Difference between revisions of "Vasubandhu’s Argument Against Atomism in the Twenty Verses"
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by Lorand Bruhacs | by Lorand Bruhacs | ||
− | July 20, 2008To my daughter Miriam, for her kindness and understanding. | + | July 20, 2008To my daughter Miriam, for her [[kindness]] and [[understanding]]. |
Contents | Contents | ||
1 Introduction 1 | 1 Introduction 1 | ||
− | 1.1 About Vasubandhu 2 | + | 1.1 About [[Vasubandhu]] 2 |
− | 1.2 The Vimsatika in a Nutshell 5 | + | 1.2 The [[Vimsatika]] in a Nutshell 5 |
− | 1.3 Rationale and Method of the Investigation 12 | + | 1.3 Rationale and Method of the [[Investigation]] 12 |
− | 1.4 Buddhism as Empiricist Mysticism 17 | + | 1.4 [[Buddhism]] as [[Empiricist]] [[Mysticism]] 17 |
− | 2 The Atomist Metaphysics of the Abhidharma 30 | + | 2 The [[Atomist]] [[Metaphysics]] of the [[Abhidharma]] 30 |
− | 2.1 Realism and Atomism 30 | + | 2.1 [[Realism]] and [[Atomism]] 30 |
− | 2.2 Early Buddhist Phenomenalism 32 | + | 2.2 Early [[Buddhist]] [[Phenomenalism]] 32 |
− | 2.3 The Origins of Buddhist Atomism 39 | + | 2.3 The Origins of [[Buddhist]] [[Atomism]] 39 |
− | 2.4 The Vaibhasika School 42 | + | 2.4 The [[Vaibhasika]] School 42 |
− | 2.4.1 Time, Space and Atom in Vaibhasika 44 | + | 2.4.1 Time, [[Space]] and {{Wiki|Atom}} in [[Vaibhasika]] 44 |
− | 2.4.2 Critical Review of Vaibhasika Presentationalism ... 52 | + | 2.4.2 Critical Review of [[Vaibhasika]] Presentationalism ... 52 |
− | 2.5 The Sautrantika School 57 | + | 2.5 The [[Sautrantika School]] 57 |
− | 2.5.1 Time, Space and Atom in Early Sautrantika 59 | + | 2.5.1 Time, [[Space]] and {{Wiki|Atom}} in Early [[Sautrantika]] 59 |
− | 2.5.2 Atomism in the Late Sautrantika Phase 65 | + | 2.5.2 [[Atomism]] in the Late [[Sautrantika]] Phase 65 |
− | 2.5.3 Critique of Sautrantika Representationalism 67 | + | 2.5.3 Critique of [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|Representationalism}} 67 |
− | 3 The Anti-Atomist Metaphysics of Vijnaptimatra 71 | + | 3 The Anti-Atomist [[Metaphysics]] of [[Vijnaptimatra]] 71 |
− | 3.1 Readings of Mind-Only 72 | + | 3.1 Readings of [[Mind-Only]] 72 |
− | 3.1.1 Revisionist Interpretations of Mind-Only 73 | + | 3.1.1 Revisionist Interpretations of [[Mind-Only]] 73 |
− | 3.1.2 The Traditional Interpretation of Cittamatra 79 | + | 3.1.2 The [[Traditional]] Interpretation of [[Cittamatra]] 79 |
3.1.3 Distinguishing True and False Aspectarianism 81 | 3.1.3 Distinguishing True and False Aspectarianism 81 | ||
− | 3.2 Argument against Atomism 85 | + | 3.2 Argument against [[Atomism]] 85 |
3.2.1 The Scheme ofthe Argument 86 | 3.2.1 The Scheme ofthe Argument 86 | ||
3.2.2 Against Spatially Differentiated Simples 89 | 3.2.2 Against Spatially Differentiated Simples 89 | ||
− | 3.2.3 Against Point-like Atoms 96 | + | 3.2.3 Against Point-like [[Atoms]] 96 |
3.2.4 Against Integral Wholes 98 | 3.2.4 Against Integral Wholes 98 | ||
Contents | Contents | ||
− | 3.2.5 Against the Causal Theory of Perception 101 | + | 3.2.5 Against the Causal [[Theory of Perception]] 101 |
3.2.6 Resumee of the Argument 102 | 3.2.6 Resumee of the Argument 102 | ||
− | 3.3 Visions of Vijnaptimatra in Empiriocriticist Eyes 104 | + | 3.3 [[Visions]] of [[Vijnaptimatra]] in Empiriocriticist [[Eyes]] 104 |
− | 4 The End of the End of Epistemology 111 | + | 4 The End of the End of {{Wiki|Epistemology}} 111 |
− | 4.1 Anti-Cartesian Meditations 112 | + | 4.1 Anti-Cartesian [[Meditations]] 112 |
− | 4.2 The Empire Strikes Back and the Return of the Empiricists . 117 | + | 4.2 The [[Empire]] Strikes Back and the Return of the [[Empiricists]] . 117 |
4.3 Concluding Reflections 119 | 4.3 Concluding Reflections 119 | ||
− | Bibliography 121 | + | [[Bibliography]] 121 |
− | Index of Subjects and Technical Terms 133 | + | Index of [[Subjects]] and Technical Terms 133 |
Index of Personal Names 139 | Index of Personal Names 139 | ||
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− | The world is given but once. Nothing is reflected. The original and mirror-image are identical. The world extended in space and time is but our representation. | + | The [[world]] is given but once. Nothing is reflected. The original and mirror-image are [[identical]]. The [[world]] extended in {{Wiki|space and time}} is but our [[representation]]. |
− | (Erwin Schrodinger) | + | ({{Wiki|Erwin Schrodinger}}) |
− | HIS PAPER WILL conduct a critical investigation of the famous argument against atomism first made by the 4th century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu in his idealist treatise Vimsatika | + | HIS PAPER WILL conduct a critical [[investigation]] of the famous argument against [[atomism]] first made by the 4th century CE [[Indian Buddhist]] [[philosopher]] [[Vasubandhu]] in his {{Wiki|idealist}} treatise [[Vimsatika]] |
− | Vijnaptimatratasiddhi (The Twenty Verses of Mind-Only). Although the present exposition will be more conceptual than historical in focus, it will first unfold the Abhidharmic Buddhist precursors of the Mind-Only epistemology. With the necessary background in place, I shall then attempt a rational reconstruction of the substance of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism, rendering it intelligible to the modern reader by transposing it into contemporary philosophical idiom. Finally, I will employ the analysis of atomism and the external world in the Mind-Only school as a point of departure from which to further probe closely related concerns of Buddhist transcendental philosophy having to do with the nature of empirical knowledge, the power of skeptical argument, and the status of apperception. | + | [[Vijnaptimatratasiddhi]] (The Twenty Verses of [[Mind-Only]]). Although the {{Wiki|present}} [[exposition]] will be more {{Wiki|conceptual}} than historical in focus, it will first unfold the [[Abhidharmic]] [[Buddhist]] precursors of the [[Mind-Only]] epistemology. With the necessary background in place, I shall then attempt a [[rational]] reconstruction of the [[substance]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]], rendering it intelligible to the {{Wiki|modern}} reader by transposing it into contemporary [[philosophical]] idiom. Finally, I will employ the analysis of [[atomism]] and the [[external world]] in the [[Mind-Only school]] as a point of departure from which to further probe closely related concerns of [[Buddhist]] [[transcendental]] [[philosophy]] having to do with the [[nature]] of [[empirical knowledge]], the power of skeptical argument, and the {{Wiki|status}} of {{Wiki|apperception}}. |
− | Before we begin, a brief clarification—the sense of the term atom as used throughout this paper should be carefully distinguished from the so-called | + | Before we begin, a brief clarification—the [[sense]] of the term {{Wiki|atom}} as used throughout this paper should be carefully {{Wiki|distinguished}} from the so-called “{{Wiki|atom}}” of the {{Wiki|modern}} [[physical]] [[sciences]]. Unless otherwise noted, I will be using the term {{Wiki|atom}} to mean a mereological {{Wiki|atom}}, or indivisible, concrete particular functioning as an elementary building block of [[phenomenal]] experience. |
− | The theory that the world is constituted by such mereological atoms is commonly believed to be the exclusive province of Western philosophical tradition, beginning with the Greek atomists, but is now known to have evolved, more or less independently from the West, within classical Indian philosophy, and last but not least, among the Buddhist scholastics of the Abhidharma sects. | + | The {{Wiki|theory}} that the [[world]] is constituted by such mereological [[atoms]] is commonly believed to be the exclusive province of [[Western]] [[philosophical]] [[tradition]], beginning with the {{Wiki|Greek}} [[Wikipedia:Atomism|atomists]], but is now known to have evolved, more or less {{Wiki|independently}} from the [[West]], within classical [[Indian philosophy]], and last but not least, among the [[Buddhist]] [[scholastics]] of the [[Abhidharma]] sects. |
− | In the Buddhist tradition, Vasubandhu occupies the unique position of being counted as one of Abhidharma’s greatest proponents as well as one of its foremost critics. The Vimsatika is a Mahayana text and belongs to the later, critical phase of his thought. | + | In the [[Buddhist tradition]], [[Vasubandhu]] occupies the unique position of being counted as one of [[Abhidharma’s]] greatest proponents as well as one of its foremost critics. The [[Vimsatika]] is a [[Mahayana]] text and belongs to the later, critical phase of his [[thought]]. |
− | ==1.1 About Vasubandhu== | + | ==1.1 About [[Vasubandhu]]== |
− | Vasubandhu tends to be a somewhat enigmatic figure even to those familiar with East Asian philosophy or the particulars of classical Indian thought. Before going into more detail on the Vimsatika’s philosophical ideas, I would like to give some brief background on Vasubandhu’s biography and other treatises (sastras). | + | [[Vasubandhu]] tends to be a somewhat enigmatic figure even to those familiar with {{Wiki|East Asian}} [[philosophy]] or the particulars of classical [[Indian]] [[thought]]. Before going into more detail on the Vimsatika’s [[philosophical]] [[ideas]], I would like to give some brief background on [[Vasubandhu’s]] {{Wiki|biography}} and other treatises ([[sastras]]). |
− | The extant biographies of Vasubandhu contain many contradictions and legendary elements. Lamotte has noted the difficulty of coming to any solid conclusions about Vasubandhu as a person: | + | The extant {{Wiki|biographies}} of [[Vasubandhu]] contain many contradictions and legendary [[elements]]. [[Wikipedia:Étienne Lamotte|Lamotte]] has noted the difficulty of coming to any solid conclusions about [[Vasubandhu]] as a [[person]]: “[[Vasubandhu]] a trop vecu, trop pense, trop ecrit; et avant de se prononcer sur sa personalite, il faudrait avoir lu, critique et compare toutes ses oeuvres.” |
− | Vasubandhu was born around the year 316 CE in Purusapura, at the time the seventh most populous city in the world, located in what are now the North-West Territories of Pakistan. The city of Purusapura had become a regional capital of the empire of Gandhara under the Kushan king Kaniska I, who reigned from approximately 127 CE, and who is famous for having erected a giant stupa, perhaps the tallest building in the world of that time, to house the Buddha’s relics. Although the Empire of Gandhara was already past its heydey by the time Vasubandhu was born, Purusapura was still a great center of Buddhist learning. Anacker relates that it was the birthplace of the scholars Dharmasri and the Bhadhanta Dharmatrata, both of the Sarvastivada school of Buddhism, and that it was known as the seat of the Pascatiyas ( | + | [[Vasubandhu]] was born around the year 316 CE in [[Purusapura]], at the time the seventh most populous city in the [[world]], located in what are now the North-West Territories of {{Wiki|Pakistan}}. The city of [[Purusapura]] had become a regional capital of the [[empire]] of [[Gandhara]] under the [[Kushan]] [[king]] {{Wiki|Kaniska}} I, who reigned from approximately 127 CE, and who is famous for having erected a giant [[stupa]], perhaps the tallest building in the [[world]] of that time, to house the [[Buddha’s]] [[relics]]. Although the [[Empire]] of [[Gandhara]] was already {{Wiki|past}} its heydey by the time [[Vasubandhu]] was born, [[Purusapura]] was still a great center of [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|learning}}. [[Anacker]] relates that it was the birthplace of the [[scholars]] [[Dharmasri]] and the Bhadhanta [[Dharmatrata]], both of the [[Sarvastivada school]] of [[Buddhism]], and that it was known as the seat of the Pascatiyas (“[[Western]] [[masters]]”) of [[Abhidharma]]. |
− | Vasubandhu received his initial education in the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivada sect. The sources are in some disagreement as to who his teachers were—according to Paramartha, Vasubandhu’s 6th century Chinese translator, Vasubandhu’s teacher was a scholar by the name of Buddhamitra, whereas other sources say that he studied under the Sautrantika teacher Manoratha and never mention Buddhamitra. The medieval Tibetan doxog- rapher Bu-ston relates that he was a student of the master Sarighabhadra, a staunch defender of neo-orthodox Kashmiri Vaibhasika scholasticism. Whether or not Sanghabhadra actually was his teacher, Vasubandhu was firmly grounded in the Abhidharmic doctrines of his era, though tending already in the early phase of his thought towards a Sautrantika perspective. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] received his initial [[education]] in the [[Abhidharma]] of the Sarvastivada [[sect]]. The sources are in some disagreement as to who his [[teachers]] were—according to [[Paramartha]], [[Vasubandhu’s]] 6th century {{Wiki|Chinese}} translator, [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[teacher]] was a [[scholar]] by the [[name]] of [[Buddhamitra]], whereas other sources say that he studied under the [[Sautrantika]] [[teacher]] [[Manoratha]] and never mention [[Buddhamitra]]. The {{Wiki|medieval}} [[Tibetan]] doxog- rapher [[Bu-ston]] relates that he was a [[student]] of the [[master]] Sarighabhadra, a staunch defender of neo-orthodox [[Kashmiri]] [[Vaibhasika]] [[scholasticism]]. Whether or not [[Sanghabhadra]] actually was his [[teacher]], [[Vasubandhu]] was firmly grounded in the [[Abhidharmic]] [[doctrines]] of his {{Wiki|era}}, though tending already in the early phase of his [[thought]] towards a [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|perspective}}. |
− | For this reason, the two scholars came to develop an intense rivalry and were often pitted against each other in debate. Later in his career, however, Vasubandhu had largely lost his zest for competitive debating—it is reported that he brushed off a challenge to debate Sanghabhadra with a caustic witticism showing that there was no friendship between the two: “Though the lion retires far off before the pig, nonetheless the wise will know which of the two is best in strength.” | + | For this [[reason]], the two [[scholars]] came to develop an intense rivalry and were often pitted against each other in [[debate]]. Later in his career, however, [[Vasubandhu]] had largely lost his zest for competitive debating—it is reported that he brushed off a challenge to [[debate]] [[Sanghabhadra]] with a caustic witticism showing that there was no [[friendship]] between the two: “Though the [[lion]] retires far off before the pig, nonetheless the [[wise]] will know which of the two is best in strength.” |
− | Vasubandhu’s ironic eulogy for Sanghabhadra shows that he felt him to have been a sophistic debater lacking in the profound insight that he valued: | + | [[Vasubandhu’s]] ironic {{Wiki|eulogy}} for [[Sanghabhadra]] shows that he felt him to have been a sophistic debater lacking in the profound [[insight]] that he valued: “[[Sanghabhadra]] was a clever and ingenious [[scholar]]. His intellective [[powers]] were not deep, but his [[dialectics]] were always to the point.” |
− | This remark, however, is more than merely a matter of personal animosity. It brings to the fore the ideological divide between the non-Mahayana and Mahayana inflections of philosophical-religious thought. For Sanghabhadra, dialectic is apologetic, whereas Vasubandhu employs it in a mainly anti- apologetic role. Against Sarighabhadra’s orthodox dogmatism, Vasubandhu is a figure of transition and a creatively deconstructive thinker. | + | This remark, however, is more than merely a {{Wiki|matter}} of personal [[animosity]]. It brings to the fore the {{Wiki|ideological}} divide between the non-Mahayana and [[Mahayana]] inflections of philosophical-religious [[thought]]. For [[Sanghabhadra]], [[dialectic]] is apologetic, whereas [[Vasubandhu]] employs it in a mainly anti- apologetic role. Against Sarighabhadra’s [[orthodox]] {{Wiki|dogmatism}}, [[Vasubandhu]] is a figure of transition and a creatively deconstructive thinker. |
− | The early works of Vasubandhu are commonly classified as belonging to the Sautrantika school, e.g. the Abhidharmakosa (Treasury of Higher Doctrine') and its auto-commentary. The later Vasubandhu is however considered to be a Mahayanist and an adherent of the idealist Mind-Only school. The Mind-Only school is variously referred to in the literature by the Sanskrit terms Yogacara, Cittamatra and Vijnanavada. I am assuming for the sake of simplicity that these names can be used interchangeably, but some commentators assert that the terms designate philosophically distinct filiations of Mahayana thought, e.g. NAGAO, who uses Yogacara as a term for the beginnings and Vijnanavada for the later evolution of the school. | + | The early works of [[Vasubandhu]] are commonly classified as belonging to the [[Sautrantika school]], e.g. the [[Abhidharmakosa]] (Treasury of [[Higher Doctrine]]') and its auto-commentary. The later [[Vasubandhu]] is however considered to be a [[Mahayanist]] and an adherent of the {{Wiki|idealist}} [[Mind-Only school]]. The [[Mind-Only school]] is variously referred to in the {{Wiki|literature}} by the [[Sanskrit]] terms [[Yogacara]], [[Cittamatra]] and [[Vijnanavada]]. I am assuming for the [[sake]] of [[simplicity]] that these names can be used interchangeably, but some commentators assert that the terms designate [[philosophically]] {{Wiki|distinct}} filiations of [[Mahayana]] [[thought]], e.g. NAGAO, who uses [[Yogacara]] as a term for the beginnings and [[Vijnanavada]] for the later [[evolution]] of the school. |
− | Some of the important Mahayana sastras of Vasubandhu’s later phase are the Karmasiddhiprakarana (Discussion for the Demonstration of Action), the Vimsatika-karika (Twenty Verses of Mind-Only) and its auto-commentary, the Trimsika (Thirty Verses), the Madhyantavibhangabhasya (Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes) and the Trisvabhavanirdesa (Treatise on the Three Natures). However, even his later Mahayana works evince many Abhidharmic themes. | + | Some of the important [[Mahayana]] [[sastras]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] later phase are the [[Karmasiddhiprakarana]] ([[Discussion]] for the Demonstration of [[Action]]), the [[Vimsatika-karika]] (Twenty Verses of [[Mind-Only]]) and its auto-commentary, the [[Trimsika]] (Thirty Verses), the Madhyantavibhangabhasya (Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes) and the [[Trisvabhavanirdesa]] ([[Treatise on the Three Natures]]). However, even his later [[Mahayana]] works evince many [[Abhidharmic]] themes. |
− | It has been conjectured (e.g. by FRAUWALLNER) that Vasubandhu is a composite figure. The issue of the identity of Vasubandhu remains to this day a major topic of controversy, but for the theses being argued here, it will be sufficient if the Vasubandhus of the Kosa and the Vimsatika are the same author. This circumstance is fortunately not under dispute— according to Frauwallner’s distribution, both works belong to | + | It has been conjectured (e.g. by FRAUWALLNER) that [[Vasubandhu]] is a composite figure. The issue of the [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]] of [[Vasubandhu]] remains to this day a major topic of [[controversy]], but for the theses being argued here, it will be sufficient if the [[Vasubandhus]] of the [[Kosa]] and the [[Vimsatika]] are the same author. This circumstance is fortunately not under dispute— according to [[Frauwallner’s]] distribution, both works belong to “[[Vasubandhu]] the Younger.” |
− | ==1.2 The Vimsatika in a Nutshell== | + | ==1.2 The [[Vimsatika]] in a Nutshell== |
− | As it will not be possible to comprehensively examine all of the Vimsatika’s arguments in their minute details, I will only give a lightning tour of its key points and excerpt the epistemological themes of Vasubandhu’s thought in this treatise. The Vimsatika is a locus classicus of the Mind-Only school, and is written in the style of a debate, presenting the idealist thesis of vijnapti- matra and defending it against various interlocutors who argue realist views: “The goal of Vimsatika is to repudiate the view that there is an external world corresponding to the images of objects.” | + | As it will not be possible to comprehensively examine all of the Vimsatika’s arguments in their minute details, I will only give a {{Wiki|lightning}} tour of its key points and excerpt the [[epistemological]] themes of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[thought]] in this treatise. The [[Vimsatika]] is a locus classicus of the [[Mind-Only school]], and is written in the style of a [[debate]], presenting the {{Wiki|idealist}} {{Wiki|thesis}} of [[vijnapti]]- [[matra]] and defending it against various interlocutors who argue realist [[views]]: “The goal of [[Vimsatika]] is to repudiate the view that there is an [[external world]] [[corresponding]] to the images of [[objects]].” |
− | Vasubandhu indicates in I that he uses the nomenclature citta, manas, vijhana and vijhapti interchangeably. The translations of these terms are respectively | + | [[Vasubandhu]] indicates in I that he uses the nomenclature [[citta]], [[manas]], [[vijhana]] and vijhapti interchangeably. The translations of these terms are respectively ‘[[mind]],’ ‘[[cognition]],’ ‘[[awareness]],’ and ‘[[percept]].’ Given that other Indian schools of [[philosophy]] do distinguish some of these terms quite sharply, [[Vasubandhu]] is making a far from [[trivial]] move in simply equating their meanings. Doesn’t it make a considerable difference as to whether one interprets the [[doctrine of Mind-Only]] as mentalism (as the sole [[existence]] of [[consciousness]]), or as positivism (all [[knowledge]] is based on [[sense]] experience)? Perhaps not. The treatment of these terms as exact synonyms implies far-reaching {{Wiki|consequences}} for the [[Mind-Only]] [[understanding]] of the [[nature]] of [[experience]] and function of [[consciousness]]. The fact that [[Vasubandhu]] amalgamates so many different terms indicates that mentalistic vocabulary is probably an implicit locus of [[philosophical]] {{Wiki|synthesis}}. |
− | The Vimsatika begins in 1 with a succinct statement of the fundamental principle that everything is perception-only, and that the appearance of the non-existent external referent (bahyartha) of perception can be compared to the optical illusions seen by the taimirikas, i.e. those persons who perceive illusory hairs or moons in their field of vision owing to a medical disorder of the eyes—a famous statement that epitomizes the Mind-Only idealist view. Wood characterizes this view essentially as a brand of idealist phenomenalism—the epistemologically naive, common-sense apprehension of an external world is (on that particular count) wildly inaccurate, because people actually only perceive their own percepts. They are familiar only with the phenomenal workings within their own minds. | + | The [[Vimsatika]] begins in 1 with a succinct statement of the fundamental [[principle]] that everything is [[perception-only]], and that the [[appearance]] of the [[non-existent]] external referent (bahyartha) of [[perception]] can be compared to the optical [[illusions]] seen by the taimirikas, i.e. those persons who {{Wiki|perceive}} [[illusory]] hairs or moons in their field of [[vision]] owing to a {{Wiki|medical}} disorder of the eyes—a famous statement that epitomizes the [[Mind-Only]] {{Wiki|idealist}} view. [[Wood]] characterizes this view [[essentially]] as a brand of {{Wiki|idealist}} phenomenalism—the [[epistemologically]] {{Wiki|naive}}, {{Wiki|common-sense}} apprehension of an [[external world]] is (on that particular count) wildly inaccurate, because [[people]] actually only {{Wiki|perceive}} their [[own]] [[percepts]]. They are familiar only with the [[phenomenal]] workings within their [[own minds]]. |
− | Several caveats before we proceed with the discussion—in contemporary scholarship, the primacy of the idealist interpretation has been at times hotly contested, e.g. by LUSTHAUS, WAYMAN, Anacker and KOCHUMUTTOM. These scholars advance revisionist readings that in recent years have gained an increasing amount of currency. The revisionist interpretations generally do not take Vasubandhu to deny external objects, thereby placing themselves in opposition to the | + | Several caveats before we proceed with the discussion—in contemporary {{Wiki|scholarship}}, the primacy of the {{Wiki|idealist}} [[interpretation]] has been at times hotly contested, e.g. by LUSTHAUS, WAYMAN, [[Anacker]] and KOCHUMUTTOM. These [[scholars]] advance revisionist readings that in recent years have gained an increasing amount of currency. The revisionist interpretations generally do not take [[Vasubandhu]] to deny [[external objects]], thereby placing themselves in [[opposition]] to the “[[traditional]] [[interpretation]]” advocated by many [[Western]] [[scholars]] such as WOOD, as well as by {{Wiki|medieval}} [[Tibetan]] [[Wikipedia:Doxography|doxographical]] accounts of the [[Cittamatra]] system of [[tenets]]. I will have more to say about the topic of these variant interpretations later on in this paper, but for the time being, I will adopt the frame of [[traditional]] [[interpretation]] as so not to prematurely introduce unnecessary complexities into the [[discussion]]. Interpretive frame-shifts will be less confusing once the fundamentals are in place. |
− | In verse 2, Vasubandhu immediately encounters the first objection of the realist—if they are mere mental creations, how can objects be determinate and definite as to time and place? After all, some of the most salient characteristics of physical objects are their apparent spatiotemporal determinacy, stability and continuity (niyama), their actuality or causally efficacious functioning (krtakriya), and their public perceptibility, i.e. the indetermination (aniyama) of mental continua with regard to public percepts. External objects, argues the realist, are not perceived in an arbitrary fashion because their behavior conforms to certain objective regularities and constraints— they do not shift about unpredictably, vanish and reappear at random, or gratuitously alter into completely different objects. | + | In verse 2, [[Vasubandhu]] immediately encounters the first objection of the realist—if they are mere [[mental]] creations, how can [[objects]] be {{Wiki|determinate}} and definite as to time and place? After all, some of the most salient characteristics of [[physical objects]] are their apparent spatiotemporal determinacy, stability and continuity ([[niyama]]), their [[actuality]] or [[causally]] efficacious functioning (krtakriya), and their public perceptibility, i.e. the indetermination (aniyama) of [[mental]] continua with regard to public [[percepts]]. [[External objects]], argues the realist, are not [[perceived]] in an arbitrary fashion because their {{Wiki|behavior}} conforms to certain [[objective]] regularities and constraints— they do not shift about unpredictably, vanish and reappear at random, or gratuitously alter into completely different [[objects]]. |
− | Vasubandhu does not deny that the observed world evinces such regularities. He merely questions whether they necessarily imply the metaphysical hypothesis of an objectively existing external world, especially since this hypothesis could be held to imply the anathematic existence of acausal objects. He agrees with the requirement that experience be subject to causal constraint, but with an internalist twist—that the conditioning factors are to be found in the mind alone, and not in an external world. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] does not deny that the observed [[world]] evinces such regularities. He merely questions whether they necessarily imply the [[metaphysical]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}} of an objectively [[existing]] [[external world]], especially since this {{Wiki|hypothesis}} could be held to imply the anathematic [[existence]] of {{Wiki|acausal}} objects. He agrees with the requirement that [[experience]] be [[subject]] to causal constraint, but with an internalist twist—that the {{Wiki|conditioning}} factors are to be found in the [[mind]] alone, and not in an [[external world]]. |
− | In accordance with Buddhism’s generally Humean notion of causality, the phenomenal laws governing the behavior of the supposedly external objects are no more and no less strictly necessary and universal than the inner laws of own subjectivity. Their lawlike behaviour can be accounted for without any appeal to a transcendentally objective realm. Vasubandhu claims that the dream hypothesis, despite seeming counterintuitive at first blush, ultimately offers a better explanation for the regularities in our experience than metaphysical realism. | + | In accordance with [[Buddhism’s]] generally [[Humean]] notion of [[causality]], the [[phenomenal]] laws governing the {{Wiki|behavior}} of the supposedly [[external objects]] are no more and no less strictly necessary and [[universal]] than the inner laws of [[own]] [[subjectivity]]. Their lawlike {{Wiki|behaviour}} can be accounted for without any appeal to a transcendentally [[objective]] [[realm]]. [[Vasubandhu]] claims that the [[dream]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}}, despite seeming {{Wiki|counterintuitive}} at first blush, ultimately offers a better explanation for the regularities in our [[experience]] than metaphysical [[realism]]. |
− | Verse 3 introduces Vasubandhu’s famous analogy of perception “as in | + | Verse 3 introduces [[Vasubandhu’s]] famous analogy of [[perception]] “as in [[dreams]]” (svapnavat). [[Consciousness]] projects [[percepts]] as external to the [[mind]]. The mere [[experience]] of objectivity therefore does not suffice as [[proof]] that the [[objects of perception]] [[exist]] {{Wiki|independently}}. In the special case of [[dreams]], even a hard-boiled [[physical]] realist will have no difficulty in saying that [[phenomena]] are [[perceived]] in absence of [[contact]] with an [[external world]]. But [[Vasubandhu’s]] {{Wiki|thesis}} is more than merely an example of argument from illusion—he proposes that this inside-out mode of [[perception]], far from being an [[exceptional]] case, is in fact the general {{Wiki|rule}}. [[Dreaming]] is the paradigmatic example for [[perception]]. |
− | As for the question of spatial and temporal location, Vasubandhu offhandedly dismisses the realist objection, pointing out that the spatiotemporal determination experienced in dreams is perfectly sufficient to account for the perception of an apparently external world. In attributing the structure of experience to purely internal substrates, and absorbing the transcendental object into the mind, Vasubandhu makes objectivity wholly parasitic upon subjectivity. In this respect, he can be rightly said to veer sharply towards idealism. | + | As for the question of spatial and {{Wiki|temporal}} location, [[Vasubandhu]] offhandedly dismisses the realist objection, pointing out that the spatiotemporal [[determination]] [[experienced]] in [[dreams]] is perfectly sufficient to account for the [[perception]] of an apparently [[external world]]. In attributing the {{Wiki|structure}} of [[experience]] to purely internal substrates, and absorbing the [[transcendental]] [[object]] into the [[mind]], [[Vasubandhu]] makes objectivity wholly parasitic upon [[subjectivity]]. In this [[respect]], he can be rightly said to veer sharply towards [[idealism]]. |
− | The indetermination of mind-streams (non-exclusiveness of percepts), Vasubandhu argues, is just as in the case of hungry ghosts (pretas), who all see rivers of water as pus due to their identical dispositional bias of perception. That sentient beings perceive a common world proves only that their karmic propensities have the same common denominator. As an example, Vasubandhu mentions beings whose negative karmic propensities will eventually come to fruition as a rebirth in a mentally projected infernal realm. Thus, Vasubandhu argues that his vijnapti-matra thesis is perfectly in accordance with the accepted Buddhist moral theory of karma (which we might characterize in the modern terminology of philosophical ethics as having a consequentialist orientation). | + | The indetermination of [[mind-streams]] (non-exclusiveness of [[percepts]]), [[Vasubandhu]] argues, is just as in the case of [[hungry ghosts]] ([[pretas]]), who all see [[rivers]] of [[water]] as pus due to their [[identical]] dispositional bias of [[perception]]. That [[sentient beings]] {{Wiki|perceive}} a common [[world]] proves only that their [[karmic]] propensities have the same common denominator. As an example, [[Vasubandhu]] mentions [[beings]] whose negative [[karmic]] propensities will eventually come to [[fruition]] as a [[rebirth]] in a [[mentally]] {{Wiki|projected}} infernal [[realm]]. Thus, [[Vasubandhu]] argues that his [[vijnapti-matra]] {{Wiki|thesis}} is perfectly in accordance with the accepted [[Buddhist]] [[moral]] [[theory of karma]] (which we might characterize in the {{Wiki|modern}} {{Wiki|terminology}} of [[philosophical]] [[ethics]] as having a consequentialist orientation). |
− | To Vasubandhu, causality and lawlike regularities, being merely empirical regulatives and therefore wholly internal to experience, do not in and of themselves suffice to offer conclusive proof of objectivity. In 4, he compares the efficacity of action (arthakriya) to nocturnal emission of semen. We might unpack this rather risque example as trying to illustrate how even wholly imaginary actions (e.g. having sexual intercourse in a dream) can nonetheless produce pragmatic effects (the emission of semen). | + | To [[Vasubandhu]], [[causality]] and lawlike regularities, being merely [[empirical]] regulatives and therefore wholly internal to [[experience]], do not in and of themselves suffice to offer conclusive [[proof]] of objectivity. In 4, he compares the efficacity of [[action]] (arthakriya) to [[nocturnal emission]] of semen. We might unpack this rather risque example as trying to illustrate how even wholly [[imaginary]] [[actions]] (e.g. having {{Wiki|sexual}} intercourse in a [[dream]]) can nonetheless produce {{Wiki|pragmatic}} effects (the emission of semen). |
− | Vasubandhu expands upon this example in his ingenious hell-guardian argument in 5, where he urges that the demonic guardians (naraka-palas) who torture their victims are nonexistent because they themselves are not being tortured. It is an axiomatic assumption of early medieval Buddhist cosmology that hell-dwellers were reborn in a hellish realm in order to experience infernal sufferings as retributions for their past actions. But since the naraka-palas inflict suffering upon others rather than experience it themselves, it follows that it is impossible for their true manner of existence to accord with their appearance of being real, sentient beings. Vasubandhu thus concludes that hell and its guardians are mental projections, suggesting that the doctrine of karma logically implies his idealist thesis. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] expands upon this example in his ingenious hell-guardian argument in 5, where he [[urges]] that the {{Wiki|demonic}} guardians (naraka-palas) who torture their {{Wiki|victims}} are [[Wikipedia:Nothing|nonexistent]] because they themselves are not being tortured. It is an axiomatic assumption of early {{Wiki|medieval}} [[Buddhist cosmology]] that [[hell-dwellers]] were [[reborn]] in a hellish [[realm]] in order to [[experience]] infernal [[sufferings]] as retributions for their {{Wiki|past}} [[actions]]. But since the naraka-palas inflict [[suffering]] upon others rather than [[experience]] it themselves, it follows that it is impossible for their true manner of [[existence]] to accord with their [[appearance]] of being real, [[sentient beings]]. [[Vasubandhu]] thus concludes that [[hell]] and its guardians are [[mental projections]], suggesting that the [[doctrine of karma]] [[logically]] implies his {{Wiki|idealist}} {{Wiki|thesis}}. |
− | Moreover, if hell, the worst logically conceivable case of suffering, is inadmissible as a Moorean proof for the metaphysically objective existence of hell, then the same applies a fortiriori to all other possible states of experience. Vasubandhu even coopts such realist proofs as support for his own thesis. Hell, Vasubandhu would diagnose, is nothing other than the painful symptom of a very severe case of Johnsonian stone-kicking. | + | Moreover, if [[hell]], the worst [[logically]] conceivable case of [[suffering]], is inadmissible as a Moorean [[proof]] for the [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] [[objective]] [[existence]] of [[hell]], then the same applies a fortiriori to all other possible states of experience. [[Vasubandhu]] even coopts such realist proofs as support for his [[own]] {{Wiki|thesis}}. [[Hell]], [[Vasubandhu]] would diagnose, is nothing other than the [[painful]] symptom of a very severe case of Johnsonian stone-kicking. |
− | In response to Mach’s sardonic aperqu?1 about the Pyrrhonist in Moliere’s Mariage force who is beaten and does not go on saying “Il me semble que vous me battez,” but takes his beating as really received, Vasubandhu might answer that his case against the metaphysical existence of an external world is predicated on a specifically transcendental sense of “seems talk.” In modern terms, we might construe Vasubandhu’s position of transcendental illusionism as advocating an internalist account of knowledge similar to the analysis of Cohen. The hell-dweller argument tries to show that if the principle of ethical consequence is to be preserved, then suffering (such as receiving a beating)—and everything else that masquerades as the external world—must be a quasi-oneiric manifestation of mental causative potentials (vasanas). In a dream, the dreamed tortures and terrors are experienced as very real indeed, but upon awakening, they evaporate. The dreamer recognizes that all of his experiences were, in truth, no more than projective appearances of his mind’s inherent muddle. | + | In response to Mach’s sardonic aperqu?1 about the Pyrrhonist in Moliere’s Mariage force who is beaten and does not go on saying “Il me semble que vous me battez,” but takes his beating as really received, [[Vasubandhu]] might answer that his case against the [[metaphysical]] [[existence]] of an [[external world]] is predicated on a specifically [[transcendental]] [[sense]] of “seems talk.” In {{Wiki|modern}} terms, we might construe [[Vasubandhu’s]] position of [[transcendental]] illusionism as advocating an internalist account of [[knowledge]] similar to the analysis of Cohen. The hell-dweller argument tries to show that if the [[principle]] of [[ethical]] consequence is to be preserved, then [[suffering]] (such as receiving a beating)—and everything else that masquerades as the external world—must be a quasi-oneiric [[manifestation]] of [[mental]] [[causative]] potentials ([[vasanas]]). In a [[dream]], the dreamed tortures and terrors are [[experienced]] as very real indeed, but upon [[awakening]], they evaporate. The dreamer [[recognizes]] that all of his [[experiences]] were, in [[truth]], no more than projective [[appearances]] of his [[mind’s]] [[inherent]] muddle. |
− | Next, Vasubandhu gives an argument in 8 against the existence of two types of sense-base (ay at ana)—sensory faculties and their external sensory fields—asserting that external sensory fields (visibles, tangibles, audibles, etc.) do not actually exist. Vasubandhu justifies this claim by means of a scriptural hermeneutic. He maintains that the statements regarding the existence of the sensory fields have a merely provisional meaning as metaphorical figures of speech set forth with the hidden (neyartha) intention of accomodating realists to the Buddhadharma. | + | Next, [[Vasubandhu]] gives an argument in 8 against the [[existence]] of two types of sense-base (ay at ana)—sensory [[faculties]] and their external sensory fields—asserting that external sensory fields (visibles, tangibles, audibles, etc.) do not actually [[exist]]. [[Vasubandhu]] justifies this claim by means of a [[scriptural]] {{Wiki|hermeneutic}}. He maintains that the statements regarding the [[existence]] of the sensory fields have a merely [[provisional meaning]] as {{Wiki|metaphorical}} figures of {{Wiki|speech}} set forth with the hidden ([[neyartha]]) [[intention]] of accomodating [[realists]] to the [[Buddhadharma]]. |
− | Taught in one way, Vasubandhu argues in 10, the doctrine of the Buddha leads to the lower understanding of the insubstantiality of the personality (pudgala-nairatmya) and taught in its deeper meaning as Mind-Only, it leads to the higher understanding of the insubstantiality of the elements of experience (dharma-nairatmya). But aside from this hermeneutic justification, he also gives a rational line of reasoning—that the existence of external sensory fields implies metaphysical realism, which seems an acceptable enough theory at first glance, but is revealed upon closer examination to be unreasonable. | + | [[Taught]] in one way, [[Vasubandhu]] argues in 10, the [[doctrine]] of the [[Buddha]] leads to the lower [[understanding]] of the [[insubstantiality]] of the [[personality]] ([[pudgala-nairatmya]]) and [[taught]] in its deeper meaning as [[Mind-Only]], it leads to the [[higher understanding]] of the [[insubstantiality]] of the [[elements]] of [[experience]] ([[dharma-nairatmya]]). But aside from this {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} justification, he also gives a [[rational]] line of reasoning—that the [[existence]] of external sensory fields implies [[metaphysical]] [[realism]], which seems an acceptable enough {{Wiki|theory}} at first glance, but is revealed upon closer {{Wiki|examination}} to be unreasonable. |
− | Vasubandhu then proceeds in 11-15 to give an inventive reductio demonstrating why the various forms of metaphysical realism fail to be a coherent alternative to his dream hypothesis of perception. The transcendental objects postulated by realism do not exist because it is impossible for them to be composed of atoms. Since Vasubandhu crystallizes the dispute over transcendental objectivity (i.e. the existence of a mind-independent external world) around the issue of atomism, he devotes a sizeable portion of the Vimsatika to a demonstration that the metaphysical existence of atoms is unproven—a treatment which is akin to the Kantian analysis of the issue, as we will explore in detail in Chapter 3. I shall argue that, unlike Kant, Vasubandhu also rejects the necessity of noumenal simples to the constitution of phenomenal reality. Kant’s deep suspicion about the legitimacy of such a philosophical move is due to his correct intuition that it would signify a final departure from realism. But this is of course precisely the paradigm shift that Vasubandhu wishes to urge. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] then proceeds in 11-15 to give an inventive reductio demonstrating why the various [[forms]] of [[metaphysical]] [[realism]] fail to be a coherent alternative to his [[dream]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}} of [[perception]]. The [[transcendental]] objects postulated by [[realism]] do not [[exist]] because it is impossible for them to be composed of [[atoms]]. Since [[Vasubandhu]] crystallizes the dispute over [[transcendental]] objectivity (i.e. the [[existence]] of a mind-independent [[external world]]) around the issue of [[atomism]], he devotes a sizeable portion of the [[Vimsatika]] to a demonstration that the [[metaphysical]] [[existence]] of [[atoms]] is unproven—a treatment which is akin to the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] analysis of the issue, as we will explore in detail in [[Chapter]] 3. I shall argue that, unlike {{Wiki|Kant}}, [[Vasubandhu]] also rejects the necessity of [[noumenal]] simples to the constitution of [[phenomenal]] [[reality]]. [[Kant’s]] deep [[suspicion]] about the legitimacy of such a [[philosophical]] move is due to his correct [[intuition]] that it would signify a final departure from [[realism]]. But this is of course precisely the [[paradigm]] shift that [[Vasubandhu]] wishes to [[urge]]. |
− | In 16, Vasubandhu refutes the causal theory of perception and then answers to a number of further realist objections against the dream theory of experience, having to do with how recollection of objects or differences in the dream and waking state can be accounted for. Just as those who are dreaming do not realize the inexistence of the objects in their dreams, he argues in XXXIII, those who lack world-transcending gnosis fail to realize insubstantiality. | + | In 16, [[Vasubandhu]] refutes the causal {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] and then answers to a number of further realist objections against the [[dream]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[experience]], having to do with how [[recollection]] of [[objects]] or differences in the [[dream]] and waking [[state]] can be accounted for. Just as those who are [[Wikipedia:Dream|dreaming]] do not realize the inexistence of the [[objects]] in their [[dreams]], he argues in XXXIII, those who lack [[world-transcending]] [[gnosis]] fail to realize [[insubstantiality]]. |
− | In a similar vein, Essler remarks that just as people rarely realize they are dreaming while they are having a dream, they are likewise unaware of the extent to which they epistemologically constitute their world when awake. Such is the nature of dreaming, Mach ironizes—while in a dream, one may reflect about the dream and recognize it as such by its oddities, but one immediately puts one’s mind to rest about them. Vasubandhu’s comparison of this constitutional creativity of the mind to dream consciousness is suggestive of the language of the Mandukya Upanisad? It strongly hints at the transformative aim of the text—if it is really true that our world is like a dream, then we can hope to awaken from it. | + | In a similar vein, Essler remarks that just as [[people]] rarely realize they are [[Wikipedia:Dream|dreaming]] while they are having a [[dream]], they are likewise unaware of the extent to which they [[epistemologically]] constitute their [[world]] when awake. Such is the [[nature]] of [[Wikipedia:Dream|dreaming]], Mach ironizes—while in a [[dream]], one may reflect about the [[dream]] and [[recognize]] it as such by its oddities, but one immediately puts one’s [[mind]] to rest about them. [[Vasubandhu’s]] comparison of this constitutional {{Wiki|creativity}} of the [[mind]] to [[dream]] [[consciousness]] is suggestive of the [[language]] of the [[Mandukya]] [[Upanisad]]? It strongly hints at the transformative aim of the text—if it is really true that our [[world]] is like a [[dream]], then we can {{Wiki|hope}} to [[awaken]] from it. |
− | Since his realist interlocutor in 18 is also Buddhist, Vasubandhu is in the position of using scriptural authority to illustrate his idea that minds do not require the intermediation of a mind-independent external world to influence each other. In the Mind-Only paradigm, the existence of a telepathic influence directly connecting the different mind-streams is not only invoked in order to absolve Mind-Only of solipsism or to explain anomalous cases, but is employed as a central explanatory mechanism for ordinary perception.In realism, common perceptions are accounted for by the external object, which causally determines the sensory core of perception. In Mind-Only idealism, the external object is merely a common locus item. | + | Since his realist interlocutor in 18 is also [[Buddhist]], [[Vasubandhu]] is in the position of using [[scriptural]] authority to illustrate his [[idea]] that [[minds]] do not require the intermediation of a mind-independent [[external world]] to influence each other. In the [[Mind-Only]] [[paradigm]], the [[existence]] of a telepathic influence directly connecting the different [[mind-streams]] is not only invoked in order to absolve [[Mind-Only]] of {{Wiki|solipsism}} or to explain {{Wiki|anomalous}} cases, but is employed as a central explanatory {{Wiki|mechanism}} for ordinary perception.In [[realism]], common [[perceptions]] are accounted for by the [[external object]], which [[causally]] determines the sensory core of [[perception]]. In [[Mind-Only]] [[idealism]], the [[external object]] is merely a common locus item. |
− | In the intriguing argument of the forest-dwelling seers in 20, Vasubandhu attempts to rebut the charge of solipsism by proposing that mental states and perceptions exercise a direct causal influence on other consciousnesses, as demonstrated by a scriptural example involving the extraordinary mental powers of certain forest hermits. This causal influence places the various minds in immediate mind-to-mind contact (paras-patah) with each other. Despite that we are unaware of this contact, Vasubandhu suggests, it is the means by which we intersubjectively constitute afolie simultanee that then appears to us as the objective world. | + | In the intriguing argument of the [[forest-dwelling]] seers in 20, [[Vasubandhu]] attempts to rebut the charge of {{Wiki|solipsism}} by proposing that [[mental states]] and [[perceptions]] exercise a direct causal influence on other [[consciousnesses]], as demonstrated by a [[scriptural]] example involving the [[extraordinary mental powers]] of certain [[forest]] [[hermits]]. This causal influence places the various [[minds]] in immediate [[mind-to-mind]] [[contact]] (paras-patah) with each other. Despite that we are unaware of this [[contact]], [[Vasubandhu]] suggests, it is the means by which we intersubjectively constitute afolie simultanee that then appears to us as the [[objective world]]. |
− | In the penultimate verse 21, Vasubandhu directly addresses the other minds problem. Not only do we not truly know other minds, we do not even know our own. Essentially, Vasubandhu frames the other minds problem as a special case of the more general problem of the epistemic status of the transcendental subject, for which he offers a deeply skeptical response. | + | In the penultimate verse 21, [[Vasubandhu]] directly addresses the other [[minds]] problem. Not only do we not truly know other [[minds]], we do not even know our [[own]]. [[Essentially]], [[Vasubandhu]] frames the other [[minds]] problem as a special case of the more general problem of the {{Wiki|epistemic}} {{Wiki|status}} of the [[transcendental]] [[subject]], for which he offers a deeply skeptical response. |
− | ==1.3 Rationale and Method of the Investigation== | + | ==1.3 Rationale and Method of the [[Investigation]]== |
− | Why single out Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism for further examination? The Vimsatika’s argument against atomism demarcates a crucial juncture both in Vasubandhu’s own thought as well as in Northern Buddhist thought in general—the two non-Mahayana schools of Northern Buddhism (the Sarvastivada/Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika) commonly accept the existence of atoms, whereas the two Mahayana schools, the Yogacara/Citta- matra (Yogic Practice/Mind-Only) and the Madhyamika (Middle Way) do not. Also, in using Vasubandhu’s argument as a mirror in which to study the epistemological interrelation of mind and object, I will offer some contemporary reflections on two perennial themes of philosophy—empiricism and Cartesian external world skepticism. | + | Why single out [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]] for further examination? The Vimsatika’s argument against [[atomism]] demarcates a crucial juncture both in [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[own]] [[thought]] as well as in [[Northern Buddhist]] [[thought]] in general—the two non-Mahayana schools of [[Northern Buddhism]] (the Sarvastivada/Vaibhasika and the [[Sautrantika]]) commonly accept the [[existence]] of [[atoms]], whereas the two [[Mahayana schools]], the Yogacara/Citta- [[matra]] ([[Yogic]] Practice/Mind-Only) and the [[Madhyamika]] ([[Middle Way]]) do not. Also, in using [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument as a [[mirror]] in which to study the [[epistemological]] interrelation of [[mind]] and [[object]], I will offer some contemporary reflections on two [[perennial]] themes of philosophy—empiricism and [[Cartesian]] [[external world]] {{Wiki|skepticism}}. |
− | However, this effort runs into certain initial difficulties, concerning not so much the analysis of Vasubandhu’s anti-atomist argument in and of itself— which will prove fairly straightforward—but rather, having to do with the hermeneutic challenges of properly assessing its significance against the broader backdrop of classical Buddhist thought and analyzing it in the light of contemporary epistemology. | + | However, this [[effort]] runs into certain initial difficulties, concerning not so much the analysis of [[Vasubandhu’s]] anti-atomist argument in and of itself— which will prove fairly straightforward—but rather, having to do with the {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} challenges of properly assessing its significance against the broader backdrop of classical [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] and analyzing it in the {{Wiki|light}} of contemporary epistemology. |
− | On the one hand, any attempt to draw out the meaning of Vasubandhu’s argument must take account of the unique historical context and the distinctive philosophical moves generated by the Buddhist program. On the other hand, an exegesis from a contemporary standpoint will necessarily be grounded, at least in part, within the matrix of the Occidental philosophical traditions, which prima facie seems very far removed from the worldview of Indian Buddhism around the 4th century CE. | + | On the one hand, any attempt to draw out the meaning of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument must take account of the unique historical context and the distinctive [[philosophical]] moves generated by the [[Buddhist]] program. On the other hand, an {{Wiki|exegesis}} from a contemporary standpoint will necessarily be grounded, at least in part, within the [[matrix]] of the {{Wiki|Occidental}} [[philosophical]] [[traditions]], which [[Wikipedia:Prima facie|prima facie]] seems very far removed from the worldview of [[Indian Buddhism]] around the 4th century CE. |
− | Herbert V. Guenther has often remarked on the difficulty of applying Western philosophical categories to Eastern patterns of thought, warning that an overly facile characterization in Western terms runs the risk of blurring or even entirely misconstruing the distinguishing features of Buddhism. | + | [[Wikipedia:Herbert Vighnāntaka Günther|Herbert V. Guenther]] has often remarked on the difficulty of applying Western [[philosophical]] categories to Eastern patterns of [[thought]], warning that an overly facile characterization in [[Western]] terms runs the [[risk]] of blurring or even entirely misconstruing the distinguishing features of [[Buddhism]]. |
− | Extrapolating grand trends and tendencies is tricky business in any philosophical context, and especially so when it comes to the history of Buddhist thought. One must be careful not to cavalierly colonize the texts of the Other. But a comparative analysis unavoidably requires a certain degree of creative extrapolation and generalization. | + | Extrapolating grand trends and {{Wiki|tendencies}} is tricky business in any philosophical context, and especially so when it comes to the history of [[Buddhist]] [[thought]]. One must be careful not to cavalierly colonize the texts of the Other. But a comparative analysis unavoidably requires a certain [[degree]] of creative extrapolation and generalization. |
− | Clearly, in the worst case, such an approach may reveal little more than the expositor’s hermeneutic bias. Yet it would be equally naive, in a philosophical sense, to desist from bringing in current vocabulary and concerns in an attempt to eliminate Western perspective from the equation. | + | Clearly, in the worst case, such an approach may reveal little more than the expositor’s {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} bias. Yet it would be equally {{Wiki|naive}}, in a [[philosophical]] [[sense]], to desist from bringing in current vocabulary and concerns in an attempt to eliminate [[Western]] {{Wiki|perspective}} from the equation. |
− | Although it would be possible to restrict oneself to a purely text-immanent interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, such a treatment of this type would be of little more than historiographical or antiquarian relevance. Indeed, it would be rather difficult to conceive of a philosophically relevant study of Vasubandhu’s position on atomism that does not attempt to line him up with Western thinkers and commensurate his ideas to familiar Western categories. | + | Although it would be possible to restrict oneself to a purely text-immanent [[interpretation]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[Vimsatika]], such a treatment of this type would be of little more than historiographical or antiquarian relevance. Indeed, it would be rather difficult to [[conceive]] of a [[philosophically]] relevant study of [[Vasubandhu’s]] position on [[atomism]] that does not attempt to line him up with [[Western]] thinkers and commensurate his [[ideas]] to familiar [[Western]] categories. |
− | One challenge is therefore to employ the inescapable perspectival slant of a contemporary interpretation to good effect in bringing Vasubandhu’s arguments to bear upon topics of interest to present-day philosophers. As B. K. Matilal notes, contemporary writing on classical Indian philosophy must somehow strike a balance between the reconstruction of historical views and the critical examination of similar modern views. Some knowledge of historical development will prove indispensable as a foundation for abstracting the underlying conceptual structure of Vasubandhu’s line of argument and reconstructing its main epistemological themes and issues. The project of philosophical re-synthesis in the guise of comparative analysis requires that the discussion fluidly shift back and forth between ideo-historical exploration and rational reconstruction. | + | One challenge is therefore to employ the inescapable perspectival slant of a contemporary [[interpretation]] to good effect in bringing [[Vasubandhu’s]] arguments to bear upon topics of [[interest]] to present-day [[philosophers]]. As B. K. [[Matilal]] notes, contemporary [[writing]] on classical [[Indian philosophy]] must somehow strike a [[balance]] between the reconstruction of historical [[views]] and the critical {{Wiki|examination}} of similar {{Wiki|modern}} [[views]]. Some [[knowledge]] of historical [[development]] will prove indispensable as a foundation for abstracting the underlying {{Wiki|conceptual}} {{Wiki|structure}} of [[Vasubandhu’s]] line of argument and reconstructing its main [[epistemological]] themes and issues. The project of [[philosophical]] re-synthesis in the guise of comparative analysis requires that the [[discussion]] fluidly shift back and forth between ideo-historical exploration and [[rational]] reconstruction. |
− | In particular, I hope to identify some of the central philosophical features of Buddhist thought by casting the Vimsatika, in an empiricist mold, juxtaposing Buddhist thinkers such as Gautama Sakyamuni and Vasubandhu with Kant as well with Avenarius and Mach, Kant’s 19th century empiriocriticist successors. The main reason why I do not elaborate the obvious parallels to Berkeley or Schopenhauer is not because it would be uninstructive or inappropriate, but because the comparisons have already been extensively pursued elsewhere. Instead, I will emphasize the comparison of Mind-Only epistemological idealism to to the post-Kantian empiriocriticist phenomenalism of Mach. Since Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosa phase of thought arguably already makes a Kantian turn and the Vimsatika represents a further critical step in his development, it seems that Mind-Only might profitably be re-evaluated as a continuation of the Kantian trajectory of critical empiricism (in other words, as an epistemology of “Experience-Only”) rather than a reversion to the pre-Kantian idealism of Berkeley. | + | In particular, I {{Wiki|hope}} to identify some of the central [[philosophical]] features of [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] by casting the [[Vimsatika]], in an [[empiricist]] mold, juxtaposing [[Buddhist]] thinkers such as [[Gautama Sakyamuni]] and [[Vasubandhu]] with {{Wiki|Kant}} as well with Avenarius and Mach, [[Kant’s]] 19th century empiriocriticist successors. The main [[reason]] why I do not elaborate the obvious parallels to [[Berkeley]] or {{Wiki|Schopenhauer}} is not because it would be uninstructive or inappropriate, but because the comparisons have already been extensively pursued elsewhere. Instead, I will {{Wiki|emphasize}} the comparison of [[Mind-Only]] [[epistemological]] [[idealism]] to to the post-Kantian empiriocriticist phenomenalism of Mach. Since [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[Abhidharmakosa]] phase of [[thought]] arguably already makes a [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] turn and the [[Vimsatika]] represents a further critical step in his [[development]], it seems that [[Mind-Only]] might profitably be re-evaluated as a continuation of the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] trajectory of critical {{Wiki|empiricism}} (in other words, as an epistemology of “Experience-Only”) rather than a reversion to the pre-Kantian [[idealism]] of [[Berkeley]]. |
− | Another reason for reading Vasubandhu in an empiriocriticist vein is that both Mach and Yogacara Buddhism may be said to have advocated a pure phenomenalism. The parallel to Mach is crucial to my interpretation due not only to his sophisticated (albeit unsystematic) phenomenalist point of view, but also to his notoriously die-hard skepticism about the theory of physical atomism, which will help to illustrate a plausible philosophical rationale for Vasubandhu’s anti-atomism. Just as the empiriocriticism of Mach and Avenarius may be regarded as an empiricism that has purified itself of transcendental objectivity and ontological absolutes, the Vijnapti- matra of Vasubandhu amounts to a Sautrantika view that has eliminated the external object (bdhydrtha). I am aware that I am suggesting a deliberately prochronistic interpretation of Vasubandhu’s views. It is by no means an authoritative reading, but hopefully, an interesting and illuminating one. | + | Another [[reason]] for reading [[Vasubandhu]] in an empiriocriticist vein is that both Mach and [[Yogacara]] [[Buddhism]] may be said to have advocated a [[pure]] {{Wiki|phenomenalism}}. The parallel to Mach is crucial to my [[interpretation]] due not only to his sophisticated (albeit unsystematic) phenomenalist point of view, but also to his notoriously die-hard {{Wiki|skepticism}} about the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[physical]] [[atomism]], which will help to illustrate a plausible [[philosophical]] rationale for [[Vasubandhu’s]] anti-atomism. Just as the empiriocriticism of Mach and Avenarius may be regarded as an {{Wiki|empiricism}} that has [[purified]] itself of [[transcendental]] objectivity and [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] absolutes, the [[Vijnapti]]- [[matra]] of [[Vasubandhu]] amounts to a [[Sautrantika]] view that has eliminated the [[external object]] (bdhydrtha). I am {{Wiki|aware}} that I am suggesting a deliberately prochronistic [[interpretation]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[views]]. It is by no means an authoritative reading, but hopefully, an [[interesting]] and [[illuminating]] one. |
− | The various philosophical ideas of the Indian ancients will be articulated largely from the perspective of analytic philosophy, while also attending to the unique concerns that they implicitly convey. The basic motivations of the classical Indian traditions seem largely alien to a contemporary philosophical audience because they were influenced by a very different historical setting and cultural outlook. Like most classical Indian philosophy, Buddhist thought of the early medieval era intimately fuses (and inevitably, often intimately confuses) rigorous philosophical analysis with dogmatic and sote- riological concerns, to a degree rarely encountered in post-Enlightenment Western philosophy. | + | The various [[philosophical]] [[ideas]] of the [[Indian]] ancients will be articulated largely from the {{Wiki|perspective}} of {{Wiki|analytic philosophy}}, while also attending to the unique concerns that they implicitly convey. The basic motivations of the classical [[Indian traditions]] seem largely alien to a contemporary [[philosophical]] audience because they were influenced by a very different historical setting and {{Wiki|cultural}} outlook. Like most classical [[Indian philosophy]], [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] of the early {{Wiki|medieval}} {{Wiki|era}} intimately fuses (and inevitably, often intimately confuses) rigorous [[philosophical]] analysis with [[dogmatic]] and sote- riological concerns, to a [[degree]] rarely encountered in post-Enlightenment {{Wiki|Western philosophy}}. |
− | Moreover, Mahayana Buddhist thinkers are almost universally mystically inclined, and Vasubandhu, a mystic of the first water, is certainly no exception. An in-depth exploration of Mahayana mysticism would unfortunately be beyond the scope of this paper—a brief survey will have to suffice. But despite that for the purposes of this discussion, I will be singling out the philosophical aspect of Vasubandhu’s thought (i.e. the level of rational argument), I will not be able to avoid making some basic interpretative allowances for its religio-mystical dimensions. The subtle interplay of philosophical argument and mystical anagoge might seem difficult to reconcile to the modern philosophical mind. However, the lines of rational argument are fortunately easier to discern in the Vimsatika than in other writings of his later phase, e.g. the Trimsika or the Trisvabhavanirdesa. | + | Moreover, [[Mahayana]] [[Buddhist]] thinkers are almost universally mystically inclined, and [[Vasubandhu]], a [[mystic]] of the first [[water]], is certainly no exception. An in-depth exploration of [[Mahayana]] [[mysticism]] would unfortunately be beyond the scope of this paper—a brief survey will have to suffice. But despite that for the purposes of this [[discussion]], I will be singling out the [[philosophical]] aspect of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[thought]] (i.e. the level of [[rational]] argument), I will not be able to avoid making some basic interpretative allowances for its religio-mystical {{Wiki|dimensions}}. The {{Wiki|subtle}} interplay of philosophical argument and [[mystical]] anagoge might seem difficult to reconcile to the {{Wiki|modern}} [[philosophical]] [[mind]]. However, the lines of [[rational]] argument are fortunately easier to discern in the [[Vimsatika]] than in other writings of his later phase, e.g. the [[Trimsika]] or the [[Trisvabhavanirdesa]]. |
− | The exceedingly condensed, epigrammatic nature of Vasubandhu’s writing poses another interpretive challenge. In stark contrast to contemporary Western philosophy, which tends to valorize lengthy prose expositions that discursively expand upon their themes in exhaustive technical detail, the Indian philosophy of that period placed a premium on brevity and poetic elegance of expression. It had evolved a philosophical poetry, written in a strictly metered form typical of classical Sanskrit composition. Key philosophical themes were epitomized in gnomic verse and expanded upon in the author’s auto-commentary. The most brilliant examples of this style evoke an air of tension, paradoxicality and mystery with their austere reductions, unexpected double-turns and double-entendre, and constant shifting of the level of discourse. | + | The exceedingly condensed, epigrammatic [[nature]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[writing]] poses another interpretive challenge. In stark contrast to contemporary {{Wiki|Western philosophy}}, which tends to valorize lengthy prose [[expositions]] that discursively expand upon their themes in exhaustive technical detail, the [[Indian philosophy]] of that period placed a premium on brevity and {{Wiki|poetic}} elegance of expression. It had evolved a [[philosophical]] [[poetry]], written in a strictly metered [[form]] typical of classical [[Sanskrit]] composition. Key philosophical themes were epitomized in gnomic verse and expanded upon in the author’s auto-commentary. The most brilliant examples of this style evoke an [[air]] of tension, paradoxicality and {{Wiki|mystery}} with their [[austere]] reductions, unexpected double-turns and double-entendre, and [[constant]] shifting of the level of [[discourse]]. |
− | Part of the reason for the use of this poetic form was to facilitate memorization, but another motivation is that verse can more easily convey elusive aesthetic subtleties and multiple levels of meaning. A poem can be read as a philosophical epitome, operating on the level of rational explanation, and on a deeper reading, function as a mystical pith instruction, which follows the entirely different modus operandi of deliberately perplexing the intellect so as to induce transcendence of conceptual limitations. | + | Part of the [[reason]] for the use of this {{Wiki|poetic}} [[form]] was to facilitate memorization, but another [[motivation]] is that verse can more easily convey elusive {{Wiki|aesthetic}} subtleties and multiple levels of meaning. A poem can be read as a [[philosophical]] {{Wiki|epitome}}, operating on the level of [[rational]] explanation, and on a deeper reading, function as a [[mystical]] [[pith instruction]], which follows the entirely different modus operandi of deliberately perplexing the [[intellect]] so as to induce {{Wiki|transcendence}} of {{Wiki|conceptual}} limitations. |
− | The paradoxical mode of expression is an integral part of the mystical attitude, and past a certain point, it defies interpretative reduction to a purely rational meaning. Vasubandhu concludes the Vimsatika in 22 with a Trac- tarian cliff-hanger—even he, the author himself, cannot fully understand the meaning of what he has written: | + | The {{Wiki|paradoxical}} mode of expression is an integral part of the [[mystical]] attitude, and {{Wiki|past}} a certain point, it defies interpretative reduction to a purely [[rational]] meaning. [[Vasubandhu]] concludes the [[Vimsatika]] in 22 with a Trac- tarian cliff-hanger—even he, the author himself, cannot fully understand the meaning of what he has written: |
− | It is impossible for people like me to consider it [the doctrine of perception-only] in all its aspects, because it is not in the range of dialectics. And in order to show by whom it is known entirely as a scope of insight, it is said to be the scope of Buddhas. | + | It is impossible for [[people]] like me to consider it [the [[doctrine]] of [[perception-only]]] in all its aspects, because it is not in the range of [[dialectics]]. And in order to show by whom it is known entirely as a scope of [[insight]], it is said to be the scope of [[Buddhas]]. |
− | ==1.4 Buddhism as Empiricist Mysticism== | + | ==1.4 [[Buddhism]] as [[Empiricist]] [[Mysticism]]== |
− | Unless it is read in the context of a meta-philosophical “grand | + | Unless it is read in the context of a meta-philosophical “grand {{Wiki|narrative}}” or background {{Wiki|hermeneutic}}, the technical analysis of [[Vasubandhu’s]] arguments against [[atomism]] will seem rather dry. The deeply {{Wiki|apophatic}} finale of the [[Vimsatika]] offers a hint as to where the meta-narrative ought to begin. We will bring the {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} lens of [[Vasubandhu]] as [[mystical]] proto-empirio- criticist into sharper focus by [[offering]] some intertextual reflections on the meaning of the [[silence]] of the [[Buddha]]. |
− | This is the silence that Gautama Sakyamuni is said to have maintained with regard to the famous fourteen unanswered questions (catvari-avyakrta- vastuni) posed to the Buddha by the wandering ascetic Vatsagotra: | + | This is the [[silence]] that [[Gautama Sakyamuni]] is said to have maintained with regard to the famous fourteen unanswered questions (catvari-avyakrta- vastuni) posed to the [[Buddha]] by the [[wandering ascetic]] Vatsagotra: |
− | Whether the cosmos has a beginning, or not, or both, or neither. Whether the cosmos has an end, or not, or both, or neither. | + | Whether the [[cosmos]] has a beginning, or not, or both, or neither. Whether the [[cosmos]] has an end, or not, or both, or neither. |
− | Whether the Tathagata exists after death, or not, or both, or neither. | + | Whether the [[Tathagata]] [[exists]] after [[death]], or not, or both, or neither. |
− | Whether the mind is identical with the body or different from it. | + | Whether the [[mind]] is [[identical]] with the [[body]] or different from it. |
− | Although he held silence for many other reasons as well, Sakyamuni’s silence about these questions of a specifically metaphysical nature is particularly significant, in that it prefigures the later Madhyamika program of insubstantialism and null ontology. Madhyamika develops the Buddha’s silence about absolutes into a profoundly meontological mysticism, deploying skeptical argument against all points of view in an attempt to demonstrate that the most important thing the Buddha said was nothing. | + | Although he held [[silence]] for many other [[reasons]] as well, [[Sakyamuni’s]] [[silence]] about these questions of a specifically [[metaphysical]] [[nature]] is particularly significant, in that it prefigures the later [[Madhyamika]] program of insubstantialism and null {{Wiki|ontology}}. [[Madhyamika]] develops the [[Buddha’s]] [[silence]] about absolutes into a profoundly meontological [[mysticism]], deploying skeptical argument against all points of view in an attempt to demonstrate that the most important thing the [[Buddha]] said was nothing. |
− | The fourteen unanswered questions moreover present a fascinating parallel to the Kantian antinomies of pure reason, where Kant raises aporiai in demonstrating that the four ideas of rational cosmology each lead to two opposing positions that appear to be equally valid. | + | The fourteen unanswered questions moreover {{Wiki|present}} a fascinating parallel to the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] antinomies of [[pure]] [[reason]], where {{Wiki|Kant}} raises aporiai in demonstrating that the four [[ideas]] of [[rational]] [[cosmology]] each lead to two opposing positions that appear to be equally valid. |
− | The first eight unanswered questions of Vatsagotra closely approximate the first Kantian antinomy of pure reason, as both reduce to aporia the question as to whether or not the world is spatiotemporally limited. The second of Kant’s antinomies, which happens not to be among the fourteen unanswered questions of sutric tradition, has to do with whether or not the world of experience is metaphysically constituted of simple or primitive elements, i.e. atoms. The atomists of the Abhidharma schools answer this question in the affirmative, whereas in the Vimsatika, Vasubandhu categorically responds in the negative. | + | The first eight unanswered questions of Vatsagotra closely approximate the first [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] antinomy of [[pure]] [[reason]], as both reduce to aporia the question as to whether or not the [[world]] is spatiotemporally limited. The second of [[Kant’s]] antinomies, which happens not to be among the fourteen unanswered questions of [[sutric]] [[tradition]], has to do with whether or not the [[world]] of [[experience]] is [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] constituted of simple or primitive [[elements]], i.e. [[atoms]]. The [[Wikipedia:Atomism|atomists]] of the [[Abhidharma]] schools answer this question in the affirmative, whereas in the [[Vimsatika]], [[Vasubandhu]] categorically responds in the negative. |
− | As for what position Gautama Sakyamuni himself may have taken on atomism—although the earliest Buddhist corpus of texts, the Pali Canon, does not mention atomist doctrines or offer any clues as to whether or not the Sakyamuni adhered to a theory of simples, in light of his silence on Vatsagotra’s questions, one can easily picture what his response might have been. I conjecture that he would have recognized the aporetic character of the issue and remained silent. | + | As for what position [[Gautama Sakyamuni]] himself may have taken on atomism—although the earliest [[Buddhist]] corpus of texts, the [[Pali Canon]], does not mention [[atomist]] [[doctrines]] or offer any clues as to whether or not the [[Sakyamuni]] adhered to a {{Wiki|theory}} of simples, in {{Wiki|light}} of his [[silence]] on Vatsagotra’s questions, one can easily picture what his response might have been. I conjecture that he would have [[recognized]] the aporetic [[character]] of the issue and remained [[silent]]. |
− | Concerning his own rationale for keeping silence about the fourteen questions, Sakyamuni does not have much to offer in the way of explanation, aside from the famous fire simile in the discourse (sutra) of Vaccagotta on Fire. It seems that Sakyamuni intended the simile to specifically address Vatsagotra’s questions about the post-mortem status of a monk who has reached nirvana, but it could also be construed, without too much of a stretch, to apply analogously to the other questions as well: | + | Concerning his [[own]] rationale for keeping [[silence]] about the fourteen questions, [[Sakyamuni]] does not have much to offer in the way of explanation, aside from the famous [[fire]] simile in the [[discourse]] ([[sutra]]) of Vaccagotta on [[Fire]]. It seems that [[Sakyamuni]] intended the simile to specifically address Vatsagotra’s questions about the [[post-mortem]] {{Wiki|status}} of a [[monk]] who has reached [[nirvana]], but it could also be construed, without too much of a stretch, to apply analogously to the other questions as well: |
− | “And suppose someone were to ask you, ‘This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East? West? North? Or south?’ Thus asked, how would you reply?” | + | “And suppose someone were to ask you, ‘This [[fire]] that has gone out in front of you, in which [[direction]] from here has it gone? [[East]]? [[West]]? [[North]]? Or [[south]]?’ Thus asked, how would you reply?” |
− | “That doesn’t apply, Master Gotama. Any fire burning dependent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being unnourished— from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any other—is classified simply as ‘out’ (unbound).” | + | “That doesn’t apply, [[Master Gotama]]. Any [[fire]] burning dependent on a [[sustenance]] of grass and timber, being unnourished— from having consumed that [[sustenance]] and not being [[offered]] any other—is classified simply as ‘out’ (unbound).” |
− | Aside from the Kantian analogy, there is also a Machian parallel to the fire discourse. Mach uses examples that are strikingly similar to the sutric simile when he accuses his fellow physicists of naively misconstruing concepts which properly apply strictly to sensations to refer to objective physical quantities. In the opinion of Mach, many putative scientific problems can be traced back to naive category errors and unmasked as philosophical pseudo-questions: | + | Aside from the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] analogy, there is also a Machian parallel to the [[fire]] [[discourse]]. Mach uses examples that are strikingly similar to the [[sutric]] simile when he accuses his fellow {{Wiki|physicists}} of naively misconstruing [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] which properly apply strictly to [[sensations]] to refer to [[objective]] [[physical]] quantities. In the opinion of Mach, many putative [[scientific]] problems can be traced back to {{Wiki|naive}} category errors and unmasked as [[philosophical]] pseudo-questions: |
− | ‘Where does the light go when it has been extinguished and no longer fills the room?’ Such are the questions of a child. Confounded by the sudden shrinking of a hydrogen balloon, the child continues to search for the large body that had still been present just a moment ago. ‘Where does the warmth come from? Where does it go?’ Such childish questions coming from the mouths of mature men determine the intellectual climate of the current century. | + | ‘Where does the {{Wiki|light}} go when it has been [[extinguished]] and no longer fills the room?’ Such are the questions of a child. Confounded by the sudden shrinking of a {{Wiki|hydrogen}} balloon, the child continues to search for the large [[body]] that had still been {{Wiki|present}} just a [[moment]] ago. ‘Where does the warmth come from? Where does it go?’ Such childish questions coming from the mouths of mature men determine the [[intellectual]] climate of the current century. |
− | In view of Mach’s quintessentially positivist theory of the pseudo-problem (Scheinproblem) and its purported root cause of metaphysical thinking, one might deduce that he would be very reluctant to acknowledge the existence of genuine aporiai, i.e. philosophical conundrums that are fundamentally and intrinsically intractable. Mach believes that philosophical problems are either solved or discovered to be nonsensical and futile. | + | In view of Mach’s quintessentially positivist {{Wiki|theory}} of the pseudo-problem (Scheinproblem) and its purported [[root cause]] of [[metaphysical]] [[thinking]], one might deduce that he would be very reluctant to [[acknowledge]] the [[existence]] of genuine aporiai, i.e. [[philosophical]] conundrums that are fundamentally and intrinsically intractable. Mach believes that [[philosophical]] problems are either solved or discovered to be nonsensical and futile. |
− | It is certainly not too much to assume that Sakyamuni was aware of the existence of pseudo-problems. Therefore, we may guess that if Gautama Sakyamuni had believed the fourteen unanswered questions to be no more than pseudo-problems, he would have plainly said as much. Panikkar conjectures Sakyamuni’s silence about the questions to be not an epistemic, but an ontic apophaticism of a metaphysically avyakta nature. In Indian philosophy, the term avyakta also carries the connotations ‘unmanifest,’ ‘allpervading,’ | + | It is certainly not too much to assume that [[Sakyamuni]] was {{Wiki|aware}} of the [[existence]] of pseudo-problems. Therefore, we may guess that if [[Gautama Sakyamuni]] had believed the fourteen unanswered questions to be no more than pseudo-problems, he would have plainly said as much. Panikkar conjectures [[Sakyamuni’s]] [[silence]] about the questions to be not an {{Wiki|epistemic}}, but an {{Wiki|ontic}} apophaticism of a [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] [[avyakta]] [[nature]]. In [[Indian philosophy]], the term [[avyakta]] also carries the connotations ‘unmanifest,’ ‘allpervading,’ ‘[[formless]],’ ‘non-differentiated,’ ‘{{Wiki|indeterminate}}’ and ‘unexpressed.’ If understood in an [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[sense]], we can see how [[avyakta]] might perhaps be comparable to Anaximander’s {{Wiki|concept}} of the apeiron. Moreover, it is worth noting that the notion of [[avyakta]] can be considered in some ways a precursor of the {{Wiki|concept}} of [[sunyata]], which later [[attained]] its full [[development]] in [[Mahayana]] [[thought]]. The [[ontologically]] negative orientation of [[sunyata]] is a [[Mahayanistic]] reprise of the early [[Buddhist]] [[anatman]] [[principle]]. |
− | Therefore, it may be argued that the Buddha’s silence was more than merely a positivistic epoche about the metaphysicalities beyond the limits of experience—it was the metaphysical silence, or apophaticism of the centerlessness and ineffability of experience itself, in its immanent immediacy. This is, generally speaking, the Madhyamika position on the issue. | + | Therefore, it may be argued that the [[Buddha’s]] [[silence]] was more than merely a positivistic {{Wiki|epoche}} about the metaphysicalities beyond the limits of experience—it was the [[metaphysical]] [[silence]], or apophaticism of the centerlessness and ineffability of [[experience]] itself, in its immanent {{Wiki|immediacy}}. This is, generally {{Wiki|speaking}}, the [[Madhyamika]] position on the issue. |
− | We will not be able to conclusively establish whether Sakyamuni’s own understanding of avyakta questions was similar to Mach’s doctrine of the pseudo-problem arising from superstitions, misunderstandings, category mistakes and misapplications of language, or whether he in fact considered that there are some truly unanswerable philosophical questions pointing towards a mystical reality of | + | We will not be able to conclusively establish whether [[Sakyamuni’s]] [[own]] [[understanding]] of [[avyakta]] questions was similar to Mach’s [[doctrine]] of the pseudo-problem [[arising]] from {{Wiki|superstitions}}, misunderstandings, category mistakes and misapplications of [[language]], or whether he in fact considered that there are some truly unanswerable [[philosophical]] questions pointing towards a [[mystical]] [[reality]] of “[[metaphysical]] [[silence]].” |
− | Even if the Buddha did not articulate an explicit positivism, the empiricist tendency of eliminating metaphysics and adverting to experience is evident. Inasmuch as his silence about the fourteen questions is interpreted as a dismissal of pseudo-problems (a wholly justified interpretation) we may consider it to be the germ of a strong proto-positivist subtext in Buddhism. There are quite a number of writings in early Buddhism that clearly state empiricist viewpoints, e.g. that speculative theories which go beyond the limits of experience generate confusion and vexation rather than knowledge. In early Buddhism, one finds—other than instances of the tetralemmatic negation (catuskoti)—little direct evidence of the deeply paradoxical formulations and the penchant for puzzling dialectic that were later to become the signature style of the Mahayana schools. On the contrary—Sakyamuni either speaks clearly or keeps silence. | + | Even if the [[Buddha]] did not articulate an explicit positivism, the [[empiricist]] tendency of eliminating [[metaphysics]] and adverting to [[experience]] is evident. Inasmuch as his [[silence]] about the fourteen questions is interpreted as a dismissal of pseudo-problems (a wholly justified [[interpretation]]) we may consider it to be the germ of a strong proto-positivist subtext in [[Buddhism]]. There are quite a number of writings in [[early Buddhism]] that clearly [[state]] [[empiricist]] viewpoints, e.g. that speculative theories which go beyond the limits of [[experience]] generate [[confusion]] and vexation rather than [[knowledge]]. In [[early Buddhism]], one finds—other than instances of the tetralemmatic {{Wiki|negation}} (catuskoti)—little direct {{Wiki|evidence}} of the deeply {{Wiki|paradoxical}} formulations and the penchant for puzzling [[dialectic]] that were later to become the signature style of the [[Mahayana schools]]. On the contrary—Sakyamuni either speaks clearly or keeps [[silence]]. |
− | Though he is known in many instances to have expressed a dislike of philosophical debate, I do not conceive Gautama Sakyamuni to have been a rigorous misologist. Rather, I construe his position to have been that constructive philosophical inquiry and theorizing have a primarily diagnostic or therapeutic purpose—in the language of Buddhist simile, they are rafts that must be abandoned once one has crossed over to the further shore, or ladders that should be cast away after they have been climbed. This soteriological instrumentalism is a characteristic feature of the Buddhist doctrine, and, especially in the Mahayana, is extended into an epistemological instrumentalism. This is also Vasubandhu’s interest. In the Vimsatika, he introduces concepts not as absolute truths, but solely as an expedient means for dissolving the conceptual rigidities of the metaphysical realist. | + | Though he is known in many instances to have expressed a dislike of [[philosophical debate]], I do not [[conceive]] [[Gautama Sakyamuni]] to have been a rigorous misologist. Rather, I construe his position to have been that constructive [[philosophical]] inquiry and theorizing have a primarily {{Wiki|diagnostic}} or {{Wiki|therapeutic}} purpose—in the [[language]] of [[Buddhist]] simile, they are rafts that must be abandoned once one has crossed over to the further shore, or ladders that should be cast away after they have been climbed. This [[soteriological]] instrumentalism is a [[characteristic]] feature of the [[Buddhist]] doctrine, and, especially in the [[Mahayana]], is extended into an [[epistemological]] instrumentalism. This is also [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[interest]]. In the [[Vimsatika]], he introduces [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] not as [[absolute]] [[truths]], but solely as an [[expedient means]] for dissolving the {{Wiki|conceptual}} rigidities of the [[metaphysical]] realist. |
− | The Buddhist skeptical mysticism was later to attain its fullest expression in the Prajnaparamita corpus of scriptures and their various exegeses. The central theme of this corpus is the wisdom (prajha) of voidness (sunyata). The notion of sunyata, though already present in some writings of early Buddhism, is taken up and analytically developed within the critical-skeptical framework of the Madhyamika school of philosophy, into the doctrine that the dependently arising elements {dharmas) of empirical experience are ineffable {anabhilapya) and void {sunya)—or to restate the same matter in terms more appropriate to mysticism—apophatically negated. Phenomena in other words cannot be said to have essences, core bearers, intrinsic identities, existence as unitary objects, and so on. The Prajnaparamita radicalizes the metaphysical silence about what lies beyond the limits of experience into a meontology of metaphysical silence. | + | The [[Buddhist]] skeptical [[mysticism]] was later to attain its fullest expression in the [[Prajnaparamita]] corpus of [[scriptures]] and their various exegeses. The central theme of this corpus is the [[wisdom]] (prajha) of [[voidness]] ([[sunyata]]). The notion of [[sunyata]], though already {{Wiki|present}} in some writings of early Buddhism, is taken up and analytically developed within the critical-skeptical framework of the [[Madhyamika school]] of [[philosophy]], into the [[doctrine]] that the dependently [[arising]] [[elements]] {[[dharmas]]) of [[empirical]] [[experience]] are {{Wiki|ineffable}} {anabhilapya) and [[void]] {sunya)—or to restate the same {{Wiki|matter}} in terms more appropriate to mysticism—apophatically negated. [[Phenomena]] in other words cannot be said to have [[essences]], core bearers, intrinsic {{Wiki|identities}}, [[existence]] as unitary [[objects]], and so on. The [[Prajnaparamita]] radicalizes the [[metaphysical]] [[silence]] about what lies beyond the limits of [[experience]] into a meontology of [[metaphysical]] [[silence]]. |
− | Based on this distinction of a mystical and a positivistic layer to the silence of the Buddha, we can attempt to hermeneutically project the Buddhist epistemological discourse along two parallel and mutually complementary avenues. The | + | Based on this {{Wiki|distinction}} of a [[mystical]] and a positivistic layer to the [[silence]] of the [[Buddha]], we can attempt to {{Wiki|hermeneutically}} project the [[Buddhist]] [[epistemological]] [[discourse]] along two parallel and mutually complementary avenues. The “{{Wiki|cataphatic}}” [[discourse]] along the via positivistica (i.e. the positivistic avenue exemplified by the critically [[purified]] [[Abhidharmika]] approach) attempts to constructively epistemologize [[experience]], whereas the via nega- tiva (paradigmatically, the [[Madhyamika]]) tends to frame its epistemology in terms of a skeptical and deconstructive practice. |
− | The hypothesis that there came to be these two closely related but nonetheless distinct understandings of the Buddha’s silence can provide us with a model for plotting the structural dynamic of the Vimsatika. We will designate the the via positivisticd's metaphysical silence about the metaphysical as the | + | The {{Wiki|hypothesis}} that there came to be these two closely related but nonetheless {{Wiki|distinct}} understandings of the [[Buddha’s]] [[silence]] can provide us with a model for plotting the structural dynamic of the [[Vimsatika]]. We will designate the the via positivisticd's [[metaphysical]] [[silence]] about the [[metaphysical]] as the “[[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|epoche}}” indicating that a bracketing of the [[transcendental]] [[object]] is taking place. This catchprase is meant to suggest [[characteristic]] modes of [[philosophical]] expression such as [[Cartesian]] [[external world]] {{Wiki|skepticism}}, and to hint at the notion of {{Wiki|phenomenological}} {{Wiki|epoche}} developed by [[Wikipedia:Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl|Husserl]] in his [[Cartesian]] [[Meditations]]. |
− | The status of the transcendental subject is left untouched by the Cartesian epoche, allowing for various modalities of metaphysically negating or asserting it that lead to weaker or stronger types of idealism. However, we hypothesize that the weaker modes of idealism (i.e., those obtained by metaphysical negation of the transcendental subject) generally fall closer to the centerline of the via positivistica because they make an effort to approximate a phenomenalist middle ground between realism and idealism. By metaphysically negating the transcendental subject, they are trying to counteract their inherent tendency to gravitate towards ontological idealism. These are in other words idealisms trying to disguise themselves as forms of neutral monism or pluralism. | + | The {{Wiki|status}} of the [[transcendental]] [[subject]] is left untouched by the Cartesian {{Wiki|epoche}}, allowing for various modalities of [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] negating or asserting it that lead to weaker or stronger types of [[idealism]]. However, we hypothesize that the weaker modes of [[idealism]] (i.e., those obtained by [[metaphysical]] {{Wiki|negation}} of the [[transcendental]] [[subject]]) generally fall closer to the centerline of the via positivistica because they make an [[effort]] to approximate a phenomenalist middle ground between [[realism]] and [[idealism]]. By [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] negating the [[transcendental]] [[subject]], they are trying to counteract their [[inherent]] tendency to gravitate towards [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] idealism. These are in other words idealisms trying to disguise themselves as [[forms]] of [[neutral]] {{Wiki|monism}} or [[pluralism]]. |
− | The metaphysical silence of the Buddhist via negativa, on the other hand, indicates the apophatic negation of the subject. It will simply be equated with the terms sunyata, dharma-nairatmya and anatman. Along with pratltya-samutpada (dependent origination), the doctrine of anatman must count as one of the most distinctively Buddhist doctrines, the anatman doctrine may be viewed as a challenge to the primacy of transcendental subjectivity in the orthodox Vedic philosophies (astika darsanasY While there is no evidence that early Buddhism rejected any kind of metempirical self, it is important to keep in mind that none of the arguments attempting to warrant the opposite thesis (that Buddhism acknowleged an atman) are substantive, nor is there any evidence that Sakyamuni taught an atman theory. | + | The [[metaphysical]] [[silence]] of the [[Buddhist]] via negativa, on the other hand, indicates the {{Wiki|apophatic}} {{Wiki|negation}} of the [[subject]]. It will simply be equated with the terms [[sunyata]], [[dharma-nairatmya]] and [[anatman]]. Along with pratltya-samutpada ([[dependent origination]]), the [[doctrine]] of [[anatman]] must count as one of the most distinctively [[Buddhist doctrines]], the [[anatman]] [[doctrine]] may be viewed as a challenge to the primacy of [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]] in the [[orthodox]] {{Wiki|Vedic}} [[philosophies]] ([[astika]] darsanasY While there is no {{Wiki|evidence}} that [[early Buddhism]] rejected any kind of metempirical [[self]], it is important to keep in [[mind]] that none of the arguments attempting to warrant the opposite {{Wiki|thesis}} (that [[Buddhism]] acknowleged an [[atman]]) are substantive, nor is there any {{Wiki|evidence}} that [[Sakyamuni]] [[taught]] an [[atman]] {{Wiki|theory}}. |
− | That there is no evidence either way of course does not prove the hypothesis that his doctrine of anatman involved an epoche of transcendental subjectivity, but at least allows for the possibility. As for the empirical reality of human existence, Buddhism almost uniformly proposes a strictly bundle-theoretic account (with the exception of the Pudgalavada schools of early Buddhism which maintained the ultimate reality of a personal self). The bundle theory of personhood is also a recurrent theme of Western empiricism—we find it e.g. in the writings of Hume. | + | That there is no {{Wiki|evidence}} either way of course does not prove the hypothesis that his [[doctrine]] of [[anatman]] involved an {{Wiki|epoche}} of [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]], but at least allows for the possibility. As for the [[empirical reality]] of [[human existence]], [[Buddhism]] almost uniformly proposes a strictly bundle-theoretic account (with the exception of the [[Pudgalavada]] schools of [[early Buddhism]] which maintained the [[ultimate reality]] of a personal [[self]]). The bundle {{Wiki|theory}} of {{Wiki|personhood}} is also a recurrent theme of [[Western]] empiricism—we find it e.g. in the writings of [[Hume]]. |
