Mapping the Mahayana: Some Historical and Doctrinal Issues

Mapping the Mahayana: Some Historical and Doctrinal Issues

Mario D’Amato*

Rollins College

Abstract

Buddhism is often characterized as divided into two forms: Mahayana and Hinayana. But how should this distinction be understood? In this article, I offer the reader a sense of how the contours of the Mahayana have been drawn from a historical and doctrinal perspective. I discuss three theories regarding the origins of the Mahayana, and elucidate an account of the Mahayana from a significant Mahayana treatise. I also comment on the use of the terms ‘Mahayana’ and ‘Hinayana’, and conclude with some thoughts on a conundrum regarding the Mahayana’s own self-understanding.

Introduction

Tracing the contours of religious movements, systems, schools, or sects is not unlike an exercise in historical cartography: boundaries are often contested and continually shifting, internal divisions are sometimes only fuzzily defined, and there are always the problems associated with hinterlands and unexplored territories. The difficulties of the exercise are further exacerbated when the ‘territory’ one is attempting to ‘map’ exists only in an imaginary plane, like the country of Uqbar in the world of Tlön, described in the famous short story by Jorge Luis Borges.1 The invocation of Borges’ fictional world is not entirely specious in this context, given the present essay’s focus on Mahayana Buddhism.2 In describing Tlön, Borges writes:

Las naciones de ese planeta son – congénitamente – idealistas. Su lenguaje y las derivaciones de su lenguaje – la religión, las letras, la metafísica – presuponen el idealismo. El mundo para ellos no es un concurso de objetos en el espacio; es una serie heterogenea de actos independientes. Es sucesivo, temporal, no espacial. (1956, p. 20)

The nations of that planet are congenitally idealist. Their language and its derivatives – religion, literature, metaphysics – presuppose idealism. The world for them is not a concurrence of objects in space; it is a heterogeneous series of independent events. It is successive and temporal, not spatial.3 Borges’ description here is reminiscent of Yogacara philosophy, one of the main philosophical schools of Mahayana Buddhism in India, wherein © 2008 The Author Religion Compass 2/4 (2008): 536–555, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2008.00083.x Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Mapping the Mahayana: Some Historical and Doctrinal Issues 537 the world is said to be ‘mind-only’ (citta-matra). Borges goes on to explain that

No es exagerado afirmar que la cultura clásica de Tlön comprende una sola disciplina: la psicología. Las otras están subordinadas a ella. He dicho que los hombres de ese planeta conciben el universo como una serie de procesos mentales, que no se desenvuelven en el espacio sino de modo sucesivo en el tiempo. (1956, p. 22)

It is no exaggeration to say that the classical culture of Tlön comprises only one discipline: psychology. All others are subordinated to it. I have said that the men of that planet conceive of the universe as a series of mental processes which do not develop in space, but only successively in time. Of course, Buddhism’s focus on psychology has been extensively explored in Western scholarship. It is not without reason that Buddhism has sometimes been described as a form of ‘mind training’ or mental cultivation (bhavana). Returning to the ‘real’ world, our problem is with mapping the Mahayana, with attempting to say just what the Mahayana is, defining its characteristic features, identifying its shape or form. Some indication of the difficulty of the task may be found in the titles of two recently published essays on the topic: ‘What, If Anything, Is Mahayana Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications’ (Silk 2005) and ‘Searching for the Origins of the Mahayana: What Are We Looking For?’ (Harrison 2005c). Allow me to state at the outset that I do not purport to have the precise answers to these questions. What I hope to do in this essay, however, is offer the reader a sense of how the contours of the Mahayana have been drawn, both from the perspective of historical research and from the perspective of Buddhist doctrine, that is to say, both from an etic (external) perspective and from an emic (internal) perspective. I take it as a given that whatever the Mahayana is, it is a semiotic phenomenon – it is a construction of human thought, human language, and human activity – hence, in developing our own map of the Mahayana, we must have some understanding of how the Mahayana has been mapped by Mahayanists themselves.4 After providing an overview of a few background issues, I move to a discussion of how pre- Mahayana Buddhism anticipates the Mahayana in a certain way, followed by a presentation of three theories regarding the origins of the Mahayana, an elucidation of its characteristic features according to an important Mahayana treatise, and some comments on the use of the terms ‘Mahayana’ and ‘Hinayana’. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts on a conundrum regarding one way in which the Mahayana has defined itself. To begin with a general characterization, according to modern scholarship, Mahayana Buddhism has its beginnings sometime between the start of the first century bce and the end of the first century ce, some four to five centuries after the time of the historical Buddha, Siddhartha Gautama, or Sakyamuni.5 The Mahayana has been broadly characterized vis-à-vis non- Mahayana forms of Buddhism as follows: soteriologically, it is oriented

toward the goal of buddhahood rather than the individualistic goal of nirvana (Williams 1989, p. 25), and is concerned with the practices and path of the bodhisattva (Hirakawa 1990, pp. 298–308); philosophically, it may be viewed as an elaboration of the doctrine of emptiness (Nakamura 1980, pp. 168–70); cultically, it emphasizes devotion to multiple buddhas and bodhisattvas (Williams 1989, pp. 215–56); and literarily, it is manifested through the development of a vast number of sutras and other texts containing various new doctrines, practices, narratives, etc. (MacQueen 2005, p. 312). Schopen states that there is ‘a kind of general consensus that if there is a single defining characteristic of the Mahayana it is that for Mahayana the ultimate religious goal is no longer nirvana, but rather the attainment of full awakening or buddhahood by all’ (2004, p. 493). Williams points out that the Mahayana should not be viewed as a distinct sect of Buddhism, or even as a social movement, but rather ‘as a vision, a vision of what Buddhism is finally all about . . . of what the final motivation and goal of serious practitioners should be’ (2000, pp. 101–2), namely, the attainment of buddhahood for the sake of all sentient beings. And the ultimate goal of the ‘great vehicle’ (mahayana) has been viewed by Mahayanists as far superior to the limited goal of the ‘inferior vehicle’ (hinayana) insofar as the Hinayana goal is not thought to be oriented toward benefiting all beings – its goal is not motivated by the great compassion (mahakaruna) of the Mahayana. Whether or not these characteristics capture any purported essence of the Mahayana, contemporary and traditional scholarship alike generally define the Mahayana in relation to non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism –

forms that have been labeled ‘Hinayana’ by Mahayanists. Indeed, an important aspect of the process of Mahayana self-definition has been the attempt to establish the Mahayana as superior (soteriologically, philosophically, etc.) to other, non-Mahayana, forms of Buddhism. Since the Mahayana originated many centuries after the Buddha, it developed in contexts in which it was offering substantial innovations to already established Buddhist doctrines and practices. So as the Mahayana continued to take shape, Mahayanists had to present justifications for their innovations in relation to these already-established visions of ‘what Buddhism is finally all about.’ Because the Mahayana came to play an important part in the general development of Buddhism, the distinction between the Mahayana and Hinayana has assumed a significant role in the study of Buddhism by modern scholars. Whether, or in what way, the terms ‘Mahayana’ and ‘Hinayana’ should be used in modern scholarship at all is an issue that I will return to below. Here I only wish to point out that the distinction has been a

