming to the former one (如昔而解), having as its cognitive object the former object-domain.130

在解釋憶念的過程中，室利邏多實際上提到「隨界」的角色： 如是「因智」（hetu-jñāna, cause-knowledge）生時，自相續中因緣（hetu-pratyaya）［――「隨界」――］有故，謂昔曾有如是「智」生傳（pāraṃparyeṇa, succession）因生今如是相「 智」。今「智」既以昔「智」為因，故今「智」生如昔而解，即以昔境為今所緣。130

Here, he speaks of the presence of hetu-pratyaya ― by which we know he intends the pursuant element―and the cause-knowledges and effect-knowledges in the serial continuity. When a present knowledge arises, it takes the object that has been cognized by these knowledges as its cognitive object. The present consciousness is the effect-knowledge of the pursuant element (the cause-knowledge) in the preceding moment; it is in turn the cause-knowledge (the pursuant element) for the effect knowledge in the next moment. It is through such a successive transmission of the pursuant elements qua cause and effect that direct perception, as well as recollection, becomes possible.

在這裏，他提及「因緣」――我們知道他意指「隨界」――以及「為因的智」與「為果的智」存在於相續中。當現在的「智」生起時，它將認被這些「智」所認知「所緣」作為其「所緣」者。現在「識」是前刹那「隨界」（「為因的智」）的「為果的智」；而反過來「為因的智」（「隨界」）是次刹那「為果的智」。這是透過「隨界」作為因與果的展轉傳遞，而令直接認知以及憶念成為可能。

Among Saṃghabhadra’s criticisms to Śrīlāta’s explanations, one explicitly refers to the pursuant element doctrine: Granting that there is the pursuant element and [that] by virtue of the serial continuity of cause-effect succession it may be plausible that [a consciousness] at the present time can grasp an object-domain that has long perished, even after many aeons. But how can a present [[[consciousness]]] grasp a future object-domain which will come into existence hundreds of thousands of aeons later? He cannot claim that it can also be grasped by virtue of the serial continuity of the cause-effect succession; since the future is non-existent, like the horn of a horse, and since there is no pursuant element. 131 Thus, we see that in Śrīlāta’s theory of cognition as well the pursuant element plays an important role to make possible both the fact of recollection and the knowledge of the external world.

在眾賢對室利邏多的解釋的批評之中，其中一個明確地是指「隨界」義理： 設許彼有「舊隨界」因果展轉相續力故，雖經多劫久已滅境而［識］今時取，理可無違。若於未來百千劫後當有境界，今［識］如何取？不可說言因果展轉相續力故，彼亦可取未來體無，如馬角故，於相續中無「隨界」故。131 故此，我們看到在室利邏多的認知學説中，「隨界」同樣是擔當着重要的角色，令憶念以及外在世界的知識這兩事成為可能。

9. Evaluation

9. i. Śrīlāta’s doctrine of the pursuant element is essentially a seed theory, similar, in the main, to the seed theory expounded by Vasubandhu. Both, being a doctrine from the present-only-exist perspective, require the notions of perfuming and saṃtati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa.

i. 室利邏多的「隨界」義理本質上是一個「種子」學説，與世親所闡釋的「種子」學説大體上相似。作為一個從唯現在有的觀點的義理，兩者都需要「熏習」及的「相續轉變差別」概念。

ii. Both, however, from the Vaibhāṣika viewpoint, suffer from an inability to satisfactorily account for the validity of these notions. Saṃghabhadra attributes this inability to the Dārṣṭāntika -Sautrāntika denial of sarvāstitva and simultaneous causality.

ii. 然而，從毘婆沙師的觀點來看，兩者都是無能力滿意地説明這些概念的有效性。眾賢將無能力説明的原因歸咎於譬喻經量部對一切有及同時因果的否定。

iii. For Śrīlāta, all dharma-s arise immediately in the present and are all retribution-born. But this is not a doctrine that a karmic retribution is effectuated immediately. Just as in the seed theory expounded by Vasubandhu, Śrīlāta’s karma theory too requires that a retribution fruit comes about after a process of maturation, and this cannot take place immediately. “Retribution-born” is to be distinguished from “retribution fruit born of a retribution cause”. Among the retribution-born, some dharma-s are indeed fruits born at the culminating point (viśeṣa) of the maturation process, others are emanational fruits.

