Difference between revisions of "The Great Debate in Mahāyāna Buddhism"
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− | Rev. Dr. James Kenneth Powell II received his Ph. D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin – Madison (1997) through advisor Geshe Lhundhup Sopa and he was the last graduate of a once internationally renowned program. He also studied theology at Cambridge, received his Master of Divinity (MDIV) degree from the University of Chicago and received his BA in Religion with a focus on Buddhism (1985) with his advisor Dr. Isshi Yamada. | + | Rev. Dr. James Kenneth Powell II received his Ph. D. in [[Buddhist Studies]] from the [[University of Wisconsin]] – [[Madison]] (1997) through advisor [[Geshe]] Lhundhup [[Sopa]] and he was the last graduate of a once internationally renowned program. He also studied {{Wiki|theology}} at [[Cambridge]], received his [[Master]] of [[Divinity]] (MDIV) [[degree]] from the [[University of Chicago]] and received his BA in [[Religion]] with a focus on [[Buddhism]] (1985) with his advisor Dr. [[Isshi]] Yamada. |
− | This work evolved from a dissonance in interpreting the two principle Mahāyāna schools ascertained through studies first with Dr. Yamada and Geshe Sopa. The former, Dr. Yamada imparted an East Asian interpretation that privileged the Yogācāra as the more sophisticated and evolved awareness among the two | + | This work evolved from a dissonance in interpreting the two [[principle]] [[Mahāyāna schools]] ascertained through studies first with Dr. Yamada and [[Geshe Sopa]]. The former, Dr. Yamada imparted an {{Wiki|East Asian}} [[interpretation]] that privileged the [[Yogācāra]] as the more sophisticated and evolved [[awareness]] among the two |
− | schools, incorporating the core Mahāyāna doctrine of śūnyatā, | + | schools, incorporating the core [[Mahāyāna doctrine]] of [[śūnyatā]], “[[zeroness]]” or more commonly known as “[[emptiness]]” within the framework of an extensive system of [[understanding]] the [[nature]] of [[consciousness]]. The [[latter]] [[Madhyamaka school]] will insist that even [[consciousness]] is a “centaur castle in the sky” a “sky [[flower]]” and hence, has no [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[existence]]. This I learned from my [[Tibetan]] and hence, {{Wiki|Central Asian}} [[teacher]], [[Geshe Sopa]]. Resolving this dispute over [[consciousness]] is the aim of this [[book]]. |
− | By Unknown - Controversy at Panadura or Panadura Vadaya by Pranith Abhayasundra - 1990 (Book), Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=19224 | + | By Unknown - Controversy at [[Panadura]] or [[Panadura]] Vadaya by Pranith Abhayasundra - 1990 ([[Book]]), Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=19224 |
− | ...however, I myself state just as much as I am capable.... | + | ...however, I myself [[state]] just as much as I am capable.... |
− | Kho bos ni rang gis ji ltar dpogs tshod smras pa yin lags | + | Kho bos ni rang gis ji ltar dpogs tshod smras pa [[yin]] lags |
− | This work is dedicated to the magnificent tradition of scholarship of the Madhyamaka tradition, from Nāgārjuna to my kalyānamitra, Geshe Sopa. | + | This work is dedicated to the magnificent [[tradition]] of {{Wiki|scholarship}} of the [[Madhyamaka tradition]], from [[Nāgārjuna]] to my kalyānamitra, [[Geshe Sopa]]. |
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− | This work arises from a period of five years of puzzlement at the diverging interpretations of the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka Schools which I received from my teachers, Geshe Lhundhup Sopa and Dr. Isshi Yamada, for whom I must reserve my deepest gratitude out of great respect for their guidance through the extremely difficult jungle which is Mahāyāna philosophical tradition. | + | This work arises from a period of five years of puzzlement at the diverging interpretations of the [[Yogācāra]] and [[Madhyamaka]] Schools which I received from my [[teachers]], [[Geshe]] Lhundhup [[Sopa]] and Dr. [[Isshi]] Yamada, for whom I must reserve my deepest [[gratitude]] out of great [[respect]] for their guidance through the extremely difficult jungle which is [[Mahāyāna]] [[philosophical]] [[tradition]]. |
− | The extent to which the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools are to be harmonized or differentiated is the subject of this investigation. Is the Yogācāra School a synthesis of Abhidharma and Madhyamaka and a more extensive yet harmonious elaboration of both, as I was taught by Dr. Yamada during the course of my B.A. studies at Northwestern and M.Div. studies at the University of Chicago? | + | The extent to which the [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] Schools are to be harmonized or differentiated is the [[subject]] of this [[investigation]]. Is the [[Yogācāra School]] a {{Wiki|synthesis}} of [[Abhidharma]] and [[Madhyamaka]] and a more extensive yet harmonious [[elaboration]] of both, as I was [[taught]] by Dr. Yamada during the course of my B.A. studies at Northwestern and M.Div. studies at the [[University of Chicago]]? |
− | Or is the Yogācāra tradition an “extensive method,” a preliminary approach, or upāya, for disciples of the Mahāyāna tradition to enter ultimately into the definitive expression of the Buddha’s truth - as found in the Madhyamaka tradition - as can be captured by verbal expression, as I was taught by Geshe Sopa? | + | Or is the [[Yogācāra tradition]] an “extensive method,” a preliminary approach, or [[upāya]], for [[disciples]] of the [[Mahāyāna tradition]] to enter ultimately into the definitive expression of the [[Buddha’s]] [[truth]] - as found in the [[Madhyamaka tradition]] - as can be captured by [[verbal]] expression, as I was [[taught]] by [[Geshe Sopa]]? |
_______________________ | _______________________ | ||
− | Further expressions of gratitude must be extended to Professor Minoru Kiyota, who encouraged a balanced view of the two schools, which kept my sympathies toward the Madhyamaka School in proper perspective, keeping students mindful of Japanese perspectives on a wide variety of topics, including those relevant to this study. To Professor Gudrun Bühnemann, for her emphasis on precision and caution in translating Tibetan and Sanskrit terms, but absolutely without fault for errors found in this work. | + | Further {{Wiki|expressions}} of [[gratitude]] must be extended to [[Professor]] Minoru [[Kiyota]], who encouraged a balanced view of the two schools, which kept my sympathies toward the [[Madhyamaka School]] in proper {{Wiki|perspective}}, keeping students [[mindful]] of [[Japanese]] perspectives on a wide variety of topics, [[including]] those relevant to this study. To [[Professor]] Gudrun Bühnemann, for her {{Wiki|emphasis}} on precision and caution in translating [[Tibetan]] and [[Sanskrit]] terms, but absolutely without fault for errors found in this work. |
_______________________ | _______________________ | ||
− | In addition to these professors in our department, I also wish to express thanks to Professor Christopher Rowland, formerly of Jesus College, Cambridge who endowed me with a much deeper appreciation of the multivalence of meaning and the implications of social realities impacting ancient religious texts; to Professor David Tracy of the University of Chicago, my Master’s dissertation advisor whose profound plumbing of philosophical depths, helped to deepen my own awareness of philosophical complexities as they arise in the new context of this investigation. Professor Arthur Droge at the University instilled an awareness of the depth of implicit meanings to be found among religious texts. | + | In addition to these professors in our department, I also wish to express thanks to [[Professor]] Christopher Rowland, formerly of {{Wiki|Jesus}} {{Wiki|College}}, [[Cambridge]] who endowed me with a much deeper [[appreciation]] of the multivalence of meaning and the implications of {{Wiki|social}} [[realities]] impacting [[ancient]] [[religious]] texts; to [[Professor]] David Tracy of the [[University of Chicago]], my [[Master’s]] {{Wiki|dissertation}} advisor whose profound plumbing of [[philosophical]] depths, helped to deepen my [[own]] [[awareness]] of [[philosophical]] complexities as they arise in the new context of this [[investigation]]. [[Professor]] Arthur Droge at the {{Wiki|University}} instilled an [[awareness]] of the depth of implicit meanings to be found among [[religious]] texts. |
____________________ | ____________________ | ||
− | I must further express deepest gratitude to my late father, whose debate and argumentation with me about religious issues doubtless inspired the allure the debates within the Mahāyāna tradition have held for me. Concomitantly, I am grateful to my mother for imbuing me with some modicum of compassion to balance this great love of debate, so that I might more effectively avoid polemics here. | + | I must further express deepest [[gratitude]] to my late father, whose [[debate]] and {{Wiki|argumentation}} with me about [[religious]] issues doubtless inspired the allure the [[debates]] within the [[Mahāyāna tradition]] have held for me. Concomitantly, I am grateful to my mother for imbuing me with some modicum of [[compassion]] to [[balance]] this great [[love]] of [[debate]], so that I might more effectively avoid {{Wiki|polemics}} here. |
− | I hope that in some small measure, I may represent something of what I have learned from my superb teachers. | + | I {{Wiki|hope}} that in some small measure, I may represent something of what I have learned from my superb [[teachers]]. |
− | Addendum: I wrote this far back in 1997 and feared to publish it due to imperfection. Evolving my online teaching expertise has been my goal almost since my graduation. One of my schools is seeking evidence of publishing, so here it goes…self-publishing a book should suffice for my lecturer status. I have | + | Addendum: I wrote this far back in 1997 and feared to publish it due to imperfection. Evolving my online [[teaching]] expertise has been my goal almost since my graduation. One of my schools is seeking {{Wiki|evidence}} of publishing, so here it goes…self-publishing a [[book]] should suffice for my lecturer {{Wiki|status}}. I have |
− | been absorbed by instruction and neglected the field, but perhaps some knowledgeable lay person will get some benefit from my old work. Who knows? There might be insight to some degree for current scholars in the field. After all, many of the insights I share are due to learning from my eminent teachers, | + | been absorbed by instruction and neglected the field, but perhaps some [[knowledgeable]] lay [[person]] will get some [[benefit]] from my old work. Who [[knows]]? There might be [[insight]] to some [[degree]] for current [[scholars]] in the field. After all, many of the [[insights]] I share are due to {{Wiki|learning}} from my {{Wiki|eminent}} [[teachers]], |
− | Dr. Isshi Yamada and Geshe Lhundhup Sopa. All the diacritics disappeared from the old file, but with some perseverance, I believe I got them all correctly done. Pardon any errors. This is already overdue for a revision! I will hope the extensive outline of contents here will provide easy access to the many arguments as well as the overall import of this book. | + | Dr. [[Isshi]] Yamada and [[Geshe]] Lhundhup [[Sopa]]. All the diacritics disappeared from the old file, but with some perseverance, I believe I got them all correctly done. Pardon any errors. This is already overdue for a revision! I will {{Wiki|hope}} the extensive outline of contents here will provide easy access to the many arguments as well as the overall import of this [[book]]. |
− | Finally, please let me clarify that when I use the terms | + | Finally, please let me clarify that when I use the terms “[[Mind Only]]” or “Cittamātrin” it is in the more pejorative context of [[Gelukpa]] abuse of these many schools, implying the [[existence]] of a [[mind]] that functions like a “[[soul]]”, anathema to the [[Buddha’s teaching]]. I employ a number of finessed terms for a |
− | variety of | + | variety of “[[Yogācāra]]” (the better [[word]]), along with “Vijñāptivāda”, even Vijñāptimātravādin”. So please do not be confused. It is a [[fallacy]] to thin of [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] as opposing schools. One should think of them more as one would [[yin]] and yang…they blend and merge and oppose each other in a tremendous variety of ways. Here is one {{Wiki|perspective}}, largely a {{Wiki|Mongolian}} one, but I offer counter-arguments also I believe. |
− | I seek to simplify these arguments in time, but for now, please appreciate my attempt at unpacking the work on the Cittamātra section of the great lCang kya II’s great treasury of Buddhist debates, his “Beautiful Ornament of the Limits of Proofs. (sGrub mTHa DZes rGyan) and to some extent, adjudicating a core dispute between the two principal Mahāyāna Schools, the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, and the nature of consciousness, but more intriguingly, the nature of self-awareness. | + | I seek to simplify these arguments in time, but for now, please appreciate my attempt at unpacking the work on the [[Cittamātra]] section of the great lCang kya II’s great treasury of [[Buddhist]] [[debates]], his “Beautiful Ornament of the Limits of Proofs. ([[sGrub]] mTHa DZes rGyan) and to some extent, adjudicating a core dispute between the two [[principal]] [[Mahāyāna]] Schools, the [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]], and the [[nature]] of [[consciousness]], but more intriguingly, the [[nature]] of [[self-awareness]]. |
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− | Some words concerning terminology. | + | Some words concerning {{Wiki|terminology}}. |
− | A Nāgārjunan critique of essentialism . | + | A Nāgārjunan critique of [[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]] . |
. | . | ||
− | The first leg of the tetralemma: negation of essence | + | The first leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of [[essence]] |
− | The second leg of the tetralemma: negation of ‘no-essence’ | + | The second leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of ‘no-essence’ |
− | The third leg of the tetralemma: negation of ‘there both is and is not an | + | The third leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of ‘there both is and is not an [[essence]]’ |
− | Fourth leg of the tetralemma: negation of ‘neither essence nor non-essence’ | + | Fourth leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of ‘neither [[essence]] nor non-essence’ |
− | Conventional essentialism relative to ultimate non-essentialism | + | [[Conventional]] [[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]] [[relative]] to [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] non-essentialism |
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− | Occidental sympathizers: van der Leeuw and Bourdieu | + | {{Wiki|Occidental}} sympathizers: van der Leeuw and Bourdieu |
− | Proposal of a Mahayanist metatheory | + | Proposal of a [[Mahayanist]] metatheory |
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− | The three natures and their implications for the relationship of theory to practice in the Mahāyāna tradition and for religious studies in general. | + | The [[three natures]] and their implications for the relationship of {{Wiki|theory}} to practice in the [[Mahāyāna tradition]] and for [[religious]] studies in general. |
The application of these for our study | The application of these for our study | ||
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− | ==THE TWO SCHOOLS: ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL OR ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT?== | + | ==[[THE TWO SCHOOLS: ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL OR ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT?]]== |
− | ==THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE PIVOT AROUND WHICH THE GREAT DEBATES UNFOLD | + | ==[[THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE PIVOT AROUND WHICH THE GREAT DEBATES UNFOLD]]== |
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− | ===THE MAHĀYĀNASAṂGRĀHA: COUNTERACTING THE EXTREMES OF POSITIVISM AND REPUDIATION | + | ===[[THE MAHĀYĀNASAṂGRĀHA: COUNTERACTING THE EXTREMES OF POSITIVISM AND REPUDIATION]]=== |
− | ==THREE CYCLES OF DOCTRINE: THE SAṂDHINIRMOCANASŪTRA | + | ==[[THREE CYCLES OF DOCTRINE: THE SAṂDHINIRMOCANASŪTRA]]== |
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Legendary origin of the three cycles. | Legendary origin of the three cycles. | ||
− | Definitive versus provisional doctrines. | + | Definitive versus provisional [[doctrines]]. |
− | The first cycle of doctrine: the Śrāvakayāna. | + | The first cycle of [[doctrine]]: the [[Śrāvakayāna]]. |
− | Interpretable nature of the first cycle. | + | Interpretable [[nature]] of the first cycle. |
− | Nirvana as | + | [[Nirvana]] as ‘[[unconditioned]]’ [[phenomenon]]. |
− | Entical nature of First Cycle doctrines. | + | Entical [[nature]] of First Cycle [[doctrines]]. |
− | The Second Cyle of doctrine: Madhyamaka. | + | The Second Cyle of [[doctrine]]: [[Madhyamaka]]. |
− | Nihilism in the Second Cycle? | + | [[Nihilism]] in the Second Cycle? |
− | The Second Cycle: for the prideful who ‘lack roots of virtue. | + | The Second Cycle: for the prideful who ‘lack [[roots of virtue]]. |
− | Two wrong attitudes with regard to the Second Cycle doctrines. | + | Two wrong attitudes with regard to the Second Cycle [[doctrines]]. |
− | The Third Cycle of doctrine: Yogācāra. | + | The Third Cycle of [[doctrine]]: [[Yogācāra]]. |
− | The whole of Buddhist teaching is encapsulated by the doctrine of the three natures. | + | The whole of [[Buddhist teaching]] is encapsulated by the [[doctrine]] of the [[three natures]]. |
− | The first of the three natures: conceptualization. | + | The first of the [[three natures]]: [[conceptualization]]. |
− | The second of the three natures: the other-dependent. | + | The second of the [[three natures]]: the [[other-dependent]]. |
− | The third of the three natures: the perfected. | + | The third of the [[three natures]]: the perfected. |
− | Cittamātra: school of definitive interpretation. | + | [[Cittamātra]]: school of definitive [[interpretation]]. |
− | One Vasubandhu. | + | One [[Vasubandhu]]. |
− | Cittamātra critique of Madhyamaka. | + | [[Cittamātra]] critique of [[Madhyamaka]]. |
− | Mādhyamika response to Cittamātra critique. | + | [[Mādhyamika]] response to [[Cittamātra]] critique. |
− | The third cycle is taught to forestall falling into the ‘Great Nihilism.’ | + | The third cycle is [[taught]] to forestall falling into the ‘Great [[Nihilism]].’ |
− | The Sajdhinirmocanasūtra as definitive Madhyamaka text. | + | The Sajdhinirmocanasūtra as definitive [[Madhyamaka]] text. |
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− | Nāgārjuna’s Bodhicittavivāraṇa. | + | [[Nāgārjuna’s]] [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]]. |
− | Interpreting Candrakīrti’s | + | Interpreting [[Candrakīrti’s]] ‘[[Abhimukhi]]’ [[Chapter]]: directed to ‘outsiders’ or ‘insiders?’ |
− | Bhāvaviveka | + | [[Bhāvaviveka]] |
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− | Monastic studies in Beijing. | + | [[Monastic]] studies in {{Wiki|Beijing}}. |
− | Patronage of Manchu emperor Qianlong. | + | {{Wiki|Patronage}} of {{Wiki|Manchu}} {{Wiki|emperor Qianlong}}. |
− | ===Chapter [[‘Kha’ of the Ornament: ‘The three realms are mind alone.]]=== | + | ===[[Chapter]] [[‘Kha’ of the Ornament: ‘The three realms are mind alone.]]=== |
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Positivism. | Positivism. | ||
− | Nihilism. | + | [[Nihilism]]. |
− | Repudiation of the other-dependent nature is repudiation of the perfected nature. | + | Repudiation of the [[other-dependent nature]] is repudiation of the perfected [[nature]]. |
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− | The logical error of Madhyamaka rejection of a basis for phenomena | + | The [[logical]] error of [[Madhyamaka]] rejection of a basis for [[phenomena]] |
− | Adhering to a mistaken emptiness. | + | Adhering to a mistaken [[emptiness]]. |
− | Madhyamaka conception of the conventional and ultimate | + | [[Madhyamaka]] {{Wiki|conception}} of the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] and [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] |
− | Ultimacy versus ultimate truth. | + | Ultimacy versus [[ultimate truth]]. |
− | Ultimate truth is found in the mind of the Aryan bodhisattva. | + | [[Ultimate truth]] is found in the [[mind]] of the [[Aryan]] [[bodhisattva]]. |
− | Conventionality versus conventional truth. | + | Conventionality versus [[conventional truth]]. |
− | The face in the mirror. | + | The face in the [[mirror]]. |
− | Asaṅga's answer to the question of ultimacy. | + | [[Asaṅga's]] answer to the question of ultimacy. |
− | The two modes of the other-dependent are the conventional and the ultimate. | + | The two modes of the [[other-dependent]] are the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] and the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]. |
− | Causation from a | + | [[Causation]] from a ‘{{Wiki|continuum}}’ or from ‘mere [[imputation]]? |
− | Prior states condition posterior states. | + | Prior states [[condition]] posterior states. |
− | Madhyamaka thought is mere nominalism. | + | [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]] is mere [[nominalism]]. |
− | All is strictly imaginary? | + | All is strictly [[imaginary]]? |
The real basis of the concealing. | The real basis of the concealing. | ||
− | Support for the Yogācāra stance in the Pramāṇavartikka. | + | |
+ | |||
+ | ===[[Support for the Yogācāra stance in the Pramāṇavartikka.]]=== | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | Arguments in favor of establishing a basis for phenomena | + | |
+ | |||
+ | A [[Lotus]] arises from its seed. | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[Tsong kha pa]]: inner versus outer [[mental]] [[concealment]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Arguments in favor of establishing a basis for [[phenomena]] | ||
− | The conceptualized: imputation with a basis in reality. | + | The [[conceptualized]]: [[imputation]] with a basis in [[reality]]. |
− | Identification and refutation of the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness. | + | Identification and refutation of the [[Madhyamaka]] [[understanding]] of [[emptiness]]. |
− | Interwovenness-with-other is established by direct experience. | + | Interwovenness-with-other is established by direct [[experience]]. |
− | The other-dependent is demonstrated logically. | + | The [[other-dependent]] is demonstrated [[logically]]. |
− | Otherness is causation and condition. | + | Otherness is [[causation]] and [[condition]]. |
− | Mistaken consciousnesses exist though mistaken. | + | Mistaken [[consciousnesses]] [[exist]] though mistaken. |
− | Mistaken consciousnesses exist. | + | Mistaken [[consciousnesses]] [[exist]]. |
− | If no entity exists, then how could it be non-existent? | + | If no [[entity]] [[exists]], then how could it be [[non-existent]]? |