prominent feature of the scholarly interpretation of Buddhism. In mapping some ways in which the Mahayana has been constructed, I hope to make clearer the generally constructed nature of the Mahayana–Hinayana distinction itself. Understanding the constructed nature of these terms may contribute to the realization that the terms are not ‘out there’ somewhere in a fixed and determinate ‘reality’, but rather are always articulated in a © 2008 The Author Religion Compass 2/4 (2008): 536–555, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2008.00083.x Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Mapping the Mahayana: Some Historical and Doctrinal Issues 539 particular context in accordance with a particular interest or intention. Such a realization may in turn lead to a more reflective use of the terms ‘Mahayana’ and ‘Hinayana’. Through understanding the categories found in Buddhist texts in more contextually specific ways, we will be less tempted to simply reproduce those same categories without critically reflecting upon them.

Before we continue, a few notes on terminology are in order. Since the Mahayana–Hinayana distinction was of course created by followers of the Mahayana, the term ‘Hinayana’ was initially intended to be pejorative. Some modern scholars have nevertheless adopted the term ‘Hinayana’ to refer to forms of Buddhism that are not specifically Mahayana, perhaps hoping that the pejorative connotation might be weakened through widespread usage, as does sometimes occur in the history of languages. Others, however, have chosen another term for non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism, such as ‘Sectarian Buddhism, Nikaya Buddhism, Conservative Buddhism, Sravakayana, and recently Mainstream Buddhism’ (Silk 2005, p. 369). Each has its problems. For my part, when referring to any form of Buddhism that is not Mahayana, I will simply use the term ‘non-Mahayana’.6

A Logical ‘Place’ for the Mahayana

While the Mahayana certainly represents an innovation with respect to previous forms of Buddhism, in a certain sense a place had already been staked out for its development, almost as if it were a territory waiting to be inhabited. Early Buddhist traditions recognize three categories of realized persons, ‘worthy ones’ (arhats) who have attained awakening (bodhi) and liberation from the cycle of birth and death (samsara): (sravaka-)arhats,7 pratyekabuddhas, and buddhas; those on the path to buddhahood are known as bodhisattvas. The three categories of ‘worthy ones’ may be explained as follows. (i) The term sravaka is derived from the verbal root sru, which means ‘to hear, be attentive, be obedient’, thus, sravaka may be translated as ‘hearer’ or ‘disciple’. Sravakas are individuals who pursue and/or attain awakening and nirvana after having heard the teachings of a buddha, and are exemplified by such figures as Sariputra or Mahakasyapa, early followers of the Buddha Sakyamuni. The distinction between a buddha and sravaka is quite straightforward: while a buddha discovers the dharma on his own and establishes it in the world, a sravaka follows that established dharma. (ii) The meaning of the term pratyekabuddha is not certain. While Edgerton translates it as ‘a Buddha for himself alone’ (1970, p. 379), Norman suggests that pratyeka may be derived from pratyaya (‘condition’ or ‘cause’), and understands the original term to mean ‘one awakened by an (external) cause,’ as opposed to one who is self-awakened (1983, p. 99). Pratyekabuddhas are those who attain awakening at a time when the dharma has not been established in the world, but who do not then go on to establish the dharma themselves: so while buddhas inaugurate a dispensation of Buddhist doctrine and set up

an institution for its transmission, pratyekabuddhas do not. Furthermore, according to the Theravada tradition, while buddhas are omniscient, pratyekabuddhas are not (Norman 1983, p. 100), which is also the account of Mahayana traditions. The pratyekabuddha is perhaps the most curious type of realized person, taking a middle place between the founder of the religion (the Buddha) and his disciples (sravakas). Norman offers the suggestion that ‘Early Buddhism and Jainism learned of a category of buddhas (from another sect, preaching in a different dialect of Middle Indo-Aryan), whom they wished to incorporate in their own systems,’ which led to the development of the middle category of pratyekabuddhas (1983, p. 101; cf. Ray 1994, p. 235 and p. 247, n. 65). On this hypothesis, the creation of the category of pratyekabuddhas allowed early Buddhism to identify revered pre-Buddhist sages as Buddhist. (iii) The term buddha simply means ‘awakened one’, while bodhisattva may be literally translated as ‘awakening being’, in the sense of a being who has formed the intention to achieve the unsurpassed, full and complete awakening of a buddha (anuttara-samyak-sambodhi ). According to Indian Mahayana texts, bodhisattvas must progress through a number of stages of spiritual development (typically ten); upon traversing these stages, a process said to require three incalculable aeons, bodhisattvas become buddhas. From positing three distinct classes of realized persons, it is not much of a leap for certain Buddhist traditions to eventually posit three distinct paths or ‘vehicles’ to spiritual realization. The doctrine of three vehicles (triyana) occurs in a number of Indian Buddhist sources, including non- Mahayana texts. In an overview of the term triyana (trini yanani, yanatraya, etc.) in Indian Buddhist texts, Fujita (1975) states that its earliest use may be found in the Ekottaragama; he also cites locations of its use in other non-Mahayana texts. However, the term never came into use in the Theravada tradition, and Fujita concludes that the doctrine of the three vehicles took shape in the northern sects of Buddhism. Some texts distinguish between the forms of awakening attained by each of the three vehicles as follows:

spiritual category vehicle form of awakening

(sravaka-)arhat sravakayana inferior

pratyekabuddha pratyekabuddhayana middling

bodhisattva bodhisattvayana superior

The superior awakening attained by bodhisattvas is the unsurpassed awakening of buddhas, understood as a form of omniscience. In Mahayanist terms, the sravakayana and pratyekabuddhayana are generally considered to be the Hinayana, while the bodhisattvayana is the Mahayana. In its most basic sense, then, the term ‘Mahayana’ has simply been used by Mahayanists as a synonym for ‘bodhisattvayana’, the spiritual vehicle of bodhisattvas pursuing the path to buddhahood (Nattier 2003, p. 138, n. 1; Ruegg 2004, p. 5). Within non-Mahayana Buddhism, the concept of the path of the bodhisattva is generally accepted as an option for the exceptional

Mapping the Mahayana: Some Historical and Doctrinal Issues 541 few who wish to take up the arduous task of striving for buddhahood. However, this path – the bodhisattvayana – is not referred to as the ‘Mahayana’, and is not conceptualized as a general form of Buddhism (with its own sutras, doctrines, etc.) to be followed by all (Samuels 1997). Referring to Spiro’s ethnographic work on Theravada Buddhism in Burma, Harrison points out that a small number of Burmese Buddhists have considered themselves to be ‘hpaya laung (“Embryo Buddhas”), i.e. bodhisattvas’ (2005b, p. 122), without however conceiving of any distinction between the Mahayana and Hinayana. Harrison asks, ‘Can this be a distant echo of the state of affairs that once existed in India, before followers of “the Bodhisattva Path” started to cut themselves off from their fellow Buddhists, and before the distinction between the two ‘vehicles’ was anything more than a different perception of the goal of the religious life’ (2005b, p. 122)? So from this brief survey we may see that a ‘territory’ had indeed already been marked for the development of the Mahayana. But from the perspective of historical research the important question is when some Buddhists – some followers of the bodhisattva path – actually came to see themselves as Mahayanists.