iii. 對室利邏多來説，一切法於現在無間生起以及皆是「異熟生」。然而，這義理並不是說業果感赴被無間地招感。正如世親所闡釋的「種子」學説一樣，室利邏多的業力學說同樣需要經歷成熟的過程後才出現「異熟果」，而這是不能立即發生。「異熟生」應從 “「異熟因」所生是「異熟果」” 區別出來。在「異熟生」之中，有些法確實是在成熟過程中的極點（viśeṣa）生出來，而其他則是「等流果」。

iv. In the earliest textual material of the Yogācāra school (i.e, the *Maulī Bhūmi of the Yogācārabhūmi), it is interesting to observe a similar notion of the retribution-born as being twofold: “born of retribution” and “born as a retribution fruit”. In the relatively later textual material, such as the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi, this distinction further developed into one which confines “retribution fruit” to the ālayavijñāna, distinct from “retribution-born” which refers to all that is born from it.

iv. 在最早的瑜伽行派文獻資料中（即《瑜伽師地論》的〈本地分〉），我們很有趣地觀察到「異熟生」的相似概念，它作為兩種意思：（i）「異熟」所生，及（ii）生為「異熟果」。於相對較後期的文獻資料，例如《瑜伽師地論》的〈攝抉擇分〉（Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī），這區別進一步發展成將「異熟果」限制為「阿賴耶識」，並有別於「異熟生」，而「異熟生」的意思是指一切從它所生的事物。

v. Like seed, the pursuant element, being causal efficacy, cannot be construed as a mere concept totally devoid of any reality. But at the same time, it is not an ontological real that is distinct from the sentient serial continuity. This is the reason why it is sometimes mentioned in the singular, sometimes in the plural.

v. 如「種子」一樣，「隨界」作為因果功能，它是不能被理解為僅是概念而完全沒有任何真實性。然而，與此同時，它不是一個本體論的真實並離於有情相續。就是這原因它有時以單數而有時以複數被提及。

vi. The pursuant element is sometimes referred to as the “old pursuant element”, particularly in the context of saṃsaric existence, where “old” clearly signifies that the causal efficacies responsible for the sentient being’s existence have been serially transmitted from moment to moment from beginningless time. In the absence of sufficient textual evidence, it is not entirely clear whether historically this notion of the “old pursuant element” had influenced the *Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra doctrine of the “anādikāliko dhātuḥ”, or the other way around. Or, perhaps, both had been inspired by an earlier common source－such as the early yogācāra-s within the broad Sarvāstivāda tradition. However, we know of no indication that these yogācāra-s had held a similar doctrine, and throughout Saṃghabhadra’s lengthy refutation of Śrīlāta’s anudhātu doctrine, we see no allusion that this doctrine was influenced or borrowed from or partial to a similar Mahāyāna/Yogācāra doctrine.132 It seems, therefore, just possible that the influence could have been from the direction of the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas.

vi.「隨界」有時候亦被稱為「舊隨界」，尤其是在生死輪迴的情況中，而「舊」一字的涵義清楚地表示因果功能從無始時來已經刹那刹那相續地傳遞，並負責有情的存在。在缺乏足夠的文獻證據下，我們不完全清楚究竟在歷史上是這「舊隨界」概念影響了《大乘阿毘達磨經》“無始時來界”（anādikāliko dhātuḥ）的義理，或是反過來的情況。又或許是兩者都是受到一個更早的共同源頭所啓發－－例如在廣泛的說一切有不傳統中的早期瑜伽師。然而，我們不知有跡象顯示這些早期瑜伽師曾主張相似的義理，而在眾賢對室利邏多「隨界」義理的長篇的破斥中，我們沒有看到任何暗示是指這義理是借用、或傾向於、或受到大乘/瑜伽行派的義理影響。132故此，似乎亦有可能是這影響是從譬喻經量部論師的方向而來。

vii. From what we can gather from the extant Abhidharma literature, it seems possible to regard the pursuant element doctrine as a more generalized doctrine of the seed theory expounded in the AKB and the Vy, etc. We discern this particularly in the context of its attempt to account for the manifestation of the totality of phenomenal existence, i.e, the continued existence of the sentient being with all his phenomenal experiences. Every phenomenon has a causal source － everything, sentient and non-sentient, is co-arisen through causal conditions (pratītya-samutpanna) －and this source is the dhātu. We may say that this doctrine － whether referred to as anudhātu or *pūrva-anudhātu－is essentially a dhātu theory. (See especially, supra, §2.iv)

vii. 從現存阿毘達磨文獻我們能搜集的資料中，似乎有可能是將「舊隨界」視為一個更廣泛的「種子」學説被闡釋於《俱舍論》及《俱舍論疏》等。我們尤其對於説明現象存在總體的顯現的嘗試的情況下辨識它，而現象存在總體的顯現，即有情以及一切他的現象經驗的持續的存在。每一現象是有其因的本源－－一切，包括有情及非情，都是緣生的－－而這本源是「界」。我們或可說這義理－－不論稱為「隨界」或「舊隨界」－－本質上就是「界」的學説。（特別閒上§2.iv）

viii. Dhātu in the term anu-dhātu does not just have the significance of a seed, but also the continuous sustaining (<√dhā) of a specific nature. That is why the pursuant element can serve as the ākāra of an object domain and can be used to explain the possibility of direct perception and recollection.