− | The other-dependent exists ultimately. | + | The [[other-dependent]] [[exists]] ultimately. |
− | The other-dependent: not ultimately established? | + | The [[other-dependent]]: not ultimately established? |
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− | The perfected nature: neither existent nor non-existent. | + | The perfected [[nature]]: neither [[existent]] nor [[non-existent]]. |
− | The other-dependent: ultimately existent but conventionally true. | + | The [[other-dependent]]: ultimately [[existent]] but {{Wiki|conventionally}} true. |
− | Ultimate truth: truth from a 'certain point of view. | + | [[Ultimate truth]]: [[truth]] from a 'certain point of view. |
− | kleśa and jñeya āvaraṇa. | + | [[kleśa]] and [[jñeya]] [[āvaraṇa]]. |
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− | Candrakīrti: assent to lCang skya's presentation of the other-dependent. | + | [[Candrakīrti]]: assent to lCang skya's presentation of the [[other-dependent]]. |
− | Candrakīrti: external objects exist in dreams. | + | [[Candrakīrti]]: [[external objects]] [[exist]] in [[dreams]]. |
− | External objects in dreams or waking reality are not produced. | + | [[External objects]] in [[dreams]] or waking [[reality]] are not produced. |
− | There is no thought in the absence of an object. | + | There is no [[thought]] in the absence of an [[object]]. |
− | Without an external object, cataracts should be seen by those with healthy eyes. | + | Without an [[external object]], cataracts should be seen by those with healthy [[eyes]]. |
− | The false appearance exists. | + | The false [[appearance]] [[exists]]. |
− | Tsong kha pa. | + | [[Tsong kha pa]]. |
mKhas Grub. | mKhas Grub. | ||
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− | Lack of a doctrine concerning a basal consciousness entails repudiation of karma theory. | + | Lack of a [[doctrine]] concerning a basal [[consciousness]] entails repudiation of [[karma]] {{Wiki|theory}}. |
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− | 1. Refuting an extreme view: self-aware gnosis knows itself as its own object. | + | 1. Refuting an extreme view: [[self-aware]] [[gnosis]] [[knows]] itself as its [[own]] [[object]]. |
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− | Error of asserting that self-awareness knows itself by means of itself. | + | Error of asserting that [[self-awareness]] [[knows]] itself by means of itself. |
− | The object of gnosis is not itself, but reality. | + | The [[object]] of [[gnosis]] is not itself, but [[reality]]. |
The second of three topics: establishing the actual meaning. | The second of three topics: establishing the actual meaning. | ||
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− | 1. The manner in which confusion arises. | + | 1. The manner in which [[confusion]] arises. |
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− | The irrefutability of self-awareness. | + | The irrefutability of [[self-awareness]]. |
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− | The sense in which dharmatā is called 'composite.' | + | The [[sense]] in which [[dharmatā]] is called 'composite.' |
+ | |||
+ | The perfected [[nature]] is the appropriate [[object]] of the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal. | ||
+ | |||
− | |||
− | The self-awareness knows emptiness implicitly, not explicitly. | + | ==[[The self-awareness knows emptiness implicitly, not explicitly.]]== |
− | |||
− | The self-awareness has no object but 'mere mental experience.' | + | |
+ | ==THE THIRD OF THREE TOPICS: WARDING OFF OPPOSING ARGUMENTS. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The [[self-awareness]] has no [[object]] but 'mere [[mental]] [[experience]].' | ||
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− | Candrakīrti. | + | [[Candrakīrti]]. |
− | Mind-only eradicates the view of an agentive self. | + | [[Mind-only]] eradicates the view of an [[agentive]] [[self]]. |
− | Refuting the agentive self of non-Buddhist schools. | + | Refuting the [[agentive]] [[self]] of [[non-Buddhist]] schools. |
− | Memory is no different from other types of cognition. | + | [[Memory]] is no different from other types of [[cognition]]. |
− | Memory is neither different from nor the same as the remembered event. | + | [[Memory]] is neither different from nor the same as the remembered event. |
− | Fire does not burn itself, nor does consciousness 'think' itself. | + | [[Fire]] does not burn itself, nor does [[consciousness]] 'think' itself. |
− | In the absence of external objects, consciousness itself cannot be an object. | + | In the absence of [[external objects]], [[consciousness]] itself cannot be an [[object]]. |
− | Identity or difference: memory relative to the original experience. | + | {{Wiki|Identity}} or difference: [[memory]] [[relative]] to the original [[experience]]. |
− | Subject/object dualism in all forms of consciousness. | + | Subject/object [[dualism]] in all [[forms]] of [[consciousness]]. |
− | The fallacy of infinite regression: cognition of a cognition of a cognition.... | + | The [[fallacy]] of [[infinite]] regression: [[cognition]] of a [[cognition]] of a [[cognition]].... |
− | Memory explained by recourse to conventional phenomena. | + | [[Memory]] explained by recourse to [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[phenomena]]. |
− | Tsong kha pa: memory occurs due to the primary experience. | + | [[Tsong kha pa]]: [[memory]] occurs due to the primary [[experience]]. |
− | The fallacy of two consciousnesses. | + | The [[fallacy]] of two [[consciousnesses]]. |
− | Tsong kha pa and infinite regression: there is no primary experience. | + | [[Tsong kha pa]] and [[infinite]] regression: there is no primary [[experience]]. |
− | The provisional validity of Yogācāra doctrine. | + | The provisional validity of [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrine]]. |
− | Without external entities, there is no stage upon which the consciousness may act. | + | Without external entities, there is no stage upon which the [[consciousness]] may act. |
− | Concomitancy cohering mind and form. | + | Concomitancy cohering [[mind]] and [[form]]. |
− | Consciousness as real, actual ultimately existent fact is refuted. | + | [[Consciousness]] as real, actual ultimately [[existent]] fact is refuted. |
− | As the object of knowledge falls, so falls the knower. | + | As the [[object of knowledge]] falls, so falls the knower. |
Line 444: | Line 454: | ||
− | The name 'Sautrāntika.' | + | The [[name]] '[[Sautrāntika]].' |
− | The place of the Sautrāntika among the early sects of Buddhism. | + | The place of the [[Sautrāntika]] among the early sects of [[Buddhism]]. |
− | Summary of the Sautrāntika position. | + | Summary of the [[Sautrāntika]] position. |
− | Summary of the Sautrāntika position. | + | Summary of the [[Sautrāntika]] position. |
− | Continuity and transformation. | + | Continuity and [[transformation]]. |
− | Mind and body. | + | [[Mind and body]]. |
− | Atomistic phenomena ultimately and actually exist. | + | Atomistic [[phenomena]] ultimately and actually [[exist]]. |
− | Rejection of atomism by both Mahāyāna schools. | + | Rejection of [[atomism]] by both [[Mahāyāna schools]]. |
− | Vasubandhu's anti-atomism. | + | [[Vasubandhu's]] anti-atomism. |
Line 470: | Line 480: | ||
The innate aspect. | The innate aspect. | ||
− | The conceptualized aspect. | + | The [[conceptualized]] aspect. |
− | The conceptualized aspect is more easily eradicated. | + | The [[conceptualized]] aspect is more easily eradicated. |
Line 480: | Line 490: | ||
− | The essence and its attributes. | + | The [[essence]] and its [[attributes]]. |
− | Tsong kha pa's understanding of this topic in the MS. | + | [[Tsong kha pa's]] [[understanding]] of this topic in the MS. |
The self-isolate and the referent category. | The self-isolate and the referent category. | ||
An opponent’s mistaken notion of the self-isolate. | An opponent’s mistaken notion of the self-isolate. | ||
− | Even the Sautrāntika hold the generic image to be positivism. | + | Even the [[Sautrāntika]] hold the [[generic image]] to be positivism. |
− | The opponent's second argument: the basal referent and the other-dependent. | + | The opponent's second argument: the basal referent and the [[other-dependent]]. |
Line 495: | Line 505: | ||
− | Tsong kha pa's response. | + | [[Tsong kha pa's]] response. |
− | Naive versus sophisticated positivism. | + | {{Wiki|Naive}} versus sophisticated positivism. |
− | Sautrāntika: exemplars of a sophisticated refication. | + | [[Sautrāntika]]: exemplars of a sophisticated refication. |
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ===[[CORRUPT VERSUS UNCORRUPT MODES OF APPEARANCE]]=== | ||
− | |||
The definitive approach according to lCang skya II | The definitive approach according to lCang skya II | ||
− | The manner in which the Sautrāntika cleave to positivism. | + | The manner in which the [[Sautrāntika]] cleave to positivism. |
− | The Cittamātrin position: even sense perception is corrupt. | + | The Cittamātrin position: even [[sense perception]] is corrupt. |
− | Sautrāntika: immediacy of sense perception. | + | [[Sautrāntika]]: {{Wiki|immediacy}} of [[sense perception]]. |
− | Does one strictly imagine entities? | + | Does one strictly [[imagine]] entities? |
− | The basis of phenomena. | + | The basis of [[phenomena]]. |
− | Sautrāntika: the fundamental difference of consciousness and its object. | + | [[Sautrāntika]]: the fundamental difference of [[consciousness]] and its [[object]]. |
− | Unmistaken and uncorrupt consciousness. | + | Unmistaken and uncorrupt [[consciousness]]. |
− | Sautrāntika: the generic image is not ultimately established. | + | [[Sautrāntika]]: the [[generic image]] is not ultimately established. |
− | The Yogācārin position concerning external entities: propensities and habituation. | + | The [[Yogācārin]] position concerning external entities: propensities and habituation. |
− | The Yogācāra position: no external entities. | + | The [[Yogācāra]] position: no external entities. |
− | Agreement of all schools of Buddhism: the generic image is a false construct. | + | Agreement of all [[schools of Buddhism]]: the [[generic image]] is a false construct. |
− | Buddhist disagreement concerning the referent object. | + | [[Buddhist]] disagreement concerning the referent [[object]]. |
− | THE FINAL DISTINCTION FOR POSITIVISM: THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS. | + | THE FINAL DISTINCTION FOR POSITIVISM: THE [[EXISTENCE]] OR NON-EXISTENCE OF [[EXTERNAL]] OBJECTS. |
− | Yogācāra: the three aspects for the existence of an apparently external object. | + | [[Yogācāra]]: the three aspects for the [[existence]] of an apparently [[external object]]. |
− | Habituation towards similar types of objects. | + | Habituation towards similar types of [[objects]]. |
− | Three principal arguments establishing the imputation of names. | + | Three [[principal]] arguments establishing the [[imputation]] of names. |
− | Prior to a sign, no intellection exists. | + | Prior to a sign, no intellection [[exists]]. |
Many names equate to many entities? | Many names equate to many entities? | ||
− | The incoherence of sphota theory. | + | The [[Wikipedia:The Incoherence of the Philosophers|incoherence]] of [[sphota]] {{Wiki|theory}}. |
− | Point three: a single name applied to several entities. | + | Point three: a single [[name]] applied to several entities. |
− | Syllogism and consequential reasoning. | + | [[Syllogism]] and consequential {{Wiki|reasoning}}. |
Line 534: | Line 546: | ||
− | Opposition to the conception of a 'basal' consciousness: the Bodhicittavivāraṇa. | + | [[Opposition]] to the {{Wiki|conception}} of a 'basal' [[consciousness]]: the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]]. |
− | Agreement among the Madhyamaka Masters: the basal consciousness is illusory. | + | Agreement among the [[Madhyamaka]] [[Masters]]: the basal [[consciousness]] is [[illusory]]. |
− | Candrakīrti: logically, ultimately there is no such thing as potentiality. | + | [[Candrakīrti]]: [[logically]], ultimately there is no such thing as potentiality. |
− | The blind would see blue. | + | The [[blind]] would see blue. |
− | The inefficaciousness of Yogācārin meditation: the basal consciousness as 'hindrance.' | + | The inefficaciousness of [[Yogācārin]] [[meditation]]: the basal [[consciousness]] as '[[hindrance]].' |
− | Tsong kha pa: the difficulties of no doctrine concerning a basal consciousness. | + | [[Tsong kha pa]]: the difficulties of no [[doctrine]] concerning a basal [[consciousness]]. |
− | The 'interpretable' nature of the doctrine of the basal consciousness. | + | The 'interpretable' [[nature]] of the [[doctrine]] of the basal [[consciousness]]. |
Line 549: | Line 561: | ||
− | The investigation of names. | + | The [[investigation]] of names. |
− | The Investigation of the object. | + | The [[Investigation of the object]]. |
− | The investigation of particularity. | + | The [[investigation]] of [[particularity]]. |
− | The Four Investigations establish the Mind-only position negatively. | + | The Four Investigations establish the [[Mind-only]] position negatively. |
+ | |||
− | + | ===[[IS THIS THE YOGĀCĀRA SYSTEM? SCHOLARS INCLINED TO A YOGĀCĀRIN STANCE]]=== | |
+ | |||
− | Nagao | + | [[Nagao]] |
− | The Yogācāra maintains a positive approach. | + | The [[Yogācāra]] maintains a positive approach. |
− | The other-dependent is a foundation and mediator. | + | The [[other-dependent]] is a foundation and [[mediator]]. |
− | The bridge between the sacred and profane. | + | The bridge between the [[sacred]] and profane. |
− | Madhyamaka: nihilism with regard to the subject. | + | [[Madhyamaka]]: [[nihilism]] with regard to the [[subject]]. |
− | Wayman. | + | [[Wayman]]. |
Keenan. | Keenan. | ||
Harris. | Harris. | ||
Line 592: | Line 606: | ||
− | Madhyamaka the definitive view of Asaṅga and Maitreya? | + | [[Madhyamaka]] the definitive view of [[Asaṅga]] and [[Maitreya]]? |
− | Discrepancy between no-self doctrine and that of primordially enlightened nature. | + | Discrepancy between [[no-self]] [[doctrine]] and that of [[primordially]] [[enlightened nature]]. |
− | Tathāgatagarbha thought is connected with both views. | + | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] [[thought]] is connected with both [[views]]. |
− | Madhyamaka: the definitive stance of Asaṅga and Maitreya. | + | [[Madhyamaka]]: the definitive stance of [[Asaṅga]] and [[Maitreya]]. |
− | The lack of doctrine concerning the basal consciousness in TGG literature. | + | The lack of [[doctrine]] concerning the basal [[consciousness]] in TGG {{Wiki|literature}}. |
− | Tathāgatagarbha absorbed in Mind-only system. | + | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] absorbed in [[Mind-only]] system. |
− | Danger of nihilism in the Perfection of Wisdom literature. | + | [[Danger]] of [[nihilism]] in the [[Perfection of Wisdom]] {{Wiki|literature}}. |
− | Tathāgatagarbha theory clarifies emptiness. | + | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} clarifies [[emptiness]]. |
− | Relative essentialism in the Cittamātra. | + | [[Relative]] [[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]] in the [[Cittamātra]]. |
− | Key Cittamātra terms missing from the RGV. | + | Key [[Cittamātra]] terms missing from the RGV. |
− | Weakness of a garbha theory devoid of the basal consciousness doctrine. | + | Weakness of a [[garbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} devoid of the basal [[consciousness doctrine]]. |
− | Equation of the basal consciousness with the tathāgatagarbha: the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. | + | Equation of the basal [[consciousness]] with the [[tathāgatagarbha]]: the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. |
− | 'Monstrous' importing of 'self' into Buddhism. | + | 'Monstrous' importing of '[[self]]' into [[Buddhism]]. |
− | The Madhyamaka interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha. | + | The [[Madhyamaka]] [[interpretation]] of the [[tathāgatagarbha]]. |
− | Tathāgatagarbha 'alien' infiltration into Madhyamaka? | + | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] 'alien' infiltration into [[Madhyamaka]]? |
− | Inherent 'essentialism' in tathāgatagarbha doctrine. | + | [[Inherent]] '[[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]]' in [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]]. |
− | Essentialism relative to Madhyamaka thought: Sthiramati. | + | [[Essentialism]] [[relative]] to [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]]: [[Sthiramati]]. |
− | Candrakīrti's counterclaim: the 'syllableless' dharma. | + | [[Candrakīrti's]] counterclaim: the 'syllableless' [[dharma]]. |
− | The Final issue: is the tathāgatagarbha doctrine definitive or provisional? | + | The Final issue: is the [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]] definitive or provisional? |
− | Candrakīrti's false accusation? | + | [[Candrakīrti's]] false accusation? |
− | Provisional nature of tathāgatagarbha doctrine: Tsong kha pa. | + | Provisional [[nature]] of [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]]: [[Tsong kha pa]]. |
− | The tathāgatagarbha is a quasi-ātman. | + | The [[tathāgatagarbha]] is a quasi-ātman. |
− | Provisionality of the tathāgatagarbha: mKhas grup. | + | Provisionality of the [[tathāgatagarbha]]: mKhas grup. |
− | Selflessness reconciled with tathāgatagarbha. | + | [[Selflessness]] reconciled with [[tathāgatagarbha]]. |
− | The Cittamatra approach is upāya. | + | The [[Cittamatra]] approach is [[upāya]]. |
Crypto-ātman. | Crypto-ātman. | ||
− | Intentional ground of tathāgatagarbha doctrine. | + | Intentional ground of [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]]. |
− | Emptiness in tathāgatagarbha theory refers to the individual mental continuum. | + | [[Emptiness]] in [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} refers to the {{Wiki|individual}} [[mental continuum]]. |
− | Tathāgatagarbha as definitive doctrine. | + | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] as definitive [[doctrine]]. |
− | gZhan stong empty of 'other.' | + | [[gZhan stong]] [[empty]] of 'other.' |
− | gZhan stong: the definitive view of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga? | + | [[gZhan stong]]: the definitive view of [[Nāgārjuna]] and [[Asaṅga]]? |
− | Empty of essence or of defilements? | + | [[Empty]] of [[essence]] or of [[defilements]]? |
Line 636: | Line 650: | ||
− | + | ==APPENDIX C: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY== | |
Abbreviations | Abbreviations | ||
+ | <poem> | ||
− | + | P. [[Pāli]] | |
− | P. Pāli | + | Sk. [[Sanskrit]] |
− | Sk. Sanskrit | + | Tib. [[Tibetan]] |
− | Tib. Tibetan | + | [[Chin]]. {{Wiki|Chinese}} |
− | Chin. Chinese | + | Jap. [[Japanese]] |
− | Jap. Japanese | ||
− | Principal texts | + | [[Principal]] texts |
Aks. Akśayamatinirdeśasūtra | Aks. Akśayamatinirdeśasūtra | ||
− | BB Bodhisattvabhūmi | + | BB [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]] |
− | BCA Bodhicaryāvatara | + | BCA [[Bodhicaryāvatara]] |
− | BV Bodhicittavivāraṇa | + | BV [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] |
CS Catuḥśatakastava | CS Catuḥśatakastava | ||
− | DDV Dharmadharmatāvibhāga | + | DDV [[Dharmadharmatāvibhāga]] |
GV Gandavyuhasūtra | GV Gandavyuhasūtra | ||
MA Madhyamakāvatara | MA Madhyamakāvatara | ||
Line 663: | Line 677: | ||
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ | MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ | ||
MMV Mūlamadhyamakavṛttibuddhapālita | MMV Mūlamadhyamakavṛttibuddhapālita | ||
− | MS Mahāyāna Saṃgrāha | + | MS [[Mahāyāna]] Saṃgrāha |
LA Laṅkāvatarasūtra | LA Laṅkāvatarasūtra | ||
− | PP Prasannapadā | + | PP [[Prasannapadā]] |
SN Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra | SN Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra | ||
Tbh Triṃśikabhāṣyam | Tbh Triṃśikabhāṣyam | ||
VV Vigrāhavyāvartaṇī | VV Vigrāhavyāvartaṇī | ||
− | TSN Trisvabhāvanirdeśa | + | TSN [[Trisvabhāvanirdeśa]] |
− | RGV Ratnagotravibhāga | + | RGV [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] |
− | =Tibetan Primary sources= | + | =[[Tibetan]] Primary sources= |
− | GRS dBu m a la ‘jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal or also simply known as the dGongs pa Rab gSal of Tsong kha pa. | + | GRS dBu m a la ‘jug pa’i [[rgya]] cher [[bshad pa]] [[dgongs pa rab gsal]] or also simply known as the [[dGongs pa Rab gSal]] of [[Tsong kha pa]]. |
− | LSN Legs bShad sNying po | + | |
− | GTDG sGrub mTHa DZes rGyan | + | LSN {{Wiki|Legs}} bShad sNying po |
+ | |||
+ | GTDG [[sGrub]] mTHa DZes rGyan | ||
− | Principal Journals | + | [[Principal]] Journals |
+ | |||
+ | IIJ [[Indo-Iranian Journal]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | JIAB Journal of the [[International Association of Buddhist Studies]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | JIP [[Journal of Indian Philosophy]] | ||
− | + | PEW [[Philosophy East and West]] | |
− | |||
− | |||
− | PEW Philosophy East and West | ||
− | |||
+ | TJ [[Tibet Journal]] | ||
+ | </poem> | ||
===Preface.=== | ===Preface.=== | ||
Line 695: | Line 715: | ||
− | This dissertation is the result of more than thirteen years of study and reflection upon the two central schools of Mahāyāna philosophical tradition and the many issues over which scholars of those traditions debated and for the most part, agreed. | + | This {{Wiki|dissertation}} is the result of more than thirteen years of study and {{Wiki|reflection}} upon the two central schools of [[Mahāyāna]] [[philosophical]] [[tradition]] and the many issues over which [[scholars]] of those [[traditions]] [[debated]] and for the most part, agreed. |
− | I was first introduced to the basic doctrines of the two schools by Dr. Isshi Yamada while an undergraduate at Northwestern, and later, as a travelling scholar from the University of Chicago. Under his tutelage, I was taught that the two schools co-abide harmoniously within Mahāyāna tradition. The Yogācāra tradition was taught as an enormous expansion and synthesis of the best insights of both the Abhidharma and Prajñāpāramitā traditions. At the ultimate level, at the limits of verbal expression, as Dr. Yamada always reminded us, the last recourse was “finally, then, Nāgārjuna .” | + | I was first introduced to the basic [[doctrines]] of the two schools by Dr. [[Isshi]] Yamada while an undergraduate at Northwestern, and later, as a travelling [[scholar]] from the [[University of Chicago]]. Under his tutelage, I was [[taught]] that the two schools co-abide harmoniously within [[Mahāyāna tradition]]. The [[Yogācāra tradition]] was [[taught]] as an enormous expansion and {{Wiki|synthesis}} of the best [[insights]] of both the [[Abhidharma]] and [[Prajñāpāramitā]] [[traditions]]. At the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level, at the limits of [[verbal]] expression, as Dr. Yamada always reminded us, the last recourse was “finally, then, [[Nāgārjuna]] .” |