Three Theories Regarding the Origins of the Mahayana: A Historical Perspective There are two forms of historical evidence for the Mahayana: textual and archaeological (primarily epigraphical). Regarding the textual evidence, the earliest extant Mahayana texts are translations of Mahayana sutras from Sanskrit to Chinese. Since these texts were translated in the second century ce (Harrison 2005b, p. 109), scholars have hypothesized that the Sanskrit originals were composed sometime between the first century bce and the first century ce, thus, marking the beginning of the Mahayana as a historical phenomenon. Epigraphical evidence, on the other hand, does not significantly appear until many centuries after the composition of the earliest Mahayana texts. In his study of ‘Mahayana in Indian Inscriptions’, Schopen states ‘we have for the first time reliable Indian information on the demography of the Mahayana in India from at least the fourth century on,’ concluding that the Mahayana did not develop as a separate group until that time (2005b, p. 238).

Theories regarding the origins of the Mahayana attempt to address the question of what accounts for the Mahayana’s development as a historical phenomenon. Earlier research tended to focus on locating pre-Mahayana sources for Mahayana innovations in doctrine and practice;8 in the past decades, however, scholars have turned to the question ‘What, then, constituted the institutional basis from which Mahayana Buddhism arose’ (Hirakawa 2005, p. 200)? These theories focus on the period between the composition of the Mahayana sutras and the emergence of the Mahayana as a separate group, movement, or institution. Here I will provide a brief overview of three prominent theories on the origins of the Mahayana.

(i) Hirakawa, in a paper originally published in 1963, argues that the Mahayana was initially a lay movement, centered on the cult of stupas (reliquaries), which developed as a reaction against the conservative and excessively monastic focus of pre-Mahayana Buddhism. He states that while the Buddha initially left teachings for both laypersons and monastics, In the extant Agama [the sutras of non-Mahayana Buddhism] there is very little teaching for the laity, because the transmitters of the Agama were the renunciants who were concerned with the proper preservation of the teachings at the time when they were passed on by memory and oral repetition. (2005, p. 215)

Hirakawa argues that the teachings for the laity were preserved by another institution, one which was distinct from the monastic community. He posits that the institution that preserved the teachings for the laity was that of the caretakers and administrators of stupas: the duty of the caretaker or the administrator increased and soon turned him into a professional who devoted his whole time to his task. . . . As means of increasing the number of worshippers, they must have also stressed the merits of stupa worship and the greatness of the Buddha as a saviour. There is a deep appeal in preaching the saving powers of the Buddha to people who are unable to undertake the orthodox disciplines. When such a development occurred over a number of centuries, it was only natural that a new doctrine of salvation be developed. (2005, p. 215)

This new doctrine of salvation was, according to Hirakawa’s theory, the basis of the early Mahayana. It is by now clear that Hirakawa’s theory has not successfully withstood the test of time. Others have strongly critiqued the theory, pointing out the ‘comparative rarity of references in this [early Mahayana] literature to the stupa cult,’ and Hirakawa’s ‘serious underestimation of the role of established [non-Mahayana] monastic Buddhism’ in that cult (Schopen 2004, p. 497; cf. Sasaki 1997). Hirakawa’s theory has, however, been useful in stimulating further research on the topic.

(ii) In a paper originally published in 1975, Schopen argues that the ‘early Mahayana (from a sociological point of view), rather than being an identifiable single group, was in the beginning a loose federation of a number of distinct though related cults, all of the same pattern, but each associated with its specific text’ (2005a, p. 52). While Hirakawa argues that the Mahayana had its beginnings in the cult of the stupa, Schopen emphasizes that the cult of the stupa was already a significant, established form of Buddhist worship, and argues that the Mahayana originated around a competing form of worship: the cult of the book. He states that ‘it is evident that in spite of this competition, or, more probably, because of it, the form of the cult of the book was closely patterned on the form in which its rival cult [the cult of the stupa] was organized’ (2005a, p. 44). The early Mahayana arose around specific sites in which Mahayana sutras

Mapping the Mahayana: Some Historical and Doctrinal Issues 543 were kept, sites that served as focal points for followers of the Mahayana, since ‘it is reasonable to assume that the early Mahayana texts, being critical of established Buddhist orthodoxy (= the Sravakas), could not be taught or explained or kept in the usual monastic centers and would require the development of separate centers that would be free of orthodox interference’ (2005a, p. 52). These sites, then, provided the institutional basis of the Mahayana.

In an interesting (and humorous) commentary on his own theory, some three decades after first publishing his essay on the cult of the book, Schopen writes, Here too it is important to note that Gregory Schopen was almost certainly wrong – and his theory too must go the way of Hirakawa’s – in seeing in these passages [from early Mahayana sutras] only an attempt by the ‘new’ movement to substitute one similar cult (the cult of the book) for another similar cult (the cult of relics). That such a substitution occurred – and perhaps rather quickly – is likely, but it now appears that it is very unlikely that this was the original or fundamental intention. (2004, p. 497)

He goes on to state that the original intention of those who composed the Mahayana sutras was ‘to shift the religious focus from cult and giving to doctrine,’ to convince fellow religionists of the importance of ‘seriously taking up or engaging with doctrine’ (2004, p. 497). Despite Schopen’s later ‘disavowal’ of his own theory (a disavowal which is, of course, only partial, since the quote cited above does indeed affirm the importance of the cult of the book for Mahayana Buddhism), his theory regarding the sociological origins of the Mahayana has received widespread support. (iii) In his book Buddhist Saints in India, Ray offers the hypothesis that ‘the Mahayana originated as a tradition of forest renunciation’ (1994, p. 407). Ray states that the standard sociological model of Buddhism is two-tiered – lay and monastic – but argues that this two-tiered model should be replaced by a three-tiered system, including forest renunciants, settled monastic renunciants, and laypersons. Ray points out that according to a number of Indian Buddhist sources, those engaged in the life of a settled monastic were often unable to engage in ‘intensive meditation or, through that, to actualize the highest goal of the tradition, enlightenment’ (1994, p. 435). Hence, many turned to the life of forest renunciation in order to pursue the most rigorous practices recommended by Buddhist traditions. According to Ray’s theory, early Mahayana began among groups of non-monastic forest renunciants, but eventually became an ‘institutionalized, monastic movement’ (1994, p. 410). He argues, on the basis of evidence collected by Schopen and others, that the monasticization of the Mahayana occurred in the fourth century ce (1994, p. 412), some three or four centuries after the composition of the earliest Mahayana sutras. Other scholars have offered theories similar to Ray’s, but have emphasized that the Mahayana was a monastic movement from the start. Harrison states:

Far from being the products of an urban, lay, devotional movement, many Mahayana sutras give evidence of a hard-core ascetic attempt to return to the original inspiration of Buddhism, the search for Buddhahood or awakened cognition. (2005c, p. 175)9 Similarly, in her study of the Ugrapariprccha (an early Mahayana sutra), Nattier argues that ‘the bodhisattva path was developed, as an optional religious vocation, within the confines of the traditional monastic community’ (2003, p. 93); in this early text, ‘To be a “Mahayanist” – that is, to be a bodhisattva – [means] . . . simply to practice Buddhism in its most rigorous and demanding form’ (2003, p. 195; cf. p. 147). So on this account, the beginnings of the Mahayana are to be found in renunciant traditions emphasizing intensive practice directed toward the ultimate goal of buddhahood, rather than in devotional movements or new forms of cultus. As Harrison states, ‘the initial message of the Mahayana is clear: people should not worship bodhisattvas, they should become bodhisattvas themselves’ (2005b, p. 118).

Considering these various theories regarding the origins of the Mahayana, we are reminded of the title of Harrison’s paper referred to earlier: in searching for the origins of the Mahayana, we have to have some sense of what the Mahayana is, of ‘what it is that we’re looking for.’ So defining the Mahayana is not just a concern within Buddhist traditions; it is also a concern of historical research. Part of the difficulty here, however, is that there are various forms of Mahayana Buddhism, and from the earliest evidence we have for the Mahayana, it appears that this has always been the case. Nattier states that in studying Mahayana sutras we find a ‘kaleidoscopic assortment of combinations of the presence and absence of elements that until now have been widely – but wrongly – grouped together as essential components of the “Mahayana”’ (2003, p. 191): some texts emphasize the supramundane nature of buddhahood, others the doctrine of emptiness, still others devotion to celestial buddhas and bodhisattvas, etc. She indicates that in the Ugrapariprccha, for example, devotional elements seem to be entirely absent (2003, p. 169): the focus is not upon the worship of buddhas and bodhisattvas as saviors, but upon becoming a buddha oneself. Hirakawa, however, looks to passages from Mahayana sutras that extol the stupa cult and emphasize the role of the Buddha as a savior. Similarly, Schopen sees the origins of the Mahayana in a form of cultus – the cult of the book rather than the cult of the stupa – but argues that the intention of those who composed the Mahayana sutras was not to establish a new form of worship; rather, their intention was reformist, to return to a more rigorous form of Buddhist practice. In these theories, then, we see a tension between what may be referred to as a ‘devotional’ stream of the Mahayana and an ‘emulatory’ stream.10 Silk hypothesizes that different monastic communities formulated different forms of Mahayana Buddhism, and that ‘later on there was a kind of leveling . . . leading to a more generalized “Mahayana,” in which originally distinct sources were treated and utilized equally’ (2005,

p. 377). So, perhaps the emulatory and devotional streams of early Mahayana thought originally developed somewhat independently (as did other tendencies within what we now refer to as ‘the Mahayana’). But again both tendencies are evidenced rather early on, and both are represented by contemporary forms of Mahayana Buddhism. It is difficult to locate precise origins when there are a variety of types and tendencies, which again is part of the problem with defining the Mahayana in the first place. But as Hirakawa points out, ‘Mahayana Buddhism is a religion centered around the Buddha’ (2005, p. 214): both tendencies emphasize the centrality of buddhahood (whether in terms of emulation or devotion), and for both tendencies the ultimate goal is the attainment of buddhahood. And as noted earlier this, if anything, is what distinguishes the Mahayana from non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism. Some Characteristic Features of the Mahayana: A Doctrinal Perspective Having considered characterizations of the Mahayana from an etic, historical perspective, we now turn to an account of what defines the Mahayana from an emic, doctrinal point of view. I will focus on the account offered by a text known as the Mahayanasutralamkara (Ornament to the Mahayana Sutras; hereafter, the Ornament). This text offers a presentation of various Mahayana themes relevant to the path of a bodhisattva, and is explicitly concerned with defining the Mahayana and establishing its superiority to the Hinayana. The Ornament is extant in Sanskrit, and occurs in the Chinese and Tibetan canons, where it is classified as belonging to the Yogacara school of Mahayana philosophy; the Yogacara (literally, ‘practice of spiritual discipline’) was probably the ‘most popular and influential of philosophical schools in India associated with Mahayana’ (Williams 2000, p. 154). The Ornament was composed ca. the fourth century ce, which as noted above is the period from which we have evidence for the emergence of the Mahayana as an independent movement. The Ornament addresses the distinction between the Mahayana and Hinayana in a number of passages, but there are two verses (1.10 and 19.46) wherein the text offers a list of criteria that differentiate the two vehicles; since 19.46 substantially recapitulates 1.10, I will focus on the earlier passage. Here, the Ornament specifies the differences between the Mahayana and Hinayana as follows: asayasyopadesasya prayogasya virodhatah/

upastambhasya kalasya yat hinam hinam eva tat// (Ornament 1.10) katham viruddham/ pañcabhir virodhaih/ asayopadesa-prayoga-upastambhakala- virodhaih/ sravakayane hy atma-parinirvanayaivasayas tad-artham evopadesas tad-artham eva prayogah parittas ca punya-jñana-sambhara-samgrhita upastambhah kalena calpena tad-artha-praptir yavat tribhir api janmabhih/ mahayane tu sarvam viparyayena/ (Ornament Commentary ad 1.10)11 Because of the incompatibility of intent, teaching, application, support, and time, the lesser [[[vehicle]]] is truly inferior.

How are [the sravakayana/Hinayana12 and the Mahayana] incompatible? Due to five incompatibilities: of intent, teaching, application, support, and time. In the sravakayana the intent is only the parinirvana of oneself. Its teaching has just the same purpose. Its application also has just the same purpose. Its support is the acquisition of limited provisions of merit and knowledge. And with a small amount of time, its goal may be obtained: even with only three births. But in the Mahayana, everything is the reverse.