− | In its most radical form, the the Buddhist via negativa may be construed as amounting to a thorough epoche of any and all types of subjectivity. The substantiality of the empirical self, the Cartesian and the Kantian cogitos, as well as the transcendental ego of Husserl and the Tractarian notion of the transcendental subject as world-limit, are all to be apophatically negated. | + | In its most radical [[form]], the the [[Buddhist]] via negativa may be construed as amounting to a thorough {{Wiki|epoche}} of any and all types of [[subjectivity]]. The substantiality of the [[empirical self]], the [[Cartesian]] and the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] cogitos, as well as the [[transcendental]] [[ego]] of [[Wikipedia:Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl|Husserl]] and the Tractarian notion of the [[transcendental]] [[subject]] as world-limit, are all to be apophatically negated. |
− | Buddhism seeks to achieve egolessness by “dissolving” the transcendental ego into the stream of empirical consciousness. After subjectivity has been bracketed, there remains only the pure “difference” of experience without any unitary forms of subjectivity or objectivity which could serve as a foundations for constructing a world or a self. As it is in fact the atman which is the source of all forms of unity and ontological categories falsely projected upon experience, bracketing the atman also eliminates these false projections. | + | [[Buddhism]] seeks to achieve [[egolessness]] by “dissolving” the [[transcendental]] [[ego]] into the {{Wiki|stream}} of [[empirical consciousness]]. After [[subjectivity]] has been bracketed, there remains only the [[pure]] “difference” of [[experience]] without any unitary [[forms]] of [[subjectivity]] or objectivity which could serve as a foundations for constructing a [[world]] or a [[self]]. As it is in fact the [[atman]] which is the source of all [[forms]] of {{Wiki|unity}} and [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] categories falsely {{Wiki|projected}} upon [[experience]], bracketing the [[atman]] also eliminates these false {{Wiki|projections}}. |
− | The atman and its cognates therefore become the Buddhist soteriology’s main targets of attack. Early Buddhist scholasticism pursues the positivistic trajectory and attempts to eliminate the subject by a reductive analysis of the elements of experience into objectified least parts. This program is played out as an atomistic sense-data phenomenalism. Vasubandhu, however, puts this Abhidharmic reductionist program to an end by reasoning against transcendental objectivity—a maneuver that brings him closer to the Upanisadic monism of the astika pattern, but also to the original via positivistica of Buddhism that had been derailed by the metaphysical realism of the Abhidharmikas. | + | The [[atman]] and its cognates therefore become the [[Buddhist]] soteriology’s main targets of attack. Early [[Buddhist]] [[scholasticism]] pursues the positivistic trajectory and attempts to eliminate the [[subject]] by a {{Wiki|reductive}} analysis of the [[elements]] of [[experience]] into objectified least parts. This program is played out as an atomistic sense-data {{Wiki|phenomenalism}}. [[Vasubandhu]], however, puts this [[Abhidharmic]] reductionist program to an end by {{Wiki|reasoning}} against [[transcendental]] objectivity—a maneuver that brings him closer to the [[Upanisadic]] {{Wiki|monism}} of the [[astika]] pattern, but also to the original via positivistica of [[Buddhism]] that had been derailed by the [[metaphysical]] [[realism]] of the [[Abhidharmikas]]. |
− | In the Western history of philosophy, we can identify the epistemology of Mach as an example of this hypothetical Buddhist via positivistica. Mach, though tracing the sources of his inspiration to Hume, Lichtenberg and William James (giving special credit to Lichtenberg’s famous correction to the Cartesian cogitcr. “Es denkt”) was aware of the general tendencies of Buddhist thought and held them in high esteem, as shown in one of Mach’s letters to Fritz Mauthner. | + | In the [[Western]] history of [[philosophy]], we can identify the epistemology of Mach as an example of this {{Wiki|hypothetical}} [[Buddhist]] via positivistica. Mach, though tracing the sources of his inspiration to [[Hume]], Lichtenberg and {{Wiki|William James}} (giving special credit to Lichtenberg’s famous {{Wiki|correction}} to the [[Cartesian]] cogitcr. “Es denkt”) was {{Wiki|aware}} of the general {{Wiki|tendencies}} of [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] and held them in high esteem, as shown in one of Mach’s letters to Fritz Mauthner. |
− | Nowhere does Mach propound an overtly soteriological aim in the vein of the Buddhist nirvana (the complete cessation of suffering and freedom from afflictive states of mind) or the Pyrrhonian ataraxia (the happiness, freedom from worry and imperturbability arising from the skeptical suspension of belief), nor does Mach have a fully evolved apophatic mysticism as does the Madhyamika. His main focus as a physical scientist is a positivistic one— employing quantitative method to investigate the functional relationships between the elements of experience. | + | Nowhere does Mach propound an overtly [[soteriological]] aim in the vein of the [[Buddhist]] [[nirvana]] (the complete [[cessation of suffering]] and freedom from {{Wiki|afflictive}} [[states of mind]]) or the Pyrrhonian {{Wiki|ataraxia}} (the [[happiness]], freedom from {{Wiki|worry}} and imperturbability [[arising]] from the skeptical [[suspension]] of [[belief]]), nor does Mach have a fully evolved {{Wiki|apophatic}} [[mysticism]] as does the [[Madhyamika]]. His main focus as a [[physical]] [[scientist]] is a positivistic one— employing quantitative method to investigate the functional relationships between the [[elements]] of [[experience]]. |
− | If Mach is able to mentally envision the refraction angles of the color spectrums that are generated by shafts of white light falling onto a prism, if he can predict where the Fraunhofer lines will appear and what changes will occur if the prism is shifted or if a thermometer touching the prism gives a different reading, he is satisfied. Because he views the quantitative laws of physics as mere regulatives of his empirical sensory intuition, he feels that he knows everything he can expect to know. | + | If Mach is able to [[mentally]] envision the refraction angles of the {{Wiki|color}} spectrums that are generated by shafts of [[white light]] falling onto a prism, if he can predict where the Fraunhofer lines will appear and what changes will occur if the prism is shifted or if a {{Wiki|thermometer}} [[touching]] the prism gives a different reading, he is satisfied. Because he [[views]] the quantitative laws of [[physics]] as mere regulatives of his [[empirical]] sensory [[intuition]], he [[feels]] that he [[knows]] everything he can expect to know. |
− | Early Buddhism, on the other hand, evolved in a historical setting in which the quantitative scientific method had not yet been developed. As a result, the aim of the Buddhist empiricism of functional relation naturally gravitated towards acquiring moral and mystical insights into the dependent arising of experience, which were elaborated into the characteristic doctrines of karma and selflessness. | + | [[Early Buddhism]], on the other hand, evolved in a historical setting in which the quantitative [[scientific method]] had not yet been developed. As a result, the aim of the [[Buddhist empiricism]] of functional [[relation]] naturally gravitated towards acquiring [[moral]] and [[mystical]] [[insights]] into the [[dependent arising]] of [[experience]], which were elaborated into the [[characteristic]] [[doctrines]] of [[karma]] and [[selflessness]]. |
− | Nevertheless, as a key point of comparison to Buddhism, we have Mach’s famous dictum “The ego cannot be saved.” Mach reflected upon this insight as an ethical saving grace rather than a disaster—he believed that it would help to value things according to their real importance and inspire a more emancipated and altruistic way of life. | + | Nevertheless, as a key point of comparison to [[Buddhism]], we have Mach’s famous dictum “The [[ego]] cannot be saved.” Mach reflected upon this [[insight]] as an [[ethical]] saving grace rather than a disaster—he believed that it would help to value things according to their real importance and inspire a more emancipated and {{Wiki|altruistic}} way of [[life]]. |
− | The Machian and the Buddhist worldviews are versions of what Sommer characterizes as the | + | The Machian and the [[Buddhist]] worldviews are versions of what Sommer characterizes as the “[[inversion]] of [[gnosis]].” If by [[gnosis]] we are to understand a [[mystical]] [[knowledge]] of the metempirically [[transcendent]] [[reality]] of [[atman]] by turning away from the [[world]] of [[empirical]] experience—as is the declared aim of [[Upanisadic]] mysticism—then the “[[inversion]] of [[gnosis]],” its polar opposite, would be a negative {{Wiki|immanence}} [[mysticism]] that tries to attain [[knowledge]] of [[dharma-nairatmya]] by turning towards the [[world]] of [[experience]]. In inverse [[gnosis]], the [[world]] is no longer believed to be that which separates us from true [[knowledge]]. Rather, it is considered that which we are separated from by the false [[dualisms]] of an internal and an [[external world]], of {{Wiki|qualia}} and {{Wiki|substances}}, [[sensations]] and [[atoms]]. |
− | The hypothesis that a via positivistica was operational in the earliest forms of Buddhism can help to account for the strong Buddhist tendencies towards phenomenalism and epistemological idealism, which are remarkably suggestive of the empiriocriticist views of Avenarius and Mach. The Carnap of the Aufbau is also firmly rooted in the Machian tradition. His Vienna Circle empiricism contends that the concept of objective reality cannot be epistemologically constituted, and that nothing meaningful can be said either way about the things-in-themselves (Dinge an sich). | + | The {{Wiki|hypothesis}} that a via positivistica was operational in the earliest [[forms]] of [[Buddhism]] can help to account for the strong [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|tendencies}} towards {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} and [[epistemological]] [[idealism]], which are remarkably suggestive of the empiriocriticist [[views]] of Avenarius and Mach. The Carnap of the Aufbau is also firmly rooted in the Machian [[tradition]]. His {{Wiki|Vienna}} Circle {{Wiki|empiricism}} contends that the {{Wiki|concept}} of [[objective reality]] cannot be [[epistemologically]] constituted, and that nothing meaningful can be said either way about the things-in-themselves (Dinge an sich). |
− | To recapitulate the “grand | + | To recapitulate the “grand {{Wiki|thesis}}” that is being staked out here: [[Vasubandhu]] and the empiriocriticists ([[including]] most of their positivist successors) have merely taken different on-ramps onto the same philosophical highway. Mach’s epistemology has been argued by some to be influenced by the [[Madhyamika]]. In this [[exposition]] we will be following up on a slightly |
− | different lead—the conjecture of a philosophical continuity between Mach and Mind-Only. Admittedly, every interpretive scheme is eventually unraveled by a sufficiently close attention to the facts—this one is certainly no exception to the rule. However, Indian philosophy is such a dense and confusing topic that we will be unable to make much headway into it unless we cut some broad aisles through the undergrowth. | + | different lead—the conjecture of a [[philosophical]] continuity between Mach and [[Mind-Only]]. Admittedly, every interpretive scheme is eventually unraveled by a sufficiently [[close attention]] to the facts—this one is certainly no exception to the {{Wiki|rule}}. However, [[Indian philosophy]] is such a dense and confusing topic that we will be unable to make much headway into it unless we cut some broad aisles through the undergrowth. |
− | Following the lead of Dharmakirti and Santaraksita, Tibetan doxographers have traditionally rendered Buddhist doctrine as a ladder of philosophical views, using the method of an ascending scale of analysis to move from common-sense realism towards more rarefied epistemological views. Since this has proven to be a useful approach, we will also be adopting it for the presentation of Vasubandhu’s argument in this thesis. | + | Following the lead of [[Dharmakirti]] and [[Santaraksita]], [[Tibetan]] [[Wikipedia:Doxography|doxographers]] have [[traditionally]] rendered [[Buddhist doctrine]] as a ladder of [[philosophical]] [[views]], using the method of an ascending scale of analysis to move from {{Wiki|common-sense}} [[realism]] towards more rarefied [[epistemological]] [[views]]. Since this has proven to be a useful approach, we will also be adopting it for the presentation of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument in this {{Wiki|thesis}}. |
− | The itinerary for the following chapters will be to tease out the unifying strands of phenomenalism and nominalism that run throughout the different schools and historical evolutions of Indian Buddhist epistemology. We will explore how these themes were initially worked out into an atomist metaphysics, and in a later stage of development “empiriocritically” revised by Vasubandhu into a non-atomistic idealism that in many respects may be considered a chip off the block of modern empiricism. We will be focusing our discussion mainly on the epistemological rationale for this critical turn. But the hermeneutic background assumption for this analysis will be that the Vimsatikd’s skeptical recovery of the hypothetical Buddhist via positivistica is ultimately motivated by a profound shift—evident throughout the later Mahayana phase of Vasubandhu’s thought—towards the via negativa. While the metaphysical higher ground of Vijnaptimatra—the restoration of idealistic phenonemalism—may the final rung of Vasubandhu’s epistemological ladder, it is not his ultimate position, but rather, a provisional antidote (pratipaksa) to substantialism—a raft to be abandoned after it has been used for its intended purpose. | + | The itinerary for the following chapters will be to tease out the unifying [[strands]] of {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} and [[nominalism]] that run throughout the different schools and historical evolutions of [[Indian Buddhist]] epistemology. We will explore how these themes were initially worked out into an [[atomist]] [[metaphysics]], and in a later stage of [[development]] “empiriocritically” revised by [[Vasubandhu]] into a non-atomistic [[idealism]] that in many respects may be considered a chip off the block of {{Wiki|modern}} {{Wiki|empiricism}}. We will be focusing our [[discussion]] mainly on the [[epistemological]] rationale for this critical turn. But the {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} background assumption for this analysis will be that the Vimsatikd’s skeptical recovery of the {{Wiki|hypothetical}} [[Buddhist]] via positivistica is ultimately motivated by a profound shift—evident throughout the later [[Mahayana]] phase of [[Vasubandhu’s]] thought—towards the via negativa. While the [[metaphysical]] higher ground of Vijnaptimatra—the restoration of idealistic phenonemalism—may the final rung of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[epistemological]] ladder, it is not his [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] position, but rather, a provisional antidote ([[pratipaksa]]) to substantialism—a raft to be abandoned after it has been used for its intended {{Wiki|purpose}}. |
− | Before we can explore Vasubandhu’s strategy for regaining the Cartesian epoche and fully draw out the empiriocriticist parallels to the Vimsatika’s argument contra atomism, it will be advantageous to examine the Abhidharmic context of its thought. We cannot expect to reasonably form an opinion on Vasubandhu’s arguments without a careful reading of his realist opponents.2 The Atomist Metaphysics of the Abhidharma | + | Before we can explore [[Vasubandhu’s]] strategy for regaining the [[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|epoche}} and fully draw out the empiriocriticist parallels to the Vimsatika’s argument contra [[atomism]], it will be advantageous to examine the [[Abhidharmic]] context of its [[thought]]. We cannot expect to reasonably [[form]] an opinion on [[Vasubandhu’s]] arguments without a careful reading of his realist opponents.2 The [[Atomist]] [[Metaphysics]] of the [[Abhidharma]] |
− | I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree," pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell them: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy." | + | I am sitting with a [[philosopher]] in the [[garden]]; he says again and again "I know that that's a [[tree]]," pointing to a [[tree]] that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell them: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing [[philosophy]]." |
− | (Ludwig Wittgenstein) | + | ({{Wiki|Ludwig Wittgenstein}}) |
− | IN THE TRADITIONAL and modern commentarial literature, the epistemologies of the two Abhidharmika schools are universally described as being realistic or substantialistic. While the Mahayana schools can be viewed as idealist and skeptical variations on the basic Buddhist themes of phenomenalism and nominalism, the non-Mahayana schools of Abhidharma comprise their realist inflections. However, given that the nature of realism is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy, what exactly is meant by this claim? A brief review of realism is in order. | + | IN THE TRADITIONAL and {{Wiki|modern}} {{Wiki|commentarial}} {{Wiki|literature}}, the epistemologies of the two [[Abhidharmika]] schools are universally described as being {{Wiki|realistic}} or substantialistic. While the [[Mahayana schools]] can be viewed as {{Wiki|idealist}} and skeptical variations on the basic [[Buddhist]] themes of {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} and [[nominalism]], the non-Mahayana schools of [[Abhidharma]] comprise their realist inflections. However, given that the [[nature]] of [[realism]] is a hotly [[debated]] topic in contemporary [[philosophy]], what exactly is meant by this claim? A brief review of [[realism]] is in order. |
− | ==2.1 Realism and Atomism== | + | ==2.1 [[Realism]] and [[Atomism]]== |
− | Although there are many different philosophical senses of realism, in the present context, we are only interested in the sense of realism that concerns the everyday world of macroscopic physical objects and its constituents. As we shall see, the position of the Buddhist atomists may be construed as an attempt to formulate an ontologically realist epistemology that deconstructs common-sense realism about ordinary objects—as opposed, for example, to the atomism of the Indian Nyaya-Vaisesika school, which attempts to defend their objective existence. | + | Although there are many different [[philosophical]] [[senses]] of [[realism]], in the {{Wiki|present}} context, we are only [[interested]] in the [[sense]] of [[realism]] that concerns the everyday [[world]] of macroscopic [[physical objects]] and its constituents. As we shall see, the position of the [[Buddhist]] [[Wikipedia:Atomism|atomists]] may be construed as an attempt to formulate an [[ontologically]] realist epistemology that deconstructs {{Wiki|common-sense}} [[realism]] about ordinary objects—as opposed, for example, to the [[atomism]] of the [[Indian]] [[Nyaya-Vaisesika]] school, which attempts to defend their [[objective]] [[existence]]. |
− | Realist claims can be grouped into two broad types—(1) the existence dimension involves claims that physical objects exist extramentally, as do the facts pertaining to them, whereas (2) the independence dimension has to do with claims that physical objects are independent of beliefs, linguistic practices and conceptual schemes. Realisms vary considerably in their degree of ontological commitment, but as a general rule of thumb, the more naive (i.e., pre-critical) the realism, the larger its ontological menagerie. | + | Realist claims can be grouped into two broad types—(1) the [[existence]] [[dimension]] involves claims that [[physical objects]] [[exist]] extramentally, as do the facts pertaining to them, whereas (2) the {{Wiki|independence}} [[dimension]] has to do with claims that [[physical objects]] are {{Wiki|independent}} of [[beliefs]], {{Wiki|linguistic}} practices and {{Wiki|conceptual}} schemes. Realisms vary considerably in their [[degree]] of [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] commitment, but as a general {{Wiki|rule}} of thumb, the more {{Wiki|naive}} (i.e., pre-critical) the [[realism]], the larger its [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] menagerie. |
− | Chatterjee ventures that all forms of realism must have atomistic ontologies because they are necessarily committed to some form of pluralism or other. Non-atomistic systems of thought such as absolute monism (e.g. Advaita Vedanta) or subjective idealism (e.g. Cittamatra) can evince realistic tendencies, but according to Chatterjee do not qualify as unreserved realism. Clearly, realism implies a commitment to an ontology of some cardinality, but why should it necessarily restrict itself to a denumerable ontology? In fact, it needn’t, and realism often employs more powerful ontologies. But for the purpose of this investigation, we will define the atomistic hypothesis, in general terms, as the view that the ontological constitution of matter, stuff, hyle (or whatever else one wishes to call it) is ultimately discrete. | + | [[Chatterjee]] ventures that all [[forms]] of [[realism]] must have atomistic ontologies because they are necessarily committed to some [[form]] of [[pluralism]] or other. Non-atomistic systems of [[thought]] such as [[absolute]] {{Wiki|monism}} (e.g. [[Wikipedia:Advaita Vedanta|Advaita Vedanta]]) or {{Wiki|subjective idealism}} (e.g. [[Cittamatra]]) can evince {{Wiki|realistic}} {{Wiki|tendencies}}, but according to [[Chatterjee]] do not qualify as unreserved [[realism]]. Clearly, [[realism]] implies a commitment to an {{Wiki|ontology}} of some cardinality, but why should it necessarily restrict itself to a denumerable {{Wiki|ontology}}? In fact, it needn’t, and [[realism]] often employs more powerful ontologies. But for the {{Wiki|purpose}} of this [[investigation]], we will define the atomistic {{Wiki|hypothesis}}, in general terms, as the view that the [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] constitution of {{Wiki|matter}}, stuff, [[hyle]] (or whatever else one wishes to call it) is ultimately discrete. |
− | It is also important to distinguish realisms employing foundationalist theories of epistemic justification, which due to their epistemic atomism are prone to lead to an atomistic ontology, from those forms of realism employing a coherence theory of justification, which are holistic, i.e. epistemically non- atomistic, and therefore far less likely to lead to an ontological atomism. | + | It is also important to distinguish realisms employing foundationalist theories of {{Wiki|epistemic}} {{Wiki|justification}}, which due to their {{Wiki|epistemic}} [[atomism]] are prone to lead to an atomistic {{Wiki|ontology}}, from those [[forms]] of [[realism]] employing a coherence {{Wiki|theory}} of {{Wiki|justification}}, which are {{Wiki|holistic}}, i.e. epistemically non- atomistic, and therefore far less likely to lead to an [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[atomism]]. |
− | If and when epistemological atomism slips into ontological atomism, as it almost invariably does (though we will see that there are exceptions to the rule), then atomism entails realism. The reverse case—that realism entails atomism—only holds for foundationalist varieties of realism with denumerable material bases of constitution. | + | If and when [[epistemological]] [[atomism]] slips into [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[atomism]], as it almost invariably does (though we will see that there are exceptions to the {{Wiki|rule}}), then [[atomism]] entails [[realism]]. The reverse case—that [[realism]] entails atomism—only holds for foundationalist varieties of [[realism]] with denumerable material bases of constitution. |
− | Moreover, we can categorize realisms into two types, according to whether they adhere to a two-term or a three-term theory of knowledge.The defining characteristic of the two-term theory is that bare perceptual evidence is inherently veridical in a quite strong sense. For the purposes of the present investigation, we will define two subtypes—(1) direct realism and (2) sense-datum realism. Direct realism (1) holds that physical objects themselves are directly apprehended, i.e. when we say we see a tree, we are not merely seeing sense-data—we are seeing the tree itself as an integral whole. In sense-datum realism (2), we are directly seeing the sense-data, which are accorded intrinsic credibility—one’s awareness of a sense datum is immediate and infallible. Sense-data are moreover held to be ontological ultimates. Thus, the evidentially given sense-data are immune to skeptical assault and constitute objectively true foundational knowledge. | + | Moreover, we can categorize realisms into two types, according to whether they adhere to a two-term or a three-term {{Wiki|theory}} of knowledge.The defining [[characteristic]] of the two-term {{Wiki|theory}} is that bare {{Wiki|perceptual}} {{Wiki|evidence}} is inherently veridical in a quite strong [[sense]]. For the purposes of the {{Wiki|present}} [[investigation]], we will define two subtypes—(1) [[direct realism]] and (2) sense-datum [[realism]]. Direct [[realism]] (1) holds that [[physical objects]] themselves are directly apprehended, i.e. when we say we see a [[tree]], we are not merely [[seeing]] sense-data—we are [[seeing]] the [[tree]] itself as an integral whole. In sense-datum [[realism]] (2), we are directly [[seeing]] the sense-data, which are accorded intrinsic credibility—one’s [[awareness]] of a [[sense]] datum is immediate and infallible. Sense-data are moreover held to be [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] ultimates. Thus, the evidentially given sense-data are immune to skeptical assault and constitute objectively true foundational [[knowledge]]. |
− | Representational realism (the three-term theory) holds that the | + | Representational [[realism]] (the three-term {{Wiki|theory}}) holds that the “[[veil]] of perception”—a [[representation]], aspect or sensation—intervenes between the perceiving [[consciousness]] and the [[object]]. |
− | A metaphysical realism is any position that has not yet overcome the category of the Ding an sich or the transcendental objectivity. The “transcendental realist” (to use Kant’s terminology) believes that he directly experiences absolute reality. But the way we are defining it here, realism is metaphysical even if the transcendental object is never experienced in itself (as is the case in critical realism) because some degree of objective backing is still held to be required as a condition of the possibility of phenomenal experience. Critical realism relies on the transcendental reduction to distinguish which parts of experience are supplied by the mind from the parts that are given in sensory intuition. | + | A [[metaphysical]] [[realism]] is any position that has not yet overcome the category of the [[Ding an sich]] or the [[transcendental]] objectivity. The “transcendental realist” (to use [[Kant’s]] {{Wiki|terminology}}) believes that he directly [[experiences]] [[absolute reality]]. But the way we are defining it here, [[realism]] is [[metaphysical]] even if the [[transcendental]] [[object]] is never [[experienced]] in itself (as is the case in [[critical realism]]) because some [[degree]] of [[objective]] backing is still held to be required as a [[condition]] of the possibility of [[phenomenal]] experience. [[Critical realism]] relies on the [[transcendental]] reduction to distinguish which parts of [[experience]] are supplied by the [[mind]] from the parts that are given in sensory [[intuition]]. |
− | ==2.2 Early Buddhist Phenomenalism== | + | ==2.2 Early [[Buddhist]] [[Phenomenalism]]== |
− | The view of pure or radical phenomenalism can be characterized in several ways: (1) epistemically, that things are just as they are known to be in experience and that there is nothing metaphysical to be said about them— (2) ontologically, that there is no real difference between phenomena and their essences, or even that phenomena are essenceless—or (3) semantically, “that propositions asserting the existence of physical objects are equivalent in meaning to propositions asserting that subjects would have certain sequences of sensations were they to have certain others.” | + | The view of [[pure]] or radical {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} can be characterized in several ways: (1) epistemically, that things are just as they are known to be in [[experience]] and that there is nothing [[metaphysical]] to be said about them— (2) [[ontologically]], that there is no real difference between [[phenomena]] and their [[essences]], or even that [[phenomena]] are essenceless—or (3) {{Wiki|semantically}}, “that propositions asserting the [[existence]] of [[physical objects]] are {{Wiki|equivalent}} in meaning to propositions asserting that [[subjects]] would have certain sequences of [[sensations]] were they to have certain others.” |
− | In other words, radical phenomenalism holds that physical objects are in a real sense constituted strictly by the sense-data of perception (and not vice versa), and that propositions about physical objects reduce to propositions about clusters of sensations or sensibilia. Knowing is grounded in the evidence of the senses, which is foundational and immediate. The bare sensations are self-disclosing (and in the case of Mind-Only, self-cognizing). Familiar objects such as material bodies, objects, wholes have only a nominal, conceptually imputed existence. In reality, they are merely bundles of sensory perceptions that are construed as objects. Phenomenalism therefore disputes the claim that objects exist independently of sensory awareness. If no such awareness were to exist, all existence claims about entities would be false. | + | In other words, radical {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} holds that [[physical objects]] are in a real [[sense]] constituted strictly by the sense-data of [[perception]] (and not [[vice versa]]), and that propositions about [[physical objects]] reduce to propositions about [[clusters]] of [[sensations]] or sensibilia. [[Knowing]] is grounded in the {{Wiki|evidence}} of the [[senses]], which is foundational and immediate. The bare [[sensations]] are self-disclosing (and in the case of [[Mind-Only]], self-cognizing). Familiar [[objects]] such as material [[bodies]], [[objects]], wholes have only a nominal, conceptually [[imputed]] [[existence]]. In [[reality]], they are merely bundles of [[sensory perceptions]] that are construed as [[objects]]. [[Phenomenalism]] therefore [[disputes]] the claim that [[objects]] [[exist]] {{Wiki|independently}} of sensory [[awareness]]. If no such [[awareness]] were to [[exist]], all [[existence]] claims about entities would be false. |
− | In what must be acknowledged as one of the “great texts” of early Buddhist epistemology, the Bahiya Sutta? we find a paradigmatic example—Gautama Sakyamuni advises the bark-cloth-wearing ascetic on how to train himself in a phenomenalistic mode of awareness. Bahya, who is an advanced contemplative, receives only a very brief instruction, to the effect that his sense of ego will disappear as soon as he succeeds in correctly taking account of just his naked sensory impressions and thoughts and no more than that: | + | In what must be [[acknowledged]] as one of the “great texts” of early [[Buddhist epistemology]], the [[Bahiya Sutta]]? we find a paradigmatic example—Gautama [[Sakyamuni]] advises the bark-cloth-wearing [[ascetic]] on how to train himself in a phenomenalistic mode of [[awareness]]. [[Bahya]], who is an advanced contemplative, receives only a very brief instruction, to the effect that his [[sense]] of [[ego]] will disappear as soon as he succeeds in correctly taking account of just his naked sensory [[impressions]] and [[thoughts]] and no more than that: |
− | In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that... | + | In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the [[sensed]], only the [[sensed]]. In reference to the [[Wikipedia:Cognition|cognized]], only the [[Wikipedia:Cognition|cognized]]. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the [[sensed]] in reference to the [[sensed]], only the [[Wikipedia:Cognition|cognized]] in reference to the [[Wikipedia:Cognition|cognized]], then, [[Bahiya]], there is no you in terms of that... |
− | Read as an example of | + | Read as an example of “[[inversion]] of [[gnosis]],” this [[sutra]] is a classic demonstration of the [[anatman]] {{Wiki|perspective}} in operation. [[Bahiya]] is being instructed to bracket his [[subjectivity]]. Whereas for [[Wikipedia:Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl|Husserl]], {{Wiki|phenomenological}} reduction involves only the [[suspension]] of [[empirical]] [[subjectivity]], the {{Wiki|epoche}} of [[anatman]] is more far-reaching in that it entails a [[suspension]] of even the [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]]. The changing acts of [[knowing]] are purely [[empirical]] and do not refer back to an [[unchanging]] [[transcendental]] knower. [[Knowing]] exhausts itself in the known. All traces of [[subjectivity]] are dissolved by the projection of [[consciousness]] into [[experience]] in its [[momentariness]] and concreteness. The [[transcendental]] subjectivity’s construction of superimposed noemata is brought to a halt and the [[thusness]] of the experiential flux revealed. |
− | Mach arrives at a somewhat similar view of things in Analyse der Empfind- ungen, albeit not by a contemplative route but by a speculative thought experiment. After its semantic scope is successively expanded until it encompasses the totality of phenomena, he imagines that the ego is finally dissolved. It is recognized to be a provisional concept, having at best a merely pragmatic utility—rather than a veridical representation of some metaphysical absolute underlying or overlooking the functional fabric of sensations that is revealed in the final analysis to be truly fundamental—colors, sounds, warmths, pressures, spaces, times, etc.: | + | Mach arrives at a somewhat similar view of things in Analyse der Empfind- ungen, albeit not by a {{Wiki|contemplative}} route but by a speculative [[thought]] experiment. After its [[Wikipedia:Semantics|semantic]] scope is [[successively]] expanded until it encompasses the {{Wiki|totality}} of [[phenomena]], he imagines that the [[ego]] is finally dissolved. It is [[recognized]] to be a provisional {{Wiki|concept}}, having at best a merely {{Wiki|pragmatic}} utility—rather than a veridical [[representation]] of some [[metaphysical]] [[absolute]] underlying or overlooking the functional fabric of sensations that is revealed in the final analysis to be truly fundamental—colors, {{Wiki|sounds}}, warmths, pressures, spaces, times, etc.: |
− | The contradistinction of ego and world, between sensation or appearance and thing then drops away, and now it is merely a matter of the interrelationship of the elements a j3 7 .... AB C ... K L M ...., of which this contradistinction had been only a partially applicable and incomplete expression. | + | The contradistinction of [[ego]] and [[world]], between [[sensation]] or [[appearance]] and thing then drops away, and now it is merely a {{Wiki|matter}} of the interrelationship of the [[elements]] a j3 7 .... AB C ... K L M ...., of which this contradistinction had been only a partially applicable and incomplete expression. |
− | As does the Buddhist theory of the elements of experience {dharmas), Mach advocates a form of sensation pluralism. | + | As does the [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|theory}} of the [[elements]] of [[experience]] {[[dharmas]]), Mach advocates a [[form]] of [[sensation]] [[pluralism]]. |
− | The Rohitassa Sutta of the Nikayas shows evidence that early Buddhism rejected cosmological world-concepts in favor of a phenomenalistic microcosm or body-world constituted by the totality of sense-impression at any given moment: | + | The [[Rohitassa Sutta]] of the [[Nikayas]] shows {{Wiki|evidence}} that [[early Buddhism]] rejected [[cosmological]] world-concepts in favor of a phenomenalistic microcosm or body-world constituted by the {{Wiki|totality}} of [[sense-impression]] at any given [[moment]]: |
− | Yet it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception and intellect, that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos. | + | Yet it is just within this fathom-long [[body]], with its [[perception]] and [[intellect]], that I declare that there is the [[cosmos]], the origination of the [[cosmos]], the [[cessation]] of the [[cosmos]], and the [[path of practice]] leading to the [[cessation]] of the [[cosmos]]. |
− | The sutric doctrine of the microcosmos of the “fathom-long | + | The [[sutric]] [[doctrine]] of the [[microcosmos]] of the “fathom-long [[body]]” is again strikingly paralleled by the Machian notion of the Korperwelt—a clever double-entendre capturing how the [[world]] appears from the {{Wiki|perspective}} of {{Wiki|common-sense}} realism—as a “[[world]] of [[bodies]],” i.e. the {{Wiki|totality}} of [[physical]] objects—as well as how it appears from the less intuitive but epistemologically more sophisticated point of view of phenomenalism—as a “body-world,” i.e. the [[logical]] [[space]] of sensibilia comprised by the [[human body]]. |
− | In keeping with Buddhism’s soteriological pattern of inverse gnosis, the macrocosm is not only reduced to the mind-body microcosm, but the latter comes to be contemplated in its empirical aspect of functional flux and dispersive difference, as aggregates or bundles {skandhas) lacking any kind of real inner unity. | + | In keeping with [[Buddhism’s]] [[soteriological]] pattern of inverse [[gnosis]], the [[macrocosm]] is not only reduced to the mind-body [[microcosm]], but the [[latter]] comes to be contemplated in its [[empirical]] aspect of functional flux and dispersive difference, as [[aggregates]] or bundles {[[skandhas]]) lacking any kind of real inner {{Wiki|unity}}. |
− | This phenomenalizing reduction of the macrocosm to the microcosm is an important prototype in early Buddhism of the later Mind-Only program of subjective idealism. Vasubandhu’s refutation of Abhidharmic realism in the Vimsatika arguably represents an attempt to urge a return to this earlier ideal type of non-atomic phenomenalism—a revival with a twist. In verse 16 of the Vimsatika, we rediscover the Bahiya Sutta’s grand theme (in the seeing, only the seen) iterated in an idealistic inversion—in the percept, only the perception (pratyaksaY | + | This phenomenalizing reduction of the [[macrocosm]] to the [[microcosm]] is an important prototype in [[early Buddhism]] of the later [[Mind-Only]] program of {{Wiki|subjective idealism}}. [[Vasubandhu’s]] refutation of [[Abhidharmic]] [[realism]] in the [[Vimsatika]] arguably represents an attempt to [[urge]] a return to this earlier {{Wiki|ideal}} type of non-atomic phenomenalism—a revival with a twist. In verse 16 of the [[Vimsatika]], we rediscover the [[Bahiya]] [[Sutta’s]] grand theme (in the [[seeing]], only the seen) iterated in an {{Wiki|idealistic}} inversion—in the [[percept]], only the [[perception]] (pratyaksaY |
− | The awareness of perception is as in dreams. When it exists, the object of perception does not exist. | + | The [[awareness]] of [[perception]] is as in [[dreams]]. When it [[exists]], the [[object]] of [[perception]] does not [[exist]]. |
− | Nominalism Buddhist doctrine has a characteristic tendency to analyze perception and knowledge in terms of particulars, and does not accept the existence or instantiation of abstract entities such real wholes or universals, as do other darsanas (e.g. Nyaya). In the context of the theory of perception, Matilal describes nominalism as the view that we are directly aware of sensible quality-particulars. These qualities do not exist apart from their instantiations, and their instantiations do not exist independently of our sensation of them. | + | [[Nominalism]] [[Buddhist doctrine]] has a [[characteristic]] tendency to analyze [[perception]] and [[knowledge]] in terms of particulars, and does not accept the [[existence]] or instantiation of abstract entities such real wholes or universals, as do other {{Wiki|darsanas}} (e.g. [[Nyaya]]). In the context of the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]], [[Matilal]] describes [[nominalism]] as the view that we are directly {{Wiki|aware}} of sensible quality-particulars. These qualities do not [[exist]] apart from their instantiations, and their instantiations do not [[exist]] {{Wiki|independently}} of our [[sensation]] of them. |
− | The development of nominalist views about perception is closely connected with the articulation of an ontological nominalism in the context of the Buddhist “bundle | + | The [[development]] of nominalist [[views]] about [[perception]] is closely connected with the articulation of an [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[nominalism]] in the context of the [[Buddhist]] “bundle {{Wiki|theory}}” of the body-world and its associated “no-ownership” stance on personal [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]]. In the [[Milindapanha]], the [[monk]] Nagasena’s famous {{Wiki|dialogue}} with [[King]] [[Menander]], [[Nagasena]] maintains that under analysis, he does not [[exist]] as a [[person]], and that his [[name]] “[[Nagasena]]” is therefore a strictly nominal designation for the [[psycho-physical]] bundles, just as the {{Wiki|conceptual}} label “[[chariot]]” is is applied to a [[phenomenon]] that does not withstand a decompositional analysis. Since there is no more to the [[chariot]] than its parts, and none of the chariot’s parts are the [[chariot]], [[Nagasena]] conveys, in [[reality]] there is no such thing as a [[chariot]]. |
− | Siderits submits that Nagasena’s argument is proposing a kind of mereo- logical reductionism. Examining a number of different readings of the chariot dialogue, Oetke makes the case that the argument is semantically underdetermined. He believes that it is far from clear precisely what philosophical argument Nagasena is trying to make. However, he for some reason misses the parallels drawn by Kapstein to instances of the chariot simile in the Katha Upanisad^ as well as in Plato’s Phaedrus. In this light, I conjecture that purely deconstructive intent offers a plausible reason for why Nagasena’s argument seems underdetermined. Instead of advancing any constructive thesis of his own, he is merely attempting to subvert a classic Upanisadic example of atman theory, i.e. to demonstrate that in actual fact, the example shows the opposite of what its proponents intend it to illustrate. Kapstein, however, argues that Nagasena’s chariot argument is proposing a logical constructivist view of personal identity, and contends that it represents a possible precursor to Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism. | + | [[Siderits]] submits that Nagasena’s argument is proposing a kind of mereo- [[logical]] {{Wiki|reductionism}}. Examining a number of different readings of the [[chariot]] {{Wiki|dialogue}}, Oetke makes the case that the argument is {{Wiki|semantically}} underdetermined. He believes that it is far from clear precisely what philosophical argument [[Nagasena]] is trying to make. However, he for some [[reason]] misses the parallels drawn by [[Wikipedia:Matthew Kapstein|Kapstein]] to instances of the [[chariot]] simile in the {{Wiki|Katha Upanisad}}^ as well as in [[Wikipedia:Plato|Plato’s]] [[Phaedrus]]. In this {{Wiki|light}}, I conjecture that purely deconstructive intent offers a plausible [[reason]] for why Nagasena’s argument seems underdetermined. Instead of advancing any constructive {{Wiki|thesis}} of his [[own]], he is merely attempting to subvert a classic [[Upanisadic]] example of [[atman]] {{Wiki|theory}}, i.e. to demonstrate that in actual fact, the example shows the opposite of what its proponents intend it to illustrate. [[Wikipedia:Matthew Kapstein|Kapstein]], however, argues that Nagasena’s [[chariot]] argument is proposing a [[logical]] constructivist view of personal [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]], and contends that it represents a possible precursor to [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]]. |
− | The logico-epistemic tradition of Yogacara worked out a more technical elaboration of this nominalism in the so-called apoha (exclusion) theory presented by Dharmakirti in the Pramanavarttika. Here, universals are interpreted as absences or eliminations—e.g., the class of trees is defined as the mere exclusion of non-trees, which is another way of saying that trees are merely whatever is labeled as a tree, without committing to ontological proliferations such as an underlying universal of “tree-hood,” an extensional set of all trees, and so forth. In articulating the relation of abstract concept to concrete particular along strictly linguistic lines, i.e. one of naming or conceptual imputation, the Buddhist apoha theory avoids trading in metaphysicalites such as instantiation, exemplification or inherence. | + | The {{Wiki|logico-epistemic}} [[tradition]] of [[Yogacara]] worked out a more technical [[elaboration]] of this [[nominalism]] in the so-called [[apoha]] (exclusion) {{Wiki|theory}} presented by [[Dharmakirti]] in the [[Pramanavarttika]]. Here, universals are interpreted as absences or eliminations—e.g., the class of [[trees]] is defined as the mere exclusion of non-trees, which is another way of saying that [[trees]] are merely whatever is labeled as a [[tree]], without committing to [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] proliferations such as an underlying [[universal]] of “tree-hood,” an extensional set of all [[trees]], and so forth. In articulating the [[relation]] of abstract {{Wiki|concept}} to concrete particular along strictly {{Wiki|linguistic}} lines, i.e. one of naming or {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[imputation]], the [[Buddhist]] [[apoha]] {{Wiki|theory}} avoids trading in metaphysicalites such as instantiation, {{Wiki|exemplification}} or {{Wiki|inherence}}. |
− | These examples are only to illustrate that ontological nominalism, or the principle that existence, reality and actuality are in the proper sense attributed only to particulars (if at all), is a deeply rooted aspect of the Buddhist philosophical pattern. | + | These examples are only to illustrate that [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[nominalism]], or the [[principle]] that [[existence]], [[reality]] and [[actuality]] are in the proper [[sense]] attributed only to particulars (if at all), is a deeply rooted aspect of the [[Buddhist]] [[philosophical]] pattern. |
− | As we will later see in more detail, the “sense-data mosaic” theory of experience is one of severals ways that the Buddhist phenomenalism has been integrated with nominalism. | + | As we will later see in more detail, the “sense-data mosaic” {{Wiki|theory}} of [[experience]] is one of severals ways that the [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} has been integrated with [[nominalism]]. |
− | The Rise and Fall of Sense-Datum Atomism A realistic sense-data nominalism allows for two possible accounts of the nature of physical objects—a regressive or a progressive theory. The regressive theory (that the physical object gives rise to sense-data) leads to representationalism, the progressive theory (that the physical object is a construction from sense-data) leads to phenomenalism, or presentationalism. The aim of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism in 11-16 will be to demonstrate that neither of these accounts work in a realist mode. | + | The Rise and Fall of Sense-Datum [[Atomism]] A {{Wiki|realistic}} sense-data nominalism allows for two possible accounts of the [[nature]] of [[physical]] objects—a regressive or a progressive {{Wiki|theory}}. The regressive {{Wiki|theory}} (that the [[physical object]] gives rise to sense-data) leads to {{Wiki|representationalism}}, the progressive {{Wiki|theory}} (that the [[physical object]] is a construction from sense-data) leads to {{Wiki|phenomenalism}}, or presentationalism. The aim of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]] in 11-16 will be to demonstrate that neither of these accounts work in a realist mode. |
− | To fill in some philosophical substructure for Vasubandhu’s delivery of this coup de grace to metaphysical realism, we will briefly survey Indian atomism, reviewing the Vaisesika doctrine and theorizing about the possible rationale for the development of Buddhist atomism. Following the path of reasoned eclecticism, we shall then construct two Weberian | + | To fill in some [[philosophical]] substructure for [[Vasubandhu’s]] delivery of this coup de grace to [[metaphysical]] [[realism]], we will briefly survey [[Indian]] [[atomism]], reviewing the [[Vaisesika]] [[doctrine]] and theorizing about the possible rationale for the [[development]] of [[Buddhist]] [[atomism]]. Following the [[path]] of reasoned eclecticism, we shall then construct two Weberian “{{Wiki|ideal}} types” or models of [[Abhidharma]] synthesized from four streams of commentary—(1) modern [[Western]] {{Wiki|scholarship}} of [[Indian]] [[Abhidharma]] (mainly [[Wikipedia:Fyodor Shcherbatskoy|STCHERBATSKY]], FRAUWALLNER and VON ROSPATT), (2) [[Gelug]] {{Wiki|doxography}} and contemporary commentary (HOPKINS, BUESCHER), (3) other {{Wiki|modern}} [[philosophical]] reconstructions of [[Abhidharma]] (notably MATILAL, CHATTERJEE, GRUPP and GUENTHER), and (4) historical review of [[atomism]] in {{Wiki|Western philosophy}} (Pyle). |
− | The main focus of the discussion will be to investigate the Abhidharmic evolution of the concept of substance in the light of its critiques of time and perception. We will illuminate how this critical dynamic forced an initial shift from a progressive to a regressive theory of mind-independent physical objects, setting the stage for Vasubandhu’s abandonment of even the regressive theory. | + | The main focus of the [[discussion]] will be to investigate the [[Abhidharmic]] [[evolution]] of the {{Wiki|concept}} of [[substance]] in the {{Wiki|light}} of its critiques of time and [[perception]]. We will [[illuminate]] how this critical dynamic forced an initial shift from a progressive to a regressive {{Wiki|theory}} of mind-independent [[physical objects]], setting the stage for [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[abandonment]] of even the regressive {{Wiki|theory}}. |
− | The philosophical ground covered by this evolution is roughly equivalent to the trajectory leading from Hume through Kant to Mach. On an ideo- historical time scale, this is no mean achievement. But the argument we are making here is stronger. We are setting out to retrace this trajectory as it is reflected in the philosophical voyage of a single thinker—in the 4th century CE. | + | The [[philosophical]] ground covered by this [[evolution]] is roughly {{Wiki|equivalent}} to the trajectory leading from [[Hume]] through {{Wiki|Kant}} to Mach. On an ideo- historical time scale, this is no mean [[achievement]]. But the argument we are making here is stronger. We are setting out to retrace this trajectory as it is reflected in the [[philosophical]] voyage of a single thinker—in the 4th century CE. |
− | 2.3 The Origins of Buddhist Atomism | + | 2.3 The Origins of [[Buddhist]] [[Atomism]] |
− | We will have to leave the questions of where the doctrine of atomism first originated—in ancient India or in Greece—and whether there was any exchange of ideas between these cradles of philosophy for others to answer. Democritus, the first known Greek atomist, can be dated to approximately 460 BC, whereas Kanada, the probable originator of atomism in India, lived possibly a century or so earlier. However, for the purposes of our investigation, it will suffice to point out that ancient India was home to numerous atomist doctrines. The theory of atomism (paramanuvada) emerged in the astika schools of Indian philosophy (e.g. Vaisesika) as well as in the nastika schools (e.g. Jainism). | + | We will have to leave the questions of where the [[doctrine]] of [[atomism]] first originated—in {{Wiki|ancient India}} or in Greece—and whether there was any exchange of [[ideas]] between these cradles of [[philosophy]] for others to answer. {{Wiki|Democritus}}, the first known {{Wiki|Greek}} [[atomist]], can be dated to approximately 460 BC, whereas [[Kanada]], the probable originator of [[atomism]] in [[India]], lived possibly a century or so earlier. However, for the purposes of our investigation, it will suffice to point out that {{Wiki|ancient India}} was home to numerous [[atomist]] [[doctrines]]. The {{Wiki|theory}} of [[atomism]] (paramanuvada) emerged in the [[astika]] schools of [[Indian philosophy]] (e.g. [[Vaisesika]]) as well as in the [[nastika]] schools (e.g. [[Jainism]]). |
− | Vaisesika Atomism Kanada’s atomism, set forth in his Vaisesika Sutra, was one of the most influential doctrines. Pace Kanada, every physical object is constituted by a finite number of paramanus—immutable, eternal, selfsubsistent, indestructible, and individually distinct atoms. These atoms have a spherical shape and touch each other. Vaisesika proposes a theory of atomic permanents, like the atomism of the Jains, who also believed that eternal and immutable atoms flowed through events. | + | [[Vaisesika]] [[Atomism]] Kanada’s [[atomism]], set forth in his [[Vaisesika]] [[Sutra]], was one of the most influential [[doctrines]]. Pace [[Kanada]], every [[physical object]] is constituted by a finite number of paramanus—immutable, eternal, selfsubsistent, [[indestructible]], and individually {{Wiki|distinct}} [[atoms]]. These [[atoms]] have a spherical shape and {{Wiki|touch}} each other. [[Vaisesika]] proposes a {{Wiki|theory}} of [[atomic]] permanents, like the [[atomism]] of the [[Jains]], who also believed that eternal and immutable [[atoms]] flowed through events. |
− | The Vaisesika doctrine of permanents somewhat resembles the view of Democritus, who submits a reductionist material constitution theory. Democritus believes that the objectively existing compound bodies to be aggregates of atoms, which are eternal, true units, and characterized by solely by primary qualities. Atoms and the empty space they are located exist eteei (in reality), whereas colors and other sensible qualities exist only nomoi (by convention). | + | The [[Vaisesika]] [[doctrine]] of permanents somewhat resembles the view of {{Wiki|Democritus}}, who submits a reductionist material constitution {{Wiki|theory}}. Democritus believes that the objectively [[existing]] compound [[bodies]] to be aggregates of [[atoms]], which are eternal, true units, and characterized by solely by primary qualities. [[Atoms]] and the [[empty space]] they are located [[exist]] eteei (in [[reality]]), whereas colors and other sensible qualities [[exist]] only nomoi (by convention). |
− | The early Vaisesika atomism of Kanada later came to be elaborated by Vatsyayana, a contemporary of Vasubandhu, who speculated that atoms are absolutely imperceptible, i.e. infinitesimal. Composite entities are integral wholes in their own right, inhering in the conglomerate (pinda) of their atoms but having different qualities from them. The discrete atoms serve as the material base of constitution in which the real integral wholes can inhere. The perception of the integral whole (avayavirf) takes place simultaneously with the perception of certain of its parts, e.g. even though one sees a tree in aspect, one can be said to be seeing the whole tree. In Vatsyayana’s mereology, atoms are never found in isolation. Two atoms (or least parts) cohere into a dyad-atom {dvyanuka') or least whole of atomic size, and all further combinations are formed from these dyad-atoms. | + | The early [[Vaisesika]] [[atomism]] of [[Kanada]] later came to be elaborated by [[Vatsyayana]], a contemporary of [[Vasubandhu]], who speculated that [[atoms]] are absolutely imperceptible, i.e. infinitesimal. Composite entities are integral wholes in their [[own]] right, inhering in the conglomerate ([[pinda]]) of their [[atoms]] but having different qualities from them. The discrete [[atoms]] serve as the material base of constitution in which the real integral wholes can inhere. The [[perception]] of the integral whole (avayavirf) takes place simultaneously with the [[perception]] of certain of its parts, e.g. even though one sees a [[tree]] in aspect, one can be said to be [[seeing]] the whole [[tree]]. In Vatsyayana’s mereology, [[atoms]] are never found in isolation. Two [[atoms]] (or least parts) cohere into a dyad-atom {[[dvyanuka]]') or least whole of [[atomic]] size, and all further combinations are formed from these dyad-atoms. |
This strange construction is motivated by the difficulty that a least part is spatially partless and therefore unable to be spatially adjoined to other least parts. The dyad-atom is held to solve this problem because it has parts and can connect to other dyad-atoms in the usual fashion. | This strange construction is motivated by the difficulty that a least part is spatially partless and therefore unable to be spatially adjoined to other least parts. The dyad-atom is held to solve this problem because it has parts and can connect to other dyad-atoms in the usual fashion. | ||
− | Buddhist Atomisms The Buddhist atomistic doctrines are considered by some to be among the most difficult atomist theories, their many subtleties and contradictions being a source of much polemical debate within Indian philosophy. I will not be able to fully explore all of the aspects and issues related to the various differentiations of atomism among the many Buddhist sects. Within the compass of this thesis, I will therefore restrict myself to a survey of the most basic doctrines and developments. | + | [[Buddhist]] Atomisms The [[Buddhist]] atomistic [[doctrines]] are considered by some to be among the most difficult [[atomist]] theories, their many subtleties and contradictions being a source of much polemical [[debate]] within [[Indian philosophy]]. I will not be able to fully explore all of the aspects and issues related to the various differentiations of [[atomism]] among the many [[Buddhist]] sects. Within the {{Wiki|compass}} of this {{Wiki|thesis}}, I will therefore restrict myself to a survey of the most basic [[doctrines]] and developments. |
− | In the fold of Indian Buddhism, atomist doctrines can be found in the Sarvastivada system of tenets, as well as in the early Sautrantika (in Gelug doxography, the school of | + | In the fold of [[Indian Buddhism]], [[atomist]] [[doctrines]] can be found in the [[Sarvastivada]] system of [[tenets]], as well as in the early [[Sautrantika]] (in [[Gelug]] {{Wiki|doxography}}, the school of “[[Sautrantika]] [[Following Scripture]]”) and late Sautrantika (“[[Sautrantika]] Following {{Wiki|Reasoning}}”) systems. All three [[atomist]] systems of [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] each in different ways hypothesize that the familiar [[physical objects]] of the [[external world]] are somehow constituted by [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] simples. They maintain that all [[ultimate truths]] can be classified either as partless simples, as absences, or as cessations, and that all [[conventional truths]] reduce to their [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] constituents. |
− | A distinguishing feature of the Buddhist schools versus non-Buddhist doctrines of atomism can be found in their rejection of the | + | A distinguishing feature of the [[Buddhist schools]] versus [[non-Buddhist]] [[doctrines]] of [[atomism]] can be found in their rejection of the [[realists]]’ {{Wiki|inherence}} ([[samavaya]]) {{Wiki|theory}} of wholes. In fact, the [[Buddhist]] positions reject all theories of constitution with the exception of mereological summation. |
− | In modern analytic philosophy, the strongly reductionist stance that there exist only partless entities is commonly referred to as mereological nihilism. More precisely, the Vaibhasika and early Sautrantika atomisms can be characterized as varieties of impure physicalistic mereological nihilism (atoms are physical and interact with each other), whereas the late Sautrantika position can be classified as a pure mereological nihilism. | + | In {{Wiki|modern}} {{Wiki|analytic philosophy}}, the strongly reductionist stance that there [[exist]] only partless entities is commonly referred to as mereological [[nihilism]]. More precisely, the [[Vaibhasika]] and early [[Sautrantika]] atomisms can be characterized as varieties of impure physicalistic mereological [[nihilism]] ([[atoms]] are [[physical]] and interact with each other), whereas the late [[Sautrantika]] position can be classified as a [[pure]] mereological [[nihilism]]. |
− | The position of mereological nihilism maintains that only elementary building blocks without proper parts have real existence—all seemingly discrete and integral wholes such as macroscopic objects in fact exist only as nominally designated aggregates or conglomerates, i.e. no differently than scattered mereological sums of atoms. | + | The position of mereological [[nihilism]] maintains that only elementary building blocks without proper parts have real existence—all seemingly discrete and integral wholes such as macroscopic [[objects]] in fact [[exist]] only as nominally designated [[aggregates]] or conglomerates, i.e. no differently than scattered mereological sums of [[atoms]]. |
− | Interestingly, there is not much controversy among commentators in that the epistemologies of all three types of Abhidharma scholasticism are considered to be different inflections of the same underlying hybrid theme of pluralistic atomism and reductionist realism. | + | Interestingly, there is not much [[controversy]] among commentators in that the [[epistemologies]] of all three types of [[Abhidharma]] [[scholasticism]] are considered to be different inflections of the same underlying hybrid theme of pluralistic [[atomism]] and reductionist [[realism]]. |
− | Why and how did Buddhism initially articulate the doctrine of atomism? As we have already pointed out, the earliest strata of Buddhist writings exhibit no evidence of such doctrines. Therefore, the atomist doctrine was almost certainly a later addition and not an actual historical teaching of Gautama Sakyamuni (though Mahavira, the contemporaneous founder of Jainism, almost certainly did teach atomist doctrines). | + | Why and how did [[Buddhism]] initially articulate the [[doctrine]] of [[atomism]]? As we have already pointed out, the earliest strata of [[Buddhist]] writings exhibit no {{Wiki|evidence}} of such [[doctrines]]. Therefore, the [[atomist]] [[doctrine]] was almost certainly a later addition and not an actual historical [[teaching]] of [[Gautama Sakyamuni]] (though [[Wikipedia:Mahāvīra|Mahavira]], the contemporaneous founder of [[Jainism]], almost certainly did teach [[atomist]] [[doctrines]]). |
− | There are three possible lines of explanation for the development of Buddhist atomism—(1) a physical atomism that was borrowed from nonBuddhist darsana, (2) a phenomenalist origin in minimal sensory magnitudes, and (3) a nominalist or mereological origin. According to the phenomenalist line of explanation (2), which we construe as an epistemological hypothesis about limit-constructs of sensation, the atoms are the sensations at the absolute threshold of vision, hearing, touch, etc., i.e. the “pixels” of a sensory field. While the 19th century psychophysics of Fechner was the first attempt to scientifically measure such thresholds and quantitatively determine functional relationships between stimuli and sensations, it is not unreasonable to assume that the pre-scientific epistemologists of early Abhidharma were well aware of the existence of sensory limits. The nominalist line of explanation (3) is best construed as a mereological hypothesis about limit-constructs of composition where the Buddhist whole-part nominalism (the whole is unreal, its parts are real) comes to be radicalized into a mereological nihilism (the whole is unreal and only its self-subsistent least parts are real). | + | There are three possible lines of explanation for the [[development]] of [[Buddhist]] atomism—(1) a [[physical]] [[atomism]] that was borrowed from nonBuddhist [[darsana]], (2) a phenomenalist origin in minimal sensory magnitudes, and (3) a nominalist or mereological origin. According to the phenomenalist line of explanation (2), which we construe as an [[epistemological]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}} about limit-constructs of [[sensation]], the [[atoms]] are the [[sensations]] at the [[absolute]] threshold of [[vision]], hearing, {{Wiki|touch}}, etc., i.e. the “pixels” of a [[sensory field]]. While the 19th century [[psychophysics]] of Fechner was the first attempt to {{Wiki|scientifically}} measure such thresholds and quantitatively determine functional relationships between {{Wiki|stimuli}} and [[sensations]], it is not unreasonable to assume that the pre-scientific [[epistemologists]] of early [[Abhidharma]] were well {{Wiki|aware}} of the [[existence]] of sensory limits. The nominalist line of explanation (3) is best construed as a mereological {{Wiki|hypothesis}} about limit-constructs of composition where the [[Buddhist]] whole-part nominalism (the whole is unreal, its parts are real) comes to be radicalized into a mereological [[nihilism]] (the whole is unreal and only its self-subsistent least parts are real). |
− | ==2.4 The Vaibhasika School== | + | ==2.4 The [[Vaibhasika]] School== |
− | In its living details, the Vaibhasika doctrine of atomism has a much richer and messier philosophical texture than the abstract type we are presenting here. The Vaibhasika stance on perceptual experience may be described as a form of physicalistic sense-datum positivism. They believed that it was possible to separate the objective constituents of perception from the epistemic object and developed a theory of atomic substance (dravya'). Their theory of atoms (paramanuvada) proposes a direct realism operating over an ontology that hybridizes all three types of atomism—physical, phenomenalist, nominalist and physical. | + | In its living details, the [[Vaibhasika]] [[doctrine]] of [[atomism]] has a much richer and messier [[philosophical]] {{Wiki|texture}} than the abstract type we are presenting here. The [[Vaibhasika]] stance on {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[experience]] may be described as a [[form]] of physicalistic sense-datum positivism. They believed that it was possible to separate the [[objective]] constituents of [[perception]] from the {{Wiki|epistemic}} [[object]] and developed a {{Wiki|theory}} of [[atomic]] [[substance]] ([[dravya]]'). Their {{Wiki|theory}} of [[atoms]] (paramanuvada) proposes a [[direct realism]] operating over an {{Wiki|ontology}} that hybridizes all three types of atomism—physical, phenomenalist, nominalist and [[physical]]. |
− | The Vaibhasika account of perception is strongly presentationalist in flavor. Extramental objects present themselves directly to an observing consciousness-moment, without intervening representational synthesis. In other words, when observing a macroscopic object, one actually directly observes its atomic constituents in aggregate. Vaibhasika believes that these percepts are as real as the perception itself, and that the external world is directly grasped in non-conceptual perception. | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] account of [[perception]] is strongly presentationalist in {{Wiki|flavor}}. Extramental [[objects]] {{Wiki|present}} themselves directly to an observing consciousness-moment, without intervening representational {{Wiki|synthesis}}. In other words, when observing a macroscopic [[object]], one actually directly observes its [[atomic]] constituents in [[aggregate]]. [[Vaibhasika]] believes that these [[percepts]] are as real as the [[perception]] itself, and that the [[external world]] is directly grasped in [[non-conceptual]] [[perception]]. |
− | The atomist doctrine of the Vaibhasika sect passed through three major phases of ideo-historical development. | + | The [[atomist]] [[doctrine]] of the [[Vaibhasika]] [[sect]] passed through three major phases of ideo-historical [[development]]. |
− | The mature doctrine of atomism as presented in Vasubandhu’s Kosa may be traced back to the Mahavibasa, an encyclopaedic compendium of the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivada schools, dating to the 1st or 2nd century CE. However, the first recorded mentions of a Buddhist doctrine of atomism must be credited to Dharmasn, the author of the Abhidharmasara. This massive synthesis of extant Abhidharmic doctrine was the first commentarial work to forge the Sarvastivada doctrines into a system of scholastic thought. The Abhidharmasara was to remain the paradigmatic model for such compendia even up until the era of Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra. It has been shown that the systematic presentation and structure of the Abhidharmakosa is derived in large part from the Abhidharmasara. | + | The mature [[doctrine]] of [[atomism]] as presented in [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[Kosa]] may be traced back to the Mahavibasa, an {{Wiki|encyclopaedic}} compendium of the [[Abhidharma]] of the [[Sarvastivada]] schools, dating to the 1st or 2nd century CE. However, the first recorded mentions of a [[Buddhist doctrine]] of [[atomism]] must be credited to Dharmasn, the author of the Abhidharmasara. This massive {{Wiki|synthesis}} of extant [[Abhidharmic]] [[doctrine]] was the first {{Wiki|commentarial}} work to forge the [[Sarvastivada doctrines]] into a system of {{Wiki|scholastic}} [[thought]]. The Abhidharmasara was to remain the paradigmatic model for such compendia even up until the {{Wiki|era}} of [[Vasubandhu]] and [[Sanghabhadra]]. It has been shown that the systematic presentation and {{Wiki|structure}} of the [[Abhidharmakosa]] is derived in large part from the Abhidharmasara. |
− | Vasubandhu’s Kosa and Sanghabhadra’s contemporaneous but considerably more voluminous Nyayanusara (a polemic rejoinder to the Kosa in 120,000 verses) form the apex of the classical Abhidharma of the Sravaka- yana, or non-Mahayana schools of Buddhist thought. Further developments of Abhidharma were to take place mostly in the context of Mahayana systematizations, e.g. the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Vasubandhu’s half-brother, Asariga the Yogacarin. | + | [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[Kosa]] and Sanghabhadra’s contemporaneous but considerably more voluminous [[Nyayanusara]] (a polemic rejoinder to the [[Kosa]] in 120,000 verses) [[form]] the apex of the classical [[Abhidharma]] of the [[Sravaka]]- [[yana]], or non-Mahayana schools of [[Buddhist]] [[thought]]. Further developments of [[Abhidharma]] were to take place mostly in the context of [[Mahayana]] systematizations, e.g. the [[Abhidharmasamuccaya]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] half-brother, Asariga the [[Yogacarin]]. |
− | ==2.4.1 Time, Space and Atom in Vaibhasika== | + | ==2.4.1 Time, [[Space]] and {{Wiki|Atom}} in [[Vaibhasika]]== |
− | Although some commentators characterize Vaibhasika as having a theory of atomic permanents, this is somewhat too simplistic. Anacker notes that for Dharmasri, atoms are momentary, though they may form “series,” or causal chains of momentary events. Time is also atomized into a series of discrete instants, but the duration of these moments is so brief that the illusion of continuity is generated, as is the case with the frames of a motion picture following in rapid succession. The atomizing approach has the greatly attractive feature of not having to account for the genidentity of macroscopic physical objects, as under analysis, the appearance of a physical object persisting in time simply explodes out into the causal chain of momentary instants of its atomic decomposition. | + | Although some commentators characterize [[Vaibhasika]] as having a {{Wiki|theory}} of [[atomic]] permanents, this is somewhat too simplistic. [[Anacker]] notes that for [[Dharmasri]], [[atoms]] are momentary, though they may [[form]] “series,” or causal chains of momentary events. Time is also atomized into a series of discrete instants, but the duration of these moments is so brief that the [[illusion]] of continuity is generated, as is the case with the frames of a {{Wiki|motion}} picture following in rapid succession. The atomizing approach has the greatly attractive feature of not having to account for the genidentity of macroscopic [[physical objects]], as under analysis, the [[appearance]] of a [[physical object]] persisting in time simply explodes out into the [[causal chain]] of momentary instants of its [[atomic]] decomposition. |
− | The Vaibhasika are known as Sarvastivadins due to their canonical tenet that “everything | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] are known as [[Sarvastivadins]] due to their [[Wikipedia:canonical|canonical]] [[tenet]] that “everything [[exists]]” ([[sarvam asti]]), meaning the [[existence]] of entities in {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}}. The [[epistemological]] rationale for this [[principle]] is the wish to defend a [[form]] of externalism—because [[knowledge]] is always [[knowledge]] of the real, the intentional [[objects]] of epistemically valid [[cognitions]] must somehow [[exist]]. |
− | The Kosa offers up a number of other arguments in favor of the sarvam asti thesis, including causal and moral rationales such as that past entities must exist in order for present effects to be brought about, and that future entities must exist or else actions would not have consequences. | + | The [[Kosa]] offers up a number of other arguments in favor of the [[sarvam asti]] {{Wiki|thesis}}, [[including]] causal and [[moral]] rationales such as that {{Wiki|past}} entities must [[exist]] in order for {{Wiki|present}} effects to be brought about, and that {{Wiki|future}} entities must [[exist]] or else [[actions]] would not have {{Wiki|consequences}}. |
− | Time As the Sarvastivada Abhidharma continued to evolve, it became increasingly aware of the problem of time. The concept of an immutable entity migrating through the stages of time was no longer acceptable, as eternal substances were held to be contrary to the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of transience (anityata). Due to this doctrinal concern, the Vaibhasika Abhidharmikas were under pressure to evolve more sophisticated accounts of substance and time. | + | Time As the [[Sarvastivada Abhidharma]] continued to evolve, it became increasingly {{Wiki|aware}} of the problem of time. The {{Wiki|concept}} of an immutable [[entity]] migrating through the stages of time was no longer acceptable, as eternal {{Wiki|substances}} were held to be contrary to the fundamental [[Buddhist doctrine]] of transience ([[anityata]]). Due to this [[doctrinal]] [[concern]], the Vaibhasika [[Abhidharmikas]] were under pressure to evolve more sophisticated accounts of [[substance]] and time. |
− | All elements of experience (.dharmas), including atoms, persist in the three periods of past, present and future. In modern terms, the sarvam asti principle may be described as a “block | + | All [[elements]] of [[experience]] (.[[dharmas]]), [[including]] [[atoms]], persist in the [[three periods]] of {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}}. In {{Wiki|modern}} terms, the [[sarvam asti]] [[principle]] may be described as a “block [[universe]]” account of {{Wiki|space-time}}, as it affords {{Wiki|equal}} [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] {{Wiki|status}} to all moment-entities regardless of their time. The [[Vaibhasika]] advanced four major accounts of temporality, credited to the encyclopaedists of the Mahavibasa who originated them: [[Dharmatrata]], [[Ghosaka]], [[Vasumitra]], and [[Buddhadeva]]. |
− | The Kosa attributes to Dharmatrata the time theory of “change of existence” (bhava-parinama'), turning on a substance-existence account of change. The existence (bhava) of an element is an accident that can arise and cease, whereas the substance (dravya) is eternal. This view is immediately dismissed as a guise of the previously refuted non-Buddhist Samkhya system. | + | The [[Kosa]] [[attributes]] to [[Dharmatrata]] the time {{Wiki|theory}} of “change of existence” (bhava-parinama'), turning on a substance-existence account of change. The [[existence]] ([[bhava]]) of an [[element]] is an accident that can arise and cease, whereas the [[substance]] ([[dravya]]) is eternal. This view is immediately dismissed as a guise of the previously refuted [[non-Buddhist]] [[Samkhya]] system. |
− | Ghosaka is attributed with the view of “change of aspect” (laksana-pari- nama), which asserts that entities have three temporal aspects or qualities (laksanas)—pastness, presentness and futurity. A future entity is merely an entity that is appearing under its future aspect and hiding its past and present aspects. The Kosa rejects this theory, reasoning that it implies a contradictory compresence of past, present and future in the same entity. | + | [[Ghosaka]] is attributed with the view of “change of aspect” (laksana-pari- [[nama]]), which asserts that entities have three {{Wiki|temporal}} aspects or qualities (laksanas)—pastness, presentness and futurity. A {{Wiki|future}} [[entity]] is merely an [[entity]] that is appearing under its {{Wiki|future}} aspect and hiding its {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|present}} aspects. The [[Kosa]] rejects this {{Wiki|theory}}, {{Wiki|reasoning}} that it implies a [[contradictory]] compresence of {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}} in the same [[entity]]. |
− | Frauwallner observes that the last two theories, the views of Vasumitra and Buddhadeva, account for time exclusively in terms of external connection, most likely in an attempt to avoid the difficulties inherent in Dharmatrata’s and Ghosaka’s substance-oriented theories of time. | + | {{Wiki|Frauwallner}} observes that the last two theories, the [[views]] of [[Vasumitra]] and [[Buddhadeva]], account for time exclusively in terms of external [[connection]], most likely in an attempt to avoid the difficulties [[inherent]] in Dharmatrata’s and Ghosaka’s substance-oriented theories of time. |
− | Buddhadeva proposes a relational theory of time, where temporality is accounted for as a change of contingency (apeksa-parinama'). Change is governed by a tenseless binary relation between entites (dharmas), such as “r is earlier than y,” that imposes a partial order upon them. An examination of the Kosa’s refutation of the theory of Buddhadeva reveals it to be identical to the classic McTaggart argument against the reality of time. If events are ordered by a two-term relation into what amounts to a McTaggart B-series, then each event comes to have all of the McTaggart A- determinant properties—the present moment is also future because it is later than another moment, and past because it is earlier than a later moment. The Vaibhasika deployment of McTaggart argument against temporal order drops a strong hint about the developmental trajectory of Abhidharmika views on the reality of time. | + | [[Buddhadeva]] proposes a relational {{Wiki|theory}} of time, where temporality is accounted for as a change of contingency (apeksa-parinama'). Change is governed by a tenseless binary [[relation]] between entites ([[dharmas]]), such as “r is earlier than y,” that imposes a partial order upon them. An {{Wiki|examination}} of the Kosa’s refutation of the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[Buddhadeva]] reveals it to be [[identical]] to the classic McTaggart argument against the [[reality]] of time. If events are ordered by a two-term [[relation]] into what amounts to a McTaggart B-series, then each event comes to have all of the McTaggart A- determinant properties—the {{Wiki|present}} [[moment]] is also {{Wiki|future}} because it is later than another [[moment]], and {{Wiki|past}} because it is earlier than a later [[moment]]. The [[Vaibhasika]] deployment of McTaggart argument against {{Wiki|temporal}} order drops a strong hint about the developmental trajectory of [[Abhidharmika]] [[views]] on the [[reality]] of time. |
− | The theory of Vasumitra is described as “change of position” (avastha-pari- nama). The Kosa’s explanation and critique of the four Vaibhasika theories of time concludes that the theory of Vasumitra is the correct view. | + | The {{Wiki|theory}} of [[Vasumitra]] is described as “change of position” (avastha-pari- [[nama]]). The Kosa’s explanation and critique of the four [[Vaibhasika]] theories of time concludes that the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[Vasumitra]] is the [[correct view]]. |
− | Frauwallner conjectures that the positional theory is a conglomerate of two contradictory theories of temporality—each proposed by a scholar named Vasumitra—which were conflated in later doxography. He points out that the abacus analogy used to show the intent of the theory logically excludes the ideas of efficiency and change.But the assumption that Indian Buddhist doxographers conflated two different Vasumitras is scarcely credible, especially not when it comes to such a central theme in the Vaibhasika philosophy of time. It is more reasonable to hypothesize that the conglomeration of seemingly contradictory views was a synthesis attempted by a single scholar. | + | {{Wiki|Frauwallner}} conjectures that the positional {{Wiki|theory}} is a conglomerate of two [[contradictory]] theories of temporality—each proposed by a [[scholar]] named Vasumitra—which were conflated in later {{Wiki|doxography}}. He points out that the abacus analogy used to show the intent of the {{Wiki|theory}} [[logically]] excludes the [[ideas]] of efficiency and change.But the assumption that [[Indian Buddhist]] [[Wikipedia:Doxography|doxographers]] conflated two different Vasumitras is scarcely credible, especially not when it comes to such a central theme in the [[Vaibhasika]] [[philosophy]] of time. It is more reasonable to hypothesize that the conglomeration of seemingly [[contradictory]] [[views]] was a {{Wiki|synthesis}} attempted by a single [[scholar]]. |
− | The general scheme of Vasumitra’s synthesis as I conceive it is that of strongly reductionist reformulation of the concept of time in terms of change and causality. Temporality itself is effective action in the infinitive, and the tenses past, present and future are the modal positions of this “causal arrow.” An entity is real iff it is effective, which holds for any of the following three cases: its efficiency is actually being discharged (present), if it is possible for its efficiency to be discharged (future), or if it is not possible for its efficiency to be discharged (past). The temporal position of a future or past entity in other words depends on whether it is possible or impossible for the entity to discharge an effect. Moreover, the position is considered to be external to the entity, rather than a property or accident of it—in other words, it is the entity’s modal context. Past and future entities are held to exist de re. | + | The general scheme of [[Vasumitra’s]] {{Wiki|synthesis}} as I [[conceive]] it is that of strongly reductionist reformulation of the [[concept of time]] in terms of change and [[causality]]. Temporality itself is effective [[action]] in the infinitive, and the tenses {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}} are the modal positions of this “causal arrow.” An [[entity]] is real iff it is effective, which holds for any of the following three cases: its efficiency is actually being discharged ({{Wiki|present}}), if it is possible for its efficiency to be discharged ({{Wiki|future}}), or if it is not possible for its efficiency to be discharged ({{Wiki|past}}). The {{Wiki|temporal}} position of a {{Wiki|future}} or {{Wiki|past}} [[entity]] in other words depends on whether it is possible or impossible for the [[entity]] to [[discharge]] an effect. Moreover, the position is considered to be external to the [[entity]], rather than a property or accident of it—in other words, it is the entity’s modal context. Past and {{Wiki|future}} entities are held to [[exist]] de re. |
− | Thus, Vasumitra’s | + | Thus, [[Vasumitra’s]] “{{Wiki|temporal}} eliminativism” refines the [[philosophically]] {{Wiki|naive}} {{Wiki|eternalist}} account of time taken over from the [[Vaisesika]] [[atomism]] into a considerably more sophisticated modal account which explains how entities can meaningfully be said to [[exist]] in {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}} without resorting to metaphysicalities such as [[absolute]] time and eternal [[existence]]. [[Vasumitra’s]] account is still straightfowardly realist, but it does away with the [[dimension]] of time. |
− | A present entity is a real actuality, past and future entities are possible and impossible real actualities, respectively. The concept of substance is identified with function, and the coming into appearance of an element is explained as the presence of the necessary conditions for its function. In this, we see the idea being reflected that the criterion of reality is efficiency (arthakriyakaritva)—a basic Abhidharmic theme which is agreed upon all the way through to Cittamatra and beyond. The debate on this issue can now be crystallized around the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika defense of an externalist version of this principle. | + | A {{Wiki|present}} [[entity]] is a real [[actuality]], {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} entities are possible and impossible real actualities, respectively. The {{Wiki|concept}} of [[substance]] is identified with function, and the coming into [[appearance]] of an [[element]] is explained as the presence of the necessary [[conditions]] for its function. In this, we see the [[idea]] being reflected that the criterion of [[reality]] is efficiency (arthakriyakaritva)—a basic [[Abhidharmic]] theme which is agreed upon all the way through to [[Cittamatra]] and beyond. The [[debate]] on this issue can now be crystallized around the [[Vaibhasika]] and [[Sautrantika]] defense of an [[externalist]] version of this [[principle]]. |
− | So far from being a mistaken and inconsistent conflation of separate theories, as Frauwallner uncharitably claims, Vasumitra’s theory should be considered a novel and significant development in the Abhidharmic critique of time. | + | So far from being a mistaken and inconsistent conflation of separate theories, as {{Wiki|Frauwallner}} uncharitably claims, [[Vasumitra’s]] {{Wiki|theory}} should be considered a {{Wiki|novel}} and significant [[development]] in the [[Abhidharmic]] critique of time. |
− | Nonetheless, there remains a major philosophical tension in the theory of Vasumitra. Why is it that we only ever experience the present, if the past and future are essentially equally real? One way that Sautrantika attempts to resolve this tension is to retain Vasumitra’s modal account of time but abandon modal realism about the past and future, thus arriving at its characteristic doctrine of momentariness (ksanikavada), about which we will later have more to say. | + | Nonetheless, there remains a major [[philosophical]] tension in the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[Vasumitra]]. Why is it that we only ever [[experience]] the {{Wiki|present}}, if the {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} are [[essentially]] equally real? One way that [[Sautrantika]] attempts to resolve this tension is to retain [[Vasumitra’s]] modal account of time but abandon modal [[realism]] about the {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}}, thus arriving at its [[characteristic]] [[doctrine]] of [[momentariness]] (ksanikavada), about which we will later have more to say. |
− | Space The Vaibhasika system asserts that atoms are partless, that there are intervals of empty space (interstices) between atoms, and that the sub- stance-atoms do not touch when aggregated. This is also asserted by some Sautrantikas, e.g. by Samgharaksita. | + | [[Space]] The [[Vaibhasika]] system asserts that [[atoms]] are partless, that there are intervals of [[empty space]] (interstices) between [[atoms]], and that the sub- stance-atoms do not {{Wiki|touch}} when aggregated. This is also asserted by some [[Sautrantikas]], e.g. by Samgharaksita. |
− | However, the Sautrantika critic Yasomitra maintains that in the Vaibhasika view, substance-atoms are without the quality of impenetrability or resistance (pratighata), which entails the quality of covering or spatial extension (avarna-laksana).5e Obstruction is an emergent quality of the aggregate-atom (samghata-paramanu), as is spatial extension. The samghata-paramanu is argued by the Vaibhasika to be both extended and partless. | + | However, the [[Sautrantika]] critic [[Yasomitra]] maintains that in the Vaibhasika view, substance-atoms are without the [[quality]] of impenetrability or resistance (pratighata), which entails the [[quality]] of covering or spatial extension (avarna-laksana).5e Obstruction is an emergent [[quality]] of the aggregate-atom (samghata-paramanu), as is spatial extension. The samghata-paramanu is argued by the [[Vaibhasika]] to be both extended and partless. |
− | The Vaibhasika substance-atom resembles the view of Hume, in that Hume also takes perception to be ultimately constituted of simples or minima sensibilia: “A single visual atom, in itself, has no extension, but combinations of atoms do. The perception of an object composed of two or more atoms is complex, since it is a perception with more than one spatial part.” According to Ayer, Hume contends that the impression of any physical extension must be compounded of a finite number of mathematically pointlike sense impressions, which are concrete objects. Because these objects are partless, they are the smallest conceivable sense-data. | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] substance-atom resembles the view of [[Hume]], in that [[Hume]] also takes [[perception]] to be ultimately constituted of simples or minima sensibilia: “A single [[visual]] {{Wiki|atom}}, in itself, has no extension, but combinations of [[atoms]] do. The [[perception]] of an [[object]] composed of two or more [[atoms]] is complex, since it is a [[perception]] with more than one spatial part.” According to Ayer, [[Hume]] contends that the [[impression]] of any [[physical]] extension must be [[compounded]] of a finite number of {{Wiki|mathematically}} pointlike [[sense impressions]], which are concrete [[objects]]. Because these [[objects]] are partless, they are the smallest conceivable sense-data. |
− | Vaibhasika scholasticism defines space (akasa) in purely negative terms as absence of obstructive contact and enumerates it as one of the three uncompounded phenomena. But unlike the other Buddhist tenet systems, Vaibhasika considers space to be existent (sat), a partless, permanent substantial entity, and infinitely divisible. | + | [[Vaibhasika]] [[scholasticism]] defines [[space]] ([[akasa]]) in purely negative terms as absence of obstructive [[contact]] and enumerates it as one of the three uncompounded [[phenomena]]. But unlike the other [[Buddhist]] [[tenet]] systems, [[Vaibhasika]] considers [[space]] to be [[existent]] (sat), a partless, [[permanent]] substantial [[entity]], and infinitely divisible. |
− | Clearly, the Vaibhasika system proposes the existence of absolute space, though it still lacks an explicit notion of what one would call in the terminology of modern mathematics an intrinsic geometry or metric, a difficulty which we will return to later on in Chapter 3. | + | Clearly, the [[Vaibhasika]] system proposes the [[existence]] of [[absolute space]], though it still lacks an explicit notion of what one would call in the terminology of {{Wiki|modern}} [[mathematics]] an intrinsic geometry or metric, a difficulty which we will return to later on in [[Chapter]] 3. |
− | Atom A substance-atom (dravya-paramanu) is an irreducible sensationunit of a certain sensory type, i.e. it is visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, etc. These sensibilia are metaphysically real qualities and are objectively present in the world. In this respect, the Vaibhasika atomism can be characterized as phenomenalistic, i.e., derived from the notion of minimal perceivable magnitudes. But the idea of atoms being located in absolute space necessitates that they be somehow smaller than physiological minimal perceivable magnitudes. | + | {{Wiki|Atom}} A substance-atom (dravya-paramanu) is an irreducible sensationunit of a certain sensory type, i.e. it is [[visual]], {{Wiki|tactile}}, [[auditory]], {{Wiki|olfactory}}, etc. These sensibilia are [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] real qualities and are objectively {{Wiki|present}} in the [[world]]. In this [[respect]], the [[Vaibhasika]] [[atomism]] can be characterized as phenomenalistic, i.e., derived from the notion of minimal {{Wiki|perceivable}} magnitudes. But the [[idea]] of [[atoms]] being located in [[absolute space]] necessitates that they be somehow smaller than [[physiological]] minimal {{Wiki|perceivable}} magnitudes. |
− | The visual features of an object, e.g. a tree, should otherwise be independent of the viewer’s distance to it, which is clearly not the case—the closer we move to the tree, the more visual detail we are able to resolve. But why are the Vaibhasikas willing to sacrifice the purity of a phenomenalistic atomism of sense-minima in order to preserve a notion of absolute space? Perhaps they feel that they are making a reasonable concession to realism. To ensure that “the things we really see when we say we see a | + | The [[visual]] features of an [[object]], e.g. a [[tree]], should otherwise be independent of the viewer’s distance to it, which is clearly not the case—the closer we move to the [[tree]], the more [[visual]] detail we are able to resolve. But why are the [[Vaibhasikas]] willing to [[Wikipedia:sacrifice|sacrifice]] the [[purity]] of a phenomenalistic [[atomism]] of sense-minima in order to preserve a notion of [[absolute space]]? Perhaps they [[feel]] that they are making a reasonable concession to [[realism]]. To ensure that “the things we really see when we say we see a [[tree]]” are not {{Wiki|solipsistic}} fictions, they need to have an [[objective]] existence—and this requires a transcendentally [[objective]] [[space]] ([[akasa]]) to serve as an observer-independent frame of reference. |
− | Matilal points out an instructive comparison of Vaibhasika to the view of Ayer, who “recommends that we conceive of perceptible external objects as being literally composed of the ultimate particles of physical theory, these being imperceptible, not in principle, but only empirically, as a consequence of their being so minute.” | + | [[Matilal]] points out an instructive comparison of [[Vaibhasika]] to the view of Ayer, who “recommends that we [[conceive]] of perceptible [[external objects]] as being literally composed of the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|particles}} of [[physical]] {{Wiki|theory}}, these being imperceptible, not in [[principle]], but only [[empirically]], as a consequence of their being so minute.” |
− | According to the Vaibhasika, a dravya-paramanu never occurs in isolation. It is always a part of an aggregate-atom, or basic cluster of atomic sensory properties (samghata-paramanu). These aggregate-atoms are only perceptible in collection, although they each appear individually to the senseconsciousness. | + | According to the [[Vaibhasika]], a dravya-paramanu never occurs in isolation. It is always a part of an aggregate-atom, or basic cluster of [[atomic]] sensory properties (samghata-paramanu). These aggregate-atoms are only perceptible in collection, although they each appear individually to the senseconsciousness. |
− | The Sarvastivadin neo-orthodoxy of Sanghabhadra, as critiqued in the Kosa(A and defended in the Nyayanusara, specifies that each aggregateatom consists of a total of at least sixteen substance-atoms—each of the four sensory atoms of color, odor, taste and tangibility being accompanied by its own set of four general elemental atoms. | + | The [[Sarvastivadin]] neo-orthodoxy of [[Sanghabhadra]], as critiqued in the Kosa(A and defended in the [[Nyayanusara]], specifies that each aggregateatom consists of a total of at least sixteen substance-atoms—each of the four sensory [[atoms]] of {{Wiki|color}}, {{Wiki|odor}}, {{Wiki|taste}} and {{Wiki|tangibility}} being accompanied by its [[own]] set of four general [[elemental]] [[atoms]]. |
− | These four fundamental elements (mahabhutas) which, like all Buddhist elements, are more like force than substance, function as the intensive magnitudes of their associated aggregate-atom. The earth element represents the qualities of solidity, hardness and repulsion; the water element represents cohesion and attraction; fire corresponds to temperature and air to motion. | + | These [[four fundamental elements]] ([[mahabhutas]]) which, like all [[Buddhist]] [[elements]], are more like force than [[substance]], function as the intensive magnitudes of their associated aggregate-atom. The [[earth element]] represents the qualities of {{Wiki|solidity}}, {{Wiki|hardness}} and [[repulsion]]; the [[water element]] represents cohesion and [[attraction]]; [[fire]] corresponds to temperature and [[air]] to {{Wiki|motion}}. |
− | Every aggregate-atom contains one atom each of these four. Earth, water, fire and air are always present in equal proportion—the difference lies only in their perceptual intensity. A tiny point of light can shine dimly or brightly, steel needles are more intensely felt than the touch of a brush, etc. | + | Every aggregate-atom contains one {{Wiki|atom}} each of these four. [[Earth]], [[water]], [[fire]] and [[air]] are always {{Wiki|present}} in {{Wiki|equal}} proportion—the difference lies only in their {{Wiki|perceptual}} intensity. A tiny point of {{Wiki|light}} can shine dimly or brightly, steel needles are more intensely felt than the {{Wiki|touch}} of a brush, etc. |