viii.「隨界」一詞中的「界」不單只有「種子」的涵義，它亦有持續地任持（<√dhā, sustain）特性的涵義。這是為甚麽「隨界」能作為境的「行相」，以及能用作為解釋現量及憶念的可能性。

ix. There are certainly philosophical difficulties in these theories as pointed out in Saṃghabhadra’s critiques, but the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika position seems clear enough that our experiences manifested in the present (and only in the present) are able to transfer the efficacies of their manifestation in the next moment. In their theory of cognition, this is in fact how the later Sautrāntikas explain the possibility of perceiving an external object that existed in the preceding moment through the process of it transferring its image to the perceiver’s mind. This probably led to the understanding of the very nature/essence of an object of knowledge (a “graspable”; grāhya) as that which is intrinsically endowed with such a causal capacity.

ix. 在眾賢的評論中指出，這些學説確實是有哲學上的困難，但譬喻經量部的立場似乎十分清楚地説明我們顯現於現在（及只於現在）的經驗是能夠於下一刹那傳遞它們的顯現功能。在他們的認知學説中，這事實上是後期的經量部論師怎樣解釋認知存在於前一刹那的外境透過傳遞其影像至認知者的識的過程的可能性。這很可能引起「智」的「所緣」（所取,grāhya, graspable）性質/本質的理解，因為它是内在地具有這樣的因果功能。

x. The doctrinal inheritance of the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika seed theory by the early Yogācāra school is well known. In this development, Śrīlāta’s more generalized version of the pursuant element could have exerted significant influence. Broadly speaking, both schools of thought explain the manifestation of the totality of existence in terms of seed/ dhātu within one’s mental serial continuity. Moreover, Śrīlāta’s view that all dharma-s, being activity-domains of the mind, are subsumable under the dharma-āyatana133－ coupled with the doctrine that all knowables (all existents) are known only as internalized mental contents (jñānākāra) － clearly suggests an idealistic predilection of his doctrine, notwithstanding that both the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntikas and the early Yogācāras are in fact realists.

x. 早期瑜伽行派對譬喻經量部「種子」學説的義理繼承是眾所周知的。在這發展過程中，室利邏多更廣泛的「隨界」版本有可能發揮重大的影響。廣義來説，兩學派都是依據有情心想續中的種子」/「界」解釋存在總體的顯現。此外，室利邏多的見解是一切法作為意的所行境為法處所攝133－－併同一切「所知」（一切存在）只被認為是内在化的心理内容（jñānākāra, 智行相）－－這清楚地表示出其義理的唯心傾向，儘管譬喻經量部論師及早期瑜伽行派論師事實上都是實有論者。

xi. One of the fundamental differences between the seed theory of these two schools is that the Yogācāras had come to whole-heartedly embrace the Sarvāstivāda doctrine of simultaneous causality in order to doctrinally account for the validity of perfuming (cf. §5) and the doctrine of vijñaptimātra which claims that the whole of phenomenal existence is manifested from the ālayavijñāna at the very same time as the latter arises.

xi. 這兩個學派的「種子」學説其中一個根本差別是瑜伽行派論師逐漸全心全意接受說一切有部同時因果的義理，這為了能義理地説明「熏習」的有效性（參考§5）以及「唯識」義理並宣說整個現象存在是從「阿賴耶識」顯現，而在同一時間與後者生起。

xii. We may further note that Asaṅga refers to the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika theory of before-after perfuming and criticizes it (likewise in the Viniścaya of the Yogācāra-bhūmi). This may also suggest that in the process of development of the seed theory into the doctrine of the dhātu as the ultimate source of the whole of existence, the influence was probably from the Dārṣṭāntika-Sautrāntika to Yogācāra, rather than the other way round. xii.我們或許進一步注意到無著引述譬喻經量部前後熏習的學説並批評它（同樣在《瑜伽師地論》的〈攝抉擇分〉中）。這或許亦表示出在「種子」學説成為「界」義理作為一切現象的終極本源的發展過程中，這影響很可能是從譬喻經量部到瑜伽行派，而非反過來的情況。