Five criteria are used to differentiate the Mahayana from the Hinayana: intent (asaya), teaching (upadesa), application (prayoga), support (upastambha), and time (kala).13 The first characteristic that separates the two vehicles is their intent (asaya) or ultimate goal: in the Hinayana, the intent is only the parinirvana of oneself, which means the attainment of nirvana without residual conditioning. Buddhist doctrine traditionally distinguishes between two forms of nirvana: nirvana with residual conditioning (sopadhisesa-nirvana) and nirvana without residual conditioning (nirupadhisesa-nirvana). The former refers to the form of nirvana attained by (sravaka-) arhats and pratyekabuddhas before the termination of their last rebirth: all the mental afflictions binding one to samsara have been completely cut off, so there will be no more rebirths, and in this sense nirvana has been obtained. However, there is still residual conditioning from previously accumulated karma, which accounts for the continuation of conditioned existence in one’s last rebirth. When this final rebirth comes to an end, nirvana without residual conditioning – or parinirvana – is attained. And the Ornament interprets this Hinayana parinirvana as a form of extinction.14 In the Mahayana, on the other hand, the ultimate goal or intent is the attainment of buddhahood. Furthermore, the Mahayana does not lead to the extinction of nirvana without residual conditioning, but rather to a third form of nirvana: non-abiding nirvana (apratisthita-nirvana), nirvana that abides in neither samsara nor nirvana. Through attaining non-abiding nirvana, buddhas are neither limited by the constraints of samsara, nor are they immersed (or dispersed) in some eternally quiescent state of nirvana; rather, they acquire the ability to manifest in the conditioned world in whatever form is appropriate in order to aid sentient beings (Ornament 17.32 and 19.61–62). So while the Hinayana parinirvana leads only to the end of one’s own suffering, the Mahayana non-abiding nirvana allows a buddha to benefit other sentient beings.

The second characteristic that differentiates the Hinayana and Mahayana is their teaching (upadesa). While our passage is brief on this topic, we may turn to other passages from the Ornament for further elucidation. In the Hinayana, a distinction is made between secondary and primary existents: while secondary existents, namely, the conventional objects that make up the world, including persons, are considered to be mere conceptualizations and not ultimately real, primary existents, namely, the momentary events that comprise secondary existents, are considered to be actually existent. Through analyzing (reducing) one’s ‘self ’ into interrelated processes of

momentary events, one eliminates all forms of craving, and attains liberation from samsara. So according to the Ornament, the Hinayana teaching eliminates the conceptualization of personhood, but maintains the conceptualization of momentary events, viewing these momentary events as the ultimately existent underlying basis of the illusion of personhood (Ornament 19.50 and 13.15). In the Mahayana teaching, however, all forms of conceptualization are eliminated (Ornament 9.81). According to the Mahayana doctrine of emptiness (sunyata), all phenomena – whether primary or secondary existents – are empty, all phenomena are mere conceptualizations (kalpana-matra, also referred to as vijñapti-matra in other contexts), with no ultimate basis in reality.15 The Mahayana teaching is understood to be superior, then, because it entails the elimination of the entire matrix of conceptualization that obstructs the mind from an unmediated apprehension of reality or ‘thusness’ (tathata).

The third and fourth characteristics that differentiate the two vehicles are their application (prayoga) and support (upastambha). Here ‘application’ refers to the extent to which one must apply oneself to, or practice in, the given vehicle. The level of application in the Hinayana is considered to be inferior, and it only allows for the development of an inferior level of ‘support’ – an inferior accumulation of provisions of merit and knowledge (punya-jñana-sambhara), which are necessary prerequisites for the attainment of awakening. According to the Ornament, since the Hinayana involves an inferior degree of application, and only allows for an inferior accumulation of merit and knowledge, in the end it leads to an inferior form of awakening. The Mahayana, on the other hand, requires a superior degree of application and leads to unlimited merit and knowledge for the benefit of all sentient beings (Ornament 18.40), and ultimately to the unsurpassed awakening of a buddha.

The fifth characteristic that differentiates the Mahayana from the Hinayana is their time (kala), or according to Ornament 19.46, their attainment (samudagama). The Hinayana is said to bring about the termination of the afflictive obstructions (klesavarana) that bind sentient beings to samsara; these afflictive obstructions are composed of various mental factors, such as passionate attachment and passionate aversion, which fuel the process of rebirth; when these mental factors are eliminated, the cycle of rebirth is brought to an end in the attainment of nirvana without residual conditioning. While the Mahayana is also said to bring about the termination of the afflictive obstructions (such as passionate attachment and aversion), it is considered to bring about the elimination of cognitive obstructions ( jñeyavarana) as well (Ornament Comm. ad 17.4–5 and Ornament 20–21.44). The cognitive obstructions are understood to be composed of various forms of ignorance that obstruct the proper vision of reality, or the way things really are. Because the Hinayana does not achieve the eradication of these cognitive obstructions, it leads to an inferior form of awakening. But since the Mahayana does bring about the eradication of cognitive

obstructions, it leads to an unlimited, entirely unobstructed form of awakening: the unsurpassed awakening of a buddha, understood as an awareness of all objects of knowledge and all modes of appearance (sarva-jñeya-sarvakarajñana), namely, omniscience (Ornament Comm. ad 20–21.58; cf. Griffiths 1990). Furthermore, since the Hinayana goal is limited in scope, it may be attained in a limited amount of time – even within three births. The Mahayana goal, however, takes three incalculable aeons to attain. Considering the Ornament’s account of the distinction between the Mahayana and Hinayana in relation to interpretations of the Mahayana offered through historical research, we can observe that the text’s account is much more clear and specific. From the Ornament’s perspective, we have a cut-and-dried answer to Silk’s question, ‘What, if anything, is Mahayana Buddhism?’ However, before we congratulate ourselves on having definitively answered this question, we should remind ourselves of the following two points. (i) The Ornament’s account is only one account among a vast number of Mahayana texts. This is not to say that the text is entirely original (it is not), nor that it has been without influence (it has been commented upon and studied in various Mahayana traditions, up to the present); it is simply to emphasize the multiplicity of perspectives that is found in Mahayana sources. (ii) The Ornament was composed many centuries after the composition of the earliest Mahayana sutras (it is after all an ‘Ornament’ to the Mahayana Sutras), and thus has the benefit of being able to systematize a number of developments that occurred over an extended period of time. Nevertheless, in arriving at any answer to the question, ‘What, if anything, is the Mahayana?’ it is necessary to understand just what the Mahayana has been understood to be by Mahayanists themselves. And, studying the Ornament’s account is one small step in that direction. On the Rectification of Names

Now that we have considered accounts of the Mahayana from a historical and doctrinal point of view, we may turn to some reflections on the terms ‘Mahayana’ and ‘Hinayana.’ A useful entry point here would be Cohen’s article ‘Discontented Categories: Hinayana and Mahayana in Indian Buddhist History’ (1995). Cohen points out that while, ‘Of all the categories through which to reconstruct Indian Buddhism’s history, Mahayana and Hinayana are the most productive,’ there are certain taxonomical difficulties with these categories (1995, p. 20). He begins, for example, with Bechert’s distinction between the Mahayana and the Hinayana: while the former is, according to Bechert, ‘not to be conceived as a “sect”,’ the latter is considered to comprise a variety of sects.16 Cohen indicates, however, a problem with taxonomies like the one offered by Bechert. Turning to epigraphical evidence, Cohen identifies an inscription in Cave 22 of the Ajanta complex, which seems to fall on both sides of the Mahayana- Hinayana divide. He translates the inscription as follows (1995, p. 11):

Success! This is the religious donation of the Sakyabhiksu Aparasaila . . . for the attainment of Unexcelled Knowledge by [my] parents [and] all sentient beings. . . .