− | Another variant of the Vaibhasika atomic theory is offered by the scholar Dipakara. According to this theory, the aggregate-atom is formed of a minimum of seven substance-atoms. We may hypothesize that one atom is located in the center of the aggregate’s cubic spatial “receptacle” and the six other atoms are positioned at the cube’s vertices. The minimal aggregateatom comprises one atom each of the fundamental elements (which together constitute the aggregate-atom’s tactile properties), and one substance-atom each of color, odor, and taste. | + | Another variant of the [[Vaibhasika]] [[atomic]] {{Wiki|theory}} is [[offered]] by the [[scholar]] Dipakara. According to this {{Wiki|theory}}, the aggregate-atom is formed of a minimum of seven substance-atoms. We may hypothesize that one {{Wiki|atom}} is located in the center of the aggregate’s cubic spatial “receptacle” and the six other [[atoms]] are positioned at the cube’s vertices. The minimal aggregateatom comprises one {{Wiki|atom}} each of the fundamental [[elements]] (which together constitute the aggregate-atom’s {{Wiki|tactile}} properties), and one substance-atom each of {{Wiki|color}}, {{Wiki|odor}}, and {{Wiki|taste}}. |
− | The most important points to keep in mind about this bewildering multiplicity of Vaibhasika atomic theories are that the atoms are held to have spatial extent and to be separated by interstices. Also, the shape (samsthana) of a visual atom is held to be an ultimate and can be perceived independently of color. | + | The most important points to keep in [[mind]] about this bewildering multiplicity of [[Vaibhasika]] [[atomic]] theories are that the [[atoms]] are held to have spatial extent and to be separated by interstices. Also, the shape (samsthana) of a [[visual]] {{Wiki|atom}} is held to be an [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] and can be [[perceived]] {{Wiki|independently}} of {{Wiki|color}}. |
− | The Vaibhasika system of tenets is unmistakeably phenomenalistic—all that exist are sensory qualities and their intensities. An eternal substance as is proposed by the Samkhya is denied by the Vaibhasika (with the exception of Dharmatrata). Moreover, Vaibhasika presents a full-blown reductive account of sensation, where the likeness of a macroscopic physical object is simply identified with the spatial arrangement of a vast number of elementary sensation-particulars or microscopic tropes. In other words, this assembly of spatiotemporally determinate, mind-independent micro-tropes is what we actually have commerce with when we think we are perceiving a macroscopic physical object. The world is built up out of the epistem- ically and ontologically ultimate bits and pieces given in immediate sensory experience. | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] system of [[tenets]] is unmistakeably phenomenalistic—all that [[exist]] are sensory qualities and their intensities. An [[eternal substance]] as is proposed by the [[Samkhya]] is denied by the [[Vaibhasika]] (with the exception of [[Dharmatrata]]). Moreover, [[Vaibhasika]] presents a full-blown {{Wiki|reductive}} account of [[sensation]], where the likeness of a macroscopic [[physical object]] is simply identified with the spatial arrangement of a vast number of elementary sensation-particulars or microscopic tropes. In other words, this assembly of spatiotemporally {{Wiki|determinate}}, mind-independent micro-tropes is what we actually have commerce with when we think we are perceiving a macroscopic [[physical object]]. The [[world]] is built up out of the epistem- ically and [[ontologically]] [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] bits and pieces given in immediate [[sensory experience]]. |
− | Therefore, although the Vaibhasika are considered by Buddhist doxog- raphy to be a substantialist school, the somewhat paradoxical situation obtains that the Vaibhasika substances are equivalent to the sense-data themselves. Substance is completely identical to trope—a sense-datum requires no further substrate. In this particular respect, the Vaibhasika mosaic theory is closer to the hypothetical “original | + | Therefore, although the [[Vaibhasika]] are considered by [[Buddhist]] doxog- raphy to be a substantialist school, the somewhat {{Wiki|paradoxical}} situation obtains that the [[Vaibhasika]] {{Wiki|substances}} are {{Wiki|equivalent}} to the sense-data themselves. [[Substance]] is completely [[identical]] to trope—a sense-datum requires no further substrate. In this particular [[respect]], the [[Vaibhasika]] mosaic {{Wiki|theory}} is closer to the {{Wiki|hypothetical}} “original {{Wiki|flavor}}” of early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} than its critical refinement, the [[Sautrantika]], which moves away from the phenomenalizing [[idea]] of the simple as a sensory [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] in favor of a progressive account of the constitution of [[physical objects]]. |
− | Though in many ways a compromise with physical realism, the Vaibhasika system is by deliberate design far too reductionistic to qualify as a truly | + | Though in many ways a compromise with [[physical]] [[realism]], the [[Vaibhasika]] system is by deliberate design far too reductionistic to qualify as a truly “{{Wiki|naive}}” [[physical]] [[realism]] such as [[Nyaya-Vaisesika]], which asserts the [[real existence]] of wholes, universals and [[actions]]. |
− | The Vaibhasika propose a quintessentially Buddhist solution to the qualia problem. Their atomizing, objectivizing phenomenalist reductionism simply denies that sensations have any intrinsic subjectivity in the ultimate view. To Vaibhasika, “raw | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] propose a quintessentially [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|solution}} to the {{Wiki|qualia}} problem. Their atomizing, objectivizing phenomenalist {{Wiki|reductionism}} simply denies that [[sensations]] have any intrinsic [[subjectivity]] in the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] view. To [[Vaibhasika]], “raw [[feels]]” such as minute flashes of {{Wiki|color}}, {{Wiki|tactile}} pin-pricks etc, are wholly public, mind-independent and [[objective]]. [[Vaibhasika]] argues the notion that sensation-atoms are somehow private to the perceiving [[consciousness]] to be an egological error. |
− | ==2.4.2 Critical Review of Vaibhasika Presentationalism== | + | ==2.4.2 Critical Review of [[Vaibhasika]] Presentationalism== |
− | In the debate on time in the fifth chapter of Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary to the Kosa, the Sautrantika takes the Vaibhasika to task over the sarvam asti thesis and the notion of karitra. Among other criticisms, the Sautrantika interlocutor denies the intelligibility of the Vaibhasika’s claim that past and future entities exist in the same sense as present entities. That Vasumitra’s theory should pose many difficulties in this regard is unsurprising, as in the terminology of modern logic, assertion of the existence of past and future entities would entail quantification into modal context. The Sautrantika also argues against the Vaibhasika ideas that future existents come into appearance by entering the scope of the present, and that the time of an entity is something separate from the entity itself. In analogy to A. N. Prior’s ideas about the logic of time, the Sautrantika would simply eliminate the metaphysical distinctions between the temporal status of an entity, its function, and its intrinsic nature. | + | In the [[debate]] on time in the fifth [[chapter]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] auto-commentary to the [[Kosa]], the [[Sautrantika]] takes the [[Vaibhasika]] to task over the [[sarvam asti]] {{Wiki|thesis}} and the notion of [[karitra]]. Among other {{Wiki|criticisms}}, the [[Sautrantika]] interlocutor denies the intelligibility of the Vaibhasika’s claim that {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} entities [[exist]] in the same [[sense]] as {{Wiki|present}} entities. That [[Vasumitra’s]] {{Wiki|theory}} should pose many difficulties in this regard is unsurprising, as in the {{Wiki|terminology}} of [[modern logic]], [[assertion]] of the [[existence]] of {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} entities would entail quantification into modal context. The [[Sautrantika]] also argues against the [[Vaibhasika]] [[ideas]] that {{Wiki|future}} [[existents]] come into [[appearance]] by entering the scope of the {{Wiki|present}}, and that the time of an [[entity]] is something separate from the [[entity]] itself. In analogy to A. N. Prior’s [[ideas]] about the [[logic]] of time, the [[Sautrantika]] would simply eliminate the [[metaphysical]] {{Wiki|distinctions}} between the {{Wiki|temporal}} {{Wiki|status}} of an [[entity]], its function, and its [[intrinsic nature]]. |
− | Later on in the debate, the Sautrantika presses the Vaibhasika to concede that the intentional object (visaya) of a cognition can be a Meinongian absistent (Gegebenheit)'. “Thus it is that both existence and non-existence may be objects of cognition.” If cognitions about irrealia are not admitted, he reasons, many absurdities result—such that if one desires not to hear an unpronounced word, one would be compelled to actually pronounce the word in order to satisfy externalism about intentionality. However, if the Vaibhasika yields to some version of Brentano’s thesis of intentional inexistence, then it becomes much more difficult for him to resist the Sautrantika’s fictionalism about past and future entities. As against existence in past, present and future, the Sautrantika is advancing a version of Augustine’s view that “the present of things past is in memory; the present of things present is in intuition; the present of things future is in expectation.” | + | Later on in the [[debate]], the [[Sautrantika]] presses the [[Vaibhasika]] to concede that the intentional [[object]] ([[visaya]]) of a [[cognition]] can be a Meinongian absistent (Gegebenheit)'. “Thus it is that both [[existence]] and [[non-existence]] may be [[objects of cognition]].” If [[cognitions]] about irrealia are not admitted, he [[reasons]], many absurdities result—such that if one [[desires]] not to hear an unpronounced [[word]], one would be compelled to actually pronounce the [[word]] in order to satisfy {{Wiki|externalism}} about {{Wiki|intentionality}}. However, if the Vaibhasika yields to some version of Brentano’s {{Wiki|thesis}} of intentional inexistence, then it becomes much more difficult for him to resist the Sautrantika’s fictionalism about {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} entities. As against [[existence]] in {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}}, the [[Sautrantika]] is advancing a version of Augustine’s view that “the {{Wiki|present}} of things {{Wiki|past}} is in [[memory]]; the {{Wiki|present}} of things {{Wiki|present}} is in [[intuition]]; the {{Wiki|present}} of things {{Wiki|future}} is in expectation.” |
− | There are problems in reconciling the Vaibhasika of objective sense-data with phenomenalism—it is difficult to conceive of a reasonable account of the existence of unsensed sensibilia that does not make liberal use of counterfactuals. If we lock a blue ball into a lightproof black box, surely it is ridiculous to say that the ball is blue even inside the box where there is no light and nobody can see it—what we mean is something of the sort that, given the same perceptual conditions inside the box as outside, if we were able to see the ball, it would be blue. | + | There are problems in reconciling the [[Vaibhasika]] of [[objective]] sense-data with phenomenalism—it is difficult to [[conceive]] of a reasonable account of the [[existence]] of unsensed sensibilia that does not make liberal use of counterfactuals. If we lock a blue ball into a lightproof black box, surely it is ridiculous to say that the ball is blue even inside the box where there is no {{Wiki|light}} and nobody can see it—what we mean is something of the sort that, given the same {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[conditions]] inside the box as outside, if we were able to see the ball, it would be blue. |
− | Ayer cogently observes that there are no empirical means of settling the question as to whether or not sense-data can exist while they are not being apprehended. Another Ayerian objection to the Vaibhasika position would be that that a phenomenalist who speaks of sensibilia as having a distinct existence in space and time has not fully carried out his program—his so- called sensibilia are merely physical objects in disguise.Pyle raises the concern that a theory of perception predicated upon a mereological nihilism about compound bodies cannot be realist in the strict | + | Ayer cogently observes that there are no [[empirical]] means of settling the question as to whether or not sense-data can [[exist]] while they are not being apprehended. Another Ayerian objection to the [[Vaibhasika]] position would be that that a phenomenalist who speaks of sensibilia as having a {{Wiki|distinct}} [[existence]] in {{Wiki|space and time}} has not fully carried out his program—his so- called sensibilia are merely [[physical objects]] in disguise.Pyle raises the [[concern]] that a {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] predicated upon a mereological [[nihilism]] about compound [[bodies]] cannot be realist in the strict [[sense]]— if the [[existence]] of compounds is denied, the explanandum of the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|theory}} is lost and the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] must be construed as an “error—theory” about why we hold mistaken [[views]] when we see macroscopic [[objects]]. However, this objection is not really a problem for the [[Vaibhasika]] since he intends to propose an error-theory of [[perception]]. |
− | Yasomitra’s critique of the Vaibhasika atom concept in his commentary of the Kosa is an anticipation of Vasubandhu’s critique in the Vimsatika-. “In the Abhidharmakosa and in Yasomitra’s commentary, the | + | [[Yasomitra’s]] critique of the [[Vaibhasika]] {{Wiki|atom}} {{Wiki|concept}} in his commentary of the [[Kosa]] is an anticipation of [[Vasubandhu’s]] critique in the [[Vimsatika]]-. “In the [[Abhidharmakosa]] and in [[Yasomitra’s]] commentary, the [[Sautrantikas]]— who refused to accept that conglomerate [[atoms]] were without parts—then pressed the [[Vaibhasikas]]. They asked them how it could be that if none of the [[substance]] [[atoms]] were extended in [[space]] and if none of them [[offered]] any resistance, how could many together do this? How could one put together many [[atoms]] that took up no [[space]] and obtain something with any extension at all?” |
− | Although atoms are said to be directly observable, they are not evident to ordinary perception, like houses, pots and trees. The atom therefore remains a metaphysical construction, and if it is admitted that the existence of atoms is only known by inference (anumana) to the best explanation, then who is to say that there cannot be some other, better explanation for phenomenal appearances? This Mind-Only critique will form a part of Vasubandhu’s argument against the Vaibhasika position later on in Chapter 3. For the idea that atoms are observables only collectively but not individually comes very close to a causal theory of perception. | + | Although [[atoms]] are said to be directly observable, they are not evident to [[ordinary perception]], like houses, pots and [[trees]]. The {{Wiki|atom}} therefore remains a [[metaphysical]] construction, and if it is admitted that the [[existence]] of [[atoms]] is only known by {{Wiki|inference}} ([[anumana]]) to the best explanation, then who is to say that there cannot be some other, better explanation for [[phenomenal]] [[appearances]]? This [[Mind-Only]] critique will [[form]] a part of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against the [[Vaibhasika]] position later on in [[Chapter]] 3. For the [[idea]] that [[atoms]] are observables only collectively but not individually comes very close to a causal {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]]. |
− | As Matilal puts the Mind-Only argument—“If the so-called atoms generate perceptions out of their own power, why are they not also grasped in such perceptions?” But as ultra-nominalists, the Vaibhasika have no other choice but to defend a doctrine of homeomeria.™ Vaibhasika encounters the difficulty that it wishes to maintain on the one hand that the atomic sensations are sensed directly, yet on the other hand claims that they are sensed only in aggregate. The Vaibhasikas assert that an isolated minute particle is not an object of a sense-consciousness, nor is it the composite as a whole, as composites are merely imputed collection-generalities (gana-samanya) | + | As [[Matilal]] puts the [[Mind-Only]] argument—“If the so-called [[atoms]] generate [[perceptions]] out of their [[own]] power, why are they not also grasped in such [[perceptions]]?” But as ultra-nominalists, the [[Vaibhasika]] have no other choice but to defend a [[doctrine]] of homeomeria.™ [[Vaibhasika]] encounters the difficulty that it wishes to maintain on the one hand that the [[atomic]] sensations are [[sensed]] directly, yet on the other hand claims that they are [[sensed]] only in [[aggregate]]. The [[Vaibhasikas]] assert that an isolated minute {{Wiki|particle}} is not an [[object]] of a [[sense-consciousness]], nor is it the composite as a whole, as composites are merely [[imputed]] collection-generalities (gana-samanya) |
− | In this critique, which will be the critique of Vasubandhu, we find a close affinity to Mach’s rejection of atomism due to his skepticism about imperceptible entities: “All his life, Mach was never able to make friends with the atomistic corpuscle theory. In discussions, whenever anybody presumed the existence of atoms as a matter of course—and we may assume that this happened quite frequently—he irascibly interjected: ‘Have you ever seen one?’ (‘Hams ans g’sehn?’)” | + | In this critique, which will be the critique of [[Vasubandhu]], we find a close [[affinity]] to Mach’s rejection of [[atomism]] due to his {{Wiki|skepticism}} about imperceptible entities: “All his [[life]], Mach was never able to make friends with the atomistic corpuscle {{Wiki|theory}}. In discussions, whenever anybody presumed the [[existence]] of [[atoms]] as a {{Wiki|matter}} of course—and we may assume that this happened quite frequently—he irascibly interjected: ‘Have you ever seen one?’ (‘Hams ans g’sehn?’)” |
− | The purpose of physics, according to Mach, is not to determine the fundamental ontological constituents of reality, but rather, to explore and describe the functional relationships between the elements given to experience. To Mach, it would be an unforgivable case of metaphysical confusion to conflate sensations (the “given” or sensory core of experience) with atoms (ontological ultimates). | + | The {{Wiki|purpose}} of [[physics]], according to Mach, is not to determine the fundamental [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] constituents of [[reality]], but rather, to explore and describe the functional relationships between the [[elements]] given to [[experience]]. To Mach, it would be an unforgivable case of [[metaphysical]] [[confusion]] to conflate [[sensations]] (the “given” or sensory core of [[experience]]) with [[atoms]] ([[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] ultimates). |
− | The Vaibhasika account of shape is deeply counterintuitive. Why is it that individual atoms come to be attributed with a substantial shape which is however imperceptible, whereas the perceptible shape of macroscopic objects is held to be merely conceptually imputed? Wouldn’t it be more reasonable to argue that perceptible shapes are real and imperceptible shapes are imputed? | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] account of shape is deeply {{Wiki|counterintuitive}}. Why is it that {{Wiki|individual}} [[atoms]] come to be attributed with a substantial shape which is however imperceptible, whereas the perceptible shape of macroscopic [[objects]] is held to be merely conceptually [[imputed]]? Wouldn’t it be more reasonable to argue that perceptible shapes are real and imperceptible shapes are [[imputed]]? |
− | Finally, realistic presentationalism is uncomfortably vulnerable to argument from illusion—how to say, for example, that a stick partly submerged in a glass of water only appears to be bent? | + | Finally, {{Wiki|realistic}} presentationalism is uncomfortably vulnerable to argument from illusion—how to say, for example, that a stick partly submerged in a glass of [[water]] only appears to be bent? |
− | A radical phenomenalist of the Machian stripe argues that there is really no such thing as illusion, or rather, that it is not possible to draw a metaphysical distinction between illusion and veridical perception. For him, the entire issue of illusion is a pseudo-problem of the metaphysical realist— whenever we speak of illusion, we can be sure that something metaphysical is cooking. Similarly, wherever the epistemic reductionist may go, the hobgoblins of emergent properties and behaviors follow not far behind. | + | A radical phenomenalist of the Machian stripe argues that there is really no such thing as [[illusion]], or rather, that it is not possible to draw a metaphysical {{Wiki|distinction}} between [[illusion]] and veridical [[perception]]. For him, the entire issue of [[illusion]] is a pseudo-problem of the [[metaphysical]] realist— whenever we speak of [[illusion]], we can be sure that something [[metaphysical]] is cooking. Similarly, wherever the {{Wiki|epistemic}} reductionist may go, the hobgoblins of emergent properties and behaviors follow not far behind. |
− | + | “[[Illusion]]” is unreal—or so we believe. It is an explanation for what is happening when the {{Wiki|synthetic}} [[activity]] of [[sensory perception]] generates some epistemically ungrounded [[percept]]. Except for deceiving us, the [[illusion]] is [[causally]] inert. “[[Emergence]],” however, is quite real—or so we suspect. It is our account for what is happening when dynamic interaction of a [[physical]] system generates some [[ontologically]] irreducible property. Here, a radical phenomenalist not committed to [[realism]] will argue that [[illusion]] and [[emergence]] are [[philosophical]] enantiomorphs. As soon as we draw a metaphysical divide between the {{Wiki|epistemic}} [[subject]] and the [[object]], the problem of [[illusion]] rears its ugly head on the side of the [[subjective]] constitution of [[experience]] and the problem of [[emergence]] arises on the side of the [[objective]] constitution. | |
− | The Vaibhasika will insist that it is all a matter of finding the “predetermined breaking point” between the subject and the object. He will argue that there cannot be such a thing as an illusion of a tree, because | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] will insist that it is all a {{Wiki|matter}} of finding the “predetermined breaking point” between the [[subject]] and the [[object]]. He will argue that there cannot be such a thing as an [[illusion]] of a [[tree]], because “[[tree]]” is merely a {{Wiki|linguistic}} and {{Wiki|conceptual}} convention [[imputed]] to some patches of {{Wiki|color}} that we see. But how to account for the fact that these colored blobs are spatiotemporally correlated with certain {{Wiki|tactile}} [[sensations]] of roughness when we attempt to {{Wiki|touch}} the trunk of the [[tree]]? The things that we are [[seeing]] and the things that we are [[touching]], the [[Vaibhasika]] explains, are the same things—our sensory [[awareness]] is making direct [[contact]] with the [[visual]] and {{Wiki|tactile}} sensation-atoms are objectively located in [[space]] and [[exist]] {{Wiki|independently}} of our [[awareness]]. When we close our [[eyes]], where do the colored blobs go? They don’t go anywhere, the [[Vaibhasika]] avers—they are still out there in [[space]], but our sensory [[awareness]] simply loses [[contact]] with them. But this account is badly vulnerable to argument from hallucination—where do the pink rats go when one closes one’s [[eyes]]? |
− | To preserve external world realism, the Vaibhasika must concede the possibility of illusion and attempt to explain it as an error of perceptual synthesis. Without perceptual synthesis, it is difficult to account even for cases of “veridical” perception. For example, the problem of inferring a visual object’s shape from its two-dimensional projection does not admit to a unique solution. This intractable problem is converted into a solvable one by adding hard-wired assumptions about how the world is usually put together. Sensory illusions arise in cases where these a priori assumptions are violated. | + | To preserve [[external world]] [[realism]], the [[Vaibhasika]] must concede the possibility of [[illusion]] and attempt to explain it as an error of {{Wiki|perceptual}} {{Wiki|synthesis}}. Without {{Wiki|perceptual}} {{Wiki|synthesis}}, it is difficult to account even for cases of “veridical” [[perception]]. For example, the problem of inferring a [[visual]] object’s shape from its two-dimensional projection does not admit to a unique {{Wiki|solution}}. This intractable problem is converted into a solvable one by adding hard-wired {{Wiki|assumptions}} about how the [[world]] is usually put together. {{Wiki|Sensory}} [[illusions]] arise in cases where these {{Wiki|a priori}} {{Wiki|assumptions}} are violated. |
− | But perceptual synthesis is exactly what the Vaibhasika direct realist account of perception wishes to deny—it argues that in non-conceptual perception, we see things as they actually are, and that we are only making a conceptual imputation (prajhapti) when we think we see a gross physical object. | + | But {{Wiki|perceptual}} {{Wiki|synthesis}} is exactly what the [[Vaibhasika]] direct realist account of [[perception]] wishes to deny—it argues that in [[non-conceptual]] [[perception]], we see things as they actually are, and that we are only making a {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[imputation]] (prajhapti) when we think we see a gross [[physical object]]. |
− | ==2.5 The Sautrantika School== | + | ==2.5 The [[Sautrantika School]]== |
− | An important feature of the philosophical program of the Sautrantika school as we construe it here is to attempt to reconcile the basic principle of empiricism (that knowledge arises from experience and is limited to the realm of experience) with the discovery of the synthetic character of empirical knowledge, i.e. the realization that its constitution is dependent upon categories and assumptions not present in immediate experience. | + | An important feature of the [[philosophical]] program of the [[Sautrantika school]] as we construe it here is to attempt to reconcile the basic [[principle]] of empiricism (that [[knowledge]] arises from [[experience]] and is limited to the [[realm]] of [[experience]]) with the discovery of the {{Wiki|synthetic}} [[character]] of [[empirical]] knowledge, i.e. the [[realization]] that its constitution is [[dependent upon]] categories and {{Wiki|assumptions}} not {{Wiki|present}} in immediate [[experience]]. |
− | In this regard, its representationalist epistemology closely accords with the familiar Kantian program of critical realism, which posits that it is necessary to make a priori posits that are epistemically prior to the content of experience; but that such metaphysics is only possible if it is strictly limited to the deduction of the conditions of possible experience. | + | In this regard, its representationalist epistemology closely accords with the familiar [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] program of [[critical realism]], which posits that it is necessary to make {{Wiki|a priori}} posits that are epistemically prior to the content of [[experience]]; but that such [[metaphysics]] is only possible if it is strictly limited to the deduction of the [[conditions]] of possible [[experience]]. |
− | Of all the schools of Indian philosophy, the Sautrantika was the only one to take such a Kantian turn. The reason for this unique ideo-historical development can only be that Sautrantika was attempting to address the same philosophical challenge as Kant—the need to critically reformulate empiricist realism in such a way as to avoid surrendering realism about a mind-independent world. | + | Of all the schools of [[Indian philosophy]], the [[Sautrantika]] was the only one to take such a [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] turn. The [[reason]] for this unique ideo-historical [[development]] can only be that [[Sautrantika]] was attempting to address the same [[philosophical]] challenge as Kant—the need to critically reformulate [[empiricist]] [[realism]] in such a way as to avoid surrendering [[realism]] about a mind-independent [[world]]. |
− | Chatterjee observes that Sautrantika is not so much a new philosophy as the critical analysis of the implications of the Sarvastivada realism. “The Sautrantika must be understood as Sarvastivada itself, aware of its own logical basis. They are not two schools, but two phases of the same metaphysical pattern.” | + | [[Chatterjee]] observes that [[Sautrantika]] is not so much a new [[philosophy]] as the critical analysis of the implications of the [[Sarvastivada]] [[realism]]. “The Sautrantika must be understood as [[Sarvastivada]] itself, {{Wiki|aware}} of its [[own]] [[logical]] basis. They are not two schools, but two phases of the same [[metaphysical]] pattern.” |
− | Though Sautrantika must also be considered an Abhidharmic school, its critical turn of the Abhidharmic pattern forced some important doctrinal points of difference to the Vaibhasika concerning the understanding of Abhi- dharma. The dogmatic presentation of the original seven texts of Abhid- harma dating approximately to the 2nd century BCE as the revealed word of the Buddha needed to be called into question. The Sautrantika strategy for resolving this dilemma was to argue that while Abhidharma existed, it was in fact diffused throughout the sutras. The Sautrantikas held that the independent set of seven core scriptures known as the Abhidharma could not lay claim to being categorically valid word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) taking precedence over interpretations conforming to the sutras in case of any conflict between the two. | + | Though [[Sautrantika]] must also be considered an [[Abhidharmic]] school, its critical turn of the [[Abhidharmic]] pattern forced some important [[doctrinal]] points of difference to the [[Vaibhasika]] concerning the [[understanding]] of [[Abhi]]- [[dharma]]. The [[dogmatic]] presentation of the original seven texts of Abhid- harma dating approximately to the 2nd century BCE as the revealed [[word of the Buddha]] needed to be called into question. The [[Sautrantika]] strategy for resolving this {{Wiki|dilemma}} was to argue that while [[Abhidharma]] existed, it was in fact diffused throughout the [[sutras]]. The [[Sautrantikas]] held that the {{Wiki|independent}} set of seven core [[scriptures]] known as the [[Abhidharma]] could not lay claim to being categorically valid [[word of the Buddha]] ([[buddhavacana]]) taking precedence over interpretations conforming to the [[sutras]] in case of any conflict between the two. |
− | Having liberated themselves in this way from the straitjacket of dogmatic scholasticism, the Sautrantika epistemologists were able to articulate two important doctrinal innovations over the system of the Vaibhasikas—the theory of presentism and the causal theory of perception. | + | Having {{Wiki|liberated}} themselves in this way from the straitjacket of [[dogmatic]] [[scholasticism]], the [[Sautrantika]] [[epistemologists]] were able to articulate two important [[doctrinal]] innovations over the system of the Vaibhasikas—the {{Wiki|theory}} of presentism and the causal {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]]. |
− | Della Santina remarks that the Sautrantika emphasis of of the role of conceptualization, or discrimination (vikalpa) is connected to their critique of the Vaibhasika category system. Synthesis now begins to fill in for many factors of experience that were previously claimed to be objective realities: “They rejected the independent, objective reality of many of the factors the Vaibhashikas accepted, ascribing these dharmas to the functioning of discrimination or imagination. This goes some way toward the standpoint of the Mind-Only school, which eventually denied the objective reality of all objects and affirmed the sole reality of mind.” | + | [[Della Santina]] remarks that the [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|emphasis}} of of the role of [[conceptualization]], or {{Wiki|discrimination}} ([[vikalpa]]) is connected to their critique of the [[Vaibhasika]] category system. Synthesis now begins to fill in for many factors of [[experience]] that were previously claimed to be [[objective]] [[realities]]: “They rejected the {{Wiki|independent}}, [[objective reality]] of many of the factors the [[Vaibhashikas]] accepted, ascribing these [[dharmas]] to the functioning of {{Wiki|discrimination}} or [[imagination]]. This goes some way toward the standpoint of the [[Mind-Only school]], which eventually denied the [[objective reality]] of all [[objects]] and [[affirmed]] the sole [[reality of mind]].” |
− | Like Kant, Sautrantika has become aware of the synthetic activity of the mind—however the vikalpa is construed as a synthesis of the unreal rather than the real, in keeping with the Buddhist principle of nominalism. | + | Like {{Wiki|Kant}}, [[Sautrantika]] has become {{Wiki|aware}} of the {{Wiki|synthetic}} [[activity]] of the mind—however the [[vikalpa]] is construed as a {{Wiki|synthesis}} of the unreal rather than the real, in keeping with the [[Buddhist]] [[principle]] of [[nominalism]]. |
− | Generally speaking, the division of the two truths according to the two means of valid knowledge or epistemic grounding (pramanas) recognized by the Sautrantika school relegates direct sensory perception or evidence (pratyaksa) to the level of phenomenal (samvrti) truth and inference or rational demonstration (anumana) to the noumenal (paramartha) truth. In Sautrantika, the real is given only to reason, and the correspondence (sarupya) between internal cognition and external cause is the criterion of truth. | + | Generally {{Wiki|speaking}}, the [[division]] of the [[two truths]] according to the two means of valid [[knowledge]] or {{Wiki|epistemic}} grounding ([[pramanas]]) [[recognized]] by the [[Sautrantika school]] relegates direct [[sensory perception]] or {{Wiki|evidence}} ([[pratyaksa]]) to the level of [[phenomenal]] ([[samvrti]]) [[truth]] and {{Wiki|inference}} or [[rational]] demonstration ([[anumana]]) to the [[noumenal]] ([[paramartha]]) [[truth]]. In [[Sautrantika]], the real is given only to [[reason]], and the correspondence ([[sarupya]]) between internal [[cognition]] and external [[cause]] is the criterion of [[truth]]. |
− | ==2.5.1 Time, Space and Atom in Early Sautrantika== | + | ==2.5.1 Time, [[Space]] and {{Wiki|Atom}} in Early [[Sautrantika]]== |
− | Time Even though the Sautrantika claims itself to be a reconstruction of the original sutric teachings of the Buddha, the Sautrantika doctrine of momentariness does not figure in earlier Buddhist writings and must be considered a proper innovation of the Sautrantika system. In Sautrantika, momentariness is not confined to phenomenal appearances—even ultimate truths such as substances are held to be in flux. | + | Time Even though the [[Sautrantika]] claims itself to be a reconstruction of the original [[sutric]] [[teachings of the Buddha]], the [[Sautrantika]] [[doctrine]] of [[momentariness]] does not figure in earlier [[Buddhist]] writings and must be considered a proper innovation of the [[Sautrantika]] system. In [[Sautrantika]], [[momentariness]] is not confined to [[phenomenal]] appearances—even [[ultimate truths]] such as {{Wiki|substances}} are held to be in flux. |
− | Von Rospatt traces the conceptual evolution of the instant (ksana) from the momentary interval to the time-atom (irreducible duration) to the completely durationless present in great detail, and summarizes his findings as follows: | + | Von Rospatt traces the {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[evolution]] of the instant ([[ksana]]) from the momentary {{Wiki|interval}} to the time-atom (irreducible duration) to the completely durationless {{Wiki|present}} in great detail, and summarizes his findings as follows: |
− | The usage of ksana in the sense of momentary entity documents that the change in the conception of the term ksana was brought to its logical conclusion. Starting out with the basic meaning of “very short time,” the ksana came to be understood—reflecting an atomistic conception of time—as “the shortest unit of time,” | + | The usage of [[ksana]] in the [[sense]] of momentary [[entity]] documents that the change in the {{Wiki|conception}} of the term [[ksana]] was brought to its [[logical]] conclusion. Starting out with the basic meaning of “very short time,” the [[ksana]] came to be understood—reflecting an atomistic {{Wiki|conception}} of time—as “the shortest unit of time,” |
− | the length of which came to be equated with the duration of mental entities (or transient entities in general) as the briefest conceivable events.” | + | the length of which came to be equated with the duration of [[mental]] entities (or transient entities in general) as the briefest conceivable events.” |
− | The Sautrantika view of momentariness as lack of temporal persistence can be traced to Vasubandhu’s definition in the Kosa, as von Rospatt explains: | + | The [[Sautrantika]] view of [[momentariness]] as lack of {{Wiki|temporal}} persistence can be traced to [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[definition]] in the [[Kosa]], as von Rospatt explains: |
− | To be ksanika (i.e. momentary), that is to be endowed with such a ksana, then entails according to Vasubandhu to perish immediately after having originated. Rather than defining ksanika as “being of momentary duration,” Vasubandhu in this way specifies the nature of this momentary existence and thus excludes alternative conceptions such as that of the Sarvastivadins. | + | To be [[ksanika]] (i.e. momentary), that is to be endowed with such a [[ksana]], then entails according to [[Vasubandhu]] to perish immediately after having originated. Rather than defining [[ksanika]] as “being of momentary duration,” [[Vasubandhu]] in this way specifies the [[nature]] of this momentary [[existence]] and thus excludes alternative conceptions such as that of the [[Sarvastivadins]]. |
− | The idea that a ksana has a certain fundamental thickness differing from a psychic addition may hold true for the Sarvastivada view of momentariness, but is not borne out by Sautrantika sources. | + | The [[idea]] that a [[ksana]] has a certain fundamental thickness differing from a [[psychic]] addition may hold true for the [[Sarvastivada]] view of [[momentariness]], but is not borne out by [[Sautrantika]] sources. |
− | Von Rospatt enumerates five modes of deduction that the Sautrantikas use in support of their doctrine of momentariness. The momentariness of mental entities (1) is one indication. The Sautrantika also attempt (2) to infer the momentariness of all conditioned entities from the momentariness of the mind, and (3) to deduce momentariness from change and (4) destruction. Finally, they adduce (5) the experience of momentariness itself. | + | Von Rospatt enumerates five modes of deduction that the [[Sautrantikas]] use in support of their [[doctrine]] of [[momentariness]]. The [[momentariness]] of [[mental]] entities (1) is one indication. The [[Sautrantika]] also attempt (2) to infer the [[momentariness]] of all [[conditioned]] entities from the [[momentariness]] of the [[mind]], and (3) to deduce [[momentariness]] from change and (4) destruction. Finally, they adduce (5) the [[experience]] of [[momentariness]] itself. |
− | Presentism is a doctrine unique to the Sautrantika school (and to Mind- Only, which inherited many Sautrantika doctrines). It is not to be found in classical and medieval Western philosophy, with the exception of the Cyrenaic school. | + | Presentism is a [[doctrine]] unique to the [[Sautrantika school]] (and to [[Mind]]- Only, which inherited many [[Sautrantika]] [[doctrines]]). It is not to be found in classical and {{Wiki|medieval}} {{Wiki|Western philosophy}}, with the exception of the Cyrenaic school. |
− | Since Sautrantika does not admit the existence of past and future entities, all that remains of the temporal sequence of past, present, and future is the principle of continuous, universal flux (samtanai—a dynamic but durationless “momentary now” or “eternal | + | Since [[Sautrantika]] does not admit the [[existence]] of {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} entities, all that remains of the {{Wiki|temporal}} sequence of {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}}, and future is the [[principle]] of continuous, [[universal]] flux (samtanai—a dynamic but durationless “momentary now” or “eternal {{Wiki|present}}” where [[phenomena]] are continuously in the process of [[arising]] or perishing, but never actually persist for any length of time whatsoever. The {{Wiki|present}} [[moment]] is a “vanishing present”—both streaming and [[standing]], like the Jamesian “specious {{Wiki|present}}” or Husserl’s “immanent temporality.” [[Wikipedia:Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl|Husserl]] writes that the subjectively constituted concreta arise from the immanent temporality as the lowermost streaming ground of concreteness. The [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|theory}} of time may be [[conceived]] as a [[form]] of “replacement presentism,” as argued convincingly by Grupp." |
− | It is important to emphasize that Sautrantika not only rejects the existence of temporal continuants, but eliminates even instantaneous existence. Phenomena and elements {dharmas) can therefore never be found as complete existents in the present—one only ever finds their arising or perishing. Garfield points out that in Madhyamika, even the domain of conventional phenomena cannot be resolved into constantly arising, constantly ceasing momentary phenomena that have inherent existence. In contrast to this Nagarjunian doctrine of total ineffability, the Sautrantika system asserts a considerably more ontological view—that there is individual arising and ceasing of ultimates, although the individual entity is always in flux. | + | It is important to {{Wiki|emphasize}} that [[Sautrantika]] not only rejects the existence of {{Wiki|temporal}} continuants, but eliminates even instantaneous [[existence]]. [[Phenomena]] and [[elements]] {[[dharmas]]) can therefore never be found as complete [[existents]] in the present—one only ever finds their [[arising]] or perishing. Garfield points out that in [[Madhyamika]], even the domain of [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[phenomena]] cannot be resolved into constantly [[arising]], constantly ceasing momentary [[phenomena]] that have [[inherent existence]]. In contrast to this [[Nagarjunian]] [[doctrine]] of total ineffability, the [[Sautrantika]] system asserts a considerably more [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] view—that there is {{Wiki|individual}} [[arising]] and ceasing of ultimates, although the {{Wiki|individual}} [[entity]] is always in flux. |
− | Space Unlike the Vaibhasikas, some Sautrantikas do not regard the experiential constituent of phenomenal space {akasa-dhatu) as a substantial entity (dravyasat). | + | [[Space]] Unlike the [[Vaibhasikas]], some [[Sautrantikas]] do not regard the experiential constituent of [[phenomenal]] [[space]] {[[akasa-dhatu]]) as a substantial [[entity]] ([[dravyasat]]). |
− | The Sautrantika view advanced by Vasubandhu in the Kosa, construes shape as a derivative property of color. As Sellars trenchantly observes, the notion of shape as existing only “by way of | + | The [[Sautrantika]] view advanced by [[Vasubandhu]] in the [[Kosa]], construes shape as a derivative property of {{Wiki|color}}. As Sellars trenchantly observes, the notion of shape as [[existing]] only “by way of [[idea]]” is a Berkeleyan one. But in [[Sautrantika]], not all spatial properties are conceptually imputed—e.g. distance is still held to be an [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]. The account of samsthana as purely a [[mental]] {{Wiki|conception}} rather than a substantial and real property in the [[Kosa]] may be a possible precursor to [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]], as it shows the beginnings of a critique of [[space]]. |
− | Aside from shape, the Sautrantika are also beginning to whittle away at the spatial interval of the atomic interstice: “The Sarvastivadins- Vaibhasikas held the view that there are intervals between the atoms of the conglomeration, while the Sautrantikas maintained that there are no intervals and yet the atoms do not touch each other.” | + | Aside from shape, the [[Sautrantika]] are also beginning to whittle away at the spatial {{Wiki|interval}} of the [[atomic]] interstice: “The [[Sarvastivadins]]- [[Vaibhasikas]] held the view that there are intervals between the [[atoms]] of the conglomeration, while the [[Sautrantikas]] maintained that there are no intervals and yet the [[atoms]] do not {{Wiki|touch}} each other.” |
− | One explanation would be that the Sautrantika held this view chiefly for apologetic reasons. If they had declared outright that the atoms touch each other, they would have been dismissed as having the view of a nonBuddhist school, the Vaisesika. This is the way Vasubandhu seems to deal with this issue in the Kosa. He argues that the Sautrantika themselves admit that it amounts to as much as touching: “Quoting an authority, Bhad- hanta, Vasubandhu says that although the atoms do not touch, when they are situated in the closest, gapless proximity we can say in words, ‘they touched’.” | + | One explanation would be that the [[Sautrantika]] held this view chiefly for apologetic [[reasons]]. If they had declared outright that the [[atoms]] {{Wiki|touch}} each other, they would have been dismissed as having the view of a nonBuddhist school, the [[Vaisesika]]. This is the way [[Vasubandhu]] seems to deal with this issue in the [[Kosa]]. He argues that the [[Sautrantika]] themselves admit that it amounts to as much as [[touching]]: “Quoting an authority, Bhad- hanta, [[Vasubandhu]] says that although the [[atoms]] do not {{Wiki|touch}}, when they are situated in the closest, gapless proximity we can say in words, ‘they touched’.” |
− | Matilal advances the explanation that the Sautrantika are claiming a potential or latent tangibility of the atoms which is actualized when they are in conglomeration, just as the latent visibility of individual atoms is actualized when they are perceived in aggregate. | + | [[Matilal]] advances the explanation that the [[Sautrantika]] are claiming a potential or latent {{Wiki|tangibility}} of the [[atoms]] which is actualized when they are in conglomeration, just as the latent visibility of {{Wiki|individual}} [[atoms]] is actualized when they are [[perceived]] in [[aggregate]]. |
− | A third explanation would be that Sautrantika held the interstice between two atoms to be mathematically infinitesimal, in other words, smaller than any possible measure. This would account for for their claim that atoms can have the seemingly contrary properties of not touching, yet not being separated. | + | A third explanation would be that [[Sautrantika]] held the interstice between two [[atoms]] to be {{Wiki|mathematically}} infinitesimal, in other words, smaller than any possible measure. This would account for for their claim that [[atoms]] can have the seemingly contrary properties of not [[touching]], yet not being separated. |
− | Atom The Sautrantika understanding of the two truths—the phenomenal (samvrti and the noumenal (paramartha) truth—bears affinities to the Cartesian dualism of the 19th century, where the atom (res extensa) is the fundamental entity of the external world and sensation (res cogitans) are the fundamental entities of the internal world, i.e. the sensory minima brought about by the impingement of atoms upon the sensory organs. The external mosaic of atoms is connected to the inner world of perception by way of the sensation, the smallest physiological unit, which covers up but at the same time reveals the external world. | + | {{Wiki|Atom}} The [[Sautrantika]] [[understanding]] of the two truths—the phenomenal ([[samvrti]] and the [[noumenal]] ([[paramartha]]) truth—bears affinities to the [[Cartesian]] [[dualism]] of the 19th century, where the {{Wiki|atom}} (res extensa) is the fundamental [[entity]] of the [[external world]] and [[sensation]] (res cogitans) are the fundamental entities of the [[internal world]], i.e. the sensory minima brought about by the impingement of [[atoms]] upon the [[sensory organs]]. The external mosaic of [[atoms]] is connected to the [[inner world]] of [[perception]] by way of the [[sensation]], the smallest [[physiological]] unit, which covers up but at the same time reveals the [[external world]]. |
− | In Sautrantika, the phenomenal or conventional truths are sensibles and the ultimate truths are intelligibles, i.e. the noumenal structures that are deduced to objectively back the perceptual flux of experience. The ultimate constituents of external objects are believed to be inferable from the “represented” forms in our awareness. Atoms are momentary (ksanika) and are given only to inference (anumana) as purely logical constructs. We are led to deduce their existence by a causal inference, as the atomic data must have caused the gross appearance (pratibhasa) in consciousness. But though this seems like an a posteriori reasoning at first glance, it is actually an a priori one. One is not drawing conclusions from the empirical to the empirical, but from the empirical to the noumenal. The atom is reasoned to be a necessary precondition to empirical knowledge. | + | In [[Sautrantika]], the [[phenomenal]] or [[conventional truths]] are sensibles and the [[ultimate truths]] are intelligibles, i.e. the [[noumenal]] structures that are deduced to objectively back the {{Wiki|perceptual}} flux of [[experience]]. The [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] constituents of [[external objects]] are believed to be inferable from the “represented” [[forms]] in our [[awareness]]. [[Atoms]] are momentary ([[ksanika]]) and are given only to {{Wiki|inference}} ([[anumana]]) as purely [[logical]] constructs. We are led to deduce their [[existence]] by a causal {{Wiki|inference}}, as the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|data}} must have [[caused]] the gross [[appearance]] ([[pratibhasa]]) in [[consciousness]]. But though this seems like an [[Wikipedia:Empirical evidence|a posteriori]] {{Wiki|reasoning}} at first glance, it is actually an {{Wiki|a priori}} one. One is not drawing conclusions from the [[empirical]] to the [[empirical]], but from the [[empirical]] to the [[noumenal]]. The {{Wiki|atom}} is reasoned to be a necessary precondition to [[empirical knowledge]]. |
− | Sautrantika thought does not have a concept directly corresponding to the Kantian notion of a priori. But inasmuch as we are justified in reconstructing Sautrantika along Kantian lines, the atom would have to be a wholly transcendental construct deriving from a priori consideration. | + | [[Sautrantika]] [[thought]] does not have a {{Wiki|concept}} directly [[corresponding]] to the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] notion of {{Wiki|a priori}}. But inasmuch as we are justified in reconstructing [[Sautrantika]] along [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] lines, the {{Wiki|atom}} would have to be a wholly [[transcendental]] construct deriving from {{Wiki|a priori}} [[consideration]]. |
− | One supporting argument for the a priori interpretation is that the Sautrantika atom is imperceptible in principle. In Sautrantika, ultimate truths are sui generis and reachable only by transcendental reasoning, not by a decompositional analysis of empirical phenomena. The Tibetan doxographer Ngawang Belden offers the example that in Sautrantika, a patch of blue is not established as a composite of external particles separate from the aspect of blue, nor is the aspect of blue a composite of external particles. The Vaibhasika atom, on the other hand, can at least in principle be isolated by empirical decomposition. It is only too minute to be individually registered (though we have already discussed the problems with this view). | + | One supporting argument for the {{Wiki|a priori}} [[interpretation]] is that the Sautrantika {{Wiki|atom}} is imperceptible in [[principle]]. In [[Sautrantika]], [[ultimate truths]] are {{Wiki|sui generis}} and reachable only by [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|reasoning}}, not by a decompositional analysis of [[empirical]] [[phenomena]]. The [[Tibetan]] doxographer [[Ngawang]] Belden offers the example that in [[Sautrantika]], a patch of blue is not established as a composite of external {{Wiki|particles}} separate from the aspect of blue, nor is the aspect of blue a composite of external {{Wiki|particles}}. The [[Vaibhasika]] {{Wiki|atom}}, on the other hand, can at least in [[principle]] be isolated by [[empirical]] decomposition. It is only too minute to be individually registered (though we have already discussed the problems with this view). |
− | Sautrantika epistemology has been compared to the representational realism of Locke. Its atomic theory is also similar in many ways to the theory of Epicurus, who also adverts to a rationally apprehended world of atoms for causal explanations of the phenomena appearing in sensory awareness. | + | [[Sautrantika]] epistemology has been compared to the representational [[realism]] of Locke. Its [[atomic]] {{Wiki|theory}} is also similar in many ways to the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[Epicurus]], who also adverts to a {{Wiki|rationally}} apprehended [[world]] of [[atoms]] for causal explanations of the [[phenomena]] appearing in sensory [[awareness]]. |
− | Clearly, Sautrantika resonates to a reasonable degree with Kantian critical realism, although the Buddhist and Kantian accounts differ considerably as to their forms of construction and categories. | + | Clearly, [[Sautrantika]] resonates to a reasonable [[degree]] with [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[critical realism]], although the [[Buddhist]] and [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] accounts differ considerably as to their [[forms]] of construction and categories. |
− | In the following, we will therefore pursue the Kantian line of interpretation and construe the Sautrantika’s inferential knowledge of the noumenal realm (paramartha-satya) to have the form of necessary a priori posits— even though there are problems with this interpretation due to anumana not having the proper technical meaning. The postulation of a necessary presupposition to knowledge would be arthapatti, which is not among the Sautrantika’s allowable pramanas. | + | In the following, we will therefore pursue the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] line of interpretation and construe the Sautrantika’s [[inferential knowledge]] of the [[noumenal]] [[realm]] ([[paramartha-satya]]) to have the [[form]] of necessary {{Wiki|a priori}} posits— even though there are problems with this [[interpretation]] due to [[anumana]] not having the proper technical meaning. The postulation of a necessary presupposition to [[knowledge]] would be [[arthapatti]], which is not among the Sautrantika’s allowable [[pramanas]]. |
− | Why does the Sautrantika system need atoms at all? The doctrine of atoms was carried over from Vaibhasika, just as the Vaibhasikas in turn had most likely inherited the doctrine from the Jainas and Vaisesikas. Also, perhaps it was considered that appearances required a substance account of causal origination in order to avert the conclusion that they are being generated ex nihilo. Finally, if the Sautrantika causal theory of perception (that mental representations are the effects of external objects) is to support an externalist reference of the intentional object (visaya), it requires that there be objective causal vectors for effective action. | + | Why does the [[Sautrantika]] system need [[atoms]] at all? The [[doctrine]] of [[atoms]] was carried over from [[Vaibhasika]], just as the [[Vaibhasikas]] in turn had most likely inherited the [[doctrine]] from the [[Jainas]] and Vaisesikas. Also, perhaps it was considered that [[appearances]] required a [[substance]] account of causal origination in order to avert the conclusion that they are being generated ex nihilo. Finally, if the [[Sautrantika]] causal {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] (that [[mental]] {{Wiki|representations}} are the effects of [[external objects]]) is to support an [[externalist]] reference of the intentional [[object]] ([[visaya]]), it requires that there be [[objective]] causal vectors for effective [[action]]. |
− | Mind (citta) in Sautrantika moreover possesses the feature of svasam- vedana (self-reflexive awareness, i.e., transcendental apperception)—but in other key respects, it is not transcendental, as the moment-to-moment arising of mind is governed by empirical causality. | + | [[Mind]] ([[citta]]) in [[Sautrantika]] moreover possesses the feature of svasam- [[vedana]] ([[self-reflexive awareness]], i.e., [[transcendental]] apperception)—but in other key respects, it is not [[transcendental]], as the moment-to-moment [[arising]] of [[mind]] is governed by [[empirical]] [[causality]]. |
− | One difficulty with the Kantian analogy is that dravya does not conform to Kant’s notion of substance. For Kant, the schema of substance is persistence through time, and we have already shown that Sautrantika does not admit dravya to possess any temporal persistence whatsoever. The Sautrantika concept of dravya would more accurately correspond to the Kantian notion of noumenon or Ding an sich, i.e. a thing as is apart from sensible or empirical intuition. But this reading, too, immediately breaks down, as the Sautrantika atom is in flux, whereas the Ding an sich is atemporal. | + | One difficulty with the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] analogy is that [[dravya]] does not conform to [[Kant’s]] notion of [[substance]]. For {{Wiki|Kant}}, the {{Wiki|schema}} of [[substance]] is persistence through time, and we have already shown that [[Sautrantika]] does not admit [[dravya]] to possess any {{Wiki|temporal}} persistence whatsoever. The [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|concept}} of [[dravya]] would more accurately correspond to the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] notion of {{Wiki|noumenon}} or [[Ding an sich]], i.e. a thing as is apart from sensible or [[empirical]] [[intuition]]. But this reading, too, immediately breaks down, as the Sautrantika {{Wiki|atom}} is in flux, whereas the [[Ding an sich]] is atemporal. |
− | Nonetheless, the existence of atoms, i.e. of intelligible simples, is given to reason by a kind of transcendental inference, as a merely empirical analysis would never suffice to establish atoms as the nonempirial objects which they are by definition intended to be. They comprise the flux of momentary atomic stimuli that causally induces tactile, visual, aural etc. sensations—from which, in turn, the mind synthesizes its phenomenal representations by way of a process of conceptual elaboration {.vikalpa). In Sautrantika thought, vikalpa generally assumes the role of synthesis, albeit an imaginatively contrived and therefore “unreal” one. | + | Nonetheless, the [[existence]] of [[atoms]], i.e. of intelligible simples, is given to [[reason]] by a kind of [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|inference}}, as a merely [[empirical]] analysis would never suffice to establish [[atoms]] as the nonempirial [[objects]] which they are by [[definition]] intended to be. They comprise the flux of momentary [[atomic]] {{Wiki|stimuli}} that [[causally]] induces {{Wiki|tactile}}, [[visual]], aural etc. sensations—from which, in turn, the [[mind]] synthesizes its [[phenomenal]] {{Wiki|representations}} by way of a process of [[conceptual elaboration]] {.[[vikalpa]]). In [[Sautrantika]] [[thought]], [[vikalpa]] generally assumes the role of {{Wiki|synthesis}}, albeit an imaginatively contrived and therefore “unreal” one. |
− | Also, if atoms are purely intelligible but not sensible, Sautrantika must rigorously separate the category of substance into rupa (variously construed as phenomenal materiality, Gestalt, or as the constituent of a perceptual datum which presents itself as objective) and dravya (the transcendentally intuited substance, that which is inferred by transcendental reasoning to be the objective basis for perception). If a dravyasat lacks temporal persistence or sensible materiality, why even call it a substance? For an existent to be intelligible may mean no more and no less than that it is a logical posit, albeit a necessary and true one. But what remains unexplained is why such a logical datum should exist independently of its being posited. | + | Also, if [[atoms]] are purely intelligible but not sensible, [[Sautrantika]] must rigorously separate the category of [[substance]] into [[rupa]] (variously construed as [[phenomenal]] [[materiality]], {{Wiki|Gestalt}}, or as the constituent of a {{Wiki|perceptual}} datum which presents itself as [[objective]]) and [[dravya]] (the transcendentally intuited [[substance]], that which is inferred by [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|reasoning}} to be the [[objective]] basis for [[perception]]). If a [[dravyasat]] lacks {{Wiki|temporal}} persistence or sensible [[materiality]], why even call it a [[substance]]? For an [[existent]] to be intelligible may mean no more and no less than that it is a [[logical]] posit, albeit a necessary and true one. But what remains unexplained is why such a [[logical]] datum should [[exist]] {{Wiki|independently}} of its being posited. |
− | ==2.5.2 Atomism in the Late Sautrantika Phase== | + | ==2.5.2 [[Atomism]] in the Late [[Sautrantika]] Phase== |
− | Gelug scholarship distinguishes between the Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning. The late phase of Sautrantika is known in the Gelug doxography as the subschool of | + | [[Gelug]] {{Wiki|scholarship}} distinguishes between the [[Followers of Scripture]] and Followers of {{Wiki|Reasoning}}. The late phase of [[Sautrantika]] is known in the [[Gelug]] {{Wiki|doxography}} as the subschool of “[[Sautrantika]] Following {{Wiki|Reasoning}}.” This sub-division of the [[Sautrantika school]] following the main system of [[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]] postulates as its [[atomic]] [[entity]] the point-instant or unique, unanalyzable unrepeatable particular ([[svalaksana]]). |
− | Chatterjee characterizes the svalaksana as an “attributive atom,” which he holds to be the atom in its truest sense. Grupp translates the svalaksana as “abstract atom.” | + | [[Chatterjee]] characterizes the [[svalaksana]] as an “attributive {{Wiki|atom}},” which he holds to be the {{Wiki|atom}} in its truest [[sense]]. Grupp translates the [[svalaksana]] as “abstract {{Wiki|atom}}.” |
− | Dharmakirti’s svalaksana may be compared to Carnap’s concept of elementary experience (Elementarerlebnis) in that they both explode the stream of experience out into unanalyzable particulars. However, the similarity ends there. For Carnap, the Elementarerlebnisse are derived by an abstractive process (the procedure of quasianalysis) and employed as constitutional elements, not asserted as metaphysical realities. Atoms are products of abstraction—the stream of experience is not intrinsically atomized in this way. For Dharmakirti, the svalaksanas are the minimal concrete particulars or “givens” of perception that the real splits itself into. As Goodman points out, a system taking concreta as atomic cannot allow qualities as atomic parts of such concreta. This difficulty is resolved by the theory that phenomenal qualities are merely superimposed on the svalaksanas as subjective constructions. The svalaksanas do not constitute anything, as is the case for the Elementarerlebnisse of Carnap’s system. Moreover, the Sautrantika Following Reasoning assert these as external (mind-independent) objects, which Carnap does not. | + | [[Dharmakirti’s]] [[svalaksana]] may be compared to Carnap’s {{Wiki|concept}} of elementary [[experience]] (Elementarerlebnis) in that they both explode the {{Wiki|stream}} of [[experience]] out into unanalyzable particulars. However, the similarity ends there. For Carnap, the Elementarerlebnisse are derived by an abstractive process (the procedure of quasianalysis) and employed as constitutional [[elements]], not asserted as [[metaphysical]] [[realities]]. [[Atoms]] are products of abstraction—the {{Wiki|stream}} of [[experience]] is not intrinsically atomized in this way. For [[Dharmakirti]], the svalaksanas are the minimal concrete particulars or “givens” of [[perception]] that the real splits itself into. As Goodman points out, a system taking concreta as [[atomic]] cannot allow qualities as [[atomic]] parts of such concreta. This difficulty is resolved by the {{Wiki|theory}} that [[phenomenal]] qualities are merely {{Wiki|superimposed}} on the svalaksanas as [[subjective]] constructions. The svalaksanas do not constitute anything, as is the case for the Elementarerlebnisse of Carnap’s system. Moreover, the Sautrantika Following {{Wiki|Reasoning}} assert these as external (mind-independent) [[objects]], which Carnap does not. |
− | The svalaksana nonetheless signals a final departure from the realism of the “substantive atom,” the latter being much closer to the common-sense view. The Sautrantika system of Dignaga and Dharmakirti postulates partless and extensionless naked particulars in a strictly instrumental fashion, as a provisional stepping-stone to the fully-fledged Yogacara view. The “attributive | + | The [[svalaksana]] nonetheless signals a final departure from the [[realism]] of the “substantive {{Wiki|atom}},” the [[latter]] being much closer to the {{Wiki|common-sense}} view. The [[Sautrantika]] system of [[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]] postulates partless and extensionless naked particulars in a strictly instrumental fashion, as a provisional stepping-stone to the fully-fledged [[Yogacara]] view. The “attributive [[atomism]]” is later in origin than [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[Vimsatika]] and is unaffected by his anti-atomist argument, for [[reasons]] that will be explained later. |
− | However, there is by no means a unanimous consensus that Dharmakirti divides time into infinitesimal or point-like instants. Oetke argues that this view is unproven, and that Dharmakirti’s views on the structure of time (whatever they may be) have no bearing on his formal proofs of momentariness in the Sattvanumana.^ | + | However, there is by no means a unanimous consensus that [[Dharmakirti]] divides time into infinitesimal or point-like instants. Oetke argues that this view is unproven, and that [[Dharmakirti’s]] [[views]] on the {{Wiki|structure}} of time (whatever they may be) have no bearing on his formal proofs of momentariness in the Sattvanumana.^ |
− | ==2.5.3 Critique of Sautrantika Representationalism== | + | ==2.5.3 Critique of [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|Representationalism}}== |
− | Passing now to criticism, one difficulty with representationalism is that it does not fully accord with radical phenomenalism. The phenomenalizing stance as expressed in the Bahiya Sutta would seem to demand a two-term or even a one-term account of perception. If in the seeing there is only the seen (etc.), then the perceived must be identified either with the representational aspect of perception (as is the case in Vijnaptimatra) or with the aggregate of the compositional constituents of perception (as in Vaibhasika)—it is not possible to have it both ways. | + | Passing now to [[criticism]], one difficulty with {{Wiki|representationalism}} is that it does not fully accord with radical {{Wiki|phenomenalism}}. The phenomenalizing stance as expressed in the [[Bahiya Sutta]] would seem to demand a two-term or even a one-term account of [[perception]]. If in the [[seeing]] there is only the seen (etc.), then the [[perceived]] must be identified either with the representational aspect of [[perception]] (as is the case in [[Vijnaptimatra]]) or with the [[aggregate]] of the compositional constituents of [[perception]] (as in Vaibhasika)—it is not possible to have it both ways. |
− | Chatterjee argues that the three-term theory is an unstable account of knowledge. Its correspondence theory of knowledge presupposes a presenta- tive account, which, however, renders the correspondence theory superfluous. | + | [[Chatterjee]] argues that the three-term {{Wiki|theory}} is an unstable account of [[knowledge]]. Its correspondence [[theory of knowledge]] presupposes a presenta- tive account, which, however, renders the correspondence {{Wiki|theory}} superfluous. |
− | Also, the novel Sautrantika doctrines of evanescence and flux fit poorly with the doctrine of atomism inherited from the Sarvastivada tradition. The Sautrantika have some difficulties in reconciling atomicity to flux, as the discrete nature of atoms would seem to break the continuity implied by absolute flux. | + | Also, the {{Wiki|novel}} [[Sautrantika]] [[doctrines]] of evanescence and flux fit poorly with the [[doctrine]] of [[atomism]] inherited from the [[Sarvastivada tradition]]. The [[Sautrantika]] have some difficulties in reconciling atomicity to flux, as the discrete [[nature]] of [[atoms]] would seem to break the continuity implied by [[absolute]] flux. |
− | If the doctrine of momentariness is made to apply to atoms, as it must be, then the atom ceases to be a static entity and becomes a wholly dynamic stimulus. It flashes into and out of existence, but does not actually persist for even the most infinitesimal moment. To use a mathematical metaphor, the atom’s process of arising and perishing might be compared to a Cauchy sequence which, though converging in the reals, fails to converge in the rationals. Despite approaching an ideal limit (the idealization of the atom qua static existent) there is never in fact any such static entity to be found at any point of time during the atom’s process of real arising and perishing. | + | If the [[doctrine]] of [[momentariness]] is made to apply to [[atoms]], as it must be, then the {{Wiki|atom}} ceases to be a static [[entity]] and becomes a wholly dynamic {{Wiki|stimulus}}. It flashes into and out of [[existence]], but does not actually persist for even the most infinitesimal [[moment]]. To use a {{Wiki|mathematical}} {{Wiki|metaphor}}, the atom’s process of [[arising]] and perishing might be compared to a Cauchy sequence which, though converging in the reals, fails to converge in the rationals. Despite approaching an {{Wiki|ideal}} limit (the idealization of the {{Wiki|atom}} qua static [[existent]]) there is never in fact any such static [[entity]] to be found at any point of time during the atom’s process of real [[arising]] and perishing. |
− | In this reconstructively purified Sautrantika view, flux and atomism are reconciled in the concept of the atom as a fundamental flux-unit, a discrete pulse of effective action (not unlike the quantum of modern physics). As a key rationale for their radical dynamization of the atomic concept, the Sautrantika offer that a static entity is by definition incapable of acting. | + | In this reconstructively [[purified]] [[Sautrantika]] view, flux and [[atomism]] are reconciled in the {{Wiki|concept}} of the {{Wiki|atom}} as a fundamental flux-unit, a discrete pulse of effective [[action]] (not unlike the {{Wiki|quantum}} of {{Wiki|modern}} [[physics]]). As a key rationale for their radical dynamization of the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|concept}}, the [[Sautrantika]] offer that a static [[entity]] is by [[definition]] incapable of acting. |
− | Vasubandhu points out that the dynamic, instantaneous nature of the atom-stimulus poses a severe difficulty for the Sautrantika’s causal account of perception—by the time the percept, i.e. the representation is registered in awareness, the stimuli that have caused it have already evanesced. Under the assumption of an externalist, i.e. a correspondence theory of representation, the percept comes to be a representation of the unreal. However, if one is willing to revert to internalism to preserve the veridicality of the representation, then why not also adopt an internalist account of causation and dispense with the noumenal object? The internalist account of reference and knowledge is simply good empiricism, as Vasubandhu might aver. A coherent account of perception does not require external bases of knowledge (alambanas). This will be the nucleus of his argument against the causal theory of perception in verse 16 of the Vimsatika. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] points out that the dynamic, instantaneous [[nature]] of the atom-stimulus poses a severe difficulty for the Sautrantika’s causal account of perception—by the time the [[percept]], i.e. the [[representation]] is registered in [[awareness]], the {{Wiki|stimuli}} that have [[caused]] it have already evanesced. Under the assumption of an [[externalist]], i.e. a correspondence {{Wiki|theory}} of representation, the [[percept]] comes to be a [[representation]] of the unreal. However, if one is willing to revert to {{Wiki|internalism}} to preserve the veridicality of the [[representation]], then why not also adopt an internalist account of [[causation]] and dispense with the [[noumenal]] [[object]]? The internalist account of reference and [[knowledge]] is simply good {{Wiki|empiricism}}, as [[Vasubandhu]] might aver. A coherent account of [[perception]] does not require [[external bases]] of [[knowledge]] (alambanas). This will be the nucleus of his argument against the causal {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] in verse 16 of the [[Vimsatika]]. |
− | Although the early Sautrantika epistemology is already remarkably advanced, we still find in it some vestigial notions inherited from the Vaibhasika direct realism, such that these discrete pulses must possess definite spatiotemporal locations. As we will later see, all of these notions are to become the object of Vasubandhu’s critique of atomism. However, in early Sautrantika we also find notions proper to critical realism, such that the discrete pulses are momentary stimulus-atoms which are themselves imperceptible, but produce percepts by impinging upon the sensory faculty. In the late Sautrantika of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, the corpuscular concept is done away with—finally the atomist doctrine, now fully purged of all substantialist vestiges, has matured into “attributive atomism.” | + | Although the early [[Sautrantika]] epistemology is already remarkably advanced, we still find in it some vestigial notions inherited from the [[Vaibhasika]] [[direct realism]], such that these discrete pulses must possess definite spatiotemporal locations. As we will later see, all of these notions are to become the [[object]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] critique of [[atomism]]. However, in early [[Sautrantika]] we also find notions proper to [[critical realism]], such that the discrete pulses are momentary stimulus-atoms which are themselves imperceptible, but produce [[percepts]] by impinging upon the sensory {{Wiki|faculty}}. In the late Sautrantika of [[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]], the corpuscular {{Wiki|concept}} is done away with—finally the [[atomist]] [[doctrine]], now fully purged of all substantialist vestiges, has matured into “attributive [[atomism]].” |
− | Thus, we can reconstruct the evolution of the atomic concept in the Ab- hidharmika schools along roughly the following lines: In the Vaibhasika presentational theory of knowledge, the atom is a physical sensation-atom or trope, i.e. a discrete, particular instance of a sensory quality. In early Sautrantika representationalism, although the atom’s noumenal substantiality has not been eliminated entirely, it is hidden from phenomenal perception. What was formerly a sensation-atom or unitary sensum is now a discrete sensory stimulus, the necessary existence of which is deduced by (transcendental) inference. | + | Thus, we can reconstruct the [[evolution]] of the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|concept}} in the Ab- hidharmika schools along roughly the following lines: In the [[Vaibhasika]] presentational [[theory of knowledge]], the {{Wiki|atom}} is a [[physical]] sensation-atom or trope, i.e. a discrete, particular instance of a sensory [[quality]]. In early Sautrantika {{Wiki|representationalism}}, although the atom’s [[noumenal]] substantiality has not been eliminated entirely, it is hidden from [[phenomenal]] [[perception]]. What was formerly a sensation-atom or unitary sensum is now a discrete sensory {{Wiki|stimulus}}, the necessary [[existence]] of which is deduced by (transcendental) {{Wiki|inference}}. |
− | The Abhidharmic reductionism attempts to epistemologize the early Buddhist teaching of the phenomenalistic elimination of references to self and subjectivity by reducing the physical world described by ordinary language of covering truth (samvrti-satya) to the purely phenomenal world described by the sense-datum language of ultimate truth (paramartha-satya) But whether this program actually plays out as intended is another question. In a parallel to Quine’s classic critique of reductionism as set forth in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Oetke strongly argues that this phenomenalizing reduction of ordinary experience to “protocol | + | The [[Abhidharmic]] {{Wiki|reductionism}} attempts to epistemologize the early [[Buddhist]] [[teaching]] of the phenomenalistic elimination of references to [[self]] and [[subjectivity]] by reducing the [[physical world]] described by [[ordinary language]] of covering [[truth]] ([[samvrti-satya]]) to the purely [[phenomenal world]] described by the sense-datum [[language]] of [[ultimate truth]] ([[paramartha-satya]]) But whether this program actually plays out as intended is another question. In a parallel to Quine’s classic critique of {{Wiki|reductionism}} as set forth in Two {{Wiki|Dogmas}} of {{Wiki|Empiricism}}, Oetke strongly argues that this phenomenalizing reduction of ordinary [[experience]] to “protocol [[language]]” is infeasible. |
− | Moreover, the Abhidharmic theory of synthetic wholes as purely nominal entities raises the possibility of similarly nominalizing the parts. Saying that the whole is a synthesis (vikalpa) superimposed on the parts by purely subjective constructive imagination (kalpana) bears the risk of reverting into idealism, because it might be that the subjectivity is constructive enough to posit the parts as well. | + | Moreover, the [[Abhidharmic]] {{Wiki|theory}} of {{Wiki|synthetic}} wholes as purely nominal entities raises the possibility of similarly nominalizing the parts. Saying that the whole is a {{Wiki|synthesis}} ([[vikalpa]]) {{Wiki|superimposed}} on the parts by purely [[subjective]] constructive [[imagination]] ([[kalpana]]) bears the [[risk]] of reverting into [[idealism]], because it might be that the [[subjectivity]] is constructive enough to posit the parts as well. |
− | In fact, this will be the thrust of Vasubandhu’s argument in the coming chapter. He will argue that the hypothesis of transcendentally objective atoms is unwarranted and superfluous. This, he will say, is firstly because the gross appearance (pratibhasa) is all that is required for empirical purposes, and secondly, because it is not proven that we constitute perception of gross physical objects from transcendentally objective atoms given in experience. | + | In fact, this will be the thrust of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument in the coming [[chapter]]. He will argue that the {{Wiki|hypothesis}} of transcendentally [[objective]] [[atoms]] is unwarranted and superfluous. This, he will say, is firstly because the gross [[appearance]] ([[pratibhasa]]) is all that is required for [[empirical]] purposes, and secondly, because it is not proven that we constitute [[perception]] of gross [[physical objects]] from transcendentally [[objective]] [[atoms]] given in [[experience]]. |
− | The example of Sautrantika illustrates an Avenarian point—any empiricism made aware of its a priori foundations but insisting on realism inevitably produces a characteristic diplopia of inner experience and outer reality, which raises the problem of how these two realms interrelate. | + | The example of [[Sautrantika]] illustrates an Avenarian point—any empiricism made {{Wiki|aware}} of its {{Wiki|a priori}} foundations but insisting on [[realism]] inevitably produces a [[characteristic]] diplopia of inner [[experience]] and outer [[reality]], which raises the problem of how these two [[realms]] interrelate. |
− | There are two very closely related modes of thought that attempt to resolve the bifurcation of internal and external world that Avenarius famously problematized as “introjection”—phenomenalizing idealism (the route taken by Vasubandhu) and empiriocriticism—the new turn of Mach and Avenarius after Kantian critical realism which reasons against the metempirical status of the synthetic a priori. | + | There are two very closely related modes of [[thought]] that attempt to resolve the [[bifurcation]] of internal and [[external world]] that Avenarius famously problematized as “introjection”—phenomenalizing [[idealism]] (the route taken by [[Vasubandhu]]) and empiriocriticism—the new turn of Mach and Avenarius after [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[critical realism]] which [[reasons]] against the metempirical {{Wiki|status}} of the {{Wiki|synthetic}} {{Wiki|a priori}}. |
− | ==3 The Anti-Atomist Metaphysics of Vijnaptimatra== | + | ==3 The Anti-Atomist [[Metaphysics]] of [[Vijnaptimatra]]== |
− | I once heard the question seriously discussed, "How the perception of a large tree could find room in the little head of a man?" | + | I once heard the question seriously discussed, "How the [[perception]] of a large [[tree]] could find room in the little head of a man?" |
(Ernst Mach) | (Ernst Mach) | ||
− | HE TASK CUT OUT for this chapter will be to argue, by conducting a detailed analysis of the relevant arguments in verses 11-16 of the Vimsatika, that Vasubandhu really did intend his refutation of the external object to operate as a critique of transcendental objectivity. In other words, by undercutting the epistemic justification of the metaphysical realist’s existence claims for such putatively external objects, he aims to demonstrate that the existence of objects ontologically independent from our own mental representations is not established. | + | HE TASK CUT OUT for this [[chapter]] will be to argue, by conducting a detailed analysis of the relevant arguments in verses 11-16 of the [[Vimsatika]], that [[Vasubandhu]] really did intend his refutation of the [[external object]] to operate as a critique of [[transcendental]] objectivity. In other words, by undercutting the {{Wiki|epistemic}} {{Wiki|justification}} of the [[metaphysical]] realist’s [[existence]] claims for such putatively [[external objects]], he aims to demonstrate that the [[existence]] of [[objects]] [[ontologically]] {{Wiki|independent}} from our [[own]] [[mental]] {{Wiki|representations}} is not established. |
− | Some modern revisionists regard Mind-Only epistemology as a phenomenological realism that focuses its attention on the flux of experience and chooses not to concern itself with metaphysicalities. It is entirely correct to point out that for Mind-Only, things-in-themselves are philosophically gratuitous. In point of fact, Mind-Only generally refrains from engaging in ontological theorizing. Yet this minimal analysis does not go nearly far enough—for if a philosophical position which is non-materialistic, excludes all extramental elements from the constitution of experience, insists on viewing the world strictly in epistemological terms, and maintains that experience of the given moment is noematically constituted solely by the generative activity of transcendental subjectivity does not deserve the label of idealism, then what does? | + | Some {{Wiki|modern}} revisionists regard [[Mind-Only]] epistemology as a phenomenological [[realism]] that focuses its [[attention]] on the flux of [[experience]] and chooses not to [[concern]] itself with metaphysicalities. It is entirely correct to point out that for [[Mind-Only]], things-in-themselves are [[philosophically]] gratuitous. In point of fact, [[Mind-Only]] generally refrains from engaging in [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] theorizing. Yet this minimal analysis does not go nearly far enough—for if a [[philosophical]] position which is non-materialistic, excludes all extramental [[elements]] from the constitution of [[experience]], insists on viewing the [[world]] strictly in [[epistemological]] terms, and maintains that [[experience]] of the given [[moment]] is noematically constituted solely by the generative [[activity]] of [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]] does not deserve the label of [[idealism]], then what does? |
− | Any reading of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism will inevitably be influenced by one’s expectations about the position that he is attempting to establish. A critical review of some of the more popular interpretations of Mind-Only will help to triangulate the epistemological intent of Vasubandhu’s argument and set our prochronistic parallels to empirio- criticism on a firmer footing. | + | Any reading of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]] will inevitably be influenced by one’s expectations about the position that he is attempting to establish. A critical review of some of the more popular interpretations of [[Mind-Only]] will help to triangulate the [[epistemological]] intent of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument and set our prochronistic parallels to empirio- [[criticism]] on a firmer footing. |
− | The Vijnaptimatra eliminates the object term of the three-term theory of perception advanced by Sautrantika and returns to a two-term theory of perception. However, it does not quite come out to direct realism, as Mind-Only bars all epistemological means of access to the noumenal realm (paramartha-satya). It confines ordinary perception (pratyaksa) and reasoning (anumana) to the egological sandbox of the conceptually constructed nature of experience (parikalpita-svabhava). | + | The [[Vijnaptimatra]] eliminates the [[object]] term of the three-term {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] advanced by [[Sautrantika]] and returns to a two-term {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]]. However, it does not quite come out to [[direct realism]], as [[Mind-Only]] bars all [[epistemological]] means of access to the [[noumenal]] [[realm]] ([[paramartha-satya]]). It confines [[ordinary perception]] ([[pratyaksa]]) and reasoning ([[anumana]]) to the egological sandbox of the conceptually [[constructed]] [[nature]] of [[experience]] ([[parikalpita-svabhava]]). |
− | ==3.1 Readings of Mind-Only== | + | ==3.1 Readings of [[Mind-Only]]== |
− | When discussing the Vijnaptimatra school, it is useful to keep three distinctions in mind—(1) the schools | + | When discussing the [[Vijnaptimatra]] school, it is useful to keep three distinctions in mind—(1) the schools “[[Following Scripture]]” and “Following {{Wiki|Reasoning}},” (2) the [[Nalanda]] and the [[Valabhi]] schools, and (3) the True and False Aspectarian readings. |
− | Tibetan doxography distinguishes the Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu ( | + | [[Tibetan]] {{Wiki|doxography}} distinguishes the [[Yogacara]] of [[Asanga]] and [[Vasubandhu]] (“[[Following Scripture]]”) from the later school of [[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]]. (Following {{Wiki|Reasoning}}). In this [[exposition]], we will unfortunately have to restrict ourselves to a [[discussion]] of the [[doctrine]] of Vasubandhu—the logico- [[epistemological]] [[idealism]] of [[Dignaga]] and [[Dharmakirti]] will be largely kept out of [[consideration]], as will the [[Sino-Japanese]] {{Wiki|reception}} history of the [[Mind-Only school]]. |
− | Within the schools of interpretation that evolved from the early Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu, we must distinguish the Nalanda school, most prominently represented by Dharmapala, and the Valabhi school, represented by Sthiramati. There are several notable differences in interpretation between these two schools, of which we will mention only one—the ontological status of the mental representation in terms of the Yogacara three-nature model. For Sthiramati, the aspect (akara) or noema is relegated to the conceptually constructed (parikalpita) nature of experience, whereas Dharmapala holds it to be a part of the other-dependent (paratantra) nature. In according to the akara a causally effective mental reality that is not imaginary conceptual construction, the Nalanda school comes to be much closer to a Berkeleyan idealism than the Valabhi school, for which the akara is unreal, and ultimately seen to “dissolve” back into the interdependent functional flux of the paratantra nature. | + | Within the schools of [[interpretation]] that evolved from the early [[Yogacara]] of [[Asanga]] and [[Vasubandhu]], we must distinguish the [[Nalanda]] school, most prominently represented by [[Dharmapala]], and the [[Valabhi]] school, represented by [[Sthiramati]]. There are several notable differences in interpretation between these two schools, of which we will mention only one—the [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] {{Wiki|status}} of the [[mental]] [[representation]] in terms of the [[Yogacara]] [[three-nature]] model. For [[Sthiramati]], the aspect ([[akara]]) or noema is relegated to the conceptually [[constructed]] ([[parikalpita]]) [[nature]] of [[experience]], whereas [[Dharmapala]] holds it to be a part of the [[other-dependent]] ([[paratantra]]) [[nature]]. In according to the [[akara]] a [[causally]] effective [[mental]] [[reality]] that is not [[imaginary]] {{Wiki|conceptual}} construction, the [[Nalanda]] school comes to be much closer to a Berkeleyan [[idealism]] than the [[Valabhi]] school, for which the [[akara]] is unreal, and ultimately seen to “dissolve” back into the [[interdependent]] functional flux of the [[paratantra nature]]. |
− | The third distinction, the distinction between True and False Aspectarian- ism as drawn by Tibetan doxography, will be covered later when we review the traditional interpretation of Cittamatra. | + | The third {{Wiki|distinction}}, the {{Wiki|distinction}} between True and False Aspectarian- ism as drawn by [[Tibetan]] {{Wiki|doxography}}, will be covered later when we review the [[traditional]] [[interpretation]] of [[Cittamatra]]. |
− | ==3.1.1 Revisionist Interpretations of Mind-Only== | + | ==3.1.1 Revisionist Interpretations of [[Mind-Only]]== |
− | The revisionist line of interpretation generally insists on reading Mind-Only not as metaphysical idealism. Rather, it is held to be a phenomenologically oriented species of pluralist realism. Instead of being concerned with the way things are qua metaphysical realities, all that matters to Yogacara is the way phenomena are perceptually and mentally constituted. It is in other words an attempt to reformulate the basic program of Buddhist empiricism in terms of a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of the activities of the mind. If it is to be considered idealism at all, it is at best a form of epistemological, but certainly not of ontological idealism. | + | The revisionist line of [[interpretation]] generally insists on reading [[Mind-Only]] not as [[metaphysical idealism]]. Rather, it is held to be a [[phenomenologically]] oriented {{Wiki|species}} of {{Wiki|pluralist}} [[realism]]. Instead of being concerned with the way things are qua [[metaphysical]] [[realities]], all that matters to [[Yogacara]] is the way [[phenomena]] are perceptually and [[mentally]] constituted. It is in other words an attempt to reformulate the basic program of [[Buddhist empiricism]] in terms of a comprehensive {{Wiki|phenomenological}} analysis of the [[activities]] of the [[mind]]. If it is to be considered [[idealism]] at all, it is at best a [[form]] of [[epistemological]], but certainly not of [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[idealism]]. |
− | The most influential modern proponents of this phenomenological interpretation are WAYMAN, Anacker, KING and LUSTHAUS. Some revisionist scholars claim that Yogacara accepts an external world and urge a critical realist interpretation (notably WAYMAN and KOCHUMUTTOM). | + | The most influential {{Wiki|modern}} proponents of this {{Wiki|phenomenological}} interpretation are WAYMAN, [[Anacker]], KING and LUSTHAUS. Some revisionist [[scholars]] claim that [[Yogacara]] accepts an [[external world]] and [[urge]] a critical realist [[interpretation]] (notably WAYMAN and KOCHUMUTTOM). |
− | Wayman Wayman alleges that the proponents of the idealist interpretation support their thesis by a selective reading of the textual evidence, bending statements that indicate Yogacarin belief in objective rupas (forms) and other mind-independent elements. But under the premise that Cittamatra is not an entirely fresh creation, but in many respects an evolution of an earlier critical realist scholastic system of the Sautrantika, it shouldn’t be surprising to find that it still preserves many overtly realist elements that have not yet been reformulated or reinterpreted to fully harmonize with idealism. Given the nature of Mind-Only as a major locus of synthesis for Buddhist philosophical doctrine, it would in any case unreasonable to assume that Cittamatra positions are always univocal. It is only natural for the overarching exegetical theme of idealism to be unraveled into a kaleidoscopic multiplicity of perspectives upon closer and more critical readings of the text. A deconstructive hermeneutic uses exegetical themes as prisms for fracturing the text and opening up its inner interpretive space for many meanings old and new. One has to wonder whether a project like Wayman’s which seems to pursue the hermeneutically rather naive goal of uncovering the hitherto hidden “true meaning” of a text really deserves the compliment of revisionism. | + | [[Wayman]] [[Wayman]] alleges that the proponents of the {{Wiki|idealist}} [[interpretation]] support their {{Wiki|thesis}} by a selective reading of the textual {{Wiki|evidence}}, bending statements that indicate [[Yogacarin]] [[belief]] in [[objective]] [[rupas]] ([[forms]]) and other mind-independent [[elements]]. But under the premise that [[Cittamatra]] is not an entirely fresh creation, but in many respects an [[evolution]] of an earlier critical realist {{Wiki|scholastic}} system of the [[Sautrantika]], it shouldn’t be surprising to find that it still preserves many overtly realist [[elements]] that have not yet been reformulated or reinterpreted to fully harmonize with [[idealism]]. Given the [[nature]] of [[Mind-Only]] as a major locus of {{Wiki|synthesis}} for [[Buddhist]] [[philosophical doctrine]], it would in any case unreasonable to assume that [[Cittamatra]] positions are always univocal. It is only natural for the overarching {{Wiki|exegetical}} theme of [[idealism]] to be unraveled into a kaleidoscopic multiplicity of perspectives upon closer and more critical readings of the text. A deconstructive {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} uses {{Wiki|exegetical}} themes as prisms for fracturing the text and opening up its inner interpretive [[space]] for many meanings old and new. One has to [[wonder]] whether a project like Wayman’s which seems to pursue the {{Wiki|hermeneutically}} rather {{Wiki|naive}} goal of uncovering the hitherto hidden “true meaning” of a text really deserves the compliment of {{Wiki|revisionism}}. |
− | Wayman is not alone in giving a strongly critical realist rendering of Cittamatra—Lindstrom, for example, even goes so far as to make the remarkable assertion that the point of Yogacara “is in fact to assert, not deny, ‘the mind-independence of the material sphere.’ ” | + | [[Wayman]] is not alone in giving a strongly critical realist rendering of Cittamatra—Lindstrom, for example, even goes so far as to make the remarkable [[assertion]] that the point of [[Yogacara]] “is in fact to assert, not deny, ‘the mind-independence of the material [[sphere]].’ ” |
− | I will attempt to show, by a rational reconstruction of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism derived from the internal evidence of the text, that quite the opposite is true. Moreover, it is reasonable to construe Mind-Only as a species of idealism on the external evidence of the arguments that its Advaitin and Madhyamika critics have lined up against it. One may of course always argue that the historical critics of Mind-Only have universally misconstrued it, but this amounts to contending that only a proponent of Mind-Only can understand the system well enough to properly critique it. This argument can safely be dismissed. | + | I will attempt to show, by a [[rational]] reconstruction of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]] derived from the internal {{Wiki|evidence}} of the text, that quite the opposite is true. Moreover, it is reasonable to construe [[Mind-Only]] as a {{Wiki|species}} of [[idealism]] on the external {{Wiki|evidence}} of the arguments that its [[Advaitin]] and [[Madhyamika]] critics have lined up against it. One may of course always argue that the historical critics of [[Mind-Only]] have universally misconstrued it, but this amounts to contending that only a proponent of [[Mind-Only]] can understand the system well enough to properly critique it. This argument can safely be dismissed. |