− | Nāgārjuna’s works elucidated the illusory, falsely bifurcating and discriminating fact of the type of truth that can be expressed in signs, that is to say, syllables, words and sentences, i.e., verbal expression, and through images, both sensorially and conceptually represented. Since all verbal expression is falsely dichotomizing, Nāgārjuna’s efforts demonstrate a “definitive” philosophical stance, in the sense of “the last | + | [[Nāgārjuna’s]] works elucidated the [[illusory]], falsely bifurcating and discriminating fact of the type of [[truth]] that can be expressed in [[signs]], that is to say, {{Wiki|syllables}}, words and sentences, i.e., [[verbal]] expression, and through images, both sensorially and conceptually represented. Since all [[verbal]] expression is falsely dichotomizing, [[Nāgārjuna’s]] efforts demonstrate a “definitive” [[philosophical]] stance, in the [[sense]] of “the last [[word]]” about words, applicable to all standpoints, [[including]] the [[Madhyamaka]], particularly when it is falsely seen as a view itself, something [[Nāgārjuna]] rejected. |
− | Nevertheless, one may accept the fact of the illusory qualities of language. When one has come to understand that words are useful tools, without which the dharma could not be communicated, then one may well conclude that works of the Yogācāra tradition are no more a distortion of reality by its use of words than are the works of Mādhyamika scholars. The Yogācāra tradition elaborates the categories of the Abhidharma traditions, meditative traditions and the | + | Nevertheless, one may accept the fact of the [[illusory]] qualities of [[language]]. When one has come to understand that words are useful tools, without which the [[dharma]] could not be communicated, then one may well conclude that works of the [[Yogācāra tradition]] are no more a [[distortion]] of [[reality]] by its use of words than are the works of [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]]. The [[Yogācāra tradition]] elaborates the categories of the [[Abhidharma]] [[traditions]], [[meditative]] [[traditions]] and the |
− | “negational” approach of the Prajñāpāramitā corpi into one very persuasive, extensive and well-ordered systematic treatment. It orders the | + | “negational” approach of the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] corpi into one very {{Wiki|persuasive}}, extensive and well-ordered systematic treatment. It orders the “[[two truths]]” of [[Madhyamaka]] [[concern]] into its three-tiered scheme, explicitly inclusive of praxis. |
− | |||
+ | Upon {{Wiki|learning}} of the [[existence]] of a living [[Madhyamaka tradition]] [[embodied]] in the [[person]] of [[Geshe]] Lhundhup [[Sopa]] at the [[University of Wisconsin]] at [[Madison]], I endeavored to discover what else I might learn of the [[tradition]] with which I had become completely transfixed. Expecting to hear roughly the same things to which I had become accustomed with Dr. Yamada, I was somewhat shocked to discover the basic presentation of the schools to be reversed from that which Dr. Yamada had [[taught]] me. | ||
− | |||
− | + | Rather than viewing the [[Yogācāra]] system as more comprehensive, it was seen rather as more “essentialist” or “foundationalist” [[Buddhist tradition]] for lack of better words, than the [[Madhyamaka]]. Its [[doctrines]] focusing on the centrality of [[consciousness]], the basal [[consciousness]], etc., were all rough preliminaries to the real issue, which is the definitive [[awareness]] of [[śūnyatā]] as presented by [[Nāgārjuna]] and particularly, his [[Prāsaṅgika]] followers. | |
− | + | Confronted by these two presentations, I felt {{Wiki|distinct}} [[Wikipedia:cognition|cognitive]] dissonance: which of the two schools is preliminary and which definitive? Is in fact, one of the [[traditions]] “{{Wiki|superior}}” to the other, or is this a false and not very useful {{Wiki|conception}}? | |
− | + | Faced with some [[confusion]], I endeavored to resolve it. This is elaborated in the conclusion of this {{Wiki|dissertation}}. Suffice it to say, all three major branches of [[Buddhist]] [[philosophical]] [[tradition]] - [[Śrāvakayāna]], [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] Schools, evince a strong [[desire]] to demonstrate that their [[own]] positions inhabit the true [[middle path]], are definitive and reveal the most profound {{Wiki|intentions}} of the [[Buddha]]. | |
− | + | In some [[sense]], all three are correct. They are correct, as [[Tibetan]] writers would say, [[ngor]] [[bden pa]] - “true from a certain point of view.” To determine the provisional and preliminary versus the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] and definitive [[truth]] of the [[Buddha]], the three [[traditions]] rely on [[logic]], example and [[scripture]]. Rather than simply negate the [[truth]] as presented | |
− | + | by the other schools, each will simply point to its [[own]] definitive {{Wiki|status}} and attempt to demonstrate the preliminary {{Wiki|status}} of the others, with the implication that the others serve a {{Wiki|purpose}} - for [[disciples]] of relatively {{Wiki|inferior}} [[mental faculties]]. | |
− | + | Disclaimer. This study is “interpretable” and “non-definitive” to use [[Mahāyāna]] {{Wiki|vernacular}}. Its scope encompasses [[knowledge]] for those who aspire to better than average [[comprehension]] of the intricacies of the [[tradition]] known in the [[West]] as “[[Mahāyāna philosophy]].” | |
− | + | This work itself aspires to {{Wiki|present}} in a summary and basic way some of the issues over which the two schools contended. Thus, it is our {{Wiki|hope}} that the trained lay-person and the beginning graduate [[student]] may have their [[awareness]] of the two main schools of the [[Mahāyāna tradition]] enhanced and that perhaps some of the fog surrounding these complex issues may lift. | |
− | + | Whether there is a dispute at all is itself a disputed issue among many {{Wiki|modern}} [[scholars]]. While the schools argue about which is the definitive [[teaching of the Buddha]], all will agree that admit that insofar as their [[doctrines]] | |
+ | remain written words and are merely [[conceptualized]] by {{Wiki|adherents}} as {{Wiki|dogma}}, their [[doctrines]] are indeed yet provisional with regard to the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal ([[paramārtha]]). In this [[sense]] the [[doctrines]] of all three schools are [[upāya]] - useful approaches but not [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] in and of themselves. | ||
− | What this work is. | + | What this work is not. This work is not intended to be a [[great accomplishment]] of philological rigor. This work contains very few references to {{Wiki|sociological}} or historical {{Wiki|data}}, for as with most [[Buddhist]] [[philosophical]] texts, there is no mention of politicians or generals. Although we do elucidate to some extent the [[development]] of the [[disputes]] from [pseudo?][[Nāgārjuna’s]] terse [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] to the compendious work of lCang skya II, this is not properly {{Wiki|speaking}}, a history of [[ideas]] or of the historical study of the texts. It is [[philosophy]]. |
− | + | Furthermore, this work is not complete in other ways. While engaged in the task of preparing this {{Wiki|dissertation}}, I received very many suggestions for additional comments from other great [[pundits]] of [[Buddhist Studies]] [[tradition]], and many more [[scholars]] and texts which address these [[subjects]] were mentioned. Rather than taking on too much, here, I have chosen to {{Wiki|present}} some basic [[understanding]] of disputed issues. | |
− | |||
− | + | What this work is. It is both a descriptive account and yet in other ways, a “normative” account. The focus of this study is a translation of a major [[Gelukpa]] summa with a [[sub-commentary]] elucidated to the best of my {{Wiki|abilities}}, the meaning of which was recounted to me by a renowned [[lha]] rampa [[Geshe]], [[Geshe Sopa]]. | |
− | + | This account is descriptive in the [[sense]] that it presents straightforwardly a major [[Geluk]] [[interpretation]] of the [[Yogācāra]] system, which itself, aims to be descriptive, even pro-active in presenting the school “from its [[own]] side” as it were, i.e. fairly and even aggressively. lCang skya’s [[Yogācāra]] [[siddhānta]] is no “straw-man” accounting. | |
+ | Some words concerning {{Wiki|terminology}}. We are employing both terms [[Yogācāra]] - Yoga-praxis [School], and [[Yogācāra]] the “[[Mind-only]] [School]” for our work here somewhat interchangeably except with regard to the translation of our central | ||
− | + | text in the [[sub-commentary]] and chapters not taken from the translation of our main text. The former term is that with which most are familiar, and the [[latter]] is arguably the most inclusive reference to the [[traditions]] [[scholars]] variously refer to as [[Vijñānavāda]] - the “[[Consciousness]] [School],” Vijñāptimātravāda - the “[[Cognition-only]] School.” | |
− | |||
+ | Certainly, many if not most [[doctrines]] are shared in common by the schools designated by the above labels, but important {{Wiki|distinctions}} must be made. The [[consciousness]] [[doctrines]] found in the Laṅkāvatarasūtra are unequivocally not to be simply conflated with the [[doctrines]] of [[Asaṅga]], [[Vasubandhu]], [[Sthiramati]] and so forth, though one finds much interplay among the [[scholars]] and texts which are considered to be allied with [[Mahāyāna]] [[doctrines]] which assert the primacy of [[consciousness]]. | ||
− | + | Generally however, except for exact usage in the translation of lCang skya’s text which is usually (though not strictly) referring to what he calls most often as the [[Sems tsam pa]] or [[Mind-only]] system, I will use the term simply [[Yogācāra]] , Yoga-praxis, Mind-alone/only, [[Sems tsam pa]], [[Yogācāra]] rNam par [[Shes pa]], [[Vijñānavāda]], [[Conscious]] alone/only, | |
− | + | [[Cognition]] alone/only rNam par [[rigs pa]], Vijñāptimātravāda, and use interchangeably, [[understanding]] that the {{Wiki|distinctions}} to be made among these various terms, is [[dependent upon]] context and one’s [[own]] approach, though efforts have been made towards consistency. A thorough [[discussion]] of the issue of the origins or {{Wiki|distinctions}} to be made among these sub-schools belongs to the efforts of others. What is clear however, is that we have at least a “[[family]]” of related [[traditions]] regardless of {{Wiki|distinctions}} {{Wiki|adherents}} or others might wish to make. | |
− | + | This is, I should {{Wiki|hope}}, an accurate, if not strictly [[word]] for [[word]] translation. Brackets are supplied with the aim of clarifying [[thoughts]] that are again, terse and abbreviated. These may of course be ignored if one seeks a [[sense]] of the [[Tibetan]] phrasing, etc. | |
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+ | In this {{Wiki|dissertation}}, we propose to {{Wiki|present}} a descriptive textual study that will {{Wiki|present}} the [[Yogācāra School]] as seen from the vantage point of the [[Madhyamaka]]. We employ as our primary text passages from the Beautiful | ||
− | + | Ornament. This work was composed in the middle of the eighteenth century by [[Rol pa’i rdo rje]] lCang skya the second, [[preceptor]] of the {{Wiki|Manchu}} [[empire]] and instructor for arguably its greatest [[emperor]], [[Wikipedia:emperor Qianlong|Qianlong]], we will {{Wiki|present}} a preliminary portrait of the school known in the text generally as the “[[Mind-only]]” School. | |
− | + | The points at which primary text translation stops and [[sub-commentary]] begins follow for the most part points at which [[Geshe Sopa]] felt were units of [[thought]]. The commentary presents his [[views]] as best as I was able to relate them. Often I have used [[Geshe Sopa’s]] [[own]] {{Wiki|terminology}} in the translation. Equally often I have used synonyms if this aided [[comprehension]]. Like many students of [[Buddhist tradition]], I have coined idiosyncratic but useful terms for a number of key terms. | |
− | + | With regard to the use of the terms “positivist” and “nihilismist,” our argument as follows. Initially we took [[Robert Thurman’s]] [[insight]] that these schools are unlike any [[Western]] schools, therefore there is an advantage in | |
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+ | avoiding [[existing]] terms. Hence his choices of “reificationism” and “repudiationism” respectively. In [[discussion]] with [[Geshe Sopa]] I discussed the manner in which the choice of terms was at issue. I explained that the terms nihilismand positivism had a specific context in the occident. | ||
− | + | Some may associate the term “[[nihilism]]” and think immediately of the works of [[Nietzsche]] and others. Others may think of Mill and so forth when the term “positivism” is mentioned. We in almost no way associate our usage of these in this text with specific works of [[Western]] [[scholars]] to whom we give this appellation. The only [[connection]] is in a general [[sense]] with the [[idea]] of things seen as either [[existing]] or [[non-existing]]. These connections, if they are at all suitable admittedly deserve fuller treatment than is or {{Wiki|purpose}} here to give. | |
+ | In the text, “skur ba debs pa” is explicitly defined as med par [[lta ba]] or a “view as [[non-existent]].” As with other types of [[nihilism]], the over-negation of the role of [[consciousness]] by the [[Madhyamaka School]] leads literally to a repudiation of the [[Buddhadharma]] and a [[concomitant]] undermining of the bodhimārga. Without a foundation of some sort, many may contend that it is difficult to maintain an [[ethical]] code, or a focus | ||
− | [ | + | This [[investigation]] is ordered as followed. Following the initial chapters of [[Wikipedia:scientific method|methodology]] and introduction, we have presented these three topics from lCang skya’s summa. We have translated and elucidated a commentary on the main |
− | + | section of the Ornament which {{Wiki|present}} the [[Mind-only]] School’s position on three central topics: [[nihilism]], [[self-awareness]] and positivism. We have presented at the end of each [[chapter]], classical [[Madhyamaka]] critical examinations of the relevant [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrines]] and within the footnotes, {{Wiki|modern}} opinions on appropriate aspects of our study. | |
− | + | It will be our {{Wiki|purpose}} to {{Wiki|present}} at least at a preliminary and probing manner, the complexities involved in this issue. The inter-relationship and commonality shared by the two schools will not be obscured in our study simply because we are focusing on disputed issues. I {{Wiki|hope}} that this will be an outcome of our study: we will have presented what have been seen as [[vital]] {{Wiki|distinctions}} among [[elements]] of the [[Mahāyānist]] textual [[traditions]], but the [[essential]] {{Wiki|unity}} and shared values and perspectives of the two schools will hopefully have been made clear. | |
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+ | ===[[Chapter]] One: [[Methodology]]=== | ||
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− | + | [In my [[book]], I argue] against the old-fashioned method of {{Wiki|dialogue}}, which I satirize as ‘Take a [[Buddhist]] to Dinner’ | |
+ | One [question] is, which [[Buddhist]] are you going to get? Maybe you get a [[Buddhist]] from one school which is very atypical. There are a lot of [[reasons]] why any common or garden-variety [[Buddhist]] is not the [[Buddhist]] you want, and also why the [[Dalai Lama]] is not the one you want either, because he’s not a typical [[Tibetan Buddhist]]. So which [[Buddhist]] are going to take to dinner? | ||
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+ | |||
+ | ==[[Wendy Doniger]] in Criterion== | ||
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− | + | Refutation of essentialist approaches found among [[Western]] [[scholars]] of [[religion]]. | |
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+ | Doniger’s quote presents of course, a highly Euro-centric position. It implies that [[Buddhologists]] from {{Wiki|Asia}} are mere “believers”, and have no “[[scholars]]”. Certainly my studies with [[Isshi]] Yamada and Lhundhup [[Sopa]] proved very much otherwise to me, and in fact, these two made me {{Wiki|aware}} of the biases from the “[[Western]]” side of this gulf. One sees in | ||
+ | the vast and diverse ocean of contending [[paradigms]] often an incompatibility among them. This {{Wiki|methodological}} section emerges out of a [[concern]] that in the area of [[Buddhist studies]], many approaches have been applied in the [[west]] to study [[Buddhism]] which fail to incorporate the full scope of [[epistemological]] and {{Wiki|methodological}} concerns which have motivated [[Buddhist scholars]] themselves. | ||
− | + | We will begin our {{Wiki|examination}} of the issues by taking on the [[epistemological]] task of describing early efforts by [[western]] {{Wiki|historians}} of [[religion]] to expose the “[[essence]]” of a [[religion]] ([[Christianity]] in this case). We will then move | |
− | + | on to provisionally outlining a [[Wikipedia:scientific method|methodology]] which corresponds to the [[Mahāyānist]] epistemology we describe at the outset. Finally, we will conclude with a [[discussion]] of how [[traditional]] [[western]] and [[traditional]] “eastern” approaches should be [[conceived]] from the standpoint of a [[Mahāyānist]] approach to the study of [[religion]]. | |
+ | [[Essentialism]] in {{Wiki|Occidental}} approaches to the study of [[religion]]. The [[arising]] of the “[[scientific]]” study of [[religion]]. In a [[sense]], we can trace the origin of the [[scientific study]] of [[religion]] back to the attempts of {{Wiki|Protestant}} [[scholars]] during the Reformation (ca. 16th century) to render {{Wiki|vernacular}} translations of the Bible and determine objectively exactly what {{Wiki|Jesus}} really said, rather than relying on papal authority to determine {{Wiki|biblical}} [[truths]]. | ||
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+ | The [[scientific study]] of the History of [[Religions]] really gets underway in the wake of the [[philosophical]] work of {{Wiki|Kant}} (1724-1804) and [[Wikipedia:Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]] (1770-1831). Roughly {{Wiki|speaking}}, {{Wiki|Kant}} held that [[humans]] have pre-determined [[mental]] categories | ||
− | + | which filter [[reality]]. Through these categories, one can know nothing of a “[[thing-in-itself]]” (Ding-an-sich), one can only know a “thing” or “[[existent]] [[entity]]” as it appears or [[manifests]] itself as a [[phenomenon]]. Opposed to [[phenomena]] are noumena or “things of the [[mind]]” which are beyond the ken of the [[mental]] categories. | |
− | + | Such a {{Wiki|concept}}, though taken as a given for a large number of [[scholars]] throughout the Occident for nigh two centuries, is scarcely comprehensible to one raised in {{Wiki|East Asia}}, the cultures of which operate under very different understandings of epistemology. | |
− | + | Dr. Lin, a {{Wiki|Chinese}} [[Christian]] [[philosopher]] had this to say about [[Kant’s]] Ding-an-sich: | |
+ | “I have sometimes asked myself, ‘Did [[China]] ever produce a [[mind]] like [[Kant’s]]?’ The answer is, obviously, No. Moreover, she could not. A {{Wiki|Chinese}} {{Wiki|Kant}} would [[laugh]] at himself the [[moment]] he talked of the Ding-an-sich, the thing | ||
− | + | in itself....the [[Chinese philosopher]] should [[feel]] that there must be qualities and differences in the pear {{Wiki|skin}} and the banana {{Wiki|skin}} [[corresponding]] to the resulting differences in {{Wiki|touch}}. Isn’t this [[knowledge]] ‘real’? What do you want to know the banana-in-itself and the pear-in-itself for?” | |
+ | “[[Divine]] things” were said by [[western]] {{Wiki|Idealists}} to be unknowable noumena and hence a [[scholar]] should not be concerned with [[transcendent]] categories, e.g. asking questions like “How many {{Wiki|angels}} can sit on the head of a pin?” (a serious [[debate]] in {{Wiki|medieval Europe}}). | ||
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+ | And, just to {{Wiki|nuance}} the issue a bit further, we have Dr. Lin’s “outside” (therefore “[[objective]]”?) comments about {{Wiki|western philosophy}} re {{Wiki|Aristotle}}: | ||
− | + | “A {{Wiki|Chinese}} is well-prepared to hear about Aristotle’s’ [[Ethics]] and Politics and {{Wiki|Poetics}}, and is amazed and duly impressed at his breadth, at his [[knowledge]] of botany and {{Wiki|astronomy}} and {{Wiki|meteorology}} and {{Wiki|biology}}, crude as his notions often are. The dispassionate inquiry, the curious [[objective]] dissection of [[life]] | |
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+ | in all its segments in [[physics]] and {{Wiki|biology}} (for {{Wiki|Aristotle}} was a {{Wiki|medical}} doctor), is astounding....[however] [[Confucius]] had a [[disciple]], Tseshia, who had a {{Wiki|propensity}} for accumulating facts of [[information]], and who was [[interested]] in the | ||
− | + | birds and {{Wiki|insects}} mentioned in the [[Book of Songs]]. [[Confucius]] said to him: “Be a gentleman [[scholar]]; do not be a petty [[scholar]]. That type of [[knowledge]] which consists in memorizing facts to answer questions is not worthy to make one a [[teacher]]. The {{Wiki|Chinese}}, in fact, are given to the intuitive [[comprehension]] of the {{Wiki|totality}}....” | |
+ | Lin here is more influenced by [[Wikipedia:Confucianism|Confucian]] [[thought]] than [[Buddhist]]. One [[thinks]] of [[Confucius]]’ well-known declaration that he refused to speak of “[[divine]] things.” It is hard to [[imagine]] that the {{Wiki|occidental}} preference for homing in on | ||
− | + | “[[essences]]” is a {{Wiki|cultural}} [[phenomenon]], however so it seems when viewed from “outside the system.” This is not to say that “[[essences]]” were not elucidated by {{Wiki|Vedic}} and other [[traditions]], but even these are to be {{Wiki|distinguished}} from seemingly similar {{Wiki|occidental}} notions. | |
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− | + | Moving on in this brief history of the History of [[Religions]], [[Wikipedia:Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel|Hegel]] took [[Kant’s]] {{Wiki|skepticism}} about the [[mind’s]] ability to know “{{Wiki|ideal}}” things or “things of the [[mind]]” (again, noumena) and historicized this [[understanding]]. Hegel’s view was that history was a dynamical process of the ever-unfolding self-revelation of Geist - “[[Mind]]” or “[[Spirit]]” - into | |
− | + | historical concreteness. He [[thought]] that history had a beginning and an end, and that the end of history would be the final [[development]] of [[Absolute]] Geist in time/space. | |
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+ | In a way reminiscent of the approach taken by the {{Wiki|materialist}} Carvāka School of {{Wiki|ancient India}}, Feuerbach (1804-1872) took a {{Wiki|materialist}} approach to the study of [[religions]], asserting that the only thing to study with regard to [[religion]] were [[material phenomena]]. Transcendentally [[metaphysical]] issues (e.g. the [[existence]] of {{Wiki|angels}}, etc.) were to be studied | ||