The first point to note regarding this inscription is that according to the criteria offered by Schopen (2005b), we may quite confidently identify this inscription as Mahayanist: the donor is identified as a sakyabhiksu, a term often used in reference to Mahayanists; and the donation is dedicated for the attainment of unexcelled knowledge (anuttara-jñana). A second point regarding the inscription is that it identifies the donor as an Aparasaila, that is to say, as a member of one of the sects, or nikayas, which Bechert’s taxonomy would describe as part of the Hinayana. How is this apparent taxonomical difficulty to be resolved?

Cohen, in the conclusion of his article, recommends that the distinction ‘Mahayana-Hinayana’ should be retained by contemporary scholarship, with the proviso that it should be understood that there is not one Mahayana- Hinayana distinction, but rather there are many, and that different Mahayana- Hinayana taxonomies may be usefully employed in different contexts. Thus, ‘Cave 22’s donor can be both a “Mahayanist” and a “Hinayanist”, albeit not within the same taxonomic moment’ (Cohen 1995, p. 21). I, however, would recommend another approach.

As Bechert points out, ‘That Mahayana itself is not to be conceived as a “sect” is settled by unambiguous textual evidence’ (1973, p. 11). Early Indian evidence for the use of the term ‘Mahayana’ (both textual and epigraphical) does not seem to indicate that the term specifically refers to particular monastic communities, lineages of ordination, hierarchical organizational structures, or the like.17 Rather, ‘Mahayana’ seems to refer to certain forms of Buddhist discourse and practice – forms directed toward the attainment of buddhahood.18 Hence, ‘Mahayana’ does not initially refer to new monastic communities, etc., but rather to new forms of discourse and practice developing within already existing ones. To reiterate a quote from Williams: the Mahayana is ‘a vision of what Buddhism is finally all about’ (2000, pp. 101–2) – to which we might add, an alternative vision developed in response to its imagined ‘other’, the ‘Hinayana’. What can be said about the category ‘Hinayana’? It must be emphasized that mapping the Hinayana is not formally similar to mapping the Mahayana. It is decidedly not the same thing as mapping non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism. Mapping the Hinayana is, rather, tracing the contours of a discursive construction deployed by individuals endeavoring to develop a novel Buddhist identity: a Mahayana identity. And given the historical context in which this new identity was formed, a context in which there were already established forms of Buddhism, the development of a Mahayana identity was considered to require a foil, an ‘other’, in terms of which this particularly ‘Mahayana’ Buddhist identity could be formulated. The ‘Hinayana’ of course was that foil. As Silk elegantly expresses it, the ‘Hinayana’ is a ‘rhetorical fiction’ (2005, p. 376).

It should come as no surprise if certain features of the construct ‘Hinayana’ resemble certain features of non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism: again, the Mahayana identity developed in a milieu in which other forms of Buddhism were present. But as nuanced interpretations of the specific discourses and practices of non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism indicate, the Mahayana construction of the ‘Hinayana’ does not conform to non-Mahayana discourses and practices on many points. And why should we expect it to? The Indian Buddhists who initially used the term ‘Hinayana’ were not developing historical–critical interpretations of various forms of Buddhism: they were not interested in articulating any sort of ‘objective’ account of how non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism differ from Mahayana forms. Rather, their interest was in deploying a discourse to establish a new Buddhist identity, based on a new vision of what Buddhism is ‘finally all about’: namely, attaining buddhahood.

Thus, I think it is a category mistake for contemporary Western interpreters of Buddhism to consider ‘Mahayana’ and ‘Hinayana’ to refer to the same sort of thing. ‘Mahayana’ refers to certain forms of Buddhist discourse and practice directed toward the goal of buddhahood, forms that began to emerge in India sometime between the first century bce and the first century ce. ‘Hinayana’ on the other hand refers to the Mahayanistconstructed image of all non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism – and I emphasize, this is not a historical–critical category, but rather a polemical one. So, despite its currency in some contemporary Western interpretations of Buddhism, I suggest that the term ‘Hinayana’ only be used to refer to Mahayanist constructions of non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism, and not to non-Mahayana forms of Buddhism simpliciter. That is to say, while the term ‘Mahayana’ may be used to refer to specific forms of Buddhism that developed in India, the term ‘Hinayana’ should only be used to refer to the Mahayana’s imagined ‘other’, rather than to any actual, historical forms of Buddhism.

Using the terms in this way will allow us to avoid certain unnecessary confusions and potentially difficult cases. For example, the inscription in Cave 22 referred to above may simply be understood as the inscription of a monk of the Aparasaila sect who considered himself to be a follower of the Mahayana, a vision of Buddhism directed towards the attainment of buddhahood. Furthermore, in examining the travelogues of Chinese Buddhist pilgrims to India, it is not surprising that Fa-hsien (ca. fourth to fifth century ce) refers to monasteries in which both the Hinayana (read ‘non- Mahayana’) and Mahayana were studied, that Hsüan-tsang (602–664 ce) refers to the ‘Mahayana-Theravada’ (read ‘members of the Theravada sect that practiced the Mahayana’) or that I-ching (635–713 ce) describes the distinction between Mahayana and Hinayana monks as somewhat unclear (Hirakawa 1990, pp. 120–2).19 All of this is quite readily compatible with the view that the Mahayana refers to a particular form of discourse and practice – a particular ‘vision’ of Buddhism directed toward buddhahood

– which developed within particular sects, becoming dominant in some, playing a minor or temporary role in others, and remaining more or less anathematized in many.

Conclusion: The Teaching of No-Teaching

In discussing the distinctions among the three categories of realized persons, I indicated that according to the standard account of Buddhist traditions, a buddha is one who discovers the dharma on his own and then goes on to establish the dharma in the world. This rather straightforward (and widely accepted) definition, however, presents something of a conundrum for Mahayana Buddhism. As Nattier states, ‘a Buddha is, by definition, a person who discovers the way to enlightenment by himself. . . . Ironically, this means that it is impossible to become a Buddha in a world in which Buddhism is already known, for to do so would be a contradiction in terms’ (2003, p. 142). The goal of the Mahayana, of course, is to lead beings to buddhahood. But a buddha is one who must discover the way for himself. Is there not a conundrum here? Is not the Mahayana undermining – or worse, contradicting – its stated aim from the moment that the first Mahayana teaching is uttered? Is the only possible way to buddhahood to avoid following the teachings of the Mahayana?