− | Lusthaus Lusthaus insists that the mainline ontological idealist reading of Yogacara is predicated on a fundamental misinterpretation of the term vijnapti-matra. He argues that correct interpretation implies no more than a realist phenomenology, the idealist features of which are confined to a strictly epistemological sense—in other words, any ontological sense of the term is precluded: | + | [[Lusthaus]] [[Lusthaus]] insists that the mainline [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] {{Wiki|idealist}} reading of [[Yogacara]] is predicated on a fundamental misinterpretation of the term [[vijnapti-matra]]. He argues that correct [[interpretation]] implies no more than a realist [[Wikipedia:Phenomenology (philosophy)|phenomenology]], the {{Wiki|idealist}} features of which are confined to a strictly [[epistemological]] sense—in other words, any [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[sense]] of the term is precluded: |
− | Why has Yogacara been misinterpreted as idealism? The common way of interpreting matra so as to valorize | + | Why has [[Yogacara]] been misinterpreted as [[idealism]]? The common way of interpreting [[matra]] so as to valorize ‘[[consciousness]]’ is striking since those same interpreters never impute such implications to [[matra]] on the many other occasions it is used by [[Buddhists]] or [[Yogacarins]]. For instance, the closely allied term prajnapti-matra (“only nominally real”) has never led a {{Wiki|modern}} interpreter to speculate that [[Language]] is the [[metaphysical]] [[reality]] behind the [[world]] of [[experience]]; on the contrary, those prone to {{Wiki|idealist}} interpretations tend to privilege ineffability and yearn for a [[realm]] beyond [[language]] and conceptions. |
− | Naturally, since anybody would agree that the term “only nominally real” doesn’t indicate that language is the metaphysical reality behind the world of experience, Lusthaus wants us to agree, mutatis mutandis, that vijnapti- matra (in his words, “nothing but noetic constitution”) doesn’t indicate noetic constitution to be a metaphysical reality behind the world of experience. By this analogy, he wants us to believe that an ontological reading of the term vijnapti-matra is wildly implausible. | + | Naturally, since anybody would agree that the term “only nominally real” doesn’t indicate that [[language]] is the [[metaphysical]] [[reality]] behind the [[world]] of [[experience]], [[Lusthaus]] wants us to agree, mutatis mutandis, that [[vijnapti]]- [[matra]] (in his words, “nothing but noetic constitution”) doesn’t indicate noetic constitution to be a [[metaphysical]] [[reality]] behind the [[world]] of [[experience]]. By this analogy, he wants us to believe that an [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] reading of the term [[vijnapti-matra]] is wildly implausible. |
− | But in order for this analogy to carry his argument, Lusthaus relies on a deliberately misleading implication. The fact that unless we are specifically discussing nominalism about propositions, we typically don’t take the term “only nominally real” to be making a metaphysical proposition about language has nothing to do with the fact that we may very well believe it to be making a metaphysical statement about the relationship of language and object. If we say, for example, that a tree is only nominally real, we are obviously talking about the referent of the term | + | But in order for this analogy to carry his argument, [[Lusthaus]] relies on a deliberately misleading implication. The fact that unless we are specifically discussing [[nominalism]] about propositions, we typically don’t take the term “only nominally real” to be making a [[metaphysical]] proposition about [[language]] has nothing to do with the fact that we may very well believe it to be making a [[metaphysical]] statement about the relationship of [[language]] and [[object]]. If we say, for example, that a [[tree]] is only nominally real, we are obviously talking about the referent of the term “[[tree]],” not about the term “[[tree]].” Not to belabor the issue ad nauseam, but given that the [[desire]] to minimize or eliminate [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[commitments]] is such a crucial [[philosophical]] [[motivation]] of [[nominalism]], if we all of a sudden make out “[[nominalism]] talk” to be about something other than {{Wiki|ontology}}, then there isn’t much left for it to be talking about! |
− | Lusthaus is right to point out the importance of epistemological idealism. But is he really justified in ruling out ontological readings of vijnapti-matra? Perhaps he is—if, somewhere, he offers a better argument for it than the one we have just discussed. | + | [[Lusthaus]] is right to point out the importance of [[epistemological]] [[idealism]]. But is he really justified in ruling out [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] readings of [[vijnapti-matra]]? Perhaps he is—if, somewhere, he offers a better argument for it than the one we have just discussed. |
− | One can certainly credit Mind-Only epistemology with the intent to be non-metaphysical. Carnap makes the perspicacious observation that realist, idealist and phenomenalist epistemologies coincide to the extent that their constitution theories of experience are ontologically neutral. This observation can help lay to rest a large portion of the perennial vexation about whether Mind-Only is realism or idealism or phenomenalism—to the extent that it happens to be non-metaphysical, all three terms equally apply. | + | One can certainly credit [[Mind-Only]] epistemology with the intent to be non-metaphysical. Carnap makes the perspicacious observation that realist, {{Wiki|idealist}} and phenomenalist [[epistemologies]] coincide to the extent that their constitution theories of [[experience]] are [[ontologically]] [[neutral]]. This observation can help lay to rest a large portion of the [[perennial]] vexation about whether [[Mind-Only]] is [[realism]] or [[idealism]] or phenomenalism—to the extent that it happens to be non-metaphysical, all three terms equally apply. |
− | Therefore, we have no doubt that Lusthaus is on to something important about Mind-Only. Also, we are not disputing anything that Lusthaus has to say about its Sino-Japanese history of reception. But what if Vasubandhu’s position in the Vimsatika, does, after all, lapse at some point into metaphysics? This is in fact what Cittamatra’s Indian and Tibetan Madhyamika critics oppugn it for. Should we ever catch such a lapse, it would come as no surprise to find that it is an idealist one. If epistemological idealism refuses to let its metaphysics in through the front door, it may simply enter through the back. | + | Therefore, we have no [[doubt]] that [[Lusthaus]] is on to something important about [[Mind-Only]]. Also, we are not disputing anything that [[Lusthaus]] has to say about its [[Sino-Japanese]] history of {{Wiki|reception}}. But what if [[Vasubandhu’s]] position in the [[Vimsatika]], does, after all, lapse at some point into metaphysics? This is in fact what Cittamatra’s [[Indian]] and [[Tibetan]] [[Madhyamika]] critics oppugn it for. Should we ever catch such a lapse, it would come as no surprise to find that it is an {{Wiki|idealist}} one. If [[epistemological]] [[idealism]] refuses to let its [[metaphysics]] in through the front door, it may simply enter through the back. |
− | Some scholars conjecture that the early phase of Yogacara was mainly phenomenological in orientation, whereas its later developments came to be more ontological. Nagao, for example, notes that the early Yogacara of the Asanga-Vasubandhu era considered the question of an external reality to be a problem of the realist’s ontology, and thus, a problem which was not their concern. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that they therefore desisted from external world skepticism. | + | Some [[scholars]] conjecture that the early phase of [[Yogacara]] was mainly {{Wiki|phenomenological}} in orientation, whereas its later developments came to be more [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]]. [[Nagao]], for example, notes that the early [[Yogacara]] of the Asanga-Vasubandhu {{Wiki|era}} considered the question of an [[external reality]] to be a problem of the realist’s {{Wiki|ontology}}, and thus, a problem which was not their [[concern]]. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that they therefore desisted from [[external world]] {{Wiki|skepticism}}. |
− | Lusthaus is more circumspect about the issue of the external world than Kochumuttom. He hedges his bets—while he does not actually say outright that he believes Mind-Only to be critical realism, he conveys this opinion obliquely: “To the extent that epistemological idealists can also be critical realists, Yogacara may be deemed a type of epistemological idealism ... | + | [[Lusthaus]] is more circumspect about the issue of the [[external world]] than {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}}. He hedges his bets—while he does not actually say outright that he believes [[Mind-Only]] to be [[critical realism]], he conveys this opinion obliquely: “To the extent that [[epistemological]] {{Wiki|idealists}} can also be critical [[realists]], [[Yogacara]] may be deemed a type of [[epistemological]] [[idealism]] ... |
” | ” | ||
− | Against the view of Lusthaus, I am arguing that the intent of Vasubandhu’s refutation of atomism is not compatible with critical realism—since if the transcendental object is bracketed out of the constitution of experience, critical realism is left behind for good. But as Kant recognized, this is a dangerous philosophical move to make. An epistemological idealism without an objective world cannot hold the middle ground and is inexorably pulled towards an ontological idealism. Once we lose the solid transcendental seabed on which to drop our | + | Against the view of [[Lusthaus]], I am arguing that the intent of [[Vasubandhu’s]] refutation of [[atomism]] is not compatible with critical realism—since if the [[transcendental]] [[object]] is bracketed out of the constitution of [[experience]], [[critical realism]] is left behind for good. But as {{Wiki|Kant}} [[recognized]], this is a [[dangerous]] [[philosophical]] move to make. An [[epistemological]] [[idealism]] without an [[objective world]] cannot hold the middle ground and is inexorably pulled towards an [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[idealism]]. Once we lose the solid [[transcendental]] seabed on which to drop our “[[reality]] anchors,” our [[world]] of [[experience]] becomes driftwood on the deep of idealism—or to use a more [[empiricist]] figure of {{Wiki|speech}}, we become sailors on Neurath’s raft. |
− | But the Vimsatika has several levels of meaning. Vasubandhu’s soterio- logical subtext is that once we wake up to the fact that we are empirical explorers floating on Kon Tiki, we should steer the raft towards the farther shore. The anagogic reason why the Vimsatika is force-feeding the realist with the epistemological idealism of Cartesian epoche is to lead him even further into skepticism—not because it wants to take a last stand on any kind of idealism. However, if the indication of being prone to idealist interpretations of Cittamatra is to “privilege ineffability and yearn for a realm beyond language and conceptions,” as Lusthaus alleges, then surely, Vasubandhu the mystic stands guilty as accused. | + | But the [[Vimsatika]] has several levels of meaning. [[Vasubandhu’s]] soterio- [[logical]] subtext is that once we wake up to the fact that we are [[empirical]] explorers floating on Kon Tiki, we should steer the raft towards the farther shore. The anagogic [[reason]] why the [[Vimsatika]] is force-feeding the realist with the [[epistemological]] [[idealism]] of [[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|epoche}} is to lead him even further into skepticism—not because it wants to take a last stand on any kind of [[idealism]]. However, if the indication of being prone to {{Wiki|idealist}} interpretations of [[Cittamatra]] is to “privilege ineffability and yearn for a [[realm]] beyond [[language]] and conceptions,” as [[Lusthaus]] alleges, then surely, [[Vasubandhu]] the [[mystic]] stands guilty as accused. |
− | Kochumuttom In Kochumuttom, we find a very systematic and generally quite convincing Kantian revisionist reading of Vasubandhu. He makes the argument that Vasubandhu does not deny the noumenon or Ding an sich outright, but merely claims that it can never be directly given in experience unless in the condition of enlightenment. Generally speaking, this is a perfectly accurate interpretation, but what this really boils down to upon closer examination is that Vasubandhu is a critical realist only in the soteriological sense. There can be no doubt that Vasubandhu believes in an ineffable noumenal nature (anabhilapya-atma) beyond phenomenal experience—the true nature of minds known to the enlightened ones. But first of all, if this is Vasubandhu’s noumenon, it is nothing like a Kantian idea of pure reason. The only rationale for calling it a noumenon is that | + | {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} In {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}}, we find a very systematic and generally quite convincing [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] revisionist reading of [[Vasubandhu]]. He makes the argument that [[Vasubandhu]] does not deny the {{Wiki|noumenon}} or [[Ding an sich]] outright, but merely claims that it can never be directly given in [[experience]] unless in the [[condition]] of [[enlightenment]]. Generally {{Wiki|speaking}}, this is a perfectly accurate [[interpretation]], but what this really boils down to upon closer {{Wiki|examination}} is that [[Vasubandhu]] is a critical realist only in the [[soteriological]] [[sense]]. There can be no [[doubt]] that [[Vasubandhu]] believes in an {{Wiki|ineffable}} [[noumenal]] [[nature]] (anabhilapya-atma) beyond [[phenomenal]] experience—the [[true nature]] of [[minds]] known to the [[enlightened ones]]. But first of all, if this is [[Vasubandhu’s]] {{Wiki|noumenon}}, it is nothing like a [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[idea]] of [[pure]] [[reason]]. The only rationale for calling it a {{Wiki|noumenon}} is that |
− | Vasubandhu avers it to be beyond ordinary experience. Because it is beyond knowing as we know it, it does not supply any kind of ontological or epistemic grounding, nor can it be rationally intuited. Vasubandhu already shows his true colors in verse 1 of the Vimsatika, where he likens the perception of external objects to seeing cataract-hairs. He is trying to communicate that all the while, we are staring into the face of the ineffable noumenon, but simply fail to realize it because we are ignorantly fixated on the obscurations of ordinary experience. This example goes to show in the context of a Mahayana mysticism in full bloom, Vasubandhu’s belief in an ineffable noumenon is insufficient to establish that he is a critical realist when it comes to the epistemology of ordinary experience—in fact, it establishes the very opposite. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] avers it to be beyond ordinary [[experience]]. Because it is beyond [[knowing]] as we know it, it does not supply any kind of [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] or {{Wiki|epistemic}} grounding, nor can it be {{Wiki|rationally}} intuited. [[Vasubandhu]] already shows his true colors in verse 1 of the [[Vimsatika]], where he likens the [[perception]] of [[external objects]] to [[seeing]] cataract-hairs. He is trying to {{Wiki|communicate}} that all the while, we are staring into the face of the {{Wiki|ineffable}} {{Wiki|noumenon}}, but simply fail to realize it because we are ignorantly fixated on the [[obscurations]] of ordinary [[experience]]. This example goes to show in the context of a [[Mahayana]] [[mysticism]] in full bloom, [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[belief]] in an {{Wiki|ineffable}} {{Wiki|noumenon}} is insufficient to establish that he is a critical realist when it comes to the epistemology of ordinary experience—in fact, it establishes the very opposite. |
− | Let us examine what Kochumuttom has to say about Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism: | + | Let us examine what {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} has to say about [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]]: |
− | Nowhere during the discussion does he say that there is no extra-mental world. Instead he has thrice said that “an atom is not obtained”. The term translated here as ‘is obtained’ is sidhyati. To be sure, this term does not mean ‘to | + | Nowhere during the [[discussion]] does he say that there is no extra-mental [[world]]. Instead he has thrice said that “an {{Wiki|atom}} is not obtained”. The term translated here as ‘is obtained’ is sidhyati. To be sure, this term does not mean ‘to [[exist]]’ ([[asti]]). Therefore, to translate the above sentence as “an {{Wiki|atom}} does not [[exist]]” would be a gross mistake. The usual meanings of the term sidhyati are ‘to be obtained (in [[experience]]),’ ‘to be given (in [[experience]])’ or ‘to be proved to be true’ etc. So [[Vasubandhu’s]] main [[criticism]] against the [[atomic]] [[realism]] is that the [[atoms]] are neither given in [[experience]] nor proved. Therefore he does not really say that there are no [[atoms]] at all, although he is not prepared to admit that things-in-themselves which are {{Wiki|ineffable}}, could be [[conceived]] in terms of [[atoms]]. |
− | There isn’t much to find fault with in this discussion. It shows that Vasubandhu is rightly very wary of making metaphysical assertions involving the existence or nonexistence of objects beyond phenomenal experience. All he says—and all he needs to say—is that atoms are neither given in phenomenal experience nor proven to constitute experience. | + | There isn’t much to find fault with in this [[discussion]]. It shows that [[Vasubandhu]] is rightly very wary of making [[metaphysical]] assertions involving the [[existence]] or [[Wikipedia:Existence|nonexistence]] of [[objects]] beyond [[phenomenal]] [[experience]]. All he says—and all he needs to say—is that [[atoms]] are neither given in [[phenomenal]] [[experience]] nor proven to constitute [[experience]]. |
− | However, if it is really true that Vasubandhu may read as accepting non- atomic Dinge an sich in the Kantian sense, something is conspicuously missing from Kochumuttom’s interpretation. Why doesn’t Kochumuttom supply a reasoning that establishes the necessity for Vasubandhu of something transcendentally objective as the condition for the function of the categories (such as is done by Kant in his thesis of the second antinomy of pure reason)? The conclusion to be drawn from this question is that if Kochumuttom doesn’t have any such reasoning to show, then there simply isn’t anything to be shown. | + | However, if it is really true that [[Vasubandhu]] may read as accepting non- [[atomic]] Dinge an sich in the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[sense]], something is conspicuously missing from Kochumuttom’s [[interpretation]]. Why doesn’t {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} supply a {{Wiki|reasoning}} that establishes the necessity for [[Vasubandhu]] of something transcendentally [[objective]] as the [[condition]] for the function of the categories (such as is done by {{Wiki|Kant}} in his {{Wiki|thesis}} of the second antinomy of [[pure]] [[reason]])? The conclusion to be drawn from this question is that if {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} doesn’t have any such {{Wiki|reasoning}} to show, then there simply isn’t anything to be shown. |
− | Additionally, there is a systematic difficulty with Kochumuttom’s reading of Cittamatra as a variation on Kantian critical realism. If Vijnana- vada and Sautrantika are both critical realisms, then what exactly does Vasubandhu stand to gain by refuting the Sautrantika theory of perception in the Vimsatika! | + | Additionally, there is a systematic difficulty with Kochumuttom’s reading of [[Cittamatra]] as a variation on [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[critical realism]]. If [[Vijnana]]- [[vada]] and [[Sautrantika]] are both critical realisms, then what exactly does [[Vasubandhu]] stand to gain by refuting the [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] in the [[Vimsatika]]! |
− | The fact that Kochumuttom cannot sufficiently substantiate the necessity to Vasubandhu’s epistemology of the Ding an sich despite that Vasubandhu’s reasoning is generally Kantian is a key justification of the empiriocriticist reading we are attempting here. Kochumuttom agrees that Vasubandhu neither affirms nor denies the existence of mind-independent atoms in an ontological sense. This is reason to conclude that Vasubandhu is developing the Vijnaptimatra epistemology in Cartesian epoche. | + | The fact that {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} cannot sufficiently substantiate the necessity to [[Vasubandhu’s]] epistemology of the [[Ding an sich]] despite that [[Vasubandhu’s]] {{Wiki|reasoning}} is generally [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] is a key {{Wiki|justification}} of the empiriocriticist reading we are attempting here. {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} agrees that [[Vasubandhu]] neither affirms nor denies the [[existence]] of mind-independent [[atoms]] in an [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[sense]]. This is [[reason]] to conclude that [[Vasubandhu]] is developing the [[Vijnaptimatra]] epistemology in [[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|epoche}}. |
− | ==3.1.2 The Traditional Interpretation of Cittamatra== | + | ==3.1.2 The [[Traditional]] Interpretation of [[Cittamatra]]== |
− | According to the traditional line of interpretation, Cittamatra is metaphysical subjective idealism. The view that the goal of the Vimsatika is to deny the existence of a mind-independent external world is backed more or less uniformly by the classical Indian and Tibetan commentarial traditions (see e.g. HOPKINS, BLUMENTHAL, or Santaraksita), and by many modern scholars such as WOOD, TOLA and DRAGONETTI, CHATTERJEE, Gupta, Matilal and Nagao. | + | According to the [[traditional]] line of [[interpretation]], [[Cittamatra]] is [[metaphysical]] {{Wiki|subjective idealism}}. The view that the goal of the [[Vimsatika]] is to deny the [[existence]] of a mind-independent [[external world]] is backed more or less uniformly by the classical [[Indian]] and [[Tibetan]] {{Wiki|commentarial}} traditions (see e.g. HOPKINS, BLUMENTHAL, or [[Santaraksita]]), and by many {{Wiki|modern}} [[scholars]] such as WOOD, TOLA and DRAGONETTI, CHATTERJEE, [[Gupta]], [[Matilal]] and [[Nagao]]. |
− | Arnold points out that Yogacara has reduced the Abhidharmika list of categories to mental events, which may be taken an indication of a Yogacara view that the mind is epistemically prior to the psycho-physical complex of experience. If it weren’t for the mind, in other words, there would be no sort of experience whatsoever. Wood, as we have already seen, argues that the Mind Only Principle frames Cittamatra as a species of ontological idealism. Matilal contends that Yogacara idealism sets out to demonstrate the inconsistency of the realist account of the external world. | + | Arnold points out that [[Yogacara]] has reduced the [[Abhidharmika]] list of categories to [[mental events]], which may be taken an indication of a Yogacara view that the [[mind]] is epistemically prior to the [[psycho-physical]] complex of [[experience]]. If it weren’t for the [[mind]], in other words, there would be no sort of [[experience]] whatsoever. [[Wood]], as we have already seen, argues that the [[Mind Only]] [[Principle]] frames [[Cittamatra]] as a {{Wiki|species}} of [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[idealism]]. [[Matilal]] contends that [[Yogacara idealism]] sets out to demonstrate the inconsistency of the realist account of the [[external world]]. |
− | Tibetan doxography unanimously reads Cittamatra as a critical refinement of Sautrantika which purifies it of the extraneous and self-contradictory category of the external object. As Mipham states: “The Sautrantikas, who assert the theory of the mental aspect, are like the Chittamatrins. The sole difference lies in the assertion or denial of the existence of the external object.” Furthermore, the Mind-Only view resembles Sautrantika in accepting their doctrine of momentariness. | + | [[Tibetan]] {{Wiki|doxography}} unanimously reads [[Cittamatra]] as a critical refinement of [[Sautrantika]] which purifies it of the extraneous and self-contradictory category of the [[external object]]. As [[Mipham]] states: “The [[Sautrantikas]], who assert the {{Wiki|theory}} of the [[mental]] aspect, are like the [[Chittamatrins]]. The sole difference lies in the [[assertion]] or {{Wiki|denial}} of the [[existence]] of the [[external object]].” Furthermore, the [[Mind-Only]] view resembles [[Sautrantika]] in accepting their [[doctrine]] of [[momentariness]]. |
− | On this understanding, the Cittamatrin reveals himself to be a Sautrantika who comes to realize that he has been cast out of the phenomenalistic garden of Eden into the physical world for having eaten of the forbidden fruit of metaphysical realism. Vasubandhu’s offensive against the external object fbahyartha) is an attempt to rectify this situation by ejecting the Ding an sich from the epistemological constitution of experience. | + | On this [[understanding]], the [[Cittamatrin]] reveals himself to be a Sautrantika who comes to realize that he has been cast out of the phenomenalistic [[garden]] of Eden into the [[physical world]] for having eaten of the forbidden fruit of [[metaphysical]] [[realism]]. [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[offensive]] against the [[external object]] fbahyartha) is an attempt to rectify this situation by ejecting the [[Ding an sich]] from the [[epistemological]] constitution of [[experience]]. |
− | King argues that the | + | [[King]] argues that the “{{Wiki|phenomenalism}}” of the [[Yogacara school]] is clearly in conflict with the [[Sautrantika]] epistemology about the issue of being able to make veridical statements about a mind-independent [[external world]]. We will later return to this point of conflict and argue it more strongly—the attack on [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|externalism}} is in fact one of the centerpieces of the Vimsatika’s [[philosophical]] program. |
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− | In Indian philosophy of mind, the debate between idealism and realism revolves around the issue of whether consciousness is formless or has a form. Realistic theories (such as those of the Nyaya and Mlmamsa schools) generally hold that consciousness is formless, whereas idealistic theories (such as Mind-Only) generally argue that consciousness has a form. This theory of the mind provides justification for their thesis that external objects are forms of consciousness. In an attempt to get a better philosophical grip on the the precise sense in which the Mind-Only view denies external objects, we find this debate between idealism and realism being carried out even within Mind-Only, where it centers on whether the sensible forms or aspects of consciousness are true or false. | + | In [[Indian philosophy]] of [[mind]], the [[debate]] between [[idealism]] and [[realism]] revolves around the issue of whether [[consciousness]] is [[formless]] or has a [[form]]. Realistic theories (such as those of the [[Nyaya]] and Mlmamsa schools) generally hold that [[consciousness]] is [[formless]], whereas {{Wiki|idealistic}} theories (such as [[Mind-Only]]) generally argue that [[consciousness]] has a [[form]]. This {{Wiki|theory}} of the [[mind]] provides {{Wiki|justification}} for their {{Wiki|thesis}} that [[external objects]] are [[forms]] of [[consciousness]]. In an attempt to get a better [[philosophical]] [[grip]] on the the precise [[sense]] in which the [[Mind-Only]] view denies [[external objects]], we find this [[debate]] between [[idealism]] and [[realism]] being carried out even within [[Mind-Only]], where it centers on whether the sensible [[forms]] or aspects of [[consciousness]] are true or false. |
− | The True and False Aspectarian views differ as to how far they press the skeptical assault on ordinary experience. Nonetheless, they are in agreement in maintaining that if one subjects ordinary experience to a transcendental analysis, one will discover what seemed at first to be the external world and its objects to be mere mental representation (vijnapti-matra) lacking extra-mental referents. They both assert (in slighly different ways), that phenomena are mere conceptual imputations (prajftaptisat) lacking substantial existence (dravyasat). However, according to Gelug doxography, both True and False Aspectarian views assert phenomena to be established as the substantial entity of the mind. Tsongkhapa attempts to resolve this discrepancy by arguing that because the Mind-Only sense of the term prajftaptisat is less rarefied than the Madhyamika sense, the Mind-Only view is realized under more subtle Madhyamika analysis to entail substantial establishment as mind. We may think of such hermeneutic maneuvers as we wish, but they do underscore the necessity of carefully distinguishing the assertions made by a given philosophical system from meta-philosophical interpretations of these assertions—which is admittedly usually much easier said than done. | + | The True and False Aspectarian [[views]] differ as to how far they press the skeptical assault on ordinary [[experience]]. Nonetheless, they are in agreement in maintaining that if one [[subjects]] ordinary [[experience]] to a [[transcendental]] analysis, one will discover what seemed at first to be the [[external world]] and its [[objects]] to be mere [[mental]] [[representation]] ([[vijnapti-matra]]) lacking extra-mental referents. They both assert (in slighly different ways), that [[phenomena]] are mere {{Wiki|conceptual}} imputations (prajftaptisat) lacking substantial [[existence]] ([[dravyasat]]). However, according to [[Gelug]] {{Wiki|doxography}}, both True and False Aspectarian [[views]] assert [[phenomena]] to be established as the substantial [[entity]] of the [[mind]]. [[Tsongkhapa]] attempts to resolve this discrepancy by arguing that because the [[Mind-Only]] [[sense]] of the term prajftaptisat is less rarefied than the [[Madhyamika]] [[sense]], the [[Mind-Only]] view is [[realized]] under more {{Wiki|subtle}} [[Madhyamika]] analysis to entail substantial establishment as [[mind]]. We may think of such {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} maneuvers as we wish, but they do underscore the necessity of carefully distinguishing the assertions made by a given [[philosophical]] system from meta-philosophical interpretations of these assertions—which is admittedly usually much easier said than done. |
− | True Aspectarianism This interpretation of Mind-Only as | + | True Aspectarianism This [[interpretation]] of [[Mind-Only]] as “{{Wiki|realistic}} idealism” denies [[external objects]] transcendentally but accepts them on an [[empirical]] level, i.e. as conventional/pragmatic [[truth]]. Following the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] {{Wiki|distinction}} of [[transcendental]] and [[empirical]] externality, True Aspectarianism denies the [[transcendental]] externality or substantiality ([[dravyatva]]) but not the [[empirical]] externality of [[objects]] (i.e. their [[rupa]]), or their spatiotemporal determinacy ([[niyama]]). Their supposed externality is [[illusory]] in a strictly [[transcendental]] sense—but not, however, in an [[empirical]] [[sense]]. True Aspectarianism is roughly what [[Kant’s]] [[transcendental]] [[idealism]] would amount to without the [[Ding an sich]]. |
− | The True Aspectarian position entails a rejection only of dravya, not of rupa. The concept of rupa may perhaps be best understood under a phenomenological reading as hyle or material Gestalt of perception, whereas dravya is a metaphysical term signifying transcendentally objective substance. | + | The True Aspectarian position entails a rejection only of [[dravya]], not of [[rupa]]. The {{Wiki|concept}} of [[rupa]] may perhaps be best understood under a phenomenological reading as [[hyle]] or material {{Wiki|Gestalt}} of [[perception]], whereas [[dravya]] is a [[metaphysical]] term signifying transcendentally [[objective]] substance. |
− | True Aspectarianism is still foundationalist because it holds that statements about sense-data (e.g. observations) do not require justification. It adopts an idealist position with regard to transcendental reality but a phe- nomenalist empiricism with regard to empirical reality: “The Yogacara is an idealist only transcendentally; in empirical matters he has no quarrel with the realist. All philosophical issues lie between the conflicting interpretations of the facts and not the facts themselves.” | + | True Aspectarianism is still foundationalist because it holds that statements about sense-data (e.g. observations) do not require {{Wiki|justification}}. It adopts an {{Wiki|idealist}} position with regard to [[transcendental]] [[reality]] but a phe- nomenalist {{Wiki|empiricism}} with regard to [[empirical reality]]: “The [[Yogacara]] is an {{Wiki|idealist}} only transcendentally; in [[empirical]] matters he has no quarrel with the realist. All [[philosophical]] issues lie between the conflicting interpretations of the facts and not the facts themselves.” |
− | False Aspectarianism The “anti-realist | + | False Aspectarianism The “anti-realist [[idealism]]” of the False Aspectarian reading radicalizes the [[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|skepticism}} of the [[True Aspectarian view]] in holding the [[external object]] to be [[illusory]] even in the [[empirical]] [[sense]]. It surrenders the last remnants of [[realism]] about the [[external world]] to [[skeptical doubt]] in rejecting the typical notion of [[traditional]] sense-datum {{Wiki|theory}} that raw [[sensations]] are incontrovertible. Even the {{Wiki|qualia}} themselves (e.g. the [[perception]] of blue as blue) are held to be polluted with innate [[ignorance]] ([[avidya]]). The [[desired]] rock-bottom {{Wiki|certainty}} is to be reached not in sense-data or {{Wiki|evidence}}, but only in the [[pure]] self-reflexive {{Wiki|apperception}}. In contesting even the validity of [[empirical evidence]], False Aspectarianism no longer qualifies as {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} sensu stricto. |
− | The False Aspectarian position that all perception—true to the spirit of Brentano’s famous dictum “Wahrnehmung ist Falschnehmung”—is tout court erroneous is closer to the position of the Madhyamikas and Advaitins, who both regard awareness as formless (nirakara) in and of itself. False Aspectarianism is a case in point that the formlessness of consciousness need not entail realism about external objects—it can just as well lead to a radically fictionalist view. | + | The False Aspectarian position that all perception—true to the [[spirit]] of Brentano’s famous dictum “Wahrnehmung ist Falschnehmung”—is tout court erroneous is closer to the position of the [[Madhyamikas]] and Advaitins, who both regard [[awareness]] as [[formless]] ([[nirakara]]) in and of itself. False Aspectarianism is a case in point that the [[formlessness]] of [[consciousness]] need not entail [[realism]] about external objects—it can just as well lead to a radically fictionalist view. |
− | Regarding the nature of the mind, False Aspectarianism is much closer to the Advaita position, as in False Aspectarian interpretation, “raw | + | Regarding the [[nature of the mind]], False Aspectarianism is much closer to the [[Wikipedia:Advaita Vedanta|Advaita]] position, as in False Aspectarian [[interpretation]], “raw [[feels]]” are mistaken and “[[consciousness]] is ultimately clear like a {{Wiki|crystal}}.” The false aspects are extrinsic to [[self-awareness]], which is in itself aspectless, veridical and nondually [[self-knowing]]. The False Aspectarian view gravitates even further in the [[direction]] of [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]], as it is not the transcendent, [[egoless]] and [[pure]] [[subjectivity]] that infects the [[mind]] with mistaken {{Wiki|qualia}}, but the egological [[consciousness]]. |
− | The False Aspectarian anti-realism about sense-data is partially vindicated by findings of contemporary psychophysics. For example, Pinker points out that outdoors, a lump of coal reflects more light than does a snowball does indoors. The absolute luminance of the “black” lump of coal is higher than the “white” snowball. Nonetheless, the coal is seen as black and the snowball is seen as white, because our visual system determines the lightness of an object by its relative luminance, i.e. it takes into account the luminance of its surroundings. On a similar note, Mach observes that a bright surface seems brighter next to a dark surface than next to one brighter than itself. Thus, although perceived qualities such as color and brightness seem to be absolute and independent, they are actually influenced by their surroundings. | + | The False Aspectarian anti-realism about sense-data is partially vindicated by findings of contemporary [[psychophysics]]. For example, Pinker points out that outdoors, a lump of coal reflects more {{Wiki|light}} than does a snowball does indoors. The [[absolute]] luminance of the “black” lump of coal is higher than the “white” snowball. Nonetheless, the coal is seen as black and the snowball is seen as white, because our [[visual]] system determines the lightness of an [[object]] by its [[relative]] luminance, i.e. it takes into account the luminance of its surroundings. On a similar note, Mach observes that a bright surface seems brighter next to a dark surface than next to one brighter than itself. Thus, although [[perceived]] qualities such as {{Wiki|color}} and [[brightness]] seem to be [[absolute]] and {{Wiki|independent}}, they are actually influenced by their surroundings. |
− | In the exposition Madhyamakalamkara (Ornament of the Middle Way), Santaraksita critiques the False Aspectarian view, arguing that it is fraught with inconsistencies. However, it is admitted that in its assessment that the phenomenal qualia are ungrounded, the False Aspectarian position better approximates Madhyamika than the True Aspectarian interpretation. | + | In the [[exposition]] [[Madhyamakalamkara]] ([[Ornament of the Middle Way]]), [[Santaraksita]] critiques the False Aspectarian view, arguing that it is fraught with inconsistencies. However, it is admitted that in its assessment that the [[phenomenal]] {{Wiki|qualia}} are ungrounded, the False Aspectarian position better approximates [[Madhyamika]] than the True Aspectarian [[interpretation]]. |
− | According to Tsongkhapa, the True and False Aspectarian positions boil down to being different ways of reading Cittamatra texts, i.e. the Vimsatika and other Mind-Only sastras potentially allow for both a True Aspectarian and a False Aspectarian interpretation. While it is tempting to categorize the Nalanda school as True and the Valabhi school as False Aspectarian, Tibetan doxographers don’t classify them along those lines. In fact, they seem to allow that Nalanda as well as Valabhi school texts can be read both ways. | + | According to [[Tsongkhapa]], the True and False Aspectarian positions boil down to being different ways of reading [[Cittamatra]] texts, i.e. the [[Vimsatika]] and other [[Mind-Only]] [[sastras]] potentially allow for both a True Aspectarian and a False Aspectarian [[interpretation]]. While it is tempting to categorize the [[Nalanda]] school as True and the [[Valabhi]] school as False Aspectarian, [[Tibetan]] [[Wikipedia:Doxography|doxographers]] don’t classify them along those lines. In fact, they seem to allow that [[Nalanda]] as well as [[Valabhi]] school texts can be read both ways. |
− | Vasubandhu’s Aspect—True or False? Is the Vasubandhu of the Vimsatika a True or a False Aspectarian? Possibly neither—if our hypothesis that the doctrine of Mind-Only is only an interim position is true. In his argument against solipsism in 21, he concludes that since one knows other minds as one knows one’s own—under the influence of avidya—one cannot | + | [[Vasubandhu’s]] Aspect—True or False? Is the [[Vasubandhu]] of the [[Vimsatika]] a True or a False Aspectarian? Possibly neither—if our hypothesis that the [[doctrine of Mind-Only]] is only an interim position is true. In his argument against {{Wiki|solipsism}} in 21, he concludes that since one [[knows]] other [[minds]] as one [[knows]] one’s own—under the influence of avidya—one cannot |
− | have direct knowledge of one’s own mind. This arguably rules out the possibility of the transcendental subjectivity knowing itself in self-reflexive awareness or by any a priori means. Here Vasubandhu is fighting fire with fire. Having closed the escape route to metaphysical realism, Vasubandhu urges that the Cartesian epoche with its unpalatable consequence of solipsism (as either subjective or absolute idealism) can only be broken by an even stronger skeptical epoche. In other words, he is implicitly submitting sunyata, for consideration. If Vasubandhu really intends to complete the Vimsatika on a note of absolute skepticism—and I think he does—then this vanishing point of the text is where its reading must be projected from in order to make sense. | + | have [[direct knowledge]] of one’s [[own mind]]. This arguably {{Wiki|rules}} out the possibility of the [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]] [[knowing]] itself in [[self-reflexive awareness]] or by any {{Wiki|a priori}} means. Here [[Vasubandhu]] is fighting [[fire]] with [[fire]]. Having closed the escape route to [[metaphysical]] [[realism]], [[Vasubandhu]] [[urges]] that the [[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|epoche}} with its unpalatable consequence of {{Wiki|solipsism}} (as either [[subjective]] or {{Wiki|absolute idealism}}) can only be broken by an even stronger skeptical {{Wiki|epoche}}. In other words, he is implicitly submitting [[sunyata]], for [[consideration]]. If [[Vasubandhu]] really intends to complete the [[Vimsatika]] on a note of [[absolute]] skepticism—and I think he does—then this vanishing point of the text is where its reading must be {{Wiki|projected}} from in order to make [[sense]]. |
− | But in order to lead his realist interlocutor to the vanishing point, Vasubandhu must first trap him under the bell jar of Cartesian epoche. This, then, is the philosophical task that Vasubandhu has cut out for himself in his argument against atomism. | + | But in order to lead his realist interlocutor to the vanishing point, [[Vasubandhu]] must first trap him under the [[bell]] jar of [[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|epoche}}. This, then, is the [[philosophical]] task that [[Vasubandhu]] has cut out for himself in his argument against [[atomism]]. |
− | ==3.2 Argument against Atomism== | + | ==3.2 Argument against [[Atomism]]== |
− | Mereological nihilism claims that wholes themselves do not exist, only their constitutive elementary parts. Vasubandhu now takes the Buddhist ultranominalism to its logical conclusion in repudiating even the elementary parts. The argument is a fundamental critique of realist conceptions of the part-whole relation. In his Kosa auto-commentary, Vasubandhu has pressed the Sautrantika critique of least-part substances persisting in time as far as possible. Now, in a change of tack, he brings under fire the notion of substances extended in space. | + | Mereological [[nihilism]] claims that wholes themselves do not [[exist]], only their constitutive elementary parts. [[Vasubandhu]] now takes the [[Buddhist]] ultranominalism to its [[logical]] conclusion in repudiating even the elementary parts. The argument is a fundamental critique of realist conceptions of the part-whole [[relation]]. In his [[Kosa]] auto-commentary, [[Vasubandhu]] has pressed the [[Sautrantika]] critique of least-part {{Wiki|substances}} persisting in time as far as possible. Now, in a change of tack, he brings under [[fire]] the notion of {{Wiki|substances}} extended in [[space]]. |
− | Schmithausen points out that Vimsatika contains modes of expression which betray an unmistakeable Sautrantika influence. There is therefore good reason to assume a continuity of philosophical agenda with the Sautrantika substance critique. King’s assessment that Yogacara criticizes atomism merely on experiential grounds is too weak, as we have seen in the previous chapter that only the Sarvastivada realist phenomenalism admits atoms to be within the realm of experience—Sautrantika does not. | + | [[Schmithausen]] points out that [[Vimsatika]] contains modes of expression which betray an unmistakeable [[Sautrantika]] influence. There is therefore good [[reason]] to assume a continuity of [[philosophical]] agenda with the Sautrantika [[substance]] critique. King’s assessment that [[Yogacara]] criticizes [[atomism]] merely on experiential grounds is too weak, as we have seen in the previous [[chapter]] that only the [[Sarvastivada]] realist {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} admits [[atoms]] to be within the [[realm]] of experience—Sautrantika does not. |
− | I shall be using TOLA and DRAGONETTI as the reference translation for the following reconstruction. However, the translations of Anacker, Wood, Kochumuttom and FRAUWALLNER are also taken into consideration. Also, I will be making frequent reference to Kapstein’s discussion of mereological considerations in Vasubandhu’s argument, as well as to the insightful analyses of SlDERlTS, CHATTERJEE, and Matilal. | + | I shall be using TOLA and DRAGONETTI as the reference translation for the following reconstruction. However, the translations of [[Anacker]], [[Wood]], {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} and FRAUWALLNER are also taken into consideration. Also, I will be making frequent reference to Kapstein’s [[discussion]] of mereological considerations in [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument, as well as to the [[insightful]] analyses of SlDERlTS, CHATTERJEE, and [[Matilal]]. |
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− | The structure of Vasubandhu’s argument is apagogic, as is typical for proofs of idealism. He attempts to disprove the realist interlocutors’ claims that external objects exist and are composed of transcendentally objective atoms given either directly in phenomenal experience or demonstrably constitutive of it. | + | The {{Wiki|structure}} of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument is apagogic, as is typical for proofs of [[idealism]]. He attempts to disprove the realist interlocutors’ claims that [[external objects]] [[exist]] and are composed of transcendentally [[objective]] [[atoms]] given either directly in [[phenomenal]] [[experience]] or demonstrably constitutive of it. |
− | Opponent Lineup Vasubandhu is arguing against three metaphysical realist opponents, each of whom propose a slightly different version of atomism. All three maintain mereological atomicity, but only the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika are mereological nihilists. | + | Opponent Lineup [[Vasubandhu]] is arguing against three [[metaphysical]] realist opponents, each of whom propose a slightly different version of [[atomism]]. All three maintain mereological atomicity, but only the [[Vaibhasika]] and the [[Sautrantika]] are mereological [[nihilists]]. |
− | The Vaisesika maintains that physical entities are real and directly given to experience. He proposes a direct realist account of perception with a foundational ontology of physical atoms in conglomeration. | + | The [[Vaisesika]] maintains that [[physical]] entities are real and directly given to [[experience]]. He proposes a direct realist account of [[perception]] with a foundational {{Wiki|ontology}} of [[physical]] [[atoms]] in conglomeration. |
− | The Vaibhasika position ventures that physical entities are conceptually imputed to coalesced collections of phenomenalistic atoms. Though the collections are only nominal, the atoms are real quality-particulars directly given to experience. Vaibhasika proposes a presentationalist account of perception based on a foundational ontology of substantial sensation-atoms that appear in collection. | + | The [[Vaibhasika]] position ventures that [[physical]] entities are conceptually [[imputed]] to coalesced collections of phenomenalistic [[atoms]]. Though the collections are only nominal, the [[atoms]] are real quality-particulars directly given to [[experience]]. [[Vaibhasika]] proposes a presentationalist account of [[perception]] based on a foundational {{Wiki|ontology}} of substantial sensation-atoms that appear in collection. |
− | In the Sautrantika view, phenomenal experience is held to be unreal (vikalpa), but has underlying realities that are given to reason as necessary conditions to experience. The Sautrantika representationalism commits to a foundational ontology of momentary stimulus-atoms. | + | In the [[Sautrantika]] view, [[phenomenal]] [[experience]] is held to be unreal ([[vikalpa]]), but has underlying [[realities]] that are given to [[reason]] as necessary [[conditions]] to [[experience]]. The [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|representationalism}} commits to a foundational {{Wiki|ontology}} of momentary stimulus-atoms. |
− | Object of Refutation The object of Vasubandhu’s refutation is not the empirically external or outer object (as such objects also also appear in dreams) but the mind-independent object, i.e. the category of the Kantian transcendental object (which does not appear in dreams). For the atomistic realist, the existence of such external objects is established by the existence of their atomic constituents. | + | [[Object]] of Refutation The [[object]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] refutation is not the empirically external or outer [[object]] (as such [[objects]] also also appear in [[dreams]]) but the mind-independent [[object]], i.e. the category of the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] transcendental [[object]] (which does not appear in [[dreams]]). For the atomistic realist, the [[existence]] of such [[external objects]] is established by the [[existence]] of their [[atomic]] constituents. |
− | But Vasubandhu argues that by modus tollens, since the existence of atoms cannot be proven, physical objects (or more technically, the outer ayatanas, i.e. the mind-independently existing sense-fields or logical spaces of sensibilia) likewise fail to be established as truly external. | + | But [[Vasubandhu]] argues that by [[modus tollens]], since the [[existence]] of [[atoms]] cannot be proven, [[physical objects]] (or more technically, the outer [[ayatanas]], i.e. the mind-independently [[existing]] sense-fields or [[logical]] spaces of sensibilia) likewise fail to be established as truly external. |
− | Vasubandhu’s line of reasoning may be roughly reconstructed as follows: The dream hypothesis of perception adequately accounts for experience and is consistent with empirical evidence. Vasubandhu has already established the internal consistency of his thesis against the realist interlocutor’s objections in verses 2-10. Given that Vasubandhu’s model is basically equivalent in skeptical strength to a Cartesian scenario, it cannot be falsified by any empirical evidence we will ever have. At this point, two closely linked objections may be brought into play: | + | [[Vasubandhu’s]] line of {{Wiki|reasoning}} may be roughly reconstructed as follows: The [[dream]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}} of [[perception]] adequately accounts for [[experience]] and is consistent with [[empirical evidence]]. [[Vasubandhu]] has already established the internal consistency of his {{Wiki|thesis}} against the realist interlocutor’s objections in verses 2-10. Given that [[Vasubandhu’s]] model is basically {{Wiki|equivalent}} in skeptical strength to a [[Cartesian]] scenario, it cannot be falsified by any [[empirical evidence]] we will ever have. At this point, two closely linked objections may be brought into play: |
− | (1) Williams relates the famous argument of O. K. Bouwsma that an illusion is no longer illusory if there is no conceivable way to distinguish it from reality. An illusion that is utterly undetectable as such by any empirical means can no longer be said to be deceiving us in any practically relevant sense. But under a True Aspectarian interpretation, this objection does not pose a problem to Vasubandhu, as he may argue that experience is illusion only in a transcendental sense. | + | (1) [[Williams]] relates the famous argument of O. K. Bouwsma that an [[illusion]] is no longer [[illusory]] if there is no conceivable way to distinguish it from [[reality]]. An [[illusion]] that is utterly undetectable as such by any [[empirical]] means can no longer be said to be deceiving us in any practically relevant [[sense]]. But under a True Aspectarian [[interpretation]], this objection does not pose a problem to [[Vasubandhu]], as he may argue that [[experience]] is [[illusion]] only in a [[transcendental]] [[sense]]. |
− | (2) By Popper’s falsification principle, the dream hypothesis is not an empirical theory because it does not have the capability of being proven false by contradicting empirical evidence. Vasubandhu can, however, safely dismiss this objection as irrelevant because he doesn’t claim that the dream hypothesis is an empirical theory—he is proposing it as a metempirical account of experience. | + | (2) By Popper’s [[falsification]] [[principle]], the [[dream]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}} is not an [[empirical]] {{Wiki|theory}} because it does not have the capability of being proven false by contradicting [[empirical evidence]]. [[Vasubandhu]] can, however, safely dismiss this objection as irrelevant because he doesn’t claim that the [[dream]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}} is an [[empirical]] theory—he is proposing it as a metempirical account of [[experience]]. |
− | Method Of Refutation Since Vasubandhu is arguing from the position of Cartesian epoche, he metaphysically brackets the transcendental existence of the external world while realism metaphysically asserts it. Therefore the entire burden of proof in this argument lies on the realist. For realism to be true, the existence of the external world must therefore be established by transcendental reasoning. | + | Method Of Refutation Since [[Vasubandhu]] is arguing from the position of [[Cartesian]] {{Wiki|epoche}}, he [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] brackets the [[transcendental]] [[existence]] of the [[external world]] while [[realism]] [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] asserts it. Therefore the entire [[burden]] of [[proof]] in this argument lies on the realist. For [[realism]] to be true, the [[existence]] of the [[external world]] must therefore be established by [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|reasoning}}. |
− | What could the realist’s transcendental reasoning establishing the existence of an external world look like? The reasoning must have two steps, analysis and constitution. The analysis (i.e., the completion of Kant’s so- called “regressus of decomposition”) is necessary otherwise the metaphysical realist can’t be certain that he has constituted from ontological ultimates. The step of constitution cross-checks the analysis to ensure that the atoms thus determined can actually account for the appearances of things. | + | What could the realist’s [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|reasoning}} establishing the existence of an [[external world]] look like? The {{Wiki|reasoning}} must have two steps, analysis and constitution. The analysis (i.e., the completion of [[Kant’s]] so- called “regressus of decomposition”) is necessary otherwise the [[metaphysical]] realist can’t be certain that he has constituted from [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] ultimates. The step of constitution cross-checks the analysis to ensure that the [[atoms]] thus determined can actually account for the [[appearances]] of things. |
− | Vasubandhu opens the argument by setting up a destructive trilemma in 11. The putatively external physical object must either itself be (1) a unitary, unanalyzable whole, or a composite that can be analytically reduced to (2) a collection of isolated atoms (.samghata), as maintained by the Vaibhasika, or (3) a conglomerate of atoms (pinda), as held by the Vaisesika. The cases (2) and (3) resolve into a dilemma between spatially differentiated and point-like atoms. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] opens the argument by setting up a {{Wiki|destructive}} trilemma in 11. The putatively external [[physical object]] must either itself be (1) a unitary, unanalyzable whole, or a composite that can be analytically reduced to (2) a collection of isolated [[atoms]] (.[[samghata]]), as maintained by the Vaibhasika, or (3) a conglomerate of [[atoms]] ([[pinda]]), as held by the [[Vaisesika]]. The cases (2) and (3) resolve into a {{Wiki|dilemma}} between spatially differentiated and point-like [[atoms]]. |
− | Vasubandhu will go about the argument by showing that if simples are held to be spatially differentiated, then the analysis is incomplete, and if they are claimed to be truly partless (i.e. point-like), then they are incapable of constituting phenomena. After (2) and (3) have been eliminated by this reductio, he will close by debunking position (1), the final horn of the trilemma. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] will go about the argument by showing that if simples are held to be spatially differentiated, then the analysis is incomplete, and if they are claimed to be truly partless (i.e. point-like), then they are incapable of constituting [[phenomena]]. After (2) and (3) have been eliminated by this reductio, he will close by debunking position (1), the final horn of the trilemma. |
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− | The argument in 12 is directed against the Vaisesika realist doctrine of minute but spatially extended spherical atoms that touch each other. Vasubandhu argues that it is impossible for spatially differentiated objects capable of direct contact with each other to be least parts (i.e. truly partless simples). This is because truly partless objects by definition cannot partially touch each other in space—they either touch completely or they do not touch at all. And they touch completely only if they precisely overlap each other, i.e. occupy the exact same location or spatial “receptacle.” Because spatially adjoining objects can only touch in parts, partless atoms cannot come into contact or be in connection (samyoga) with each other. | + | The argument in 12 is directed against the [[Vaisesika]] realist [[doctrine]] of minute but spatially extended spherical [[atoms]] that {{Wiki|touch}} each other. [[Vasubandhu]] argues that it is impossible for spatially differentiated [[objects]] capable of direct [[contact]] with each other to be least parts (i.e. truly partless simples). This is because truly partless [[objects]] by [[definition]] cannot partially {{Wiki|touch}} each other in space—they either {{Wiki|touch}} completely or they do not {{Wiki|touch}} at all. And they {{Wiki|touch}} completely only if they precisely overlap each other, i.e. occupy the exact same location or spatial “receptacle.” Because spatially adjoining [[objects]] can only {{Wiki|touch}} in parts, partless [[atoms]] cannot come into [[contact]] or be in [[connection]] ([[samyoga]]) with each other. |
− | Mereological Argument This reading exploits the intuition of the metaphysical realist that space is absolute, which implies that objects do not modify the geometrical structure of the space that they occupy. Vasubandhu assumes that even if it were possible to superimpose several objects of exactly identical shape into the same space, that the size of the objects would remain unchanged by this operation. The Vaisesika in fact admits that his binary least whole (dvyanuka), is of exactly atomic size because the constituent atoms cannot touch each other in parts. But according to the Vaisesika, the dvyanuka formed in this manner is now a real parts-possessor—a whole over and above its parts. | + | Mereological Argument This reading exploits the [[intuition]] of the metaphysical realist that [[space]] is [[absolute]], which implies that [[objects]] do not modify the geometrical {{Wiki|structure}} of the [[space]] that they occupy. [[Vasubandhu]] assumes that even if it were possible to superimpose several [[objects]] of exactly [[identical]] shape into the same [[space]], that the size of the [[objects]] would remain unchanged by this operation. The [[Vaisesika]] in fact admits that his binary least whole ([[dvyanuka]]), is of exactly [[atomic]] size because the constituent [[atoms]] cannot {{Wiki|touch}} each other in parts. But according to the [[Vaisesika]], the [[dvyanuka]] formed in this manner is now a real parts-possessor—a whole over and above its parts. |
− | There are, however, two problems with this view. First of all, two parts are only enough to constitute joining in two spatial dimensions. In order to arrange spheres in a three dimensional cubic lattice (as is probably the Vaisesika proposal), a minimum of six parts is required, as each atom contacts six others. This does not pose a major difficulty for the Vaisesika, as he may easily revise his concept of least whole, and argue that it comprises six least parts rather than two. | + | There are, however, two problems with this view. First of all, two parts are only enough to constitute joining in two spatial {{Wiki|dimensions}}. In order to arrange [[spheres]] in a three dimensional cubic lattice (as is probably the [[Vaisesika]] proposal), a minimum of six parts is required, as each {{Wiki|atom}} contacts six others. This does not pose a major difficulty for the [[Vaisesika]], as he may easily revise his {{Wiki|concept}} of least whole, and argue that it comprises six least parts rather than two. |
− | Vasubandhu would of course argue that this revision doesn’t do anything solve the underlying issue. This leads us to the second problem, which is that mereological parts can only join by occupying the same spatial receptacle. Least wholes cannot contact each other in parts as this would entail the spatial overlap of the contacting parts—and if this were to occur, the six atoms surrounding the center atom in the cubic lattice would collapse into it. All composite wholes would have the same size as a single atom, which Vasubandhu holds to be absurd. This is the “standard | + | [[Vasubandhu]] would of course argue that this revision doesn’t do anything solve the underlying issue. This leads us to the second problem, which is that mereological parts can only join by occupying the same spatial receptacle. Least wholes cannot [[contact]] each other in parts as this would entail the spatial overlap of the contacting parts—and if this were to occur, the six [[atoms]] surrounding the center {{Wiki|atom}} in the cubic lattice would collapse into it. All composite wholes would have the same size as a single {{Wiki|atom}}, which [[Vasubandhu]] holds to be absurd. This is the “standard [[interpretation]]” of the argument as presented e.g. in [[Gelugpa]] {{Wiki|doxography}}. |
− | Here we observe that Vasubandhu is controversially assuming that connection (samyoga) entails overlap, which is not generally the case. Connection is a topological concept, whereas overlap is mereological.51 If the two concepts are taken to be equivalent, then topology amounts to a model of mereology. Vasubandhu, being a Buddhist ultra-nominalist, is arguing just this. The gravamen of his case against the realist is the objection that an individual substance qua ontological ultimate must be construed as a bare mereological concept. Due to his Sautrantika roots, Vasubandhu has a critical concept of space and considers topological primitives such as connection and shape to be vikalpa. To him, these conceptual constructions are unreal and therefore not appropriate to the realm of ontology. Once we have accepted the ultra-nominalist premise that ultimate ontology is bare mereology—as Vasubandhu is urging—then his argument against atomism simply runs its course without further obstacles. | + | Here we observe that [[Vasubandhu]] is controversially assuming that connection ([[samyoga]]) entails overlap, which is not generally the case. Connection is a topological {{Wiki|concept}}, whereas overlap is mereological.51 If the two [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] are taken to be {{Wiki|equivalent}}, then topology amounts to a model of mereology. [[Vasubandhu]], being a [[Buddhist]] ultra-nominalist, is arguing just this. The gravamen of his case against the realist is the objection that an {{Wiki|individual}} [[substance]] qua [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] must be construed as a bare mereological {{Wiki|concept}}. Due to his [[Sautrantika]] [[roots]], [[Vasubandhu]] has a critical {{Wiki|concept}} of [[space]] and considers topological primitives such as [[connection]] and shape to be [[vikalpa]]. To him, these {{Wiki|conceptual}} constructions are unreal and therefore not appropriate to the [[realm]] of {{Wiki|ontology}}. Once we have accepted the ultra-nominalist premise that [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|ontology}} is bare mereology—as [[Vasubandhu]] is urging—then his argument against [[atomism]] simply runs its course without further [[obstacles]]. |
− | Since his two Buddhist opponents, the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika are both committed to mereological nihilism, they have no other choice but to go along with the unwelcome consequences of this position that Vasubandhu is about to draw for them. | + | Since his two [[Buddhist]] opponents, the [[Vaibhasika]] and the [[Sautrantika]] are both committed to mereological [[nihilism]], they have no other choice but to go along with the unwelcome {{Wiki|consequences}} of this position that [[Vasubandhu]] is about to draw for them. |
− | The Sautrantika position will be scrutinized later—for now, Vasubandhu is going to score points against the Kashmiri Vaibhasikas, who submit in XX that the mereological argument has no impact on their position. | + | The [[Sautrantika]] position will be scrutinized later—for now, [[Vasubandhu]] is going to score points against the [[Kashmiri]] [[Vaibhasikas]], who submit in XX that the mereological argument has no impact on their position. |
− | The Vaibhasikas explain that because they do not maintain the existence of connections between the partless substance-atoms that constitute the aggregate-atom (we recall that according to their view, the substance-atoms are separated by interstices). They argue that only these aggregate-atoms (or cohesive | + | The [[Vaibhasikas]] explain that because they do not maintain the [[existence]] of connections between the partless substance-atoms that constitute the aggregate-atom (we recall that according to their view, the substance-atoms are separated by interstices). They argue that only these aggregate-atoms (or cohesive “{{Wiki|molecular}}” groups) are connected among themselves, since they have parts. [[Vasubandhu]] off-handedly dismisses this {{Wiki|theory}} in 14 with the observation that the [[aggregate]] is a nominally designated mereological sum. Therefore, it cannot be a parts-possessor or be admitted to have any [[physical]] |
− | properties (such as connection, covering, resistance and obstruction) that its individual atoms lack. | + | properties (such as [[connection]], covering, resistance and obstruction) that its {{Wiki|individual}} [[atoms]] lack. |
− | Otherwise the aggregate-atom becomes a real conglomerate (pinda), which would be the position of the Vaisesika. Being an ultra-nominalist, the Vaibhasika is forced to accept this consequence. Vasubandhu emphasizes that the aggregate-atom’s inability to connect is due its purely nominal status, not due to the partlessness of the substance-atoms—this is an issue that he deals separately later on in the argument. | + | Otherwise the aggregate-atom becomes a real conglomerate ([[pinda]]), which would be the position of the [[Vaisesika]]. Being an ultra-nominalist, the Vaibhasika is forced to accept this consequence. [[Vasubandhu]] emphasizes that the aggregate-atom’s inability to connect is due its purely nominal {{Wiki|status}}, not due to the partlessness of the substance-atoms—this is an issue that he deals separately later on in the argument. |
− | The Vaisesika, on the other hand, is still very much alive and kicking. He is not willing to accept the idea that the atom is a bare mereological least part and retables an amended version of his proposal. Substance-atoms are not quite bare mereological least parts, he argues. They occupy receptacles and therefore have spatial extent. Two atoms join through mereological overlap (filling the same receptacle) to form a binary (dvyanuka).^ Topological connection is a property of integral wholes, not of least parts. The dvyanuka, being an integral whole, can now topologically connect as it pleases. | + | The [[Vaisesika]], on the other hand, is still very much alive and kicking. He is not willing to accept the [[idea]] that the {{Wiki|atom}} is a bare mereological least part and retables an amended version of his proposal. Substance-atoms are not quite bare mereological least parts, he argues. They occupy receptacles and therefore have spatial extent. Two [[atoms]] join through mereological overlap (filling the same receptacle) to [[form]] a binary ([[dvyanuka]]).^ Topological [[connection]] is a property of integral wholes, not of least parts. The [[dvyanuka]], being an integral whole, can now topologically connect as it pleases. |
− | However, Vasubandhu evidently thinks there is something deeply wrong with the idea that a mereological least part can possess spatial extent. Thus far, we have examined his “mereological argument” against the Vaisesika. But later on in 14 and XXIII, he offers a more general “geometric argument” intended to knock down the notion that an atom extended in space (i.e. occupying a spatial receptacle) can be an indivisible unity (ekatva). Vasubandhu unfortunately does not specify the argument in depth. He says only this much—a unity in which there is a | + | However, [[Vasubandhu]] evidently [[thinks]] there is something deeply wrong with the [[idea]] that a mereological least part can possess spatial extent. Thus far, we have examined his “mereological argument” against the [[Vaisesika]]. But later on in 14 and XXIII, he offers a more general “geometric argument” intended to knock down the notion that an {{Wiki|atom}} extended in [[space]] (i.e. occupying a spatial receptacle) can be an indivisible {{Wiki|unity}} ([[ekatva]]). [[Vasubandhu]] unfortunately does not specify the argument in depth. He says only this much—a {{Wiki|unity}} in which there is a “[[division]] according to the [[sections]] of the [[space]]” is not [[logically]] possible. In the following, we will examine two possible readings for this argument—the Zenonian and the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] model. |
− | Zenonian argument from complete divisibility The argument of complete divisibility (essentially a reformulated version of Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension), was first described by Aristotle, but later attributed to Zeno by Simplicius. | + | Zenonian argument from complete divisibility The argument of complete divisibility ([[essentially]] a reformulated version of Zeno’s metrical [[paradox]] of extension), was first described by {{Wiki|Aristotle}}, but later attributed to Zeno by Simplicius. |
− | If a body is completely divisible, then it must be divisible into parts that do not have any magnitude (else these parts would have spatial magnitude and therefore be incompletely divided). A complete division leaves either extensionless point-parts or nothing whatsoever. Zeno concludes that if nothing whatsoever remains after the division of a body, then the body is an illusion—ex nihil nihilo fit. And if only extensionless points remain, the sum of their extensions is zero, and therefore the body will be unextended. By consequence, if in reality, the body is no larger than a single point-atom, the appearance of an extended body would be illusory. | + | If a [[body]] is completely divisible, then it must be divisible into parts that do not have any magnitude (else these parts would have spatial magnitude and therefore be incompletely divided). A complete [[division]] leaves either extensionless point-parts or nothing whatsoever. Zeno concludes that if nothing whatsoever remains after the [[division]] of a [[body]], then the [[body]] is an illusion—ex nihil nihilo fit. And if only extensionless points remain, the sum of their extensions is zero, and therefore the [[body]] will be unextended. By consequence, if in [[reality]], the [[body]] is no larger than a single point-atom, the [[appearance]] of an extended [[body]] would be [[illusory]]. |
− | Against this, the Vaisesika will convey that the indivisibility of the atom is a merely physical one. It applies only to its physical substance and not to its spatial extent. The thesis being stated here is that for an entity to be a mereological least part, it is necessary and sufficient for it to be physically indivisible. This counter-argument is reasonable enough to derail the Zenonian analysis, and it is not immediately obvious as to what might be wrong with it. | + | Against this, the [[Vaisesika]] will convey that the [[indivisibility]] of the {{Wiki|atom}} is a merely [[physical]] one. It applies only to its [[physical substance]] and not to its spatial extent. The {{Wiki|thesis}} being stated here is that for an [[entity]] to be a mereological least part, it is necessary and sufficient for it to be {{Wiki|physically}} indivisible. This counter-argument is reasonable enough to derail the Zenonian analysis, and it is not immediately obvious as to what might be wrong with it. |
− | We can observe that by insisting on the necessity of a limit to physical division, the Vaisesika is maintaining a position that resembles Kant’s thesis of the second antinomy of pure reason, which now leads us to examine the second interpretive model for Vasubandhu’s geometric argument. | + | We can observe that by insisting on the necessity of a limit to [[physical]] [[division]], the [[Vaisesika]] is maintaining a position that resembles [[Kant’s]] {{Wiki|thesis}} of the second antinomy of [[pure]] [[reason]], which now leads us to examine the second interpretive model for [[Vasubandhu’s]] geometric argument. |
− | Kantian antithesis In the thesis of the second antinomy, Kant argues that composites are decomposable, and, more controversially, proposes the necessity of mereological atomicity—decomposition must entail reducibility to minimal parts. Every real composite must be reducible to a bottom level of self-subsisting simples. For if the operation of decomposition were to possess the property of closure (i.e. every composite entity yields only further composite entities under decomposition), nothing would remain if all composite entities were to be analyzed away, which Kant claims to be absurd. | + | [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] {{Wiki|antithesis}} In the {{Wiki|thesis}} of the second antinomy, {{Wiki|Kant}} argues that composites are decomposable, and, more controversially, proposes the necessity of mereological atomicity—decomposition must entail reducibility to minimal parts. Every real composite must be reducible to a bottom level of self-subsisting simples. For if the operation of decomposition were to possess the property of closure (i.e. every composite [[entity]] yields only further composite entities under decomposition), nothing would remain if all composite entities were to be analyzed away, which {{Wiki|Kant}} claims to be absurd. |
− | The antithesis of Kant’s second antinomy attempts to show that composites cannot have minimal parts. Kant’s case is based on the following premises— (1) composition is an external relation of substances and is possible only in space, (2) every part of a composite must occupy a sub-receptacle of the composite’s receptacle, (3) these sub-receptacles are themselves spaces. Therefore the receptacles of the simples are spatial. However, according to Kant, because space is external relation of substances, or rather, an inner mode of representation in which certain perceptions are connected to each other, a receptacle cannot be a space unless it contains a manifold or composite of substances in external relation to each other. But if the receptacle of a simple substance contains a composite, this implies the absurdity that the simple is a substantial composite. | + | The {{Wiki|antithesis}} of [[Kant’s]] second antinomy attempts to show that composites cannot have minimal parts. [[Kant’s]] case is based on the following premises— (1) composition is an external [[relation]] of {{Wiki|substances}} and is possible only in [[space]], (2) every part of a composite must occupy a sub-receptacle of the composite’s receptacle, (3) these sub-receptacles are themselves spaces. Therefore the receptacles of the simples are spatial. However, according to {{Wiki|Kant}}, because [[space]] is external [[relation]] of {{Wiki|substances}}, or rather, an inner mode of [[representation]] in which certain [[perceptions]] are connected to each other, a receptacle cannot be a [[space]] unless it contains a manifold or composite of {{Wiki|substances}} in external [[relation]] to each other. But if the receptacle of a simple [[substance]] contains a composite, this implies the absurdity that the simple is a substantial composite. |
− | Furthermore, Kant thinks that it is inconsistent for one and the same space to have two distinct limit-concepts—the extensionless geometrical point and additionally, the physically indivisible but geometrically spacefilling physical point. | + | Furthermore, {{Wiki|Kant}} [[thinks]] that it is inconsistent for one and the same [[space]] to have two {{Wiki|distinct}} limit-concepts—the extensionless geometrical point and additionally, the {{Wiki|physically}} indivisible but geometrically spacefilling [[physical]] point. |
− | Perhaps the Vaisesika position that the atom is “absolutely imperceptible” may be seen as an attempt to get a grip on this discrepancy by letting the physical extent of the atom converge against the spatial limit-concept. Supposing the atom is held to be geometrically divisible but physically indivisible, one may ask whether its shape is physical or geometrical. If it is both, then absurdly, the atom’s shape is divisible and indivisible. Finally, if the atom’s shape is merely geometrical, then the atom has turned out to be a synthesis of a substance with a geometric shape—and a simple, by definition, may not be a synthetic whole. | + | Perhaps the [[Vaisesika]] position that the {{Wiki|atom}} is “absolutely imperceptible” may be seen as an attempt to get a [[grip]] on this discrepancy by letting the [[physical]] extent of the {{Wiki|atom}} converge against the spatial limit-concept. Supposing the {{Wiki|atom}} is held to be geometrically divisible but {{Wiki|physically}} indivisible, one may ask whether its shape is [[physical]] or geometrical. If it is both, then absurdly, the atom’s shape is divisible and indivisible. Finally, if the atom’s shape is merely geometrical, then the {{Wiki|atom}} has turned out to be a {{Wiki|synthesis}} of a [[substance]] with a geometric shape—and a simple, by [[definition]], may not be a {{Wiki|synthetic}} whole. |
− | Kant remarks that the antitheses of the antinomies are typical of empiricist views. If Vasubandhu’s argument is anything like the antithesis of the second antinomy—and I think it is—then it should be fair enough to characterize his position as a kind of empiricism. | + | {{Wiki|Kant}} remarks that the antitheses of the antinomies are typical of empiricist [[views]]. If [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument is anything like the {{Wiki|antithesis}} of the second antinomy—and I think it is—then it should be fair enough to characterize his position as a kind of {{Wiki|empiricism}}. |
− | We will not be able to establish here whether Kant’s attempt to prove that a substance cannot have both spatial extent and simplicity satisfactorily accomplishes the work cut out for it. Vasubandhu probably intuits—for reasons much similar to those of Kant—that there can be no such thing as a mereological least part that occupies a receptacle. Would he then also agree with the thesis of the second antinomy? On Kapstein’s reading, Vasubandhu argues both the thesis and the antithesis of Kant’s second antinomy: | + | We will not be able to establish here whether [[Kant’s]] attempt to prove that a [[substance]] cannot have both spatial extent and [[simplicity]] satisfactorily accomplishes the work cut out for it. [[Vasubandhu]] probably intuits—for [[reasons]] much similar to those of Kant—that there can be no such thing as a mereological least part that occupies a receptacle. Would he then also agree with the {{Wiki|thesis}} of the second antinomy? On Kapstein’s reading, [[Vasubandhu]] argues both the {{Wiki|thesis}} and the {{Wiki|antithesis}} of [[Kant’s]] second antinomy: “[[Vasubandhu]], on the other hand, aims to demonstrate that the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|theory}} is both false and necessary.” |
− | But Kapstein’s explanation of what Vasubandhu is up to here is muddled. Vasubandhu is not aiming to establish the necessity of the atomic theory—he is merely attempting to demonstrate that the realist’s atomic theory leads to antinomy. The “necessity” of the atomic theory is the realist’s position, not Vasubandhu’s. | + | But Kapstein’s explanation of what [[Vasubandhu]] is up to here is muddled. [[Vasubandhu]] is not aiming to establish the necessity of the [[atomic]] theory—he is merely attempting to demonstrate that the realist’s [[atomic]] {{Wiki|theory}} leads to antinomy. The “necessity” of the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|theory}} is the realist’s position, not [[Vasubandhu’s]]. |
− | What of the possibility of “exotic space?” The realist need not assume that space is continuous—he may argue that it is discrete (as was first proposed by Zuse). Or he could argue that the metrical structure of three-dimensional Euclidean space is a property that only emerges at the scale of macroscopic objects. Continuity and metric could be macroscopic epiphenomena of some more exotic type of space at a microscopic level, e.g. a space that comes in discrete chunks, that has more than three dimensions, etc.—as is often assumed in modern theoretical physics. | + | What of the possibility of “exotic [[space]]?” The realist need not assume that [[space]] is continuous—he may argue that it is discrete (as was first proposed by Zuse). Or he could argue that the metrical {{Wiki|structure}} of three-dimensional {{Wiki|Euclidean}} [[space]] is a property that only emerges at the scale of macroscopic [[objects]]. Continuity and metric could be macroscopic epiphenomena of some more exotic type of [[space]] at a microscopic level, e.g. a [[space]] that comes in discrete chunks, that has more than three {{Wiki|dimensions}}, etc.—as is often assumed in {{Wiki|modern}} [[theoretical physics]]. |
− | However, if the realist were to travel down this route, he would effectively be arguing that space has hidden properties not accessible to sensible intuition—a very slippery slope for a direct realist like the Vaisesika. | + | However, if the realist were to travel down this route, he would effectively be arguing that [[space]] has hidden properties not accessible to sensible intuition—a very slippery slope for a direct realist like the [[Vaisesika]]. |
− | ==3.2.3 Against Point-like Atoms== | + | ==3.2.3 Against Point-like [[Atoms]]== |
− | The treatment of point-like atoms as a possible case is a hermeneutic interpolation to make the proof easier to follow. The terms “point” or “point-like” are not explicitly mentioned by Vasubandhu—the karikas and auto-commentary only discuss the atom qua | + | The treatment of point-like [[atoms]] as a possible case is a {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} interpolation to make the [[proof]] easier to follow. The terms “point” or “point-like” are not explicitly mentioned by Vasubandhu—the [[karikas]] and auto-commentary only discuss the {{Wiki|atom}} qua “{{Wiki|unity}}” ([[ekatva]]). This assumption is supported by the [[interpretation]] of [[Siderits]], who also ventures that [[Vasubandhu]] is examining the case of point-like [[atoms]]. |
− | Vasubandhu’s arguments in 14 are directed against the idea that phenomenal appearances cannot be constituted from point-like atoms. He argues that atoms must be spatially differentiated in order to account for certain visual phenomena such as light and shadow or extended surfaces. | + | [[Vasubandhu’s]] arguments in 14 are directed against the [[idea]] that phenomenal [[appearances]] cannot be constituted from point-like [[atoms]]. He argues that [[atoms]] must be spatially differentiated in order to account for certain [[visual]] [[phenomena]] such as {{Wiki|light}} and shadow or extended surfaces. |
− | Since Vasubandhu has already established that true atoms cannot not have spatial differentiation, the argument that point-like atoms cannot account for appearances completes the reductio against atoms. | + | Since [[Vasubandhu]] has already established that true [[atoms]] cannot not have spatial differentiation, the argument that point-like [[atoms]] cannot account for [[appearances]] completes the reductio against [[atoms]]. |
− | Shadow Terminator Argument This argument is against the Vaisesika opponent, who wishes to dodge Vasubandhu’s arguments against spatially extended atoms by proposing point-like atoms in lieu of his original theory that atoms are infinitesimally sized spheres. Vasubandhu’s objection is predicated on the Vaisesika’s physicalistic belief that light is a kind of incorporeal substance or luminous fluidum (unlike the understanding of the phenomenalizing Buddhist schools, who analyze light strictly as intensity of visual sensation or stimulus). The Vaisesika define shadow as absence of illumination. | + | Shadow Terminator Argument This argument is against the [[Vaisesika]] opponent, who wishes to dodge [[Vasubandhu’s]] arguments against spatially extended [[atoms]] by proposing point-like [[atoms]] in lieu of his original {{Wiki|theory}} that [[atoms]] are infinitesimally sized [[spheres]]. [[Vasubandhu’s]] objection is predicated on the Vaisesika’s physicalistic [[belief]] that {{Wiki|light}} is a kind of incorporeal [[substance]] or {{Wiki|luminous}} fluidum (unlike the [[understanding]] of the phenomenalizing [[Buddhist schools]], who analyze {{Wiki|light}} strictly as intensity of [[visual]] [[sensation]] or {{Wiki|stimulus}}). The [[Vaisesika]] define shadow as absence of [[illumination]]. |
− | Vasubandhu contends that for a matter-atom to be able to cast shadow on other objects, it must obstruct the fluidum, which it can only do if it is bisected by a shadow terminator (a line dividing the illuminated from the shadowed section of the atom). But a truly point-like matter-atom cannot have a light and a shadow side. It is incapable of obstructing the luminous fluidum, any more than a dam can hold back water without an upstream and a downstream face. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] contends that for a matter-atom to be able to cast shadow on other [[objects]], it must obstruct the fluidum, which it can only do if it is bisected by a shadow terminator (a line dividing the [[illuminated]] from the shadowed section of the {{Wiki|atom}}). But a truly point-like matter-atom cannot have a {{Wiki|light}} and a shadow side. It is incapable of obstructing the {{Wiki|luminous}} fluidum, any more than a [[dam can]] hold back [[water]] without an upstream and a downstream face. |
− | The realist protests that even if individual atoms are uniformly light or shadow, this does not logically exclude the possibility that a conglomerate of atoms could be bisected with a shadow terminator, dividing uniformly light from uniformly dark atoms. | + | The realist protests that even if {{Wiki|individual}} [[atoms]] are uniformly {{Wiki|light}} or shadow, this does not [[logically]] exclude the possibility that a conglomerate of [[atoms]] could be bisected with a shadow terminator, dividing uniformly {{Wiki|light}} from uniformly dark [[atoms]]. |
− | In response, Vasubandhu inquires whether is it being admitted that an agglomeration (pinda) is something other than the atoms themselves. Is the realist in other words willing to admit conglomerates of atoms into his foundational ontology? The realist objector is forced to answer that they can’t be admitted—to do so would defeat the whole point of having a foundational ontology. However, if the conglomerate is not admitted as an entity in its own right, then the realist’s objection is scuttled. How is it that the conglomerate as a whole can obstruct light if none of its atoms are able to? One would expect it to be totally transparent. | + | In response, [[Vasubandhu]] inquires whether is it being admitted that an agglomeration ([[pinda]]) is something other than the [[atoms]] themselves. Is the realist in other words willing to admit conglomerates of [[atoms]] into his foundational {{Wiki|ontology}}? The realist objector is forced to answer that they can’t be admitted—to do so would defeat the whole point of having a foundational {{Wiki|ontology}}. However, if the conglomerate is not admitted as an [[entity]] in its [[own]] right, then the realist’s objection is scuttled. How is it that the conglomerate as a whole can obstruct {{Wiki|light}} if none of its [[atoms]] are able to? One would expect it to be totally transparent. |
− | Of course, this line of reasoning does not take into account the modern physical theory of point-like particles that can act at a distance by way of field effects. But this poses no problem for Vasubandhu because none of his realist opponents adhere to such a view. | + | Of course, this line of {{Wiki|reasoning}} does not take into account the {{Wiki|modern}} [[physical]] {{Wiki|theory}} of point-like {{Wiki|particles}} that can act at a distance by way of field effects. But this poses no problem for [[Vasubandhu]] because none of his realist opponents adhere to such a view. |
− | Displacement Argument Here Vasubandhu argues that if atoms are incapable of obstructing each other, they lose the ability to spatially displace each other and collapse into the same spatial location when connected. Possibly, Vasubandhu is playing on the geometrical intuition that an extensionless (i.e. point-like) atom with no internal structure can make direct contact with another such atom if and only if they both occupy the exact same geometrical point. In this particular edge case, topological connection coincides with mereological overlap. | + | Displacement Argument Here [[Vasubandhu]] argues that if [[atoms]] are incapable of obstructing each other, they lose the ability to spatially displace each other and collapse into the same spatial location when connected. Possibly, [[Vasubandhu]] is playing on the geometrical [[intuition]] that an extensionless (i.e. point-like) {{Wiki|atom}} with no internal {{Wiki|structure}} can make direct [[contact]] with another such {{Wiki|atom}} if and only if they both occupy the exact same geometrical point. In this particular edge case, topological [[connection]] coincides with mereological overlap. |
− | The displacement argument applies equally to the Vaisesika and the Vaibhasika atomisms. The Vaibhasika’s aggregate-atoms cannot connect, nor can their non-obstructing partless atoms. The Vaibhasika of course agrees that atoms do not connect to each other. But if atoms are unconnected, individually partless and non-obstructing (i.e. point-like), the Vaibhasika is unable to account for how they might constitute physically resistant or visually opaque surfaces in sum. He is reduced to abiding by the unconvincing hypothesis that individual substance-atoms have latent properties that are actualized only when they are perceived in collection. This is unsatisfactory because it is not admitted that an individual atom may be perceived in isolation—hence, the cases of latent properties and “insensible sensibilia” coincide. Talk of latent properties does nothing to alleviate the real problem at hand. | + | The displacement argument applies equally to the [[Vaisesika]] and the Vaibhasika atomisms. The Vaibhasika’s aggregate-atoms cannot connect, nor can their non-obstructing partless [[atoms]]. The [[Vaibhasika]] of course agrees that [[atoms]] do not connect to each other. But if [[atoms]] are unconnected, individually partless and non-obstructing (i.e. point-like), the [[Vaibhasika]] is unable to account for how they might constitute {{Wiki|physically}} resistant or visually opaque surfaces in sum. He is reduced to abiding by the unconvincing {{Wiki|hypothesis}} that {{Wiki|individual}} substance-atoms have latent properties that are actualized only when they are [[perceived]] in collection. This is unsatisfactory because it is not admitted that an {{Wiki|individual}} {{Wiki|atom}} may be [[perceived]] in isolation—hence, the cases of latent properties and “insensible sensibilia” coincide. Talk of latent properties does nothing to alleviate the real problem at hand. |
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− | After Vasubandhu has thoroughly laid waste to the idea that atomism is compatible with a two-term theory of perception, the Vaisesika is back with a new proposal predicated instead on the integral whole (auayavin). He objects that since Vasubandhu’s reasoning against atoms and conglomerates has left the phenomenal characteristics (such as form-color) of the external sense-fields untouched, why not simply admit percepts (i.e., integral wholes) as external? | + | After [[Vasubandhu]] has thoroughly laid waste to the [[idea]] that [[atomism]] is compatible with a two-term {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]], the [[Vaisesika]] is back with a new proposal predicated instead on the integral whole (auayavin). He [[objects]] that since [[Vasubandhu’s]] {{Wiki|reasoning}} against [[atoms]] and conglomerates has left the [[phenomenal characteristics]] (such as form-color) of the external sense-fields untouched, why not simply admit [[percepts]] (i.e., integral wholes) as external? |
− | The Vaisesika contends that the whole is an object of valid knowledge. If the whole is known by any means of valid knowledge, it is useless to consider the alternatives as to how it exists in the parts. He pleads the common-sense realist standpoint that abstract speculation cannot override valid experience of unities. The perception of the unitary whole does not depend on the perception of atoms, he argues, although their existence can be inferred. We can already surmise what Vasubandhu thinks of this. In his auto-commentary to the Kosa, he has gone so far as to disparage the integral whole (avayaviri) theory of the Vaisesika as | + | The [[Vaisesika]] contends that the whole is an [[object]] of valid [[knowledge]]. If the whole is known by any means of valid [[knowledge]], it is useless to consider the alternatives as to how it [[exists]] in the parts. He pleads the {{Wiki|common-sense}} realist standpoint that abstract speculation cannot override valid [[experience]] of unities. The [[perception]] of the unitary whole does not depend on the [[perception]] of [[atoms]], he argues, although their [[existence]] can be inferred. We can already surmise what [[Vasubandhu]] [[thinks]] of this. In his auto-commentary to the [[Kosa]], he has gone so far as to disparage the integral whole (avayaviri) {{Wiki|theory}} of the [[Vaisesika]] as “{{Wiki|infantile}}.” |
− | Although he almost can’t be bothered with a counter-argument, Vasubandhu expands into a one-or-many reductio and immediately dismisses the many case as having already been refuted. As for the case that phenomenal appearances themselves are integral wholes, Vasubandhu argues that a real, self-subsisting unity ought to have uniform, non-conflicting properties. He then points out some of the absurdities that result from this idea. The core of the argument is contained in his axiomatic proposition: “For a concurrent apprehension and non-apprehension of the same thing isn’t logical.” | + | Although he almost can’t be bothered with a counter-argument, [[Vasubandhu]] expands into a one-or-many reductio and immediately dismisses the many case as having already been refuted. As for the case that [[phenomenal]] [[appearances]] themselves are integral wholes, [[Vasubandhu]] argues that a real, self-subsisting {{Wiki|unity}} ought to have {{Wiki|uniform}}, non-conflicting properties. He then points out some of the absurdities that result from this [[idea]]. The core of the argument is contained in his axiomatic proposition: “For a concurrent apprehension and non-apprehension of the same thing isn’t [[logical]].” |
− | Here we need to keep in mind that Vasubandhu is speaking of the atom qua perceptual datum. By definition, an atomic perceptual datum must either be given in its entirety or not at all. If it is possible to see only part of an object (for example, an aspect of a tree), the object cannot be an atomic datum. But all gross physical phenomena, Vasubandhu points out, are only ever given in aspect. While we may say that we see a brown table, we will have to admit that there are parts of the table that we do not see. | + | Here we need to keep in [[mind]] that [[Vasubandhu]] is {{Wiki|speaking}} of the {{Wiki|atom}} qua {{Wiki|perceptual}} datum. By [[definition]], an [[atomic]] {{Wiki|perceptual}} datum must either be given in its entirety or not at all. If it is possible to see only part of an [[object]] (for example, an aspect of a [[tree]]), the [[object]] cannot be an [[atomic]] datum. But all gross [[physical phenomena]], [[Vasubandhu]] points out, are only ever given in aspect. While we may say that we see a brown table, we will have to admit that there are parts of the table that we do not see. |