− | + | as [[projections of the mind]] onto the [[material world]]. [[Religion]] was just a projection of the [[desires]] and wishful [[thinking]] of the materially composed [[mind]] onto the [[material world]]. | |
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+ | In the progression of theories about the [[nature]] of [[religion]] from {{Wiki|Kant}} to Feuerbach, one can see an increasing tendency towards a {{Wiki|materialist}} and [[rationalist]] stance. With Max Weber, a self-consciously {{Wiki|sociological}} construal of | ||
− | + | [[religion]] emerged. For example, one may the mention well-known Weberian {{Wiki|thesis}} that holds that Calvinism as a [[religious]] [[phenomenon]] prepared the soil from which {{Wiki|modern}} [[western]] [[capitalism]] sprang. [[Religion]] is an aspect of primarily {{Wiki|social}} interaction. | |
− | + | F. C. Baur (1792-1850) had first applied Hegel’s notion of the [[development]] of Geist-in-time to [[Christianity]], [[seeing]] [[Christianity]] as the {{Wiki|synthesis}} of the two anti-theses of {{Wiki|Greek}} [[religious]] [[philosophy]] and {{Wiki|Judaism}}. Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) took Baur’s (and others’) pioneering work into this century. Troeltsch applied Weber’s {{Wiki|sociological}} approaches to the already [[existent]] Hegelian approach. | |
− | + | These tools and new philological approaches were in vogue at the time ([[including]] a fascination with [[Sanskrit]] and the reconstruction of the original {{Wiki|Indo-European}} [[language]]). Certain, mostly [[German]] [[scholars]] at the end of the last century paved the way for the study of [[religion]] in the [[west]] for decades to come. It is an issue among these [[scholars]] of those newly {{Wiki|modern}} times on which I want to focus. | |
− | + | Das Unwesen des Christentums. Again, the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule emerged in [[opposition]] to old approaches taken to study [[Christianity]] that focused on the study of [[doctrine]] and [[scripture]]. For the founders of the school, reform was required. Moving away from Hegel’s view of [[Christianity]] as the “[[absolute]] [[religion]],” the founders of the | |
+ | History of [[Religions]] school relativized (or one might say, “de-absolutized”) [[Christianity]], placing it among the world’s [[religions]] as just a “[[religion]] among [[religions]].” Its basic [[insight]] was that by means of tracing historical developments among [[religious]] [[traditions]] one might best know their “[[essence]]” and [[character]]. | ||
− | + | By employing the latest [[scientific]] [[techniques]], incorporating the [[sciences]] of archaeology, {{Wiki|anthropology}}, {{Wiki|sociology}}, newly established {{Wiki|linguistic}} approaches and so forth, these [[scholars]] focused [[western]] [[scientific]] modes of analysis on the world’s [[religions]] (beginning naturally with [[Christianity]] as its first specimen) to determine the “[[essences]]” of the various [[religions]] “{{Wiki|scientifically}}.” | |
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+ | While we applaud the break with the old style of narrow, [[dogmatic]] study of [[religion]], we note there was certainly not total break with [[Christian]] world-view. The founders of the History of [[Religions]] School were “with one exception...from [[North]] {{Wiki|Germany}}’ with the exception of one farmer’s son and one {{Wiki|New Testament}} professor’s son, all were pastor’s children.” | ||
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− | + | Basic {{Wiki|Protestant}} {{Wiki|theological}} notions underlie the approach of the History of [[Religions]] School. [[Elements]] of {{Wiki|anthropocentrism}}, historo-centrism, essentialist [[thinking]] and a peculiarly [[western]] {{Wiki|emphasis}} on a collective {{Wiki|social}} [[understanding]] of [[religion]] belie the claim of the History of [[Religions]] School to be engaged in “[[objective]]” | |
− | + | “[[scientific]]” studies of [[religion]]. They are clearly “[[subjective]]” accounts when seen from the {{Wiki|perspective}} of [[religions]] outside the [[traditional]] {{Wiki|European}} and Euro-American framework, whether Native [[American]], African, or in our case, [[Mahāyānist]]. | |
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+ | Von Harnack, Loisy and Troeltsch: the “[[essence]]” of [[Christianity]]. {{Wiki|Protestant}} [[scholar]] of the history of [[Christian]] [[doctrine]], Adolf von Harnack in 1898 wrote Das Wesen des Christentums (The [[Essence]] of [[Christianity]]), a pioneering work in the historical/critical approach to the study of [[Christianity]]. In this work, it was Harnack’s major {{Wiki|thesis}} | ||
− | + | that from research into the history of [[Christian]] [[Doctrines]] and {{Wiki|biblical}} studies, it was possible to determine {{Wiki|scientifically}} the “[[essential]]” [[truth]] of the [[Christian]] [[faith]]. The term “unwesen” of our [[subject]] heading is a {{Wiki|negation}} of the term “wesen,” [[German]] for “[[essence]].” The term was used in a work of monumental import. Adolf von Harnack used the term “Wesen” with regard to [[Christianity]]. | |
− | + | Out of intense research, Harnack whittled away the “husk” (e.g. [[doctrines]] and [[rituals]]) of [[Christian]] [[truth]] to one “[[essential]]” kernel of [[truth]]: | |
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− | + | “…it is that disposition which the Father of {{Wiki|Jesus Christ}} awakens in men’s hearts through the {{Wiki|Gospel}}. It is an ‘inward’ and ‘personal’ [[moral]] conviction; what part can [[philosophy]] then have in it?” “No one [[knows]] the Son but the Father and no one [[knows]] the Father but the Son and those to whom the Son may choose to reveal him.” | |
− | + | This is the [[pure]] “kernel” or “[[essential]]” [[truth]] of [[Christianity]] Harnack took from [[Chapter]] 11, verse 27b of the {{Wiki|Gospel}} of Matthew in the [[Christian]] {{Wiki|New Testament}}. | |
− | + | In a manner both westernly [[scientific]] and {{Wiki|Protestant}} at the same time, he determined that all {{Wiki|hope}} of a Jewish-style “coming {{Wiki|Kingdom}}” and all the {{Wiki|Roman Catholic}} [[rituals]] and {{Wiki|ecclesiastical}} structures were the outward “husk,” to be | |
− | + | discarded in favor of the [[essential truth]] given above. It is Harnack’s self-styled “non-philosophical” internal disposition of [[faith]] which comprises the [[Absolute truth]] which is the [[essential]] kernel of the [[religion]] which again, is itself, in Harnack’s {{Wiki|conception}}, the [[vital]] kernel of the [[religions]] of the [[earth]]. | |
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+ | {{Wiki|French}} {{Wiki|Catholic}} [[scholar]], Alfred Loisy rose to meet this {{Wiki|Protestant}} challenge. In L’Église et l’ Évangile, Loisy declared that what Harnack claims is the discardable “husk” of the historical [[development]] of [[Christianity]] (i.e. the [[Wikipedia:Judaism|Jewish]] and {{Wiki|Catholic}} [[elements]]) in fact [[forms]] the centrality if not the entirety of the continual {{Wiki|metamorphoses}} of the [[religion]] as it develops [[ritually]], theologically and {{Wiki|politically}}. Harnack’s so-called “[[essence]]” is just the {{Wiki|reflection}} of his [[own]] {{Wiki|Protestant}} [[beliefs]] read back into history as the [[pure]] “[[essence]]” of the [[tradition]], found in {{Wiki|Jesus}}’ alleged “original, [[pure]]” teachings. | ||
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+ | {{Wiki|Protestant}} historian of [[religions]] Ernst Troeltsch, the foremost among the founders of the Religionsgeschliche Schule, had problems with the stance taken by both of the above [[scholars]]. In his response to both Harnack and Loisy, “Wie heisst ‘Wesen Christentums’?” he agrees with Loisy: Harnack “Protestantizes and modernizes the {{Wiki|Gospel}}.” He agrees with Loisy’s [[criticism]] of Harnack’s {{Wiki|Protestant}} presupposition that the [[essence]] is to be | ||
− | + | “…considered as a criterion to be drawn from ‘original [[Christianity]]’, thereby attacking what to a {{Wiki|Roman Catholic}} [[scholar]] appears as a glaring example of ‘one-sided {{Wiki|Protestant}} Biblicism’. | |
− | + | Against Loisy however,“...Loisy’s [[views]] about the ‘necessity of {{Wiki|Catholicism}} are [[interesting]] and largely correct as an exercise in historical induction; but they have nothing to do with the [[essence]].” | |
− | + | Troeltsch notes that Loisy relegates {{Wiki|Protestantism}} to the role of external critic of the abuses of the “main branch” of [[tradition]] - defined as the {{Wiki|medieval}} {{Wiki|Roman Catholic}} {{Wiki|church}} - and this is where his argument militates against his [[own]] view of the organic, necessary [[evolution]] of [[Christianity]] from pre-Christian [[elements]] through the {{Wiki|New Testament}} to an “[[essence]]” albeit defined loosely and as [[impermanent]]. | |
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− | + | By placing the {{Wiki|Protestant}} revolt in the role of external critic of {{Wiki|Catholic}} abuses, he admits to a “falling away” from the [[original teaching]]. This is a falling away” from what? Troeltsch asks. From an [[essence]]! He concludes. To put a complex argument in a nutshell, Troeltsch concludes that the {{Wiki|Protestant}} [[interpretation]] of [[Christian]] [[tradition]] is basically a | |
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+ | “…purer, deeper [[understanding]] of [[Christianity]] and is a catastrophe which invalidates this [Loisy’s] whole {{Wiki|theory}}....” | ||
− | + | Troeltsch expands the notion of an [[essence]] of [[religion]] from Harnack’s narrow “kernel” notion that the [[essence]] of [[Christianity]] is to be found in the {{Wiki|Gospel}} of Matthew quote given above. The [[essence]] should include the [[views]] of the “{{Wiki|heretics}}” of the [[tradition]], the [[art]], the [[ritual]], and the “{{Wiki|pagan}}” [[philosophies]] of {{Wiki|Platonism}} and [[Aristotelianism]] which fuel the various [[Christian]] theologies which arose. | |
+ | But finally, there is an “[[essence]]” of [[Christianity]] for Troeltsch. In a manner reminiscent of Hegel’s [[own]] “evolving Geist notion, Troeltsch’s [[essence]] is a “driving {{Wiki|ideal}},” as a critical tool which is a | ||
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− | + | “…{{Wiki|discrimination}} between that which corresponds to the [[essence]] and that which is contrary to it.” We must be able “to detach the inner drive of the [[essence]] from its temporary individualization [[conditioned]] by other factors.” | |
+ | Yet Troeltsch is also {{Wiki|aware}} that the radical historicism of the {{Wiki|modern}} age has led to an “inescapable {{Wiki|relativism}}” and “[[subjectivity]]” affecting all {{Wiki|modern}} critical inquiries into the [[truth]] of [[religion]], and thus, he stumbles onto a core [[Buddhist truth]] viz our topic at hand, the [[nature]] of [[consciousness]], and [[objective]] and [[subjective]] [[awareness]]. | ||
− | + | “The unified [[idea]] of the [[essence]] only [[exists]] after all in the [[mind]] of the historian summarizing the material [my emphases throughout].” | |
− | + | {{Wiki|Modern}} theories concerning the “[[essence]]” of [[religion]]. We will examine below the above [[debate]] via [[Madhyamaka]] {{Wiki|argumentation}} to elucidate a “[[middle path]]” to a [[Mahāyānist]] [[epistemological]] framework for [[understanding]] what the goal is for a [[scholar]] in studying [[religions]]. But first, let us fill out in a bit more detail the issues involved in this [[discussion]] by bringing our brief history of the History of [[Religions]] study in the [[West]] up to {{Wiki|modern}} times. | |
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− | + | Max Mueller (1823-1900), a [[German]] [[scholar]] of [[religions]] working at [[Oxford]], was among the very first to thoroughly research “{{Wiki|oriental}}” [[religions]].” Though like the others discussed above, Mueller sought a [[scientific study]] of [[religions]], he himself was comfortable with [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] notions. And he shared with his | |
− | + | {{Wiki|Protestant}} [[German]] colleague the [[idea]] that the studying the sources of a [[religion]] could disclose that [[religion]]. Further for Mueller, [[Christian]] notions such as the [[ideas]] of [[belief]] in [[God]], the [[immortality]] of the [[soul]] and [[ideas]] of a final retribution were [[characteristics]] of all [[religions]] in some [[form]]. | |
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− | + | Rudolf Otto’s notion was that all [[people]] [[experience]] an “[[idea]] of the {{Wiki|holy}}.” [[Religion]] is not “contained...in any series of [[rational]] assertions.” Rather, [[religious]] [[reality]] was a [[sense]] of the numinous, the mysterium tremendum whose focus is being and | |
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+ | “…starts from a [[consciousness]] of the [[absolute]] {{Wiki|superiority}} or supremacy of a power other than myself...transmuted into a plenitude of being.” | ||
+ | Of course, Rudolf Otto was among the first to apply [[Husserl’s phenomenology]] to the study of [[religion]] itself. Though Otto is sympathetic to “eastern” [[mysticism]], and even speaks of [[śūnyatā]], comparing it with [[western]] [[nature]] [[mysticism]], | ||
− | + | Otto was not free from {{Wiki|cultural}} constraints and neither was his [[teacher]]. Listen to this proud declaration by Otto’s seminal influence, {{Wiki|Edmund Husserl}} as he compares [[Indian philosophy]] with {{Wiki|Greek}}, and note how his view corroborates that of Lin Yutang’s cited at the beginning: | |
+ | “[{{Wiki|oriental}} [[philosophies]]]...are and remain [[mythical]] and {{Wiki|practical}}, and it is a mistake, a [[falsification]] of their [[sense]], for those raised in the [[scientific]] ways of [[thinking]] created in {{Wiki|Greece}} and developed in the {{Wiki|modern}} period, to speak of [[Indian]] and [[Chinese philosophy]] and [[science]] ({{Wiki|astronomy}}, [[mathematics]]), i.e., to interpret [[India]], {{Wiki|Babylonia}}, [[China]] in a {{Wiki|European}} way. Sharply {{Wiki|distinguished}} from this is the | ||
+ | ‘{{Wiki|theoretical}}’ [[attitude]], which is not {{Wiki|practical}} in any [[sense]] used so far, it is the [[attitude]] of ‘thaumasein’, to which the great figures of the first culminating period of {{Wiki|Greek philosophy}}, {{Wiki|Plato}} and {{Wiki|Aristotle}}, traced the origin of | ||
− | + | [[philosophy]]. Man becomes gripped by the [[passion]] of a world-view and world-knowledge that turns away from all {{Wiki|practical}} interests and, within the closed [[sphere]] of its [[Wikipedia:cognition|cognitive]] [[activity]], in the times devoted to it, strives for and achieves nothing but [[pure]] theoria [my emphases].” | |
− | + | While [[traditionally]] in the [[west]] some circles have maintained a sharp {{Wiki|distinction}} between {{Wiki|theory}} and practice, [[faith]] and [[reason]], {{Wiki|theology}} and [[philosophy]], [[science]] and [[religion]], in fact upon analysis, the interplay and mutual [[dependency]] among these seeming opposites is obvious, the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|distinctions}}, [[illusory]]. The [[religious]] background of the | |
− | + | [[objective]] “[[scientists]]” of [[religion]] of a century ago are obvious to those who read these fellows today. We are reminded of Schweitzer’s remark that [[German]] {{Wiki|biblical}} [[scholars]] had peered down the dark well of time to find the historical {{Wiki|Jesus}} and had seen their [[own]] reflections at the bottom of that well. | |
− | + | The [[development]] of these basic patterns of [[thought]] in History of [[Religions]] research continues in the work of {{Wiki|Mircea Eliade}}. Eliade’s great [[achievement]] was to uncover the vast treasury of [[mythological]] patterns shared among all the world’s peoples. He applied the notion of “{{Wiki|archetypes}}” developed by [[German]] {{Wiki|psychologist}} C. G. {{Wiki|Jung}} to the [[religious]] [[imagination]]. | |
− | + | To put it briefly (and hopefully avoid [[distortion]]), [[psychological]] {{Wiki|archetypes}} are {{Wiki|phenomenological}} structures of the [[mind]] deeply ingrained within [[people]] of all cultures, this school argues. For instance, all [[religions]] have [[myths]] of [[birth]]. The [[birth]] [[myths]] of Moses, {{Wiki|Christ}}, the [[Buddha]], [[Kṛṣṇa]], etc. elaborate in a [[sense]], the meaning of the individual’s [[own]] [[birth]] in [[cosmological]] and [[mythological]] terms. | |
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− | + | There has been in recent years a growing {{Wiki|reaction}} to the dominance of the “History of [[Religions]]” approach as practiced by the {{Wiki|Chicago}} School and related German-style approaches. Some [[scholars]] of the so-called “{{Wiki|Religious Studies}}” approach (I think rightly to some extent) take issue with the [[idea]] of [[religious]] structures of the {{Wiki|brain}} guiding the [[development]] of the [[religions]] of the [[world]]. | |
− | + | Sam Gill, Don Wiebe, Robert Baird, among others, point out that these [[religious]] structures have not been demonstrated {{Wiki|scientifically}}. Where in the {{Wiki|brain}} do they reside? How can the {{Wiki|non-theism}} of [[Buddhism]] be reconciled with [[Christian]] [[Theism]]? The “essentialist/intuitionalist” as Baird puts it, concerning the [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] School, is ill-equipped to deal with the significant differences among the [[religions]]. | |
− | + | Baird makes the case that the generalizing theories employed by the [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] School cannot be either falsified or verified. They are normative assertions to be accepted or rejected. They are not [[scientific]] enough. His school seeks “descriptive” studies of [[religion]] which | |
− | + | report on the {{Wiki|archaeological}} and written {{Wiki|evidence}} and resists incorporating such {{Wiki|evidence}} into large [[metaphysical]] systems. His is a strictly non-normative (as he puts it) historical approach. | |
+ | Baird defines the study of [[religions]] somewhat in the manner of [[Cantwell]] Smith, long-time [[scholar]] at {{Wiki|Harvard}}: [[religious]] studies are the study of what is ultimately important to persons and communities. Baird, almost sounding Nāgārjunan, declares that | ||
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+ | ===[[“The possibility of sifting an ‘essence’ from the variety of material here presented is questionable.”]]=== | ||
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− | |||
− | + | Don Wiebe seeks a study of [[religion]] that is free of any {{Wiki|theological}} concerns. A secularized study of [[religion]] can best transcend {{Wiki|cultural}} [[boundaries]]. Sam Gill has refuted earlier {{Wiki|scholarship}} that posited a [[universal]] “[[earth]] mother” {{Wiki|worship}} among the tribes of Native [[Americans]]. He saw only particular [[feminine deities]] in the tribal [[religious]] [[traditions]] he studies, not a [[universal]] “earth-mother.” | |
− | + | However the [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholar]] will want to inquire as to whether the {{Wiki|Religious Studies}} thinkers have achieved the objectivity that eluded the [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] [[scholars]]. In their struggle to oppose the positing of “[[identical]] [[religious]] structures” (to use Baird’s {{Wiki|terminology}}) of the [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] school, haven’t these | |
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− | + | [[scholars]] gone over to the other extreme, over-stressing the differentiation among [[religious]] [[traditions]] as they descriptively study their particular [[manifestations]]? Is this not a recapitulation of the Harnack-Loisy [[debate]] in a more sophisticated [[form]], one side {{Wiki|emphasizing}} [[essential]] features, the other, the particular [[characteristics]]? | |
+ | The two above methodologies (i.e. [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] and the Baird/Gill/Wiebe approaches) are opposed to each other. Each asserts the other lacks genuine objectivity. If we might pretend for a [[moment]] to speak for them, [[scholars]] following [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] would say the {{Wiki|Religious Studies}} [[people]] lack objectivity because they ignore the fact of their [[own]] {{Wiki|social}} | ||
− | + | {{Wiki|conditioning}}, and that pre-conceived notions and [[religious]] categories of [[thought]] biases are inescapable and {{Wiki|scientifically}} demonstrable. Every [[religious]] [[tradition]] has, for example, some type of [[birth]] {{Wiki|narrative}} as part of their [[religious]] story. Who would deny then, that at some level, these types of stories are “[[essential]]” features of every [[religion]]? | |
− | + | The {{Wiki|Religious Studies}} [[people]] assert that they are the true [[scientists]], detachedly analyzing the {{Wiki|data}} only, not fitting it into the pre-conceived notions of a Jungianesque {{Wiki|phenomenological}} [[paradigm]]. The [[scholar]] of [[religions]], they assert, can put aside his/her {{Wiki|conditioning}} and render strictly [[objective]] accounts. | |
− | + | While we will take issue with Baird’s complete {{Wiki|denial}} of an [[essence]] - even at the level of [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[verbal]] [[discourse]] - we concur in doubting one can ultimately cleave to this [[idea]]. Certain [[scholars]] who we might say generally follow Eliade’s approach seem not to have | |
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− | + | fully clarified the [[confusion]] surrounding this problem of an “[[essence]]” of [[religions]] which so perplexed Troeltsch, many decades ago. As {{Wiki|evidence}} for this, we cite this from the {{Wiki|Encyclopedia}} of [[Religion]], of which [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] was editor states this as recently as 1987: General requirements for a “more adequate {{Wiki|classification}} of [[religions]]” include that | |
− | + | “Judgments should be made in order to distinguish what is [[essential]] or fundamental in [[religions]] from what is accidental or incidental.” | |
− | + | Still, the issue of the relationship of an [[essence]] to its [[manifestations]] would seem to be problematic given our above analysis. | |
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+ | We do not want to make a blanket statement here, but there is a [[sense]] when one encounters texts from both of the above [[traditions]] an inclination to take the view that {{Wiki|adherents}} of {{Wiki|Asian}} [[traditions]] of {{Wiki|scholarship}} on [[religion]] have been pre-scientific, lacking the scientist’s objectivity to be found in the [[traditions]] [[emerging]] from the Religionsgeschichtliche {{Wiki|movement}} in {{Wiki|Europe}}, not so long ago. | ||
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+ | ===[[Towards a Madhyamaka Historiography.]]=== | ||