In order to develop a possible ‘dissolution’ of this conundrum, I will again turn to the Ornament. The Ornament makes a number of interesting claims to the effect that all statements, even those made by the Mahayana, are illusory and ultimately unable to describe or characterize reality. Reality itself is said to be inexpressible. Ornament 11.13 states that reality (tattva) is unable to be expressed and is without the nature of discursivity (aprapañcatmaka). And in Ornament Comm. ad 11.41, the perfected characteristic (another term for reality) is said to be without conceptual discrimination (avikalpa), since it is not discursive (nisprapañcata). Words and language do not refer to actual objects; rather, they are to be viewed as mental constructions, and all mental constructions are ultimately unreal. And this includes Buddhist teachings themselves: Ornament 11.28 states that the doctrines offered as an antidote to the afflictions are like an illusion (mayopama); the commentary explains this to mean that they are non-existent (avidyamana). The next verse (11.29) continues with this theme, stating that all doctrines are like one illusory king defeating another. Furthermore, Ornament 13.2 offers the well-known Buddhist trope of the dharma as a raft. Thus, on the Ornament’s account, the Mahayana does not describe reality, and Mahayana teachings themselves are ultimately illusory. Indeed, we might characterize the Mahayana as a ‘no-teaching teaching’.

But what then is the purpose of this ‘no-teaching teaching’? What is its ultimate aim? In a word: non-conceptualization. According to the Ornament, the fundamental awareness of a buddha is a non-conceptual awareness (nirvikalpa-jñana). Buddhahood – the unsurpassed, full and complete

awakening of a buddha – is understood to be a non-conceptual awareness, a direct, unmediated realization of thusness. Such an awareness cannot be ‘taught’ or contained within any system of doctrine. It must be directly realized, and thus buddhas are those who directly realize the way on their own. The Mahayana, however, may be understood as an aid in pointing sentient beings in the right direction. In the end, however, they must go and see for themselves.

Ultimately, the Ornament is in accordance with the Lankavatara-sutra’s claim that when there is a transformation of the mind – when reality is realized – there is neither a vehicle nor one who goes by it.20 From the perspective of historical scholarship, the Hinayana is indeed a ‘rhetorical fiction’, but from the perspective of this Mahayana doctrine, the Mahayana is as well. And so in the end we return to where we began: attempting to map an imaginary realm, like Borges’ Tlön.

Short Biography

Mario D’Amato (BA, Loyola University Chicago; MA and PhD, University of Chicago) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Rollins College in Winter Park, FL, USA. Before arriving at Rollins, he taught at Hampshire College (Amherst, MA, USA). D’Amato specializes in the study of Mahayana philosophy, with a particular focus on the Yogacara school, and has published papers on Yogacara thought in Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Journal of Indian Philosophy, Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies, and Semiotica. He is currently completing a book-length study and translation of a Yogacara doctrinal treatise known as the Madhyantavibhaga (Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes).

Notes

• Correspondence address: Mario D’Amato, Rollins College, 1000 Holt Ave., 2659, Winter

Park, FL 32789, USA. Email: mdamato@rollins.edu. 1 I am referring here, of course, to ‘Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius’ in Borges’ Ficciones (1956). 2 In fact, Borges had a deep and long-term interest in Buddhism, and even wrote a book on the topic, wherein he describes the Mahayana as a form of ‘absolute idealism’ (idealismo absoluto) (Borges 1979, p. 756).

3 All translations in this article are my own. 4 As Ruegg states, ‘the clarification of “emic” usage is a prerequisite for our being able usefully and effectively to pursue “etic” analyses and comparisons’ (2004, pp. 32–3). 5 This assumes that the Buddha’s dates are ca. 566–486 bce. If Bechert’s dates for the Buddha are used (448–368 bce), the Mahayana would have its beginnings some three to four centuries after the time of the historical Buddha; see Bechert 1982. 6 I admit, however, that such usage only makes sense in the context of a discussion of the Mahayana: a scholar of contemporary Theravada Buddhism – the only currently practiced form of Buddhism that is not Mahayana – might find it rather tedious to constantly refer to the Theravada as ‘non-Mahayana’.

7 I employ the term (sravaka-)arhat to distinguish the first category of realized persons or ‘worthy ones’ (arhats) from the categories of pratyekabuddha and buddha. Harrison points out that ‘sravakas are both people who aspire to arhatship or nirvana and people who actually attain that goal’ (2005b, p. 119); by the term (sravaka-)arhat I mean the latter, that is, sravakas who have attained the goal. 8 Hirakawa (2005) offers a review of this research, indicating that precursors of many important Mahayana ideas may be found in earlier Mahasamghika and Sarvastivada works. 9 Interestingly, in his seminal study Barabudur (originally published in 1935), Mus had remarked that ‘the Hinayanist tradition would have given a first twist to early Buddhism; and if the Mahayanist reaction sometimes went too far in the other direction, it was none the less an attempt to come back to the spirit of the early days. . . . My own opinion is that the currents whence the Mahayana derived seem to have influenced from the start the whole of the church’ (1998, pp. 45–6).

10 Harrison states, ‘Mahayana Buddhism is often thought of as a heterogeneous movement embracing two main streams: on the one hand the Prajñaparamita, the Perfection of Wisdom, a tradition of self-emancipation through insight, perpetuated in the Far East by Ch’an (Zen); and on the other, the Pure Land, a tradition of salvation by faith in the grace and power of certain personifications of the Buddha-principle. The relationship between these two traditions, which, it must be noted in passing, by no means encompass the entire range of the Mahayana, remains problematical’ (2005a, p. 84); he later describes these two streams as respectively emphasizing emulation of and devotion to the Buddha. Nattier (2003, pp. 168–70) makes a distinction between imitative vs. relational cultivation, which roughly accords with Harrison’s emulation vs. devotion. 11 All quotations from the Mahayanasutralamkara (the Ornament) and its commentary, the Mahayanasutralamkara-bhasya (the Ornament Comm.), identified by chapter and verse, are from Lévi’s Sanskrit edition (1907). 12 While the commentary uses the term sravakayana, it is quite clear from the verse itself that sravakayana = hinayana.