− | Chatterjee conjectures that Vasubandhu is making an argument for the necessity of phenomenal pluralism to subjective epistemic knowing, as absolute unity would entail an absolute uniformity of experience without change or succession. Kochumuttom has it that Vasubandhu is attempting to refute Parmenidean monism. | + | [[Chatterjee]] conjectures that [[Vasubandhu]] is making an argument for the necessity of [[phenomenal]] [[pluralism]] to [[subjective]] {{Wiki|epistemic}} [[knowing]], as [[absolute unity]] would entail an [[absolute]] uniformity of [[experience]] without change or succession. {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}} has it that [[Vasubandhu]] is attempting to refute [[Wikipedia:Parmenides|Parmenidean]] {{Wiki|monism}}. |
− | While there is something to be said for these points, the following examples provided by Vasubandhu illustrate that his argument is mainly mereological in thrust. On the reading being proposed here, after already having argued against the substantial partless part, Vasubandhu is now demolishing the idea of the substantial partless whole. | + | While there is something to be said for these points, the following examples provided by [[Vasubandhu]] illustrate that his argument is mainly mereological in thrust. On the reading being proposed here, after already having argued against the substantial partless part, [[Vasubandhu]] is now demolishing the [[idea]] of the substantial partless whole. |
− | In the first example, Vasubandhu raises the objection that partless wholes contradict the experiential reality of incremental movement. If the earth, for instance, were an indivisible unity, it should not be possible to walk, because the ground would have no parts that could be traversed by the successive steps. For motion to be possible, there must be distance, which in turn entails spatial extent and directional parts. | + | In the first example, [[Vasubandhu]] raises the objection that partless wholes contradict the experiential [[reality]] of incremental {{Wiki|movement}}. If the [[earth]], for instance, were an indivisible {{Wiki|unity}}, it should not be possible to walk, because the ground would have no parts that could be traversed by the successive steps. For {{Wiki|motion}} to be possible, there must be distance, which in turn entails spatial extent and directional parts. |
− | Next, if entities are partless wholes, it should not be possible to grasp a whole in some parts but not in others. Yet clearly, we are touching the elephant even if we are only touching its trunk and not its tail. | + | Next, if entities are partless wholes, it should not be possible to [[grasp]] a whole in some parts but not in others. Yet clearly, we are [[touching]] the [[elephant]] even if we are only [[touching]] its trunk and not its tail. |
− | Moreover, if it is supposed that partless wholes are differentiated only by their phenomenal characteristics and not by their spatial location, then it should not be possible to distinguish horses from elephants, or several horses from one. A separation of entities could not be accepted since everything would be spatially indistinct, i.e. occupying the same location. | + | Moreover, if it is supposed that partless wholes are differentiated only by their [[phenomenal characteristics]] and not by their spatial location, then it should not be possible to distinguish [[horses]] from [[elephants]], or several [[horses]] from one. A separation of entities could not be accepted since everything would be spatially indistinct, i.e. occupying the same location. |
− | In the final example, which involves microscopic aquatic animals, Vasubandhu argues that entities are distinguished by size. Else if phenomenal characteristics were held to be independent of physical size, we should be able to see micro/-organisms with the naked eye. | + | In the final example, which involves microscopic aquatic [[animals]], [[Vasubandhu]] argues that entities are {{Wiki|distinguished}} by size. Else if phenomenal [[characteristics]] were held to be {{Wiki|independent}} of [[physical]] size, we should be able to see micro/-organisms with the naked [[eye]]. |
− | The distinction of phenomenal characteristics (i.e. description of sensory experience in a purely phenomenal language) is in and of itself insufficient to distinguish unities—non-phenomenal factors such as quantity, distance, size and time must be brought in. Such concepts are not reducible to phenomenal language. | + | The {{Wiki|distinction}} of [[phenomenal characteristics]] (i.e. description of [[sensory experience]] in a purely [[phenomenal]] [[language]]) is in and of itself insufficient to distinguish unities—non-phenomenal factors such as {{Wiki|quantity}}, distance, size and time must be brought in. Such [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] are not reducible to [[phenomenal]] [[language]]. |
− | The phenomenal wholes given to experience have parts, Vasubandhu reasons, and if they are to be substantial, they must necessarily have least parts. But they do not—therefore he concludes that phenomena are insubstantial, and that there is no more to a phenomenon than our awareness of it. | + | The [[phenomenal]] wholes given to [[experience]] have parts, [[Vasubandhu]] reasons, and if they are to be substantial, they must necessarily have least parts. But they do not—therefore he concludes that [[phenomena]] are insubstantial, and that there is no more to a [[phenomenon]] than our [[awareness]] of it. |
− | ==3.2.5 Against the Causal Theory of Perception== | + | ==3.2.5 Against the Causal [[Theory of Perception]]== |
− | In 16, the argument is against the Sautrantika, who espouses a stripped- down version of the Vaibhasika externalism of mental intentionality. A mental representation is epistemically grounded by the collection of stimulusatoms that causally generated it, the Sautrantika wishes to claim. He is proposing something of the sort that momentary (ksanika) point-like stimulus-atoms act in aggregate upon the sense bases to causally generate non-point-like sensations that assemble into representations. | + | In 16, the argument is against the [[Sautrantika]], who espouses a stripped- down version of the [[Vaibhasika]] {{Wiki|externalism}} of [[mental]] {{Wiki|intentionality}}. A mental [[representation]] is epistemically grounded by the collection of stimulusatoms that [[causally]] generated it, the [[Sautrantika]] wishes to claim. He is proposing something of the sort that momentary ([[ksanika]]) point-like stimulus-atoms act in [[aggregate]] upon the [[sense bases]] to [[causally]] generate non-point-like [[sensations]] that assemble into {{Wiki|representations}}. |
− | The time-gap argument for representationalism is premised on the idea that because there can be a delay between an observed event and one’s observation of it, one actually observes a representation of the event. But the time-gap argument only supports representationalism if physical objects are assumed to exist. If the external object is the probandum of the argument—as is the case for the Sautrantika strain of realism—it operates against representationalism instead of confirming it. | + | The time-gap argument for {{Wiki|representationalism}} is premised on the [[idea]] that because there can be a delay between an observed event and one’s observation of it, one actually observes a [[representation]] of the event. But the time-gap argument only supports {{Wiki|representationalism}} if [[physical objects]] are assumed to [[exist]]. If the [[external object]] is the [[probandum]] of the argument—as is the case for the [[Sautrantika]] strain of realism—it operates against {{Wiki|representationalism}} instead of confirming it. |
− | Vasubandhu points out that under a strict presentist account of atoms, externalism about intentional states breaks down completely. Because Sautrantika doesn’t admit to external temporal continuants, by the time a mental representation arises, the stimuli that caused it have evanesced. By consequence, all representations of external objects come to be representations of absistents—neither do they offer a solid ground of inference about reality, nor do they require the epistemic grounding that such an inference might provide. | + | [[Vasubandhu]] points out that under a strict presentist account of [[atoms]], {{Wiki|externalism}} about intentional states breaks down completely. Because Sautrantika doesn’t admit to external {{Wiki|temporal}} continuants, by the time a [[mental]] [[representation]] arises, the {{Wiki|stimuli}} that [[caused]] it have evanesced. By consequence, all {{Wiki|representations}} of [[external objects]] come to be representations of absistents—neither do they offer a solid ground of {{Wiki|inference}} about [[reality]], nor do they require the {{Wiki|epistemic}} grounding that such an {{Wiki|inference}} might provide. |
− | This line of reasoning echoes a Vaibhasika critique of the Sautrantika representationalism, to the effect that that inference is based on logical pervasion (vyapti) of the mark of inference and the inferred property. This pervasion being the ground of inference, it cannot itself be derived from inference but must be given in perception. However, since the Sautrantika denies direct perception of external objects, they can never be objects of inference either due to a lack of the necessary ground of inference. | + | This line of {{Wiki|reasoning}} echoes a [[Vaibhasika]] critique of the [[Sautrantika]] {{Wiki|representationalism}}, to the effect that that {{Wiki|inference}} is based on [[logical pervasion]] ([[vyapti]]) of the mark of {{Wiki|inference}} and the inferred property. This pervasion being the ground of {{Wiki|inference}}, it cannot itself be derived from {{Wiki|inference}} but must be given in [[perception]]. However, since the [[Sautrantika]] denies direct [[perception]] of [[external objects]], they can never be [[objects]] of {{Wiki|inference}} either due to a lack of the necessary ground of {{Wiki|inference}}. |
− | Since the Sautrantika’s causal theory of perception invalidates his own thesis while establishing the position of Vasubandhu, the Sautrantika might as well dispense with his gratuitous metaphysical hypothesis of external objects. Russell once famously argued that naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. Vasubandhu is driving home an analogous point about the Sautrantika position. | + | Since the Sautrantika’s causal {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] invalidates his [[own]] {{Wiki|thesis}} while establishing the position of [[Vasubandhu]], the [[Sautrantika]] might as well dispense with his gratuitous [[metaphysical]] {{Wiki|hypothesis}} of [[external objects]]. Russell once famously argued that {{Wiki|naive}} [[realism]], if true, is false; therefore it is false. [[Vasubandhu]] is driving home an analogous point about the [[Sautrantika]] position. |
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− | If there are no atoms, then ought Mind-Only not to maintain that phenomena are in principle infinitely divisible? Why is it is taken for granted by his realist opponents that infinite divisibility is a problem? Leibniz, for example, believed the idea that atoms mark an end to the subdivision of matter to be a dangerous error. David Lewis and others have speculated that the hypothesis that physical objects are “atomless gunk” ought not to be ruled out a priori. It is also conceivable that some (but not all) composite objects have a complete atomic decomposition. | + | If there are no [[atoms]], then ought [[Mind-Only]] not to maintain that [[phenomena]] are in [[principle]] infinitely divisible? Why is it is taken for granted by his realist opponents that [[infinite]] divisibility is a problem? {{Wiki|Leibniz}}, for example, believed the [[idea]] that [[atoms]] mark an end to the subdivision of {{Wiki|matter}} to be a [[dangerous]] error. David Lewis and others have speculated that the {{Wiki|hypothesis}} that [[physical objects]] are “atomless gunk” ought not to be ruled out {{Wiki|a priori}}. It is also conceivable that some (but not all) composite [[objects]] have a complete [[atomic]] decomposition. |
− | It has been argued by some modern commentators that Vasubandhu’s demonstration shows not that phenomena are not compounded, but that they are compounded to an infinite degree, i.e. that phenomena are gunk. Following the principle of ex nihilo nihilo fit, since infinitely divisible phenomena lack a compositional base of elemental substances, they are insubstantial and therefore illusory. Vasubandhu’s line of reasoning may be construed as an inversion of | + | It has been argued by some {{Wiki|modern}} commentators that [[Vasubandhu’s]] demonstration shows not that [[phenomena]] are not [[compounded]], but that they are [[compounded]] to an [[infinite]] [[degree]], i.e. that [[phenomena]] are gunk. Following the [[principle]] of ex nihilo nihilo fit, since infinitely divisible phenomena lack a compositional base of [[elemental]] {{Wiki|substances}}, they are insubstantial and therefore [[illusory]]. [[Vasubandhu’s]] line of {{Wiki|reasoning}} may be construed as an [[inversion]] of [[Epicurus]]’ [[principle]] that indivisible minima are necessary if macroscopic [[bodies]] are not to be mere [[appearances]]. Since indivisible minima are [[logically]] impossible, [[Vasubandhu]] concludes that macroscopic [[bodies]] are in fact no more than [[appearances]]. |
− | Must phenomena have a compositional base in order to sustain realism? Or restating the question in broader terms, need a foundationalist realism entail reductionism and externalism? The Indian realists of Vasubandhu’s day seemed to think so. Would they even recognize a coherentist, nonreductionist, internalist epistemology as realism? To hazard a guess, perhaps they might recognize such a realism as Vijnanavada! | + | Must [[phenomena]] have a compositional base in order to sustain [[realism]]? Or restating the question in broader terms, need a foundationalist [[realism]] entail {{Wiki|reductionism}} and {{Wiki|externalism}}? The [[Indian]] [[realists]] of [[Vasubandhu’s]] day seemed to think so. Would they even [[recognize]] a coherentist, nonreductionist, internalist epistemology as [[realism]]? To hazard a guess, perhaps they might [[recognize]] such a [[realism]] as [[Vijnanavada]]! |
− | The argument against atomism requires a number of unstated assumptions to function as intended, many of which are quite possibly false. The notion of physical divisibility, for example, may pose theoretical difficulties to Vasubandhu’s analysis, as it requires a concrete physical operation, as opposed to a purely abstract or mental operation. The required energy to split a composite particle must be supplied by some particle interaction which physically destroys the original composite particle. This process cannot be compared to analytic decomposition, as once a composite particle has been physically split into its component parts, the composite that they were a part of no longer exists. Therefore, they can no longer be properly considered parts of that composite. | + | The argument against [[atomism]] requires a number of unstated assumptions to function as intended, many of which are quite possibly false. The notion of [[physical]] divisibility, for example, may pose {{Wiki|theoretical}} difficulties to [[Vasubandhu’s]] analysis, as it requires a concrete [[physical]] operation, as opposed to a purely abstract or [[mental]] operation. The required [[energy]] to split a composite {{Wiki|particle}} must be supplied by some {{Wiki|particle}} interaction which {{Wiki|physically}} destroys the original composite {{Wiki|particle}}. This process cannot be compared to analytic decomposition, as once a composite {{Wiki|particle}} has been {{Wiki|physically}} split into its component parts, the composite that they were a part of no longer [[exists]]. Therefore, they can no longer be properly considered parts of that composite. |
− | To give a blanket refutation of atomism, Vasubandhu would have to demonstrate that, generally speaking, all atomistic mereologies are either logically inconsistent or empirically useless, but of course his argument accomplishes no such thing. Also, it does not defeat gunk theory and theories such as those of modern particle physics involving point-particles with interactional force fields, nor does it damage ontologically non-absolute atomisms such as constitution from sensory minima, attributive atomism, instrumentalist atomism or logical atomism. | + | To give a blanket refutation of [[atomism]], [[Vasubandhu]] would have to demonstrate that, generally {{Wiki|speaking}}, all atomistic mereologies are either [[logically]] inconsistent or [[empirically]] useless, but of course his argument accomplishes no such thing. Also, it does not defeat gunk {{Wiki|theory}} and theories such as those of {{Wiki|modern}} {{Wiki|particle}} [[physics]] involving point-particles with interactional force fields, nor does it damage [[ontologically]] non-absolute atomisms such as constitution from sensory minima, attributive [[atomism]], instrumentalist [[atomism]] or [[logical]] [[atomism]]. |
− | But Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism is nonetheless strong enough to handily dispatch any realist account which proposes that ontologically absolute atoms are metaphysically constitutive of phenomenal experience. It pulls out the rug from the Vaisesika claim that their particles lack proper parts, and beats back the Vaibhasika notion of point-particle sensations that aggregate to form extended sensation-clusters that join with other clusters to constitute macroscopic phenomena. And, as I will argue in the following, the Vijnaptimatra viewpoint does not intend to damage ontologically relativist forms of atomism—on the contrary, it is fully compatible with it. | + | But [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]] is nonetheless strong enough to handily dispatch any realist account which proposes that ontologically [[absolute]] [[atoms]] are [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] constitutive of [[phenomenal]] [[experience]]. It pulls out the rug from the [[Vaisesika]] claim that their {{Wiki|particles}} lack proper parts, and beats back the [[Vaibhasika]] notion of point-particle [[sensations]] that [[aggregate]] to [[form]] extended sensation-clusters that join with other [[clusters]] to constitute macroscopic [[phenomena]]. And, as I will argue in the following, the [[Vijnaptimatra]] viewpoint does not intend to damage ontologically relativist [[forms]] of atomism—on the contrary, it is fully compatible with it. |
− | From the Mind-Only point of view, parts and wholes are conceptual fictions (vikalpa), yet within within the dream-like epistemological fiction of ordinary experience, they are true. For unlike Cincinnatus C., the unfortunate protagonist of Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading, who is imprisoned and sentenced to death for the unutterable crime of | + | From the [[Mind-Only]] point of view, parts and wholes are {{Wiki|conceptual}} fictions ([[vikalpa]]), yet within within the dream-like [[epistemological]] {{Wiki|fiction}} of ordinary [[experience]], they are true. For unlike Cincinnatus C., the unfortunate {{Wiki|protagonist}} of Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading, who is imprisoned and sentenced to [[death]] for the unutterable [[crime]] of “[[gnostic]] turpitude,” we generally do not [[care]] to entertain the [[idea]] that the [[world]] we are inhabiting is an unreal {{Wiki|fiction}} ([[abhuta-parikalpa]]) generated by the dualizing [[mind]]. During the course of our [[discussion]] of the argument against [[atomism]], we have seen how [[Vasubandhu]] parlays the [[Buddhist’s]] nominalist {{Wiki|skepticism}} about part-whole [[realism]] into a full-scale assault on the [[Ding an sich]]. Little should we be surprised if the [[gnostic]] turpitude that [[Vasubandhu]] is so blatantly inciting reveals itself upon closer {{Wiki|examination}} to be nothing other than good, solid {{Wiki|empiricism}}. |
− | ==3.3 Visions of Vijnaptimatra in Empiriocriticist Eyes== | + | ==3.3 [[Visions]] of [[Vijnaptimatra]] in Empiriocriticist [[Eyes]]== |
− | Swapping our philosophical horses in midstream, we now pass to an investigation of empiriocriticist views on the ontological status of the atom and the external object. To be sure, the aim of comparing Mind-Only with empirio- criticism is not to completely gloss over the differences between the two. Mach and Avenarius are not subjective idealists, and their critique of the synthetic a priori does not have an equivalent in Mind-Only (though there is a great deal of category critique to be found). The radical presentism and the strong mystical subtext of Mind-Only are absent in empiriocriticism. Nevertheless, a search for epistemological common ground won’t take long to strike paydirt. | + | Swapping our [[philosophical]] [[horses]] in midstream, we now pass to an investigation of empiriocriticist [[views]] on the [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] {{Wiki|status}} of the {{Wiki|atom}} and the [[external object]]. To be sure, the aim of comparing [[Mind-Only]] with empirio- [[criticism]] is not to completely gloss over the differences between the two. Mach and Avenarius are not [[subjective]] {{Wiki|idealists}}, and their critique of the {{Wiki|synthetic}} {{Wiki|a priori}} does not have an {{Wiki|equivalent}} in [[Mind-Only]] (though there is a great deal of category critique to be found). The radical presentism and the strong [[mystical]] subtext of [[Mind-Only]] are absent in empiriocriticism. Nevertheless, a search for [[epistemological]] common ground won’t take long to strike paydirt. |
− | We must be careful not to push the comparison with Mind-Only too far— Mach attempts to steer clear of the extreme of mentalism (ontological idealism), whereas Vasubandhu arguably embraces it. But although Vasubandhu is planted more firmly in the idealist camp, his anti-atomistic epistemology is remarkably close to the sensation pluralism of Mach, a passionate critic of atomism. He is opposed to the Kantian Dinge an sich as well as to the metaphysical atomism of the physical theory of his day for very much the same reasons as Vasubandhu rejected the atom and the external object. | + | We must be careful not to push the comparison with [[Mind-Only]] too far— Mach attempts to steer clear of the extreme of mentalism ([[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] idealism), whereas [[Vasubandhu]] arguably embraces it. But although [[Vasubandhu]] is planted more firmly in the {{Wiki|idealist}} camp, his anti-atomistic epistemology is remarkably close to the [[sensation]] [[pluralism]] of Mach, a [[passionate]] critic of [[atomism]]. He is opposed to the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] Dinge an sich as well as to the [[metaphysical]] [[atomism]] of the [[physical]] {{Wiki|theory}} of his day for very much the same [[reasons]] as [[Vasubandhu]] rejected the {{Wiki|atom}} and the [[external object]]. |
− | Mach attempts to gain the unstable epistemological middle ground between idealism and realism. Sommer points out a small but important detail about Mach’s position: sensations are not intrinsically subjective, as is commonly assumed. To Mach, the elements of experience (the explananda) are the epistemically prior raw materials of the explanans, i.e. the construction of subjectivity and objectivity as they are given rise to by naive realism. | + | Mach attempts to gain the unstable [[epistemological]] middle ground between [[idealism]] and [[realism]]. Sommer points out a small but important detail about Mach’s position: [[sensations]] are not intrinsically [[subjective]], as is commonly assumed. To Mach, the [[elements]] of [[experience]] (the explananda) are the epistemically prior raw materials of the explanans, i.e. the construction of [[subjectivity]] and objectivity as they are given rise to by {{Wiki|naive}} [[realism]]. |
− | In Mach’s view, as opposed to the metaphysical Vaibhasika notion of the aggregate-atom (samghata-paramanu), sensation-nuclei are purely correlative conceptual constructs. The atom is a mental shorthand (Gedanken- symbol) for the covariance of functional relationships between the sensational elements of different psychophysical spaces, i.e. the space of vision, of hearing and of tactile sensation. The notions of metaphysically absolute space, time and substance have no place in Mach’s epistemology. Substances and atoms are higher order “tensorial abstractions.” They are pragmatic ideas that help us to economically conceptualize the complexes, relations and connections of sensations. In the same vein, Mach maintains that scientific explanations, including the natural laws of physics, are merely economical descriptions of functional relation. | + | In Mach’s view, as opposed to the [[metaphysical]] [[Vaibhasika]] notion of the aggregate-atom (samghata-paramanu), sensation-nuclei are purely correlative {{Wiki|conceptual}} constructs. The {{Wiki|atom}} is a [[mental]] shorthand (Gedanken- [[symbol]]) for the covariance of functional relationships between the sensational [[elements]] of different {{Wiki|psychophysical}} spaces, i.e. the [[space]] of [[vision]], of hearing and of {{Wiki|tactile}} [[sensation]]. The notions of [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] [[absolute space]], time and [[substance]] have no place in Mach’s epistemology. {{Wiki|Substances}} and [[atoms]] are higher order “tensorial {{Wiki|abstractions}}.” They are {{Wiki|pragmatic}} [[ideas]] that help us to economically conceptualize the complexes, relations and connections of [[sensations]]. In the same vein, Mach maintains that [[scientific]] explanations, [[including]] the [[natural laws]] of [[physics]], are merely {{Wiki|economical}} descriptions of functional [[relation]]. |
− | As Musil observes, Mach does not see any difference in kind between explanation and description, nor does he believe the veridicality of descriptions to involve any kind of metaphysical correspondence to reality. His theory of metaphysics and epistemology is grounded in evolutionary psychology. Descriptions acquire their truth-value in pragmatic use. Conceptualization does not stand apart from the process of functional relation, but rather, participates in it, by assisting the organism in selectively adapting to its environment. | + | As Musil observes, Mach does not see any difference in kind between explanation and description, nor does he believe the veridicality of descriptions to involve any kind of [[metaphysical]] correspondence to [[reality]]. His {{Wiki|theory}} of [[metaphysics]] and epistemology is grounded in {{Wiki|evolutionary psychology}}. Descriptions acquire their truth-value in {{Wiki|pragmatic}} use. [[Conceptualization]] does not stand apart from the process of functional [[relation]], but rather, participates in it, by assisting the {{Wiki|organism}} in selectively adapting to its {{Wiki|environment}}. |
− | Turning to Avenarius, Mach’s philosophical brother-in-arms, we find that he mobilizes a similarly instrumentalist view of atomism, framing the principle of economy as the cognitive rationale for the atomic concept. This principle is the cornerstone of Avenarius’ radically empiricist reformulation of Kantianism, and may be characterized as a philosophical generalization of the principle of least action in physics. The requirement for underlying unities that hold experience together is not an a priori in the Kantian sense, but a matter of descriptive parsimony: | + | Turning to Avenarius, Mach’s [[philosophical]] brother-in-arms, we find that he mobilizes a similarly instrumentalist view of [[atomism]], framing the [[principle]] of {{Wiki|economy}} as the [[Wikipedia:cognition|cognitive]] rationale for the [[atomic]] {{Wiki|concept}}. This [[principle]] is the cornerstone of Avenarius’ radically [[empiricist]] reformulation of {{Wiki|Kantianism}}, and may be characterized as a [[philosophical]] generalization of the [[principle]] of least [[action]] in [[physics]]. The requirement for underlying unities that hold [[experience]] together is not an {{Wiki|a priori}} in the [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] [[sense]], but a {{Wiki|matter}} of descriptive parsimony: |
− | Due to the principle of economy, we have a need to think in terms of limiting concepts such as the atom, despite that its existence is not proven or transcendentally established. | + | Due to the [[principle]] of {{Wiki|economy}}, we have a need to think in terms of limiting [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] such as the {{Wiki|atom}}, despite that its [[existence]] is not proven or transcendentally established. |
− | Because analytical decomposition satisfies the need for comprehension, the process of decomposition is mentally continued even where empirical evidence no longer supplies solid confirmation but only indicates the direction of analysis. This actually infinite process of mental analysis can only be brought to a conclusion by interrupting it at a certain point and declaring it to be completed by some new idea at a more remote point left in the dark. | + | Because analytical decomposition satisfies the need for comprehension, the process of decomposition is [[mentally]] continued even where [[empirical evidence]] no longer supplies solid confirmation but only indicates the [[direction]] of analysis. This actually [[infinite]] process of [[mental]] analysis can only be brought to a conclusion by interrupting it at a certain point and declaring it to be completed by some new [[idea]] at a more remote point left in the dark. |
− | Aside from giving the impression of comprehension, these completing concepts offer intellectual support from two sides, on the one hand, by positing that their referent is no longer composite but simple, thereby putting an end to the mental process of division, and on the other hand, by suggesting that the indivisible thing is immutable, thus pacifying the demand for a continual change of content. The simple is now the immutable, even though its accidental connections are subject to absolute change, such a fictitious terminating idea is embodied in the concept of the atom, inasmuch as the atom is considered to be unanalyzable and immutable. | + | Aside from giving the [[impression]] of [[comprehension]], these completing [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] offer [[intellectual]] support from two sides, on the one hand, by positing that their referent is no longer composite but simple, thereby putting an end to the [[mental]] process of division, and on the other hand, by suggesting that the indivisible thing is immutable, thus pacifying the demand for a continual change of content. The simple is now the immutable, even though its accidental connections are [[subject]] to [[absolute]] change, such a fictitious terminating [[idea]] is [[embodied]] in the {{Wiki|concept}} of the {{Wiki|atom}}, inasmuch as the {{Wiki|atom}} is considered to be unanalyzable and immutable. |
− | According to Avenarius, the regressus of decomposition gratifies the demand for ontological closure, i.e. the cognitive need for fixed objects that are regulated by the structuring concepts of experience. But he is under no illusion that this procedure can ever truly be brought to to completion or be made to yield Dinge an sich—rather, it is simply cut off at some point to produce a conveniently fictitious ontology. | + | According to Avenarius, the regressus of decomposition gratifies the demand for [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] closure, i.e. the [[Wikipedia:cognition|cognitive]] need for fixed [[objects]] that are regulated by the structuring [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] of [[experience]]. But he is under no [[illusion]] that this procedure can ever truly be brought to to completion or be made to yield Dinge an sich—rather, it is simply cut off at some point to produce a conveniently fictitious {{Wiki|ontology}}. |
− | However, Avenarius is concerned that this approach might lead to reduc- tionism, which he eschews as being an unacceptable reification of atomist instrumentalism: “Thus this so-to-say atomistic individualization of sensations will remain an indispensable aid in creating the impression of comprehension with regard to our life of sensations and concepts, but it must be warned against viewing the world as a kind of kaleidoscope composed of such mosaic pieces of sensation.” | + | However, Avenarius is concerned that this approach might lead to reduc- tionism, which he eschews as being an unacceptable [[reification]] of [[atomist]] instrumentalism: “Thus this so-to-say atomistic individualization of sensations will remain an indispensable aid in creating the [[impression]] of comprehension with regard to our [[life]] of [[sensations]] and [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]], but it must be warned against viewing the [[world]] as a kind of kaleidoscope composed of such mosaic pieces of [[sensation]].” |
− | Avenarius is justifiably suspicious of reductionism. Even if a reductionist program could be carried out, he would be left holding the bag of metaphysical commitment to phenomenalistic atoms, with all the pitfalls that this position entails. Like Vasubandhu, he does not believe that there are atoms given to pre-theoretical, common-sense intuition, or that the whole of experience naturally fractures into atoms along pre-determined breaking points. He characterizes the atom as a mere “Hiilfsbegriff”—a provisional concept of theory that satisfies the pragmatic need for intellectual comprehension, but he dares not urge a firm ontological commitment to it, lest his pure phenomenalism revert back to a pre-critical metaphysics. | + | Avenarius is justifiably suspicious of {{Wiki|reductionism}}. Even if a reductionist program could be carried out, he would be left holding the bag of metaphysical commitment to phenomenalistic [[atoms]], with all the pitfalls that this position entails. Like [[Vasubandhu]], he does not believe that there are [[atoms]] given to pre-theoretical, {{Wiki|common-sense}} [[intuition]], or that the whole of [[experience]] naturally fractures into [[atoms]] along pre-determined breaking points. He characterizes the {{Wiki|atom}} as a mere “Hiilfsbegriff”—a provisional {{Wiki|concept}} of {{Wiki|theory}} that satisfies the {{Wiki|pragmatic}} need for [[intellectual]] [[comprehension]], but he dares not [[urge]] a firm [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] commitment to it, lest his [[pure]] {{Wiki|phenomenalism}} revert back to a pre-critical [[metaphysics]]. |
− | The Avenarian substance-atoms are theoretical constructs, much like the constitutional elements of Carnap’s Aufbau-. | + | The Avenarian substance-atoms are {{Wiki|theoretical}} constructs, much like the constitutional [[elements]] of Carnap’s Aufbau-. “{{Wiki|Constitution}} {{Wiki|theory}} and [[transcendental]] [[idealism]] agree that all [[objects of knowledge]] are constituted (in {{Wiki|idealistic}} [[language]], ‘generated by [[thought]]’), and that this ultimately applies to the basic [[elements]] of the constitution system.” |
− | For both Avenarius and Carnap, it is irrelevant as to whether or not material composition or epistemological constitution are grounded in a metaphysically absolute ontology. To their point of view, foundational ontology is just as much a logical construct as the world that is built up from it. The similarity to the epistemological idealism of Mind-Only is striking: “Thus, the thesis of the intentionality of citta becomes displaced in the emerging Yogacara philosophy by an emphasis upon the ‘phenomenalistic’ nature of objects. Objects are really dharma-constructs and representations (vijnapti), dependent upon the complex processes of citta for their appearance.” | + | For both Avenarius and Carnap, it is irrelevant as to whether or not material composition or [[epistemological]] constitution are grounded in a [[Wikipedia:Metaphysics|metaphysically]] [[absolute]] {{Wiki|ontology}}. To their point of view, foundational ontology is just as much a [[logical]] construct as the [[world]] that is built up from it. The similarity to the [[epistemological]] [[idealism]] of [[Mind-Only]] is striking: “Thus, the {{Wiki|thesis}} of the {{Wiki|intentionality}} of [[citta]] becomes displaced in the emerging [[Yogacara]] [[philosophy]] by an {{Wiki|emphasis}} upon the ‘phenomenalistic’ [[nature]] of [[objects]]. [[Objects]] are really dharma-constructs and {{Wiki|representations}} ([[vijnapti]]), [[dependent upon]] the complex {{Wiki|processes}} of [[citta]] for their [[appearance]].” |
− | The Avenarian empiriocriticism contends that atomism is valuable as a strictly instrumentalist hypothesis, whereas Mach believes even an instrumentalist concept of the atom to be unnecessary to science. Avenarius’ rationale for the dichotomy of appearances and things-in-themselves is also remarkably similar to the Mind-Only doctrine that the dualizing mind (vijnana) is responsible for the superimposition of the conceptually constructed (parikalpita) nature onto the flux of experience: | + | The Avenarian empiriocriticism contends that [[atomism]] is valuable as a strictly instrumentalist {{Wiki|hypothesis}}, whereas Mach believes even an instrumentalist {{Wiki|concept}} of the {{Wiki|atom}} to be unnecessary to [[science]]. Avenarius’ rationale for the {{Wiki|dichotomy}} of [[appearances]] and things-in-themselves is also remarkably similar to the [[Mind-Only]] [[doctrine]] that the dualizing [[mind]] ([[vijnana]]) is responsible for the superimposition of the conceptually constructed ([[parikalpita]]) [[nature]] onto the flux of [[experience]]: |
− | The development of thought eventually had to reach the point where it came to awareness that the so-called properties of the thing were in fact sensations of the sensing subject; thus, the properties ceased to belong to the thing itself—as their designation would indicate—they departed their relationship of dependence from the thing and entered into a more idealistic relationship with the sensing subject. As a result, a difference had to emerge between the thing as it was for the sensing subject and the thing as it was in itself | + | The [[development]] of [[thought]] eventually had to reach the point where it came to [[awareness]] that the so-called properties of the thing were in fact [[sensations]] of the sensing [[subject]]; thus, the properties ceased to belong to the thing itself—as their designation would indicate—they departed their relationship of [[dependence]] from the thing and entered into a more {{Wiki|idealistic}} relationship with the sensing [[subject]]. As a result, a difference had to emerge between the thing as it was for the sensing [[subject]] and the thing as it was in itself |
− | In Mind-Only, the percept is held to be a noema generated by transcendental subjectivity. Thus we find the Avenarian “introjection,” or bifurcation between the strictly private percept and the public object, being carried to its most radical conclusion. The strategy of Mind-Only for eliminating introjection is to wholly absorb the objective world into the subjective perception. The epistemological trajectory that begins with naive realism and progresses through critical realism (where the organizing forms of experience are constituted by metempirical generative acts of the mind) is brought to maturity in the view that experience springs entirely from the transcendental subjectivity. | + | In [[Mind-Only]], the [[percept]] is held to be a noema generated by transcendental [[subjectivity]]. Thus we find the Avenarian “introjection,” or [[bifurcation]] between the strictly private [[percept]] and the public [[object]], being carried to its most radical conclusion. The strategy of [[Mind-Only]] for eliminating introjection is to wholly absorb the [[objective world]] into the [[subjective]] [[perception]]. The [[epistemological]] trajectory that begins with {{Wiki|naive}} [[realism]] and progresses through [[critical realism]] (where the organizing [[forms]] of experience are constituted by metempirical generative acts of the [[mind]]) is brought to maturity in the view that [[experience]] springs entirely from the [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]]. |
− | Mach’s psycho-physical parallelism, which attempts to resolve the Avenarian problem of introjection, is often cast as a paradigmatic example of neutral monism. But while Avenarius’ sensation monism is an explicit one, the picture with Mach is slightly more complex. He argues dualism against monism and vice versa in a Madhyamika-esque play to dialectically hold the elusive middle ground beyond both extremes. | + | Mach’s [[psycho-physical]] parallelism, which attempts to resolve the Avenarian problem of introjection, is often cast as a paradigmatic example of [[neutral]] {{Wiki|monism}}. But while Avenarius’ [[sensation]] {{Wiki|monism}} is an explicit one, the picture with Mach is slightly more complex. He argues [[dualism]] against {{Wiki|monism}} and [[vice versa]] in a Madhyamika-esque play to dialectically hold the elusive middle ground beyond both extremes. |
− | Avenarius feels at home with the idea that epistemological construction is a pragmatic process of evolutionary adaptation to experience. In a metaphor, we build our sandcastles on shifting sand because we have to live somewhere and have no other building materials at hand. Avenarius argues that the conceptualizing of change and process requires that we posit fixed nuclei or absolutes as counterpoints to experiential flux, but regards these nuclei or fixed points as mere idealizations. In this respect, it is not unreasonable to characterize the Avenarian view as resembling a ontologically relativized Sautrantika epistemology. | + | Avenarius [[feels]] at home with the [[idea]] that [[epistemological]] construction is a {{Wiki|pragmatic}} process of evolutionary [[adaptation]] to [[experience]]. In a {{Wiki|metaphor}}, we build our sandcastles on shifting sand because we have to live somewhere and have no other building materials at hand. Avenarius argues that the [[conceptualizing]] of change and process requires that we posit fixed nuclei or absolutes as counterpoints to experiential flux, but regards these nuclei or fixed points as mere idealizations. In this [[respect]], it is not unreasonable to characterize the Avenarian view as resembling a [[ontologically]] relativized [[Sautrantika]] epistemology. |
− | Avenarius’ theory of the atom as an instrumental posit may be directly compared to Quine’s view: “Positing does not stop with macroscopic physical objects. Objects at the atomic level and beyond are posited to make the laws of macroscopic objects, and ultimately the laws of experience, simpler and more manageable... ” | + | Avenarius’ {{Wiki|theory}} of the {{Wiki|atom}} as an instrumental posit may be directly compared to Quine’s view: “Positing does not stop with macroscopic [[physical objects]]. [[Objects]] at the [[atomic]] level and beyond are posited to make the laws of macroscopic [[objects]], and ultimately the laws of [[experience]], simpler and more manageable... ” |
− | Though Quine has shed the sensationalist and phenomenalist trappings of empiriocriticism and early logical empiricism, in other respects, he is still holding to the course of the via positivistica. The empiriocriticist core of epistemological instrumentalism and fictionalism shines through, extending even to his views on physical objects. In a line that might have been taken straight from Vasubandhu’s playbook, Quine states that “The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.” | + | Though Quine has shed the sensationalist and phenomenalist trappings of empiriocriticism and early [[logical]] {{Wiki|empiricism}}, in other respects, he is still holding to the course of the via positivistica. The empiriocriticist core of [[epistemological]] instrumentalism and fictionalism shines through, extending even to his [[views]] on [[physical objects]]. In a line that might have been taken straight from [[Vasubandhu’s]] playbook, Quine states that “The [[myth]] of physical [[objects]] is [[epistemologically]] {{Wiki|superior}} to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other [[myths]] as a device for working a manageable {{Wiki|structure}} into the flux of [[experience]].” |
− | Admittedly, Quine is not making a direct argument against the transcendental object. But in cutting physical objects down to size as quasi-mythical mirages conjured by the theory-ladenness of common-sense realism, he is quite vigorously attacking the foundations of the metaphysical realist belief in objectivity. And if Quine is any judge, Vasubandhu’s anti-atomism—far from being an antiquated relic of early medieval Indian philosophy—is of considerable relevance to contemporary philosophy.4 The End of the End of Epistemology | + | Admittedly, Quine is not making a direct argument against the transcendental [[object]]. But in cutting [[physical objects]] down to size as quasi-mythical mirages conjured by the theory-ladenness of {{Wiki|common-sense}} [[realism]], he is quite vigorously attacking the foundations of the [[metaphysical]] realist [[belief]] in objectivity. And if Quine is any [[judge]], [[Vasubandhu’s]] anti-atomism—far from being an antiquated [[relic]] of early {{Wiki|medieval}} [[Indian]] philosophy—is of considerable relevance to contemporary philosophy.4 The End of the End of {{Wiki|Epistemology}} |
− | I have a dream. | + | I have a [[dream]]. |
− | (Martin Luther King) | + | ([[Martin Luther King]]) |
− | Are THERE ANY PHILOSOPHICAL or ideo-historical conclusions of value that we can draw from the narrative sweep presented thus far? Possibly, our retracing of the evolutionary trajectory of Buddhist epistemology, beginning with phenomenalistic realism and leading to idealist and skeptical positions of increasing critical refinement and rarefication may may add a mosaic piece or two to our picture of the historical development of occidental empiricism. To state the matter more boldly, the idea suggests itself that Buddhism affords to the modern mind the possibility of re-envisioning empiricism from the ground up, in the cloth of an alternate history of ideas. Anticipating the grand themes of the Western empiricist tradition by more than a millenium, the | + | Are THERE ANY PHILOSOPHICAL or ideo-historical conclusions of value that we can draw from the {{Wiki|narrative}} sweep presented thus far? Possibly, our retracing of the evolutionary trajectory of [[Buddhist]] epistemology, beginning with phenomenalistic [[realism]] and leading to {{Wiki|idealist}} and skeptical positions of increasing critical refinement and rarefication may may add a mosaic piece or two to our picture of the historical [[development]] of {{Wiki|occidental}} {{Wiki|empiricism}}. To [[state]] the {{Wiki|matter}} more boldly, the [[idea]] suggests itself that [[Buddhism]] affords to the {{Wiki|modern}} [[mind]] the possibility of re-envisioning {{Wiki|empiricism}} from the ground up, in the cloth of an alternate history of [[ideas]]. Anticipating the grand themes of the [[Western]] [[empiricist]] [[tradition]] by more than a millenium, the “{{Wiki|empiricism}} of the [[East]]” presents us with a unique opportunity to re-experience our [[own]] [[philosophical]] genesis in a new and perhaps more [[humble]] {{Wiki|light}}. |
− | Against the realist’s objections, Vasubandhu proposes in 3 that the spatiotemporal determination of experience is as in a dream. Striking a chord across centuries and cultures, Mach dismisses the question of whether the world is real or whether we merely dream it as being devoid of scientific meaning. Epistemology is just as much an abstract inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of knowledge as a historical quest for philosophical beginnings—a trail that may lead us as readily to Mach’s 19th century Vienna as to the 4th century Purusapura of Vasubandhu, if we are prepared to follow it. | + | Against the realist’s objections, [[Vasubandhu]] proposes in 3 that the spatiotemporal [[determination]] of [[experience]] is as in a [[dream]]. Striking a chord across centuries and cultures, Mach dismisses the question of whether the [[world]] is real or whether we merely [[dream]] it as being devoid of [[scientific]] meaning. {{Wiki|Epistemology}} is just as much an abstract inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of [[knowledge]] as a historical quest for [[philosophical]] beginnings—a trail that may lead us as readily to Mach’s 19th century {{Wiki|Vienna}} as to the 4th century [[Purusapura]] of [[Vasubandhu]], if we are prepared to follow it. |
− | However, unlike the quest of Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations to regain the ground of first philosophy, a phenomenological beginning in transcendental intersubjectivity, the journey of Vasubandhu and Mach is more than anything else a voyage to epistemology’s end. Each in their own way, they both attempt to recast empirical knowledge in light of its ultimate meaning. To Mach, the end of epistemology is its pragmatic purpose as the critical voice of scientific inquiry. To Vasubandhu, the end is a mystical and soteriological one—the cessation of innate ignorance (avidya) sought for by “the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos.” | + | However, unlike the quest of [[Wikipedia:Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl|Husserl]] in his [[Cartesian]] [[Meditations]] to regain the ground of first [[philosophy]], a {{Wiki|phenomenological}} beginning in transcendental intersubjectivity, the journey of [[Vasubandhu]] and Mach is more than anything else a voyage to epistemology’s end. Each in their [[own]] way, they both attempt to recast [[empirical knowledge]] in {{Wiki|light}} of its [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] meaning. To Mach, the end of epistemology is its {{Wiki|pragmatic}} {{Wiki|purpose}} as the critical {{Wiki|voice}} of [[scientific]] inquiry. To [[Vasubandhu]], the end is a [[mystical]] and [[soteriological]] one—the [[cessation]] of innate [[ignorance]] ([[avidya]]) sought for by “the [[path of practice]] leading to the [[cessation]] of the [[cosmos]].” |
− | ==4.1 Anti-Cartesian Meditations== | + | ==4.1 Anti-Cartesian [[Meditations]]== |
− | Since we have not yet managed to touch upon any of the multifarous critiques that the Mind-Only standpoint of the Vimsatika has generated within Indian philosophy, I will round out the investigation with a brief recapitulation of some of the more interesting objections. Aside from the fairly predictable counter-arguments offered by the realist darsanas such as Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa, we find a number of critiques put forth by skeptical schools of thought such as Madhyamika or by other idealisms, notably Advaita. It is illuminating to take notice of the fact that in the pre-scientific Indo-Tibetan philosophical tradition, the most devastating critiques of Mind-Only are the skeptical attacks on transcendental subjectivity while the realist defenses of objectivity are comparatively weak. Ironically, the situation in the West is exactly the other way around, as it would seem that scientific progress has catapulted realism into the pole position. | + | Since we have not yet managed to {{Wiki|touch}} upon any of the multifarous critiques that the [[Mind-Only]] standpoint of the [[Vimsatika]] has generated within [[Indian philosophy]], I will round out the [[investigation]] with a brief recapitulation of some of the more [[interesting]] objections. Aside from the fairly predictable counter-arguments [[offered]] by the realist {{Wiki|darsanas}} such as [[Nyaya-Vaisesika]] and [[Mimamsa]], we find a number of critiques put forth by skeptical schools of [[thought]] such as [[Madhyamika]] or by other idealisms, notably [[Wikipedia:Advaita Vedanta|Advaita]]. It is [[illuminating]] to take notice of the fact that in the pre-scientific [[Indo-Tibetan]] [[philosophical]] [[tradition]], the most devastating critiques of [[Mind-Only]] are the skeptical attacks on [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]] while the realist defenses of objectivity are comparatively weak. Ironically, the situation in the [[West]] is exactly the other way around, as it would seem that [[scientific]] progress has catapulted [[realism]] into the pole position. |
− | Advaita The Advaita Vedanta epistemology of Samkara may be classified as a species of absolute monism with realistic tendencies. Although it quite evidently qualifies as a strong strain of idealism, Advaita insists on a separation of the subject and object within the domain of phenomenal experience. | + | [[Wikipedia:Advaita Vedanta|Advaita]] The [[Wikipedia:Advaita Vedanta|Advaita Vedanta]] epistemology of [[Samkara]] may be classified as a {{Wiki|species}} of [[absolute]] {{Wiki|monism}} with {{Wiki|realistic}} {{Wiki|tendencies}}. Although it quite evidently qualifies as a strong strain of [[idealism]], [[Wikipedia:Advaita Vedanta|Advaita]] insists on a separation of the [[subject]] and [[object]] within the domain of [[phenomenal]] [[experience]]. |
− | Sinha observes that Samkara’s criticism of Mind-Only is not very thorough. Strangely, Samkara does not offer any direct counter-argument to the Mind-Only thesis that external objects cannot exist due to the impossibility of atoms, despite that he was almost certainly aware of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism. This circumstance severely reduces the force of Samkara’s defense of objectivity. | + | [[Sinha]] observes that Samkara’s [[criticism]] of [[Mind-Only]] is not very thorough. Strangely, [[Samkara]] does not offer any direct counter-argument to the [[Mind-Only]] {{Wiki|thesis}} that [[external objects]] cannot [[exist]] due to the impossibility of [[atoms]], despite that he was almost certainly {{Wiki|aware}} of [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]]. This circumstance severely reduces the force of Samkara’s defense of objectivity. |
− | The keystone of Samkara’s critique is the | + | The keystone of Samkara’s critique is the “{{Wiki|phenomenological}} argument.” He points out that [[sensory perception]] establishes the [[existence]] of the external [[world]], as we {{Wiki|perceive}} [[external objects]] such as a table or a [[tree]]. This seems like [[Samkara]] is attempting a Moorean [[proof]] of the [[external object]] by appeal to {{Wiki|common-sense}} {{Wiki|evidence}}. |
− | But what is preventing us from having intentional states directed at some impossible object, e.g. a “square circle?” Given that it is entirely possible to think about absistents, the externality of a percept could very well be a sort of absistent property, such as the “squareness” of a circular patch of color. From the presence of an external world to intentional awareness, we cannot deduce that it exists, any more than we ontologically commits ourselves to the existence of a hare’s horns simply because we are able to think about them. In a Meinongian sense, it is perfectly reasonable to speak of the non-externality of a perceived object. | + | But what is preventing us from having intentional states directed at some impossible [[object]], e.g. a “square circle?” Given that it is entirely possible to think about absistents, the externality of a [[percept]] could very well be a sort of absistent property, such as the “squareness” of a circular patch of {{Wiki|color}}. From the presence of an [[external world]] to intentional [[awareness]], we cannot deduce that it [[exists]], any more than we [[ontologically]] commits ourselves to the [[existence]] of a hare’s horns simply because we are able to think about them. In a Meinongian [[sense]], it is perfectly reasonable to speak of the non-externality of a [[perceived]] [[object]]. |
− | In another argument, Samkara attempts to turn the tables on the idealist, by asking: if one admits consciousness, why not external objects? The Mind- Only proponent’s assertion of the priority of inner over outer experience seems arbitrary, he argues. | + | In another argument, [[Samkara]] attempts to turn the tables on the {{Wiki|idealist}}, by asking: if one admits [[consciousness]], why not [[external objects]]? The [[Mind]]- Only proponent’s [[assertion]] of the priority of inner over outer [[experience]] seems arbitrary, he argues. |
− | While it is plausible to admit that one can represent in inner experience (i.e. dreams or hallucinations) objects that do not actually exist, it is not equally plausible to admit the converse hypothesis that there exist real objects not representable in inner experience. The Cittamatrin may therefore argue that the former simply expresses a familiar empirical fact, whereas the latter proposes a wildly metaphysical theory—the two cases are very different in nature and far from being symmetrically interchangeable, as Samkara would suggest. | + | While it is plausible to admit that one can represent in inner [[experience]] (i.e. [[dreams]] or [[hallucinations]]) [[objects]] that do not actually [[exist]], it is not equally plausible to admit the converse {{Wiki|hypothesis}} that there [[exist]] real [[objects]] not representable in inner [[experience]]. The [[Cittamatrin]] may therefore argue that the former simply expresses a familiar [[empirical]] fact, whereas the [[latter]] proposes a wildly [[metaphysical]] theory—the two cases are very different in [[nature]] and far from being symmetrically interchangeable, as [[Samkara]] would suggest. |
− | Samkara trots out a number of further arguments against Mind-Only, none of which are especially memorable. He does, however, unfold a critique of self-reflexive awareness (svasamvedana) very much resembling the Madhyamika argument put forth by Candrakirti: Just as the light shining from a lamp can illuminate other objects, but not itself, or the blade of a sword can only cut other objects, a self-reflexive awareness would entail the absurdity of something acting upon itself. Although Samkara’s critique of the Mind-Only position on objectivity fails to be convincing, his criticisms of transcendental subjectivity come a great deal closer to striking at the Achilles heel. | + | [[Samkara]] trots out a number of further arguments against [[Mind-Only]], none of which are especially memorable. He does, however, unfold a critique of [[self-reflexive awareness]] ([[svasamvedana]]) very much resembling the [[Madhyamika]] argument put forth by [[Candrakirti]]: Just as the {{Wiki|light}} shining from a [[lamp]] can [[illuminate]] other [[objects]], but not itself, or the blade of a sword can only cut other [[objects]], a [[self-reflexive awareness]] would entail the absurdity of something acting upon itself. Although Samkara’s critique of the [[Mind-Only]] position on objectivity fails to be convincing, his {{Wiki|criticisms}} of [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]] come a great deal closer to striking at the Achilles heel. |
− | Madhyamika Tsongkhapa contends that while Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism is valid, it misses the mark. Essence or own-nature (sva- bhava) is the category that is in need of refutation, not substance {dravya). The refutation of atoms fails to knock out this vastly more crucial and elusive target, because atoms are only superficial cognitive misconceptions generated by metaphysical doctrines, whereas svabhava is an innate misconception deeply entrenched in pre-philosophical common-sense intuition. | + | [[Madhyamika]] [[Tsongkhapa]] contends that while [[Vasubandhu’s]] argument against [[atomism]] is valid, it misses the mark. [[Essence]] or [[own-nature]] ([[sva]]- [[bhava]]) is the category that is in need of refutation, [[not substance]] {[[dravya]]). The refutation of [[atoms]] fails to knock out this vastly more crucial and elusive target, because [[atoms]] are only [[superficial]] [[Wikipedia:cognition|cognitive]] misconceptions generated by [[metaphysical]] [[doctrines]], whereas [[svabhava]] is an innate {{Wiki|misconception}} deeply entrenched in pre-philosophical {{Wiki|common-sense}} [[intuition]]. |
− | Since the concept of partless simples does not enter into our ordinary experience, which is after all informed by the pre-philosophical intuitions of common-sense realism, Tsongkhapa argues that while Vasubandhu’s refutation of atomism is all very well and good, its skeptical force is not strong enough to damage the object of the Madhyamika critique of substantialism. In modern terminology, perhaps Tsongkhapa’s distinction of dravya and svabhava may be read along similar lines to the distinction of the existence and the independence dimensions of realism. Evidently, he believes the independence dimension to be the more challenging target, and the soteriologically more rewarding one. | + | Since the {{Wiki|concept}} of partless simples does not enter into our ordinary [[experience]], which is after all informed by the pre-philosophical intuitions of {{Wiki|common-sense}} [[realism]], [[Tsongkhapa]] argues that while [[Vasubandhu’s]] refutation of [[atomism]] is all very well and good, its skeptical force is not strong enough to damage the [[object]] of the [[Madhyamika]] critique of {{Wiki|substantialism}}. In {{Wiki|modern}} {{Wiki|terminology}}, perhaps [[Tsongkhapa’s]] {{Wiki|distinction}} of [[dravya]] and svabhava may be read along similar lines to the {{Wiki|distinction}} of the [[existence]] and the {{Wiki|independence}} {{Wiki|dimensions}} of [[realism]]. Evidently, he believes the independence [[dimension]] to be the more challenging target, and the [[soteriologically]] more rewarding one. |
− | We may note that nowhere in the post-Vasubandhu philosophy of Mahayana are there any novel defenses of atomism to be found (with the possible exception of the late Sautrantika atomism), nor do we find any novel anti- atomist arguments. This conspicuous absence of further development in the issue might indicate that Vasubandhu’s victory over atomist realism was considered by Mahayanists to be so overwhelming that nothing needed to be added to it. | + | We may note that nowhere in the post-Vasubandhu [[philosophy]] of Mahayana are there any {{Wiki|novel}} defenses of [[atomism]] to be found (with the possible exception of the late [[Sautrantika]] [[atomism]]), nor do we find any {{Wiki|novel}} anti- [[atomist]] arguments. This conspicuous absence of further [[development]] in the issue might indicate that [[Vasubandhu’s]] victory over [[atomist]] [[realism]] was considered by [[Mahayanists]] to be so overwhelming that nothing needed to be added to it. |
− | In the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakavatara, Candraklrti unleashes a scathing barrage of Madhyamika arguments against the the Mind-Only position. These may be roughly classified into four main groups: (1) the refutation of the nonexternality of sense-objects, (2) the failure of mental potentials to account for sense-experiences, (3) counter-arguments to the dream theory of experience and the ultimate existence of the mind, and (4) the refutation of apperception. This classic critique of Candraklrti is one of the philosophical crown jewels of the Tibetan Sarma traditions. It serves as a case in point for how the pure criticism of Madhyamika builds on the Mind-Only position, as the full development of its skeptical force requires the deployment of a sufficiently similar position as an argumentative foil. While the polemic phraseology of the debate evokes the impression that the two positions are very remote from each other, on closer examination, the intimate resemblance of the Mind-Only position to the Madhyamika view is what actually makes for the power of Candraklrti’s argument. | + | In the sixth [[chapter]] of the [[Madhyamakavatara]], [[Candraklrti]] unleashes a scathing barrage of [[Madhyamika]] arguments against the the [[Mind-Only]] position. These may be roughly classified into four main groups: (1) the refutation of the nonexternality of [[sense-objects]], (2) the failure of [[mental]] potentials to account for sense-experiences, (3) counter-arguments to the [[dream]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[experience]] and the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[existence]] of the [[mind]], and (4) the refutation of {{Wiki|apperception}}. This classic critique of [[Candraklrti]] is one of the [[philosophical]] {{Wiki|crown}} [[jewels]] of the [[Tibetan]] [[Sarma traditions]]. It serves as a case in point for how the [[pure]] [[criticism]] of [[Madhyamika]] builds on the [[Mind-Only]] position, as the full [[development]] of its skeptical force requires the deployment of a sufficiently similar position as an argumentative foil. While the polemic {{Wiki|phraseology}} of the [[debate]] evokes the [[impression]] that the two positions are very remote from each other, on closer {{Wiki|examination}}, the intimate resemblance of the [[Mind-Only]] position to the [[Madhyamika]] view is what actually makes for the power of Candraklrti’s argument. |
− | In the Tarkajvala (Blaze of Reasoning), the auto-commentary of his Madhyamakahrdayakarikas (Heart Verses of the Middle Way) the Madhyamika scholar Bhavaviveka proposes an intriguing argument against the Mind-Only strategy of accepting self-reflexive apperception as a provisional antidote to substantialism. Bhavaviveka’s objection, which happens not to be among those presented by Candraklrti, runs as follows: | + | In the [[Tarkajvala]] (Blaze of {{Wiki|Reasoning}}), the auto-commentary of his Madhyamakahrdayakarikas ([[Heart]] Verses of the [[Middle Way]]) the Madhyamika [[scholar]] [[Bhavaviveka]] proposes an intriguing argument against the [[Mind-Only]] strategy of accepting self-reflexive {{Wiki|apperception}} as a provisional antidote to {{Wiki|substantialism}}. [[Bhavaviveka’s]] objection, which happens not to be among those presented by [[Candraklrti]], runs as follows: |
− | If you think that external objects actually do not exist, why consider them part of consciousness? If you think that someone first treats them as part of consciousness, then uses another argument, other than [the argument] that they are part of consciousness, to refute [the idea that they are part of consciousness], it would be better to stay away from the mud and not to touch it than to wash it away. ... It is as if a certain fool were to leave a clean road and enter an unclean, muddy river. Others might then ask him, “Why did you leave the clean road and enter the mud?” If he said, “So that I can wash it off,” the others would say, “You fool! If you have to wash it off, you should stay away from the mud and not touch it in the first place.” | + | If you think that [[external objects]] actually do not [[exist]], why consider them part of [[consciousness]]? If you think that someone first treats them as part of [[consciousness]], then uses another argument, other than [the argument] that they are part of [[consciousness]], to refute [the [[idea]] that they are part of [[consciousness]]], it would be better to stay away from the mud and not to {{Wiki|touch}} it than to wash it away. ... It is as if a certain fool were to leave a clean road and enter an unclean, muddy [[river]]. Others might then ask him, “Why did you leave the clean road and enter the mud?” If he said, “So that I can wash it off,” the others would say, “You fool! If you have to wash it off, you should stay away from the mud and not {{Wiki|touch}} it in the first place.” |
− | Unpacking this argument along Kantian lines, one may inquire: why postulate the self-reflexive awareness of percepts as an antidote (pratipaksa) if one thereby accomplishes no more than to saddle oneself with an unnecessary a priori commitment to transcendental apperception? Kant acknowledges that although the transcendental apperception expressed in the proposition “I think” (“Ich denke”) is an empirical intuition, the concept of “I” fails to be an empirical concept because it is never met with in empirical experience. In this light, the general tendency of the Madhyamika critique of self-reflexive awareness may be outlined as follows: Because the “I” is functionally equivalent to the transcendentality of apperception, it would be misleading to claim the possibility of an ego-less transcendental apperception, as does the Mind-Only. And if self-reflexive awareness is not held to be transcendental, then it would have to be an empirical phenomenon like any other. It would be a contingent aspect of representations rather than the necessary condition of their possibility. But in this case, how can it be employed as an antidote for the reification of empirical phenomena, if the antidote itself is part of the what is being reified? A reified antidote is just what we don’t want. The initial pseudo-problem of objectivity will have merely been exchanged for another one—the problem of transcendental subjectivity. | + | Unpacking this argument along [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] lines, one may inquire: why postulate the [[self-reflexive awareness]] of [[percepts]] as an antidote ([[pratipaksa]]) if one thereby accomplishes no more than to saddle oneself with an unnecessary {{Wiki|a priori}} commitment to [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|apperception}}? {{Wiki|Kant}} acknowledges that although the [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|apperception}} expressed in the proposition “I think” (“Ich denke”) is an [[empirical]] [[intuition]], the {{Wiki|concept}} of “I” fails to be an [[empirical]] {{Wiki|concept}} because it is never met with in [[empirical]] [[experience]]. In this {{Wiki|light}}, the general tendency of the [[Madhyamika]] critique of [[self-reflexive awareness]] may be outlined as follows: Because the “I” is functionally {{Wiki|equivalent}} to the [[transcendentality]] of {{Wiki|apperception}}, it would be misleading to claim the possibility of an ego-less [[transcendental]] apperception, as does the [[Mind-Only]]. And if [[self-reflexive awareness]] is not held to be [[transcendental]], then it would have to be an [[empirical]] [[phenomenon]] like any other. It would be a contingent aspect of {{Wiki|representations}} rather than the necessary [[condition]] of their possibility. But in this case, how can it be employed as an antidote for the [[reification]] of [[empirical]] [[phenomena]], if the antidote itself is part of the what is being reified? A reified antidote is just what we don’t want. The initial pseudo-problem of objectivity will have merely been exchanged for another one—the problem of [[transcendental]] [[subjectivity]]. |
− | Bhavaviveka’s argument expresses in a nutshell the general thrust Madhyamika “metacritique” of the Mind-Only epoche of objectivity. As a case of barking up the wrong philosophical tree, retreating up the epistemological ladder into inner experience is a soteriologically useless maneuver. But perhaps Bhavaviveka’s dismissal is premature—for without an adequate containment strategy for the metaphysical “virulence” of objectivity, scientific realism so resoundingly carries the show that a modern Madhyamika-style critique of subjectivity and essence will never manage to get off the ground. Reified absolutes are poison to the Madhyamika view, yet as we will see, 20th century theoretical physics inescapably suggests them. | + | [[Bhavaviveka’s]] argument expresses in a nutshell the general thrust [[Madhyamika]] “metacritique” of the [[Mind-Only]] {{Wiki|epoche}} of objectivity. As a case of barking up the wrong [[philosophical]] [[tree]], retreating up the epistemological ladder into inner [[experience]] is a [[soteriologically]] useless maneuver. But perhaps [[Bhavaviveka’s]] dismissal is premature—for without an adequate containment strategy for the [[metaphysical]] “virulence” of objectivity, [[scientific]] [[realism]] so resoundingly carries the show that a {{Wiki|modern}} Madhyamika-style critique of [[subjectivity]] and [[essence]] will never manage to get off the ground. Reified absolutes are [[poison]] to the [[Madhyamika]] view, yet as we will see, 20th century [[theoretical physics]] inescapably suggests them. |
− | ==4.2 The Empire Strikes Back and the Return of the Empiricists== | + | ==4.2 The [[Empire]] Strikes Back and the Return of the [[Empiricists]]== |
− | Briefly turning our attention once more to Western philosophy of science, the meteoric rise to power of Mach-inspired logical empiricism was not always favorably received. It provoked a backlash among many experimental scientists, who preferred the more familiar model of critical realism. Planck may be identified as an influential example of this | + | Briefly turning our [[attention]] once more to {{Wiki|Western philosophy}} of [[science]], the meteoric rise to power of Mach-inspired [[logical]] {{Wiki|empiricism}} was not always favorably received. It provoked a backlash among many experimental [[scientists]], who preferred the more familiar model of [[critical realism]]. Planck may be identified as an influential example of this “{{Wiki|reactionary}}” tendency. He mounted a spirited defense of objectivity and absolutes against the instrumentalist and relativist {{Wiki|tendencies}} of positivism: “That we do not create the [[external world]] for [[reasons]] of convenience, but rather, that it impresses itself upon us with elementary force is a point which, in our positivistically influenced day and age, may not remain an unspoken {{Wiki|matter}} of course.” |
− | This statement is an obvious gibe against Mach’s instrumentalist views on the status of the external world. Planck points out how the progress of physical science has enabled absolute values to be established for quantities that were previously believed to be definable only as relative differences, notably energy and entropy. In classical mechanics, only energy differences can be measured, and while energy is a conserved quantity, the idea of an absolute value of energy has no significance within the theory. However, Einstein’s theory of special relativity fixes an absolute value for the resting energy of an object (the famous equation E = me2). Similarly, even though the descriptive force of classical thermodynamics is only sufficient to account for entropy differences, the introduction of the quantum hypothesis permits an absolute value to be derived for the entropy of a system S = k log W (where ll r is the number of microstates corresponding to the macrostate of the system), as IE then comes to be discrete. | + | This statement is an obvious gibe against Mach’s instrumentalist [[views]] on the {{Wiki|status}} of the [[external world]]. Planck points out how the progress of [[physical]] [[science]] has enabled [[absolute]] values to be established for quantities that were previously believed to be definable only as [[relative]] differences, notably [[energy]] and {{Wiki|entropy}}. In classical mechanics, only [[energy]] differences can be measured, and while [[energy]] is a conserved {{Wiki|quantity}}, the [[idea]] of an [[absolute]] value of [[energy]] has no significance within the {{Wiki|theory}}. However, Einstein’s {{Wiki|theory}} of special [[relativity]] fixes an [[absolute]] value for the resting [[energy]] of an [[object]] (the famous equation E = me2). Similarly, even though the descriptive force of classical thermodynamics is only sufficient to account for {{Wiki|entropy}} differences, the introduction of the {{Wiki|quantum}} {{Wiki|hypothesis}} permits an [[absolute]] value to be derived for the {{Wiki|entropy}} of a system S = k log W (where ll r is the number of microstates [[corresponding]] to the macrostate of the system), as IE then comes to be discrete. |
− | As Planck delineates, the development of physical theories proceeds from the differential to the integral and from relative quantities to absolutes. The absolutes of Newtonian space and time have been relativized, only to re-establish the absolute on a more fundamental level as the metric of space-time (the speed of light in vacuum c). | + | As Planck delineates, the [[development]] of [[physical]] theories proceeds from the differential to the integral and from [[relative]] quantities to absolutes. The absolutes of Newtonian {{Wiki|space and time}} have been relativized, only to re-establish the [[absolute]] on a more fundamental level as the metric of {{Wiki|space-time}} (the {{Wiki|speed}} of {{Wiki|light}} in {{Wiki|vacuum}} c). |
− | Planck holds the principle of transcendental objectivity to be the foundation and raison d’etre of physics. Even though he concedes that physical theory will never be absolutely complete and certain, he optimistically believes that it is possible to obtain asymptoptically close knowledge of absolute reality. In sum, Planck’s considerations pose a very serious challenge to Mach’s empiricism of radical relativity. | + | Planck holds the [[principle]] of [[transcendental]] objectivity to be the foundation and raison d’etre of [[physics]]. Even though he concedes that [[physical]] {{Wiki|theory}} will never be absolutely complete and certain, he optimistically believes that it is possible to obtain asymptoptically close [[knowledge]] of [[absolute reality]]. In sum, Planck’s considerations pose a very serious challenge to Mach’s {{Wiki|empiricism}} of radical [[relativity]]. |
− | An empiricist counter-attack might be organized along two | + | An [[empiricist]] counter-attack might be organized along two {{Wiki|dimensions}}— (1) the observational underdetermination and (2) the [[Wikipedia:Semantics|semantic]] incompleteness of [[empirical]] theories. In (1), the Quine-Duhem {{Wiki|thesis}} can be brought to bear against the notion that theories can asymptotically approximate [[reality]]. As for (2), Godelian {{Wiki|reasoning}} can be deployed to show that since a {{Wiki|theory}} cannot internally prove its [[own]] consistency, there is no [[absolute]] [[sense]] in which it can be said to have a model. |
− | A metatheoretically reflecting empiricism will come, on a metaphysical or epistemological level of reflection, to relativize the objectivity of physical absolutes to the theory they are posited by, just as it relativizes the concepts of analyticity, aprioricity (etc.) to some theoretical or metatheoretical language. The model empiricist may venture that the Planckian critical realist notion of absolute objectivity is no more intelligible than the idea of a universal metalanguage or an ultimate level of reflection. | + | A metatheoretically {{Wiki|reflecting}} {{Wiki|empiricism}} will come, on a [[metaphysical]] or [[epistemological]] level of {{Wiki|reflection}}, to relativize the objectivity of [[physical]] absolutes to the {{Wiki|theory}} they are posited by, just as it relativizes the concepts of analyticity, aprioricity (etc.) to some {{Wiki|theoretical}} or metatheoretical [[language]]. The model [[empiricist]] may venture that the Planckian critical realist notion of [[absolute]] objectivity is no more intelligible than the [[idea]] of a [[universal]] metalanguage or an [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level of {{Wiki|reflection}}. |
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− | On any scale, the charting of a possible course from 4th century Indian idealism to contemporary philosophy of science would make for an immensely ambitious undertaking. In an effort to advance through the subject matter at a reasonable pace, I have largely glossed over many noteworthy and distinctive features of Vasubandhu’s thought. The Yogacara theories of karma and causality have received especially short shrift. The nature of the investigation has required a perhaps overly large amount of historical glossing and hermeneutic circling, necessarily at the expense of rigorous analytic reconstruction. | + | On any scale, the charting of a possible course from 4th century [[Indian]] [[idealism]] to contemporary [[philosophy]] of [[science]] would make for an immensely ambitious {{Wiki|undertaking}}. In an [[effort]] to advance through the [[subject]] {{Wiki|matter}} at a reasonable pace, I have largely glossed over many noteworthy and {{Wiki|distinctive}} features of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[thought]]. The [[Yogacara]] theories of [[karma]] and [[causality]] have received especially short shrift. The [[nature]] of the [[investigation]] has required a perhaps overly large amount of historical glossing and {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} circling, necessarily at the expense of rigorous analytic reconstruction. |
− | Despite that much of the precision inherent in the Buddhist philosophical terminology of Vasubandhu’s era has been lost in the mists of time, more effort could and should have been invested in clarifying the technical meanings of terms. By its very nature, comparative philosophy is a hermeneutic transaction in medias res. To be able to say anything whatsoever, one needs to keep one’s meanings fluid. Interpretation to a certain extent trades in suggestive ambiguities. But if meanings are too fluid, one becomes guilty of fitting the evidence to the theory. The deployment of a semi-formalized philosophical precision language is really the only answer to this dilemma, though in my defense, such a strongly structured approach would not have been appropriate to the intended scale of the investigation. | + | Despite that much of the precision [[inherent]] in the [[Buddhist]] [[philosophical]] {{Wiki|terminology}} of [[Vasubandhu’s]] {{Wiki|era}} has been lost in the mists of time, more [[effort]] could and should have been invested in clarifying the technical meanings of terms. By its very [[nature]], comparative [[philosophy]] is a {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} transaction in medias res. To be able to say anything whatsoever, one needs to keep one’s meanings fluid. Interpretation to a certain extent trades in suggestive ambiguities. But if meanings are too fluid, one becomes guilty of fitting the {{Wiki|evidence}} to the {{Wiki|theory}}. The deployment of a semi-formalized [[philosophical]] precision [[language]] is really the only answer to this {{Wiki|dilemma}}, though in my defense, such a strongly structured approach would not have been appropriate to the intended scale of the [[investigation]]. |
− | As far as possible, I have tried to compensate my lack of philological competence in the original languages of Indian philosophy with rational interpolation. When working with classical texts, this is really the only conceivable strength a philosopher can play to vis-a-vis an expert philologist. | + | As far as possible, I have tried to compensate my lack of philological competence in the original [[languages]] of [[Indian philosophy]] with [[rational]] interpolation. When working with classical texts, this is really the only conceivable strength a [[philosopher]] can play to vis-a-vis an expert [[Wikipedia:Philology|philologist]]. |
− | Regarding the aims and tasks of the investigation, I believe that I have taken a sufficiently broad and deep cross-section of the subject matter for me to be able to hope to have extracted an acceptable fraction of the philosophical import of Vasubandu’s arguments against atomism. Overall, I think that the goal to strike a balance between a presentation of the arguments in historical perspective and a demonstration of their relevance to contemporary epistemology has been accomplished. | + | Regarding the aims and tasks of the [[investigation]], I believe that I have taken a sufficiently broad and deep cross-section of the [[subject]] {{Wiki|matter}} for me to be able to {{Wiki|hope}} to have extracted an acceptable fraction of the [[philosophical]] import of Vasubandu’s arguments against [[atomism]]. Overall, I think that the goal to strike a [[balance]] between a presentation of the arguments in historical {{Wiki|perspective}} and a demonstration of their relevance to contemporary epistemology has been accomplished. |
− | Sarva mangalam | + | [[Sarva mangalam]] |
− | Bibliography | + | [[Bibliography]] |
<poem> | <poem> | ||
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− | Bhikkhu, Thanissaro, Vajira Sutta [Please insert “PrerenderUnicode-" into preamble] SN 5.10. Online (URL: | + | [[Bhikkhu]], [[Thanissaro]], [[Vajira Sutta]] [Please insert “PrerenderUnicode-" into preamble] SN 5.10. Online (URL: |
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− | Blumenthal, James, The Ornament of the Middle Way: A study of the Madhyamaka Thought of Santaraksita. Snow Lion Publications, 2004. | + | Blumenthal, James, The [[Ornament of the Middle Way]]: A study of the [[Madhyamaka]] [[Thought]] of [[Santaraksita]]. [[Snow Lion Publications]], 2004. |
− | Bostrom, Nick, Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? Philosophical Quarterly, 53 2003, 243-255. | + | Bostrom, Nick, Are You Living in a Computer Simulation? [[Philosophical]] Quarterly, 53 2003, 243-255. |
− | Brown, Jason, Microgenesis and Buddhism: The Concept of Momentariness. Philosophy East and West, 49 1999:3, 261-277. | + | Brown, Jason, Microgenesis and [[Buddhism]]: The {{Wiki|Concept}} of [[Momentariness]]. [[Philosophy East and West]], 49 1999:3, 261-277. |
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− | Zuse, Konrad, Rechnender Raum. Vieweg, 1969.Index of Subjects and Technical Terms | + | Zuse, Konrad, Rechnender Raum. Vieweg, 1969.Index of [[Subjects]] and Technical Terms |
A | A | ||
− | a priori , 57, 104, 106 | + | {{Wiki|a priori}} , 57, 104, 106 |
− | synthetic, 70 | + | {{Wiki|synthetic}}, 70 |
− | absistent, 53, 101, 113 action | + | absistent, 53, 101, 113 [[action]] |
− | at a distance, 97 moral consequence of, 45 | + | at a distance, 97 [[moral]] consequence of, 45 |
anagoge, 16, 77 | anagoge, 16, 77 | ||
antinomy, 24 | antinomy, 24 | ||
− | anti-realism, 83 anumana, 54, 59, 63, 64 apeiron, 20 apoha, 37 apophaticism, 20 | + | anti-realism, 83 [[anumana]], 54, 59, 63, 64 apeiron, 20 [[apoha]], 37 apophaticism, 20 |
aporia, 20 | aporia, 20 | ||
− | apperception | + | {{Wiki|apperception}} |
refutation of, 115 | refutation of, 115 | ||
− | ataraxia, 26 | + | {{Wiki|ataraxia}}, 26 |
− | atomic lattice, 90 | + | [[atomic]] lattice, 90 |
− | atomism | + | [[atomism]] |
attributive, 69 | attributive, 69 | ||
− | epistemic, 31 explanations for, 42 instrumentalist, 103, 106-108 origins of, 39 phenomenalistic, 49, 87, 107 physical, 39, 87 | + | {{Wiki|epistemic}}, 31 explanations for, 42 instrumentalist, 103, 106-108 origins of, 39 phenomenalistic, 49, 87, 107 [[physical]], 39, 87 |
− | stimulus theory of, 63 | + | {{Wiki|stimulus}} {{Wiki|theory}} of, 63 |
B | B | ||
bahyartha, 15 | bahyartha, 15 | ||
− | Brentano's thesis, 53 | + | Brentano's {{Wiki|thesis}}, 53 |
C | C | ||
category, 64 | category, 64 | ||
critique, 58, 104 | critique, 58, 104 | ||
mistake, 21 | mistake, 21 | ||
− | Cauchy sequence, 68 cessation, 26, 41, 112 classical | + | Cauchy sequence, 68 [[cessation]], 26, 41, 112 classical |
− | electrodynamics, 89 mechanics, 118 thermodynamics, 118 close-packing, 90 cogito, 24, 26 consciousness | + | electrodynamics, 89 mechanics, 118 thermodynamics, 118 close-packing, 90 cogito, 24, 26 [[consciousness]] |
− | appearance in, 63 | + | [[appearance]] in, 63 |
− | crystal analogy, 83 lamp analogy, 114 | + | {{Wiki|crystal}} analogy, 83 [[lamp]] analogy, 114 |
Lichtenberg, 116 | Lichtenberg, 116 | ||
mud analogy, 115 | mud analogy, 115 | ||
privacy of, 52 | privacy of, 52 | ||
− | constitution, 103, 108 | + | constitution, 103, [[108]] |
noetic, 75 | noetic, 75 | ||
− | of experience, 71, 77, 80, 88 | + | of [[experience]], 71, 77, 80, 88 |
− | of space, 95 constitution theory, 76, 108 continuants, 61, 101 counterfactuals, 53 | + | of [[space]], 95 constitution {{Wiki|theory}}, 76, [[108]] continuants, 61, 101 counterfactuals, 53 |
D | D | ||
diagonalization, 24 | diagonalization, 24 | ||
− | Ding an sich, 32, 65, 77, 79, 80, 82, 107 | + | [[Ding an sich]], 32, 65, 77, 79, 80, 82, 107 |
displacement argument, 97 dissolution | displacement argument, 97 dissolution | ||
− | of conceptual rigidities, 22 | + | of {{Wiki|conceptual}} rigidities, 22 |
− | of the ego, 34 | + | of the [[ego]], 34 |
− | dualism | + | [[dualism]] |
− | Cartesian, 63 | + | [[Cartesian]], 63 |
E | E | ||
E = me2, 118 | E = me2, 118 | ||
− | effective action | + | effective [[action]] |
causal vectors of, 64 | causal vectors of, 64 | ||
discrete pulses of, 68 infinitive, 47 | discrete pulses of, 68 infinitive, 47 | ||
− | wet dream example, 8 Elementarerlebnis, 66, 116 elements | + | wet [[dream]] example, 8 Elementarerlebnis, 66, 116 [[elements]] |
a /3 7... A B C... K L M..., 34, 105 | a /3 7... A B C... K L M..., 34, 105 | ||
− | four fundamental, 50 emergence, 56 empiricism, 13, 15, 24, 26, 28, 57 empiriocritical assumption, 108 empiriocriticism, 14, 15, 17, 27-29, 70, 72, 79, 104, 108, 110 energy, 118 epoche | + | four fundamental, 50 [[emergence]], 56 {{Wiki|empiricism}}, 13, 15, 24, 26, 28, 57 empiriocritical assumption, [[108]] empiriocriticism, 14, 15, 17, 27-29, 70, 72, 79, 104, [[108]], 110 [[energy]], 118 {{Wiki|epoche}} |
− | Cartesian, 23, 29, 77, 79, 85, 88, | + | [[Cartesian]], 23, 29, 77, 79, 85, 88, |
117 | 117 | ||
− | of subjectivity, 24 phenomenological, 23 positivistic, 20 | + | of [[subjectivity]], 24 {{Wiki|phenomenological}}, 23 positivistic, 20 |
− | evolutionary psychology, 106 experience | + | {{Wiki|evolutionary psychology}}, 106 [[experience]] |
− | as in dreams, 7, 8, 11, 111 elements of, 35, 45 factors of, 58 | + | as in [[dreams]], 7, 8, 11, 111 [[elements]] of, 35, 45 factors of, 58 |
− | ineffability of, 20, 61 intersubjective, 12 mosaic theory of, 37, 51, 107 of objectivity, 7 | + | ineffability of, 20, 61 intersubjective, 12 mosaic {{Wiki|theory}} of, 37, 51, 107 of objectivity, 7 |
− | priority of inner, 113 projection of consciousness into, | + | priority of inner, 113 projection of [[consciousness]] into, |
34 | 34 | ||
− | psycho-physical complex of, 80 reduction of, 69 | + | [[psycho-physical]] complex of, 80 reduction of, 69 |
− | sensory core of, 55 stream of, 63, 66 subjective constitution of, 56 externalism, 44, 53, 81, 101 | + | sensory core of, 55 {{Wiki|stream}} of, 63, 66 [[subjective]] constitution of, 56 {{Wiki|externalism}}, 44, 53, 81, 101 |
F | F | ||
False Aspectarianism, 83, 84 fictionalism, 53 | False Aspectarianism, 83, 84 fictionalism, 53 | ||
− | fire simile, 19 forest-dwelling seers, 12 foundationalism, 31 | + | [[fire]] simile, 19 [[forest-dwelling]] seers, 12 {{Wiki|foundationalism}}, 31 |
G | G | ||
Gedankensymbol, 105 genidentity, 44 | Gedankensymbol, 105 genidentity, 44 | ||
− | Gestalt, 65, 82 | + | {{Wiki|Gestalt}}, 65, 82 |
− | gnosis, 27 | + | [[gnosis]], 27 |
− | inversion of, 27, 34, 35 gnostic turpitude, 104 gunk, 102, 103 | + | [[inversion]] of, 27, 34, 35 [[gnostic]] turpitude, 104 gunk, 102, 103 |
H | H | ||
− | hallucination | + | {{Wiki|hallucination}} |
− | argument from, 56 doctrine of collective, 12 hell-guardian argument, 9 homeomeria, 54 Hiilfsbegriff, 107 hyle, 82 | + | argument from, 56 [[doctrine]] of collective, 12 hell-guardian argument, 9 homeomeria, 54 Hiilfsbegriff, 107 [[hyle]], 82 |
I | I | ||
− | illucutionary negation, 17 illusion | + | illucutionary {{Wiki|negation}}, 17 [[illusion]] |
− | argument from, 55 transcendental, 9 immanent temporality, 61 incompleteness, 118 indetermination | + | argument from, 55 [[transcendental]], 9 immanent temporality, 61 incompleteness, 118 indetermination |
− | hungry ghosts example, 8 infinitesimal, 62, 94, 96 inherence, 37, 41 internalism, 7, 9, 68 introjection, 70, 109 | + | [[hungry ghosts]] example, 8 infinitesimal, 62, 94, 96 {{Wiki|inherence}}, 37, 41 {{Wiki|internalism}}, 7, 9, 68 introjection, 70, 109 |
K | K | ||
− | Kantian turn, 14, 57 karma, 26, 106, 119 Korperwelt, 35 | + | [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] turn, 14, 57 [[karma]], 26, 106, 119 Korperwelt, 35 |
L | L | ||
ladder | ladder | ||
− | of views, 28, 29, 117 | + | of [[views]], 28, 29, 117 |
− | Wittgenstein’s simile, 21 levels of reflection, 7, 23, 119 luminance, 84 | + | Wittgenstein’s simile, 21 levels of {{Wiki|reflection}}, 7, 23, 119 luminance, 84 |
M | M | ||
magnitude | magnitude | ||
intensive, 50 | intensive, 50 | ||
− | minimal perceivable, 49 | + | minimal {{Wiki|perceivable}}, 49 |
McTaggart argument, 46 mentalism, 105 meontology, 18, 22 mereological | McTaggart argument, 46 mentalism, 105 meontology, 18, 22 mereological | ||
− | argument, 89 atom, 2 overlap, 92 metalanguage, 119 metaphysics, 57, 75, 106 middle ground | + | argument, 89 {{Wiki|atom}}, 2 overlap, 92 metalanguage, 119 [[metaphysics]], 57, 75, 106 middle ground |
− | of monism and dualism, 109 of realism and idealism, 23, 77, 105 | + | of {{Wiki|monism}} and [[dualism]], 109 of [[realism]] and [[idealism]], 23, 77, 105 |
− | monism | + | {{Wiki|monism}} |
− | absolute, 31, 112 | + | [[absolute]], 31, 112 |
− | neutral, 109 | + | [[neutral]], 109 |
− | Parmenidean, 99 | + | [[Wikipedia:Parmenides|Parmenidean]], 99 |
− | Moorean proof, 9, 113 motion, 100, 118 mysticism, 27, 28 | + | Moorean [[proof]], 9, 113 {{Wiki|motion}}, 100, 118 [[mysticism]], 27, 28 |
− | apophatic, 26 | + | {{Wiki|apophatic}}, 26 |
− | immanence, 27 | + | {{Wiki|immanence}}, 27 |
− | myth | + | [[myth]] |
− | of physical objects, 110 | + | of [[physical objects]], 110 |
− | of the given, 108 | + | of the given, [[108]] |
N | N | ||
− | negation | + | {{Wiki|negation}} |
− | apophatic, 25 | + | {{Wiki|apophatic}}, 25 |
− | tetralemmatic, 21 nihilism | + | tetralemmatic, 21 [[nihilism]] |
− | Madhyamika, 21 | + | [[Madhyamika]], 21 |
− | mereological, 41, 85, 86, 91 nirvana, 19 noema, 72, 109 no-ownership theory, 36 noumenon, 65, 78 | + | mereological, 41, 85, 86, 91 [[nirvana]], 19 noema, 72, 109 no-ownership {{Wiki|theory}}, 36 {{Wiki|noumenon}}, 65, 78 |
O | O | ||
− | ontological relativism, 104 ontology | + | [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] {{Wiki|relativism}}, 104 {{Wiki|ontology}} |
− | convenient fiction, 107 ultimate, 91 | + | convenient {{Wiki|fiction}}, 107 [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]], 91 |
P | P | ||
− | paradox | + | [[paradox]] |
as stylistic device, 16 | as stylistic device, 16 | ||
− | of metrical extension, 92 paratantra-svabhava, 73 particle physics, 103 | + | of metrical extension, 92 [[paratantra-svabhava]], 73 {{Wiki|particle}} [[physics]], 103 |
− | point-particle problem, 89 perception | + | point-particle problem, 89 [[perception]] |
− | causal theory of, 54, 58, 68 error-theory of, 54 | + | causal {{Wiki|theory}} of, 54, 58, 68 error-theory of, 54 |
− | veil of, 32 | + | [[veil]] of, 32 |
− | perceptual datum, 65, 99 phenomenalism, 6, 14, 15, 23, 25, | + | {{Wiki|perceptual}} datum, 65, 99 {{Wiki|phenomenalism}}, 6, 14, 15, 23, 25, |
27-30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 52, 53, 67 | 27-30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 52, 53, 67 | ||
− | philosophical poetry, 16 physical absolutes, 117, 119 | + | [[philosophical]] [[poetry]], 16 [[physical]] absolutes, 117, 119 |
− | physical objects, 30-33, 35, 38, 70 in disguise, 53 | + | [[physical objects]], 30-33, 35, 38, 70 in disguise, 53 |
− | myth of, 110 | + | [[myth]] of, 110 |
positivism, 5, 21, 27, 42, 117 | positivism, 5, 21, 27, 42, 117 | ||
− | Prajnaparamita, 22 | + | [[Prajnaparamita]], 22 |
− | pratibhasa, 63, 70 | + | [[pratibhasa]], 63, 70 |
− | pratipaksa, 29, 116 | + | [[pratipaksa]], 29, 116 |
− | pratyaksa, 35, 59, 72 | + | [[pratyaksa]], 35, 59, 72 |
presentism, 58 | presentism, 58 | ||
replacement, 61 | replacement, 61 | ||
− | principle | + | [[principle]] |
− | of economy, 106 | + | of {{Wiki|economy}}, 106 |
− | of Epicurus, 102 | + | of [[Epicurus]], 102 |
− | of falsification, 88 | + | of [[falsification]], 88 |
− | of least action, 106 pseudo-problem, 20, 56, 117 psycho-physical parallelism, 109 psychophysics, 42, 83 | + | of least [[action]], 106 pseudo-problem, 20, 56, 117 [[psycho-physical]] parallelism, 109 [[psychophysics]], 42, 83 |
− | pure reason | + | [[pure]] [[reason]] |
− | antinomies of, 18 idea of, 78 | + | antinomies of, 18 [[idea]] of, 78 |
Q | Q | ||
− | qualia, 27, 52, 83, 84 “quantifying into”, 52 quantum, 68, 118 | + | {{Wiki|qualia}}, 27, 52, 83, 84 “quantifying into”, 52 {{Wiki|quantum}}, 68, 118 |
quasianalysis, 66 | quasianalysis, 66 | ||
− | Quine-Duhem thesis, 118 | + | Quine-Duhem {{Wiki|thesis}}, 118 |
R | R | ||
raft | raft | ||
Neurath’s simile, 77 | Neurath’s simile, 77 | ||
− | Sakyamuni’s simile, 21 | + | [[Sakyamuni’s]] simile, 21 |
− | raw feel, 52 | + | raw [[feel]], 52 |
− | realism | + | [[realism]] |
− | critical, 32, 64, 109 deconstruction of, 30 direct, 57, 72 existence dimension of, 31 metaphysical, 7, 80 modal, 48 physical, 52 representational, 32 reality | + | critical, 32, 64, 109 deconstruction of, 30 direct, 57, 72 [[existence]] [[dimension]] of, 31 [[metaphysical]], 7, 80 modal, 48 [[physical]], 52 representational, 32 [[reality]] |
− | absolute, 32, 118 | + | [[absolute]], 32, 118 |
criterion of, 47 | criterion of, 47 | ||
− | mystical, 21 | + | [[mystical]], 21 |
− | of human existence, 24 transcendent, 27 reality problem, 55 receptacle, 89, 92, 94 regressus, 88, 107 regulative, 8 | + | of [[human existence]], 24 [[transcendent]], 27 [[reality]] problem, 55 receptacle, 89, 92, 94 regressus, 88, 107 regulative, 8 |
− | of sensory intuition, 26 relation | + | of sensory [[intuition]], 26 [[relation]] |
external, 94 | external, 94 | ||
− | functional, 26 relativity theory, 90, 118 renormalization, 89 res extensa, 63 | + | functional, 26 [[relativity]] {{Wiki|theory}}, 90, 118 renormalization, 89 res extensa, 63 |
S | S | ||
− | s = k log if, ns sarvam asti, 44 Scheinproblem, 21 sensibilia, 33, 35, 48, 49, 53, 98 shadow terminator, 97 shape, 39, 51, 55, 57, 61, 62, 89-91, 95 | + | s = k log if, ns [[sarvam asti]], 44 Scheinproblem, 21 sensibilia, 33, 35, 48, 49, 53, 98 shadow terminator, 97 shape, 39, 51, 55, 57, 61, 62, 89-91, 95 |
− | silence | + | [[silence]] |
− | about absolutes, 18 metaphysical, 20, 21 of the Buddha, 17, 22 skepticism | + | about absolutes, 18 [[metaphysical]], 20, 21 of the [[Buddha]], 17, 22 {{Wiki|skepticism}} |