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− | + | A Nāgārjunan critique of [[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]]. The [[logical]] schools emerged in [[Indian Buddhism]] at least in part if not in the main, to defend the [[tradition]] against the arguments of other schools. Texts such as the MūlaMadhyamakakārikāḥ emerged to translate the {{Wiki|poetic}} and cryptic descriptions of [[śūnyatā]] in the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] {{Wiki|literature}} into a rigorous [[logical]] [[form]] which demonstrated the [[actuality]] of [[śūnyatā]] and [[pratītya-samutpāda]] in a manner which enabled the employment of these [[ideas]] in the [[debates]] with [[scholars]] of the {{Wiki|Vedic}} and [[Jain]] [[traditions]], among others. | |
+ | An encounter with [[Madhyamaka]] [[logic]] offers an “outsider” the possibility for {{Wiki|dialogue}} with the [[Mahāyāna tradition]] and by means of this, either demonstrate or disprove the [[western]] bias against there being a [[scientific]] objectivity in [[traditional]] [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|scholarship}}. It has always been a maxim among [[Indian]] | ||
− | + | [[philosophers]] that through [[logical analysis]] of causal connections among {{Wiki|conceptual}} systems, [[people]] from different cultures may discuss issues and perhaps demonstrate their [[views]] among those of other [[traditions]] of inquiry. Among the many [[schools of Buddhism]], [[Madhyamaka]] [[logic]] is fairly said to be the most prone to engaging in this sort of {{Wiki|dialogue}} with other schools. | |
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+ | As we will show below, if one can demonstrate that the four-fold {{Wiki|negation}} (in the [[form]] of what is known as the “[[tetralemma]]”) is not [[logically]] valid with regard to the [[assertion]] that there neither is nor is not an “[[essence]]” for a given [[religion]], and that, ultimately events neither arise, nor abide nor cease, then the critical historian from | ||
− | + | these above-mentioned schools may uphold his or her notion of history of a [[religion]] as either a {{Wiki|temporal}} progression continually unfolding [[phenomena]] from out of [[essentially]] [[existent]], recurrent features, or conversely, if the results of Nāgārjunan {{Wiki|reasoning}} are rejected, perhaps the {{Wiki|Religious Studies}} [[scholars]] may uphold their [[own]] view of the history of a [[religion]] as the [[manifestation]] of discrete facts which have no “[[essential]]” features. | |
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− | + | Arguments from the kārikāḥ. In outlining an [[understanding]] of [[religious history]], one must have some {{Wiki|theory}} with regard to what identifies and differentiates one [[religion]] from another. This was the [[motivation]] for seeking an [[essence]] of those [[scholars]] we discussed above. It is not an issue which can be dismissed. | |
+ | We will focus on [[Nāgārjuna]] ’s arguments concerning the “[[svabhāva]]” or “self-entity” - “[[essence]]” - from his Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ, the [[Root]] [-[[stanzas]]] on the [[Middle Way]], to elucidate a [[Mahāyānist]] answer to the difficulties discussed above. We will employ [[Nāgārjuna’s]] method of the so-called “[[tetralemma]],” or four-fold {{Wiki|negation}} to a {{Wiki|modern}} [[discussion]] to address these issues. | ||
− | + | The first leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of “[[essence]].” To begin, Nāgārjunanotes that if one assumes that an [[essence]] or [[self-nature]], self-entity, ([[svabhāva]]), etc., emerges by means of [[causes and conditions]], it would be | |
− | + | something created. But how is this possible? If it is uncreated, it would not be contingent upon an “other.” If Harnack’s [[essence]] is not contingent to any “other entities” (e.g., [[Wikipedia:Judaism|Jewish]] {{Wiki|eschatology}}, {{Wiki|Catholic}} [[rituals]], etc.) how could it even be known? It is only in [[connection]] to its [[manifestations]] as “external” [[forms]] that Harnack’s “[[vital]] kernel” could be known. | |
+ | Obviously, an uncreated [[entity]] does not [[exist]]. A created thing is, according to [[Madhyamaka]] [[logic]], something that comes into being by means of [[causes and conditions]]. If an “[[essence]]” is contingent upon those other [[elements]], it cannot [[exist]] alone and apart as Harnack asserts. If it is {{Wiki|independent}} of [[causes and conditions]], it is uncreated and cannot [[exist]] and cannot be known. Clearly it is [[dependent upon]] [[causes and conditions]]: for one thing, his “[[essence]]” is [[dependent upon]] {{Wiki|Jesus}}’ utterances as a [[primary cause]] and upon later authors having written it down as auxiliary [[conditions]]. | ||
− | + | The second leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of “no-essence.” What of Loisy’s contention that there is no [[essential teaching]] of the {{Wiki|New Testament}}? That it is only the [[manifestations]] we can know or study? Troeltsch’s response, in | |
− | the | + | our view suffices to demonstrate the [[Madhyamaka]] stance at this juncture. While there can be no [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[essence]] along Harnack’s line, there can indeed be a [[verbal]] {{Wiki|distinction}} of an [[essence]] which is true {{Wiki|conventionally}} (saṃvṛtitaḥ) but not ultimately ([[paramārthataḥ]]). Ultimately, Harnack’s [[essence]] is [[dependent upon]] [[causes and conditions]]. |
− | + | Conventionally or provisionally, [[Martin Luther]] could act from a standpoint whereupon [[faith]] was an [[essential]] and central standpoint to oppose abuses and a “falling away” of what were [[conceptualized]] as “[[essential]] [[truths]],” even though this [[idea]] falls apart when carried to a [[logical]] extreme. Therefore, there is an [[essence]] based on the mere | |
− | + | fact of [[people]] [[conceiving]] an [[essence]] and verbally distinguishing it; in this way such [[views]] share in “[[conventional truth]].” It is at this stage the [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholar]] avoids the charge of “[[nihilism]].” Indeed, “[[essence]]” is negated at the level of [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] analysis, but the fact and [[truth]] of {{Wiki|conventionally}} determined [[essences]] are [[affirmed]] by the {{Wiki|negation}} of “no-essence.” | |
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− | + | The third leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of “there both is and is not an [[essence]].” This is the {{Wiki|negation}} of Troeltsch’s standpoint, and it is here that what is intended becomes increasingly difficult to conceptualize, for the increasing level of difficulty to conceptualize [[phenomena]] is a primary aim of the [[Prāsaṅgika]] project. [[Nāgārjuna’s]] | |
+ | line of {{Wiki|reasoning}} holds that two mutually incompatible states cannot co-abide within the same [[entity]]. They would conflict at their point of [[contact]] or {{Wiki|integration}}. That is to say, that while Troeltsch negates Harnack’s notion of a simple [[essence]] and negates Loisy’s {{Wiki|negation}} of Harnack’s [[essence]], he incorporates both with the [[idea]] that there is an [[essence]], but it [[exists]] in the [[mind]] of the historian and is inclusive of much more “accidental” [[phenomena]] than Harnack allowed. | ||
− | + | On the face of it this seems quite reasonable, but this more or less Idealist picture runs into the same problem. If we posit a [[mental]] [[essence]], how can it be “[[permanent]],” “{{Wiki|individual}}” or “fundamental” - usual [[attributes]] for the [[definition]] of “[[essence]]”? For even in the [[mind]] of the historian, the “[[essence]]” is a changing composite [[phenomenon]] created by means of [[causes and conditions]]. | |
− | + | For [[Nāgārjuna]], Troeltsch’s mentalized [[essence]] is a figment of the [[imagination]]. Troeltsch more or less admits to this, but he still cleaves to the [[idea]] of an [[essence]] as a “driving {{Wiki|ideal}},” something the [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholar]] ultimately rejects - even as a mentalized [[phenomenon]]. | |
+ | Fourth leg of the [[tetralemma]]: {{Wiki|negation}} of “neither [[essence]] nor non-essence.” This is the most difficult aspect of [[Nāgārjuna’s]] [[philosophy]] for the {{Wiki|occidental}} [[mind]] to fathom. This is the level that points directly to the wordlessness and [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[non-existence]] of [[phenomena]] posited by the [[Mahāyāna tradition]]. | ||
− | + | The third leg noted that the mutually [[contradictory]] states of “both is and is not an [[essence]]” cannot co-abide within one [[entity]], or they would cancel each other out. The fourth leg is concerned to avoid a nihilismistic conclusion, recapitulating to a certain extent the second leg. It aims to expose a | |
+ | “[[neutral]]” middle [[state]] poised between [[being and non-being]], ultimately neither alternative. There is not a “non-essence” (because one can be conceptually and verbally elucidated at the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] level), and because one should not [[conceive]] of “non-essence” or “niḥility” as some sort of [[entity]] either, nor is there “not a non-essence,” which is impossible to [[conceive]]. This is the point of the “[[emptiness]] of [[emptiness]] itself.” | ||
− | + | Through this final {{Wiki|negation}}, one is left at a point of conceptionlessness. Certainly, [[Nāgārjuna’s]] approach leaves one far from the standpoint of Husserl’s [[pure]] theoria, however it can hardly be said that the [[Madhyamaka]] approach | |
− | + | sidesteps [[logical analysis]] even as it aims to undermine the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] validity of any [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[discourse]], even [[logical]] [[discourse]]. [[Logical]] [[discourse]] is nevertheless central to the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] elucidation of the [[Madhyamaka]] “system of no system.” | |
− | + | [[Conventional]] [[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]] [[relative]] to [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] non-essentialism. In sum at the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level of [[logical analysis]], we have in the [[Madhyamaka tradition]] a complete rejection of any “essentialist” stance whatsoever. The extreme of “being” is negated as is the other extreme of “[[nihilism]].” What is left? A system of [[thought]] which can provide for [[verbal]] {{Wiki|distinctions}}, such as the elucidation of “[[essences]]” of [[religion]], yet is [[self-aware]] as it does so, that these | |
+ | [[essences]] are figments, and that they do not [[exist]] as [[essences]] even in one’s [[own mind]]. Hence I can assert both “[[Nāgārjuna’s]] [[thought]] is [[essential]] to [[Mahāyānist]] [[thought]] ({{Wiki|conventionally}})” and at the same time, “there is not ultimately any such thing as [[Mahāyānist]] [[thought]] (for ultimately, it has no [[essence]]).” | ||
+ | The [[two truths]] cut a [[path]] between the extremes of either [[existence]] or [[non-existence]]. One colleague critical of [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]], which he deems {{Wiki|paradoxical}} and by its [[own]] admission, [[illogical]], accuses [[Nāgārjuna]] of negating his | ||
− | + | [[own]] argument, and that he therefore proves nothing. This is the point. | |
+ | [[Nāgārjuna]] was accused of the same thing by [[ancient]] [[Nyāya]] [[scholars]]. [[Nāgārjuna]] anticipated this charge (of negating his [[own]] stance) in his “[[Apology]],” the Vigrāhavyāvartaṇī. Here are his words: | ||
+ | “You have not understood the meaning of the [[emptiness]] of entities, yet you have set out to criticize me, saying, ‘Since your statement is devoid of self-entity, the {{Wiki|negation}} of the [[intrinsic nature]] of entities is not valid’.” | ||
+ | “Suppose that a [[magic]] man created by a [[Wikipedia:Magician(paranormal)|magician]] should prevent another [[magic]] man created by his [[own]] [[magic]] [from] doing something...the [[magic]] man who is prevented is [[empty]] and the [[magic]] man who prevents is also [[empty]]. In like manner, a {{Wiki|negation}} of the self-entity of all entities by my statement is possible, even though this statement [itself] is [[empty]].” | ||
− | + | This concludes the first part of our study. The historian of [[religion]] operating from a [[Madhyamaka]] standpoint should not seek to define a normative [[essence]], but may {{Wiki|conventionally}} assert [[phenomena]] s/he deems [[essential]] to [[knowing]] a [[religious]] [[tradition]]. This holds as long as the historian is {{Wiki|aware}} that an “[[essence]]” is a verbally designated [[phenomenon]] originating from his/her [[own mind]] as [[imputation]], and that on the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level, even the given [[tradition]] | |
− | + | studied does not [[exist]] with its [[own]] [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]] in a “positivistic” [[sense]], given the [[infinite]] inter-relationships which tie that [[tradition]] to [[traditions]] other than itself and among which it evolves. This is the [[logic]] of [[pratītya-samutpāda]] - co-originating inter-relationship the [[proof]] of which is a central aim as well of [[Nāgārjuna’s]] proofs. | |
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− | + | ===[[A Mahāyānist Methodology for Religious Studies]]=== | |
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− | + | In this second section, 1) we shall be presenting the problem of subject/object [[dualism]] in the study of [[Buddhism]] as exemplified in the writings of certain {{Wiki|modern}} {{Wiki|occidental}} [[scholars]]. That this is a problem is apparent to those who study with [[teachers]] indigenous to the [[tradition]] we are investigating. 2) We will be elucidating the [[views]] of two {{Wiki|occidental}} [[scholars]] who have rendered attempts aimed at solving difficulties [[inherent]] in the assumption by many | |
+ | {{Wiki|occidental}} [[scholars]] of a so-called “[[objective]]” stance and 3) finally, we will aim to propose a [[Wikipedia:scientific method|methodology]] from the standpoint of the [[Madhyamaka]] [[philosophical]] [[tradition]], inclusive of certain [[elements]] of [[Yogācārin]] [[insights]]. We will propose this both as appropriate means by which to understand [[Buddhism]] and further, any [[religion]] deemed an “other” or an “[[object]]” of study. | ||
− | + | I come to this [[subject]] as one with a lot of [[frustration]] and a [[thought]] to resolve it. I have encountered a number of arenas where [[western]] tools used to study [[Buddhism]] were simply not comprehensive enough to fully engage the [[tradition]]. For instance, to hearken back to a statement problematic for me, let me repeat Dr. Wendy Doniger’s statement. In her [[book]] she argues | |
− | + | “...against the old-fashioned method of {{Wiki|dialogue}}, which I satirize as “Take a [[Buddhist]] to Dinner.” One [question] is, which [[Buddhist]] are you going to get? Maybe you get a stupid [[Buddhist]], or maybe you get a [[Buddhist]] from one school which is very atypical. There are a lot of [[reasons]] why any common or garden-variety [[Buddhist]] is not the [[Buddhist]] you want, and also why the [[Dalai Lama]] is not the one you want either because he’s not a typical [[Tibetan Buddhist]]. So which [[Buddhist]] are you going to take to dinner?” | |
− | + | To speak frankly, and giving due regard to her achievements, the above quote by one of America’s most celebrated {{Wiki|Indologists}} stands out to those who study with {{Wiki|Asian}} [[scholars]] of [[Buddhism]] as frankly - absurd. Basically, if we | |
− | + | should not study with “garden-variety” [[Buddhists]] nor “stupid” [[Buddhists]] nor even brilliant [[Buddhists]] (i.e. the [[Dalai Lama]]), maybe the implication of her statements is to say that study with no [[Buddhists]] is the most appropriate means by which to engage in [[Buddhist studies]]. | |
+ | While somewhat outrageous to anyone from a [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|culture}}, this view is prevalent among certain [[scholars]] engaging in the [[western]] {{Wiki|academic}} study of [[religion]]. If we reversed the [[idea]] and placed it in our {{Wiki|cultural}} context, and one imagines a {{Wiki|Chinese}} [[student]] asking, “Which place in the [[world]] is the best | ||
+ | to study the {{Wiki|New Testament}}?” according to [[Professor Doniger]], the [[Pope]] would not be the best, for he is not typical. Engaging church-goers (say, anthropologically) in the meaning of the {{Wiki|New Testament}} for them is not of value, for they are typical, but might be “stupid.” Studying the {{Wiki|New Testament}} at Tubingen would not be [[wise]], for it too is “very atypical.” | ||
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+ | Her point that [[religious]] study should be undertaken in a manner as “[[scientific]]” and “[[objective]]” as possible is well-taken. Conventionally, this works. A [[scholar]] of [[religion]] should might be well-advised not to engage in a mindless, polemical apologetic for his/her [[tradition]]. Ultimately, however there is no [[pure]], removed, utterly [[objective]] standpoint. One may seek at most a standpoint which is relatively [[objective]]; an utterly [[objective]] standpoint is a “view from nowhere.” | ||
− | + | {{Wiki|Gananath Obeyesekere}}, while a native [[Sinhalese]], employs an {{Wiki|occidental}} [[paradigm]]. He conceptualizes [[Buddhism]] as an “other” in his [[discussion]] of [[hair]] in Medusa’s [[Hair]]. He describes in a Neo-Freudian way, how the shaven heads of [[Buddhist monks]] {{Wiki|unconsciously}} represent “castration or the loss of the {{Wiki|penis}},” while the [[ascetics]]’ matted [[hair]] [[symbolizes]] the [[emergence]] through the head of a “sub-lated {{Wiki|penis}}.” | |
− | + | While there is no [[inherent]] problem in employing what we might call the “sex-o-centric” {{Wiki|conceptual}} apparatus of {{Wiki|Freudian psychology}}, for we [[acknowledge]] the two [[hair]] styles could be interpreted that way and his [[discussion]] contributes to the general [[discussion]] in a provocative way, we [[feel]] that besides demonstrating a lack of [[respect]] for those in the [[tradition]] who would be offended by such a description (as they would the impudence of assuming one [[knows]] | |
+ | the [[unconscious]] motivations of the [[Buddha]] who is said to have instigated these {{Wiki|rules}}), that it would have been more comprehensive a [[discussion]] of the issues involved for Obeyesekere to have informed readers of the native | ||
+ | [[interpretation]] of their shaven heads. Perhaps then we would have a more complete [[understanding]] of the practice. To [[balance]] one’s [[own]] [[Wikipedia:Hermeneutics|hermeneutical]] approach with an [[investigation]] of the native self-interpretation seems to me to be the more relatively “[[objective]]” approach. | ||
− | + | A more {{Wiki|subtle}} example of the imposition of one’s [[own]] [[self]] and {{Wiki|culture}} on another occurs in the work of Paul Griffiths. In his [[book]], On Being Mindless, he states that the [[Yogācāra]] [[philosophical]] system is “strictly {{Wiki|idealist}}” though he acknowledges it is devoid of a substantialist or essentialist basis in its [[thinking]]. To use a culturally loaded term like “Idealist” with regard to an {{Wiki|Asian}} system is once again to impute one’s [[own]] categories onto another system without regard to how proponents of the [[tradition]] itself would respond. | |
+ | How can [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]] be termed “Idealist” when it identifies the “ātmadṛṣṭi” - the “[[self-view]]” or “ego-centric standpoint” as an [[affliction]] to be resolved, or better, dissolved into the higher standpoint of the absence of the [[real existence]] of apprehender and apprehended? Hence the notion, [[Yogācāra]], [[Mind-only]] and Vijñāptimātra, [[cognition-only]] should not be simply conflated with Berkeleyian or any other [[western]] [[idealism]]. | ||
− | + | The [[Yogācārin]] notion of the [[other-dependent]] ([[paratantra]]) can ultimately be known. Is it then to be equated with [[Kant’s]] [[noumenal]] [[realm]]? Where is anything like [[śūnyatā]] to be found among [[Western]] Idealist systems? With so many differences, is it accurate to call [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]] “[[Idealism]]”? And if so, might we not just as accurately call [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] or Hegelian [[thought]] examples of [[Western]] [[Yogācāra]]? The [[Western]] proponents of these [[traditions]] would, methinks, protest too much. | |
+ | {{Wiki|Occidental}} Sympathizers: van der Leeuw and Bourdieu. Gerardus van der Leeuw is widely known for his [[stress]] on the importance of the inter-play found in what he calls the “[[object]] and [[subject]] in this reciprocal operation.” He discusses the “[[reality]]” of [[dream]] [[consciousness]], a [[state]] wherein “the supporting pillar of [[conscious]] [[experience]], while | ||
− | + | we are awake, the tension between [[subject]] and [[object]] disappears....” In his [[discussion]] of the [[reality]] of [[dream]] [[consciousness]], and his citing cases among certain tribespeople where [[dreams]] are regarded as more real than [[waking consciousness]], van der Leeuw dissolves the hard boundary between [[subject]] and [[object]] so cherished by classical {{Wiki|historians}} of [[religion]] and by many of their successors today. | |
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− | + | As Rogers Brubaker sums up Bourdieu’s [[thought]], he notes that, | |
+ | “Every {{Wiki|sociological}} practice, {{Wiki|theoretical}} or [[empirical]], rests on an implicit or explicit metatheory - a general {{Wiki|conceptual}} framework for the [[understanding]] of [[human]] {{Wiki|social}} [[life]]. Metatheory matters: it is consequential for substantive work, determining (in part) the kind of problems that are posed, the kinds of explanations that are [[offered]], and the kinds of [[techniques]] of [[empirical]] study that are employed.” | ||
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+ | He describes Bourdieu’s approach as contending with a set of problems subsumed within the framework of “[[objectivism]] vs. [[subjectivism]].” | ||
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+ | “[[Objectivism]] explains {{Wiki|social}} [[life]] in terms of mind-independent [[existence]]; [[subjectivism]], by contrast, appeals to mind-dependent and agent-dependent [[elements]] such as the conceptions and [[beliefs]] of {{Wiki|individuals}}. Neither of these one-sided modes of [[thought]] can comprehend the intrinsically double [[nature]] of {{Wiki|social}} [[reality]]. | ||