13 Ornament 19.46 uses slightly different terms, as follows: the second item is desana, which also means ‘teaching’; the fourth item is sambhara (provision), which the commentary equates with upastambha (support); and the fifth item is samudagama (attainment), which is commensurate with kala (‘time’), that is, a lesser goal is attained in less time. 14 See Ornament Comm. ad 3.3 and 16.50. In every place where the term nirupadhisesa- or anupadhisesa-nirvana is used in the text, it is related to some form of the term ksaya (loss, destruction, end, termination). 15 Ornament 18.101 states: ‘All phenomena are without self; according to ultimate truth, there is emptiness.’ Note, however, that this is not taken to imply that there is nothing at all. Rather, what there is, is an indescribable ‘thusness’ (tathata). 16 Bechert (1973, p. 11): ‘The so-called “sects,” i.e. the nikayas or vadas, on the other hand had come into being inside the development of Hinayana or Sravakayana’ [italics mine]. 17 Note that I think we may most usefully employ the term ‘sect’ to pick out such particular monastic communities, lineages of ordination, hierarchical organizational structures, etc. – in short, ‘sect’ may most usefully be employed to refer to forms of social institutions (cf. Silk 2005, p. 374).

18 On these points, see Williams 1989, p. 25: ‘As Buddhahood became supreme over Arhatship, so attaining Buddhahood, and therefore becoming a Bodhisattva, became the new religious goal advocated for all Buddhist practitioners. This, if anything, characterizes the Mahayana’; and Harrison 2005b, p. 113: ‘The rarity of the terms mahayana and bodhisattvayana [in the earliest extant Mahayana sutras] already invites the conclusion that at this stage there was no rigid division of the Buddhist Sangha into two hostile camps. . . . there is little evidence of any urge on their part to enshrine their different point of view in hard and fast sectarian categories.’ 19 According to I-ching’s description, ‘Those who worship the Bodhisattvas and read the Mahayana Sutras are called Mahayanists, while those who do not perform these are called the Hinayanists’ (Silk 2005, pp. 371–2) – we can guess, however, that the latter were called ‘Hinayanists’ only by Mahayanists.

20 Lankavatara-sutra 2.16.204cd (Nanjio 1923, p. 135): citte tu vai paravrtte na yanam na ca yaninah//. 554 Mario D’Amato © 2008 The Author Religion Compass 2/4 (2008): 536–555, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2008.00083.x Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Works Cited Bechert, H, 1973, ‘Notes on the Formation of Buddhist Sects and the Origins of Mahayana’, in the Cultural Department of the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany (ed.), German Scholars on India, vol. 1, pp. 6–18, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, India. ——, 1982, ‘The Date of the Buddha Reconsidered’, Indologica Taurinensia, vol. 10, pp. 29–36. Borges, JL, 1956, Ficciones, Emecé Editores, Buenos Aires, Argentina. ——, 1979, Qué es el Budismo (with Alicia Jurado), in JL Borges (ed.), Jorge Luis Borges: Obras Completas en colaboración, pp. 717–81, Emecé Editores, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Cohen, R, 1995, ‘Discontented Categories: Hinayana and Mahayana in Indian Buddhist History’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, vol. 63, no. 1, pp. 1–25. Edgerton, F, 1970, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary, vol. 2, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, India.

Fujita, K, 1975, ‘One Vehicle or Three?’ Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 3, no. 1/2, pp. 79– 166. Griffiths, P, 1990, ‘Omniscience in the Mahayanasutralankara and Its Commentaries’, Indo- Iranian Journal, vol. 33, no. 2, pp. 85–120. Harrison, P, 2005a, ‘Buddhanusmrti in the Pratyutpannabuddhasammukhavasthitasamadhi-sutra’, in P Williams (ed.), Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol. 3, pp. 84–107, Routledge, New York, NY. ——, 2005b, ‘Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle? Self-image and Identity among the Followers of Early Mahayana’, in P Williams (ed.), Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol. 3, pp. 108–25, Routledge, New York, NY. ——, 2005c, ‘Searching for the Origins of the Mahayana: What Are We Looking For?’ in P Williams (ed.), Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol. 3, pp. 164–80, Routledge, New York, NY.

Hirakawa, A, 1990, A History of Indian Buddhism: From Sakyamuni to Early Mahayana, Paul Groner (trans.), University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI. ——, 2005, ‘The Rise of Mahayana Buddhism and Its Relationship to the Worship of Stupas’, in P Williams (ed.), Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol. 3, pp. 181–226, Routledge, New York, NY. Lévi, S, (ed.), 1907, Mahayana-Sutralamkara, Librairie Honoré Champion, Paris, France. MacQueen, G, 2005, ‘Inspired Speech in Early Mahayana Buddhism’, in P Williams (ed.), Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol. 3, pp. 312–28, Routledge, New York, NY. Mus, P, 1998, Barabudur: Sketch of a History of Buddhism Based on Archaeological Criticism of the Texts, Alexander Macdonald (trans.), Sterling Publishers, New Delhi, India. Nakamura, H, 1980, Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes, Kufs Publication, Tokyo, Japan.

Nanjio, B, (ed.), 1923, Lankavatara-sutra, Otani University Press, Kyoto, Japan. Nattier, J, 2003, A Few Good Men: The Bodhisattva Path according to The Inquiry of Ugra (Ugrapariprccha), University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI. Norman, KR, 1983, ‘The Pratyeka-Buddha in Buddhism and Jainism’, in P Denwood and A Piatigorsky (eds.), Buddhist Studies: Ancient and Modern, pp. 92–106, Curzon Press, London, UK. Ray, R, 1994, Buddhist Saints in India, Oxford University Press, New York, NY. Ruegg, DS, 2004, ‘Aspects of the Study of the (Earlier) Indian Mahayana’, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 3–62. Samuels, J, 1997, ‘The Bodhisattva Ideal in Theravada Buddhist Theory and Practice: A Reevaluation of the Bodhisattva-Sravaka Opposition’, Philosophy East and West, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 399–415.

Sasaki, S, 1997, ‘A Study on the Origin of Mahayana Buddhism’, Eastern Buddhist, vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 79–113. Schopen, G, 2004, ‘Mahayana’, in R Buswell (ed.), Encyclopedia of Buddhism, vol. 2, pp. 492– 9, Macmillan Reference USA, New York, NY.

——, 2005a, ‘The Phrase sa prthivipradesas caityabhuto bhavet in the Vajracchedika: Notes on © 2008 The Author Religion Compass 2/4 (2008): 536–555, 10.1111/j.1749-8171.2008.00083.x Journal Compilation © 2008 Blackwell Publishing Ltd

Mapping the Mahayana: Some Historical and Doctrinal Issues 555 the Cult of the Book in Mahayana’, in G Schopen (ed.), Figments and Fragments of Mahayana Buddhism in India, pp. 25–62, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI. ——, 2005b, ‘Mahayana in Indian Inscriptions’, in G Schopen (ed.), Figments and Fragments of Mahayana Buddhism in India, pp. 223–46, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, HI. Silk, J, 2005, ‘What, If Anything, Is Mahayana Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications’, in P Williams (ed.), Buddhism: Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol. 3, pp. 368–404, Routledge, New York, NY.

Williams, P, 1989, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, Routledge, New York, NY. ——, 2000, Buddhist Thought, Routledge, New York, NY.