− | Cartesian, 13 solipsism, 11, 12, 85 space | + | [[Cartesian]], 13 {{Wiki|solipsism}}, 11, 12, 85 [[space]] |
− | absolute, 49, 105 as absence of obstruction, 49 as relation of substances, 94 Carnap scheme, 94 | + | [[absolute]], 49, 105 as absence of obstruction, 49 as [[relation]] of {{Wiki|substances}}, 94 Carnap scheme, 94 |
− | Euclidean, 90 exotic, 95 limit-concepts of, 94 | + | {{Wiki|Euclidean}}, 90 exotic, 95 limit-concepts of, 94 |
− | Newtonian, 118 sunyata, 20, 22, 24 svabhava, 114 svalaksana, 66 svasamvedana, 64, 114 | + | Newtonian, 118 [[sunyata]], 20, 22, 24 [[svabhava]], 114 [[svalaksana]], 66 [[svasamvedana]], 64, 114 |
T | T | ||
− | telepathy, 11 temporal | + | {{Wiki|telepathy}}, 11 {{Wiki|temporal}} |
eliminativism, 47 | eliminativism, 47 | ||
time | time | ||
− | critique of, 38 modal theory of, 48 motion picture analogy, 44 time-gap argument, 101 transcendental | + | critique of, 38 modal {{Wiki|theory}} of, 48 {{Wiki|motion}} picture analogy, 44 time-gap argument, 101 [[transcendental]] |
− | apperception, 25, 64, 116 ego, 23, 25 idealism, 82, 108illusionism, 9, 88 | + | {{Wiki|apperception}}, 25, 64, 116 [[ego]], 23, 25 [[idealism]], 82, 108illusionism, 9, 88 |
− | object, 77 objectivity, 10, 15, 32, 71 reasoning, 63, 88 transcending gnosis, 11 True Aspectarianism, 82, 84, 88 | + | [[object]], 77 objectivity, 10, 15, 32, 71 {{Wiki|reasoning}}, 63, 88 transcending [[gnosis]], 11 True Aspectarianism, 82, 84, 88 |
U underdetermination, 118 | U underdetermination, 118 | ||
V | V | ||
− | via negativa, 24, 28 via positivistica, 28 vikalpa, 58, 65, 91 | + | via negativa, 24, 28 via positivistica, 28 [[vikalpa]], 58, 65, 91 |
− | vyapti, 101 | + | [[vyapti]], 101 |
− | W world | + | W [[world]] |
− | distinction of ego and, 34 inner covering outer, 63 like a dream, 11 limits of, 25 path to the end of, 35Index of Personal Names | + | {{Wiki|distinction}} of [[ego]] and, 34 inner covering outer, 63 like a [[dream]], 11 limits of, 25 [[path]] to the end of, 35Index of Personal Names |
A | A | ||
− | Anacker, Stefan, 3, 6, 44, 73, 86, | + | [[Anacker]], Stefan, 3, 6, 44, 73, 86, |
100 | 100 | ||
− | Anaximander, 20 | + | {{Wiki|Anaximander}}, 20 |
− | Aristotle, 93 | + | {{Wiki|Aristotle}}, 93 |
Augustine, 53 | Augustine, 53 | ||
Avenarius, Richard, 14, 15, 27, 70, | Avenarius, Richard, 14, 15, 27, 70, | ||
Line 1,536: | Line 1,536: | ||
Ayer, A.J., 49, 50, 53 | Ayer, A.J., 49, 50, 53 | ||
B | B | ||
− | Bahya Darucirya, 33, 34 | + | [[Bahya]] Darucirya, 33, 34 |
− | Belden, Ngawang, 63 | + | Belden, [[Ngawang]], 63 |
− | Berkeley, George, 15, 23, 73 | + | [[Berkeley]], George, 15, 23, 73 |
− | Bhavaviveka, 115, 116 | + | [[Bhavaviveka]], 115, 116 |
− | Boltzmann, Ludwig, 108 | + | Boltzmann, Ludwig, [[108]] |
Bouwsma, O. K., 88 | Bouwsma, O. K., 88 | ||
Brentano, Franz, 83 | Brentano, Franz, 83 | ||
− | Buddhadeva, 45, 46 | + | [[Buddhadeva]], 45, 46 |
− | Bu-ston, 3 | + | [[Bu-ston]], 3 |
C | C | ||
− | Candraklrti, 115 | + | [[Candraklrti]], 115 |
Carnap, Rudolf, 23, 27, 55, 66, 68, | Carnap, Rudolf, 23, 27, 55, 66, 68, | ||
− | 76, 94, 108 | + | 76, 94, [[108]] |
− | Chatterjee, A. K., 31, 38, 58, 66, 67, | + | [[Chatterjee]], A. K., 31, 38, 58, 66, 67, |
D | D | ||
della Santina, Peter, 58 | della Santina, Peter, 58 | ||
− | Democritus, 39 | + | {{Wiki|Democritus}}, 39 |
− | Dharmakirti, 37, 66, 67, 69, 72 | + | [[Dharmakirti]], 37, 66, 67, 69, 72 |
− | Dharmapala, 72 | + | [[Dharmapala]], 72 |
− | Dharmasri, 3, 43, 44 | + | [[Dharmasri]], 3, 43, 44 |
Dharmatrai ta, 3, 45, 46, 51 | Dharmatrai ta, 3, 45, 46, 51 | ||
Dignaiga, 66, 69 | Dignaiga, 66, 69 | ||
Dipakara, 51 | Dipakara, 51 | ||
E | E | ||
− | Einstein, Albert, 90, 118 | + | {{Wiki|Einstein}}, Albert, 90, 118 |
− | Epicurus, 64, 102 | + | [[Epicurus]], 64, 102 |
Essler, W. K., 7, 11 | Essler, W. K., 7, 11 | ||
F | F | ||
Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 42 | Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 42 | ||
− | Frauwallner, Erich, 4, 5, 38, 46, 48, | + | {{Wiki|Frauwallner}}, Erich, 4, 5, 38, 46, 48, |
86 | 86 | ||
G | G | ||
Line 1,573: | Line 1,573: | ||
Goodman, Nelson, 66 | Goodman, Nelson, 66 | ||
Grupp, Jeffrey, 38, 61, 66 | Grupp, Jeffrey, 38, 61, 66 | ||
− | Guenther, Herbert V., 13, 38� | + | [[Guenther]], Herbert V., 13, 38� |
H | H | ||
− | Hume, David, 24, 25, 38, 48, 49 | + | [[Hume]], David, 24, 25, 38, 48, 49 |
− | Husserl, Edmund, 12, 23, 25, 34, | + | [[Wikipedia:Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl|Husserl]], Edmund, 12, 23, 25, 34, |
61, 111 | 61, 111 | ||
J | J | ||
Line 1,583: | Line 1,583: | ||
K | K | ||
Kan. ada, 39 | Kan. ada, 39 | ||
− | Kant, Immanuel, 10, 14, 18, 21, 26, | + | {{Wiki|Kant}}, Immanuel, 10, 14, 18, 21, 26, |
38, 68, 82, 93, 94 | 38, 68, 82, 93, 94 | ||
− | Kapstein, Matthew, 36, 37, 86, 95, | + | [[Wikipedia:Matthew Kapstein|Kapstein, Matthew]], 36, 37, 86, 95, |
100 | 100 | ||
− | King, Martin Luther, 111 | + | [[King]], [[Martin Luther]], 111 |
− | Kochumuttom, Thomas, 6, 29, 73, | + | {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}}, Thomas, 6, 29, 73, |
77-79, 86, 99 | 77-79, 86, 99 | ||
L | L | ||
− | Lamotte, Etienne, 2 | + | [[Wikipedia:Étienne Lamotte|Lamotte]], Etienne, 2 |
Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van, 100 | Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van, 100 | ||
− | Leibniz, Gottfried, 102 | + | {{Wiki|Leibniz}}, Gottfried, 102 |
Lewis, David, 102 | Lewis, David, 102 | ||
Lichtenberg, Georg, 25, 26, 116 | Lichtenberg, Georg, 25, 26, 116 | ||
Locke, John, 64 | Locke, John, 64 | ||
− | Lusthaus, Dan, 6, 73-77 | + | [[Lusthaus, Dan]], 6, 73-77 |
M | M | ||
Mach, Ernst, 9, 11, 14, 25-27, 38, | Mach, Ernst, 9, 11, 14, 25-27, 38, | ||
− | 55, 71, 85, 108, 111 | + | 55, 71, 85, [[108]], 111 |
− | Mahavira, 42 | + | [[Wikipedia:Mahāvīra|Mahavira]], 42 |
− | Matilal, B. K., 14, 36, 38, 50, 54, 62, | + | [[Matilal]], B. K., 14, 36, 38, 50, 54, 62, |
80, 86, 104 | 80, 86, 104 | ||
Mauthner, Fritz, 26 | Mauthner, Fritz, 26 | ||
McTaggart, J. M. E., 46 | McTaggart, J. M. E., 46 | ||
Meinong, Alexius, 53 | Meinong, Alexius, 53 | ||
− | Mipham, Ju, 80, 84 | + | [[Mipham]], Ju, 80, 84 |
Musil, Robert, 106 | Musil, Robert, 106 | ||
N | N | ||
− | Nabokov, Vladimir, 104 Nagao, Gadjin M., 4, 76, 80 Naigairjuna, 61, 118 | + | Nabokov, Vladimir, 104 [[Nagao]], Gadjin M., 4, 76, 80 Naigairjuna, 61, 118 |
Naigasena, 36 | Naigasena, 36 | ||
Neurath, Otto, 77 | Neurath, Otto, 77 | ||
O | O | ||
Oetke, Claus, 36, 67, 69 | Oetke, Claus, 36, 67, 69 | ||
− | Ostwald, Wilhelm, 108 | + | Ostwald, Wilhelm, [[108]] |
P | P | ||
Panikkar, Raimon, 20 | Panikkar, Raimon, 20 | ||
Paramai rtha, 3 | Paramai rtha, 3 | ||
Parfit, Derek, 24 | Parfit, Derek, 24 | ||
− | Parmenides, 99 | + | {{Wiki|Parmenides}}, 99 |
Pinker, Steven, 83 | Pinker, Steven, 83 | ||
Planck, Max, 117-119 | Planck, Max, 117-119 | ||
− | Plato, 36 | + | {{Wiki|Plato}}, 36 |
Popper, Karl, 88 | Popper, Karl, 88 | ||
Prior, A. N., 52 | Prior, A. N., 52 | ||
Line 1,632: | Line 1,632: | ||
Russell, Bertrand, 102 | Russell, Bertrand, 102 | ||
S | S | ||
− | {Sakyamuni, 14, 17-21, 24, 33 | + | {[[Sakyamuni]], 14, 17-21, 24, 33 |
− | Samkara, 112-114 | + | [[Samkara]], 112-114 |
− | Sanghabhadra, 3, 4, 43, 50Santaraksita, 28, 80, 84 | + | [[Sanghabhadra]], 3, 4, 43, 50Santaraksita, 28, 80, 84 |
− | Schmithausen, Lambert, 86 | + | [[Schmithausen]], Lambert, 86 |
− | Schopenhauer, Arthur, 14 | + | {{Wiki|Schopenhauer}}, Arthur, 14 |
Schrodinger, Erwin, 1 | Schrodinger, Erwin, 1 | ||
− | Sellars, Wilfrid, 61, 108 | + | Sellars, Wilfrid, 61, [[108]] |
− | Siderits, Mark, 15, 21, 22, 36, 86, 96 | + | [[Siderits, Mark]], 15, 21, 22, 36, 86, 96 |
− | Sinha, Jadunath, 53, 112 | + | [[Sinha]], Jadunath, 53, 112 |
− | Stcherbatsky, Theodor, 38 | + | [[Wikipedia:Fyodor Shcherbatskoy|Stcherbatsky]], Theodor, 38 |
− | Sthiramati, 72 | + | [[Sthiramati]], 72 |
T | T | ||
− | Tsongkhapa, 81, 84, 114 | + | [[Tsongkhapa]], 81, 84, 114 |
V | V | ||
− | Vasumitra, 45, 46, 48 | + | [[Vasumitra]], 45, 46, 48 |
− | Vatsyayana, 40 | + | [[Vatsyayana]], 40 |
− | von Rospatt, Alexander, 38, 59, 60 | + | von Rospatt, [[Alexander]], 38, 59, 60 |
W | W | ||
− | Wayman, Alex, 6, 73, 74 | + | [[Wayman, Alex]], 6, 73, 74 |
− | Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 21, 30 | + | {{Wiki|Wittgenstein}}, Ludwig, 21, 30 |
Y | Y | ||
− | Yasomitra, 48, 54 | + | [[Yasomitra]], 48, 54 |
Z | Z | ||
Zeno, 92, 93 | Zeno, 92, 93 | ||
Line 1,663: | Line 1,663: | ||
− | Kapitel 1 Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt das Argument gegen den Ato- mismus aus den Vimsatika Vijnaptimatratasiddhi (Zwanzig Versen des Nur-Geistes), einer erkenntnistheoretischen Abhandlung des spatantiken indischen Philosophen Vasubandhu. Unter Atomismus wird hierbei durchge- hend die Lehre vom Aufbau der Welt aus kleinsten, nicht weiter zerlegbaren Wirklichkeitsbestandteilen verstanden, wie sie im Altertum in verschiedent- licher Form von griechischen wie auch von indischen Weltanschauungslehren vertreten wurde. | + | Kapitel 1 [[Die]] vorliegende Arbeit behandelt das Argument [[gegen]] den Ato- mismus aus den [[Vimsatika]] [[Vijnaptimatratasiddhi]] (Zwanzig Versen des Nur-Geistes), einer erkenntnistheoretischen Abhandlung des spatantiken indischen Philosophen [[Vasubandhu]]. Unter Atomismus wird hierbei durchge- hend [[die]] Lehre vom Aufbau der Welt aus kleinsten, nicht weiter zerlegbaren Wirklichkeitsbestandteilen verstanden, wie sie im Altertum in verschiedent- licher [[Form]] von griechischen wie auch von indischen Weltanschauungslehren vertreten wurde. |
− | Das Argument Vasubandhus beriihrt insbesondere die atomistischen Leh- ren der Vaibhasika- und Sautrantika-Schulen der fruhbuddhistischen Scho- lastik. Daher wird zunachst ein Abriss der Erkenntnistheorien dieser beiden Schulen des Abhidharma gegeben, wobei besonderes Augenmerk auf die kritische Entwicklungslinie ihrer Kategorienlehren in Bezug auf Raum, Zeit und Substanz gelegt wird. Durch diese vorbereitende Darlegung wer- den sowohl die philosophischen Hintergriinde und Voraussetzungen der Argumentation Vasubandhus aufgedeckt als auch die vorzunehmende Interpretation seiner anti-atomistischen Wirklichkeitsauffassung im Lich- te der empiriokritizistischen Uberwindung des Dings an sich untermau- ert. Die so gewonnene Sichtweise wird schlieBlich als Ausgangspunkt fur transzendentalphilosophische Betrachtungen im Sinne der buddhistischen Erkenntnistheorie genutzt, wie etwa fur Uberlegungen fiber den Status der transzendentalen Apperzeption, die Konstitution von Erfahrungserkenntnis und die Aussagekraft skeptischer Argumente. | + | Das Argument [[Vasubandhus]] beriihrt insbesondere [[die]] atomistischen Leh- ren der [[Vaibhasika]]- und Sautrantika-Schulen der fruhbuddhistischen Scho- lastik. Daher wird zunachst ein Abriss der Erkenntnistheorien dieser beiden Schulen des [[Abhidharma]] gegeben, wobei besonderes Augenmerk auf [[die]] kritische Entwicklungslinie ihrer Kategorienlehren in Bezug auf Raum, Zeit und Substanz gelegt wird. Durch diese vorbereitende Darlegung wer- den sowohl [[die]] philosophischen Hintergriinde und Voraussetzungen der Argumentation [[Vasubandhus]] aufgedeckt als auch [[die]] vorzunehmende Interpretation seiner anti-atomistischen Wirklichkeitsauffassung im Lich- te der empiriokritizistischen Uberwindung des Dings an sich untermau- ert. [[Die]] so gewonnene Sichtweise wird schlieBlich als Ausgangspunkt fur transzendentalphilosophische Betrachtungen im Sinne der buddhistischen Erkenntnistheorie genutzt, wie etwa fur Uberlegungen fiber den {{Wiki|Status}} der transzendentalen Apperzeption, [[die]] Konstitution von Erfahrungserkenntnis und [[die]] Aussagekraft skeptischer Argumente. |
− | In der Einleitung werden zunachst einige Bemerkungen zur Person, zur Lebensgeschichte und zum philosophischen Schaffen Vasubandhus gemacht. | + | In der Einleitung werden zunachst einige Bemerkungen zur [[Person]], zur Lebensgeschichte und zum philosophischen Schaffen [[Vasubandhus]] gemacht. |
− | Es folgt anschlieBend ein Resumee der erkenntnistheoretisch relevanten Themen der Vimsatika, in dem Vasubandhus stark idealistisch eingefarbter AuBenweltskeptizismus in Grundzugen sichtbar gemacht wird. Die Haupt- these Vasubandhus, die er gleich zu Anfang der Vimsatika aufstellt und im Verlauf der Abhandlung gegen realistische Einwande zu verteidigen sucht, ist das Prinzip der Traumartigkeit der Erfahrungserkenntnis. Damit soil im Wesentlichen gesagt werden, dass - trotz des gegenteiligen Anscheins - in der Erfahrung nirgends die Erkenntnis eines erkenntnisunabhangigen Gegenstands moglich ist. Vasubandhu stellt insbesondere die Erkenntnis- moglichkeit einer metaphysisch gegebenen objektiven AuBenwelt in Abrede und schlagt vor, dass eine intersubjektive Konstitution der Erfahrungs- mannigfaltigkeit an dessen Stelle treten solle. | + | Es folgt anschlieBend ein Resumee der erkenntnistheoretisch relevanten Themen der [[Vimsatika]], in dem [[Vasubandhus]] stark idealistisch eingefarbter AuBenweltskeptizismus in Grundzugen sichtbar gemacht wird. [[Die]] Haupt- these [[Vasubandhus]], [[die]] er gleich zu Anfang der [[Vimsatika]] aufstellt und im Verlauf der Abhandlung [[gegen]] realistische Einwande zu verteidigen sucht, ist das Prinzip der Traumartigkeit der Erfahrungserkenntnis. Damit soil im Wesentlichen gesagt werden, dass - trotz des gegenteiligen Anscheins - in der Erfahrung nirgends [[die]] Erkenntnis eines erkenntnisunabhangigen Gegenstands moglich ist. [[Vasubandhu]] stellt insbesondere [[die]] Erkenntnis- moglichkeit einer metaphysisch gegebenen objektiven AuBenwelt in Abrede und schlagt vor, dass eine intersubjektive Konstitution der Erfahrungs- mannigfaltigkeit an dessen Stelle treten solle. |
− | Auf die im Resumee herausgestellten Ergebnisse aufbauend lasst sich nun begrunden, weshalb eine nahere Betrachtung der Argumente gegen den Atomismus von geistesgeschichtlichem und erkenntnistheoretischem Interesse ist. Ferner wird die zu verwendende hermeneutische Methode der Untersuchung - der interkulturelle Vergleich zum kritischen Realis- mus Kants und dem Empiriokritizismus seiner Nachfolger Avenarius und Mach - eingefuhrt. Durch den Vergleich sollen Bezugspunkte zur modernen Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftsphilosophie geschaffen und die philo- sophische Relevanz der Ideen Vasubandhus klarer zur Geltung gebracht werden. Es werden dabei allerdings auch die methodischen Probleme eines solchen Deutungsansatzes berucksichtigt. | + | Auf [[die]] im Resumee herausgestellten Ergebnisse aufbauend lasst sich [[nun]] begrunden, weshalb eine nahere Betrachtung der Argumente [[gegen]] den Atomismus von geistesgeschichtlichem und erkenntnistheoretischem Interesse ist. Ferner wird [[die]] zu verwendende hermeneutische Methode der Untersuchung - der interkulturelle Vergleich zum kritischen Realis- mus Kants und dem Empiriokritizismus seiner Nachfolger Avenarius und Mach - eingefuhrt. Durch den Vergleich sollen Bezugspunkte zur modernen Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftsphilosophie geschaffen und [[die]] philo- sophische Relevanz der Ideen [[Vasubandhus]] klarer zur Geltung gebracht werden. Es werden [[dabei]] allerdings auch [[die]] methodischen Probleme eines solchen Deutungsansatzes berucksichtigt. |
− | Um die Analyse der Atomismusargumente mit einer hermeneutischen Hintergrundstruktur zu unterfuttern, wird ein erster Bruckenschlag zwi- schen der buddhistischen und der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie gewagt. Das Schweigen des Buddhas Gautama Sakyamuni zu den vierzehn metaphy- sischen Fragen wird zur Mach’schen Auffassung des Scheinproblems in Be- zug gesetzt. Am so gedeuteten Mittelpunktereignis des Buddha-Schweigens wird die Hypothese abgelesen, dass der buddhistischen Erkenntnislehre empiristische und erkenntniskritische Momente zu Grunde liegen. Ganz nach Fapon des logischen Empirismus wird im Zuge des Reflektierens uber die Bedingungen und Moglichkeiten von Erfahrungserkenntnis Ein- sicht dartiber gewonnen, dass uber alles jenseits der Erkenntnisgrenzen Liegende geschwiegen werden muss. Es wird die These entwickelt, dass das Buddha-Schweigen in seinem positivistischen Deutungssinn mit einer Urteilsenthaltung uber das transzendental Objektive einhergeht, also unter die philosophische Figur der „Cartesischen | + | Um [[die]] Analyse der Atomismusargumente mit einer hermeneutischen Hintergrundstruktur zu unterfuttern, wird ein erster Bruckenschlag zwi- schen der buddhistischen und der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie gewagt. Das Schweigen des [[Buddhas]] [[Gautama Sakyamuni]] zu den vierzehn metaphy- sischen Fragen wird zur Mach’schen Auffassung des Scheinproblems in Be- zug gesetzt. Am so gedeuteten Mittelpunktereignis des Buddha-Schweigens wird [[die]] Hypothese abgelesen, dass der buddhistischen Erkenntnislehre empiristische und erkenntniskritische Momente zu Grunde liegen. Ganz nach Fapon des logischen Empirismus wird im Zuge des Reflektierens uber [[die]] Bedingungen und Moglichkeiten von Erfahrungserkenntnis Ein- sicht dartiber gewonnen, dass uber alles jenseits der Erkenntnisgrenzen Liegende geschwiegen werden muss. Es wird [[die]] These entwickelt, dass das Buddha-Schweigen in seinem positivistischen Deutungssinn mit einer Urteilsenthaltung uber das transzendental Objektive einhergeht, also unter [[die]] philosophische Figur der „Cartesischen {{Wiki|epoche}}“ gefasst werden kann. Der erkenntnistheoretische Hohengewinn eines [[die]] Reflektion von Bedin- gung und Moglichkeit von Erfahrung erlaubenden Standpunktes geht mit einem Abwurf metaphysischen Ballasts einher, bzw. ist nur auf solchem cartesisch-skeptischen Wege zu erlangen. |
− | Allerdings ist dabei noch zu beriicksichtigen, dass das Hauptmoment der buddhistischen Soteriologie in ihrer Lehre vom Nicht-Selbst (anatman) und von der Leerheit der Erfahrungselemente liegt. Auch hier sind Parallelen zu einschlagigen empiristischen Anschauungen (etwa zur Bundeltheorie der Person) gegeben. In seiner mahayanistischen Blute entwickelt sich der der Leerheitsbegriff jedoch zu einer negativen Mystik und verlasst damit das Terrain der Erkenntnistheorie. Die reine via negativa ist nun neben der als gfiltig erachteten positivistischen Deutung die tiefere und eigentlichere Auslegungsmoglichkeit des Buddha-Schweigens, und lasst sich philosophisch gesehen mit einer epoche der transzendentalen Subjektivitat in Deckung bringen. | + | Allerdings ist [[dabei]] noch zu beriicksichtigen, dass das Hauptmoment der buddhistischen Soteriologie in ihrer Lehre vom Nicht-Selbst ([[anatman]]) und von der Leerheit der Erfahrungselemente liegt. Auch hier sind Parallelen zu einschlagigen empiristischen Anschauungen (etwa zur Bundeltheorie der [[Person]]) gegeben. In seiner mahayanistischen Blute entwickelt sich der der Leerheitsbegriff jedoch zu einer negativen Mystik und verlasst damit das Terrain der Erkenntnistheorie. [[Die]] reine via negativa ist [[nun]] neben der als gfiltig erachteten positivistischen Deutung [[die]] tiefere und eigentlichere Auslegungsmoglichkeit des Buddha-Schweigens, und lasst sich philosophisch gesehen mit einer {{Wiki|epoche}} der transzendentalen Subjektivitat in Deckung bringen. |
− | Uber ein positivistisches Schweigen kann auf hoherer Reflektionsstufe noch nachgedacht und gesprochen werden, wahrend sich das negativ- mystische Schweigen jeder Moglichkeit eines reflektierenden Zugangs ent- zieht. Die epoche des Objekts wird aber dadurch nicht hinfallig - sie gewinnt dadurch im Gegenteil ihren rechten Sinn als Propadeutik. Im Kontext der mahayanistischen Erlbsungslehre wird das vermeintlich absolut existieren- de Erkenntnisobjekt der Alltagserfahrung (wie auch die Erkenntnis selbst und letztlich auch jedes Reflektieren fiber Bedingung und Moglichkeit von Erkenntnis) als instrumentell aufgefasst. Ziel und Ende von Erkenntnis, wie auch das eigentliche Wesen von Erfahrung, sind mystisch und ungreifbar. | + | Uber ein positivistisches Schweigen kann auf hoherer Reflektionsstufe noch nachgedacht und gesprochen werden, wahrend sich das negativ- mystische Schweigen jeder Moglichkeit eines reflektierenden Zugangs ent- zieht. [[Die]] {{Wiki|epoche}} des Objekts wird aber dadurch nicht hinfallig - sie gewinnt dadurch im Gegenteil ihren rechten Sinn als Propadeutik. Im Kontext der mahayanistischen Erlbsungslehre wird das vermeintlich [[absolut]] existieren- de Erkenntnisobjekt der Alltagserfahrung (wie auch [[die]] Erkenntnis selbst und letztlich auch jedes Reflektieren fiber Bedingung und Moglichkeit von Erkenntnis) als instrumentell aufgefasst. Ziel und Ende von Erkenntnis, wie auch das eigentliche Wesen von Erfahrung, sind mystisch und ungreifbar. |
− | Die in den Vimsatika von Vasubandhu entfaltete idealistische Erkenntnistheorie ist demnach von einem negativ-mystischen Letztsinn geleitet. Dieser Gesichtspunkt muss bei der Deutung seines rational-argumentativen Vor- gehens in ebensolchem MaBe wie die philosophischen Hintergrtinde der abhidharmischen Scholastik Berficksichtigung finden. Obgleich in Grund- ziigen vorhanden, kommt das mystische Moment bei Mach ungleich weniger deutlich zum Vorschein als bei Vasubandhu. Als positivistisch denkender Naturwissenschaftler begniigt er sich damit, den antimetaphysischen Stand- punkt zu gewinnen. Von hier aus soil Physik auf eine Beschreibung des Funktionszusammenhangs der Empfindungen reduziert werden konnen. Dieser Mach’sche Phanomenalismus entspricht aber gerade jenem fruh- buddhistischen Boden, der durch den Realismus der buddhistischen Scho- lastik verloren gegangen war und dessen Zuruckgewinn von Vasubandhu verteidigt wird. | + | [[Die]] in den [[Vimsatika]] von [[Vasubandhu]] entfaltete idealistische Erkenntnistheorie ist demnach von einem negativ-mystischen Letztsinn geleitet. Dieser Gesichtspunkt muss bei der Deutung seines rational-argumentativen Vor- gehens in ebensolchem MaBe wie [[die]] philosophischen Hintergrtinde der abhidharmischen Scholastik Berficksichtigung finden. Obgleich in Grund- ziigen vorhanden, kommt das mystische [[Moment]] bei Mach ungleich weniger deutlich zum Vorschein als bei [[Vasubandhu]]. Als positivistisch denkender Naturwissenschaftler begniigt er sich damit, den antimetaphysischen Stand- punkt zu gewinnen. Von hier aus soil Physik auf eine Beschreibung des Funktionszusammenhangs der Empfindungen reduziert werden konnen. Dieser Mach’sche Phanomenalismus entspricht aber gerade jenem fruh- buddhistischen Boden, der durch den Realismus der buddhistischen Scho- lastik verloren gegangen [[war]] und dessen Zuruckgewinn von [[Vasubandhu]] verteidigt wird. |
− | Kapitel 2 Solche weitgreifende Thesen verlangen natiirlich nach einer aus- fuhrlicheren Begrundung, die im Rahmen einer Begriffsklarung erfolgt. Die Kernbegriffe Realismus, Phanomenalismus und Nominalismus werden naher ausgeleuchtet. Der Briickenschlag von der buddhistischen zu einer radikal-empiristischen Erkenntnistheorie wird anhand einer Betrach- tung ausgewahlter fruhbuddhistischer Lehrreden weiter vorangetrieben, die Parallelisierung zur Ideenwelt Machs erhartet. | + | Kapitel 2 Solche weitgreifende Thesen verlangen natiirlich nach einer aus- fuhrlicheren Begrundung, [[die]] im Rahmen einer Begriffsklarung erfolgt. [[Die]] Kernbegriffe Realismus, Phanomenalismus und Nominalismus werden naher ausgeleuchtet. Der Briickenschlag von der buddhistischen zu einer radikal-empiristischen Erkenntnistheorie wird anhand einer Betrach- tung ausgewahlter fruhbuddhistischer Lehrreden weiter vorangetrieben, [[die]] Parallelisierung zur Ideenwelt Machs erhartet. |
− | Die noch naher durchzufuhrende Darstellung vom Aufstieg und Fall des buddhistischen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus wird angerissen: Im Zuge einer fortschreitenden Zeitkritik wandelt sich innerhalb der Abhidharma-Schulen die Auffassung vom Objekt. Wo sich in der Vaibhasika-Schule das auBen- weltlich Objektive progressiv als begriffliche Beifugung zum letztlich sei- enden Empfindungsmosaik konstituiert, wird es bei den Sautrantika in regressiver Weise gewonnen, d.h. als apriorisch zu denkender, letztlich sei- ender Kausalgrund von Empfindung (die nurmehr als in bloB begrifflich- beigefugter Weise seiend gilt) gesetzt. Diese philosophische Bewegung soil nun anhand modellhafter Rekonstruktionen der Erkenntnistheorien der Vaibhasika- und der Sautrantika-Schulen eine weitere Untersuchung erfahren. | + | [[Die]] noch naher durchzufuhrende Darstellung vom Aufstieg und Fall des buddhistischen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus wird angerissen: Im Zuge einer fortschreitenden Zeitkritik wandelt sich innerhalb der Abhidharma-Schulen [[die]] Auffassung vom Objekt. Wo sich in der Vaibhasika-Schule das auBen- weltlich Objektive progressiv als begriffliche Beifugung zum letztlich sei- enden Empfindungsmosaik konstituiert, wird es bei den [[Sautrantika]] in regressiver Weise gewonnen, d.h. als apriorisch zu denkender, letztlich sei- ender Kausalgrund von Empfindung ([[die]] nurmehr als in bloB begrifflich- beigefugter Weise seiend gilt) gesetzt. Diese philosophische Bewegung soil [[nun]] anhand modellhafter Rekonstruktionen der Erkenntnistheorien der Vaibhasika- und der Sautrantika-Schulen eine weitere Untersuchung erfahren. |
− | Zunachst werden jedoch die historischen Urspriinge des indischen Atomis- mus in der nicht-buddhistischen Vaisesika-Schule gesucht und die Atom- theorie dieser Schule in Grundziigen skizziert - sowohl um eine Verstandnis- grundlage fur die im Folgenden nachzuzeichnenden Entwicklungen der buddhistischen Schulen an die Hand zu geben als auch um die zentrale Kontrastfigur fur Vasubandhus anti-atomistische Argumentation aufzu- stellen. Der Einfluss der realistischen Vaisesika-Metaphysik stellt einen moglichen Grund fur die Entfaltung atomistischer Lehren innerhalb der ur- spriinglich nicht-atomistischen Erkenntnistheorie des Buddhismus dar, aber es sind auch Herleitungen aus phanomenalistischen oder nominalistischen Gesichtspunkten denkbar. | + | Zunachst werden jedoch [[die]] historischen Urspriinge des indischen Atomis- mus in der nicht-buddhistischen Vaisesika-Schule gesucht und [[die]] {{Wiki|Atom}}- theorie dieser Schule in Grundziigen skizziert - sowohl um eine Verstandnis- grundlage fur [[die]] im Folgenden nachzuzeichnenden Entwicklungen der buddhistischen Schulen an [[die]] Hand zu geben als auch um [[die]] zentrale Kontrastfigur fur [[Vasubandhus]] anti-atomistische Argumentation aufzu- stellen. Der Einfluss der realistischen Vaisesika-Metaphysik stellt einen moglichen Grund fur [[die]] Entfaltung atomistischer Lehren innerhalb der ur- spriinglich nicht-atomistischen Erkenntnistheorie des Buddhismus dar, aber es sind auch Herleitungen aus phanomenalistischen oder nominalistischen Gesichtspunkten denkbar. |
− | Im Atomismus der Vaibhasika-Schule sind realistische, phanomenalistische und nominalistische Einfliisse in mehr oder minder starkem AusmaBe zur Auspragung gekommen. Lehrmeinung des Vaibhasika ist eine zweigliedrige Wahrnehmungstheorie. Demnach entsteht Erkenntnis im unmittelba- ren Kontakt der Bewusstseinsmomente zu den Empfindungsatomen, die als letztlich seiende Substanzen im absoluten Raum aufgefasst werden. Diese Atomlehre ist im Rahmen enzyklopadischer Systematisierungen des Abhidharma dargestellt worden und teilt sich anhand dessen in drei Entwicklungsphasen auf. Die dritte, abschlieBende Stufe dieser Entwicklung ist in Vasubandhus Abhidharmakosa sowie im Nyayanusara, der Replik seines Lehrers und Kontrahenten Sarighabhadra, gegeben. | + | Im Atomismus der Vaibhasika-Schule sind realistische, phanomenalistische und nominalistische Einfliisse in mehr oder minder starkem AusmaBe zur Auspragung gekommen. Lehrmeinung des [[Vaibhasika]] ist eine zweigliedrige Wahrnehmungstheorie. Demnach entsteht Erkenntnis im unmittelba- ren Kontakt der Bewusstseinsmomente zu den Empfindungsatomen, [[die]] als letztlich seiende Substanzen im absoluten Raum aufgefasst werden. Diese Atomlehre ist im Rahmen enzyklopadischer Systematisierungen des [[Abhidharma]] dargestellt worden und teilt sich anhand dessen in drei Entwicklungsphasen auf. [[Die]] dritte, abschlieBende Stufe dieser Entwicklung ist in [[Vasubandhus]] [[Abhidharmakosa]] sowie im [[Nyayanusara]], der Replik seines Lehrers und Kontrahenten Sarighabhadra, gegeben. |
− | Die Vaibhasikas vertraten eine Lehre von der Existenz in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, und entwickelten vier Zeittheorien, Diese Theorien sowie ihre Kritiken werden etwas ausfuhrlicher dargestellt, wobei Parallelen zur modernen westlichen Philosophie gezogen werden, etwa zur Zeitkritik McTaggarts. Es wird eine Rekonstruktion der Zeittheorie des Vasumitra vorgenommen, welche versucht, Zeitlichkeit als Modus von Aktualitat und Existenz in Vergangenheit und Zukunft mit einem modalen Realismus zu fassen. | + | [[Die]] [[Vaibhasikas]] vertraten eine Lehre von der Existenz in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, und entwickelten vier Zeittheorien, Diese Theorien sowie ihre Kritiken werden etwas ausfuhrlicher dargestellt, wobei Parallelen zur modernen westlichen Philosophie gezogen werden, etwa zur Zeitkritik McTaggarts. Es wird eine Rekonstruktion der Zeittheorie des [[Vasumitra]] vorgenommen, welche versucht, Zeitlichkeit als Modus von Aktualitat und Existenz in Vergangenheit und Zukunft mit einem modalen Realismus zu fassen. |
− | Die Theorie der Vaibhasika von den Empfindungsatomen wird ausgefuhrt und mit dem Hume’schen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus verglichen. Es folgt eine kritische Betrachtung der dargestellten Lehren, die zum Standpunkt der fruhen Sautrantika-Schule iiberleitet. | + | [[Die]] Theorie der [[Vaibhasika]] von den Empfindungsatomen wird ausgefuhrt und mit dem Hume’schen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus verglichen. Es folgt eine kritische Betrachtung der dargestellten Lehren, [[die]] zum Standpunkt der fruhen Sautrantika-Schule iiberleitet. |
− | Die Anschauungen der Sautrantikas zeichnen sich gegentiber den Theorien der Vaibhasikas im Wesentlichen durch zwei Neuerungen aus - den Reprasentationalismus sowie die Lehre von der Momentanheit des Seien- den. Darunter wird der Ineinsfall von Zeitlichkeit und Kausalfunktion mit, dem Wesen des Seienden verstanden. Da die Sautrantika sogar den augen- blicklichen zeitlichen Bestand ablehnen, entsteht damit eine Auffassung von Atomen als augenblicklich-flusshafte Reizimpulse. | + | [[Die]] Anschauungen der [[Sautrantikas]] zeichnen sich gegentiber den Theorien der [[Vaibhasikas]] im Wesentlichen durch zwei Neuerungen aus - den Reprasentationalismus sowie [[die]] Lehre von der Momentanheit des Seien- den. Darunter wird der Ineinsfall von Zeitlichkeit und Kausalfunktion mit, dem Wesen des Seienden verstanden. Da [[die]] [[Sautrantika]] sogar den augen- blicklichen zeitlichen Bestand ablehnen, entsteht damit eine Auffassung von Atomen als augenblicklich-flusshafte Reizimpulse. |
− | Die Sautrantika vertreten eine Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis - eine wahrheitsgemaBe Empfindung ist demnach eine solche, die mit ihrer letztlich seienden, augenblicklich-flusshaften Reizgrundlage ubereinstimmt. Die Reizatome werden den Kant’schen Dingen an sich gegeniibergestellt und dieser Vergleich wird problematisiert. Die Sautrantika-Lehre der irrealen Wahrnehmungssynthese durch begriffliche Einbildungskraft wird beleuchtet, um den Unterscheid zum Synthesebegriff Kants zu unterstreichen. | + | [[Die]] [[Sautrantika]] vertreten eine Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis - eine wahrheitsgemaBe Empfindung ist demnach eine solche, [[die]] mit ihrer letztlich seienden, augenblicklich-flusshaften Reizgrundlage ubereinstimmt. [[Die]] Reizatome werden den Kant’schen Dingen an sich gegeniibergestellt und dieser Vergleich wird problematisiert. [[Die]] Sautrantika-Lehre der irrealen Wahrnehmungssynthese durch begriffliche Einbildungskraft wird beleuchtet, um den Unterscheid zum Synthesebegriff Kants zu unterstreichen. |
− | Die Atomlehre der spaten Sautrantika-Phase, in der nur noch von logisch partikularen Augenblicklichkeitspunkten die Rede ist, wird im Ansatz vorge- stellt und mit dem Elementarerlebnis Carnaps verglichen. Die Theorie der Augenblicklichkeitspunkte ist nicht von der Atomkritik Vasubandhus betrof- fen, da sie sich von der Vorstellung der Substanzhaftigkeit und raumlichen Ausdehnung des Atoms gelost hat. | + | [[Die]] Atomlehre der spaten Sautrantika-Phase, in der nur noch von logisch partikularen Augenblicklichkeitspunkten [[die]] Rede ist, wird im Ansatz vorge- stellt und mit dem Elementarerlebnis Carnaps verglichen. [[Die]] Theorie der Augenblicklichkeitspunkte ist nicht von der Atomkritik [[Vasubandhus]] betrof- fen, da sie sich von der Vorstellung der Substanzhaftigkeit und raumlichen Ausdehnung des [[Atoms]] gelost hat. |
− | Es folgt eine Zusammenfassung und kritische Wiirdigung der Erkenntnis- theorie der Sautrantika-Schule. Es werden Unstimmigkeiten an ihrer re- prasentationalistischen Erkenntnistheorie aufgezeigt, die auf die Notwen- digkeit einer ganzlichen Aufgabe des auBenweltlichen Objekts (wie dies von der Nur-Geist-Schule schlieBlich vollzogen wird) hindeuten. | + | Es folgt eine Zusammenfassung und kritische Wiirdigung der Erkenntnis- theorie der Sautrantika-Schule. Es werden Unstimmigkeiten an ihrer re- prasentationalistischen Erkenntnistheorie aufgezeigt, [[die]] auf [[die]] Notwen- digkeit einer ganzlichen Aufgabe des auBenweltlichen Objekts (wie [[dies]] von der Nur-Geist-Schule schlieBlich vollzogen wird) hindeuten. |
− | Kapitel 3 Die idealistische Lesart der Nur-Geist-Lehre wird zu Anfang programmatisch in den Vordergrund gestellt. Die Betrachtung geht zu einer Unterscheidung der wichtigsten historischen Entwicklungslinien der Nur-Geist-Schule uber. Als nachstes wird die revisionistische Linie der modemen Rezeptionsgeschichte im Groben dargestellt. Es folgt eine nahere Erlauterung der drei einflussreichsten revisionistischen Lesarten. Diese deuten die Erkenntnistheorie der Nur-Geist-Schule im Wesentlichen als phanomenologische Spielart des kritischen Realismus. Die Stellungnahme zu diesen Lesarten arbeitet die eigene Interpretationslinie klarer heraus und untermauert diese. | + | Kapitel 3 [[Die]] idealistische Lesart der Nur-Geist-Lehre wird zu Anfang programmatisch in den Vordergrund gestellt. [[Die]] Betrachtung geht zu einer Unterscheidung der wichtigsten historischen Entwicklungslinien der Nur-Geist-Schule uber. Als nachstes wird [[die]] revisionistische Linie der modemen Rezeptionsgeschichte im Groben dargestellt. Es folgt eine nahere Erlauterung der drei einflussreichsten revisionistischen Lesarten. Diese deuten [[die]] Erkenntnistheorie der Nur-Geist-Schule im Wesentlichen als phanomenologische Spielart des kritischen Realismus. [[Die]] Stellungnahme zu diesen Lesarten arbeitet [[die]] eigene Interpretationslinie klarer heraus und untermauert diese. |
− | AnschlieBend wird die traditionelle Interpretation der Nur-Geist-Lehre vorgestellt. Die in der tibetischen Doxographie iibliche Unterscheidung der Wahr- und Falschaspektler-Lesarten wird eingefuhrt und im Ansatz phi- losophisch rekonstruiert. Die Wahraspektler-Lesart wird als „realistische“, die Falschaspektler-Lesart als „antirealistische“ Deklination des Nur-Geist- Standpunktes umschrieben. | + | AnschlieBend wird [[die]] traditionelle Interpretation der Nur-Geist-Lehre vorgestellt. [[Die]] in der tibetischen Doxographie iibliche Unterscheidung der Wahr- und Falschaspektler-Lesarten wird eingefuhrt und im Ansatz phi- losophisch rekonstruiert. [[Die]] Wahraspektler-Lesart wird als „realistische“, [[die]] Falschaspektler-Lesart als „antirealistische“ Deklination des Nur-Geist- Standpunktes umschrieben. |
− | Nachdem der Interpretationsraum aufgespannt wurde, wird das Argument gegen den Atomismus schematisch umrissen. Weil sich die Angriffslinie der Zeitkritik am Atombegriff im Sautrantika erschopft hat, versucht Vasubandhu nun, das Atom und damit den Substanzbegriff auf dem Wege der Raumkritik ganzlich zu eliminieren. Vasubandhu vertritt die These, dass Atome weder in der Erfahrung selbst noch als ihre materiellen Konstitutions- elemente gegeben sind. Die realistische Gegenposition stellt sich in den drei Atomtheorien der Vaisesika-, der Vaibhasika- und der Sautrantika-Schulen dar. Die Argumentation verlauft apagogisch, da die Position Vasubandhus eine epoche ist und deshalb nur die realistische Gegenposition einen Nach- weis schuldet. Gelingt dieser nicht, ist damit der Standpunkt Vasubandhus erwiesen. | + | Nachdem der Interpretationsraum aufgespannt wurde, wird das Argument [[gegen]] den Atomismus schematisch umrissen. Weil sich [[die]] Angriffslinie der Zeitkritik am Atombegriff im [[Sautrantika]] erschopft hat, versucht Vasubandhu [[nun]], das {{Wiki|Atom}} und damit den Substanzbegriff auf dem Wege der Raumkritik ganzlich zu eliminieren. [[Vasubandhu]] vertritt [[die]] These, dass Atome weder in der Erfahrung selbst noch als ihre materiellen Konstitutions- elemente gegeben sind. [[Die]] realistische Gegenposition stellt sich in den drei Atomtheorien der [[Vaisesika]]-, der [[Vaibhasika]]- und der Sautrantika-Schulen dar. [[Die]] Argumentation verlauft apagogisch, da [[die]] Position [[Vasubandhus]] eine {{Wiki|epoche}} ist und deshalb nur [[die]] realistische Gegenposition einen Nach- weis schuldet. Gelingt dieser nicht, ist damit der Standpunkt [[Vasubandhus]] erwiesen. |
− | Der Realist habe laut Vasubandhu drei Moglichkeiten, das auBenweltliche Objekt nachzuweisen: als einheitliches Ganzes, als loser Atomhaufen oder als zusammenhangendes Atomkonglomerat. Wird wie in den letzten beiden Fallen des Trilemmas eine Atomtheorie angenommen, sind abermals zwei Faile zu unterscheiden: das Substanzatom als raumlich ausgedehntes Teil- chen oder als ausdehnungsloser Punkt. Vasubandhu wird nun zeigen, dass beide Faile unmoglich sind, womit nur noch der Fall des auBen weltlichen Objekts als einheitliches Ganzes zu widerlegen bleibt. | + | Der Realist habe laut [[Vasubandhu]] drei Moglichkeiten, das auBenweltliche Objekt nachzuweisen: als einheitliches Ganzes, als loser Atomhaufen oder als zusammenhangendes Atomkonglomerat. Wird wie in den letzten beiden Fallen des Trilemmas eine Atomtheorie angenommen, sind abermals zwei Faile zu unterscheiden: das Substanzatom als raumlich ausgedehntes Teil- [[chen]] oder als ausdehnungsloser Punkt. [[Vasubandhu]] wird [[nun]] zeigen, dass beide Faile unmoglich sind, womit nur noch der Fall des auBen weltlichen Objekts als einheitliches Ganzes zu widerlegen bleibt. |
− | Der Fall des Atoms als raumlich ausgedehntes Teilchen wird mit einer mereologisch ausgerichteten Beweisfuhrung behandelt. Wesentlicher Aspekt der Argumentation ist die implizite Annahme, dass die raumliche Verbindung und Anordnung von Atomen nur mit mereotopologischen Mitteln darstellbar sind, Ontologie sich jedoch auf den rein mereologischen Anted beschranken muss. Topologische Eigenschaften sind als begriffliche Ein- bildungen bei der Betrachtung des letztlich Seienden auBer Acht zu lassen. Damit fiihrt Vasubandhu eine von der Sache her analoge Argumentation zur Antithese der zweiten Antinomie der reinen Vernunft bei Kant - er erweist, dass alles, was einen Raum einnimmt, zusammengesetzt ist. | + | Der Fall des [[Atoms]] als raumlich ausgedehntes Teilchen wird mit einer mereologisch ausgerichteten Beweisfuhrung behandelt. Wesentlicher Aspekt der Argumentation ist [[die]] implizite Annahme, dass [[die]] raumliche Verbindung und Anordnung von Atomen nur mit mereotopologischen Mitteln darstellbar sind, Ontologie sich jedoch auf den rein mereologischen Anted beschranken muss. Topologische Eigenschaften sind als begriffliche Ein- bildungen bei der Betrachtung des letztlich Seienden auBer Acht zu lassen. Damit fiihrt [[Vasubandhu]] eine von der Sache her analoge Argumentation zur Antithese der zweiten Antinomie der reinen Vernunft bei {{Wiki|Kant}} - er erweist, dass alles, was einen Raum einnimmt, zusammengesetzt ist. |
− | Gegen das punktformige Atom tragt Vasubandhu ebenfalls vernichtende Einwande vor, etwa dass sich solche Atome nur beruhren konnen, wenn sie den gleichen Raumort einnehmen. Ausgedehnte Korper, die aus solchen Atomen zusammengesetzt sind, fallen auf PunktgroBe zusammen. Des Wei- teren sind phanomenal wahrnehmbare Eigenschaften wie Verdrangung oder Schattenwurf nur unter Zugrundelegung einer raumlichen Ausdehnung des Atoms konstituierbar. Vasubandhu geht daraufhin zur Betrachtung des Falls tiber, dass das auBenweltliche Objekt als einheitliches Ganzes gegeben sei. Er fuhrt hierzu eine Reihe von Gegenbeispielen an, die wieder in Ahnlich- keit zum Kant’schen Standpunkt zeigen sollen, dass echte Einheiten in der Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeit nirgends vorzufinden sind. | + | [[Gegen]] das punktformige {{Wiki|Atom}} tragt [[Vasubandhu]] ebenfalls vernichtende Einwande vor, etwa dass sich solche Atome nur beruhren konnen, wenn sie den gleichen Raumort einnehmen. Ausgedehnte Korper, [[die]] aus solchen Atomen zusammengesetzt sind, fallen auf PunktgroBe zusammen. Des Wei- teren sind phanomenal wahrnehmbare Eigenschaften wie Verdrangung oder Schattenwurf nur unter Zugrundelegung einer raumlichen Ausdehnung des [[Atoms]] konstituierbar. [[Vasubandhu]] geht daraufhin zur Betrachtung des Falls tiber, dass das auBenweltliche Objekt als einheitliches Ganzes gegeben sei. Er fuhrt hierzu eine Reihe von Gegenbeispielen an, [[die]] wieder in Ahnlich- keit zum Kant’schen Standpunkt zeigen sollen, dass echte Einheiten in der Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeit nirgends vorzufinden sind. |
− | Im nachsten Argument wird die kausale Wahrnehmungstheorie der Sautrantika abgehandelt. Vasubandhu weist darauf hin, dass eine Kausa- litatsbeziehung nur zwischen aufeinanderfolgenden Momenten moglich ist. Weil der Anhaltspunkt einer Wahrnehmung zu dem Zeitpunkt, als dar- aus ein Wahrnehmungsobjekt entsteht, bereits entschwunden ist, kann die Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis nicht aufrecht erhalten werden. Damit ist dann auch die Notwendigkeit einer apriorisch zu denkenden auBen- weltlichen Reizgrundlage hinfallig geworden. | + | Im nachsten Argument wird [[die]] kausale Wahrnehmungstheorie der Sautrantika abgehandelt. [[Vasubandhu]] weist darauf hin, dass eine Kausa- litatsbeziehung nur zwischen aufeinanderfolgenden Momenten moglich ist. Weil der Anhaltspunkt einer Wahrnehmung zu dem Zeitpunkt, als dar- aus ein Wahrnehmungsobjekt entsteht, bereits entschwunden ist, kann [[die]] Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis nicht aufrecht erhalten werden. Damit ist dann auch [[die]] Notwendigkeit einer apriorisch zu denkenden auBen- weltlichen Reizgrundlage hinfallig geworden. |
− | Atomtheorien, die als im Vasubandhu’schen Sinne widerlegt gelten durfen, sind solche, die von der erkenntnisunabhangigen Existenz unteilbarer, letzt- lich seiender Substanzen im absoluten Raum ausgehen. Atomismen, die sich nicht auf einen solchen Substanzbegriff festlegen, bleiben von seiner Argumentation unberiihrt, ebenso logische und instrumentelle Atomismen sowie realistische Standpunkte, die von einer unendlichen Teilbarkeit des StofElichen ausgehen. | + | Atomtheorien, [[die]] als im Vasubandhu’schen Sinne widerlegt gelten durfen, sind solche, [[die]] von der erkenntnisunabhangigen Existenz unteilbarer, letzt- lich seiender Substanzen im absoluten Raum ausgehen. Atomismen, [[die]] sich nicht auf einen solchen Substanzbegriff festlegen, bleiben von seiner Argumentation unberiihrt, ebenso logische und instrumentelle Atomismen sowie realistische Standpunkte, [[die]] von einer unendlichen Teilbarkeit des StofElichen ausgehen. |
− | Den Vergleichsfaden zur empiriokritizistischen Erkenntnistheorie wieder aufgreifend kann der Standpunkt Vasubandhus nun anhand des Mach’schen Antiatomismus neu ausbuchstabiert werden. Mach und Avenarius fiihren wissenschaftliche Erklarung auf Beschreibung, Ontologie auf das Prinzip der Denkokonomie zuriick. In der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie gerat das Atom zum bloBen Gedankensymbol, bei Avenarius ist es ein aus Zweck- maBigkeitsgrunden gewahlter Grenzbegriff. Fur die Empiriokritizisten ist die bewusstseinsunabhangige Gegen standlichkeit des Erkenntnisobjekts genau wie fur Vasubandhu eine Fiktion. Ahnliche Standpunkte finden sich bei Carnap und sogar bei Quine, so dass der Idealismus Vasubandhus vom Grundsatz her keineswegs als ganzlich veraltet gelten kann. | + | Den Vergleichsfaden zur empiriokritizistischen Erkenntnistheorie wieder aufgreifend kann der Standpunkt [[Vasubandhus]] [[nun]] anhand des Mach’schen Antiatomismus neu ausbuchstabiert werden. Mach und Avenarius fiihren wissenschaftliche Erklarung auf Beschreibung, Ontologie auf das Prinzip der Denkokonomie zuriick. In der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie gerat das {{Wiki|Atom}} zum bloBen Gedankensymbol, bei Avenarius ist es ein aus Zweck- maBigkeitsgrunden gewahlter Grenzbegriff. Fur [[die]] Empiriokritizisten ist [[die]] bewusstseinsunabhangige [[Gegen]] standlichkeit des Erkenntnisobjekts genau wie fur [[Vasubandhu]] eine Fiktion. Ahnliche Standpunkte finden sich bei Carnap und sogar bei Quine, so dass der Idealismus [[Vasubandhus]] vom Grundsatz her keineswegs als ganzlich veraltet gelten kann. |
− | Kapitel 4 Die vorangegangenen Erorterungen legen nahe, die Vasuband- hu’sche Sicht als einen Empirismus in fremdem Gewande zu deuten. Der durchgefuhrte Perspektivwechsel zur buddhistischen Erkenntnistheorie ver- schafft dem abendlandischen Philosophierenden einen neuartigen Ausblick auf seine eigene empiristische Denktradition. Die Suche nach Anfangs- griinden und Sinn von Erkenntnis gestaltet sich gleichermaflen im Abstrak- ten als erkenntnistheoretische Reflektion wie auch im Konkreten als geistes- geschichtliche Reise zu den ost-westlichen Urquellen der Erkenntnistheorie. | + | Kapitel 4 [[Die]] vorangegangenen Erorterungen legen nahe, [[die]] Vasuband- hu’sche Sicht als einen Empirismus in fremdem Gewande zu deuten. Der durchgefuhrte Perspektivwechsel zur buddhistischen Erkenntnistheorie ver- schafft dem abendlandischen Philosophierenden einen neuartigen Ausblick auf seine eigene empiristische Denktradition. [[Die]] Suche nach Anfangs- griinden und Sinn von Erkenntnis gestaltet sich gleichermaflen im Abstrak- ten als erkenntnistheoretische Reflektion wie auch im Konkreten als geistes- geschichtliche Reise zu den ost-westlichen Urquellen der Erkenntnistheorie. |
− | Um weitere Perspektiven der erfolgten Analyse zu eroffnen, wird die Kritik an der Nur-Geist-Sichtweise vonseiten der Advaita Vedanta- und Madhya- mika-Schulen angerissen. Die Nur-Geist-Lehre dient dabei als notwendige Gegenfigur fur die voile Entfaltung des metakritischen Skeptizismus der Madhyamikas, der sich den Angriff auf die transzendentale Subjektivitat zum Programm macht. Andererseits geht der Madhyamika in seiner De- struktion der Objektivitatskritik der Nur-Geist-Schule deutlich zu weit. Es wird die These aufgestellt, dass Kritik am Objektivitatsbegriff Bedingung der Moglichkeit einer Subjektivitatskritik ist. Hat man namlich keine Mittel zur Hand, sich des absoluten Charakters gewisser physikalischer Grundbegriffe zu erwehren, ist jeder Ansatz einer Wesenslosigkeitsmystik im Sinne des Madhyamika im Keime erstickt. | + | Um weitere Perspektiven der erfolgten Analyse zu eroffnen, wird [[die]] Kritik an der Nur-Geist-Sichtweise vonseiten der [[Wikipedia:Advaita Vedanta|Advaita Vedanta]]- und [[Madhya]]- mika-Schulen angerissen. [[Die]] Nur-Geist-Lehre dient [[dabei]] als notwendige Gegenfigur fur [[die]] voile Entfaltung des metakritischen Skeptizismus der [[Madhyamikas]], der sich den Angriff auf [[die]] transzendentale Subjektivitat zum Programm macht. Andererseits geht der [[Madhyamika]] in seiner De- struktion der Objektivitatskritik der Nur-Geist-Schule deutlich zu weit. Es wird [[die]] These aufgestellt, dass Kritik am Objektivitatsbegriff Bedingung der Moglichkeit einer Subjektivitatskritik ist. Hat man namlich keine Mittel zur Hand, sich des absoluten Charakters gewisser physikalischer Grundbegriffe zu erwehren, ist jeder Ansatz einer Wesenslosigkeitsmystik im Sinne des [[Madhyamika]] im Keime erstickt. |
− | Planck bringt auf den Punkt, wie aufgrund theoretischer Fortschritte (beispielsweise der speziellen Relativitatstheorie und der Quantenhypothe- se) entgegen den fruhpositivistischen Ansichten Machs tatsachlich auf die Absolutwertigkeit u.a. von Energie und Entropie geschlossen werden kann. Die Mach’schen Prinzipien der Relativitat physikalischer Begriffe und der Instrumentality der AuBenwelthypothese seien durch die gezeigte Bewe- gung vom Relativen zum Absoluten entkraftet. Der Empirismus findet jedoch in der metatheoretischen Reflektion einen Ausweg. Durch absolutwertige Begriffe ist einerseits ein wissenschaftlicher Bodengewinn gegeben, anderer- seits kommt man aus erkenntnistheoretischen Grunden nicht umhin, diese Absolutheit wieder in Bezug auf Theorie und Reflektionsstufe zu relativieren. | + | Planck bringt auf den Punkt, wie aufgrund theoretischer Fortschritte (beispielsweise der speziellen Relativitatstheorie und der Quantenhypothe- se) entgegen den fruhpositivistischen Ansichten Machs tatsachlich auf [[die]] Absolutwertigkeit u.a. von Energie und Entropie geschlossen werden kann. [[Die]] Mach’schen Prinzipien der Relativitat physikalischer Begriffe und der Instrumentality der AuBenwelthypothese seien durch [[die]] gezeigte Bewe- gung vom Relativen zum Absoluten entkraftet. Der Empirismus findet jedoch in der metatheoretischen Reflektion einen Ausweg. Durch absolutwertige Begriffe ist einerseits ein wissenschaftlicher Bodengewinn gegeben, anderer- seits kommt man aus erkenntnistheoretischen Grunden nicht umhin, diese Absolutheit wieder in Bezug auf Theorie und Reflektionsstufe zu relativieren. |
− | AbschlieBend folgt eine kurze Selbstbeurteilung des Geleisteten im Hin- blick auf die Aufgabenstellung der Arbeit und den bearbeiteten Stoff.Lebenslauf | + | AbschlieBend folgt eine kurze Selbstbeurteilung des Geleisteten im Hin- blick auf [[die]] Aufgabenstellung der Arbeit und den bearbeiteten Stoff.Lebenslauf |
Personliche Daten | Personliche Daten | ||
− | Name: Bruhacs, Lorand | + | [[Name]]: Bruhacs, Lorand |
Anschrift: Eichwaldstr. 56, 60385 Frankfurt a.M. | Anschrift: Eichwaldstr. 56, 60385 Frankfurt a.M. | ||
Line 1,744: | Line 1,744: | ||
Familienstand: ledig, 1 Kind | Familienstand: ledig, 1 Kind | ||
− | Staatsangehorigkeit: USA | + | Staatsangehorigkeit: {{Wiki|USA}} |
− | Geburtsdaten: 21. Oktober 1975 in Wiesbaden | + | Geburtsdaten: 21. Oktober 1975 in [[Wiesbaden]] |
Schulische Ausbildung/Studium | Schulische Ausbildung/Studium | ||
− | 1995 Gutenbergschule / Wiesbaden Abschluss: Allgemeine Hochschulreife | + | 1995 Gutenbergschule / [[Wiesbaden]] Abschluss: Allgemeine Hochschulreife |
− | 1995— Studium an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat / Frankfurt a.M. | + | 1995— Studium an der Johann Wolfgang [[Goethe]] Universitat / Frankfurt a.M. |
Fachrichtung: Philosophie (M.A.) | Fachrichtung: Philosophie (M.A.) | ||
Line 1,763: | Line 1,763: | ||
1997 Institut fur Neue Medien | 1997 Institut fur Neue Medien | ||
Tatigkeit: Praktikant | Tatigkeit: Praktikant | ||
− | 1997—1998 Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat / | + | 1997—1998 Johann Wolfgang [[Goethe]] Universitat / |
Frankfurt a.M. | Frankfurt a.M. | ||
Tatigkeit: studentische Hilfskraft | Tatigkeit: studentische Hilfskraft | ||
1998—2002 IP23 GmbH /Frankfurt a.M. | 1998—2002 IP23 GmbH /Frankfurt a.M. | ||
− | Tatigkeit: Internet Engineer / Technical Writer | + | Tatigkeit: [[Internet]] Engineer / Technical Writer |
2003— Deutsche Nationalbibliothek / Frankfurt a.M. | 2003— Deutsche Nationalbibliothek / Frankfurt a.M. | ||
Tatigkeit: Systemverwaltung Unix/Netzwerke | Tatigkeit: Systemverwaltung Unix/Netzwerke | ||
Line 1,775: | Line 1,775: | ||
− | Hiermit versichere ich, dass vorliegende Arbeit selbstandig verfaBt und keine anderen als die angegebenen Hilfsmittel benutzt sowie die Stellen der Arbeit, die anderen Werken dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, dur ch Angabe der Quellen kenntlich gemacht wurden. Ferner versichere ich, dass die Arbeit in gleicher oder ahnlicher Fassung | + | Hiermit versichere ich, dass vorliegende Arbeit selbstandig verfaBt und keine anderen als [[die]] angegebenen Hilfsmittel benutzt sowie [[die]] Stellen der Arbeit, [[die]] anderen Werken dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, dur ch Angabe der Quellen kenntlich gemacht wurden. Ferner versichere ich, dass [[die]] Arbeit in gleicher oder ahnlicher Fassung |
− | noch nicht Bestandteil einer Studien- oder Prufungsleistung war. | + | noch nicht Bestandteil einer Studien- oder Prufungsleistung [[war]]. |
Frankfurt a.M., den 22. Juli 2008 | Frankfurt a.M., den 22. Juli 2008 | ||
Latest revision as of 11:06, 5 February 2020
Vasubandhu's Argument Against Atomism in the Twenty Verses
by Lorand Bruhacs
July 20, 2008To my daughter Miriam, for her kindness and understanding.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 About Vasubandhu 2
1.2 The Vimsatika in a Nutshell 5
1.3 Rationale and Method of the Investigation 12
1.4 Buddhism as Empiricist Mysticism 17
2 The Atomist Metaphysics of the Abhidharma 30
2.1 Realism and Atomism 30
2.2 Early Buddhist Phenomenalism 32
2.3 The Origins of Buddhist Atomism 39
2.4 The Vaibhasika School 42
2.4.1 Time, Space and Atom in Vaibhasika 44
2.4.2 Critical Review of Vaibhasika Presentationalism ... 52
2.5 The Sautrantika School 57
2.5.1 Time, Space and Atom in Early Sautrantika 59
2.5.2 Atomism in the Late Sautrantika Phase 65
2.5.3 Critique of Sautrantika Representationalism 67
3 The Anti-Atomist Metaphysics of Vijnaptimatra 71
3.1 Readings of Mind-Only 72
3.1.1 Revisionist Interpretations of Mind-Only 73
3.1.2 The Traditional Interpretation of Cittamatra 79
3.1.3 Distinguishing True and False Aspectarianism 81
3.2 Argument against Atomism 85
3.2.1 The Scheme ofthe Argument 86
3.2.2 Against Spatially Differentiated Simples 89
3.2.3 Against Point-like Atoms 96
3.2.4 Against Integral Wholes 98
Contents
3.2.5 Against the Causal Theory of Perception 101
3.2.6 Resumee of the Argument 102
3.3 Visions of Vijnaptimatra in Empiriocriticist Eyes 104
4 The End of the End of Epistemology 111
4.1 Anti-Cartesian Meditations 112
4.2 The Empire Strikes Back and the Return of the Empiricists . 117
4.3 Concluding Reflections 119
Bibliography 121
Index of Subjects and Technical Terms 133
Index of Personal Names 139
Appendix I
1 Introduction
The world is given but once. Nothing is reflected. The original and mirror-image are identical. The world extended in space and time is but our representation. (Erwin Schrodinger)
HIS PAPER WILL conduct a critical investigation of the famous argument against atomism first made by the 4th century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu in his idealist treatise Vimsatika
Vijnaptimatratasiddhi (The Twenty Verses of Mind-Only). Although the present exposition will be more conceptual than historical in focus, it will first unfold the Abhidharmic Buddhist precursors of the Mind-Only epistemology. With the necessary background in place, I shall then attempt a rational reconstruction of the substance of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism, rendering it intelligible to the modern reader by transposing it into contemporary philosophical idiom. Finally, I will employ the analysis of atomism and the external world in the Mind-Only school as a point of departure from which to further probe closely related concerns of Buddhist transcendental philosophy having to do with the nature of empirical knowledge, the power of skeptical argument, and the status of apperception.
Before we begin, a brief clarification—the sense of the term atom as used throughout this paper should be carefully distinguished from the so-called “atom” of the modern physical sciences. Unless otherwise noted, I will be using the term atom to mean a mereological atom, or indivisible, concrete particular functioning as an elementary building block of phenomenal experience.
The theory that the world is constituted by such mereological atoms is commonly believed to be the exclusive province of Western philosophical tradition, beginning with the Greek atomists, but is now known to have evolved, more or less independently from the West, within classical Indian philosophy, and last but not least, among the Buddhist scholastics of the Abhidharma sects.
In the Buddhist tradition, Vasubandhu occupies the unique position of being counted as one of Abhidharma’s greatest proponents as well as one of its foremost critics. The Vimsatika is a Mahayana text and belongs to the later, critical phase of his thought.
1.1 About Vasubandhu
Vasubandhu tends to be a somewhat enigmatic figure even to those familiar with East Asian philosophy or the particulars of classical Indian thought. Before going into more detail on the Vimsatika’s philosophical ideas, I would like to give some brief background on Vasubandhu’s biography and other treatises (sastras). The extant biographies of Vasubandhu contain many contradictions and legendary elements. Lamotte has noted the difficulty of coming to any solid conclusions about Vasubandhu as a person: “Vasubandhu a trop vecu, trop pense, trop ecrit; et avant de se prononcer sur sa personalite, il faudrait avoir lu, critique et compare toutes ses oeuvres.” Vasubandhu was born around the year 316 CE in Purusapura, at the time the seventh most populous city in the world, located in what are now the North-West Territories of Pakistan. The city of Purusapura had become a regional capital of the empire of Gandhara under the Kushan king Kaniska I, who reigned from approximately 127 CE, and who is famous for having erected a giant stupa, perhaps the tallest building in the world of that time, to house the Buddha’s relics. Although the Empire of Gandhara was already past its heydey by the time Vasubandhu was born, Purusapura was still a great center of Buddhist learning. Anacker relates that it was the birthplace of the scholars Dharmasri and the Bhadhanta Dharmatrata, both of the Sarvastivada school of Buddhism, and that it was known as the seat of the Pascatiyas (“Western masters”) of Abhidharma.
Vasubandhu received his initial education in the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivada sect. The sources are in some disagreement as to who his teachers were—according to Paramartha, Vasubandhu’s 6th century Chinese translator, Vasubandhu’s teacher was a scholar by the name of Buddhamitra, whereas other sources say that he studied under the Sautrantika teacher Manoratha and never mention Buddhamitra. The medieval Tibetan doxog- rapher Bu-ston relates that he was a student of the master Sarighabhadra, a staunch defender of neo-orthodox Kashmiri Vaibhasika scholasticism. Whether or not Sanghabhadra actually was his teacher, Vasubandhu was firmly grounded in the Abhidharmic doctrines of his era, though tending already in the early phase of his thought towards a Sautrantika perspective.
For this reason, the two scholars came to develop an intense rivalry and were often pitted against each other in debate. Later in his career, however, Vasubandhu had largely lost his zest for competitive debating—it is reported that he brushed off a challenge to debate Sanghabhadra with a caustic witticism showing that there was no friendship between the two: “Though the lion retires far off before the pig, nonetheless the wise will know which of the two is best in strength.”
Vasubandhu’s ironic eulogy for Sanghabhadra shows that he felt him to have been a sophistic debater lacking in the profound insight that he valued: “Sanghabhadra was a clever and ingenious scholar. His intellective powers were not deep, but his dialectics were always to the point.”
This remark, however, is more than merely a matter of personal animosity. It brings to the fore the ideological divide between the non-Mahayana and Mahayana inflections of philosophical-religious thought. For Sanghabhadra, dialectic is apologetic, whereas Vasubandhu employs it in a mainly anti- apologetic role. Against Sarighabhadra’s orthodox dogmatism, Vasubandhu is a figure of transition and a creatively deconstructive thinker.
The early works of Vasubandhu are commonly classified as belonging to the Sautrantika school, e.g. the Abhidharmakosa (Treasury of Higher Doctrine') and its auto-commentary. The later Vasubandhu is however considered to be a Mahayanist and an adherent of the idealist Mind-Only school. The Mind-Only school is variously referred to in the literature by the Sanskrit terms Yogacara, Cittamatra and Vijnanavada. I am assuming for the sake of simplicity that these names can be used interchangeably, but some commentators assert that the terms designate philosophically distinct filiations of Mahayana thought, e.g. NAGAO, who uses Yogacara as a term for the beginnings and Vijnanavada for the later evolution of the school.
Some of the important Mahayana sastras of Vasubandhu’s later phase are the Karmasiddhiprakarana (Discussion for the Demonstration of Action), the Vimsatika-karika (Twenty Verses of Mind-Only) and its auto-commentary, the Trimsika (Thirty Verses), the Madhyantavibhangabhasya (Commentary on the Separation of the Middle from Extremes) and the Trisvabhavanirdesa (Treatise on the Three Natures). However, even his later Mahayana works evince many Abhidharmic themes.
It has been conjectured (e.g. by FRAUWALLNER) that Vasubandhu is a composite figure. The issue of the identity of Vasubandhu remains to this day a major topic of controversy, but for the theses being argued here, it will be sufficient if the Vasubandhus of the Kosa and the Vimsatika are the same author. This circumstance is fortunately not under dispute— according to Frauwallner’s distribution, both works belong to “Vasubandhu the Younger.”
1.2 The Vimsatika in a Nutshell
As it will not be possible to comprehensively examine all of the Vimsatika’s arguments in their minute details, I will only give a lightning tour of its key points and excerpt the epistemological themes of Vasubandhu’s thought in this treatise. The Vimsatika is a locus classicus of the Mind-Only school, and is written in the style of a debate, presenting the idealist thesis of vijnapti- matra and defending it against various interlocutors who argue realist views: “The goal of Vimsatika is to repudiate the view that there is an external world corresponding to the images of objects.”
Vasubandhu indicates in I that he uses the nomenclature citta, manas, vijhana and vijhapti interchangeably. The translations of these terms are respectively ‘mind,’ ‘cognition,’ ‘awareness,’ and ‘percept.’ Given that other Indian schools of philosophy do distinguish some of these terms quite sharply, Vasubandhu is making a far from trivial move in simply equating their meanings. Doesn’t it make a considerable difference as to whether one interprets the doctrine of Mind-Only as mentalism (as the sole existence of consciousness), or as positivism (all knowledge is based on sense experience)? Perhaps not. The treatment of these terms as exact synonyms implies far-reaching consequences for the Mind-Only understanding of the nature of experience and function of consciousness. The fact that Vasubandhu amalgamates so many different terms indicates that mentalistic vocabulary is probably an implicit locus of philosophical synthesis.
The Vimsatika begins in 1 with a succinct statement of the fundamental principle that everything is perception-only, and that the appearance of the non-existent external referent (bahyartha) of perception can be compared to the optical illusions seen by the taimirikas, i.e. those persons who perceive illusory hairs or moons in their field of vision owing to a medical disorder of the eyes—a famous statement that epitomizes the Mind-Only idealist view. Wood characterizes this view essentially as a brand of idealist phenomenalism—the epistemologically naive, common-sense apprehension of an external world is (on that particular count) wildly inaccurate, because people actually only perceive their own percepts. They are familiar only with the phenomenal workings within their own minds.
Several caveats before we proceed with the discussion—in contemporary scholarship, the primacy of the idealist interpretation has been at times hotly contested, e.g. by LUSTHAUS, WAYMAN, Anacker and KOCHUMUTTOM. These scholars advance revisionist readings that in recent years have gained an increasing amount of currency. The revisionist interpretations generally do not take Vasubandhu to deny external objects, thereby placing themselves in opposition to the “traditional interpretation” advocated by many Western scholars such as WOOD, as well as by medieval Tibetan doxographical accounts of the Cittamatra system of tenets. I will have more to say about the topic of these variant interpretations later on in this paper, but for the time being, I will adopt the frame of traditional interpretation as so not to prematurely introduce unnecessary complexities into the discussion. Interpretive frame-shifts will be less confusing once the fundamentals are in place.
In verse 2, Vasubandhu immediately encounters the first objection of the realist—if they are mere mental creations, how can objects be determinate and definite as to time and place? After all, some of the most salient characteristics of physical objects are their apparent spatiotemporal determinacy, stability and continuity (niyama), their actuality or causally efficacious functioning (krtakriya), and their public perceptibility, i.e. the indetermination (aniyama) of mental continua with regard to public percepts. External objects, argues the realist, are not perceived in an arbitrary fashion because their behavior conforms to certain objective regularities and constraints— they do not shift about unpredictably, vanish and reappear at random, or gratuitously alter into completely different objects.
Vasubandhu does not deny that the observed world evinces such regularities. He merely questions whether they necessarily imply the metaphysical hypothesis of an objectively existing external world, especially since this hypothesis could be held to imply the anathematic existence of acausal objects. He agrees with the requirement that experience be subject to causal constraint, but with an internalist twist—that the conditioning factors are to be found in the mind alone, and not in an external world. In accordance with Buddhism’s generally Humean notion of causality, the phenomenal laws governing the behavior of the supposedly external objects are no more and no less strictly necessary and universal than the inner laws of own subjectivity. Their lawlike behaviour can be accounted for without any appeal to a transcendentally objective realm. Vasubandhu claims that the dream hypothesis, despite seeming counterintuitive at first blush, ultimately offers a better explanation for the regularities in our experience than metaphysical realism.
Verse 3 introduces Vasubandhu’s famous analogy of perception “as in dreams” (svapnavat). Consciousness projects percepts as external to the mind. The mere experience of objectivity therefore does not suffice as proof that the objects of perception exist independently. In the special case of dreams, even a hard-boiled physical realist will have no difficulty in saying that phenomena are perceived in absence of contact with an external world. But Vasubandhu’s thesis is more than merely an example of argument from illusion—he proposes that this inside-out mode of perception, far from being an exceptional case, is in fact the general rule. Dreaming is the paradigmatic example for perception.
As for the question of spatial and temporal location, Vasubandhu offhandedly dismisses the realist objection, pointing out that the spatiotemporal determination experienced in dreams is perfectly sufficient to account for the perception of an apparently external world. In attributing the structure of experience to purely internal substrates, and absorbing the transcendental object into the mind, Vasubandhu makes objectivity wholly parasitic upon subjectivity. In this respect, he can be rightly said to veer sharply towards idealism.
The indetermination of mind-streams (non-exclusiveness of percepts), Vasubandhu argues, is just as in the case of hungry ghosts (pretas), who all see rivers of water as pus due to their identical dispositional bias of perception. That sentient beings perceive a common world proves only that their karmic propensities have the same common denominator. As an example, Vasubandhu mentions beings whose negative karmic propensities will eventually come to fruition as a rebirth in a mentally projected infernal realm. Thus, Vasubandhu argues that his vijnapti-matra thesis is perfectly in accordance with the accepted Buddhist moral theory of karma (which we might characterize in the modern terminology of philosophical ethics as having a consequentialist orientation).
To Vasubandhu, causality and lawlike regularities, being merely empirical regulatives and therefore wholly internal to experience, do not in and of themselves suffice to offer conclusive proof of objectivity. In 4, he compares the efficacity of action (arthakriya) to nocturnal emission of semen. We might unpack this rather risque example as trying to illustrate how even wholly imaginary actions (e.g. having sexual intercourse in a dream) can nonetheless produce pragmatic effects (the emission of semen).
Vasubandhu expands upon this example in his ingenious hell-guardian argument in 5, where he urges that the demonic guardians (naraka-palas) who torture their victims are nonexistent because they themselves are not being tortured. It is an axiomatic assumption of early medieval Buddhist cosmology that hell-dwellers were reborn in a hellish realm in order to experience infernal sufferings as retributions for their past actions. But since the naraka-palas inflict suffering upon others rather than experience it themselves, it follows that it is impossible for their true manner of existence to accord with their appearance of being real, sentient beings. Vasubandhu thus concludes that hell and its guardians are mental projections, suggesting that the doctrine of karma logically implies his idealist thesis.
Moreover, if hell, the worst logically conceivable case of suffering, is inadmissible as a Moorean proof for the metaphysically objective existence of hell, then the same applies a fortiriori to all other possible states of experience. Vasubandhu even coopts such realist proofs as support for his own thesis. Hell, Vasubandhu would diagnose, is nothing other than the painful symptom of a very severe case of Johnsonian stone-kicking.
In response to Mach’s sardonic aperqu?1 about the Pyrrhonist in Moliere’s Mariage force who is beaten and does not go on saying “Il me semble que vous me battez,” but takes his beating as really received, Vasubandhu might answer that his case against the metaphysical existence of an external world is predicated on a specifically transcendental sense of “seems talk.” In modern terms, we might construe Vasubandhu’s position of transcendental illusionism as advocating an internalist account of knowledge similar to the analysis of Cohen. The hell-dweller argument tries to show that if the principle of ethical consequence is to be preserved, then suffering (such as receiving a beating)—and everything else that masquerades as the external world—must be a quasi-oneiric manifestation of mental causative potentials (vasanas). In a dream, the dreamed tortures and terrors are experienced as very real indeed, but upon awakening, they evaporate. The dreamer recognizes that all of his experiences were, in truth, no more than projective appearances of his mind’s inherent muddle.
Next, Vasubandhu gives an argument in 8 against the existence of two types of sense-base (ay at ana)—sensory faculties and their external sensory fields—asserting that external sensory fields (visibles, tangibles, audibles, etc.) do not actually exist. Vasubandhu justifies this claim by means of a scriptural hermeneutic. He maintains that the statements regarding the existence of the sensory fields have a merely provisional meaning as metaphorical figures of speech set forth with the hidden (neyartha) intention of accomodating realists to the Buddhadharma.
Taught in one way, Vasubandhu argues in 10, the doctrine of the Buddha leads to the lower understanding of the insubstantiality of the personality (pudgala-nairatmya) and taught in its deeper meaning as Mind-Only, it leads to the higher understanding of the insubstantiality of the elements of experience (dharma-nairatmya). But aside from this hermeneutic justification, he also gives a rational line of reasoning—that the existence of external sensory fields implies metaphysical realism, which seems an acceptable enough theory at first glance, but is revealed upon closer examination to be unreasonable.
Vasubandhu then proceeds in 11-15 to give an inventive reductio demonstrating why the various forms of metaphysical realism fail to be a coherent alternative to his dream hypothesis of perception. The transcendental objects postulated by realism do not exist because it is impossible for them to be composed of atoms. Since Vasubandhu crystallizes the dispute over transcendental objectivity (i.e. the existence of a mind-independent external world) around the issue of atomism, he devotes a sizeable portion of the Vimsatika to a demonstration that the metaphysical existence of atoms is unproven—a treatment which is akin to the Kantian analysis of the issue, as we will explore in detail in Chapter 3. I shall argue that, unlike Kant, Vasubandhu also rejects the necessity of noumenal simples to the constitution of phenomenal reality. Kant’s deep suspicion about the legitimacy of such a philosophical move is due to his correct intuition that it would signify a final departure from realism. But this is of course precisely the paradigm shift that Vasubandhu wishes to urge.
In 16, Vasubandhu refutes the causal theory of perception and then answers to a number of further realist objections against the dream theory of experience, having to do with how recollection of objects or differences in the dream and waking state can be accounted for. Just as those who are dreaming do not realize the inexistence of the objects in their dreams, he argues in XXXIII, those who lack world-transcending gnosis fail to realize insubstantiality.
In a similar vein, Essler remarks that just as people rarely realize they are dreaming while they are having a dream, they are likewise unaware of the extent to which they epistemologically constitute their world when awake. Such is the nature of dreaming, Mach ironizes—while in a dream, one may reflect about the dream and recognize it as such by its oddities, but one immediately puts one’s mind to rest about them. Vasubandhu’s comparison of this constitutional creativity of the mind to dream consciousness is suggestive of the language of the Mandukya Upanisad? It strongly hints at the transformative aim of the text—if it is really true that our world is like a dream, then we can hope to awaken from it.
Since his realist interlocutor in 18 is also Buddhist, Vasubandhu is in the position of using scriptural authority to illustrate his idea that minds do not require the intermediation of a mind-independent external world to influence each other. In the Mind-Only paradigm, the existence of a telepathic influence directly connecting the different mind-streams is not only invoked in order to absolve Mind-Only of solipsism or to explain anomalous cases, but is employed as a central explanatory mechanism for ordinary perception.In realism, common perceptions are accounted for by the external object, which causally determines the sensory core of perception. In Mind-Only idealism, the external object is merely a common locus item.
In the intriguing argument of the forest-dwelling seers in 20, Vasubandhu attempts to rebut the charge of solipsism by proposing that mental states and perceptions exercise a direct causal influence on other consciousnesses, as demonstrated by a scriptural example involving the extraordinary mental powers of certain forest hermits. This causal influence places the various minds in immediate mind-to-mind contact (paras-patah) with each other. Despite that we are unaware of this contact, Vasubandhu suggests, it is the means by which we intersubjectively constitute afolie simultanee that then appears to us as the objective world.
In the penultimate verse 21, Vasubandhu directly addresses the other minds problem. Not only do we not truly know other minds, we do not even know our own. Essentially, Vasubandhu frames the other minds problem as a special case of the more general problem of the epistemic status of the transcendental subject, for which he offers a deeply skeptical response.
1.3 Rationale and Method of the Investigation
Why single out Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism for further examination? The Vimsatika’s argument against atomism demarcates a crucial juncture both in Vasubandhu’s own thought as well as in Northern Buddhist thought in general—the two non-Mahayana schools of Northern Buddhism (the Sarvastivada/Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika) commonly accept the existence of atoms, whereas the two Mahayana schools, the Yogacara/Citta- matra (Yogic Practice/Mind-Only) and the Madhyamika (Middle Way) do not. Also, in using Vasubandhu’s argument as a mirror in which to study the epistemological interrelation of mind and object, I will offer some contemporary reflections on two perennial themes of philosophy—empiricism and Cartesian external world skepticism.
However, this effort runs into certain initial difficulties, concerning not so much the analysis of Vasubandhu’s anti-atomist argument in and of itself— which will prove fairly straightforward—but rather, having to do with the hermeneutic challenges of properly assessing its significance against the broader backdrop of classical Buddhist thought and analyzing it in the light of contemporary epistemology.
On the one hand, any attempt to draw out the meaning of Vasubandhu’s argument must take account of the unique historical context and the distinctive philosophical moves generated by the Buddhist program. On the other hand, an exegesis from a contemporary standpoint will necessarily be grounded, at least in part, within the matrix of the Occidental philosophical traditions, which prima facie seems very far removed from the worldview of Indian Buddhism around the 4th century CE.
Herbert V. Guenther has often remarked on the difficulty of applying Western philosophical categories to Eastern patterns of thought, warning that an overly facile characterization in Western terms runs the risk of blurring or even entirely misconstruing the distinguishing features of Buddhism.
Extrapolating grand trends and tendencies is tricky business in any philosophical context, and especially so when it comes to the history of Buddhist thought. One must be careful not to cavalierly colonize the texts of the Other. But a comparative analysis unavoidably requires a certain degree of creative extrapolation and generalization.
Clearly, in the worst case, such an approach may reveal little more than the expositor’s hermeneutic bias. Yet it would be equally naive, in a philosophical sense, to desist from bringing in current vocabulary and concerns in an attempt to eliminate Western perspective from the equation.
Although it would be possible to restrict oneself to a purely text-immanent interpretation of Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika, such a treatment of this type would be of little more than historiographical or antiquarian relevance. Indeed, it would be rather difficult to conceive of a philosophically relevant study of Vasubandhu’s position on atomism that does not attempt to line him up with Western thinkers and commensurate his ideas to familiar Western categories.
One challenge is therefore to employ the inescapable perspectival slant of a contemporary interpretation to good effect in bringing Vasubandhu’s arguments to bear upon topics of interest to present-day philosophers. As B. K. Matilal notes, contemporary writing on classical Indian philosophy must somehow strike a balance between the reconstruction of historical views and the critical examination of similar modern views. Some knowledge of historical development will prove indispensable as a foundation for abstracting the underlying conceptual structure of Vasubandhu’s line of argument and reconstructing its main epistemological themes and issues. The project of philosophical re-synthesis in the guise of comparative analysis requires that the discussion fluidly shift back and forth between ideo-historical exploration and rational reconstruction.
In particular, I hope to identify some of the central philosophical features of Buddhist thought by casting the Vimsatika, in an empiricist mold, juxtaposing Buddhist thinkers such as Gautama Sakyamuni and Vasubandhu with Kant as well with Avenarius and Mach, Kant’s 19th century empiriocriticist successors. The main reason why I do not elaborate the obvious parallels to Berkeley or Schopenhauer is not because it would be uninstructive or inappropriate, but because the comparisons have already been extensively pursued elsewhere. Instead, I will emphasize the comparison of Mind-Only epistemological idealism to to the post-Kantian empiriocriticist phenomenalism of Mach. Since Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosa phase of thought arguably already makes a Kantian turn and the Vimsatika represents a further critical step in his development, it seems that Mind-Only might profitably be re-evaluated as a continuation of the Kantian trajectory of critical empiricism (in other words, as an epistemology of “Experience-Only”) rather than a reversion to the pre-Kantian idealism of Berkeley.
Another reason for reading Vasubandhu in an empiriocriticist vein is that both Mach and Yogacara Buddhism may be said to have advocated a pure phenomenalism. The parallel to Mach is crucial to my interpretation due not only to his sophisticated (albeit unsystematic) phenomenalist point of view, but also to his notoriously die-hard skepticism about the theory of physical atomism, which will help to illustrate a plausible philosophical rationale for Vasubandhu’s anti-atomism. Just as the empiriocriticism of Mach and Avenarius may be regarded as an empiricism that has purified itself of transcendental objectivity and ontological absolutes, the Vijnapti- matra of Vasubandhu amounts to a Sautrantika view that has eliminated the external object (bdhydrtha). I am aware that I am suggesting a deliberately prochronistic interpretation of Vasubandhu’s views. It is by no means an authoritative reading, but hopefully, an interesting and illuminating one.
The various philosophical ideas of the Indian ancients will be articulated largely from the perspective of analytic philosophy, while also attending to the unique concerns that they implicitly convey. The basic motivations of the classical Indian traditions seem largely alien to a contemporary philosophical audience because they were influenced by a very different historical setting and cultural outlook. Like most classical Indian philosophy, Buddhist thought of the early medieval era intimately fuses (and inevitably, often intimately confuses) rigorous philosophical analysis with dogmatic and sote- riological concerns, to a degree rarely encountered in post-Enlightenment Western philosophy.
Moreover, Mahayana Buddhist thinkers are almost universally mystically inclined, and Vasubandhu, a mystic of the first water, is certainly no exception. An in-depth exploration of Mahayana mysticism would unfortunately be beyond the scope of this paper—a brief survey will have to suffice. But despite that for the purposes of this discussion, I will be singling out the philosophical aspect of Vasubandhu’s thought (i.e. the level of rational argument), I will not be able to avoid making some basic interpretative allowances for its religio-mystical dimensions. The subtle interplay of philosophical argument and mystical anagoge might seem difficult to reconcile to the modern philosophical mind. However, the lines of rational argument are fortunately easier to discern in the Vimsatika than in other writings of his later phase, e.g. the Trimsika or the Trisvabhavanirdesa.
The exceedingly condensed, epigrammatic nature of Vasubandhu’s writing poses another interpretive challenge. In stark contrast to contemporary Western philosophy, which tends to valorize lengthy prose expositions that discursively expand upon their themes in exhaustive technical detail, the Indian philosophy of that period placed a premium on brevity and poetic elegance of expression. It had evolved a philosophical poetry, written in a strictly metered form typical of classical Sanskrit composition. Key philosophical themes were epitomized in gnomic verse and expanded upon in the author’s auto-commentary. The most brilliant examples of this style evoke an air of tension, paradoxicality and mystery with their austere reductions, unexpected double-turns and double-entendre, and constant shifting of the level of discourse.
Part of the reason for the use of this poetic form was to facilitate memorization, but another motivation is that verse can more easily convey elusive aesthetic subtleties and multiple levels of meaning. A poem can be read as a philosophical epitome, operating on the level of rational explanation, and on a deeper reading, function as a mystical pith instruction, which follows the entirely different modus operandi of deliberately perplexing the intellect so as to induce transcendence of conceptual limitations.
The paradoxical mode of expression is an integral part of the mystical attitude, and past a certain point, it defies interpretative reduction to a purely rational meaning. Vasubandhu concludes the Vimsatika in 22 with a Trac- tarian cliff-hanger—even he, the author himself, cannot fully understand the meaning of what he has written:
It is impossible for people like me to consider it [the doctrine of perception-only] in all its aspects, because it is not in the range of dialectics. And in order to show by whom it is known entirely as a scope of insight, it is said to be the scope of Buddhas.
1.4 Buddhism as Empiricist Mysticism
Unless it is read in the context of a meta-philosophical “grand narrative” or background hermeneutic, the technical analysis of Vasubandhu’s arguments against atomism will seem rather dry. The deeply apophatic finale of the Vimsatika offers a hint as to where the meta-narrative ought to begin. We will bring the hermeneutic lens of Vasubandhu as mystical proto-empirio- criticist into sharper focus by offering some intertextual reflections on the meaning of the silence of the Buddha. This is the silence that Gautama Sakyamuni is said to have maintained with regard to the famous fourteen unanswered questions (catvari-avyakrta- vastuni) posed to the Buddha by the wandering ascetic Vatsagotra:
Whether the cosmos has a beginning, or not, or both, or neither. Whether the cosmos has an end, or not, or both, or neither.
Whether the Tathagata exists after death, or not, or both, or neither.
Whether the mind is identical with the body or different from it.
Although he held silence for many other reasons as well, Sakyamuni’s silence about these questions of a specifically metaphysical nature is particularly significant, in that it prefigures the later Madhyamika program of insubstantialism and null ontology. Madhyamika develops the Buddha’s silence about absolutes into a profoundly meontological mysticism, deploying skeptical argument against all points of view in an attempt to demonstrate that the most important thing the Buddha said was nothing. The fourteen unanswered questions moreover present a fascinating parallel to the Kantian antinomies of pure reason, where Kant raises aporiai in demonstrating that the four ideas of rational cosmology each lead to two opposing positions that appear to be equally valid.
The first eight unanswered questions of Vatsagotra closely approximate the first Kantian antinomy of pure reason, as both reduce to aporia the question as to whether or not the world is spatiotemporally limited. The second of Kant’s antinomies, which happens not to be among the fourteen unanswered questions of sutric tradition, has to do with whether or not the world of experience is metaphysically constituted of simple or primitive elements, i.e. atoms. The atomists of the Abhidharma schools answer this question in the affirmative, whereas in the Vimsatika, Vasubandhu categorically responds in the negative.
As for what position Gautama Sakyamuni himself may have taken on atomism—although the earliest Buddhist corpus of texts, the Pali Canon, does not mention atomist doctrines or offer any clues as to whether or not the Sakyamuni adhered to a theory of simples, in light of his silence on Vatsagotra’s questions, one can easily picture what his response might have been. I conjecture that he would have recognized the aporetic character of the issue and remained silent.
Concerning his own rationale for keeping silence about the fourteen questions, Sakyamuni does not have much to offer in the way of explanation, aside from the famous fire simile in the discourse (sutra) of Vaccagotta on Fire. It seems that Sakyamuni intended the simile to specifically address Vatsagotra’s questions about the post-mortem status of a monk who has reached nirvana, but it could also be construed, without too much of a stretch, to apply analogously to the other questions as well:
“And suppose someone were to ask you, ‘This fire that has gone out in front of you, in which direction from here has it gone? East? West? North? Or south?’ Thus asked, how would you reply?” “That doesn’t apply, Master Gotama. Any fire burning dependent on a sustenance of grass and timber, being unnourished— from having consumed that sustenance and not being offered any other—is classified simply as ‘out’ (unbound).”
Aside from the Kantian analogy, there is also a Machian parallel to the fire discourse. Mach uses examples that are strikingly similar to the sutric simile when he accuses his fellow physicists of naively misconstruing concepts which properly apply strictly to sensations to refer to objective physical quantities. In the opinion of Mach, many putative scientific problems can be traced back to naive category errors and unmasked as philosophical pseudo-questions: ‘Where does the light go when it has been extinguished and no longer fills the room?’ Such are the questions of a child. Confounded by the sudden shrinking of a hydrogen balloon, the child continues to search for the large body that had still been present just a moment ago. ‘Where does the warmth come from? Where does it go?’ Such childish questions coming from the mouths of mature men determine the intellectual climate of the current century.
In view of Mach’s quintessentially positivist theory of the pseudo-problem (Scheinproblem) and its purported root cause of metaphysical thinking, one might deduce that he would be very reluctant to acknowledge the existence of genuine aporiai, i.e. philosophical conundrums that are fundamentally and intrinsically intractable. Mach believes that philosophical problems are either solved or discovered to be nonsensical and futile.
It is certainly not too much to assume that Sakyamuni was aware of the existence of pseudo-problems. Therefore, we may guess that if Gautama Sakyamuni had believed the fourteen unanswered questions to be no more than pseudo-problems, he would have plainly said as much. Panikkar conjectures Sakyamuni’s silence about the questions to be not an epistemic, but an ontic apophaticism of a metaphysically avyakta nature. In Indian philosophy, the term avyakta also carries the connotations ‘unmanifest,’ ‘allpervading,’ ‘formless,’ ‘non-differentiated,’ ‘indeterminate’ and ‘unexpressed.’ If understood in an ontological sense, we can see how avyakta might perhaps be comparable to Anaximander’s concept of the apeiron. Moreover, it is worth noting that the notion of avyakta can be considered in some ways a precursor of the concept of sunyata, which later attained its full development in Mahayana thought. The ontologically negative orientation of sunyata is a Mahayanistic reprise of the early Buddhist anatman principle.
Therefore, it may be argued that the Buddha’s silence was more than merely a positivistic epoche about the metaphysicalities beyond the limits of experience—it was the metaphysical silence, or apophaticism of the centerlessness and ineffability of experience itself, in its immanent immediacy. This is, generally speaking, the Madhyamika position on the issue.
We will not be able to conclusively establish whether Sakyamuni’s own understanding of avyakta questions was similar to Mach’s doctrine of the pseudo-problem arising from superstitions, misunderstandings, category mistakes and misapplications of language, or whether he in fact considered that there are some truly unanswerable philosophical questions pointing towards a mystical reality of “metaphysical silence.”
Even if the Buddha did not articulate an explicit positivism, the empiricist tendency of eliminating metaphysics and adverting to experience is evident. Inasmuch as his silence about the fourteen questions is interpreted as a dismissal of pseudo-problems (a wholly justified interpretation) we may consider it to be the germ of a strong proto-positivist subtext in Buddhism. There are quite a number of writings in early Buddhism that clearly state empiricist viewpoints, e.g. that speculative theories which go beyond the limits of experience generate confusion and vexation rather than knowledge. In early Buddhism, one finds—other than instances of the tetralemmatic negation (catuskoti)—little direct evidence of the deeply paradoxical formulations and the penchant for puzzling dialectic that were later to become the signature style of the Mahayana schools. On the contrary—Sakyamuni either speaks clearly or keeps silence.
Though he is known in many instances to have expressed a dislike of philosophical debate, I do not conceive Gautama Sakyamuni to have been a rigorous misologist. Rather, I construe his position to have been that constructive philosophical inquiry and theorizing have a primarily diagnostic or therapeutic purpose—in the language of Buddhist simile, they are rafts that must be abandoned once one has crossed over to the further shore, or ladders that should be cast away after they have been climbed. This soteriological instrumentalism is a characteristic feature of the Buddhist doctrine, and, especially in the Mahayana, is extended into an epistemological instrumentalism. This is also Vasubandhu’s interest. In the Vimsatika, he introduces concepts not as absolute truths, but solely as an expedient means for dissolving the conceptual rigidities of the metaphysical realist.
The Buddhist skeptical mysticism was later to attain its fullest expression in the Prajnaparamita corpus of scriptures and their various exegeses. The central theme of this corpus is the wisdom (prajha) of voidness (sunyata). The notion of sunyata, though already present in some writings of early Buddhism, is taken up and analytically developed within the critical-skeptical framework of the Madhyamika school of philosophy, into the doctrine that the dependently arising elements {dharmas) of empirical experience are ineffable {anabhilapya) and void {sunya)—or to restate the same matter in terms more appropriate to mysticism—apophatically negated. Phenomena in other words cannot be said to have essences, core bearers, intrinsic identities, existence as unitary objects, and so on. The Prajnaparamita radicalizes the metaphysical silence about what lies beyond the limits of experience into a meontology of metaphysical silence.
Based on this distinction of a mystical and a positivistic layer to the silence of the Buddha, we can attempt to hermeneutically project the Buddhist epistemological discourse along two parallel and mutually complementary avenues. The “cataphatic” discourse along the via positivistica (i.e. the positivistic avenue exemplified by the critically purified Abhidharmika approach) attempts to constructively epistemologize experience, whereas the via nega- tiva (paradigmatically, the Madhyamika) tends to frame its epistemology in terms of a skeptical and deconstructive practice.
The hypothesis that there came to be these two closely related but nonetheless distinct understandings of the Buddha’s silence can provide us with a model for plotting the structural dynamic of the Vimsatika. We will designate the the via positivisticd's metaphysical silence about the metaphysical as the “Cartesian epoche” indicating that a bracketing of the transcendental object is taking place. This catchprase is meant to suggest characteristic modes of philosophical expression such as Cartesian external world skepticism, and to hint at the notion of phenomenological epoche developed by Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations.
The status of the transcendental subject is left untouched by the Cartesian epoche, allowing for various modalities of metaphysically negating or asserting it that lead to weaker or stronger types of idealism. However, we hypothesize that the weaker modes of idealism (i.e., those obtained by metaphysical negation of the transcendental subject) generally fall closer to the centerline of the via positivistica because they make an effort to approximate a phenomenalist middle ground between realism and idealism. By metaphysically negating the transcendental subject, they are trying to counteract their inherent tendency to gravitate towards ontological idealism. These are in other words idealisms trying to disguise themselves as forms of neutral monism or pluralism.
The metaphysical silence of the Buddhist via negativa, on the other hand, indicates the apophatic negation of the subject. It will simply be equated with the terms sunyata, dharma-nairatmya and anatman. Along with pratltya-samutpada (dependent origination), the doctrine of anatman must count as one of the most distinctively Buddhist doctrines, the anatman doctrine may be viewed as a challenge to the primacy of transcendental subjectivity in the orthodox Vedic philosophies (astika darsanasY While there is no evidence that early Buddhism rejected any kind of metempirical self, it is important to keep in mind that none of the arguments attempting to warrant the opposite thesis (that Buddhism acknowleged an atman) are substantive, nor is there any evidence that Sakyamuni taught an atman theory.