− | + | [[Subjectivism]] ignores the external constraints placed on agents by thing-like {{Wiki|social}} facts and the {{Wiki|social}} formation of every ‘[[subject]]’ but [[objectivism]] ignores the ‘objectivity of the [[subjective]]’ and the ‘[[reality]] of the [[representation]]’, because it does not [[recognize]] that the [[experience]] {{Wiki|individuals}} have in and of {{Wiki|social}} [[reality]] and the conceptions they [[form]] about it are partly constitutive of that [[reality]]. | |
− | + | Only a {{Wiki|theory}} based on a [[conceptualization]] of the [[relation]] between material and [[symbolic]] properties, and between external, constraining {{Wiki|social}} facts and experiencing, apprehending acting {{Wiki|individuals}}, can be adequate for the [[human]] [[sciences]].” | |
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+ | ===[[Certainly, the Harnack-Loisy debate fits into these two categories.]]=== | ||
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− | of | + | While we do not want to make the same mistake we accused Griffiths of making, and overlay our [[own]] prejudices onto another system and equating the two systems - i.e., in our case, to say Cittamātrin metatheory and Bourdieusian metatheory are basically the same, our goal in this section of our paper is to point out that the two share in common an insistence that one deny the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[existence]] of grasper and grasped, ([[grāhya]], [[grāhaka]]), [[subject]] and [[object]]. [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]] [[merit]] [[consideration]] on their [[own]] terms as their {{Wiki|reflection}} could be applied to constructing a metatheory of [[religions]] study based on their [[thought]]. |
+ | Proposal of a [[Mahāyānist]] Metatheory. {{Wiki|Keiji Nishitani}} is one of Heidegger’s least-acknowledged students, but among Heidegger’s many students who were [[Christian]] or raised [[Christian]], Nishitani was his only [[Buddhist]] pupil. [[East Asian Buddhism]] is very heavily dependent on [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]], more so than the {{Wiki|Central Asian}} [[traditions]] which incline more | ||
+ | towards a [[Madhyamaka]] standpoint, generally {{Wiki|speaking}}. Nishitani in some [[sense]] then, could be viewed as among the first Cittamātrin [[scholars]] of [[religion]] in the [[west]], since certainly he was a [[western]] thinker in at least as many ways as Obeyesekere, having incorporated a Neo-Heideggerian [[paradigm]] as opposed to a Neo-Freudian model. | ||
− | + | “{{Wiki|Plato}}, it will be recalled, likened our ordinary relationship to things to being tied up inside a [[cave]], watching the shadows passing to and fro across its walls, and calling those shadows ‘[[reality]].’ To look at things from the standpoint of the [[self]] is always to see things merely as [[objects]], that is, to look at things without from a field | |
− | + | ||
+ | within the [[self]]. It means assuming a position vis-a-vis things from which [[self]] and things remain fundamentally separated from one another. This standpoint of separation of [[subject]] and [[object]], or [[opposition]] between within and without is what we call the field of [[consciousness]].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | Continuing further in these passages, Nishitani displays a [[pure]] [[Yogācāra]] view of [[reality]]. Things, the [[self]], are “real” he says, | ||
+ | “On the field of [[consciousness]] where they are ordinarily taken for real, however, they are not {{Wiki|present}} in their [[true reality]] but only in the [[form]] of {{Wiki|representations}}. So long as the field of separation between within and without is not broken through, and so long as a [[conversion]] from that standpoint does not take place, the lack of {{Wiki|unity}} and {{Wiki|contradiction}} spoken of earlier cannot help but prevail among the things we take as real. This sort of {{Wiki|contradiction}} shows up, for example, in the [[opposition]] between {{Wiki|materialism}} and [[idealism]]....” | ||
+ | [[Yogācārin]] [[insights]] into the relationship of [[religious]] praxis to non-essentialism: The [[three natures]] and their implications for the relationship of {{Wiki|theory}} to practice in the [[Mahāyāna tradition]] and for [[religious]] studies in general. | ||
− | + | Central to the [[Yogācāra]] system is the notion of the “[[three natures]]” (Sk. [[trisvabhāva]]). These [[three natures]], along with some other basic features of Cittamātrin [[thought]] will serve as an outline for a metatheory of [[understanding]] the [[reality]] of [[religions]] deemed an “other” to oneself. | |
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+ | The field of [[consciousness]] wherein [[subject]] and [[object]] [[dualism]] operate mentioned above by Nishitani designates the first of the [[three natures]] and is called “[[conceptualized]] [[nature]].” All [[consciousnesses]] naively operate at this level, according to [[Asaṅga]], [[Vasubandhu]], (founders of the [[Yogācāra school]]) et. al. from the standpoint of the “ātmadṛṣṭi” or “[[self-view]]” or better translated for our purposes here as the “[[subject]] [-centered]-{{Wiki|theory}}.” | ||
− | + | This [[conceptualized]] [[nature]] takes as [[inherently existing]] the [[bifurcation]] of [[subject]] and [[object]]. One assumes that [[forms]], etc., are external to one’s [[own mind]], and all sorts of [[mental states]] arise from that basic “subject-theory,” among them being [[aversion]], [[jealousy]], prejudice and bigotry, etc.. | |
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− | + | From the Cittamātrin standpoint, analysis coming from out of a {{Wiki|naive}} [[thought]] that [[subject]] and [[object]] [[exist]] alone and apart from each other and that one’s [[own]] theorizing about, in our case, the [[reality]] of a [[religion]] deemed an “other” | |
+ | constitutes that “other” [[religion]] is mistaken. This first of the [[three natures]] aims to elucidate the view that our false [[imputation]] of [[inherent existence]] to the [[subject]] or to excessively {{Wiki|emphasize}} the [[inherent existence]] of the | ||
− | + | [[object]] - are extremes which miss the [[Middle view]] which is that, for the Cittamātrins, the [[subject]] ([[grāhaka]]) and [[object]] ([[grāhya]]) [[exist]] as only from the level of immediate, un-reflected-upon [[consciousness]] and do not [[exist]] ultimately separate upon the further analysis at the second of the [[three natures]], the “[[paratantrasvabhāva]]” or as we translate this, the (literally) “[[other-dependent]]” [[nature]]. | |
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− | + | This second aspect of analysis aims at revealing the fact that only “enmeshed with” or “interwoven-with” what is [[conceptualized]] as an “other” can that which is [[conceptualized]] as “[[self]]” [[exist]]. The external [[forms]] the internal, yet | |
− | + | the internal construes and configures the external. Therefore it is said that through the mistaken [[impression]] of there being a dual [[reality]] of [[subject]] and [[object]], this {{Wiki|misconception}} is nevertheless actual in spite of its being a {{Wiki|misconception}}. | |
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+ | The mistaken [[consciousness]] is really apprehending something in its false [[imputation]] of a [[bifurcation]] - the [[bifurcation]] itself is [[illusory]] and falls away at the second level of {{Wiki|reflection}} - the [[other-dependent]] - wherein one realizes that one’s [[own]] [[perceptions]] are built upon that which is “other” than itself for all its {{Wiki|assumptions}} and world-view-making {{Wiki|abilities}}. | ||
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+ | [[Religious]] studies taken on from within this standpoint would [[acknowledge]] readily that, in our case, our [[own]] summing up of [[Indian]] [[religious]] [[reality]] is going to be fundamentally [[constructed]] on the basis of our [[own]] prejudices and from | ||
− | + | factors of our [[own]] {{Wiki|environment}} growing up as Protestants, [[Catholics]] or [[Jews]], etc. in [[America]], but that [[India’s]] [[religious]] [[reality]], as we meet with it, configures our [[own]] internal [[mental]] [[matrix]] as it were, whether or not we reject or accept features of [[Indian]] [[religious]] world-view as our [[own]]. | |
+ | In short, the two - the [[student]] of [[Indian]] [[religion]] and [[Indian]] [[religion]] itself - mutually create each other. Far from rendering our judgments [[void]] - our analyses are more valuable when taken in their context - i.e. as Native [[American]], African-American construal of [[Indian]] [[religion]], or in my case, a Scots-Irish-German liberal {{Wiki|Protestant}} Midwestern construal of [[Buddhism]]. | ||
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− | + | Only a “full disclosure” of one’s [[own]] biases and only a full disclosure of the “other” tradition’s internal view of its [[own]] [[reality]], can further the [[cause]] of achieving increasingly comprehensive modes of analyzing [[Indian]] [[religious]] systems, or for that {{Wiki|matter}}, any [[religious]] system deemed an “other” to one’s [[own]]. | |
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+ | The “perfected” or “thoroughly established” [[nature]] ([[pariniṣpannasvabhāva]]) - is the [[state]] of having [[realized]] fully in practice the [[illusory nature]] of subject-object [[dualism]]. In Cittamātrin {{Wiki|theory}}, this is the [[state]] of perfected [[realization]]. The implication of [[Mahāyānist]] [[insight]] here is that one must go beyond mere {{Wiki|theory}} and embody one’s | ||
− | + | {{Wiki|theory}} in practice if one seeks a complete [[awareness]] of given [[subject]] {{Wiki|matter}}. I have been more informed about {{Wiki|Judaism}} and {{Wiki|Islam}} by engaging in certain practices of those [[traditions]], though I never accepted for myself the {{Wiki|ideological}} standpoint of those [[traditions]]. | |
− | + | If one is to understand an “other” [[religion]] as comprehensively as possible, one really should engage in the practice to the extent one is able and is permitted to do so, to deepen one’s [[awareness]] of that [[tradition]]. This notion fits in with another Bourdieusian notion: | |
− | + | “...the basic requirement of a [[scientific]] {{Wiki|sociology}} is its {{Wiki|theory}} and [[Wikipedia:scientific method|methodology]] are both [[interdependent]] and totally reflexive.” | |
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+ | And so we have it. Nāgārjunan epistemology elucidates the fact of there being ultimately no separation between entities on the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level. There is ultimately no [[essence]] apart from its [[manifestations]]; this is in | ||
+ | correspondence with his {{Wiki|examination}} of many commonly [[experienced]] [[phenomena]], e.g. his {{Wiki|examination}} of the creator’s relationship to its creation, the lack of [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|distinction}} between the {{Wiki|temporal}} states of origination, abiding and [[cessation]], and so forth. | ||
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+ | The Cittamātrins extended, in their view, the [[epistemological]] implications of [[Madhyamaka]] [[insight]] into their notion of the [[three natures]] which are explicitly inclusive of praxis, denoting the problem (the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]), the {{Wiki|theoretical}} means to solve it ([[awareness]] of the [[other-dependent nature]]) and the combination of {{Wiki|theory}} and practice which perfects the system (the thoroughly established or perfected [[nature]]). | ||
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+ | I [[feel]] that a [[religious]] study can proceed along the above grounds. Perhaps there might be something of value for [[scholars]] of [[religion]] coming from other [[traditions]]. Certainly this relationship is reciprocal: [[Mahāyānist]] [[scholars]] in this country will be greatly benefitted by incorporating where relevant the [[insights]] of {{Wiki|sociology}}, history, | ||
− | + | {{Wiki|anthropology}}, and, specific to [[religious]] studies, the [[insights]] proffered by [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]] [[scholars]] into the commonalities of [[religious experience]] and the [[insights]] of Baird, (et. al.) [[scholars]] into being [[sensitive]] to differences among the [[traditions]] and concerned to document “just the facts” at least, as in the case of this study, before evaluative judgments are made. | |
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+ | Of course, one employing a [[Mahāyānist]] {{Wiki|hermeneutic}} will use these methodologies on a [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] level, but on an [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level will of course conclude that the various [[traditions]] of the [[world]] are neither the same, nor different, nor both, nor neither - and finally, to realize that even this scheme is “mere [[verbal]] convention.” | ||
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+ | The application of these to our study. As should be apparent from the foregoing, we shall be elucidating [[essential]] [[elements]] of the Yoga-praxis School which distinguish it from the two other primary [[Buddhist schools]], the [[Madhyamaka]] and the two major [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools, the [[Sautrāntika]] and [[Vaibhāṣika]]. However, these will be the [[essential]] [[elements]] | ||
− | + | as seen from the {{Wiki|perspective}} of a [[Madhyamaka]] writer. Since such is the case, one may only say that we will be describing the “[[essential]]” [[elements]] of Yoga-praxis [[doctrine]], as Troeltsch would say, as they [[exist]] “in the [[mind]] of the historian summarizing the material,” who in this case is lCang skya II and those [[scholars]] he chooses to quote. | |
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+ | In keeping with what we said above, a more thorough [[investigation]] would entail examining the [[ideas]] of those who consider themselves Yoga-praxis {{Wiki|adherents}} with regard to defining the “[[essence]]” of their school. It is in the exchange of [[views]] of the critical outsider and the “believing” insider that one may find whatsoever [[essence]] that may [[exist]] - {{Wiki|conventionally}} {{Wiki|speaking}}, of course. | ||
− | + | Again, in the twentieth century, to say “Yoga-praxis School [[doctrine]]” is quite a different thing than it was in lCang skya’s day. To him, [[Sanskrit]] materials were inaccessible, as were many other texts. He had available to him sufficient [[Tibetan texts]] to make his comments authoritative and well worthy | |
+ | of [[consideration]], but when one realizes that he is [[writing]] about texts fifteen hundred years prior to his age and before the two schools had fully solidified, so to speak, then one sees that his “[[essence]]” or “[[essential]] themes” are certainly [[subjective]] along with being authoritative. This [[essence]] or any other of course, is not ultimately | ||
− | + | [[existent]], yet this [[idea]] does not render our study meaningless. Precisely because Yoga-praxis [[thought]] is seen from many diverse angles is lCang skya’s contribution very meaningful as an admixture into the cauldron of roiling interpretations of [[Yoga]] praxis [[doctrine]]. | |
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+ | ===[[Chapter]] Two: [[Introduction: Yogācāra - Madhyamaka disputes from Nāgārjuna to Rol pa’i rdo rje lCang skya II.]]=== | ||
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+ | These two systems are perfectly in accordance with the [[noble]] [[doctrine]]. Can we then say which of the two is right? Both equally conform to [[truth]] and lead us to [[Nirvāṇa]]. Nor can we find out which is true or false? Both aim at the destruction of [[passion]] ([[kleśa]]) and the {{Wiki|salvation}} of all [[beings]]. We must not, in trying to settle the comparative [[merits]] of these two, create great [[confusion]] and fall further into [[perplexity]]. | ||
+ | For, if we act conformably with any of these [[doctrines]], we are enabled to attain the Other Shore ([[Nirvāṇa]]), and if we turn away from them, we remain drowned, as it were, in the ocean of [[transmigration]]. The two systems are, in like manner, [[taught]] in [[India]], for in [[essential]] points they do not differ from each other.- | ||
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− | [ | + | ===[[I-tsing]]=== |
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− | + | Commencement of the [[disputes]]. There can be no [[doubt]] that by the time of [[I-tsing]] at the latest, [[Mahāyāna]] was fragmented into two specific schools: The [[Madhyamaka]] and the [[Yogācāra]]. It will be one major aim of this study to investigate the origins of this cleavage. We will be examining [[Tibetan]] claims of a very early date and we will be examining the severity of the disagreements. | |
− | + | Certain works tend to highly under-exaggerate the discrepancies, while other, especially early {{Wiki|occidental}} works, and tend to over-exaggerate the differences between [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] systems, often in the framework of “[[nihilism]]” versus “[[Idealism]],” respectively. | |
+ | Having reflected on this issue for some years, and while by no means having at all fully resolved it, it is our contention that [[truth]] lies in both the under- and over- exaggerated positions mentioned above - and yet, neither. We will be demonstrating both the perspectives shared by the two schools, especially [[relative]] to the [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools. By implication more than explicitly, we will unveil the common ground of all these [[Buddhist schools]] share [[relative]] to [[non-Buddhist]] schools. | ||
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− | + | The multivalent aspects of this study. As evinced from the title of this study, we will be primarily concerned with the “[[Great Debate]]” engaged by the two schools over the course of some centuries, as recorded in the work of lCang skya [[Rol pa’i rdo rje]] (whose {{Wiki|biography}} we will relate below). In chapters three, four and five, the [[heart]] of this work, is the translation and [[sub-commentary]] of lCang skya II’s opus magnum, A Beautiful Ornament for [[Mt. Meru]] of the {{Wiki|Adept}} [[[Buddha’s]]] [[Teaching]], a Clear [[Exposition]] Presenting the Limits of Proofs. | |
+ | There are four textual layers employed in this study. Doubly indented are textual citations lCang skya himself employs to make his arguments. The translation of his [[own]] work immediately surrounds those citations of earlier works he cites. | ||
− | + | Below the translation is a [[sub-commentary]] that is an [[elaboration]] of obscure points in his work. This [[sub-commentary]] in a descriptive manner sets out the meaning of the text from the standpoint of authoritative [[Gelukpa]] [[interpretation]] from two years’ work on it with [[Geshe]] Lhundhup [[Sopa]]. | |
− | + | A [[translator]] can only {{Wiki|hope}} to eliminate {{Wiki|obscurity}} in his/her translation to as great an extent possible. To help ensure clarity we have included this extensive [[sub-commentary]] partly as a control, for sometimes we are merely repeating the translation to affirm that what it states need be interpreted no | |
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− | + | further. At other times we have included additional [[information]] without which the text, abbreviated as it often is, would be incomprehensible. Without the [[insights]] of [[Geshe Sopa’s]] [[tradition]] of {{Wiki|scholarship}} to help flesh out the meaning of the [[root text]], I would have been stymied in my efforts to translate at all accurately or fully. | |
+ | Finally, the footnotes in this study contain not only additional [[information]] from secondary sources and other primary sources. It is in this format that we have presented [[views]] of certain {{Wiki|modern}} [[scholars]] relevant to this study. These may be the [[insights]] of others that may conflict with the primary text of this study. | ||
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− | + | The two schools: [[essentially]] [[identical]] or [[essentially]] different? It is a pan-Mahāyānist [[philosophical]] standpoint to reject notions of “self-identity.” To say, for example, the two [[Mahāyāna]] Schools are [[identical]] would be to violate one of their [[own]] basic {{Wiki|principles}} in defining them. In Nāgārjunan analysis, something strictly [[identical]] to another thing could not be ipso facto, differentiated at all, in [[thought]], [[name]] or experiential [[reality]]. | |
− | The | + | To assert the [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]] of or even to say that they are “virtually” [[identical]] is to negate another [[vital]] aspect of [[Mahāyāna]] and all [[Buddhist doctrine]], the [[doctrine]] of [[upāya]]: the “approach” or “method” a [[Buddha]] or any [[teacher]] employs |
+ | |||
+ | to gradually train [[disciples]]. The manifold variety of approaches are all part of [[Buddha’s]] enticements into the [[dharma]], all valid to varying degrees and intended for [[sentient beings]] who are also manifold and variegated. The final aim of the [[Buddha’s teaching]] is [[nirvāṇa]] itself, and this is [[inconceivable]]. All the schools are hence “interpretable” and “provisional.” | ||
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− | + | The [[nature]] of [[consciousness]]: the pivot around which the [[great debates]] unfold. The [[nature]] of [[consciousness]] is the primary [[subject]] of the great issues which distinguish a [[Madhyamaka]] stance from that of a [[Yogācārin]]. Does the [[Yogācārin]] possess an outlook that is svacitta - “[[mind-in-itself]]?” This is what [pseudo?] [[Nāgārjuna]] claims. | |
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− | + | Is this school “Idealist?” The [[Yogacārin]] position hinges on its discusion of the [[self-awareness]] ([[rang rig]]), which is the [[subject]] of [[chapter]] four. Is this notion of a “[[self-aware]]” [[consciousness]] constitutive of some type of [[idealism]]? We offer arguments in our [[chapter]] on [[Wikipedia:scientific method|methodology]] as to why this {{Wiki|occidental}} term is inaccurate. As we shall see, perhaps “Consciousnessism,” ([[Vijñānavāda]]), “Mentalism” or “Mentationism” ([[Yogācāra]]), or “Cognitionism” | |
− | + | (Vijñāptimātravāda) are more accurate, though some will contend that we are [[quibbling]]. The implications of the two schools’ contentions over the greater or lesser importance accorded {{Wiki|mentation}} in the role of [[attaining]] [[liberation]] is central to this study. Connected with that is the [[relative]] {{Wiki|emphasis}} on either {{Wiki|theory}} or practice. | |
− | + | There [[exist]] major difficulties viewing either of the two schools strictly objectively. One always has an initial reference point. In the case of [[Gadjin Nagao]], that reference point was that of the [[Yogācāra School]]. He admits that his study of that school was heavily influenced by his prior [[knowledge]] of Yoga-praxis positions. | |