That there is no evidence either way of course does not prove the hypothesis that his doctrine of anatman involved an epoche of transcendental subjectivity, but at least allows for the possibility. As for the empirical reality of human existence, Buddhism almost uniformly proposes a strictly bundle-theoretic account (with the exception of the Pudgalavada schools of early Buddhism which maintained the ultimate reality of a personal self). The bundle theory of personhood is also a recurrent theme of Western empiricism—we find it e.g. in the writings of Hume.
In its most radical form, the the Buddhist via negativa may be construed as amounting to a thorough epoche of any and all types of subjectivity. The substantiality of the empirical self, the Cartesian and the Kantian cogitos, as well as the transcendental ego of Husserl and the Tractarian notion of the transcendental subject as world-limit, are all to be apophatically negated.
Buddhism seeks to achieve egolessness by “dissolving” the transcendental ego into the stream of empirical consciousness. After subjectivity has been bracketed, there remains only the pure “difference” of experience without any unitary forms of subjectivity or objectivity which could serve as a foundations for constructing a world or a self. As it is in fact the atman which is the source of all forms of unity and ontological categories falsely projected upon experience, bracketing the atman also eliminates these false projections.
The atman and its cognates therefore become the Buddhist soteriology’s main targets of attack. Early Buddhist scholasticism pursues the positivistic trajectory and attempts to eliminate the subject by a reductive analysis of the elements of experience into objectified least parts. This program is played out as an atomistic sense-data phenomenalism. Vasubandhu, however, puts this Abhidharmic reductionist program to an end by reasoning against transcendental objectivity—a maneuver that brings him closer to the Upanisadic monism of the astika pattern, but also to the original via positivistica of Buddhism that had been derailed by the metaphysical realism of the Abhidharmikas.
In the Western history of philosophy, we can identify the epistemology of Mach as an example of this hypothetical Buddhist via positivistica. Mach, though tracing the sources of his inspiration to Hume, Lichtenberg and William James (giving special credit to Lichtenberg’s famous correction to the Cartesian cogitcr. “Es denkt”) was aware of the general tendencies of Buddhist thought and held them in high esteem, as shown in one of Mach’s letters to Fritz Mauthner.
Nowhere does Mach propound an overtly soteriological aim in the vein of the Buddhist nirvana (the complete cessation of suffering and freedom from afflictive states of mind) or the Pyrrhonian ataraxia (the happiness, freedom from worry and imperturbability arising from the skeptical suspension of belief), nor does Mach have a fully evolved apophatic mysticism as does the Madhyamika. His main focus as a physical scientist is a positivistic one— employing quantitative method to investigate the functional relationships between the elements of experience.
If Mach is able to mentally envision the refraction angles of the color spectrums that are generated by shafts of white light falling onto a prism, if he can predict where the Fraunhofer lines will appear and what changes will occur if the prism is shifted or if a thermometer touching the prism gives a different reading, he is satisfied. Because he views the quantitative laws of physics as mere regulatives of his empirical sensory intuition, he feels that he knows everything he can expect to know.
Early Buddhism, on the other hand, evolved in a historical setting in which the quantitative scientific method had not yet been developed. As a result, the aim of the Buddhist empiricism of functional relation naturally gravitated towards acquiring moral and mystical insights into the dependent arising of experience, which were elaborated into the characteristic doctrines of karma and selflessness.
Nevertheless, as a key point of comparison to Buddhism, we have Mach’s famous dictum “The ego cannot be saved.” Mach reflected upon this insight as an ethical saving grace rather than a disaster—he believed that it would help to value things according to their real importance and inspire a more emancipated and altruistic way of life. The Machian and the Buddhist worldviews are versions of what Sommer characterizes as the “inversion of gnosis.” If by gnosis we are to understand a mystical knowledge of the metempirically transcendent reality of atman by turning away from the world of empirical experience—as is the declared aim of Upanisadic mysticism—then the “inversion of gnosis,” its polar opposite, would be a negative immanence mysticism that tries to attain knowledge of dharma-nairatmya by turning towards the world of experience. In inverse gnosis, the world is no longer believed to be that which separates us from true knowledge. Rather, it is considered that which we are separated from by the false dualisms of an internal and an external world, of qualia and substances, sensations and atoms.
The hypothesis that a via positivistica was operational in the earliest forms of Buddhism can help to account for the strong Buddhist tendencies towards phenomenalism and epistemological idealism, which are remarkably suggestive of the empiriocriticist views of Avenarius and Mach. The Carnap of the Aufbau is also firmly rooted in the Machian tradition. His Vienna Circle empiricism contends that the concept of objective reality cannot be epistemologically constituted, and that nothing meaningful can be said either way about the things-in-themselves (Dinge an sich).
To recapitulate the “grand thesis” that is being staked out here: Vasubandhu and the empiriocriticists (including most of their positivist successors) have merely taken different on-ramps onto the same philosophical highway. Mach’s epistemology has been argued by some to be influenced by the Madhyamika. In this exposition we will be following up on a slightly
different lead—the conjecture of a philosophical continuity between Mach and Mind-Only. Admittedly, every interpretive scheme is eventually unraveled by a sufficiently close attention to the facts—this one is certainly no exception to the rule. However, Indian philosophy is such a dense and confusing topic that we will be unable to make much headway into it unless we cut some broad aisles through the undergrowth.
Following the lead of Dharmakirti and Santaraksita, Tibetan doxographers have traditionally rendered Buddhist doctrine as a ladder of philosophical views, using the method of an ascending scale of analysis to move from common-sense realism towards more rarefied epistemological views. Since this has proven to be a useful approach, we will also be adopting it for the presentation of Vasubandhu’s argument in this thesis.
The itinerary for the following chapters will be to tease out the unifying strands of phenomenalism and nominalism that run throughout the different schools and historical evolutions of Indian Buddhist epistemology. We will explore how these themes were initially worked out into an atomist metaphysics, and in a later stage of development “empiriocritically” revised by Vasubandhu into a non-atomistic idealism that in many respects may be considered a chip off the block of modern empiricism. We will be focusing our discussion mainly on the epistemological rationale for this critical turn. But the hermeneutic background assumption for this analysis will be that the Vimsatikd’s skeptical recovery of the hypothetical Buddhist via positivistica is ultimately motivated by a profound shift—evident throughout the later Mahayana phase of Vasubandhu’s thought—towards the via negativa. While the metaphysical higher ground of Vijnaptimatra—the restoration of idealistic phenonemalism—may the final rung of Vasubandhu’s epistemological ladder, it is not his ultimate position, but rather, a provisional antidote (pratipaksa) to substantialism—a raft to be abandoned after it has been used for its intended purpose.
Before we can explore Vasubandhu’s strategy for regaining the Cartesian epoche and fully draw out the empiriocriticist parallels to the Vimsatika’s argument contra atomism, it will be advantageous to examine the Abhidharmic context of its thought. We cannot expect to reasonably form an opinion on Vasubandhu’s arguments without a careful reading of his realist opponents.2 The Atomist Metaphysics of the Abhidharma
I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again "I know that that's a tree," pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell them: "This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy."
(Ludwig Wittgenstein) IN THE TRADITIONAL and modern commentarial literature, the epistemologies of the two Abhidharmika schools are universally described as being realistic or substantialistic. While the Mahayana schools can be viewed as idealist and skeptical variations on the basic Buddhist themes of phenomenalism and nominalism, the non-Mahayana schools of Abhidharma comprise their realist inflections. However, given that the nature of realism is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy, what exactly is meant by this claim? A brief review of realism is in order.
2.1 Realism and Atomism
Although there are many different philosophical senses of realism, in the present context, we are only interested in the sense of realism that concerns the everyday world of macroscopic physical objects and its constituents. As we shall see, the position of the Buddhist atomists may be construed as an attempt to formulate an ontologically realist epistemology that deconstructs common-sense realism about ordinary objects—as opposed, for example, to the atomism of the Indian Nyaya-Vaisesika school, which attempts to defend their objective existence.
Realist claims can be grouped into two broad types—(1) the existence dimension involves claims that physical objects exist extramentally, as do the facts pertaining to them, whereas (2) the independence dimension has to do with claims that physical objects are independent of beliefs, linguistic practices and conceptual schemes. Realisms vary considerably in their degree of ontological commitment, but as a general rule of thumb, the more naive (i.e., pre-critical) the realism, the larger its ontological menagerie.
Chatterjee ventures that all forms of realism must have atomistic ontologies because they are necessarily committed to some form of pluralism or other. Non-atomistic systems of thought such as absolute monism (e.g. Advaita Vedanta) or subjective idealism (e.g. Cittamatra) can evince realistic tendencies, but according to Chatterjee do not qualify as unreserved realism. Clearly, realism implies a commitment to an ontology of some cardinality, but why should it necessarily restrict itself to a denumerable ontology? In fact, it needn’t, and realism often employs more powerful ontologies. But for the purpose of this investigation, we will define the atomistic hypothesis, in general terms, as the view that the ontological constitution of matter, stuff, hyle (or whatever else one wishes to call it) is ultimately discrete.
It is also important to distinguish realisms employing foundationalist theories of epistemic justification, which due to their epistemic atomism are prone to lead to an atomistic ontology, from those forms of realism employing a coherence theory of justification, which are holistic, i.e. epistemically non- atomistic, and therefore far less likely to lead to an ontological atomism.
If and when epistemological atomism slips into ontological atomism, as it almost invariably does (though we will see that there are exceptions to the rule), then atomism entails realism. The reverse case—that realism entails atomism—only holds for foundationalist varieties of realism with denumerable material bases of constitution.
Moreover, we can categorize realisms into two types, according to whether they adhere to a two-term or a three-term theory of knowledge.The defining characteristic of the two-term theory is that bare perceptual evidence is inherently veridical in a quite strong sense. For the purposes of the present investigation, we will define two subtypes—(1) direct realism and (2) sense-datum realism. Direct realism (1) holds that physical objects themselves are directly apprehended, i.e. when we say we see a tree, we are not merely seeing sense-data—we are seeing the tree itself as an integral whole. In sense-datum realism (2), we are directly seeing the sense-data, which are accorded intrinsic credibility—one’s awareness of a sense datum is immediate and infallible. Sense-data are moreover held to be ontological ultimates. Thus, the evidentially given sense-data are immune to skeptical assault and constitute objectively true foundational knowledge.
Representational realism (the three-term theory) holds that the “veil of perception”—a representation, aspect or sensation—intervenes between the perceiving consciousness and the object.
A metaphysical realism is any position that has not yet overcome the category of the Ding an sich or the transcendental objectivity. The “transcendental realist” (to use Kant’s terminology) believes that he directly experiences absolute reality. But the way we are defining it here, realism is metaphysical even if the transcendental object is never experienced in itself (as is the case in critical realism) because some degree of objective backing is still held to be required as a condition of the possibility of phenomenal experience. Critical realism relies on the transcendental reduction to distinguish which parts of experience are supplied by the mind from the parts that are given in sensory intuition.
2.2 Early Buddhist Phenomenalism
The view of pure or radical phenomenalism can be characterized in several ways: (1) epistemically, that things are just as they are known to be in experience and that there is nothing metaphysical to be said about them— (2) ontologically, that there is no real difference between phenomena and their essences, or even that phenomena are essenceless—or (3) semantically, “that propositions asserting the existence of physical objects are equivalent in meaning to propositions asserting that subjects would have certain sequences of sensations were they to have certain others.”
In other words, radical phenomenalism holds that physical objects are in a real sense constituted strictly by the sense-data of perception (and not vice versa), and that propositions about physical objects reduce to propositions about clusters of sensations or sensibilia. Knowing is grounded in the evidence of the senses, which is foundational and immediate. The bare sensations are self-disclosing (and in the case of Mind-Only, self-cognizing). Familiar objects such as material bodies, objects, wholes have only a nominal, conceptually imputed existence. In reality, they are merely bundles of sensory perceptions that are construed as objects. Phenomenalism therefore disputes the claim that objects exist independently of sensory awareness. If no such awareness were to exist, all existence claims about entities would be false.
In what must be acknowledged as one of the “great texts” of early Buddhist epistemology, the Bahiya Sutta? we find a paradigmatic example—Gautama Sakyamuni advises the bark-cloth-wearing ascetic on how to train himself in a phenomenalistic mode of awareness. Bahya, who is an advanced contemplative, receives only a very brief instruction, to the effect that his sense of ego will disappear as soon as he succeeds in correctly taking account of just his naked sensory impressions and thoughts and no more than that:
In reference to the seen, there will be only the seen. In reference to the heard, only the heard. In reference to the sensed, only the sensed. In reference to the cognized, only the cognized. That is how you should train yourself. When for you there will be only the seen in reference to the seen, only the heard in reference to the heard, only the sensed in reference to the sensed, only the cognized in reference to the cognized, then, Bahiya, there is no you in terms of that...
Read as an example of “inversion of gnosis,” this sutra is a classic demonstration of the anatman perspective in operation. Bahiya is being instructed to bracket his subjectivity. Whereas for Husserl, phenomenological reduction involves only the suspension of empirical subjectivity, the epoche of anatman is more far-reaching in that it entails a suspension of even the transcendental subjectivity. The changing acts of knowing are purely empirical and do not refer back to an unchanging transcendental knower. Knowing exhausts itself in the known. All traces of subjectivity are dissolved by the projection of consciousness into experience in its momentariness and concreteness. The transcendental subjectivity’s construction of superimposed noemata is brought to a halt and the thusness of the experiential flux revealed.
Mach arrives at a somewhat similar view of things in Analyse der Empfind- ungen, albeit not by a contemplative route but by a speculative thought experiment. After its semantic scope is successively expanded until it encompasses the totality of phenomena, he imagines that the ego is finally dissolved. It is recognized to be a provisional concept, having at best a merely pragmatic utility—rather than a veridical representation of some metaphysical absolute underlying or overlooking the functional fabric of sensations that is revealed in the final analysis to be truly fundamental—colors, sounds, warmths, pressures, spaces, times, etc.:
The contradistinction of ego and world, between sensation or appearance and thing then drops away, and now it is merely a matter of the interrelationship of the elements a j3 7 .... AB C ... K L M ...., of which this contradistinction had been only a partially applicable and incomplete expression. As does the Buddhist theory of the elements of experience {dharmas), Mach advocates a form of sensation pluralism. The Rohitassa Sutta of the Nikayas shows evidence that early Buddhism rejected cosmological world-concepts in favor of a phenomenalistic microcosm or body-world constituted by the totality of sense-impression at any given moment:
Yet it is just within this fathom-long body, with its perception and intellect, that I declare that there is the cosmos, the origination of the cosmos, the cessation of the cosmos, and the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos.
The sutric doctrine of the microcosmos of the “fathom-long body” is again strikingly paralleled by the Machian notion of the Korperwelt—a clever double-entendre capturing how the world appears from the perspective of common-sense realism—as a “world of bodies,” i.e. the totality of physical objects—as well as how it appears from the less intuitive but epistemologically more sophisticated point of view of phenomenalism—as a “body-world,” i.e. the logical space of sensibilia comprised by the human body.
In keeping with Buddhism’s soteriological pattern of inverse gnosis, the macrocosm is not only reduced to the mind-body microcosm, but the latter comes to be contemplated in its empirical aspect of functional flux and dispersive difference, as aggregates or bundles {skandhas) lacking any kind of real inner unity.
This phenomenalizing reduction of the macrocosm to the microcosm is an important prototype in early Buddhism of the later Mind-Only program of subjective idealism. Vasubandhu’s refutation of Abhidharmic realism in the Vimsatika arguably represents an attempt to urge a return to this earlier ideal type of non-atomic phenomenalism—a revival with a twist. In verse 16 of the Vimsatika, we rediscover the Bahiya Sutta’s grand theme (in the seeing, only the seen) iterated in an idealistic inversion—in the percept, only the perception (pratyaksaY
The awareness of perception is as in dreams. When it exists, the object of perception does not exist.
Nominalism Buddhist doctrine has a characteristic tendency to analyze perception and knowledge in terms of particulars, and does not accept the existence or instantiation of abstract entities such real wholes or universals, as do other darsanas (e.g. Nyaya). In the context of the theory of perception, Matilal describes nominalism as the view that we are directly aware of sensible quality-particulars. These qualities do not exist apart from their instantiations, and their instantiations do not exist independently of our sensation of them.
The development of nominalist views about perception is closely connected with the articulation of an ontological nominalism in the context of the Buddhist “bundle theory” of the body-world and its associated “no-ownership” stance on personal identity. In the Milindapanha, the monk Nagasena’s famous dialogue with King Menander, Nagasena maintains that under analysis, he does not exist as a person, and that his name “Nagasena” is therefore a strictly nominal designation for the psycho-physical bundles, just as the conceptual label “chariot” is is applied to a phenomenon that does not withstand a decompositional analysis. Since there is no more to the chariot than its parts, and none of the chariot’s parts are the chariot, Nagasena conveys, in reality there is no such thing as a chariot.
Siderits submits that Nagasena’s argument is proposing a kind of mereo- logical reductionism. Examining a number of different readings of the chariot dialogue, Oetke makes the case that the argument is semantically underdetermined. He believes that it is far from clear precisely what philosophical argument Nagasena is trying to make. However, he for some reason misses the parallels drawn by Kapstein to instances of the chariot simile in the Katha Upanisad^ as well as in Plato’s Phaedrus. In this light, I conjecture that purely deconstructive intent offers a plausible reason for why Nagasena’s argument seems underdetermined. Instead of advancing any constructive thesis of his own, he is merely attempting to subvert a classic Upanisadic example of atman theory, i.e. to demonstrate that in actual fact, the example shows the opposite of what its proponents intend it to illustrate. Kapstein, however, argues that Nagasena’s chariot argument is proposing a logical constructivist view of personal identity, and contends that it represents a possible precursor to Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism.
The logico-epistemic tradition of Yogacara worked out a more technical elaboration of this nominalism in the so-called apoha (exclusion) theory presented by Dharmakirti in the Pramanavarttika. Here, universals are interpreted as absences or eliminations—e.g., the class of trees is defined as the mere exclusion of non-trees, which is another way of saying that trees are merely whatever is labeled as a tree, without committing to ontological proliferations such as an underlying universal of “tree-hood,” an extensional set of all trees, and so forth. In articulating the relation of abstract concept to concrete particular along strictly linguistic lines, i.e. one of naming or conceptual imputation, the Buddhist apoha theory avoids trading in metaphysicalites such as instantiation, exemplification or inherence.
These examples are only to illustrate that ontological nominalism, or the principle that existence, reality and actuality are in the proper sense attributed only to particulars (if at all), is a deeply rooted aspect of the Buddhist philosophical pattern.
As we will later see in more detail, the “sense-data mosaic” theory of experience is one of severals ways that the Buddhist phenomenalism has been integrated with nominalism.
The Rise and Fall of Sense-Datum Atomism A realistic sense-data nominalism allows for two possible accounts of the nature of physical objects—a regressive or a progressive theory. The regressive theory (that the physical object gives rise to sense-data) leads to representationalism, the progressive theory (that the physical object is a construction from sense-data) leads to phenomenalism, or presentationalism. The aim of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism in 11-16 will be to demonstrate that neither of these accounts work in a realist mode.
To fill in some philosophical substructure for Vasubandhu’s delivery of this coup de grace to metaphysical realism, we will briefly survey Indian atomism, reviewing the Vaisesika doctrine and theorizing about the possible rationale for the development of Buddhist atomism. Following the path of reasoned eclecticism, we shall then construct two Weberian “ideal types” or models of Abhidharma synthesized from four streams of commentary—(1) modern Western scholarship of Indian Abhidharma (mainly STCHERBATSKY, FRAUWALLNER and VON ROSPATT), (2) Gelug doxography and contemporary commentary (HOPKINS, BUESCHER), (3) other modern philosophical reconstructions of Abhidharma (notably MATILAL, CHATTERJEE, GRUPP and GUENTHER), and (4) historical review of atomism in Western philosophy (Pyle).
The main focus of the discussion will be to investigate the Abhidharmic evolution of the concept of substance in the light of its critiques of time and perception. We will illuminate how this critical dynamic forced an initial shift from a progressive to a regressive theory of mind-independent physical objects, setting the stage for Vasubandhu’s abandonment of even the regressive theory.
The philosophical ground covered by this evolution is roughly equivalent to the trajectory leading from Hume through Kant to Mach. On an ideo- historical time scale, this is no mean achievement. But the argument we are making here is stronger. We are setting out to retrace this trajectory as it is reflected in the philosophical voyage of a single thinker—in the 4th century CE.
2.3 The Origins of Buddhist Atomism
We will have to leave the questions of where the doctrine of atomism first originated—in ancient India or in Greece—and whether there was any exchange of ideas between these cradles of philosophy for others to answer. Democritus, the first known Greek atomist, can be dated to approximately 460 BC, whereas Kanada, the probable originator of atomism in India, lived possibly a century or so earlier. However, for the purposes of our investigation, it will suffice to point out that ancient India was home to numerous atomist doctrines. The theory of atomism (paramanuvada) emerged in the astika schools of Indian philosophy (e.g. Vaisesika) as well as in the nastika schools (e.g. Jainism). Vaisesika Atomism Kanada’s atomism, set forth in his Vaisesika Sutra, was one of the most influential doctrines. Pace Kanada, every physical object is constituted by a finite number of paramanus—immutable, eternal, selfsubsistent, indestructible, and individually distinct atoms. These atoms have a spherical shape and touch each other. Vaisesika proposes a theory of atomic permanents, like the atomism of the Jains, who also believed that eternal and immutable atoms flowed through events.
The Vaisesika doctrine of permanents somewhat resembles the view of Democritus, who submits a reductionist material constitution theory. Democritus believes that the objectively existing compound bodies to be aggregates of atoms, which are eternal, true units, and characterized by solely by primary qualities. Atoms and the empty space they are located exist eteei (in reality), whereas colors and other sensible qualities exist only nomoi (by convention).
The early Vaisesika atomism of Kanada later came to be elaborated by Vatsyayana, a contemporary of Vasubandhu, who speculated that atoms are absolutely imperceptible, i.e. infinitesimal. Composite entities are integral wholes in their own right, inhering in the conglomerate (pinda) of their atoms but having different qualities from them. The discrete atoms serve as the material base of constitution in which the real integral wholes can inhere. The perception of the integral whole (avayavirf) takes place simultaneously with the perception of certain of its parts, e.g. even though one sees a tree in aspect, one can be said to be seeing the whole tree. In Vatsyayana’s mereology, atoms are never found in isolation. Two atoms (or least parts) cohere into a dyad-atom {dvyanuka') or least whole of atomic size, and all further combinations are formed from these dyad-atoms.
This strange construction is motivated by the difficulty that a least part is spatially partless and therefore unable to be spatially adjoined to other least parts. The dyad-atom is held to solve this problem because it has parts and can connect to other dyad-atoms in the usual fashion.
Buddhist Atomisms The Buddhist atomistic doctrines are considered by some to be among the most difficult atomist theories, their many subtleties and contradictions being a source of much polemical debate within Indian philosophy. I will not be able to fully explore all of the aspects and issues related to the various differentiations of atomism among the many Buddhist sects. Within the compass of this thesis, I will therefore restrict myself to a survey of the most basic doctrines and developments.
In the fold of Indian Buddhism, atomist doctrines can be found in the Sarvastivada system of tenets, as well as in the early Sautrantika (in Gelug doxography, the school of “Sautrantika Following Scripture”) and late Sautrantika (“Sautrantika Following Reasoning”) systems. All three atomist systems of Buddhist thought each in different ways hypothesize that the familiar physical objects of the external world are somehow constituted by ultimate simples. They maintain that all ultimate truths can be classified either as partless simples, as absences, or as cessations, and that all conventional truths reduce to their ultimate constituents.
A distinguishing feature of the Buddhist schools versus non-Buddhist doctrines of atomism can be found in their rejection of the realists’ inherence (samavaya) theory of wholes. In fact, the Buddhist positions reject all theories of constitution with the exception of mereological summation.
In modern analytic philosophy, the strongly reductionist stance that there exist only partless entities is commonly referred to as mereological nihilism. More precisely, the Vaibhasika and early Sautrantika atomisms can be characterized as varieties of impure physicalistic mereological nihilism (atoms are physical and interact with each other), whereas the late Sautrantika position can be classified as a pure mereological nihilism.
The position of mereological nihilism maintains that only elementary building blocks without proper parts have real existence—all seemingly discrete and integral wholes such as macroscopic objects in fact exist only as nominally designated aggregates or conglomerates, i.e. no differently than scattered mereological sums of atoms.
Interestingly, there is not much controversy among commentators in that the epistemologies of all three types of Abhidharma scholasticism are considered to be different inflections of the same underlying hybrid theme of pluralistic atomism and reductionist realism.
Why and how did Buddhism initially articulate the doctrine of atomism? As we have already pointed out, the earliest strata of Buddhist writings exhibit no evidence of such doctrines. Therefore, the atomist doctrine was almost certainly a later addition and not an actual historical teaching of Gautama Sakyamuni (though Mahavira, the contemporaneous founder of Jainism, almost certainly did teach atomist doctrines).
There are three possible lines of explanation for the development of Buddhist atomism—(1) a physical atomism that was borrowed from nonBuddhist darsana, (2) a phenomenalist origin in minimal sensory magnitudes, and (3) a nominalist or mereological origin. According to the phenomenalist line of explanation (2), which we construe as an epistemological hypothesis about limit-constructs of sensation, the atoms are the sensations at the absolute threshold of vision, hearing, touch, etc., i.e. the “pixels” of a sensory field. While the 19th century psychophysics of Fechner was the first attempt to scientifically measure such thresholds and quantitatively determine functional relationships between stimuli and sensations, it is not unreasonable to assume that the pre-scientific epistemologists of early Abhidharma were well aware of the existence of sensory limits. The nominalist line of explanation (3) is best construed as a mereological hypothesis about limit-constructs of composition where the Buddhist whole-part nominalism (the whole is unreal, its parts are real) comes to be radicalized into a mereological nihilism (the whole is unreal and only its self-subsistent least parts are real).
2.4 The Vaibhasika School
In its living details, the Vaibhasika doctrine of atomism has a much richer and messier philosophical texture than the abstract type we are presenting here. The Vaibhasika stance on perceptual experience may be described as a form of physicalistic sense-datum positivism. They believed that it was possible to separate the objective constituents of perception from the epistemic object and developed a theory of atomic substance (dravya'). Their theory of atoms (paramanuvada) proposes a direct realism operating over an ontology that hybridizes all three types of atomism—physical, phenomenalist, nominalist and physical.
The Vaibhasika account of perception is strongly presentationalist in flavor. Extramental objects present themselves directly to an observing consciousness-moment, without intervening representational synthesis. In other words, when observing a macroscopic object, one actually directly observes its atomic constituents in aggregate. Vaibhasika believes that these percepts are as real as the perception itself, and that the external world is directly grasped in non-conceptual perception.
The atomist doctrine of the Vaibhasika sect passed through three major phases of ideo-historical development.
The mature doctrine of atomism as presented in Vasubandhu’s Kosa may be traced back to the Mahavibasa, an encyclopaedic compendium of the Abhidharma of the Sarvastivada schools, dating to the 1st or 2nd century CE. However, the first recorded mentions of a Buddhist doctrine of atomism must be credited to Dharmasn, the author of the Abhidharmasara. This massive synthesis of extant Abhidharmic doctrine was the first commentarial work to forge the Sarvastivada doctrines into a system of scholastic thought. The Abhidharmasara was to remain the paradigmatic model for such compendia even up until the era of Vasubandhu and Sanghabhadra. It has been shown that the systematic presentation and structure of the Abhidharmakosa is derived in large part from the Abhidharmasara.
Vasubandhu’s Kosa and Sanghabhadra’s contemporaneous but considerably more voluminous Nyayanusara (a polemic rejoinder to the Kosa in 120,000 verses) form the apex of the classical Abhidharma of the Sravaka- yana, or non-Mahayana schools of Buddhist thought. Further developments of Abhidharma were to take place mostly in the context of Mahayana systematizations, e.g. the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Vasubandhu’s half-brother, Asariga the Yogacarin.
2.4.1 Time, Space and Atom in Vaibhasika
Although some commentators characterize Vaibhasika as having a theory of atomic permanents, this is somewhat too simplistic. Anacker notes that for Dharmasri, atoms are momentary, though they may form “series,” or causal chains of momentary events. Time is also atomized into a series of discrete instants, but the duration of these moments is so brief that the illusion of continuity is generated, as is the case with the frames of a motion picture following in rapid succession. The atomizing approach has the greatly attractive feature of not having to account for the genidentity of macroscopic physical objects, as under analysis, the appearance of a physical object persisting in time simply explodes out into the causal chain of momentary instants of its atomic decomposition.
The Vaibhasika are known as Sarvastivadins due to their canonical tenet that “everything exists” (sarvam asti), meaning the existence of entities in past, present and future. The epistemological rationale for this principle is the wish to defend a form of externalism—because knowledge is always knowledge of the real, the intentional objects of epistemically valid cognitions must somehow exist.
The Kosa offers up a number of other arguments in favor of the sarvam asti thesis, including causal and moral rationales such as that past entities must exist in order for present effects to be brought about, and that future entities must exist or else actions would not have consequences.
Time As the Sarvastivada Abhidharma continued to evolve, it became increasingly aware of the problem of time. The concept of an immutable entity migrating through the stages of time was no longer acceptable, as eternal substances were held to be contrary to the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of transience (anityata). Due to this doctrinal concern, the Vaibhasika Abhidharmikas were under pressure to evolve more sophisticated accounts of substance and time.
All elements of experience (.dharmas), including atoms, persist in the three periods of past, present and future. In modern terms, the sarvam asti principle may be described as a “block universe” account of space-time, as it affords equal ontological status to all moment-entities regardless of their time. The Vaibhasika advanced four major accounts of temporality, credited to the encyclopaedists of the Mahavibasa who originated them: Dharmatrata, Ghosaka, Vasumitra, and Buddhadeva.
The Kosa attributes to Dharmatrata the time theory of “change of existence” (bhava-parinama'), turning on a substance-existence account of change. The existence (bhava) of an element is an accident that can arise and cease, whereas the substance (dravya) is eternal. This view is immediately dismissed as a guise of the previously refuted non-Buddhist Samkhya system.
Ghosaka is attributed with the view of “change of aspect” (laksana-pari- nama), which asserts that entities have three temporal aspects or qualities (laksanas)—pastness, presentness and futurity. A future entity is merely an entity that is appearing under its future aspect and hiding its past and present aspects. The Kosa rejects this theory, reasoning that it implies a contradictory compresence of past, present and future in the same entity.
Frauwallner observes that the last two theories, the views of Vasumitra and Buddhadeva, account for time exclusively in terms of external connection, most likely in an attempt to avoid the difficulties inherent in Dharmatrata’s and Ghosaka’s substance-oriented theories of time.
Buddhadeva proposes a relational theory of time, where temporality is accounted for as a change of contingency (apeksa-parinama'). Change is governed by a tenseless binary relation between entites (dharmas), such as “r is earlier than y,” that imposes a partial order upon them. An examination of the Kosa’s refutation of the theory of Buddhadeva reveals it to be identical to the classic McTaggart argument against the reality of time. If events are ordered by a two-term relation into what amounts to a McTaggart B-series, then each event comes to have all of the McTaggart A- determinant properties—the present moment is also future because it is later than another moment, and past because it is earlier than a later moment. The Vaibhasika deployment of McTaggart argument against temporal order drops a strong hint about the developmental trajectory of Abhidharmika views on the reality of time.
The theory of Vasumitra is described as “change of position” (avastha-pari- nama). The Kosa’s explanation and critique of the four Vaibhasika theories of time concludes that the theory of Vasumitra is the correct view.
Frauwallner conjectures that the positional theory is a conglomerate of two contradictory theories of temporality—each proposed by a scholar named Vasumitra—which were conflated in later doxography. He points out that the abacus analogy used to show the intent of the theory logically excludes the ideas of efficiency and change.But the assumption that Indian Buddhist doxographers conflated two different Vasumitras is scarcely credible, especially not when it comes to such a central theme in the Vaibhasika philosophy of time. It is more reasonable to hypothesize that the conglomeration of seemingly contradictory views was a synthesis attempted by a single scholar.
The general scheme of Vasumitra’s synthesis as I conceive it is that of strongly reductionist reformulation of the concept of time in terms of change and causality. Temporality itself is effective action in the infinitive, and the tenses past, present and future are the modal positions of this “causal arrow.” An entity is real iff it is effective, which holds for any of the following three cases: its efficiency is actually being discharged (present), if it is possible for its efficiency to be discharged (future), or if it is not possible for its efficiency to be discharged (past). The temporal position of a future or past entity in other words depends on whether it is possible or impossible for the entity to discharge an effect. Moreover, the position is considered to be external to the entity, rather than a property or accident of it—in other words, it is the entity’s modal context. Past and future entities are held to exist de re.
Thus, Vasumitra’s “temporal eliminativism” refines the philosophically naive eternalist account of time taken over from the Vaisesika atomism into a considerably more sophisticated modal account which explains how entities can meaningfully be said to exist in past, present and future without resorting to metaphysicalities such as absolute time and eternal existence. Vasumitra’s account is still straightfowardly realist, but it does away with the dimension of time.
A present entity is a real actuality, past and future entities are possible and impossible real actualities, respectively. The concept of substance is identified with function, and the coming into appearance of an element is explained as the presence of the necessary conditions for its function. In this, we see the idea being reflected that the criterion of reality is efficiency (arthakriyakaritva)—a basic Abhidharmic theme which is agreed upon all the way through to Cittamatra and beyond. The debate on this issue can now be crystallized around the Vaibhasika and Sautrantika defense of an externalist version of this principle.
So far from being a mistaken and inconsistent conflation of separate theories, as Frauwallner uncharitably claims, Vasumitra’s theory should be considered a novel and significant development in the Abhidharmic critique of time.
Nonetheless, there remains a major philosophical tension in the theory of Vasumitra. Why is it that we only ever experience the present, if the past and future are essentially equally real? One way that Sautrantika attempts to resolve this tension is to retain Vasumitra’s modal account of time but abandon modal realism about the past and future, thus arriving at its characteristic doctrine of momentariness (ksanikavada), about which we will later have more to say.
Space The Vaibhasika system asserts that atoms are partless, that there are intervals of empty space (interstices) between atoms, and that the sub- stance-atoms do not touch when aggregated. This is also asserted by some Sautrantikas, e.g. by Samgharaksita. However, the Sautrantika critic Yasomitra maintains that in the Vaibhasika view, substance-atoms are without the quality of impenetrability or resistance (pratighata), which entails the quality of covering or spatial extension (avarna-laksana).5e Obstruction is an emergent quality of the aggregate-atom (samghata-paramanu), as is spatial extension. The samghata-paramanu is argued by the Vaibhasika to be both extended and partless.
The Vaibhasika substance-atom resembles the view of Hume, in that Hume also takes perception to be ultimately constituted of simples or minima sensibilia: “A single visual atom, in itself, has no extension, but combinations of atoms do. The perception of an object composed of two or more atoms is complex, since it is a perception with more than one spatial part.” According to Ayer, Hume contends that the impression of any physical extension must be compounded of a finite number of mathematically pointlike sense impressions, which are concrete objects. Because these objects are partless, they are the smallest conceivable sense-data.
Vaibhasika scholasticism defines space (akasa) in purely negative terms as absence of obstructive contact and enumerates it as one of the three uncompounded phenomena. But unlike the other Buddhist tenet systems, Vaibhasika considers space to be existent (sat), a partless, permanent substantial entity, and infinitely divisible. Clearly, the Vaibhasika system proposes the existence of absolute space, though it still lacks an explicit notion of what one would call in the terminology of modern mathematics an intrinsic geometry or metric, a difficulty which we will return to later on in Chapter 3.
Atom A substance-atom (dravya-paramanu) is an irreducible sensationunit of a certain sensory type, i.e. it is visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, etc. These sensibilia are metaphysically real qualities and are objectively present in the world. In this respect, the Vaibhasika atomism can be characterized as phenomenalistic, i.e., derived from the notion of minimal perceivable magnitudes. But the idea of atoms being located in absolute space necessitates that they be somehow smaller than physiological minimal perceivable magnitudes.
The visual features of an object, e.g. a tree, should otherwise be independent of the viewer’s distance to it, which is clearly not the case—the closer we move to the tree, the more visual detail we are able to resolve. But why are the Vaibhasikas willing to sacrifice the purity of a phenomenalistic atomism of sense-minima in order to preserve a notion of absolute space? Perhaps they feel that they are making a reasonable concession to realism. To ensure that “the things we really see when we say we see a tree” are not solipsistic fictions, they need to have an objective existence—and this requires a transcendentally objective space (akasa) to serve as an observer-independent frame of reference.
Matilal points out an instructive comparison of Vaibhasika to the view of Ayer, who “recommends that we conceive of perceptible external objects as being literally composed of the ultimate particles of physical theory, these being imperceptible, not in principle, but only empirically, as a consequence of their being so minute.”
According to the Vaibhasika, a dravya-paramanu never occurs in isolation. It is always a part of an aggregate-atom, or basic cluster of atomic sensory properties (samghata-paramanu). These aggregate-atoms are only perceptible in collection, although they each appear individually to the senseconsciousness.
The Sarvastivadin neo-orthodoxy of Sanghabhadra, as critiqued in the Kosa(A and defended in the Nyayanusara, specifies that each aggregateatom consists of a total of at least sixteen substance-atoms—each of the four sensory atoms of color, odor, taste and tangibility being accompanied by its own set of four general elemental atoms.
These four fundamental elements (mahabhutas) which, like all Buddhist elements, are more like force than substance, function as the intensive magnitudes of their associated aggregate-atom. The earth element represents the qualities of solidity, hardness and repulsion; the water element represents cohesion and attraction; fire corresponds to temperature and air to motion.
Every aggregate-atom contains one atom each of these four. Earth, water, fire and air are always present in equal proportion—the difference lies only in their perceptual intensity. A tiny point of light can shine dimly or brightly, steel needles are more intensely felt than the touch of a brush, etc.
Another variant of the Vaibhasika atomic theory is offered by the scholar Dipakara. According to this theory, the aggregate-atom is formed of a minimum of seven substance-atoms. We may hypothesize that one atom is located in the center of the aggregate’s cubic spatial “receptacle” and the six other atoms are positioned at the cube’s vertices. The minimal aggregateatom comprises one atom each of the fundamental elements (which together constitute the aggregate-atom’s tactile properties), and one substance-atom each of color, odor, and taste.
The most important points to keep in mind about this bewildering multiplicity of Vaibhasika atomic theories are that the atoms are held to have spatial extent and to be separated by interstices. Also, the shape (samsthana) of a visual atom is held to be an ultimate and can be perceived independently of color.
The Vaibhasika system of tenets is unmistakeably phenomenalistic—all that exist are sensory qualities and their intensities. An eternal substance as is proposed by the Samkhya is denied by the Vaibhasika (with the exception of Dharmatrata). Moreover, Vaibhasika presents a full-blown reductive account of sensation, where the likeness of a macroscopic physical object is simply identified with the spatial arrangement of a vast number of elementary sensation-particulars or microscopic tropes. In other words, this assembly of spatiotemporally determinate, mind-independent micro-tropes is what we actually have commerce with when we think we are perceiving a macroscopic physical object. The world is built up out of the epistem- ically and ontologically ultimate bits and pieces given in immediate sensory experience.
Therefore, although the Vaibhasika are considered by Buddhist doxog- raphy to be a substantialist school, the somewhat paradoxical situation obtains that the Vaibhasika substances are equivalent to the sense-data themselves. Substance is completely identical to trope—a sense-datum requires no further substrate. In this particular respect, the Vaibhasika mosaic theory is closer to the hypothetical “original flavor” of early Buddhist phenomenalism than its critical refinement, the Sautrantika, which moves away from the phenomenalizing idea of the simple as a sensory ultimate in favor of a progressive account of the constitution of physical objects.
Though in many ways a compromise with physical realism, the Vaibhasika system is by deliberate design far too reductionistic to qualify as a truly “naive” physical realism such as Nyaya-Vaisesika, which asserts the real existence of wholes, universals and actions.
The Vaibhasika propose a quintessentially Buddhist solution to the qualia problem. Their atomizing, objectivizing phenomenalist reductionism simply denies that sensations have any intrinsic subjectivity in the ultimate view. To Vaibhasika, “raw feels” such as minute flashes of color, tactile pin-pricks etc, are wholly public, mind-independent and objective. Vaibhasika argues the notion that sensation-atoms are somehow private to the perceiving consciousness to be an egological error.
2.4.2 Critical Review of Vaibhasika Presentationalism
In the debate on time in the fifth chapter of Vasubandhu’s auto-commentary to the Kosa, the Sautrantika takes the Vaibhasika to task over the sarvam asti thesis and the notion of karitra. Among other criticisms, the Sautrantika interlocutor denies the intelligibility of the Vaibhasika’s claim that past and future entities exist in the same sense as present entities. That Vasumitra’s theory should pose many difficulties in this regard is unsurprising, as in the terminology of modern logic, assertion of the existence of past and future entities would entail quantification into modal context. The Sautrantika also argues against the Vaibhasika ideas that future existents come into appearance by entering the scope of the present, and that the time of an entity is something separate from the entity itself. In analogy to A. N. Prior’s ideas about the logic of time, the Sautrantika would simply eliminate the metaphysical distinctions between the temporal status of an entity, its function, and its intrinsic nature.
Later on in the debate, the Sautrantika presses the Vaibhasika to concede that the intentional object (visaya) of a cognition can be a Meinongian absistent (Gegebenheit)'. “Thus it is that both existence and non-existence may be objects of cognition.” If cognitions about irrealia are not admitted, he reasons, many absurdities result—such that if one desires not to hear an unpronounced word, one would be compelled to actually pronounce the word in order to satisfy externalism about intentionality. However, if the Vaibhasika yields to some version of Brentano’s thesis of intentional inexistence, then it becomes much more difficult for him to resist the Sautrantika’s fictionalism about past and future entities. As against existence in past, present and future, the Sautrantika is advancing a version of Augustine’s view that “the present of things past is in memory; the present of things present is in intuition; the present of things future is in expectation.”
There are problems in reconciling the Vaibhasika of objective sense-data with phenomenalism—it is difficult to conceive of a reasonable account of the existence of unsensed sensibilia that does not make liberal use of counterfactuals. If we lock a blue ball into a lightproof black box, surely it is ridiculous to say that the ball is blue even inside the box where there is no light and nobody can see it—what we mean is something of the sort that, given the same perceptual conditions inside the box as outside, if we were able to see the ball, it would be blue.
Ayer cogently observes that there are no empirical means of settling the question as to whether or not sense-data can exist while they are not being apprehended. Another Ayerian objection to the Vaibhasika position would be that that a phenomenalist who speaks of sensibilia as having a distinct existence in space and time has not fully carried out his program—his so- called sensibilia are merely physical objects in disguise.Pyle raises the concern that a theory of perception predicated upon a mereological nihilism about compound bodies cannot be realist in the strict sense— if the existence of compounds is denied, the explanandum of the atomic theory is lost and the atomic theory of perception must be construed as an “error—theory” about why we hold mistaken views when we see macroscopic objects. However, this objection is not really a problem for the Vaibhasika since he intends to propose an error-theory of perception.
Yasomitra’s critique of the Vaibhasika atom concept in his commentary of the Kosa is an anticipation of Vasubandhu’s critique in the Vimsatika-. “In the Abhidharmakosa and in Yasomitra’s commentary, the Sautrantikas— who refused to accept that conglomerate atoms were without parts—then pressed the Vaibhasikas. They asked them how it could be that if none of the substance atoms were extended in space and if none of them offered any resistance, how could many together do this? How could one put together many atoms that took up no space and obtain something with any extension at all?”
Although atoms are said to be directly observable, they are not evident to ordinary perception, like houses, pots and trees. The atom therefore remains a metaphysical construction, and if it is admitted that the existence of atoms is only known by inference (anumana) to the best explanation, then who is to say that there cannot be some other, better explanation for phenomenal appearances? This Mind-Only critique will form a part of Vasubandhu’s argument against the Vaibhasika position later on in Chapter 3. For the idea that atoms are observables only collectively but not individually comes very close to a causal theory of perception.
As Matilal puts the Mind-Only argument—“If the so-called atoms generate perceptions out of their own power, why are they not also grasped in such perceptions?” But as ultra-nominalists, the Vaibhasika have no other choice but to defend a doctrine of homeomeria.™ Vaibhasika encounters the difficulty that it wishes to maintain on the one hand that the atomic sensations are sensed directly, yet on the other hand claims that they are sensed only in aggregate. The Vaibhasikas assert that an isolated minute particle is not an object of a sense-consciousness, nor is it the composite as a whole, as composites are merely imputed collection-generalities (gana-samanya)
In this critique, which will be the critique of Vasubandhu, we find a close affinity to Mach’s rejection of atomism due to his skepticism about imperceptible entities: “All his life, Mach was never able to make friends with the atomistic corpuscle theory. In discussions, whenever anybody presumed the existence of atoms as a matter of course—and we may assume that this happened quite frequently—he irascibly interjected: ‘Have you ever seen one?’ (‘Hams ans g’sehn?’)”
The purpose of physics, according to Mach, is not to determine the fundamental ontological constituents of reality, but rather, to explore and describe the functional relationships between the elements given to experience. To Mach, it would be an unforgivable case of metaphysical confusion to conflate sensations (the “given” or sensory core of experience) with atoms (ontological ultimates).
The Vaibhasika account of shape is deeply counterintuitive. Why is it that individual atoms come to be attributed with a substantial shape which is however imperceptible, whereas the perceptible shape of macroscopic objects is held to be merely conceptually imputed? Wouldn’t it be more reasonable to argue that perceptible shapes are real and imperceptible shapes are imputed?
Finally, realistic presentationalism is uncomfortably vulnerable to argument from illusion—how to say, for example, that a stick partly submerged in a glass of water only appears to be bent?
A radical phenomenalist of the Machian stripe argues that there is really no such thing as illusion, or rather, that it is not possible to draw a metaphysical distinction between illusion and veridical perception. For him, the entire issue of illusion is a pseudo-problem of the metaphysical realist— whenever we speak of illusion, we can be sure that something metaphysical is cooking. Similarly, wherever the epistemic reductionist may go, the hobgoblins of emergent properties and behaviors follow not far behind.
“Illusion” is unreal—or so we believe. It is an explanation for what is happening when the synthetic activity of sensory perception generates some epistemically ungrounded percept. Except for deceiving us, the illusion is causally inert. “Emergence,” however, is quite real—or so we suspect. It is our account for what is happening when dynamic interaction of a physical system generates some ontologically irreducible property. Here, a radical phenomenalist not committed to realism will argue that illusion and emergence are philosophical enantiomorphs. As soon as we draw a metaphysical divide between the epistemic subject and the object, the problem of illusion rears its ugly head on the side of the subjective constitution of experience and the problem of emergence arises on the side of the objective constitution.
The Vaibhasika will insist that it is all a matter of finding the “predetermined breaking point” between the subject and the object. He will argue that there cannot be such a thing as an illusion of a tree, because “tree” is merely a linguistic and conceptual convention imputed to some patches of color that we see. But how to account for the fact that these colored blobs are spatiotemporally correlated with certain tactile sensations of roughness when we attempt to touch the trunk of the tree? The things that we are seeing and the things that we are touching, the Vaibhasika explains, are the same things—our sensory awareness is making direct contact with the visual and tactile sensation-atoms are objectively located in space and exist independently of our awareness. When we close our eyes, where do the colored blobs go? They don’t go anywhere, the Vaibhasika avers—they are still out there in space, but our sensory awareness simply loses contact with them. But this account is badly vulnerable to argument from hallucination—where do the pink rats go when one closes one’s eyes?
To preserve external world realism, the Vaibhasika must concede the possibility of illusion and attempt to explain it as an error of perceptual synthesis. Without perceptual synthesis, it is difficult to account even for cases of “veridical” perception. For example, the problem of inferring a visual object’s shape from its two-dimensional projection does not admit to a unique solution. This intractable problem is converted into a solvable one by adding hard-wired assumptions about how the world is usually put together. Sensory illusions arise in cases where these a priori assumptions are violated.
But perceptual synthesis is exactly what the Vaibhasika direct realist account of perception wishes to deny—it argues that in non-conceptual perception, we see things as they actually are, and that we are only making a conceptual imputation (prajhapti) when we think we see a gross physical object.
2.5 The Sautrantika School
An important feature of the philosophical program of the Sautrantika school as we construe it here is to attempt to reconcile the basic principle of empiricism (that knowledge arises from experience and is limited to the realm of experience) with the discovery of the synthetic character of empirical knowledge, i.e. the realization that its constitution is dependent upon categories and assumptions not present in immediate experience.
In this regard, its representationalist epistemology closely accords with the familiar Kantian program of critical realism, which posits that it is necessary to make a priori posits that are epistemically prior to the content of experience; but that such metaphysics is only possible if it is strictly limited to the deduction of the conditions of possible experience.
Of all the schools of Indian philosophy, the Sautrantika was the only one to take such a Kantian turn. The reason for this unique ideo-historical development can only be that Sautrantika was attempting to address the same philosophical challenge as Kant—the need to critically reformulate empiricist realism in such a way as to avoid surrendering realism about a mind-independent world.
Chatterjee observes that Sautrantika is not so much a new philosophy as the critical analysis of the implications of the Sarvastivada realism. “The Sautrantika must be understood as Sarvastivada itself, aware of its own logical basis. They are not two schools, but two phases of the same metaphysical pattern.”
Though Sautrantika must also be considered an Abhidharmic school, its critical turn of the Abhidharmic pattern forced some important doctrinal points of difference to the Vaibhasika concerning the understanding of Abhi- dharma. The dogmatic presentation of the original seven texts of Abhid- harma dating approximately to the 2nd century BCE as the revealed word of the Buddha needed to be called into question. The Sautrantika strategy for resolving this dilemma was to argue that while Abhidharma existed, it was in fact diffused throughout the sutras. The Sautrantikas held that the independent set of seven core scriptures known as the Abhidharma could not lay claim to being categorically valid word of the Buddha (buddhavacana) taking precedence over interpretations conforming to the sutras in case of any conflict between the two.
Having liberated themselves in this way from the straitjacket of dogmatic scholasticism, the Sautrantika epistemologists were able to articulate two important doctrinal innovations over the system of the Vaibhasikas—the theory of presentism and the causal theory of perception.
Della Santina remarks that the Sautrantika emphasis of of the role of conceptualization, or discrimination (vikalpa) is connected to their critique of the Vaibhasika category system. Synthesis now begins to fill in for many factors of experience that were previously claimed to be objective realities: “They rejected the independent, objective reality of many of the factors the Vaibhashikas accepted, ascribing these dharmas to the functioning of discrimination or imagination. This goes some way toward the standpoint of the Mind-Only school, which eventually denied the objective reality of all objects and affirmed the sole reality of mind.”
Like Kant, Sautrantika has become aware of the synthetic activity of the mind—however the vikalpa is construed as a synthesis of the unreal rather than the real, in keeping with the Buddhist principle of nominalism.
Generally speaking, the division of the two truths according to the two means of valid knowledge or epistemic grounding (pramanas) recognized by the Sautrantika school relegates direct sensory perception or evidence (pratyaksa) to the level of phenomenal (samvrti) truth and inference or rational demonstration (anumana) to the noumenal (paramartha) truth. In Sautrantika, the real is given only to reason, and the correspondence (sarupya) between internal cognition and external cause is the criterion of truth.
2.5.1 Time, Space and Atom in Early Sautrantika
Time Even though the Sautrantika claims itself to be a reconstruction of the original sutric teachings of the Buddha, the Sautrantika doctrine of momentariness does not figure in earlier Buddhist writings and must be considered a proper innovation of the Sautrantika system. In Sautrantika, momentariness is not confined to phenomenal appearances—even ultimate truths such as substances are held to be in flux.
Von Rospatt traces the conceptual evolution of the instant (ksana) from the momentary interval to the time-atom (irreducible duration) to the completely durationless present in great detail, and summarizes his findings as follows:
The usage of ksana in the sense of momentary entity documents that the change in the conception of the term ksana was brought to its logical conclusion. Starting out with the basic meaning of “very short time,” the ksana came to be understood—reflecting an atomistic conception of time—as “the shortest unit of time,” the length of which came to be equated with the duration of mental entities (or transient entities in general) as the briefest conceivable events.” The Sautrantika view of momentariness as lack of temporal persistence can be traced to Vasubandhu’s definition in the Kosa, as von Rospatt explains:
To be ksanika (i.e. momentary), that is to be endowed with such a ksana, then entails according to Vasubandhu to perish immediately after having originated. Rather than defining ksanika as “being of momentary duration,” Vasubandhu in this way specifies the nature of this momentary existence and thus excludes alternative conceptions such as that of the Sarvastivadins.
The idea that a ksana has a certain fundamental thickness differing from a psychic addition may hold true for the Sarvastivada view of momentariness, but is not borne out by Sautrantika sources.
Von Rospatt enumerates five modes of deduction that the Sautrantikas use in support of their doctrine of momentariness. The momentariness of mental entities (1) is one indication. The Sautrantika also attempt (2) to infer the momentariness of all conditioned entities from the momentariness of the mind, and (3) to deduce momentariness from change and (4) destruction. Finally, they adduce (5) the experience of momentariness itself.
Presentism is a doctrine unique to the Sautrantika school (and to Mind- Only, which inherited many Sautrantika doctrines). It is not to be found in classical and medieval Western philosophy, with the exception of the Cyrenaic school.
Since Sautrantika does not admit the existence of past and future entities, all that remains of the temporal sequence of past, present, and future is the principle of continuous, universal flux (samtanai—a dynamic but durationless “momentary now” or “eternal present” where phenomena are continuously in the process of arising or perishing, but never actually persist for any length of time whatsoever. The present moment is a “vanishing present”—both streaming and standing, like the Jamesian “specious present” or Husserl’s “immanent temporality.” Husserl writes that the subjectively constituted concreta arise from the immanent temporality as the lowermost streaming ground of concreteness. The Sautrantika theory of time may be conceived as a form of “replacement presentism,” as argued convincingly by Grupp."
It is important to emphasize that Sautrantika not only rejects the existence of temporal continuants, but eliminates even instantaneous existence. Phenomena and elements {dharmas) can therefore never be found as complete existents in the present—one only ever finds their arising or perishing. Garfield points out that in Madhyamika, even the domain of conventional phenomena cannot be resolved into constantly arising, constantly ceasing momentary phenomena that have inherent existence. In contrast to this Nagarjunian doctrine of total ineffability, the Sautrantika system asserts a considerably more ontological view—that there is individual arising and ceasing of ultimates, although the individual entity is always in flux.
Space Unlike the Vaibhasikas, some Sautrantikas do not regard the experiential constituent of phenomenal space {akasa-dhatu) as a substantial entity (dravyasat).
The Sautrantika view advanced by Vasubandhu in the Kosa, construes shape as a derivative property of color. As Sellars trenchantly observes, the notion of shape as existing only “by way of idea” is a Berkeleyan one. But in Sautrantika, not all spatial properties are conceptually imputed—e.g. distance is still held to be an ultimate. The account of samsthana as purely a mental conception rather than a substantial and real property in the Kosa may be a possible precursor to Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism, as it shows the beginnings of a critique of space.
Aside from shape, the Sautrantika are also beginning to whittle away at the spatial interval of the atomic interstice: “The Sarvastivadins- Vaibhasikas held the view that there are intervals between the atoms of the conglomeration, while the Sautrantikas maintained that there are no intervals and yet the atoms do not touch each other.” One explanation would be that the Sautrantika held this view chiefly for apologetic reasons. If they had declared outright that the atoms touch each other, they would have been dismissed as having the view of a nonBuddhist school, the Vaisesika. This is the way Vasubandhu seems to deal with this issue in the Kosa. He argues that the Sautrantika themselves admit that it amounts to as much as touching: “Quoting an authority, Bhad- hanta, Vasubandhu says that although the atoms do not touch, when they are situated in the closest, gapless proximity we can say in words, ‘they touched’.”
Matilal advances the explanation that the Sautrantika are claiming a potential or latent tangibility of the atoms which is actualized when they are in conglomeration, just as the latent visibility of individual atoms is actualized when they are perceived in aggregate.
A third explanation would be that Sautrantika held the interstice between two atoms to be mathematically infinitesimal, in other words, smaller than any possible measure. This would account for for their claim that atoms can have the seemingly contrary properties of not touching, yet not being separated.
Atom The Sautrantika understanding of the two truths—the phenomenal (samvrti and the noumenal (paramartha) truth—bears affinities to the Cartesian dualism of the 19th century, where the atom (res extensa) is the fundamental entity of the external world and sensation (res cogitans) are the fundamental entities of the internal world, i.e. the sensory minima brought about by the impingement of atoms upon the sensory organs. The external mosaic of atoms is connected to the inner world of perception by way of the sensation, the smallest physiological unit, which covers up but at the same time reveals the external world.
In Sautrantika, the phenomenal or conventional truths are sensibles and the ultimate truths are intelligibles, i.e. the noumenal structures that are deduced to objectively back the perceptual flux of experience. The ultimate constituents of external objects are believed to be inferable from the “represented” forms in our awareness. Atoms are momentary (ksanika) and are given only to inference (anumana) as purely logical constructs. We are led to deduce their existence by a causal inference, as the atomic data must have caused the gross appearance (pratibhasa) in consciousness. But though this seems like an a posteriori reasoning at first glance, it is actually an a priori one. One is not drawing conclusions from the empirical to the empirical, but from the empirical to the noumenal. The atom is reasoned to be a necessary precondition to empirical knowledge.
Sautrantika thought does not have a concept directly corresponding to the Kantian notion of a priori. But inasmuch as we are justified in reconstructing Sautrantika along Kantian lines, the atom would have to be a wholly transcendental construct deriving from a priori consideration.
One supporting argument for the a priori interpretation is that the Sautrantika atom is imperceptible in principle. In Sautrantika, ultimate truths are sui generis and reachable only by transcendental reasoning, not by a decompositional analysis of empirical phenomena. The Tibetan doxographer Ngawang Belden offers the example that in Sautrantika, a patch of blue is not established as a composite of external particles separate from the aspect of blue, nor is the aspect of blue a composite of external particles. The Vaibhasika atom, on the other hand, can at least in principle be isolated by empirical decomposition. It is only too minute to be individually registered (though we have already discussed the problems with this view).
Sautrantika epistemology has been compared to the representational realism of Locke. Its atomic theory is also similar in many ways to the theory of Epicurus, who also adverts to a rationally apprehended world of atoms for causal explanations of the phenomena appearing in sensory awareness.
Clearly, Sautrantika resonates to a reasonable degree with Kantian critical realism, although the Buddhist and Kantian accounts differ considerably as to their forms of construction and categories.
In the following, we will therefore pursue the Kantian line of interpretation and construe the Sautrantika’s inferential knowledge of the noumenal realm (paramartha-satya) to have the form of necessary a priori posits— even though there are problems with this interpretation due to anumana not having the proper technical meaning. The postulation of a necessary presupposition to knowledge would be arthapatti, which is not among the Sautrantika’s allowable pramanas.
Why does the Sautrantika system need atoms at all? The doctrine of atoms was carried over from Vaibhasika, just as the Vaibhasikas in turn had most likely inherited the doctrine from the Jainas and Vaisesikas. Also, perhaps it was considered that appearances required a substance account of causal origination in order to avert the conclusion that they are being generated ex nihilo. Finally, if the Sautrantika causal theory of perception (that mental representations are the effects of external objects) is to support an externalist reference of the intentional object (visaya), it requires that there be objective causal vectors for effective action.
Mind (citta) in Sautrantika moreover possesses the feature of svasam- vedana (self-reflexive awareness, i.e., transcendental apperception)—but in other key respects, it is not transcendental, as the moment-to-moment arising of mind is governed by empirical causality.
One difficulty with the Kantian analogy is that dravya does not conform to Kant’s notion of substance. For Kant, the schema of substance is persistence through time, and we have already shown that Sautrantika does not admit dravya to possess any temporal persistence whatsoever. The Sautrantika concept of dravya would more accurately correspond to the Kantian notion of noumenon or Ding an sich, i.e. a thing as is apart from sensible or empirical intuition. But this reading, too, immediately breaks down, as the Sautrantika atom is in flux, whereas the Ding an sich is atemporal.
Nonetheless, the existence of atoms, i.e. of intelligible simples, is given to reason by a kind of transcendental inference, as a merely empirical analysis would never suffice to establish atoms as the nonempirial objects which they are by definition intended to be. They comprise the flux of momentary atomic stimuli that causally induces tactile, visual, aural etc. sensations—from which, in turn, the mind synthesizes its phenomenal representations by way of a process of conceptual elaboration {.vikalpa). In Sautrantika thought, vikalpa generally assumes the role of synthesis, albeit an imaginatively contrived and therefore “unreal” one.
Also, if atoms are purely intelligible but not sensible, Sautrantika must rigorously separate the category of substance into rupa (variously construed as phenomenal materiality, Gestalt, or as the constituent of a perceptual datum which presents itself as objective) and dravya (the transcendentally intuited substance, that which is inferred by transcendental reasoning to be the objective basis for perception). If a dravyasat lacks temporal persistence or sensible materiality, why even call it a substance? For an existent to be intelligible may mean no more and no less than that it is a logical posit, albeit a necessary and true one. But what remains unexplained is why such a logical datum should exist independently of its being posited.
2.5.2 Atomism in the Late Sautrantika Phase
Gelug scholarship distinguishes between the Followers of Scripture and Followers of Reasoning. The late phase of Sautrantika is known in the Gelug doxography as the subschool of “Sautrantika Following Reasoning.” This sub-division of the Sautrantika school following the main system of Dignaga and Dharmakirti postulates as its atomic entity the point-instant or unique, unanalyzable unrepeatable particular (svalaksana).
Chatterjee characterizes the svalaksana as an “attributive atom,” which he holds to be the atom in its truest sense. Grupp translates the svalaksana as “abstract atom.” Dharmakirti’s svalaksana may be compared to Carnap’s concept of elementary experience (Elementarerlebnis) in that they both explode the stream of experience out into unanalyzable particulars. However, the similarity ends there. For Carnap, the Elementarerlebnisse are derived by an abstractive process (the procedure of quasianalysis) and employed as constitutional elements, not asserted as metaphysical realities. Atoms are products of abstraction—the stream of experience is not intrinsically atomized in this way. For Dharmakirti, the svalaksanas are the minimal concrete particulars or “givens” of perception that the real splits itself into. As Goodman points out, a system taking concreta as atomic cannot allow qualities as atomic parts of such concreta. This difficulty is resolved by the theory that phenomenal qualities are merely superimposed on the svalaksanas as subjective constructions. The svalaksanas do not constitute anything, as is the case for the Elementarerlebnisse of Carnap’s system. Moreover, the Sautrantika Following Reasoning assert these as external (mind-independent) objects, which Carnap does not.
The svalaksana nonetheless signals a final departure from the realism of the “substantive atom,” the latter being much closer to the common-sense view. The Sautrantika system of Dignaga and Dharmakirti postulates partless and extensionless naked particulars in a strictly instrumental fashion, as a provisional stepping-stone to the fully-fledged Yogacara view. The “attributive atomism” is later in origin than Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika and is unaffected by his anti-atomist argument, for reasons that will be explained later.
However, there is by no means a unanimous consensus that Dharmakirti divides time into infinitesimal or point-like instants. Oetke argues that this view is unproven, and that Dharmakirti’s views on the structure of time (whatever they may be) have no bearing on his formal proofs of momentariness in the Sattvanumana.^
2.5.3 Critique of Sautrantika Representationalism
Passing now to criticism, one difficulty with representationalism is that it does not fully accord with radical phenomenalism. The phenomenalizing stance as expressed in the Bahiya Sutta would seem to demand a two-term or even a one-term account of perception. If in the seeing there is only the seen (etc.), then the perceived must be identified either with the representational aspect of perception (as is the case in Vijnaptimatra) or with the aggregate of the compositional constituents of perception (as in Vaibhasika)—it is not possible to have it both ways.
Chatterjee argues that the three-term theory is an unstable account of knowledge. Its correspondence theory of knowledge presupposes a presenta- tive account, which, however, renders the correspondence theory superfluous.
Also, the novel Sautrantika doctrines of evanescence and flux fit poorly with the doctrine of atomism inherited from the Sarvastivada tradition. The Sautrantika have some difficulties in reconciling atomicity to flux, as the discrete nature of atoms would seem to break the continuity implied by absolute flux.
If the doctrine of momentariness is made to apply to atoms, as it must be, then the atom ceases to be a static entity and becomes a wholly dynamic stimulus. It flashes into and out of existence, but does not actually persist for even the most infinitesimal moment. To use a mathematical metaphor, the atom’s process of arising and perishing might be compared to a Cauchy sequence which, though converging in the reals, fails to converge in the rationals. Despite approaching an ideal limit (the idealization of the atom qua static existent) there is never in fact any such static entity to be found at any point of time during the atom’s process of real arising and perishing. In this reconstructively purified Sautrantika view, flux and atomism are reconciled in the concept of the atom as a fundamental flux-unit, a discrete pulse of effective action (not unlike the quantum of modern physics). As a key rationale for their radical dynamization of the atomic concept, the Sautrantika offer that a static entity is by definition incapable of acting.
Vasubandhu points out that the dynamic, instantaneous nature of the atom-stimulus poses a severe difficulty for the Sautrantika’s causal account of perception—by the time the percept, i.e. the representation is registered in awareness, the stimuli that have caused it have already evanesced. Under the assumption of an externalist, i.e. a correspondence theory of representation, the percept comes to be a representation of the unreal. However, if one is willing to revert to internalism to preserve the veridicality of the representation, then why not also adopt an internalist account of causation and dispense with the noumenal object? The internalist account of reference and knowledge is simply good empiricism, as Vasubandhu might aver. A coherent account of perception does not require external bases of knowledge (alambanas). This will be the nucleus of his argument against the causal theory of perception in verse 16 of the Vimsatika.
Although the early Sautrantika epistemology is already remarkably advanced, we still find in it some vestigial notions inherited from the Vaibhasika direct realism, such that these discrete pulses must possess definite spatiotemporal locations. As we will later see, all of these notions are to become the object of Vasubandhu’s critique of atomism. However, in early Sautrantika we also find notions proper to critical realism, such that the discrete pulses are momentary stimulus-atoms which are themselves imperceptible, but produce percepts by impinging upon the sensory faculty. In the late Sautrantika of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, the corpuscular concept is done away with—finally the atomist doctrine, now fully purged of all substantialist vestiges, has matured into “attributive atomism.”
Thus, we can reconstruct the evolution of the atomic concept in the Ab- hidharmika schools along roughly the following lines: In the Vaibhasika presentational theory of knowledge, the atom is a physical sensation-atom or trope, i.e. a discrete, particular instance of a sensory quality. In early Sautrantika representationalism, although the atom’s noumenal substantiality has not been eliminated entirely, it is hidden from phenomenal perception. What was formerly a sensation-atom or unitary sensum is now a discrete sensory stimulus, the necessary existence of which is deduced by (transcendental) inference.
The Abhidharmic reductionism attempts to epistemologize the early Buddhist teaching of the phenomenalistic elimination of references to self and subjectivity by reducing the physical world described by ordinary language of covering truth (samvrti-satya) to the purely phenomenal world described by the sense-datum language of ultimate truth (paramartha-satya) But whether this program actually plays out as intended is another question. In a parallel to Quine’s classic critique of reductionism as set forth in Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Oetke strongly argues that this phenomenalizing reduction of ordinary experience to “protocol language” is infeasible.
Moreover, the Abhidharmic theory of synthetic wholes as purely nominal entities raises the possibility of similarly nominalizing the parts. Saying that the whole is a synthesis (vikalpa) superimposed on the parts by purely subjective constructive imagination (kalpana) bears the risk of reverting into idealism, because it might be that the subjectivity is constructive enough to posit the parts as well.
In fact, this will be the thrust of Vasubandhu’s argument in the coming chapter. He will argue that the hypothesis of transcendentally objective atoms is unwarranted and superfluous. This, he will say, is firstly because the gross appearance (pratibhasa) is all that is required for empirical purposes, and secondly, because it is not proven that we constitute perception of gross physical objects from transcendentally objective atoms given in experience.
The example of Sautrantika illustrates an Avenarian point—any empiricism made aware of its a priori foundations but insisting on realism inevitably produces a characteristic diplopia of inner experience and outer reality, which raises the problem of how these two realms interrelate. There are two very closely related modes of thought that attempt to resolve the bifurcation of internal and external world that Avenarius famously problematized as “introjection”—phenomenalizing idealism (the route taken by Vasubandhu) and empiriocriticism—the new turn of Mach and Avenarius after Kantian critical realism which reasons against the metempirical status of the synthetic a priori.
3 The Anti-Atomist Metaphysics of Vijnaptimatra
I once heard the question seriously discussed, "How the perception of a large tree could find room in the little head of a man?" (Ernst Mach) HE TASK CUT OUT for this chapter will be to argue, by conducting a detailed analysis of the relevant arguments in verses 11-16 of the Vimsatika, that Vasubandhu really did intend his refutation of the external object to operate as a critique of transcendental objectivity. In other words, by undercutting the epistemic justification of the metaphysical realist’s existence claims for such putatively external objects, he aims to demonstrate that the existence of objects ontologically independent from our own mental representations is not established.
Some modern revisionists regard Mind-Only epistemology as a phenomenological realism that focuses its attention on the flux of experience and chooses not to concern itself with metaphysicalities. It is entirely correct to point out that for Mind-Only, things-in-themselves are philosophically gratuitous. In point of fact, Mind-Only generally refrains from engaging in ontological theorizing. Yet this minimal analysis does not go nearly far enough—for if a philosophical position which is non-materialistic, excludes all extramental elements from the constitution of experience, insists on viewing the world strictly in epistemological terms, and maintains that experience of the given moment is noematically constituted solely by the generative activity of transcendental subjectivity does not deserve the label of idealism, then what does?
Any reading of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism will inevitably be influenced by one’s expectations about the position that he is attempting to establish. A critical review of some of the more popular interpretations of Mind-Only will help to triangulate the epistemological intent of Vasubandhu’s argument and set our prochronistic parallels to empirio- criticism on a firmer footing.
The Vijnaptimatra eliminates the object term of the three-term theory of perception advanced by Sautrantika and returns to a two-term theory of perception. However, it does not quite come out to direct realism, as Mind-Only bars all epistemological means of access to the noumenal realm (paramartha-satya). It confines ordinary perception (pratyaksa) and reasoning (anumana) to the egological sandbox of the conceptually constructed nature of experience (parikalpita-svabhava).
3.1 Readings of Mind-Only
When discussing the Vijnaptimatra school, it is useful to keep three distinctions in mind—(1) the schools “Following Scripture” and “Following Reasoning,” (2) the Nalanda and the Valabhi schools, and (3) the True and False Aspectarian readings.
Tibetan doxography distinguishes the Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu (“Following Scripture”) from the later school of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. (Following Reasoning). In this exposition, we will unfortunately have to restrict ourselves to a discussion of the doctrine of Vasubandhu—the logico- epistemological idealism of Dignaga and Dharmakirti will be largely kept out of consideration, as will the Sino-Japanese reception history of the Mind-Only school.
Within the schools of interpretation that evolved from the early Yogacara of Asanga and Vasubandhu, we must distinguish the Nalanda school, most prominently represented by Dharmapala, and the Valabhi school, represented by Sthiramati. There are several notable differences in interpretation between these two schools, of which we will mention only one—the ontological status of the mental representation in terms of the Yogacara three-nature model. For Sthiramati, the aspect (akara) or noema is relegated to the conceptually constructed (parikalpita) nature of experience, whereas Dharmapala holds it to be a part of the other-dependent (paratantra) nature. In according to the akara a causally effective mental reality that is not imaginary conceptual construction, the Nalanda school comes to be much closer to a Berkeleyan idealism than the Valabhi school, for which the akara is unreal, and ultimately seen to “dissolve” back into the interdependent functional flux of the paratantra nature. The third distinction, the distinction between True and False Aspectarian- ism as drawn by Tibetan doxography, will be covered later when we review the traditional interpretation of Cittamatra.
3.1.1 Revisionist Interpretations of Mind-Only
The revisionist line of interpretation generally insists on reading Mind-Only not as metaphysical idealism. Rather, it is held to be a phenomenologically oriented species of pluralist realism. Instead of being concerned with the way things are qua metaphysical realities, all that matters to Yogacara is the way phenomena are perceptually and mentally constituted. It is in other words an attempt to reformulate the basic program of Buddhist empiricism in terms of a comprehensive phenomenological analysis of the activities of the mind. If it is to be considered idealism at all, it is at best a form of epistemological, but certainly not of ontological idealism.
The most influential modern proponents of this phenomenological interpretation are WAYMAN, Anacker, KING and LUSTHAUS. Some revisionist scholars claim that Yogacara accepts an external world and urge a critical realist interpretation (notably WAYMAN and KOCHUMUTTOM).
Wayman Wayman alleges that the proponents of the idealist interpretation support their thesis by a selective reading of the textual evidence, bending statements that indicate Yogacarin belief in objective rupas (forms) and other mind-independent elements. But under the premise that Cittamatra is not an entirely fresh creation, but in many respects an evolution of an earlier critical realist scholastic system of the Sautrantika, it shouldn’t be surprising to find that it still preserves many overtly realist elements that have not yet been reformulated or reinterpreted to fully harmonize with idealism. Given the nature of Mind-Only as a major locus of synthesis for Buddhist philosophical doctrine, it would in any case unreasonable to assume that Cittamatra positions are always univocal. It is only natural for the overarching exegetical theme of idealism to be unraveled into a kaleidoscopic multiplicity of perspectives upon closer and more critical readings of the text. A deconstructive hermeneutic uses exegetical themes as prisms for fracturing the text and opening up its inner interpretive space for many meanings old and new. One has to wonder whether a project like Wayman’s which seems to pursue the hermeneutically rather naive goal of uncovering the hitherto hidden “true meaning” of a text really deserves the compliment of revisionism.
Wayman is not alone in giving a strongly critical realist rendering of Cittamatra—Lindstrom, for example, even goes so far as to make the remarkable assertion that the point of Yogacara “is in fact to assert, not deny, ‘the mind-independence of the material sphere.’ ”
I will attempt to show, by a rational reconstruction of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism derived from the internal evidence of the text, that quite the opposite is true. Moreover, it is reasonable to construe Mind-Only as a species of idealism on the external evidence of the arguments that its Advaitin and Madhyamika critics have lined up against it. One may of course always argue that the historical critics of Mind-Only have universally misconstrued it, but this amounts to contending that only a proponent of Mind-Only can understand the system well enough to properly critique it. This argument can safely be dismissed.
Lusthaus Lusthaus insists that the mainline ontological idealist reading of Yogacara is predicated on a fundamental misinterpretation of the term vijnapti-matra. He argues that correct interpretation implies no more than a realist phenomenology, the idealist features of which are confined to a strictly epistemological sense—in other words, any ontological sense of the term is precluded:
Why has Yogacara been misinterpreted as idealism? The common way of interpreting matra so as to valorize ‘consciousness’ is striking since those same interpreters never impute such implications to matra on the many other occasions it is used by Buddhists or Yogacarins. For instance, the closely allied term prajnapti-matra (“only nominally real”) has never led a modern interpreter to speculate that Language is the metaphysical reality behind the world of experience; on the contrary, those prone to idealist interpretations tend to privilege ineffability and yearn for a realm beyond language and conceptions.
Naturally, since anybody would agree that the term “only nominally real” doesn’t indicate that language is the metaphysical reality behind the world of experience, Lusthaus wants us to agree, mutatis mutandis, that vijnapti- matra (in his words, “nothing but noetic constitution”) doesn’t indicate noetic constitution to be a metaphysical reality behind the world of experience. By this analogy, he wants us to believe that an ontological reading of the term vijnapti-matra is wildly implausible. But in order for this analogy to carry his argument, Lusthaus relies on a deliberately misleading implication. The fact that unless we are specifically discussing nominalism about propositions, we typically don’t take the term “only nominally real” to be making a metaphysical proposition about language has nothing to do with the fact that we may very well believe it to be making a metaphysical statement about the relationship of language and object. If we say, for example, that a tree is only nominally real, we are obviously talking about the referent of the term “tree,” not about the term “tree.” Not to belabor the issue ad nauseam, but given that the desire to minimize or eliminate ontological commitments is such a crucial philosophical motivation of nominalism, if we all of a sudden make out “nominalism talk” to be about something other than ontology, then there isn’t much left for it to be talking about!
Lusthaus is right to point out the importance of epistemological idealism. But is he really justified in ruling out ontological readings of vijnapti-matra? Perhaps he is—if, somewhere, he offers a better argument for it than the one we have just discussed.
One can certainly credit Mind-Only epistemology with the intent to be non-metaphysical. Carnap makes the perspicacious observation that realist, idealist and phenomenalist epistemologies coincide to the extent that their constitution theories of experience are ontologically neutral. This observation can help lay to rest a large portion of the perennial vexation about whether Mind-Only is realism or idealism or phenomenalism—to the extent that it happens to be non-metaphysical, all three terms equally apply. Therefore, we have no doubt that Lusthaus is on to something important about Mind-Only. Also, we are not disputing anything that Lusthaus has to say about its Sino-Japanese history of reception. But what if Vasubandhu’s position in the Vimsatika, does, after all, lapse at some point into metaphysics? This is in fact what Cittamatra’s Indian and Tibetan Madhyamika critics oppugn it for. Should we ever catch such a lapse, it would come as no surprise to find that it is an idealist one. If epistemological idealism refuses to let its metaphysics in through the front door, it may simply enter through the back.
Some scholars conjecture that the early phase of Yogacara was mainly phenomenological in orientation, whereas its later developments came to be more ontological. Nagao, for example, notes that the early Yogacara of the Asanga-Vasubandhu era considered the question of an external reality to be a problem of the realist’s ontology, and thus, a problem which was not their concern. However, it would be a mistake to conclude that they therefore desisted from external world skepticism. Lusthaus is more circumspect about the issue of the external world than Kochumuttom. He hedges his bets—while he does not actually say outright that he believes Mind-Only to be critical realism, he conveys this opinion obliquely: “To the extent that epistemological idealists can also be critical realists, Yogacara may be deemed a type of epistemological idealism ...
” Against the view of Lusthaus, I am arguing that the intent of Vasubandhu’s refutation of atomism is not compatible with critical realism—since if the transcendental object is bracketed out of the constitution of experience, critical realism is left behind for good. But as Kant recognized, this is a dangerous philosophical move to make. An epistemological idealism without an objective world cannot hold the middle ground and is inexorably pulled towards an ontological idealism. Once we lose the solid transcendental seabed on which to drop our “reality anchors,” our world of experience becomes driftwood on the deep of idealism—or to use a more empiricist figure of speech, we become sailors on Neurath’s raft.
But the Vimsatika has several levels of meaning. Vasubandhu’s soterio- logical subtext is that once we wake up to the fact that we are empirical explorers floating on Kon Tiki, we should steer the raft towards the farther shore. The anagogic reason why the Vimsatika is force-feeding the realist with the epistemological idealism of Cartesian epoche is to lead him even further into skepticism—not because it wants to take a last stand on any kind of idealism. However, if the indication of being prone to idealist interpretations of Cittamatra is to “privilege ineffability and yearn for a realm beyond language and conceptions,” as Lusthaus alleges, then surely, Vasubandhu the mystic stands guilty as accused.
Kochumuttom In Kochumuttom, we find a very systematic and generally quite convincing Kantian revisionist reading of Vasubandhu. He makes the argument that Vasubandhu does not deny the noumenon or Ding an sich outright, but merely claims that it can never be directly given in experience unless in the condition of enlightenment. Generally speaking, this is a perfectly accurate interpretation, but what this really boils down to upon closer examination is that Vasubandhu is a critical realist only in the soteriological sense. There can be no doubt that Vasubandhu believes in an ineffable noumenal nature (anabhilapya-atma) beyond phenomenal experience—the true nature of minds known to the enlightened ones. But first of all, if this is Vasubandhu’s noumenon, it is nothing like a Kantian idea of pure reason. The only rationale for calling it a noumenon is that
Vasubandhu avers it to be beyond ordinary experience. Because it is beyond knowing as we know it, it does not supply any kind of ontological or epistemic grounding, nor can it be rationally intuited. Vasubandhu already shows his true colors in verse 1 of the Vimsatika, where he likens the perception of external objects to seeing cataract-hairs. He is trying to communicate that all the while, we are staring into the face of the ineffable noumenon, but simply fail to realize it because we are ignorantly fixated on the obscurations of ordinary experience. This example goes to show in the context of a Mahayana mysticism in full bloom, Vasubandhu’s belief in an ineffable noumenon is insufficient to establish that he is a critical realist when it comes to the epistemology of ordinary experience—in fact, it establishes the very opposite.
Let us examine what Kochumuttom has to say about Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism:
Nowhere during the discussion does he say that there is no extra-mental world. Instead he has thrice said that “an atom is not obtained”. The term translated here as ‘is obtained’ is sidhyati. To be sure, this term does not mean ‘to exist’ (asti). Therefore, to translate the above sentence as “an atom does not exist” would be a gross mistake. The usual meanings of the term sidhyati are ‘to be obtained (in experience),’ ‘to be given (in experience)’ or ‘to be proved to be true’ etc. So Vasubandhu’s main criticism against the atomic realism is that the atoms are neither given in experience nor proved. Therefore he does not really say that there are no atoms at all, although he is not prepared to admit that things-in-themselves which are ineffable, could be conceived in terms of atoms.
There isn’t much to find fault with in this discussion. It shows that Vasubandhu is rightly very wary of making metaphysical assertions involving the existence or nonexistence of objects beyond phenomenal experience. All he says—and all he needs to say—is that atoms are neither given in phenomenal experience nor proven to constitute experience. However, if it is really true that Vasubandhu may read as accepting non- atomic Dinge an sich in the Kantian sense, something is conspicuously missing from Kochumuttom’s interpretation. Why doesn’t Kochumuttom supply a reasoning that establishes the necessity for Vasubandhu of something transcendentally objective as the condition for the function of the categories (such as is done by Kant in his thesis of the second antinomy of pure reason)? The conclusion to be drawn from this question is that if Kochumuttom doesn’t have any such reasoning to show, then there simply isn’t anything to be shown.
Additionally, there is a systematic difficulty with Kochumuttom’s reading of Cittamatra as a variation on Kantian critical realism. If Vijnana- vada and Sautrantika are both critical realisms, then what exactly does Vasubandhu stand to gain by refuting the Sautrantika theory of perception in the Vimsatika!
The fact that Kochumuttom cannot sufficiently substantiate the necessity to Vasubandhu’s epistemology of the Ding an sich despite that Vasubandhu’s reasoning is generally Kantian is a key justification of the empiriocriticist reading we are attempting here. Kochumuttom agrees that Vasubandhu neither affirms nor denies the existence of mind-independent atoms in an ontological sense. This is reason to conclude that Vasubandhu is developing the Vijnaptimatra epistemology in Cartesian epoche.
3.1.2 The Traditional Interpretation of Cittamatra
According to the traditional line of interpretation, Cittamatra is metaphysical subjective idealism. The view that the goal of the Vimsatika is to deny the existence of a mind-independent external world is backed more or less uniformly by the classical Indian and Tibetan commentarial traditions (see e.g. HOPKINS, BLUMENTHAL, or Santaraksita), and by many modern scholars such as WOOD, TOLA and DRAGONETTI, CHATTERJEE, Gupta, Matilal and Nagao.
Arnold points out that Yogacara has reduced the Abhidharmika list of categories to mental events, which may be taken an indication of a Yogacara view that the mind is epistemically prior to the psycho-physical complex of experience. If it weren’t for the mind, in other words, there would be no sort of experience whatsoever. Wood, as we have already seen, argues that the Mind Only Principle frames Cittamatra as a species of ontological idealism. Matilal contends that Yogacara idealism sets out to demonstrate the inconsistency of the realist account of the external world.
Tibetan doxography unanimously reads Cittamatra as a critical refinement of Sautrantika which purifies it of the extraneous and self-contradictory category of the external object. As Mipham states: “The Sautrantikas, who assert the theory of the mental aspect, are like the Chittamatrins. The sole difference lies in the assertion or denial of the existence of the external object.” Furthermore, the Mind-Only view resembles Sautrantika in accepting their doctrine of momentariness. On this understanding, the Cittamatrin reveals himself to be a Sautrantika who comes to realize that he has been cast out of the phenomenalistic garden of Eden into the physical world for having eaten of the forbidden fruit of metaphysical realism. Vasubandhu’s offensive against the external object fbahyartha) is an attempt to rectify this situation by ejecting the Ding an sich from the epistemological constitution of experience.
King argues that the “phenomenalism” of the Yogacara school is clearly in conflict with the Sautrantika epistemology about the issue of being able to make veridical statements about a mind-independent external world. We will later return to this point of conflict and argue it more strongly—the attack on Sautrantika externalism is in fact one of the centerpieces of the Vimsatika’s philosophical program.
3.1.3 Distinguishing True and False Aspectarianism
In Indian philosophy of mind, the debate between idealism and realism revolves around the issue of whether consciousness is formless or has a form. Realistic theories (such as those of the Nyaya and Mlmamsa schools) generally hold that consciousness is formless, whereas idealistic theories (such as Mind-Only) generally argue that consciousness has a form. This theory of the mind provides justification for their thesis that external objects are forms of consciousness. In an attempt to get a better philosophical grip on the the precise sense in which the Mind-Only view denies external objects, we find this debate between idealism and realism being carried out even within Mind-Only, where it centers on whether the sensible forms or aspects of consciousness are true or false.
The True and False Aspectarian views differ as to how far they press the skeptical assault on ordinary experience. Nonetheless, they are in agreement in maintaining that if one subjects ordinary experience to a transcendental analysis, one will discover what seemed at first to be the external world and its objects to be mere mental representation (vijnapti-matra) lacking extra-mental referents. They both assert (in slighly different ways), that phenomena are mere conceptual imputations (prajftaptisat) lacking substantial existence (dravyasat). However, according to Gelug doxography, both True and False Aspectarian views assert phenomena to be established as the substantial entity of the mind. Tsongkhapa attempts to resolve this discrepancy by arguing that because the Mind-Only sense of the term prajftaptisat is less rarefied than the Madhyamika sense, the Mind-Only view is realized under more subtle Madhyamika analysis to entail substantial establishment as mind. We may think of such hermeneutic maneuvers as we wish, but they do underscore the necessity of carefully distinguishing the assertions made by a given philosophical system from meta-philosophical interpretations of these assertions—which is admittedly usually much easier said than done.
True Aspectarianism This interpretation of Mind-Only as “realistic idealism” denies external objects transcendentally but accepts them on an empirical level, i.e. as conventional/pragmatic truth. Following the Kantian distinction of transcendental and empirical externality, True Aspectarianism denies the transcendental externality or substantiality (dravyatva) but not the empirical externality of objects (i.e. their rupa), or their spatiotemporal determinacy (niyama). Their supposed externality is illusory in a strictly transcendental sense—but not, however, in an empirical sense. True Aspectarianism is roughly what Kant’s transcendental idealism would amount to without the Ding an sich.
The True Aspectarian position entails a rejection only of dravya, not of rupa. The concept of rupa may perhaps be best understood under a phenomenological reading as hyle or material Gestalt of perception, whereas dravya is a metaphysical term signifying transcendentally objective substance.
True Aspectarianism is still foundationalist because it holds that statements about sense-data (e.g. observations) do not require justification. It adopts an idealist position with regard to transcendental reality but a phe- nomenalist empiricism with regard to empirical reality: “The Yogacara is an idealist only transcendentally; in empirical matters he has no quarrel with the realist. All philosophical issues lie between the conflicting interpretations of the facts and not the facts themselves.”
False Aspectarianism The “anti-realist idealism” of the False Aspectarian reading radicalizes the Cartesian skepticism of the True Aspectarian view in holding the external object to be illusory even in the empirical sense. It surrenders the last remnants of realism about the external world to skeptical doubt in rejecting the typical notion of traditional sense-datum theory that raw sensations are incontrovertible. Even the qualia themselves (e.g. the perception of blue as blue) are held to be polluted with innate ignorance (avidya). The desired rock-bottom certainty is to be reached not in sense-data or evidence, but only in the pure self-reflexive apperception. In contesting even the validity of empirical evidence, False Aspectarianism no longer qualifies as phenomenalism sensu stricto.
The False Aspectarian position that all perception—true to the spirit of Brentano’s famous dictum “Wahrnehmung ist Falschnehmung”—is tout court erroneous is closer to the position of the Madhyamikas and Advaitins, who both regard awareness as formless (nirakara) in and of itself. False Aspectarianism is a case in point that the formlessness of consciousness need not entail realism about external objects—it can just as well lead to a radically fictionalist view.
Regarding the nature of the mind, False Aspectarianism is much closer to the Advaita position, as in False Aspectarian interpretation, “raw feels” are mistaken and “consciousness is ultimately clear like a crystal.” The false aspects are extrinsic to self-awareness, which is in itself aspectless, veridical and nondually self-knowing. The False Aspectarian view gravitates even further in the direction of transcendental subjectivity, as it is not the transcendent, egoless and pure subjectivity that infects the mind with mistaken qualia, but the egological consciousness.