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− | + | No [[scholar]] of any [[tradition]], to our [[knowledge]], maintains that the two schools are either exactly the same or that they are utterly to be differentiated. Relatively {{Wiki|speaking}}, assertions of the gulf cleaving the two schools however, diverge widely. | |
+ | There are definitive and interpretable [[doctrines]]. The [[Buddhist schools]] never in {{Wiki|theory}} simply condemn the [[doctrines]] of other schools, however, they do rank them according to [[relative]] depth of [[insight]], etc. In the case of these [[disputes]], each claims the other’s [[doctrine]] “needs further elucidation” to hit the mark of the [[Buddha’s]] [[intention]]. | ||
− | + | [[David Seyfort Ruegg]], [[standing]] outside a particular [[Buddhist tradition]], terms the [[disputes]] as between a positive or [[mystical]] current ({{Wiki|cataphatic}}) and a negative {{Wiki|theory}} ({{Wiki|apophatic}}) {{Wiki|theory}} concerning these issues. The notion that some texts and [[ideas]] are “interpretable,” having a different [[intention]] (abhiprāya) than the apparent meaning, rather than “definitive” meaning must be used with [[care]]. He states, | |
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− | + | “...so powerful a [[Wikipedia:Hermeneutics|hermeneutical]] instrument as the [[idea]] of an intentionally motivated ‘surface’ [[teaching]] of provisional or non-definitive meaning requiring [[interpretation]] in a [[sense]] other than the obvious surface one, and opposed to a ‘deep’ [[teaching]] of final and [[definitive meaning]], had to be handled with [[care]] and {{Wiki|restraint}} - and no [[doubt]] also as sparingly as possible - in order not to be [[tainted]] with arbitrariness and [[disregard]] for a [[Wikipedia:canonical|canonical]] corpus.” | |
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− | + | Finally, as [[Geshe]] Lhundhup [[Sopa]] has put it, all of the schools whose [[doctrines]] are included among the three cycles (which we will discuss below) have arguments as to the [[reasons]] and [[methods]] by which they avoid falling into the classical chasm of either [[nihilism]] or {{Wiki|substantialism}}, anniḥiliationism or “[[permanence]]” [[thinking]]. | |
− | + | The [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]: Counteracting the extremes of positivism and repudiation. We have consulted Etienne Lamotte’s work to help “enflesh” our [[understanding]] of certain issues as evinced in the Saṃgrāha. The [[Sanskrit]] originals of these three works have been lost, leaving readers to rely on the {{Wiki|Chinese}} and [[Tibetan]] translations. The [[Mahāyāna]] Saṃgrāha and the [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]] are the two most often quoted textual sources for lCang skya. | |
− | The | ||
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+ | Three cycles of [[doctrine]]: the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. This issue of the Three Cycles of the [[Wheel of Dharma]] (dharmacakrapravartaṇa) defines the entirety of [[Buddhist doctrines]] - from the [[Mahāyāna]] {{Wiki|perspective}}. This | ||
− | + | systematization of [[Buddhist schools]] is famously elucidated in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. The [[Sanskrit]] edition was lost most likely already by the thirteenth century. Numerous [[Tibetan]] (at least ten) and {{Wiki|Chinese}} editions (at least three) [[exist]], attesting to this sūtra’s widespread influence and authority. | |
− | + | Legendary origin of the three cycles. Why are the [[doctrines]] of the three major divisions of [[Buddhist schools]] - according to the [[Mahāyāna]] Schools - called “cycles” or “[[wheels]]?” | |
− | + | “If [one asks] ‘[Why] is it a “[[wheel]]”?’ it is because it is [[a wheel]] of all the teachings of complete [[realization]] and [[scriptural]] teachings for the {{Wiki|purpose}} of cutting off unharmonious [[[elements]]] in the [[mental continuum]] of the [[disciple]] by the Bhāgavan. It is like the [[precious]] [[wheel]] of the [[cakravartin]] [[kings]] that travelled gradually from one region to another, conquering unharmonious [[elements]] through its power. Therefore, the [[[Buddhadharma]]] is similar to that [[wheel]], since it conquers unharmonious [[elements]] such as [[attachment]], etc., travelling gradually to the [[mental]] continua of [[disciples]].” | |
− | + | Definitive versus provisional [[doctrines]]. The first cycle of [[doctrine]]: the [[Śrāvakayāna]]. Needless to say, representatives of what the [[Mahāyāna]] Schools term the so-called [[Hīnayāna]] (“Lesser” or even “{{Wiki|Inferior}}” [[Vehicle]]) do not accept this elucidation of the [[Buddha’s teaching]] in the [[form]] of “three cycles of the [[wheel of Dharma]].” The only remaining school among the eighteen original schools included under this designation “[[Hīnayāna]]” are the various [[Theravāda traditions]] found in Wri Lavka and most of {{Wiki|Southeast Asia}}. They accept only the [[teachings of the Buddha]] as found in the [[three baskets]] of the [[Pali canon]] as authoritative and view what they deem later [[Mahāyāna]] developments as imaginative fictions. On the other hand, certain [[scholars]] find [[śūnyatā]] and numerous other [[doctrines]] in the [[Pali canon]] itself. | |
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+ | [[Scholars]] of [[Mahāyāna traditions]] have viewed the [[Hīnayāna]] as a [[teaching]] for [[śrāvakas]] and [[pratyekabuddhas]]. These aspirants to [[Buddhist]] [[awakening]] have a self-serving agenda. They pursue only their [[own]] [[awakening]] to the [[selflessness of the individual]] among the [[skandhas]], without regard to the [[suffering]] of fellow [[sentient beings]]. This system of the three cycles involves [[elements]] controversial to all [[forms]] of [[Buddhism]]. | ||
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− | + | The section of the [[sūtra]] elucidating the [[three turnings]] of the [[wheel]] (tricakra, [[khor lo]] [[gsum]]) appears in [[chapter]] seven, the questions of [[Bodhisattva]] Paramārthasamudgata to the [[Buddha]]. Paramārthasamudgata begins his inquiry of the [[Buddha]] by noting, | |
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− | + | “Bhāgavan, when I was in [[seclusion]] there arose this [[thought]]: ‘The Bhāgavan has spoken in many ways of the own-character of the [[aggregates]] and further spoken of their [[character]] of production, their [[character]] of {{Wiki|disintegration}}, and their [[abandonment]] and [[realization]]. Just as he has spoken of the [[aggregates]], he has also spoken of the [[sense]] [[spheres]]….[etc.]’” | |
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+ | Paramārthasamudgata continue, listing features of [[sentient]] [[consciousness]] the [[Buddha]] [[taught]] as having their “[[own]] [[characteristics]]” ([[svalaksana]], [[rang gi mtshan nyid]]). Continuing, he refers to the [[Buddha’s teaching]] concerning the “own-characteristics” of the [[Buddhist]] [[Noble Eight-fold]] [[Path]] etc. | ||
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− | + | Interpretable [[nature]] of the first cycle. Here is a reference to what the [[sūtra]] exposes as [[the first turning]] of the Cycle of [[Dharma]]. All [[Mahāyāna traditions]] view [[doctrines]] contained within this [[wheel]] as “provisional” or | |
− | The | + | “interpretable” - “requiring further elucidation” ([[neyartha]]). The [[reason]] for this is the [[realism]] concerning [[dharma]] {{Wiki|theory}} found in the [[Abhidhammapiṭaka]]. In the [[Abhidharmakoṣa]], a commentary on and compendium of theories from the [[piṭaka]], [[dharmas]] ([[phenomena]]) are said to be the fundamental constituents of time/space [[reality]]. |
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− | + | A selection from the Abhidharmakosabhāṣyam by [[Vasubandhu]] depicting a dispute between two now [[non-existent]] so-called (by the [[Mahāyāna]]) “[[Hīnayāna]]” or “{{Wiki|inferior}}” schools, the [[Vaibhāṣikas]] and [[Sautrāntika]] (with the former we can class the {{Wiki|modern}} [[Theravāda tradition]]), illustrates the “[[realism]]” of [[dharma]] {{Wiki|theory}} which served as one of many targets for the [[criticism]] of later [[Mahāyāna]] thinkers. | |
− | + | “[The [[Vaibhāṣikas]] say: the [[Sūtra]] teaches that] all rūpa...is, individually, called skandha...thus each ‘real’ ([[atomic]]) [[element]] of {{Wiki|past}} rūpa...present...and future...receives the [[name]] of [[skandha]]. Thus the [[skandhas]] have [[real existence]] and not merely nominal [[existence]]. | |
+ | [The [[Sautrāntika]]:] If this is the case, then the material āyatanas...have only a nominal [[existence]], for the [[quality]] of being a ‘gate of [[arising]] of the [[mind]]...’ does not belong to [[atoms]] taken one by one, which are solely real, but to collections of [[atoms]] which constitute an {{Wiki|organ}} of [[sight]], a [[visible object]], etc.” | ||
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− | + | Though both schools may disagree about the [[true reality]] or nominally [[reality]] of composite [[phenomena]], both adhere to the [[teaching]] that [[dharmas]] (“[[atoms]]” in the translation) are the fundamental time/space constituents of [[reality]]. The view was demolished later by [[Vasubandhu]] by means of his critique of this “atom/dharma” {{Wiki|theory}}. | |
+ | [[Nirvāṇa]] as ‘[[unconditioned]]’ [[phenomenon]]. Further, [[nirvāṇa]] in the {{Wiki|conception}} of the [[Hīnayāna]] School, was asserted to be an [[unconditioned]] [[state]], an [[assertion]] rejected by [[Nāgārjuna]] in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ in [[chapter]] 25 (the “nirvāṇapārīksā”). This notion of [[nirvana]] as “[[unconditioned]]” ([[asaṃskṛta]]) was rejected as violating the notion of [[pratītyasamutpāda]]; [[nirvāṇa]] and [[saṃsāra]] are co-arising and mutually [[interdependent]], according to [[Madhyamaka]] view. | ||
− | + | Entical [[nature]] of First Cycle [[doctrines]]. Therefore, the [[Buddha]] promulgated this [[Turning of the Wheel]] for [[Śrāvaka]] [[disciples]] who adhered to “entical” or “essentialist” [[thinking]], unprepared for the deeper [[truths]] of the [[Buddhadharma]] concerned with [[śūnyatā]]. In the seventh [[chapter]], the [[Buddha]] explains to Paramārthasamudgata the [[reason]] for not explaining the lack of [[self-nature]] (“[[own]] being” in the translation) to certain types of [[beings]]: | |
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+ | “Paramārthasamudgata, I do not designate the three types of lack of [[own]] being because [[sentient beings]] in the [[realm]] of [[sentient]] beings...because of being [[bound]] to [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] designations or due to predispositions toward [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] designations, they strongly adhere to the [[character]] of the [[own-being]] of the imputational as the [[own-being]] of the [[other-dependent]] and the thoroughly established.” | ||
− | + | He elucidates the view that [[sentient beings]] [[experience]] the [[world]] as having “[[inherent existence]]” or “[[self-nature]]” ([[svabhāva]]). They attach [[true existence]] to that which is merely [[conceptualized]] ([[parikalpita]]) and {{Wiki|perceive}} “entities” | |
− | + | where there are none. This is the “[[conceptualization]]” or “[[imagination]]” of the “unreal” ([[abhutaparikalpa]]). They equate this level of [[comprehension]] with the deeper “[[own]] being” or “self-entity” of the interwoven-with-other. To teach the lack of [[self-nature]] ([[niḥsvabhāva]]) to such [[sentient beings]] would be to generate within them further [[afflictions]] for which they are unprepared to cope. | |
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+ | The Second Cyle of [[doctrine]]: [[Madhyamaka]]. The [[Second Turning of the Wheel]] refers to the rise of systems of [[thought]] associated with the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] {{Wiki|literature}}. Within this corpus, [[ideas]] appear which seem to contradict teachings in the corpus of {{Wiki|literature}} associated with the first Turning. Among the various [[Prajñāpāramitā sūtras]], we read that the [[paths]] to [[awakening]] do not arise, that [[nirvāṇa]], rather than being an [[unconditioned]] [[realm]] is directly accessible, and in fact, all [[phenomena]] are “quiescent from the beginning.” | ||
− | + | [[Nihilism]] in the Second Cycle? The [[doctrine of śūnyatā]] is that which stands as the foremost [[teaching]] among these systems of [[thought]]. This [[doctrine]] seems like “[[nihilism]]” to both [[Hīnayāna]] [[Buddhists]] and non-Buddhists alike. To | |
+ | [[Mahāyānist]] proponents of [[Madhyamaka]] [[doctrines]], this is an extension of the [[Buddha’s teaching]] of [[anattā]] - the lack of an [[individual self]] among the [[skandhas]] - to the lack of [[selfhood]] for all [[phenomena]] (sarvadharmanairātmya) as well. | ||
+ | The [[Buddha]] responds to [[Paramārtha’s]] [[confusion]] as to why he would teach such [[doctrines]] that seem so to contradict his earlier teachings. The [[Buddha]] replies as follows: | ||
− | + | “Paramārthasamudgata, I initially teach [[doctrines]] starting with the lack of [[own-being]] in terms of production to those [[beings]] who have not generated [[roots of virtue]], who have not [[purified]] obstructions, who have not ripened their | |
+ | continuums.... They know [[[phenomena]]] as being impermanent...unstable, unworthy of confidence...whereupon they develope [[aversion]] and [[antipathy]] toward all [[compounded]] phenomena...their [[understanding]] is not [[infused]] with [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] designations.” | ||
− | + | The Second Cycle: for the prideful who ‘lack [[roots of virtue]]. Therefore, while it is said that [[sentient beings]] who were unripe to receive [[teaching]] concerning [[śūnyatā]]. These [[disciples]] of the [[Second Turning]] are said to be those who lack “[[roots of virtue]]” etc. and develop an [[understanding]] of [[language]] and [[sense-perception]] as “[[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] | |
− | + | designation only” (Saṃvṛtimātra). Their basis of [[understanding]] of [[reality]] needs to be demolished, and these [[doctrines]] are useful for reducing the [[pride]] of those too prone to adhere to the obstructions of entical [[views]]. | |
+ | The [[doctrines]] associated with the Second [[Wheel]], as that of the First [[Wheel]], are said to be “interpretable,” “needing elucidation” ([[neyārtha]]), as the [[Buddha]] states in the following: | ||
+ | “With [[respect]] to this well-taught [[doctrine]], degrees of conviction appear among [[sentient beings]]. Paramārthasamudgata, [[thinking]] of just these three types of lack of [[own-being]], through the teachings that are [[Sūtras]] of interpretable meaning, the [[Tathāgata]] [[taught]] such [[doctrines]] as: “All [[phenomena]] lack [[own-being]]; all [[phenomena]] are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally in a [[state of nirvana]].” | ||
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− | + | The [[danger]] with the [[Buddha’s]] [[doctrines]] connected with the [[Second Turning]] is that | |
− | + | “[[[Disciples]]] believe in the [[doctrine]], they strongly adhere just to the literal meaning of the [[doctrine]], [[[thinking]]], ‘All [[phenomena]] just lack [[own-being]]; all [[phenomena]] are just unproduced, just unceasing, just quiescent from the start, | |
− | + | just naturally in a [[state of nirvana]].’ Based on this, they adopt the view that all [[phenomena]] do not exist...they {{Wiki|perceive}} what is not the meaning to be the meaning....” | |
− | + | Therefore, the meaning of these [[doctrines]] needs to be interpreted lest “undeveloped” [[mental]] continua misinterprete “[[sarvam]] śūnyam” (all is [[empty]]) as a nihilismistic [[doctrine]]. | |
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− | + | Two wrong attitudes with regard to the Second Cycle [[doctrines]]. The [[Buddha]] in these passages also chides those who reject this [[doctrine]] as a [[doctrine]] [[taught]] not by the [[Buddha]], but by [[Māra]]. So there are two wrong attitudes to Second [[Wheel]] [[doctrines]]: 1] to accept them, but in a nihilismistic manner, and 2] to reject them as not [[taught]] by the [[Buddha]] and view as enemies those who propound these [[views]]. | |
− | + | The Third Cycle of [[doctrine]]: [[Yogācāra]]. The [[Bodhisattva]] Paramārthasamudgata comprehended the [[Buddha’s teachings]] in the following way: | |
− | + | Initially, in the Varanāsi area, in the {{Wiki|Deer}} Park...the Bhāgavan [[taught]] the aspects of the [[four truths]] of the [[Āryas]] for those who were genuinely engaged in the [[Śrāvaka vehicle]]. The [[wheel]] of [[doctrine]] you turned at first is wondrous...however, this [[wheel]] of [[doctrine]] that the Bhāgavan turned is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable meaning, and serves as a basis for dispute. | |
+ | Then the Bhāgavan turned a second [[wheel]] of [[doctrine]] which is more wondrous still for those who are genuinely engaged in the [[Great Vehicle]], because of the aspect of [[teaching]] emptiness...however this [[wheel]] of doctrine...is surpassable....[etc.]” | ||
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− | + | So the third [[wheel]], from the standpoint of the [[Yogācāra School]], is definitive (nitārtha) because it distinguishes the boundary between the first and second [[wheels]], encapsulating all their [[doctrines]]. How is this done? | |
− | + | The whole of [[Buddhist teaching]] is encapsulated by the [[doctrine]] of the [[three natures]]. From the [[Yogācāra]] standpoint, the whole of [[Buddhist teaching]] is reinterpreted by means of the [[three natures]] ([[trisvabhāva]]) {{Wiki|theory}}. They take the notion of “[[non-self-nature]]” ([[niḥsvabhāva]]) elaborated in [[Nāgārjuna’s]] works (foremost among them, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥs) and apply it in a three-fold way. | |
− | + | The first of the [[three natures]]: [[conceptualization]]. The first of these [[three natures]] is the “[[conceptualized]] [[nature]]” ([[parikalpitasvabhāva]]). It involves the [[imputation]] of {{Wiki|conceptual}} constructs creating “enticalized” [[objects]]. In fact, | |
+ | they do not [[exist]] of their [[own]] accord or concretely. This is the “[[conceptualization]] or [[imagination of the unreal]].’ This is the [[Yogācāra]] [[evolution]] of the [[saṃvṛtisatya]] notion of the schools of the [[Second Turning]] (i.e. the various [[Madhyamaka]] Schools). | ||
− | + | The second of the [[three natures]]: the [[other-dependent]]. The coining of the term [[paratantra]] was its expression of Nāgārjunan [[śūnyatā]], expressing the [[idea]] elucidated [[logically]] by [[Nāgārjuna]] that entities [[exist]] only as “mutually dependent” (parasparāpekṣā), not as {{Wiki|independent}} entities. “Interwoven-with-other” sums up the notion of [[niḥsvabhāva]], in their view, because the implication of this notions is that no “[[entity]]” is [[self-existent]] though they are falsely [[imputed]] as being so; in [[reality]], they are radically interwoven with what is mentated as “other” to itself. Hence they subsume the [[idea]] of the [[selflessness of the individual]] and [[phenomena]] (ātmadhrmanairātmya) under this notion. | |
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+ | The third of the [[three natures]]: the “perfected.” The [[Yogācāra]] assert their definitiveness as [[Mahāyāna]] [[teaching]] further by the term “[[pariniṣpannasvabhāva]].” The term implies [[perfection]] of practice - the actualization of the | ||
− | + | [[awareness]] of [[paratantra]] through practice in [[meditation]]. Further it has been said that the [[Yogācāra School]] is a continuation of the [[Abhidhamma]] period having gone through the filter of [[Mahāyāna]] [[logic]], etc. and by means of this, a “de-enticalization” of the [[Abhidhamma]] system occurred. | |
+ | [[Yogācāra]]: school of definitive [[interpretation]]. They are a school of definitive [[interpretation]], it is said, because they incorporate the [[Abhidhamma]]. If we accept the story as given by the [[tradition]], the same [[Vasubandhu]] began his career as the great [[scholar]] of the [[Abhidharmakosa]] [[fame]], who converted to the [[Mahāyāna]] upon {{Wiki|learning}} of his half brother’s [[doctrine]] brought back from the [[Tuṣitā]] [[realm]]. If this is true pre-Mahāyāna [[Abhidhamma]] [[thought]] is directly | ||
− | + | connected with [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]] in the works of one of its central thinkers. | |
+ | One [[Vasubandhu]]. [[Frauwallner’s]] arguments to the contrary, it is not at all [[philosophically]] improbable that the author of the Koṣa is one and the same [[person]] as who wrote the Triṃsika, et. al.. Differences in style can be accounted for by the fact that different issues rose to [[concern]]. Specifically, how does one integrate [[the three-nature theory]] and the compelling standpoint of [[śūnyatā]] with [[abhidhamma]] categories? How does one then account for different [[meditative]] states and the various levels of [[consciousness]] [[realized]] through them? | ||
− | + | [[Yogācāra]] critique of [[Madhyamaka]]. [[Rebirth]]: without the [[ālaya consciousness]], how does one account for that [[psychic]] [[reality]] which is [[reborn]]? [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[thought]] enabled the new [[Mahāyānist]] {{Wiki|synthesis}} of classical [[doctrines]] such as the [[twelve-fold chain]] of [[causation]] (dvādaṣaṅgapratītyasamutpāda). Further, from the [[Yogācāra]] standpoint, the | |
− | + | [[Madhyamaka]] system is explanatorily weak. It illuminates the {{Wiki|distinction}} between the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] and [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[relative]] to [[śūnyatā]], but cannot incorpate all the [[teachings of the Buddha]] as the [[sūtra]] states. Finally, the [[śūnya]] [[doctrine]] is positively [[dangerous]] for those [[mental continuum]] is immature and for whom it would be “{{Wiki|poisonous}}.’ | |
+ | [[Mādhyamika]] response to [[Yogācāra]] critique. The [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[Madhyamaka]] can agree that the [[Madhyamaka]] [[doctrine]] is not for all trainees in the [[Mahāyāna]] system. Employing a type of “snob appeal,” They can indicate that [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[Madhyamaka]] can indeed lead to a nihilismistic view for some [[mental]] continua (see [[Tsong kha pa’s]] view just below). Therefore, they may assent to the notion that the [[Yogācāra]] elucidates an “extensive method” and venerate Asavga whom | ||
+ | they see as of the [[lineage]] of [[Maitreya]] as on a par with [[Nāgārjuna]], of the [[lineage]] of Mañjuwri. However, in their view, Asavga held as his [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] view, the standpoint of [[Mādhyamika]] [[śūnyatā]] | ||
+ | The third cycle is [[taught]] to forestall falling into the ‘Great [[Nihilism]].’ [[Tsong kha pa]] himself states: | ||