The False Aspectarian anti-realism about sense-data is partially vindicated by findings of contemporary psychophysics. For example, Pinker points out that outdoors, a lump of coal reflects more light than does a snowball does indoors. The absolute luminance of the “black” lump of coal is higher than the “white” snowball. Nonetheless, the coal is seen as black and the snowball is seen as white, because our visual system determines the lightness of an object by its relative luminance, i.e. it takes into account the luminance of its surroundings. On a similar note, Mach observes that a bright surface seems brighter next to a dark surface than next to one brighter than itself. Thus, although perceived qualities such as color and brightness seem to be absolute and independent, they are actually influenced by their surroundings.
In the exposition Madhyamakalamkara (Ornament of the Middle Way), Santaraksita critiques the False Aspectarian view, arguing that it is fraught with inconsistencies. However, it is admitted that in its assessment that the phenomenal qualia are ungrounded, the False Aspectarian position better approximates Madhyamika than the True Aspectarian interpretation.
According to Tsongkhapa, the True and False Aspectarian positions boil down to being different ways of reading Cittamatra texts, i.e. the Vimsatika and other Mind-Only sastras potentially allow for both a True Aspectarian and a False Aspectarian interpretation. While it is tempting to categorize the Nalanda school as True and the Valabhi school as False Aspectarian, Tibetan doxographers don’t classify them along those lines. In fact, they seem to allow that Nalanda as well as Valabhi school texts can be read both ways. Vasubandhu’s Aspect—True or False? Is the Vasubandhu of the Vimsatika a True or a False Aspectarian? Possibly neither—if our hypothesis that the doctrine of Mind-Only is only an interim position is true. In his argument against solipsism in 21, he concludes that since one knows other minds as one knows one’s own—under the influence of avidya—one cannot
have direct knowledge of one’s own mind. This arguably rules out the possibility of the transcendental subjectivity knowing itself in self-reflexive awareness or by any a priori means. Here Vasubandhu is fighting fire with fire. Having closed the escape route to metaphysical realism, Vasubandhu urges that the Cartesian epoche with its unpalatable consequence of solipsism (as either subjective or absolute idealism) can only be broken by an even stronger skeptical epoche. In other words, he is implicitly submitting sunyata, for consideration. If Vasubandhu really intends to complete the Vimsatika on a note of absolute skepticism—and I think he does—then this vanishing point of the text is where its reading must be projected from in order to make sense.
But in order to lead his realist interlocutor to the vanishing point, Vasubandhu must first trap him under the bell jar of Cartesian epoche. This, then, is the philosophical task that Vasubandhu has cut out for himself in his argument against atomism.
3.2 Argument against Atomism
Mereological nihilism claims that wholes themselves do not exist, only their constitutive elementary parts. Vasubandhu now takes the Buddhist ultranominalism to its logical conclusion in repudiating even the elementary parts. The argument is a fundamental critique of realist conceptions of the part-whole relation. In his Kosa auto-commentary, Vasubandhu has pressed the Sautrantika critique of least-part substances persisting in time as far as possible. Now, in a change of tack, he brings under fire the notion of substances extended in space.
Schmithausen points out that Vimsatika contains modes of expression which betray an unmistakeable Sautrantika influence. There is therefore good reason to assume a continuity of philosophical agenda with the Sautrantika substance critique. King’s assessment that Yogacara criticizes atomism merely on experiential grounds is too weak, as we have seen in the previous chapter that only the Sarvastivada realist phenomenalism admits atoms to be within the realm of experience—Sautrantika does not.
I shall be using TOLA and DRAGONETTI as the reference translation for the following reconstruction. However, the translations of Anacker, Wood, Kochumuttom and FRAUWALLNER are also taken into consideration. Also, I will be making frequent reference to Kapstein’s discussion of mereological considerations in Vasubandhu’s argument, as well as to the insightful analyses of SlDERlTS, CHATTERJEE, and Matilal.
3.2.1 The Scheme of the Argument
The structure of Vasubandhu’s argument is apagogic, as is typical for proofs of idealism. He attempts to disprove the realist interlocutors’ claims that external objects exist and are composed of transcendentally objective atoms given either directly in phenomenal experience or demonstrably constitutive of it. Opponent Lineup Vasubandhu is arguing against three metaphysical realist opponents, each of whom propose a slightly different version of atomism. All three maintain mereological atomicity, but only the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika are mereological nihilists. The Vaisesika maintains that physical entities are real and directly given to experience. He proposes a direct realist account of perception with a foundational ontology of physical atoms in conglomeration.
The Vaibhasika position ventures that physical entities are conceptually imputed to coalesced collections of phenomenalistic atoms. Though the collections are only nominal, the atoms are real quality-particulars directly given to experience. Vaibhasika proposes a presentationalist account of perception based on a foundational ontology of substantial sensation-atoms that appear in collection.
In the Sautrantika view, phenomenal experience is held to be unreal (vikalpa), but has underlying realities that are given to reason as necessary conditions to experience. The Sautrantika representationalism commits to a foundational ontology of momentary stimulus-atoms.
Object of Refutation The object of Vasubandhu’s refutation is not the empirically external or outer object (as such objects also also appear in dreams) but the mind-independent object, i.e. the category of the Kantian transcendental object (which does not appear in dreams). For the atomistic realist, the existence of such external objects is established by the existence of their atomic constituents.
But Vasubandhu argues that by modus tollens, since the existence of atoms cannot be proven, physical objects (or more technically, the outer ayatanas, i.e. the mind-independently existing sense-fields or logical spaces of sensibilia) likewise fail to be established as truly external.
Vasubandhu’s line of reasoning may be roughly reconstructed as follows: The dream hypothesis of perception adequately accounts for experience and is consistent with empirical evidence. Vasubandhu has already established the internal consistency of his thesis against the realist interlocutor’s objections in verses 2-10. Given that Vasubandhu’s model is basically equivalent in skeptical strength to a Cartesian scenario, it cannot be falsified by any empirical evidence we will ever have. At this point, two closely linked objections may be brought into play:
(1) Williams relates the famous argument of O. K. Bouwsma that an illusion is no longer illusory if there is no conceivable way to distinguish it from reality. An illusion that is utterly undetectable as such by any empirical means can no longer be said to be deceiving us in any practically relevant sense. But under a True Aspectarian interpretation, this objection does not pose a problem to Vasubandhu, as he may argue that experience is illusion only in a transcendental sense.
(2) By Popper’s falsification principle, the dream hypothesis is not an empirical theory because it does not have the capability of being proven false by contradicting empirical evidence. Vasubandhu can, however, safely dismiss this objection as irrelevant because he doesn’t claim that the dream hypothesis is an empirical theory—he is proposing it as a metempirical account of experience.
Method Of Refutation Since Vasubandhu is arguing from the position of Cartesian epoche, he metaphysically brackets the transcendental existence of the external world while realism metaphysically asserts it. Therefore the entire burden of proof in this argument lies on the realist. For realism to be true, the existence of the external world must therefore be established by transcendental reasoning.
What could the realist’s transcendental reasoning establishing the existence of an external world look like? The reasoning must have two steps, analysis and constitution. The analysis (i.e., the completion of Kant’s so- called “regressus of decomposition”) is necessary otherwise the metaphysical realist can’t be certain that he has constituted from ontological ultimates. The step of constitution cross-checks the analysis to ensure that the atoms thus determined can actually account for the appearances of things. Vasubandhu opens the argument by setting up a destructive trilemma in 11. The putatively external physical object must either itself be (1) a unitary, unanalyzable whole, or a composite that can be analytically reduced to (2) a collection of isolated atoms (.samghata), as maintained by the Vaibhasika, or (3) a conglomerate of atoms (pinda), as held by the Vaisesika. The cases (2) and (3) resolve into a dilemma between spatially differentiated and point-like atoms.
Vasubandhu will go about the argument by showing that if simples are held to be spatially differentiated, then the analysis is incomplete, and if they are claimed to be truly partless (i.e. point-like), then they are incapable of constituting phenomena. After (2) and (3) have been eliminated by this reductio, he will close by debunking position (1), the final horn of the trilemma.
3.2.2 Against Spatially Differentiated Simples
The argument in 12 is directed against the Vaisesika realist doctrine of minute but spatially extended spherical atoms that touch each other. Vasubandhu argues that it is impossible for spatially differentiated objects capable of direct contact with each other to be least parts (i.e. truly partless simples). This is because truly partless objects by definition cannot partially touch each other in space—they either touch completely or they do not touch at all. And they touch completely only if they precisely overlap each other, i.e. occupy the exact same location or spatial “receptacle.” Because spatially adjoining objects can only touch in parts, partless atoms cannot come into contact or be in connection (samyoga) with each other.
Mereological Argument This reading exploits the intuition of the metaphysical realist that space is absolute, which implies that objects do not modify the geometrical structure of the space that they occupy. Vasubandhu assumes that even if it were possible to superimpose several objects of exactly identical shape into the same space, that the size of the objects would remain unchanged by this operation. The Vaisesika in fact admits that his binary least whole (dvyanuka), is of exactly atomic size because the constituent atoms cannot touch each other in parts. But according to the Vaisesika, the dvyanuka formed in this manner is now a real parts-possessor—a whole over and above its parts. There are, however, two problems with this view. First of all, two parts are only enough to constitute joining in two spatial dimensions. In order to arrange spheres in a three dimensional cubic lattice (as is probably the Vaisesika proposal), a minimum of six parts is required, as each atom contacts six others. This does not pose a major difficulty for the Vaisesika, as he may easily revise his concept of least whole, and argue that it comprises six least parts rather than two.
Vasubandhu would of course argue that this revision doesn’t do anything solve the underlying issue. This leads us to the second problem, which is that mereological parts can only join by occupying the same spatial receptacle. Least wholes cannot contact each other in parts as this would entail the spatial overlap of the contacting parts—and if this were to occur, the six atoms surrounding the center atom in the cubic lattice would collapse into it. All composite wholes would have the same size as a single atom, which Vasubandhu holds to be absurd. This is the “standard interpretation” of the argument as presented e.g. in Gelugpa doxography.
Here we observe that Vasubandhu is controversially assuming that connection (samyoga) entails overlap, which is not generally the case. Connection is a topological concept, whereas overlap is mereological.51 If the two concepts are taken to be equivalent, then topology amounts to a model of mereology. Vasubandhu, being a Buddhist ultra-nominalist, is arguing just this. The gravamen of his case against the realist is the objection that an individual substance qua ontological ultimate must be construed as a bare mereological concept. Due to his Sautrantika roots, Vasubandhu has a critical concept of space and considers topological primitives such as connection and shape to be vikalpa. To him, these conceptual constructions are unreal and therefore not appropriate to the realm of ontology. Once we have accepted the ultra-nominalist premise that ultimate ontology is bare mereology—as Vasubandhu is urging—then his argument against atomism simply runs its course without further obstacles.
Since his two Buddhist opponents, the Vaibhasika and the Sautrantika are both committed to mereological nihilism, they have no other choice but to go along with the unwelcome consequences of this position that Vasubandhu is about to draw for them.
The Sautrantika position will be scrutinized later—for now, Vasubandhu is going to score points against the Kashmiri Vaibhasikas, who submit in XX that the mereological argument has no impact on their position.
The Vaibhasikas explain that because they do not maintain the existence of connections between the partless substance-atoms that constitute the aggregate-atom (we recall that according to their view, the substance-atoms are separated by interstices). They argue that only these aggregate-atoms (or cohesive “molecular” groups) are connected among themselves, since they have parts. Vasubandhu off-handedly dismisses this theory in 14 with the observation that the aggregate is a nominally designated mereological sum. Therefore, it cannot be a parts-possessor or be admitted to have any physical
properties (such as connection, covering, resistance and obstruction) that its individual atoms lack. Otherwise the aggregate-atom becomes a real conglomerate (pinda), which would be the position of the Vaisesika. Being an ultra-nominalist, the Vaibhasika is forced to accept this consequence. Vasubandhu emphasizes that the aggregate-atom’s inability to connect is due its purely nominal status, not due to the partlessness of the substance-atoms—this is an issue that he deals separately later on in the argument.
The Vaisesika, on the other hand, is still very much alive and kicking. He is not willing to accept the idea that the atom is a bare mereological least part and retables an amended version of his proposal. Substance-atoms are not quite bare mereological least parts, he argues. They occupy receptacles and therefore have spatial extent. Two atoms join through mereological overlap (filling the same receptacle) to form a binary (dvyanuka).^ Topological connection is a property of integral wholes, not of least parts. The dvyanuka, being an integral whole, can now topologically connect as it pleases.
However, Vasubandhu evidently thinks there is something deeply wrong with the idea that a mereological least part can possess spatial extent. Thus far, we have examined his “mereological argument” against the Vaisesika. But later on in 14 and XXIII, he offers a more general “geometric argument” intended to knock down the notion that an atom extended in space (i.e. occupying a spatial receptacle) can be an indivisible unity (ekatva). Vasubandhu unfortunately does not specify the argument in depth. He says only this much—a unity in which there is a “division according to the sections of the space” is not logically possible. In the following, we will examine two possible readings for this argument—the Zenonian and the Kantian model.
Zenonian argument from complete divisibility The argument of complete divisibility (essentially a reformulated version of Zeno’s metrical paradox of extension), was first described by Aristotle, but later attributed to Zeno by Simplicius.
If a body is completely divisible, then it must be divisible into parts that do not have any magnitude (else these parts would have spatial magnitude and therefore be incompletely divided). A complete division leaves either extensionless point-parts or nothing whatsoever. Zeno concludes that if nothing whatsoever remains after the division of a body, then the body is an illusion—ex nihil nihilo fit. And if only extensionless points remain, the sum of their extensions is zero, and therefore the body will be unextended. By consequence, if in reality, the body is no larger than a single point-atom, the appearance of an extended body would be illusory.
Against this, the Vaisesika will convey that the indivisibility of the atom is a merely physical one. It applies only to its physical substance and not to its spatial extent. The thesis being stated here is that for an entity to be a mereological least part, it is necessary and sufficient for it to be physically indivisible. This counter-argument is reasonable enough to derail the Zenonian analysis, and it is not immediately obvious as to what might be wrong with it.
We can observe that by insisting on the necessity of a limit to physical division, the Vaisesika is maintaining a position that resembles Kant’s thesis of the second antinomy of pure reason, which now leads us to examine the second interpretive model for Vasubandhu’s geometric argument.
Kantian antithesis In the thesis of the second antinomy, Kant argues that composites are decomposable, and, more controversially, proposes the necessity of mereological atomicity—decomposition must entail reducibility to minimal parts. Every real composite must be reducible to a bottom level of self-subsisting simples. For if the operation of decomposition were to possess the property of closure (i.e. every composite entity yields only further composite entities under decomposition), nothing would remain if all composite entities were to be analyzed away, which Kant claims to be absurd.
The antithesis of Kant’s second antinomy attempts to show that composites cannot have minimal parts. Kant’s case is based on the following premises— (1) composition is an external relation of substances and is possible only in space, (2) every part of a composite must occupy a sub-receptacle of the composite’s receptacle, (3) these sub-receptacles are themselves spaces. Therefore the receptacles of the simples are spatial. However, according to Kant, because space is external relation of substances, or rather, an inner mode of representation in which certain perceptions are connected to each other, a receptacle cannot be a space unless it contains a manifold or composite of substances in external relation to each other. But if the receptacle of a simple substance contains a composite, this implies the absurdity that the simple is a substantial composite. Furthermore, Kant thinks that it is inconsistent for one and the same space to have two distinct limit-concepts—the extensionless geometrical point and additionally, the physically indivisible but geometrically spacefilling physical point.
Perhaps the Vaisesika position that the atom is “absolutely imperceptible” may be seen as an attempt to get a grip on this discrepancy by letting the physical extent of the atom converge against the spatial limit-concept. Supposing the atom is held to be geometrically divisible but physically indivisible, one may ask whether its shape is physical or geometrical. If it is both, then absurdly, the atom’s shape is divisible and indivisible. Finally, if the atom’s shape is merely geometrical, then the atom has turned out to be a synthesis of a substance with a geometric shape—and a simple, by definition, may not be a synthetic whole.
Kant remarks that the antitheses of the antinomies are typical of empiricist views. If Vasubandhu’s argument is anything like the antithesis of the second antinomy—and I think it is—then it should be fair enough to characterize his position as a kind of empiricism.
We will not be able to establish here whether Kant’s attempt to prove that a substance cannot have both spatial extent and simplicity satisfactorily accomplishes the work cut out for it. Vasubandhu probably intuits—for reasons much similar to those of Kant—that there can be no such thing as a mereological least part that occupies a receptacle. Would he then also agree with the thesis of the second antinomy? On Kapstein’s reading, Vasubandhu argues both the thesis and the antithesis of Kant’s second antinomy: “Vasubandhu, on the other hand, aims to demonstrate that the atomic theory is both false and necessary.”
But Kapstein’s explanation of what Vasubandhu is up to here is muddled. Vasubandhu is not aiming to establish the necessity of the atomic theory—he is merely attempting to demonstrate that the realist’s atomic theory leads to antinomy. The “necessity” of the atomic theory is the realist’s position, not Vasubandhu’s. What of the possibility of “exotic space?” The realist need not assume that space is continuous—he may argue that it is discrete (as was first proposed by Zuse). Or he could argue that the metrical structure of three-dimensional Euclidean space is a property that only emerges at the scale of macroscopic objects. Continuity and metric could be macroscopic epiphenomena of some more exotic type of space at a microscopic level, e.g. a space that comes in discrete chunks, that has more than three dimensions, etc.—as is often assumed in modern theoretical physics. However, if the realist were to travel down this route, he would effectively be arguing that space has hidden properties not accessible to sensible intuition—a very slippery slope for a direct realist like the Vaisesika.
3.2.3 Against Point-like Atoms
The treatment of point-like atoms as a possible case is a hermeneutic interpolation to make the proof easier to follow. The terms “point” or “point-like” are not explicitly mentioned by Vasubandhu—the karikas and auto-commentary only discuss the atom qua “unity” (ekatva). This assumption is supported by the interpretation of Siderits, who also ventures that Vasubandhu is examining the case of point-like atoms.
Vasubandhu’s arguments in 14 are directed against the idea that phenomenal appearances cannot be constituted from point-like atoms. He argues that atoms must be spatially differentiated in order to account for certain visual phenomena such as light and shadow or extended surfaces. Since Vasubandhu has already established that true atoms cannot not have spatial differentiation, the argument that point-like atoms cannot account for appearances completes the reductio against atoms.
Shadow Terminator Argument This argument is against the Vaisesika opponent, who wishes to dodge Vasubandhu’s arguments against spatially extended atoms by proposing point-like atoms in lieu of his original theory that atoms are infinitesimally sized spheres. Vasubandhu’s objection is predicated on the Vaisesika’s physicalistic belief that light is a kind of incorporeal substance or luminous fluidum (unlike the understanding of the phenomenalizing Buddhist schools, who analyze light strictly as intensity of visual sensation or stimulus). The Vaisesika define shadow as absence of illumination.
Vasubandhu contends that for a matter-atom to be able to cast shadow on other objects, it must obstruct the fluidum, which it can only do if it is bisected by a shadow terminator (a line dividing the illuminated from the shadowed section of the atom). But a truly point-like matter-atom cannot have a light and a shadow side. It is incapable of obstructing the luminous fluidum, any more than a dam can hold back water without an upstream and a downstream face. The realist protests that even if individual atoms are uniformly light or shadow, this does not logically exclude the possibility that a conglomerate of atoms could be bisected with a shadow terminator, dividing uniformly light from uniformly dark atoms.
In response, Vasubandhu inquires whether is it being admitted that an agglomeration (pinda) is something other than the atoms themselves. Is the realist in other words willing to admit conglomerates of atoms into his foundational ontology? The realist objector is forced to answer that they can’t be admitted—to do so would defeat the whole point of having a foundational ontology. However, if the conglomerate is not admitted as an entity in its own right, then the realist’s objection is scuttled. How is it that the conglomerate as a whole can obstruct light if none of its atoms are able to? One would expect it to be totally transparent. Of course, this line of reasoning does not take into account the modern physical theory of point-like particles that can act at a distance by way of field effects. But this poses no problem for Vasubandhu because none of his realist opponents adhere to such a view.
Displacement Argument Here Vasubandhu argues that if atoms are incapable of obstructing each other, they lose the ability to spatially displace each other and collapse into the same spatial location when connected. Possibly, Vasubandhu is playing on the geometrical intuition that an extensionless (i.e. point-like) atom with no internal structure can make direct contact with another such atom if and only if they both occupy the exact same geometrical point. In this particular edge case, topological connection coincides with mereological overlap.
The displacement argument applies equally to the Vaisesika and the Vaibhasika atomisms. The Vaibhasika’s aggregate-atoms cannot connect, nor can their non-obstructing partless atoms. The Vaibhasika of course agrees that atoms do not connect to each other. But if atoms are unconnected, individually partless and non-obstructing (i.e. point-like), the Vaibhasika is unable to account for how they might constitute physically resistant or visually opaque surfaces in sum. He is reduced to abiding by the unconvincing hypothesis that individual substance-atoms have latent properties that are actualized only when they are perceived in collection. This is unsatisfactory because it is not admitted that an individual atom may be perceived in isolation—hence, the cases of latent properties and “insensible sensibilia” coincide. Talk of latent properties does nothing to alleviate the real problem at hand.
3.2.4 Against Integral Wholes
After Vasubandhu has thoroughly laid waste to the idea that atomism is compatible with a two-term theory of perception, the Vaisesika is back with a new proposal predicated instead on the integral whole (auayavin). He objects that since Vasubandhu’s reasoning against atoms and conglomerates has left the phenomenal characteristics (such as form-color) of the external sense-fields untouched, why not simply admit percepts (i.e., integral wholes) as external?
The Vaisesika contends that the whole is an object of valid knowledge. If the whole is known by any means of valid knowledge, it is useless to consider the alternatives as to how it exists in the parts. He pleads the common-sense realist standpoint that abstract speculation cannot override valid experience of unities. The perception of the unitary whole does not depend on the perception of atoms, he argues, although their existence can be inferred. We can already surmise what Vasubandhu thinks of this. In his auto-commentary to the Kosa, he has gone so far as to disparage the integral whole (avayaviri) theory of the Vaisesika as “infantile.”
Although he almost can’t be bothered with a counter-argument, Vasubandhu expands into a one-or-many reductio and immediately dismisses the many case as having already been refuted. As for the case that phenomenal appearances themselves are integral wholes, Vasubandhu argues that a real, self-subsisting unity ought to have uniform, non-conflicting properties. He then points out some of the absurdities that result from this idea. The core of the argument is contained in his axiomatic proposition: “For a concurrent apprehension and non-apprehension of the same thing isn’t logical.”
Here we need to keep in mind that Vasubandhu is speaking of the atom qua perceptual datum. By definition, an atomic perceptual datum must either be given in its entirety or not at all. If it is possible to see only part of an object (for example, an aspect of a tree), the object cannot be an atomic datum. But all gross physical phenomena, Vasubandhu points out, are only ever given in aspect. While we may say that we see a brown table, we will have to admit that there are parts of the table that we do not see. Chatterjee conjectures that Vasubandhu is making an argument for the necessity of phenomenal pluralism to subjective epistemic knowing, as absolute unity would entail an absolute uniformity of experience without change or succession. Kochumuttom has it that Vasubandhu is attempting to refute Parmenidean monism.
While there is something to be said for these points, the following examples provided by Vasubandhu illustrate that his argument is mainly mereological in thrust. On the reading being proposed here, after already having argued against the substantial partless part, Vasubandhu is now demolishing the idea of the substantial partless whole.
In the first example, Vasubandhu raises the objection that partless wholes contradict the experiential reality of incremental movement. If the earth, for instance, were an indivisible unity, it should not be possible to walk, because the ground would have no parts that could be traversed by the successive steps. For motion to be possible, there must be distance, which in turn entails spatial extent and directional parts.
Next, if entities are partless wholes, it should not be possible to grasp a whole in some parts but not in others. Yet clearly, we are touching the elephant even if we are only touching its trunk and not its tail.
Moreover, if it is supposed that partless wholes are differentiated only by their phenomenal characteristics and not by their spatial location, then it should not be possible to distinguish horses from elephants, or several horses from one. A separation of entities could not be accepted since everything would be spatially indistinct, i.e. occupying the same location. In the final example, which involves microscopic aquatic animals, Vasubandhu argues that entities are distinguished by size. Else if phenomenal characteristics were held to be independent of physical size, we should be able to see micro/-organisms with the naked eye. The distinction of phenomenal characteristics (i.e. description of sensory experience in a purely phenomenal language) is in and of itself insufficient to distinguish unities—non-phenomenal factors such as quantity, distance, size and time must be brought in. Such concepts are not reducible to phenomenal language. The phenomenal wholes given to experience have parts, Vasubandhu reasons, and if they are to be substantial, they must necessarily have least parts. But they do not—therefore he concludes that phenomena are insubstantial, and that there is no more to a phenomenon than our awareness of it.
3.2.5 Against the Causal Theory of Perception
In 16, the argument is against the Sautrantika, who espouses a stripped- down version of the Vaibhasika externalism of mental intentionality. A mental representation is epistemically grounded by the collection of stimulusatoms that causally generated it, the Sautrantika wishes to claim. He is proposing something of the sort that momentary (ksanika) point-like stimulus-atoms act in aggregate upon the sense bases to causally generate non-point-like sensations that assemble into representations. The time-gap argument for representationalism is premised on the idea that because there can be a delay between an observed event and one’s observation of it, one actually observes a representation of the event. But the time-gap argument only supports representationalism if physical objects are assumed to exist. If the external object is the probandum of the argument—as is the case for the Sautrantika strain of realism—it operates against representationalism instead of confirming it.
Vasubandhu points out that under a strict presentist account of atoms, externalism about intentional states breaks down completely. Because Sautrantika doesn’t admit to external temporal continuants, by the time a mental representation arises, the stimuli that caused it have evanesced. By consequence, all representations of external objects come to be representations of absistents—neither do they offer a solid ground of inference about reality, nor do they require the epistemic grounding that such an inference might provide.
This line of reasoning echoes a Vaibhasika critique of the Sautrantika representationalism, to the effect that that inference is based on logical pervasion (vyapti) of the mark of inference and the inferred property. This pervasion being the ground of inference, it cannot itself be derived from inference but must be given in perception. However, since the Sautrantika denies direct perception of external objects, they can never be objects of inference either due to a lack of the necessary ground of inference.
Since the Sautrantika’s causal theory of perception invalidates his own thesis while establishing the position of Vasubandhu, the Sautrantika might as well dispense with his gratuitous metaphysical hypothesis of external objects. Russell once famously argued that naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is false. Vasubandhu is driving home an analogous point about the Sautrantika position.
3.2.6 Resumee of the Argument
If there are no atoms, then ought Mind-Only not to maintain that phenomena are in principle infinitely divisible? Why is it is taken for granted by his realist opponents that infinite divisibility is a problem? Leibniz, for example, believed the idea that atoms mark an end to the subdivision of matter to be a dangerous error. David Lewis and others have speculated that the hypothesis that physical objects are “atomless gunk” ought not to be ruled out a priori. It is also conceivable that some (but not all) composite objects have a complete atomic decomposition.
It has been argued by some modern commentators that Vasubandhu’s demonstration shows not that phenomena are not compounded, but that they are compounded to an infinite degree, i.e. that phenomena are gunk. Following the principle of ex nihilo nihilo fit, since infinitely divisible phenomena lack a compositional base of elemental substances, they are insubstantial and therefore illusory. Vasubandhu’s line of reasoning may be construed as an inversion of Epicurus’ principle that indivisible minima are necessary if macroscopic bodies are not to be mere appearances. Since indivisible minima are logically impossible, Vasubandhu concludes that macroscopic bodies are in fact no more than appearances. Must phenomena have a compositional base in order to sustain realism? Or restating the question in broader terms, need a foundationalist realism entail reductionism and externalism? The Indian realists of Vasubandhu’s day seemed to think so. Would they even recognize a coherentist, nonreductionist, internalist epistemology as realism? To hazard a guess, perhaps they might recognize such a realism as Vijnanavada!
The argument against atomism requires a number of unstated assumptions to function as intended, many of which are quite possibly false. The notion of physical divisibility, for example, may pose theoretical difficulties to Vasubandhu’s analysis, as it requires a concrete physical operation, as opposed to a purely abstract or mental operation. The required energy to split a composite particle must be supplied by some particle interaction which physically destroys the original composite particle. This process cannot be compared to analytic decomposition, as once a composite particle has been physically split into its component parts, the composite that they were a part of no longer exists. Therefore, they can no longer be properly considered parts of that composite.
To give a blanket refutation of atomism, Vasubandhu would have to demonstrate that, generally speaking, all atomistic mereologies are either logically inconsistent or empirically useless, but of course his argument accomplishes no such thing. Also, it does not defeat gunk theory and theories such as those of modern particle physics involving point-particles with interactional force fields, nor does it damage ontologically non-absolute atomisms such as constitution from sensory minima, attributive atomism, instrumentalist atomism or logical atomism.
But Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism is nonetheless strong enough to handily dispatch any realist account which proposes that ontologically absolute atoms are metaphysically constitutive of phenomenal experience. It pulls out the rug from the Vaisesika claim that their particles lack proper parts, and beats back the Vaibhasika notion of point-particle sensations that aggregate to form extended sensation-clusters that join with other clusters to constitute macroscopic phenomena. And, as I will argue in the following, the Vijnaptimatra viewpoint does not intend to damage ontologically relativist forms of atomism—on the contrary, it is fully compatible with it.
From the Mind-Only point of view, parts and wholes are conceptual fictions (vikalpa), yet within within the dream-like epistemological fiction of ordinary experience, they are true. For unlike Cincinnatus C., the unfortunate protagonist of Nabokov’s Invitation to a Beheading, who is imprisoned and sentenced to death for the unutterable crime of “gnostic turpitude,” we generally do not care to entertain the idea that the world we are inhabiting is an unreal fiction (abhuta-parikalpa) generated by the dualizing mind. During the course of our discussion of the argument against atomism, we have seen how Vasubandhu parlays the Buddhist’s nominalist skepticism about part-whole realism into a full-scale assault on the Ding an sich. Little should we be surprised if the gnostic turpitude that Vasubandhu is so blatantly inciting reveals itself upon closer examination to be nothing other than good, solid empiricism.
3.3 Visions of Vijnaptimatra in Empiriocriticist Eyes
Swapping our philosophical horses in midstream, we now pass to an investigation of empiriocriticist views on the ontological status of the atom and the external object. To be sure, the aim of comparing Mind-Only with empirio- criticism is not to completely gloss over the differences between the two. Mach and Avenarius are not subjective idealists, and their critique of the synthetic a priori does not have an equivalent in Mind-Only (though there is a great deal of category critique to be found). The radical presentism and the strong mystical subtext of Mind-Only are absent in empiriocriticism. Nevertheless, a search for epistemological common ground won’t take long to strike paydirt.
We must be careful not to push the comparison with Mind-Only too far— Mach attempts to steer clear of the extreme of mentalism (ontological idealism), whereas Vasubandhu arguably embraces it. But although Vasubandhu is planted more firmly in the idealist camp, his anti-atomistic epistemology is remarkably close to the sensation pluralism of Mach, a passionate critic of atomism. He is opposed to the Kantian Dinge an sich as well as to the metaphysical atomism of the physical theory of his day for very much the same reasons as Vasubandhu rejected the atom and the external object.
Mach attempts to gain the unstable epistemological middle ground between idealism and realism. Sommer points out a small but important detail about Mach’s position: sensations are not intrinsically subjective, as is commonly assumed. To Mach, the elements of experience (the explananda) are the epistemically prior raw materials of the explanans, i.e. the construction of subjectivity and objectivity as they are given rise to by naive realism.
In Mach’s view, as opposed to the metaphysical Vaibhasika notion of the aggregate-atom (samghata-paramanu), sensation-nuclei are purely correlative conceptual constructs. The atom is a mental shorthand (Gedanken- symbol) for the covariance of functional relationships between the sensational elements of different psychophysical spaces, i.e. the space of vision, of hearing and of tactile sensation. The notions of metaphysically absolute space, time and substance have no place in Mach’s epistemology. Substances and atoms are higher order “tensorial abstractions.” They are pragmatic ideas that help us to economically conceptualize the complexes, relations and connections of sensations. In the same vein, Mach maintains that scientific explanations, including the natural laws of physics, are merely economical descriptions of functional relation.
As Musil observes, Mach does not see any difference in kind between explanation and description, nor does he believe the veridicality of descriptions to involve any kind of metaphysical correspondence to reality. His theory of metaphysics and epistemology is grounded in evolutionary psychology. Descriptions acquire their truth-value in pragmatic use. Conceptualization does not stand apart from the process of functional relation, but rather, participates in it, by assisting the organism in selectively adapting to its environment.
Turning to Avenarius, Mach’s philosophical brother-in-arms, we find that he mobilizes a similarly instrumentalist view of atomism, framing the principle of economy as the cognitive rationale for the atomic concept. This principle is the cornerstone of Avenarius’ radically empiricist reformulation of Kantianism, and may be characterized as a philosophical generalization of the principle of least action in physics. The requirement for underlying unities that hold experience together is not an a priori in the Kantian sense, but a matter of descriptive parsimony:
Due to the principle of economy, we have a need to think in terms of limiting concepts such as the atom, despite that its existence is not proven or transcendentally established.
Because analytical decomposition satisfies the need for comprehension, the process of decomposition is mentally continued even where empirical evidence no longer supplies solid confirmation but only indicates the direction of analysis. This actually infinite process of mental analysis can only be brought to a conclusion by interrupting it at a certain point and declaring it to be completed by some new idea at a more remote point left in the dark.
Aside from giving the impression of comprehension, these completing concepts offer intellectual support from two sides, on the one hand, by positing that their referent is no longer composite but simple, thereby putting an end to the mental process of division, and on the other hand, by suggesting that the indivisible thing is immutable, thus pacifying the demand for a continual change of content. The simple is now the immutable, even though its accidental connections are subject to absolute change, such a fictitious terminating idea is embodied in the concept of the atom, inasmuch as the atom is considered to be unanalyzable and immutable.
According to Avenarius, the regressus of decomposition gratifies the demand for ontological closure, i.e. the cognitive need for fixed objects that are regulated by the structuring concepts of experience. But he is under no illusion that this procedure can ever truly be brought to to completion or be made to yield Dinge an sich—rather, it is simply cut off at some point to produce a conveniently fictitious ontology.
However, Avenarius is concerned that this approach might lead to reduc- tionism, which he eschews as being an unacceptable reification of atomist instrumentalism: “Thus this so-to-say atomistic individualization of sensations will remain an indispensable aid in creating the impression of comprehension with regard to our life of sensations and concepts, but it must be warned against viewing the world as a kind of kaleidoscope composed of such mosaic pieces of sensation.”
Avenarius is justifiably suspicious of reductionism. Even if a reductionist program could be carried out, he would be left holding the bag of metaphysical commitment to phenomenalistic atoms, with all the pitfalls that this position entails. Like Vasubandhu, he does not believe that there are atoms given to pre-theoretical, common-sense intuition, or that the whole of experience naturally fractures into atoms along pre-determined breaking points. He characterizes the atom as a mere “Hiilfsbegriff”—a provisional concept of theory that satisfies the pragmatic need for intellectual comprehension, but he dares not urge a firm ontological commitment to it, lest his pure phenomenalism revert back to a pre-critical metaphysics. The Avenarian substance-atoms are theoretical constructs, much like the constitutional elements of Carnap’s Aufbau-. “Constitution theory and transcendental idealism agree that all objects of knowledge are constituted (in idealistic language, ‘generated by thought’), and that this ultimately applies to the basic elements of the constitution system.” For both Avenarius and Carnap, it is irrelevant as to whether or not material composition or epistemological constitution are grounded in a metaphysically absolute ontology. To their point of view, foundational ontology is just as much a logical construct as the world that is built up from it. The similarity to the epistemological idealism of Mind-Only is striking: “Thus, the thesis of the intentionality of citta becomes displaced in the emerging Yogacara philosophy by an emphasis upon the ‘phenomenalistic’ nature of objects. Objects are really dharma-constructs and representations (vijnapti), dependent upon the complex processes of citta for their appearance.”
The Avenarian empiriocriticism contends that atomism is valuable as a strictly instrumentalist hypothesis, whereas Mach believes even an instrumentalist concept of the atom to be unnecessary to science. Avenarius’ rationale for the dichotomy of appearances and things-in-themselves is also remarkably similar to the Mind-Only doctrine that the dualizing mind (vijnana) is responsible for the superimposition of the conceptually constructed (parikalpita) nature onto the flux of experience:
The development of thought eventually had to reach the point where it came to awareness that the so-called properties of the thing were in fact sensations of the sensing subject; thus, the properties ceased to belong to the thing itself—as their designation would indicate—they departed their relationship of dependence from the thing and entered into a more idealistic relationship with the sensing subject. As a result, a difference had to emerge between the thing as it was for the sensing subject and the thing as it was in itself
In Mind-Only, the percept is held to be a noema generated by transcendental subjectivity. Thus we find the Avenarian “introjection,” or bifurcation between the strictly private percept and the public object, being carried to its most radical conclusion. The strategy of Mind-Only for eliminating introjection is to wholly absorb the objective world into the subjective perception. The epistemological trajectory that begins with naive realism and progresses through critical realism (where the organizing forms of experience are constituted by metempirical generative acts of the mind) is brought to maturity in the view that experience springs entirely from the transcendental subjectivity. Mach’s psycho-physical parallelism, which attempts to resolve the Avenarian problem of introjection, is often cast as a paradigmatic example of neutral monism. But while Avenarius’ sensation monism is an explicit one, the picture with Mach is slightly more complex. He argues dualism against monism and vice versa in a Madhyamika-esque play to dialectically hold the elusive middle ground beyond both extremes.
Avenarius feels at home with the idea that epistemological construction is a pragmatic process of evolutionary adaptation to experience. In a metaphor, we build our sandcastles on shifting sand because we have to live somewhere and have no other building materials at hand. Avenarius argues that the conceptualizing of change and process requires that we posit fixed nuclei or absolutes as counterpoints to experiential flux, but regards these nuclei or fixed points as mere idealizations. In this respect, it is not unreasonable to characterize the Avenarian view as resembling a ontologically relativized Sautrantika epistemology.
Avenarius’ theory of the atom as an instrumental posit may be directly compared to Quine’s view: “Positing does not stop with macroscopic physical objects. Objects at the atomic level and beyond are posited to make the laws of macroscopic objects, and ultimately the laws of experience, simpler and more manageable... ” Though Quine has shed the sensationalist and phenomenalist trappings of empiriocriticism and early logical empiricism, in other respects, he is still holding to the course of the via positivistica. The empiriocriticist core of epistemological instrumentalism and fictionalism shines through, extending even to his views on physical objects. In a line that might have been taken straight from Vasubandhu’s playbook, Quine states that “The myth of physical objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efficacious than other myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.”
Admittedly, Quine is not making a direct argument against the transcendental object. But in cutting physical objects down to size as quasi-mythical mirages conjured by the theory-ladenness of common-sense realism, he is quite vigorously attacking the foundations of the metaphysical realist belief in objectivity. And if Quine is any judge, Vasubandhu’s anti-atomism—far from being an antiquated relic of early medieval Indian philosophy—is of considerable relevance to contemporary philosophy.4 The End of the End of Epistemology
I have a dream.
(Martin Luther King)
Are THERE ANY PHILOSOPHICAL or ideo-historical conclusions of value that we can draw from the narrative sweep presented thus far? Possibly, our retracing of the evolutionary trajectory of Buddhist epistemology, beginning with phenomenalistic realism and leading to idealist and skeptical positions of increasing critical refinement and rarefication may may add a mosaic piece or two to our picture of the historical development of occidental empiricism. To state the matter more boldly, the idea suggests itself that Buddhism affords to the modern mind the possibility of re-envisioning empiricism from the ground up, in the cloth of an alternate history of ideas. Anticipating the grand themes of the Western empiricist tradition by more than a millenium, the “empiricism of the East” presents us with a unique opportunity to re-experience our own philosophical genesis in a new and perhaps more humble light.
Against the realist’s objections, Vasubandhu proposes in 3 that the spatiotemporal determination of experience is as in a dream. Striking a chord across centuries and cultures, Mach dismisses the question of whether the world is real or whether we merely dream it as being devoid of scientific meaning. Epistemology is just as much an abstract inquiry into the conditions and possibilities of knowledge as a historical quest for philosophical beginnings—a trail that may lead us as readily to Mach’s 19th century Vienna as to the 4th century Purusapura of Vasubandhu, if we are prepared to follow it.
However, unlike the quest of Husserl in his Cartesian Meditations to regain the ground of first philosophy, a phenomenological beginning in transcendental intersubjectivity, the journey of Vasubandhu and Mach is more than anything else a voyage to epistemology’s end. Each in their own way, they both attempt to recast empirical knowledge in light of its ultimate meaning. To Mach, the end of epistemology is its pragmatic purpose as the critical voice of scientific inquiry. To Vasubandhu, the end is a mystical and soteriological one—the cessation of innate ignorance (avidya) sought for by “the path of practice leading to the cessation of the cosmos.”
4.1 Anti-Cartesian Meditations
Since we have not yet managed to touch upon any of the multifarous critiques that the Mind-Only standpoint of the Vimsatika has generated within Indian philosophy, I will round out the investigation with a brief recapitulation of some of the more interesting objections. Aside from the fairly predictable counter-arguments offered by the realist darsanas such as Nyaya-Vaisesika and Mimamsa, we find a number of critiques put forth by skeptical schools of thought such as Madhyamika or by other idealisms, notably Advaita. It is illuminating to take notice of the fact that in the pre-scientific Indo-Tibetan philosophical tradition, the most devastating critiques of Mind-Only are the skeptical attacks on transcendental subjectivity while the realist defenses of objectivity are comparatively weak. Ironically, the situation in the West is exactly the other way around, as it would seem that scientific progress has catapulted realism into the pole position.
Advaita The Advaita Vedanta epistemology of Samkara may be classified as a species of absolute monism with realistic tendencies. Although it quite evidently qualifies as a strong strain of idealism, Advaita insists on a separation of the subject and object within the domain of phenomenal experience. Sinha observes that Samkara’s criticism of Mind-Only is not very thorough. Strangely, Samkara does not offer any direct counter-argument to the Mind-Only thesis that external objects cannot exist due to the impossibility of atoms, despite that he was almost certainly aware of Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism. This circumstance severely reduces the force of Samkara’s defense of objectivity.
The keystone of Samkara’s critique is the “phenomenological argument.” He points out that sensory perception establishes the existence of the external world, as we perceive external objects such as a table or a tree. This seems like Samkara is attempting a Moorean proof of the external object by appeal to common-sense evidence. But what is preventing us from having intentional states directed at some impossible object, e.g. a “square circle?” Given that it is entirely possible to think about absistents, the externality of a percept could very well be a sort of absistent property, such as the “squareness” of a circular patch of color. From the presence of an external world to intentional awareness, we cannot deduce that it exists, any more than we ontologically commits ourselves to the existence of a hare’s horns simply because we are able to think about them. In a Meinongian sense, it is perfectly reasonable to speak of the non-externality of a perceived object.
In another argument, Samkara attempts to turn the tables on the idealist, by asking: if one admits consciousness, why not external objects? The Mind- Only proponent’s assertion of the priority of inner over outer experience seems arbitrary, he argues.
While it is plausible to admit that one can represent in inner experience (i.e. dreams or hallucinations) objects that do not actually exist, it is not equally plausible to admit the converse hypothesis that there exist real objects not representable in inner experience. The Cittamatrin may therefore argue that the former simply expresses a familiar empirical fact, whereas the latter proposes a wildly metaphysical theory—the two cases are very different in nature and far from being symmetrically interchangeable, as Samkara would suggest.
Samkara trots out a number of further arguments against Mind-Only, none of which are especially memorable. He does, however, unfold a critique of self-reflexive awareness (svasamvedana) very much resembling the Madhyamika argument put forth by Candrakirti: Just as the light shining from a lamp can illuminate other objects, but not itself, or the blade of a sword can only cut other objects, a self-reflexive awareness would entail the absurdity of something acting upon itself. Although Samkara’s critique of the Mind-Only position on objectivity fails to be convincing, his criticisms of transcendental subjectivity come a great deal closer to striking at the Achilles heel.
Madhyamika Tsongkhapa contends that while Vasubandhu’s argument against atomism is valid, it misses the mark. Essence or own-nature (sva- bhava) is the category that is in need of refutation, not substance {dravya). The refutation of atoms fails to knock out this vastly more crucial and elusive target, because atoms are only superficial cognitive misconceptions generated by metaphysical doctrines, whereas svabhava is an innate misconception deeply entrenched in pre-philosophical common-sense intuition.
Since the concept of partless simples does not enter into our ordinary experience, which is after all informed by the pre-philosophical intuitions of common-sense realism, Tsongkhapa argues that while Vasubandhu’s refutation of atomism is all very well and good, its skeptical force is not strong enough to damage the object of the Madhyamika critique of substantialism. In modern terminology, perhaps Tsongkhapa’s distinction of dravya and svabhava may be read along similar lines to the distinction of the existence and the independence dimensions of realism. Evidently, he believes the independence dimension to be the more challenging target, and the soteriologically more rewarding one.
We may note that nowhere in the post-Vasubandhu philosophy of Mahayana are there any novel defenses of atomism to be found (with the possible exception of the late Sautrantika atomism), nor do we find any novel anti- atomist arguments. This conspicuous absence of further development in the issue might indicate that Vasubandhu’s victory over atomist realism was considered by Mahayanists to be so overwhelming that nothing needed to be added to it.
In the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakavatara, Candraklrti unleashes a scathing barrage of Madhyamika arguments against the the Mind-Only position. These may be roughly classified into four main groups: (1) the refutation of the nonexternality of sense-objects, (2) the failure of mental potentials to account for sense-experiences, (3) counter-arguments to the dream theory of experience and the ultimate existence of the mind, and (4) the refutation of apperception. This classic critique of Candraklrti is one of the philosophical crown jewels of the Tibetan Sarma traditions. It serves as a case in point for how the pure criticism of Madhyamika builds on the Mind-Only position, as the full development of its skeptical force requires the deployment of a sufficiently similar position as an argumentative foil. While the polemic phraseology of the debate evokes the impression that the two positions are very remote from each other, on closer examination, the intimate resemblance of the Mind-Only position to the Madhyamika view is what actually makes for the power of Candraklrti’s argument.
In the Tarkajvala (Blaze of Reasoning), the auto-commentary of his Madhyamakahrdayakarikas (Heart Verses of the Middle Way) the Madhyamika scholar Bhavaviveka proposes an intriguing argument against the Mind-Only strategy of accepting self-reflexive apperception as a provisional antidote to substantialism. Bhavaviveka’s objection, which happens not to be among those presented by Candraklrti, runs as follows:
If you think that external objects actually do not exist, why consider them part of consciousness? If you think that someone first treats them as part of consciousness, then uses another argument, other than [the argument] that they are part of consciousness, to refute [the idea that they are part of consciousness], it would be better to stay away from the mud and not to touch it than to wash it away. ... It is as if a certain fool were to leave a clean road and enter an unclean, muddy river. Others might then ask him, “Why did you leave the clean road and enter the mud?” If he said, “So that I can wash it off,” the others would say, “You fool! If you have to wash it off, you should stay away from the mud and not touch it in the first place.”
Unpacking this argument along Kantian lines, one may inquire: why postulate the self-reflexive awareness of percepts as an antidote (pratipaksa) if one thereby accomplishes no more than to saddle oneself with an unnecessary a priori commitment to transcendental apperception? Kant acknowledges that although the transcendental apperception expressed in the proposition “I think” (“Ich denke”) is an empirical intuition, the concept of “I” fails to be an empirical concept because it is never met with in empirical experience. In this light, the general tendency of the Madhyamika critique of self-reflexive awareness may be outlined as follows: Because the “I” is functionally equivalent to the transcendentality of apperception, it would be misleading to claim the possibility of an ego-less transcendental apperception, as does the Mind-Only. And if self-reflexive awareness is not held to be transcendental, then it would have to be an empirical phenomenon like any other. It would be a contingent aspect of representations rather than the necessary condition of their possibility. But in this case, how can it be employed as an antidote for the reification of empirical phenomena, if the antidote itself is part of the what is being reified? A reified antidote is just what we don’t want. The initial pseudo-problem of objectivity will have merely been exchanged for another one—the problem of transcendental subjectivity.
Bhavaviveka’s argument expresses in a nutshell the general thrust Madhyamika “metacritique” of the Mind-Only epoche of objectivity. As a case of barking up the wrong philosophical tree, retreating up the epistemological ladder into inner experience is a soteriologically useless maneuver. But perhaps Bhavaviveka’s dismissal is premature—for without an adequate containment strategy for the metaphysical “virulence” of objectivity, scientific realism so resoundingly carries the show that a modern Madhyamika-style critique of subjectivity and essence will never manage to get off the ground. Reified absolutes are poison to the Madhyamika view, yet as we will see, 20th century theoretical physics inescapably suggests them.
4.2 The Empire Strikes Back and the Return of the Empiricists
Briefly turning our attention once more to Western philosophy of science, the meteoric rise to power of Mach-inspired logical empiricism was not always favorably received. It provoked a backlash among many experimental scientists, who preferred the more familiar model of critical realism. Planck may be identified as an influential example of this “reactionary” tendency. He mounted a spirited defense of objectivity and absolutes against the instrumentalist and relativist tendencies of positivism: “That we do not create the external world for reasons of convenience, but rather, that it impresses itself upon us with elementary force is a point which, in our positivistically influenced day and age, may not remain an unspoken matter of course.”
This statement is an obvious gibe against Mach’s instrumentalist views on the status of the external world. Planck points out how the progress of physical science has enabled absolute values to be established for quantities that were previously believed to be definable only as relative differences, notably energy and entropy. In classical mechanics, only energy differences can be measured, and while energy is a conserved quantity, the idea of an absolute value of energy has no significance within the theory. However, Einstein’s theory of special relativity fixes an absolute value for the resting energy of an object (the famous equation E = me2). Similarly, even though the descriptive force of classical thermodynamics is only sufficient to account for entropy differences, the introduction of the quantum hypothesis permits an absolute value to be derived for the entropy of a system S = k log W (where ll r is the number of microstates corresponding to the macrostate of the system), as IE then comes to be discrete.
As Planck delineates, the development of physical theories proceeds from the differential to the integral and from relative quantities to absolutes. The absolutes of Newtonian space and time have been relativized, only to re-establish the absolute on a more fundamental level as the metric of space-time (the speed of light in vacuum c).
Planck holds the principle of transcendental objectivity to be the foundation and raison d’etre of physics. Even though he concedes that physical theory will never be absolutely complete and certain, he optimistically believes that it is possible to obtain asymptoptically close knowledge of absolute reality. In sum, Planck’s considerations pose a very serious challenge to Mach’s empiricism of radical relativity.
An empiricist counter-attack might be organized along two dimensions— (1) the observational underdetermination and (2) the semantic incompleteness of empirical theories. In (1), the Quine-Duhem thesis can be brought to bear against the notion that theories can asymptotically approximate reality. As for (2), Godelian reasoning can be deployed to show that since a theory cannot internally prove its own consistency, there is no absolute sense in which it can be said to have a model.
A metatheoretically reflecting empiricism will come, on a metaphysical or epistemological level of reflection, to relativize the objectivity of physical absolutes to the theory they are posited by, just as it relativizes the concepts of analyticity, aprioricity (etc.) to some theoretical or metatheoretical language. The model empiricist may venture that the Planckian critical realist notion of absolute objectivity is no more intelligible than the idea of a universal metalanguage or an ultimate level of reflection.
4.3 Concluding Reflections
On any scale, the charting of a possible course from 4th century Indian idealism to contemporary philosophy of science would make for an immensely ambitious undertaking. In an effort to advance through the subject matter at a reasonable pace, I have largely glossed over many noteworthy and distinctive features of Vasubandhu’s thought. The Yogacara theories of karma and causality have received especially short shrift. The nature of the investigation has required a perhaps overly large amount of historical glossing and hermeneutic circling, necessarily at the expense of rigorous analytic reconstruction.
Despite that much of the precision inherent in the Buddhist philosophical terminology of Vasubandhu’s era has been lost in the mists of time, more effort could and should have been invested in clarifying the technical meanings of terms. By its very nature, comparative philosophy is a hermeneutic transaction in medias res. To be able to say anything whatsoever, one needs to keep one’s meanings fluid. Interpretation to a certain extent trades in suggestive ambiguities. But if meanings are too fluid, one becomes guilty of fitting the evidence to the theory. The deployment of a semi-formalized philosophical precision language is really the only answer to this dilemma, though in my defense, such a strongly structured approach would not have been appropriate to the intended scale of the investigation.
As far as possible, I have tried to compensate my lack of philological competence in the original languages of Indian philosophy with rational interpolation. When working with classical texts, this is really the only conceivable strength a philosopher can play to vis-a-vis an expert philologist. Regarding the aims and tasks of the investigation, I believe that I have taken a sufficiently broad and deep cross-section of the subject matter for me to be able to hope to have extracted an acceptable fraction of the philosophical import of Vasubandu’s arguments against atomism. Overall, I think that the goal to strike a balance between a presentation of the arguments in historical perspective and a demonstration of their relevance to contemporary epistemology has been accomplished.
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Zuse, Konrad, Rechnender Raum. Vieweg, 1969.Index of Subjects and Technical Terms
A
a priori , 57, 104, 106
synthetic, 70
absistent, 53, 101, 113 action
at a distance, 97 moral consequence of, 45
anagoge, 16, 77
antinomy, 24
anti-realism, 83 anumana, 54, 59, 63, 64 apeiron, 20 apoha, 37 apophaticism, 20
aporia, 20
apperception
refutation of, 115
ataraxia, 26
atomic lattice, 90
atomism
attributive, 69
epistemic, 31 explanations for, 42 instrumentalist, 103, 106-108 origins of, 39 phenomenalistic, 49, 87, 107 physical, 39, 87
stimulus theory of, 63
B
bahyartha, 15
Brentano's thesis, 53
C
category, 64
critique, 58, 104
mistake, 21
Cauchy sequence, 68 cessation, 26, 41, 112 classical
electrodynamics, 89 mechanics, 118 thermodynamics, 118 close-packing, 90 cogito, 24, 26 consciousness
appearance in, 63
crystal analogy, 83 lamp analogy, 114
Lichtenberg, 116
mud analogy, 115
privacy of, 52
constitution, 103, 108
noetic, 75
of experience, 71, 77, 80, 88
of space, 95 constitution theory, 76, 108 continuants, 61, 101 counterfactuals, 53
D
diagonalization, 24
Ding an sich, 32, 65, 77, 79, 80, 82, 107
displacement argument, 97 dissolution
of conceptual rigidities, 22
of the ego, 34
dualism
Cartesian, 63
E
E = me2, 118
effective action
causal vectors of, 64
discrete pulses of, 68 infinitive, 47
wet dream example, 8 Elementarerlebnis, 66, 116 elements
a /3 7... A B C... K L M..., 34, 105
four fundamental, 50 emergence, 56 empiricism, 13, 15, 24, 26, 28, 57 empiriocritical assumption, 108 empiriocriticism, 14, 15, 17, 27-29, 70, 72, 79, 104, 108, 110 energy, 118 epoche
Cartesian, 23, 29, 77, 79, 85, 88,
117
of subjectivity, 24 phenomenological, 23 positivistic, 20
evolutionary psychology, 106 experience
as in dreams, 7, 8, 11, 111 elements of, 35, 45 factors of, 58
ineffability of, 20, 61 intersubjective, 12 mosaic theory of, 37, 51, 107 of objectivity, 7
priority of inner, 113 projection of consciousness into,
34
psycho-physical complex of, 80 reduction of, 69
sensory core of, 55 stream of, 63, 66 subjective constitution of, 56 externalism, 44, 53, 81, 101
F
False Aspectarianism, 83, 84 fictionalism, 53
fire simile, 19 forest-dwelling seers, 12 foundationalism, 31
G
Gedankensymbol, 105 genidentity, 44
Gestalt, 65, 82
gnosis, 27
inversion of, 27, 34, 35 gnostic turpitude, 104 gunk, 102, 103
H
hallucination
argument from, 56 doctrine of collective, 12 hell-guardian argument, 9 homeomeria, 54 Hiilfsbegriff, 107 hyle, 82
I
illucutionary negation, 17 illusion
argument from, 55 transcendental, 9 immanent temporality, 61 incompleteness, 118 indetermination
hungry ghosts example, 8 infinitesimal, 62, 94, 96 inherence, 37, 41 internalism, 7, 9, 68 introjection, 70, 109
K
Kantian turn, 14, 57 karma, 26, 106, 119 Korperwelt, 35
L
ladder
of views, 28, 29, 117
Wittgenstein’s simile, 21 levels of reflection, 7, 23, 119 luminance, 84
M
magnitude
intensive, 50
minimal perceivable, 49
McTaggart argument, 46 mentalism, 105 meontology, 18, 22 mereological
argument, 89 atom, 2 overlap, 92 metalanguage, 119 metaphysics, 57, 75, 106 middle ground
of monism and dualism, 109 of realism and idealism, 23, 77, 105
monism
absolute, 31, 112
neutral, 109
Parmenidean, 99
Moorean proof, 9, 113 motion, 100, 118 mysticism, 27, 28
apophatic, 26
immanence, 27
myth
of physical objects, 110
of the given, 108
N
negation
apophatic, 25
tetralemmatic, 21 nihilism
Madhyamika, 21
mereological, 41, 85, 86, 91 nirvana, 19 noema, 72, 109 no-ownership theory, 36 noumenon, 65, 78
O
ontological relativism, 104 ontology
convenient fiction, 107 ultimate, 91
P
paradox
as stylistic device, 16
of metrical extension, 92 paratantra-svabhava, 73 particle physics, 103
point-particle problem, 89 perception
causal theory of, 54, 58, 68 error-theory of, 54
veil of, 32
perceptual datum, 65, 99 phenomenalism, 6, 14, 15, 23, 25,
27-30, 32, 33, 35, 37, 38, 52, 53, 67
philosophical poetry, 16 physical absolutes, 117, 119
physical objects, 30-33, 35, 38, 70 in disguise, 53
myth of, 110
positivism, 5, 21, 27, 42, 117
Prajnaparamita, 22
pratibhasa, 63, 70
pratipaksa, 29, 116
pratyaksa, 35, 59, 72
presentism, 58
replacement, 61
principle
of economy, 106
of Epicurus, 102
of falsification, 88
of least action, 106 pseudo-problem, 20, 56, 117 psycho-physical parallelism, 109 psychophysics, 42, 83
pure reason
antinomies of, 18 idea of, 78
Q
qualia, 27, 52, 83, 84 “quantifying into”, 52 quantum, 68, 118
quasianalysis, 66
Quine-Duhem thesis, 118
R
raft
Neurath’s simile, 77
Sakyamuni’s simile, 21
raw feel, 52
realism
critical, 32, 64, 109 deconstruction of, 30 direct, 57, 72 existence dimension of, 31 metaphysical, 7, 80 modal, 48 physical, 52 representational, 32 reality
absolute, 32, 118
criterion of, 47
mystical, 21
of human existence, 24 transcendent, 27 reality problem, 55 receptacle, 89, 92, 94 regressus, 88, 107 regulative, 8
of sensory intuition, 26 relation
external, 94
functional, 26 relativity theory, 90, 118 renormalization, 89 res extensa, 63
S
s = k log if, ns sarvam asti, 44 Scheinproblem, 21 sensibilia, 33, 35, 48, 49, 53, 98 shadow terminator, 97 shape, 39, 51, 55, 57, 61, 62, 89-91, 95
silence
about absolutes, 18 metaphysical, 20, 21 of the Buddha, 17, 22 skepticism
Cartesian, 13 solipsism, 11, 12, 85 space
absolute, 49, 105 as absence of obstruction, 49 as relation of substances, 94 Carnap scheme, 94
Euclidean, 90 exotic, 95 limit-concepts of, 94
Newtonian, 118 sunyata, 20, 22, 24 svabhava, 114 svalaksana, 66 svasamvedana, 64, 114
T
telepathy, 11 temporal
eliminativism, 47
time
critique of, 38 modal theory of, 48 motion picture analogy, 44 time-gap argument, 101 transcendental
apperception, 25, 64, 116 ego, 23, 25 idealism, 82, 108illusionism, 9, 88
object, 77 objectivity, 10, 15, 32, 71 reasoning, 63, 88 transcending gnosis, 11 True Aspectarianism, 82, 84, 88
U underdetermination, 118
V
via negativa, 24, 28 via positivistica, 28 vikalpa, 58, 65, 91
vyapti, 101
W world
distinction of ego and, 34 inner covering outer, 63 like a dream, 11 limits of, 25 path to the end of, 35Index of Personal Names
A
Anacker, Stefan, 3, 6, 44, 73, 86,
100
Anaximander, 20
Aristotle, 93
Augustine, 53
Avenarius, Richard, 14, 15, 27, 70,
106, 107, 109
Ayer, A.J., 49, 50, 53
B
Bahya Darucirya, 33, 34
Belden, Ngawang, 63
Berkeley, George, 15, 23, 73
Bhavaviveka, 115, 116
Boltzmann, Ludwig, 108
Bouwsma, O. K., 88
Brentano, Franz, 83
Buddhadeva, 45, 46
Bu-ston, 3
C
Candraklrti, 115
Carnap, Rudolf, 23, 27, 55, 66, 68,
76, 94, 108
Chatterjee, A. K., 31, 38, 58, 66, 67,
D
della Santina, Peter, 58
Democritus, 39
Dharmakirti, 37, 66, 67, 69, 72
Dharmapala, 72
Dharmasri, 3, 43, 44
Dharmatrai ta, 3, 45, 46, 51
Dignaiga, 66, 69
Dipakara, 51
E
Einstein, Albert, 90, 118
Epicurus, 64, 102
Essler, W. K., 7, 11
F
Fechner, Gustav Theodor, 42
Frauwallner, Erich, 4, 5, 38, 46, 48,
86
G
Garfield, Jay L., 61
Ghos.aka, 45, 46
Godel, Kurt, 119
Goodman, Nelson, 66
Grupp, Jeffrey, 38, 61, 66
Guenther, Herbert V., 13, 38�
H
Hume, David, 24, 25, 38, 48, 49
Husserl, Edmund, 12, 23, 25, 34,
61, 111
J
James, William, 26, 61
Johnson, Samuel, 9
K
Kan. ada, 39
Kant, Immanuel, 10, 14, 18, 21, 26,
38, 68, 82, 93, 94
Kapstein, Matthew, 36, 37, 86, 95,
100
King, Martin Luther, 111
Kochumuttom, Thomas, 6, 29, 73,
77-79, 86, 99
L
Lamotte, Etienne, 2
Leeuwenhoek, Antonie van, 100
Leibniz, Gottfried, 102
Lewis, David, 102
Lichtenberg, Georg, 25, 26, 116
Locke, John, 64
Lusthaus, Dan, 6, 73-77
M
Mach, Ernst, 9, 11, 14, 25-27, 38,
55, 71, 85, 108, 111
Mahavira, 42
Matilal, B. K., 14, 36, 38, 50, 54, 62,
80, 86, 104
Mauthner, Fritz, 26
McTaggart, J. M. E., 46
Meinong, Alexius, 53
Mipham, Ju, 80, 84
Musil, Robert, 106
N
Nabokov, Vladimir, 104 Nagao, Gadjin M., 4, 76, 80 Naigairjuna, 61, 118
Naigasena, 36
Neurath, Otto, 77
O
Oetke, Claus, 36, 67, 69
Ostwald, Wilhelm, 108
P
Panikkar, Raimon, 20
Paramai rtha, 3
Parfit, Derek, 24
Parmenides, 99
Pinker, Steven, 83
Planck, Max, 117-119
Plato, 36
Popper, Karl, 88
Prior, A. N., 52
Q
Quine, W. V. O., 69, 110
R
Rorty, Richard, 15
Russell, Bertrand, 102
S
{Sakyamuni, 14, 17-21, 24, 33
Samkara, 112-114
Sanghabhadra, 3, 4, 43, 50Santaraksita, 28, 80, 84
Schmithausen, Lambert, 86
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 14
Schrodinger, Erwin, 1
Sellars, Wilfrid, 61, 108
Siderits, Mark, 15, 21, 22, 36, 86, 96
Sinha, Jadunath, 53, 112
Stcherbatsky, Theodor, 38
Sthiramati, 72
T
Tsongkhapa, 81, 84, 114
V
Vasumitra, 45, 46, 48
Vatsyayana, 40
von Rospatt, Alexander, 38, 59, 60
W
Wayman, Alex, 6, 73, 74
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 21, 30
Y
Yasomitra, 48, 54
Z
Zeno, 92, 93
Zuse, Konrad, 95Appendix
Zusammenfassung in deutscher Sprache
Kapitel 1 Die vorliegende Arbeit behandelt das Argument gegen den Ato- mismus aus den Vimsatika Vijnaptimatratasiddhi (Zwanzig Versen des Nur-Geistes), einer erkenntnistheoretischen Abhandlung des spatantiken indischen Philosophen Vasubandhu. Unter Atomismus wird hierbei durchge- hend die Lehre vom Aufbau der Welt aus kleinsten, nicht weiter zerlegbaren Wirklichkeitsbestandteilen verstanden, wie sie im Altertum in verschiedent- licher Form von griechischen wie auch von indischen Weltanschauungslehren vertreten wurde.
Das Argument Vasubandhus beriihrt insbesondere die atomistischen Leh- ren der Vaibhasika- und Sautrantika-Schulen der fruhbuddhistischen Scho- lastik. Daher wird zunachst ein Abriss der Erkenntnistheorien dieser beiden Schulen des Abhidharma gegeben, wobei besonderes Augenmerk auf die kritische Entwicklungslinie ihrer Kategorienlehren in Bezug auf Raum, Zeit und Substanz gelegt wird. Durch diese vorbereitende Darlegung wer- den sowohl die philosophischen Hintergriinde und Voraussetzungen der Argumentation Vasubandhus aufgedeckt als auch die vorzunehmende Interpretation seiner anti-atomistischen Wirklichkeitsauffassung im Lich- te der empiriokritizistischen Uberwindung des Dings an sich untermau- ert. Die so gewonnene Sichtweise wird schlieBlich als Ausgangspunkt fur transzendentalphilosophische Betrachtungen im Sinne der buddhistischen Erkenntnistheorie genutzt, wie etwa fur Uberlegungen fiber den Status der transzendentalen Apperzeption, die Konstitution von Erfahrungserkenntnis und die Aussagekraft skeptischer Argumente. In der Einleitung werden zunachst einige Bemerkungen zur Person, zur Lebensgeschichte und zum philosophischen Schaffen Vasubandhus gemacht.
Es folgt anschlieBend ein Resumee der erkenntnistheoretisch relevanten Themen der Vimsatika, in dem Vasubandhus stark idealistisch eingefarbter AuBenweltskeptizismus in Grundzugen sichtbar gemacht wird. Die Haupt- these Vasubandhus, die er gleich zu Anfang der Vimsatika aufstellt und im Verlauf der Abhandlung gegen realistische Einwande zu verteidigen sucht, ist das Prinzip der Traumartigkeit der Erfahrungserkenntnis. Damit soil im Wesentlichen gesagt werden, dass - trotz des gegenteiligen Anscheins - in der Erfahrung nirgends die Erkenntnis eines erkenntnisunabhangigen Gegenstands moglich ist. Vasubandhu stellt insbesondere die Erkenntnis- moglichkeit einer metaphysisch gegebenen objektiven AuBenwelt in Abrede und schlagt vor, dass eine intersubjektive Konstitution der Erfahrungs- mannigfaltigkeit an dessen Stelle treten solle.
Auf die im Resumee herausgestellten Ergebnisse aufbauend lasst sich nun begrunden, weshalb eine nahere Betrachtung der Argumente gegen den Atomismus von geistesgeschichtlichem und erkenntnistheoretischem Interesse ist. Ferner wird die zu verwendende hermeneutische Methode der Untersuchung - der interkulturelle Vergleich zum kritischen Realis- mus Kants und dem Empiriokritizismus seiner Nachfolger Avenarius und Mach - eingefuhrt. Durch den Vergleich sollen Bezugspunkte zur modernen Erkenntnistheorie und Wissenschaftsphilosophie geschaffen und die philo- sophische Relevanz der Ideen Vasubandhus klarer zur Geltung gebracht werden. Es werden dabei allerdings auch die methodischen Probleme eines solchen Deutungsansatzes berucksichtigt.
Um die Analyse der Atomismusargumente mit einer hermeneutischen Hintergrundstruktur zu unterfuttern, wird ein erster Bruckenschlag zwi- schen der buddhistischen und der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie gewagt. Das Schweigen des Buddhas Gautama Sakyamuni zu den vierzehn metaphy- sischen Fragen wird zur Mach’schen Auffassung des Scheinproblems in Be- zug gesetzt. Am so gedeuteten Mittelpunktereignis des Buddha-Schweigens wird die Hypothese abgelesen, dass der buddhistischen Erkenntnislehre empiristische und erkenntniskritische Momente zu Grunde liegen. Ganz nach Fapon des logischen Empirismus wird im Zuge des Reflektierens uber die Bedingungen und Moglichkeiten von Erfahrungserkenntnis Ein- sicht dartiber gewonnen, dass uber alles jenseits der Erkenntnisgrenzen Liegende geschwiegen werden muss. Es wird die These entwickelt, dass das Buddha-Schweigen in seinem positivistischen Deutungssinn mit einer Urteilsenthaltung uber das transzendental Objektive einhergeht, also unter die philosophische Figur der „Cartesischen epoche“ gefasst werden kann. Der erkenntnistheoretische Hohengewinn eines die Reflektion von Bedin- gung und Moglichkeit von Erfahrung erlaubenden Standpunktes geht mit einem Abwurf metaphysischen Ballasts einher, bzw. ist nur auf solchem cartesisch-skeptischen Wege zu erlangen.
Allerdings ist dabei noch zu beriicksichtigen, dass das Hauptmoment der buddhistischen Soteriologie in ihrer Lehre vom Nicht-Selbst (anatman) und von der Leerheit der Erfahrungselemente liegt. Auch hier sind Parallelen zu einschlagigen empiristischen Anschauungen (etwa zur Bundeltheorie der Person) gegeben. In seiner mahayanistischen Blute entwickelt sich der der Leerheitsbegriff jedoch zu einer negativen Mystik und verlasst damit das Terrain der Erkenntnistheorie. Die reine via negativa ist nun neben der als gfiltig erachteten positivistischen Deutung die tiefere und eigentlichere Auslegungsmoglichkeit des Buddha-Schweigens, und lasst sich philosophisch gesehen mit einer epoche der transzendentalen Subjektivitat in Deckung bringen.
Uber ein positivistisches Schweigen kann auf hoherer Reflektionsstufe noch nachgedacht und gesprochen werden, wahrend sich das negativ- mystische Schweigen jeder Moglichkeit eines reflektierenden Zugangs ent- zieht. Die epoche des Objekts wird aber dadurch nicht hinfallig - sie gewinnt dadurch im Gegenteil ihren rechten Sinn als Propadeutik. Im Kontext der mahayanistischen Erlbsungslehre wird das vermeintlich absolut existieren- de Erkenntnisobjekt der Alltagserfahrung (wie auch die Erkenntnis selbst und letztlich auch jedes Reflektieren fiber Bedingung und Moglichkeit von Erkenntnis) als instrumentell aufgefasst. Ziel und Ende von Erkenntnis, wie auch das eigentliche Wesen von Erfahrung, sind mystisch und ungreifbar.
Die in den Vimsatika von Vasubandhu entfaltete idealistische Erkenntnistheorie ist demnach von einem negativ-mystischen Letztsinn geleitet. Dieser Gesichtspunkt muss bei der Deutung seines rational-argumentativen Vor- gehens in ebensolchem MaBe wie die philosophischen Hintergrtinde der abhidharmischen Scholastik Berficksichtigung finden. Obgleich in Grund- ziigen vorhanden, kommt das mystische Moment bei Mach ungleich weniger deutlich zum Vorschein als bei Vasubandhu. Als positivistisch denkender Naturwissenschaftler begniigt er sich damit, den antimetaphysischen Stand- punkt zu gewinnen. Von hier aus soil Physik auf eine Beschreibung des Funktionszusammenhangs der Empfindungen reduziert werden konnen. Dieser Mach’sche Phanomenalismus entspricht aber gerade jenem fruh- buddhistischen Boden, der durch den Realismus der buddhistischen Scho- lastik verloren gegangen war und dessen Zuruckgewinn von Vasubandhu verteidigt wird.
Kapitel 2 Solche weitgreifende Thesen verlangen natiirlich nach einer aus- fuhrlicheren Begrundung, die im Rahmen einer Begriffsklarung erfolgt. Die Kernbegriffe Realismus, Phanomenalismus und Nominalismus werden naher ausgeleuchtet. Der Briickenschlag von der buddhistischen zu einer radikal-empiristischen Erkenntnistheorie wird anhand einer Betrach- tung ausgewahlter fruhbuddhistischer Lehrreden weiter vorangetrieben, die Parallelisierung zur Ideenwelt Machs erhartet.
Die noch naher durchzufuhrende Darstellung vom Aufstieg und Fall des buddhistischen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus wird angerissen: Im Zuge einer fortschreitenden Zeitkritik wandelt sich innerhalb der Abhidharma-Schulen die Auffassung vom Objekt. Wo sich in der Vaibhasika-Schule das auBen- weltlich Objektive progressiv als begriffliche Beifugung zum letztlich sei- enden Empfindungsmosaik konstituiert, wird es bei den Sautrantika in regressiver Weise gewonnen, d.h. als apriorisch zu denkender, letztlich sei- ender Kausalgrund von Empfindung (die nurmehr als in bloB begrifflich- beigefugter Weise seiend gilt) gesetzt. Diese philosophische Bewegung soil nun anhand modellhafter Rekonstruktionen der Erkenntnistheorien der Vaibhasika- und der Sautrantika-Schulen eine weitere Untersuchung erfahren.
Zunachst werden jedoch die historischen Urspriinge des indischen Atomis- mus in der nicht-buddhistischen Vaisesika-Schule gesucht und die Atom- theorie dieser Schule in Grundziigen skizziert - sowohl um eine Verstandnis- grundlage fur die im Folgenden nachzuzeichnenden Entwicklungen der buddhistischen Schulen an die Hand zu geben als auch um die zentrale Kontrastfigur fur Vasubandhus anti-atomistische Argumentation aufzu- stellen. Der Einfluss der realistischen Vaisesika-Metaphysik stellt einen moglichen Grund fur die Entfaltung atomistischer Lehren innerhalb der ur- spriinglich nicht-atomistischen Erkenntnistheorie des Buddhismus dar, aber es sind auch Herleitungen aus phanomenalistischen oder nominalistischen Gesichtspunkten denkbar.
Im Atomismus der Vaibhasika-Schule sind realistische, phanomenalistische und nominalistische Einfliisse in mehr oder minder starkem AusmaBe zur Auspragung gekommen. Lehrmeinung des Vaibhasika ist eine zweigliedrige Wahrnehmungstheorie. Demnach entsteht Erkenntnis im unmittelba- ren Kontakt der Bewusstseinsmomente zu den Empfindungsatomen, die als letztlich seiende Substanzen im absoluten Raum aufgefasst werden. Diese Atomlehre ist im Rahmen enzyklopadischer Systematisierungen des Abhidharma dargestellt worden und teilt sich anhand dessen in drei Entwicklungsphasen auf. Die dritte, abschlieBende Stufe dieser Entwicklung ist in Vasubandhus Abhidharmakosa sowie im Nyayanusara, der Replik seines Lehrers und Kontrahenten Sarighabhadra, gegeben.
Die Vaibhasikas vertraten eine Lehre von der Existenz in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft, und entwickelten vier Zeittheorien, Diese Theorien sowie ihre Kritiken werden etwas ausfuhrlicher dargestellt, wobei Parallelen zur modernen westlichen Philosophie gezogen werden, etwa zur Zeitkritik McTaggarts. Es wird eine Rekonstruktion der Zeittheorie des Vasumitra vorgenommen, welche versucht, Zeitlichkeit als Modus von Aktualitat und Existenz in Vergangenheit und Zukunft mit einem modalen Realismus zu fassen.
Die Theorie der Vaibhasika von den Empfindungsatomen wird ausgefuhrt und mit dem Hume’schen Sinnesdaten-Atomismus verglichen. Es folgt eine kritische Betrachtung der dargestellten Lehren, die zum Standpunkt der fruhen Sautrantika-Schule iiberleitet.
Die Anschauungen der Sautrantikas zeichnen sich gegentiber den Theorien der Vaibhasikas im Wesentlichen durch zwei Neuerungen aus - den Reprasentationalismus sowie die Lehre von der Momentanheit des Seien- den. Darunter wird der Ineinsfall von Zeitlichkeit und Kausalfunktion mit, dem Wesen des Seienden verstanden. Da die Sautrantika sogar den augen- blicklichen zeitlichen Bestand ablehnen, entsteht damit eine Auffassung von Atomen als augenblicklich-flusshafte Reizimpulse.
Die Sautrantika vertreten eine Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis - eine wahrheitsgemaBe Empfindung ist demnach eine solche, die mit ihrer letztlich seienden, augenblicklich-flusshaften Reizgrundlage ubereinstimmt. Die Reizatome werden den Kant’schen Dingen an sich gegeniibergestellt und dieser Vergleich wird problematisiert. Die Sautrantika-Lehre der irrealen Wahrnehmungssynthese durch begriffliche Einbildungskraft wird beleuchtet, um den Unterscheid zum Synthesebegriff Kants zu unterstreichen.
Die Atomlehre der spaten Sautrantika-Phase, in der nur noch von logisch partikularen Augenblicklichkeitspunkten die Rede ist, wird im Ansatz vorge- stellt und mit dem Elementarerlebnis Carnaps verglichen. Die Theorie der Augenblicklichkeitspunkte ist nicht von der Atomkritik Vasubandhus betrof- fen, da sie sich von der Vorstellung der Substanzhaftigkeit und raumlichen Ausdehnung des Atoms gelost hat.
Es folgt eine Zusammenfassung und kritische Wiirdigung der Erkenntnis- theorie der Sautrantika-Schule. Es werden Unstimmigkeiten an ihrer re- prasentationalistischen Erkenntnistheorie aufgezeigt, die auf die Notwen- digkeit einer ganzlichen Aufgabe des auBenweltlichen Objekts (wie dies von der Nur-Geist-Schule schlieBlich vollzogen wird) hindeuten.
Kapitel 3 Die idealistische Lesart der Nur-Geist-Lehre wird zu Anfang programmatisch in den Vordergrund gestellt. Die Betrachtung geht zu einer Unterscheidung der wichtigsten historischen Entwicklungslinien der Nur-Geist-Schule uber. Als nachstes wird die revisionistische Linie der modemen Rezeptionsgeschichte im Groben dargestellt. Es folgt eine nahere Erlauterung der drei einflussreichsten revisionistischen Lesarten. Diese deuten die Erkenntnistheorie der Nur-Geist-Schule im Wesentlichen als phanomenologische Spielart des kritischen Realismus. Die Stellungnahme zu diesen Lesarten arbeitet die eigene Interpretationslinie klarer heraus und untermauert diese.
AnschlieBend wird die traditionelle Interpretation der Nur-Geist-Lehre vorgestellt. Die in der tibetischen Doxographie iibliche Unterscheidung der Wahr- und Falschaspektler-Lesarten wird eingefuhrt und im Ansatz phi- losophisch rekonstruiert. Die Wahraspektler-Lesart wird als „realistische“, die Falschaspektler-Lesart als „antirealistische“ Deklination des Nur-Geist- Standpunktes umschrieben.
Nachdem der Interpretationsraum aufgespannt wurde, wird das Argument gegen den Atomismus schematisch umrissen. Weil sich die Angriffslinie der Zeitkritik am Atombegriff im Sautrantika erschopft hat, versucht Vasubandhu nun, das Atom und damit den Substanzbegriff auf dem Wege der Raumkritik ganzlich zu eliminieren. Vasubandhu vertritt die These, dass Atome weder in der Erfahrung selbst noch als ihre materiellen Konstitutions- elemente gegeben sind. Die realistische Gegenposition stellt sich in den drei Atomtheorien der Vaisesika-, der Vaibhasika- und der Sautrantika-Schulen dar. Die Argumentation verlauft apagogisch, da die Position Vasubandhus eine epoche ist und deshalb nur die realistische Gegenposition einen Nach- weis schuldet. Gelingt dieser nicht, ist damit der Standpunkt Vasubandhus erwiesen.
Der Realist habe laut Vasubandhu drei Moglichkeiten, das auBenweltliche Objekt nachzuweisen: als einheitliches Ganzes, als loser Atomhaufen oder als zusammenhangendes Atomkonglomerat. Wird wie in den letzten beiden Fallen des Trilemmas eine Atomtheorie angenommen, sind abermals zwei Faile zu unterscheiden: das Substanzatom als raumlich ausgedehntes Teil- chen oder als ausdehnungsloser Punkt. Vasubandhu wird nun zeigen, dass beide Faile unmoglich sind, womit nur noch der Fall des auBen weltlichen Objekts als einheitliches Ganzes zu widerlegen bleibt.
Der Fall des Atoms als raumlich ausgedehntes Teilchen wird mit einer mereologisch ausgerichteten Beweisfuhrung behandelt. Wesentlicher Aspekt der Argumentation ist die implizite Annahme, dass die raumliche Verbindung und Anordnung von Atomen nur mit mereotopologischen Mitteln darstellbar sind, Ontologie sich jedoch auf den rein mereologischen Anted beschranken muss. Topologische Eigenschaften sind als begriffliche Ein- bildungen bei der Betrachtung des letztlich Seienden auBer Acht zu lassen. Damit fiihrt Vasubandhu eine von der Sache her analoge Argumentation zur Antithese der zweiten Antinomie der reinen Vernunft bei Kant - er erweist, dass alles, was einen Raum einnimmt, zusammengesetzt ist. Gegen das punktformige Atom tragt Vasubandhu ebenfalls vernichtende Einwande vor, etwa dass sich solche Atome nur beruhren konnen, wenn sie den gleichen Raumort einnehmen. Ausgedehnte Korper, die aus solchen Atomen zusammengesetzt sind, fallen auf PunktgroBe zusammen. Des Wei- teren sind phanomenal wahrnehmbare Eigenschaften wie Verdrangung oder Schattenwurf nur unter Zugrundelegung einer raumlichen Ausdehnung des Atoms konstituierbar. Vasubandhu geht daraufhin zur Betrachtung des Falls tiber, dass das auBenweltliche Objekt als einheitliches Ganzes gegeben sei. Er fuhrt hierzu eine Reihe von Gegenbeispielen an, die wieder in Ahnlich- keit zum Kant’schen Standpunkt zeigen sollen, dass echte Einheiten in der Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeit nirgends vorzufinden sind.
Im nachsten Argument wird die kausale Wahrnehmungstheorie der Sautrantika abgehandelt. Vasubandhu weist darauf hin, dass eine Kausa- litatsbeziehung nur zwischen aufeinanderfolgenden Momenten moglich ist. Weil der Anhaltspunkt einer Wahrnehmung zu dem Zeitpunkt, als dar- aus ein Wahrnehmungsobjekt entsteht, bereits entschwunden ist, kann die Korrespondenztheorie der Erkenntnis nicht aufrecht erhalten werden. Damit ist dann auch die Notwendigkeit einer apriorisch zu denkenden auBen- weltlichen Reizgrundlage hinfallig geworden.
Atomtheorien, die als im Vasubandhu’schen Sinne widerlegt gelten durfen, sind solche, die von der erkenntnisunabhangigen Existenz unteilbarer, letzt- lich seiender Substanzen im absoluten Raum ausgehen. Atomismen, die sich nicht auf einen solchen Substanzbegriff festlegen, bleiben von seiner Argumentation unberiihrt, ebenso logische und instrumentelle Atomismen sowie realistische Standpunkte, die von einer unendlichen Teilbarkeit des StofElichen ausgehen.
Den Vergleichsfaden zur empiriokritizistischen Erkenntnistheorie wieder aufgreifend kann der Standpunkt Vasubandhus nun anhand des Mach’schen Antiatomismus neu ausbuchstabiert werden. Mach und Avenarius fiihren wissenschaftliche Erklarung auf Beschreibung, Ontologie auf das Prinzip der Denkokonomie zuriick. In der Mach’schen Erkenntnistheorie gerat das Atom zum bloBen Gedankensymbol, bei Avenarius ist es ein aus Zweck- maBigkeitsgrunden gewahlter Grenzbegriff. Fur die Empiriokritizisten ist die bewusstseinsunabhangige Gegen standlichkeit des Erkenntnisobjekts genau wie fur Vasubandhu eine Fiktion. Ahnliche Standpunkte finden sich bei Carnap und sogar bei Quine, so dass der Idealismus Vasubandhus vom Grundsatz her keineswegs als ganzlich veraltet gelten kann.
Kapitel 4 Die vorangegangenen Erorterungen legen nahe, die Vasuband- hu’sche Sicht als einen Empirismus in fremdem Gewande zu deuten. Der durchgefuhrte Perspektivwechsel zur buddhistischen Erkenntnistheorie ver- schafft dem abendlandischen Philosophierenden einen neuartigen Ausblick auf seine eigene empiristische Denktradition. Die Suche nach Anfangs- griinden und Sinn von Erkenntnis gestaltet sich gleichermaflen im Abstrak- ten als erkenntnistheoretische Reflektion wie auch im Konkreten als geistes- geschichtliche Reise zu den ost-westlichen Urquellen der Erkenntnistheorie.
Um weitere Perspektiven der erfolgten Analyse zu eroffnen, wird die Kritik an der Nur-Geist-Sichtweise vonseiten der Advaita Vedanta- und Madhya- mika-Schulen angerissen. Die Nur-Geist-Lehre dient dabei als notwendige Gegenfigur fur die voile Entfaltung des metakritischen Skeptizismus der Madhyamikas, der sich den Angriff auf die transzendentale Subjektivitat zum Programm macht. Andererseits geht der Madhyamika in seiner De- struktion der Objektivitatskritik der Nur-Geist-Schule deutlich zu weit. Es wird die These aufgestellt, dass Kritik am Objektivitatsbegriff Bedingung der Moglichkeit einer Subjektivitatskritik ist. Hat man namlich keine Mittel zur Hand, sich des absoluten Charakters gewisser physikalischer Grundbegriffe zu erwehren, ist jeder Ansatz einer Wesenslosigkeitsmystik im Sinne des Madhyamika im Keime erstickt.
Planck bringt auf den Punkt, wie aufgrund theoretischer Fortschritte (beispielsweise der speziellen Relativitatstheorie und der Quantenhypothe- se) entgegen den fruhpositivistischen Ansichten Machs tatsachlich auf die Absolutwertigkeit u.a. von Energie und Entropie geschlossen werden kann. Die Mach’schen Prinzipien der Relativitat physikalischer Begriffe und der Instrumentality der AuBenwelthypothese seien durch die gezeigte Bewe- gung vom Relativen zum Absoluten entkraftet. Der Empirismus findet jedoch in der metatheoretischen Reflektion einen Ausweg. Durch absolutwertige Begriffe ist einerseits ein wissenschaftlicher Bodengewinn gegeben, anderer- seits kommt man aus erkenntnistheoretischen Grunden nicht umhin, diese Absolutheit wieder in Bezug auf Theorie und Reflektionsstufe zu relativieren.
AbschlieBend folgt eine kurze Selbstbeurteilung des Geleisteten im Hin- blick auf die Aufgabenstellung der Arbeit und den bearbeiteten Stoff.Lebenslauf
Personliche Daten
Name: Bruhacs, Lorand
Anschrift: Eichwaldstr. 56, 60385 Frankfurt a.M.
Telefon: 069 / 46939002
Email-Adresse: nahuaque@gmail.com
Familienstand: ledig, 1 Kind
Staatsangehorigkeit: USA
Geburtsdaten: 21. Oktober 1975 in Wiesbaden
Schulische Ausbildung/Studium
1995 Gutenbergschule / Wiesbaden Abschluss: Allgemeine Hochschulreife
1995— Studium an der Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat / Frankfurt a.M.
Fachrichtung: Philosophie (M.A.)
1996— Fachrichtung: Informatik (Dipl.)
Berufliche Erfahrungen
1996 EnterpriseFlorida / Frankfurt a.M. Tatigkeit: Praktikant 1997 Institut fur Neue Medien Tatigkeit: Praktikant 1997—1998 Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universitat / Frankfurt a.M.
Tatigkeit: studentische Hilfskraft 1998—2002 IP23 GmbH /Frankfurt a.M. Tatigkeit: Internet Engineer / Technical Writer 2003— Deutsche Nationalbibliothek / Frankfurt a.M. Tatigkeit: Systemverwaltung Unix/Netzwerke Frankfurt a.M., den 22. Juli 2008 Eidesstattliche Erklarung
Hiermit versichere ich, dass vorliegende Arbeit selbstandig verfaBt und keine anderen als die angegebenen Hilfsmittel benutzt sowie die Stellen der Arbeit, die anderen Werken dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinn nach entnommen sind, dur ch Angabe der Quellen kenntlich gemacht wurden. Ferner versichere ich, dass die Arbeit in gleicher oder ahnlicher Fassung
noch nicht Bestandteil einer Studien- oder Prufungsleistung war.
Frankfurt a.M., den 22. Juli 2008
Lorand Bruhacs