− | + | “Finally, [in the third [[wheel]]], the statements of the lack of intrinsic identifiability of the first [[nature]] and of the intrinsically identifiable [[existence]] of the [[latter]] two natures [are interpretable in meaning]. [They are] [[taught]] | |
+ | for those [[[disciples]]] of the [[Mahāyāna]] who would find no ground to establish cause-effect...in the intrinsic realitylessness that is [[emptiness]] with [[respect]] to intrinsically identifiable {{Wiki|status}}, in order to forestall their falling into the great [[nihilism]] ....” | ||
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+ | The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra as definitive [[Madhyamaka]] text. Some [[Mādhyamika]] have held that the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is a definitive text because it basically assents to the notion that the [[Second Turning]] is definitive, though too hard to comprehend for the trainee of less than superb [[faculties]]. In the end, even all holders of [[Vijñānavāda]] [[lineage]] will come to the [[profound view]] (of [[śūnyatā]]) in the end, when their [[mental]] continua are matured. | ||
+ | Here, our [[investigation]] requires some preferatory remarks. At times in {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|present}} one finds sometimes a tendency to draw rather simple comparisons among schools. It has been and is in many circles still common to refer to the [[Yogācāra School]] as a [[form]] of “[[Idealism]]” because of its {{Wiki|emphasis}} on the [[doctrine]] of “[[cognition-only]]” Vijñāpti- or [[vijñānamātra]]. | ||
− | + | Variously called “[[Mind-only]]” ([[Yogācāra]]), “[[consciousness-only]]” ([[vijñānamātra]]) and more generically perhaps, the “Yoga-praxis” ([[Yogācāra]]) school, this [[philosophical]] system has received diverse treātment at the hands of {{Wiki|occidental}} [[scholars]] struggling to find footholds of meaning in the craggy edifice of its centuries-long [[development]] textually. | |
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− | + | Complicating matters further is the fact that one’s [[definition]] of the school’s [[doctrines]] will depend greatly upon whether one is employing Central or {{Wiki|East Asian}} sources for one’s [[interpretation]]. In the hands of [[Gelukpa]] [[Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]] of [[Tibet]] and [[Mongolia]], the [[Yogācāra]] seems more greatly to resemble {{Wiki|occidental}} “Idealisms” (of necessity generally defined). The [[interpretation]] differs from the interpretations one is likely to find among the [[investigation]] of the original [[Indian]] [[Yogācāra]] systems to be found among [[Japanese]] [[scholars]] of the twentieth century. | |
− | + | Texts and authors. [[Nāgārjuna’s]] [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]]. In this work we have an early and biting critique of Cittamātrin [[thinking]]. Whether this work is {{Wiki|pseudepigraphal}} or not remains to be determined. [[Christian Lindtner]] holds that it is | |
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− | + | not. He notes that the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] is referred to neither by [[Buddhapālita]] nor [[Candrakīrti]], yet it serves as a basic authority for [[Bhavya]] “in his most mature work, the Ratnapradīpa.” He neglects quoting it in his earlier works, the [[Tarkajvāla]], [[Prajñāpradīpa]], however [[Asvabhāva]] and [[Śāntarakṣita]] both refer to this text. | |
− | + | It is Lindtner’s opinion that the Yuktiśāstika, the Catuḥśatakastava and the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] “are the most frequently quoted among all works ascribed to [[Nāgārjuna]] in later [[Indian literature]].” [[Lindtner]] holds that the | |
+ | [[consciousness-only]] [[doctrines]] [[Nāgārjuna]] refutes are likely derived from those extant in the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. On this point he states, | ||
+ | “Having seen how vehemently [[Nāgārjuna]] attacks any kind of [[acceptance]] of [[svabhāva]] one would also expect him to have criticized those who might have [[thought]] themselves justified in maintaining the [[absolute existence]] of [[vijñāna]] ([[citta]]). But in the texts dealt with hitherto this has only happened incidentally. Here [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] provides us with the missing link.” | ||
− | + | For {{Wiki|evidence}} that [[Nāgārjuna]] was indeed familiar with the [[doctrines]] of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra, [[Lindtner]] cites the following parallels: | |
+ | The {{Wiki|allusions}} to [[Vijñānavāda]] - or more precisely to the [[Vijñānavāda]] of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra...generally held to be posterior to [[Nāgārjuna]] - are quite consistent with the fact that [[Nāgārjuna]] also refers to this [[sūtra]] elsewhere.” | ||
+ | However, [[Lindtner]]’ comments are dubious, given that some will assert that holding [[Bhavya]] as genuine author of the Ratnapradīpa is itself open to question. Furthermore, Ruegg however holds that this text is the product of the so-called “[[tantric]] [[Nāgārjuna]].” This [[Nāgārjuna]] seems to have lived in the seventh (or at the latest in the eighth) century. The [[Bodhicittavivarana]] may well be his composition....” | ||
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− | + | He makes mention of the fact that [[Indian]] and [[Tibetan]] records identify the writers of [[Tantric]] works with the writers of wastras with the same [[name]] living centuries earlier. The [[traditions]] hold that [[Nāgārjuna]], [[Candrakīrti]], etc., lived enormously long [[lives]], even for several centuries. These records do sharply differentiate between the [[philosophical]] and [[tantric]] corpi associated with these writers however. | |
− | + | The issues involved are a bit like those associated with the “two [[Vasubandhus]]” {{Wiki|theory}}, or the elusive “search for the historical [[Maitreya]].” As discussed above, {{Wiki|Frauwallner}} analyzed differences in the style of [[writing]] as found in the works of [[Vasubandhu]] the author of the [[Abhidharmakoṣa]] versus that of the Cittamātrin [[master]] of the same [[name]]. But | |
+ | perhaps there were also two Beethovens, one pre and one post Eroica; perhaps there were two Kants, one pre and one post [[Hume]]. If we compare a {{Wiki|Beethoven}} Sonata with a {{Wiki|symphony}}, again one could conclude that there were two Beethovens, even though the pieces may have been written contemporaneously. | ||
− | The | + | The same may be said for a great number of authors whose [[views]] shifted during the course of their careers. In the case of the [[tantric]] [[Nāgārjuna]] versus the [[philosopher]] original, the issue is concerned with divergent materials and genres. If the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] fits in with “[[Nāgārjuna]].” The [[Prāsaṅgika]] |
+ | [[Madhayamika]] renders more or less the same critique of a number of {{Wiki|East Asian}} [[Buddhist schools]] influenced heavily by [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]] of the same kind of relatively substantialist “entity”-view. The problems with notions such as | ||
− | + | [[hongaku]] and [[Buddha Nature]] as seen in many of these schools are problems similar to that [[Gelukpa]] have with [[gZhan stong]] (or “[[zeroness]] of other”). [[Thinking]] in their [[own]] {{Wiki|culture}}. It leads to a [[form]] of [[nihilism]] in the declaration of a [[pure]] [[nature]] which is [[empty]] - not inherently - but [[empty]] of [[defilements]] ([[kleśa]]). | |
− | + | How does this seemingly more positive [[doctrine]] lead to [[nihilism]]? [[Conceptualizing]] the [[Dharmakāya]] and the [[Buddha Nature]] within as the only real [[truth]], [[concomitant]] with the notion of the [[non-existence]] of [[external objects]] lead to a | |
− | + | devaluation of this world’s [[reality]] in declaring it all [[illusion]] and leads to a [[nihilism]] in the [[sense]] that [[language]], observed [[phenomena]] are viewed as simply false. Such a view loses the notion of [[two truths]]. [[Saṃvṛti]] is a [[form of truth]], albeit [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]. | |
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+ | With regard to the authenticity of the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] and its professed Nāgārjunan authorship, with its grave [[opposition]] to Cittamātrin notions is a [[subject]] of dispute. | ||
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− | + | Ruegg notes that this work was familiar to [[Haribhadra]] who lived in the ninth century. This [[tantric]] [[Nāgārjuna]] he asserts, lived in the seventh century or eighth century at the latest. This means that in a span of no more than two centuries, the [[existence]] of this second [[Nāgārjuna]] would have been gone from [[memory]] and works of his authorship conflated with that of the original. The theories about all sorts of “multiple-personalitied” [[Masters]] is overly-involved. Ruegg himself cites the [[existence]] of a [[tantric]] [[Candrakīrti]], a [[tantric]] [[Āryadeva]], and so on. | |
+ | One must note that it is odd that such a severe critique of the [[Yogācāra School]], if known to [[Buddhapālita]] and [[Candrakīrti]], would not receive reference from them, especially in the passages ascribed by [[Tibetan tradition]] as | ||
− | + | critiques of [[Yogācāra]] by [[Candrakīrti]], i.e., the sixth [[chapter]] of the Madhyamakāvatara. But then, one must posit the [[existence]] of a [[tantric]] [[Bhāvaviveka]] to escape the reference to the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] in his Ratnapradīpa. | |
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− | + | The history and [[lineages]] of the [[Siddhas]] and Tantrin [[masters]] remains very obscure for us, and our sources sometimes give quite divergent accounts of them so that it is not yet possible to fit them coherently into the history of [[Indian]] and [[Buddhist]] [[thought]]. | |
− | + | While the major focus of our work here does not entail detailed redaction-critical work, it is important to make inquiry into whether this text is authentically Nāgārjunan because of the role it will play in our study. This brief text does set the themes for works which later appear on this topic and if we are to engage in historical [[investigation]] of these [[disputes]], it is surely important to get our {{Wiki|chronological}} ordering correct. While some will criticize us for dodging the issue, we accept [[Thurman’s]] arguments with regard to the [[tantric]] versus [[sastric]] [[Buddhist masters]]. | |
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− | + | Thurman however puts this whole type of [[controversy]] into a post-modernesque framework which we find intellectually satisfying. He notes that with numerous authors of [[sastras]], it has been fashionable to assert the [[existence]] of corollary “[[tantric]]” counterparts who are considered specious or pseudonymous of these given [[tantric]] texts. For | |
− | + | example, while [[Nāgārjuna]], [[Bhāvaviveka]], et. al. are accepted as the genuine authors of certain treatises, so-called “[[tantric]] [[Nāgārjuna]] ” and “[[tantric]] [[Bhāvaviveka]]” are seen as later, pseudepigraphical authors. | |
+ | He notes that since [[tantric traditions]] were oral for centuries and only entered written [[form]] near the close of the first millenium of the [[Common Era]], it may be reasonable to hold that these later texts were the orally passed down teachings of the great [[Masters]], the words of whom were written down only centuries later. | ||
− | + | It is our aim to clarify this issues and others through the course of this study. For our purposes though, we find it highly aesthetically [[pleasing]] to accept the [[tradition]] at its [[word]] for now, and will examine the [[Bodhicittavivarana]] as an acceptable first [[manifestation]] of a [[Madhyamaka]] critique of key [[Yogācāra]] notions. We will prescind from making a [[judgment]] on this issue until the conclusion of our study. | |
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− | + | ===[[Interpreting Candrakīrti’s ‘Abhimukhi’ Chapter: directed to ‘outsiders’ or ‘insiders?]]=== | |
+ | ==[[Candrakīrti: Madhyamakāvatara and its Bhāṣya]]== | ||
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+ | While [[Candrakīrti]] and [[Bhāvaviveka]] were by no means in full agreement on a number of issues, both nevertheless accounted themselves [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]] and held [[Nāgārjuna]] in [[highest]] esteem as an authority. Equally, they wrote critiques of Cittamātrin notions and are more or less in agreement concerning what they felt were problems with [[Yogācāra]] systems. | ||
+ | We have seen the initial stages of the [[disputes]] which are the [[subject]] of this [[investigation]] took place perhaps in the writings of [[Nāgārjuna]] himself. A short period of time later, critiques of “[[Mind-only]]” systems were written in more extensive fashion, by two of the most famous earlier [[disciples]] of [[Nāgārjuna]], [[Bhāvaviveka]] and [[Candrakīrti]]. Later [[Tibetan tradition]] styles the first [[scholar]] “Svatantrika-Mādhyamika” and the [[latter]], “[[Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika]],” but in their [[own]] day [[relative]] to the {{Wiki|adherents}} of “[[Cognition-only]],” they were of like-mind. | ||
− | [ | + | There are three major aspects of [[Candrakīrti’s]] disagreement with [[Yogācārins]] with regard to the [[other-dependent nature]]. That it is [[manifest]] apart from apprehended [[external objects]], that is [[exists]] in [[actuality]] and that its [[own]] [[inherent reality]] is lies beyond {{Wiki|conceptual}} analysis. |
− | + | [[Bhāvaviveka]]. In [[Bhāvaviveka’s]] commentary on [[Nāgārjuna’s]] [[Stanzas]] [Concerning] the [[Root]] of the [[Middle Way]], he “castigates the followers of “[[Mind Only]]” as introducing the {{Wiki|heretical}} notion of a ‘[[self]]’ ([[ātman]]) under another [[name]].” | |
− | + | “If you say that [[tathatā]] ([[Suchness]]), although beyond words, is a real thing, then this is the [[ātman]] of the {{Wiki|heretics}} which you designate with the different [[name]] of [[tathatā]]. Your [[tathatā]] is a real thing, and yet from the viewpoint of [[absolute truth]] it does not belong to the categories of being or nonbeing; but such is the [[ātman]]. The {{Wiki|heretics}} also believe that the [[ātman]], a real thing, is {{Wiki|omnipresent}}, eternal, | |
− | + | acting, [[feeling]], and yet beyond all categories and [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] ([[nirvikalpa]]). Because it does not pertain to the [[sphere]] of words, because it presents no [[object]] ot the discursive [[intellect]] (vikalpa-buddhi), it is said to be beyond categories. The [[teaching]] of the {{Wiki|heretics}} says: ‘Words do not reach there; [[thought]] (manas-citta) does not {{Wiki|present}} itself; this is why it is called [[ātman]].” | |
− | + | “Although such is the [[character]] of the [[ātman]], you say non the less; ‘[[Knowledge]] that relies on the [[ātman]] does not.’ But what is the difference between your [[tathatā]] and the [[ātman]], since both of them are {{Wiki|ineffable}} and yet possess real [[self-nature]]? It is only out of a {{Wiki|partisan}} [[spirit]] that you speak as you do. Therefore I cannot accept this [[tathatā]], the same as the [[ātman]], real yet nonexisting.” | |
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+ | Snellgrove [[feels]] that [[Bhāvaviveka’s]] “argument can only be pressed by taking [[ātman]] in a [[purified]] [[Vedanta]] [[sense]] and dissociating it from all notion of a personal [[sense]].” He credits the “[[Mind Only]]” School with attempting to solve the problem of continuity over successive [[births]], a basic [[Buddhist doctrine]] seemingly at odds with the [[doctrine]] of [[anātman]]. He notes that the issue of [[personality]] for the Cittamātrin is resolved at the level of the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]] ([[parikalpitasvabhāva]]). | ||
− | [ | + | At this relatively [[superficial]] level, an [[imaginary]] or [[imputed]] self-identity does indeed [[exist]]. At the next stage, the “interwoven-with-other” [[nature]], the problem of {{Wiki|individual}} [[personality]] dissolves, the second nature’s {{Wiki|emphasis}} on all entities’ being dependent on what is “other” to themselves for their [[existence]]. Here, “the problem of differentiating {{Wiki|individual}} streams of [[consciousness]] from the [[universal]] {{Wiki|stream}} need not arise.” |
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+ | With regard to the [[nature]] of the [[ālaya consciousness]], he cites the passage of the [[Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra]] wherein it is discussed. | ||
+ | “This [[consciousness]] is known as the ‘apprehending [[consciousness]]’ in that it [[grasps]] at and comprehends this [[bodily]] [[form]]. It is also called “[[basic consciousness]]” in that it adheres and clings to this [[bodily]] [[form]] with a single [[sense]] of {{Wiki|security}}. It is also called ‘[[mind]]’ in that it is an acucmulation and aggregation of [[appearances]], {{Wiki|sounds}}, {{Wiki|smells}}, {{Wiki|tastes}}, [[sensations]] of {{Wiki|touch}} and of [[thoughts]].” | ||
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− | + | He cites Scherbatsky’s reading of the [[ālaya]] as “one of the best descriptions” of the “[[basic consciousness]]” to be found among {{Wiki|European}} works. While many will wish to contest this view given Scherbatsky’s “datedness,” nevertheless, he expresses features of the [[ālaya]] which serve as [[objects]] of [[Mādhyamika]] refutation. He calls it | |
− | + | “...a step towards the reintroduction of the dethroned [[Soul]]. [[Uddyotakara]] and Vacaspatimishra reject it as a poor substitute for their substitute for their Substantial [[Soul]]. ...This [[Wikipedia:sacrifice|sacrifice]] [[Buddhism]] could not make. The anātma-vāda could not become [[ātma-vāda]]. | |
+ | [[Buddhism]] continued to be a pluralistic [[dharma]] {{Wiki|theory}}, but a {{Wiki|monistic}} subway was added to it...[the [[ālaya]]] replaces both the external (nimitta-bhāga) and the internal (darśana-bhāga) [[worlds]]. But it is not a [[substance]]; it is a process; it runs underground of actual [[experience]].” | ||
− | + | He goes on to differentiate it from the {{Wiki|Greek}} [[Wikipedia:Psyche (psychology)|psyche]], the [[Vedāntic]] [[ātman]], etc., but nevertheless concludes “that it is a substitute for an individual’s surviving [[Soul]] is clear from the words of [[Uddyotakara]] and [[Vacaspati]].” | |
− | + | We would personally refrain from employing the [[views]] of {{Wiki|Vedic}} [[scholars]] to interpret a [[Buddhist]] term as complex as that of the basal [[consciousness]], but as we shall have seen from the critiques of this notion rendered by [[Mādhyamika]] | |
+ | [[scholars]], this is more or less their [[own]] problem with it: it is an [[idea]] promulgated for the {{Wiki|purpose}} of attracting those afraid of relinquishing the [[ātman]] to [[Buddhist doctrine]] of a relatively less [[profound view]] than that outlined in the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] {{Wiki|literature}} and upon which [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]] wrote extensive commentaries. | ||
+ | Having investigated [[Bhāvaviveka’s]] [[discussion]] of basic Cittamātrin notions, we turn to [[Candrakīrti]] on the same theme. Living approximately one century after [[Bhāvya]], [[Candrakīrti’s]] critique of Cittamātrin notions is more extensive than that of [[Bhāvaviveka]]. | ||
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− | + | When these [[disputes]] became issues of [[concern]] is not easily or uncontroversially to be determined. Whether {{Wiki|pseudepigraphal}} or not, we do have in hand a work by [[Nāgārjuna]] containing within it a hard-handed critique of basic [[Yogācāra]] notions. Indeed, whether spurious or authentically Nāgārjunan, the work at the very least indicates the seriousness with which the [[disciples]] of [[Nāgārjuna]] who attributed the work to him took [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrines]]. Like other great | |
− | + | [[Tibetan Madhyamaka]] texts, lCang skya’s work is it should be kept in [[mind]] that the Beautiful Ornament is in large part apologetical. All the [[sections]] of the text culminate in the [[exposition]] of the definitive [[truth]], which in lCang skya’s [[Gelukpa tradition]] is that established | |
− | + | first by [[Nāgārjuna]], descending through [[Buddhapālita]] and [[Candrakīrti]] through [[Tsong kha pa]] and his heirs. We might add, the [[Gelukpa]] incorporate the works of [[Dharmakīrti]] as an almost equally authoritative [[interpretation]] of [[Mahāyāna]] notions of [[śūnyatā]], and while {{Wiki|conventionally}} he employs some highly useful understandings, one might well argue if he belongs with [[Nāgārjuna]] at the “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level” of analysis. | |
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+ | ===[[Chapter]] Three: [[The Yogācāra examination and refutation of (Madhyamaka) nihilism.]]=== | ||
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+ | ==[[The life and writings of lCang skya II, Rol pa’i rdo rje]]== | ||
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− | + | The next section introduces the work of [[Rol pa’i rdo rje]] lCang skya II, a high [[lama]] serving as court advisor to the Qing or {{Wiki|Manchu}} [[emperor]], [[Wikipedia:emperor Qianlong|Qianlong]] (1711-1799). The first lCang skya Qutuqtu (1642-1714) arrived in {{Wiki|Peking}} at the request of the [[emperor]], and the second was born in 1717 to {{Wiki|Mongol}} nomads in [[Amdo]], a region {{Wiki|lying}} in the area | |
+ | spanning the borders between [[Tibet]] and [[Mongolia]], though properly {{Wiki|lying}} within the {{Wiki|political}} [[boundaries]] of [[Tibet]]. His is the second and perhaps most notable of of the lCang skya [[lamas]]. His full title is rDo rje ‘[[chang]] lCang skya Rol pai [[rdo rje]] [[Ye shes]] bstan pa’i [[sgron me]] [[dpal bzang]] po. | ||
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+ | [[Monastic]] studies in {{Wiki|Beijing}}. He began his [[monastic]] studies in {{Wiki|Beijing}} after a {{Wiki|Chinese}} unit destroyed his home [[monastery]] of dGon lung and among his [[teachers]] there was the second Thu’u bkwan Qutuqtu [[Ngag dbang]] [[Chos kyi]] rGya mTSHo (1680-1736). lCang skya in turn would instruct the third [[incarnation]] of Thu’u bkwan. He spent some time engaged in study [[in Tibet]] as well, studying with the [[seventh Dalai Lama]] and receiving final [[monastic vows]] from the second [[Panchen lama]]. | ||
− | + | {{Wiki|Patronage}} of {{Wiki|Manchu}} {{Wiki|emperor Qianlong}}. The previous [[emperor]], [[Yung-cheng]] (1722-1735) had been favorable to indigenous [[Chinese Buddhism]], though even this [[interest]] was not great. However a great and life-long {{Wiki|patron}} of lCang skya and the [[Gelukpa order]] emerged as the {{Wiki|emperor Qianlong}} (1711-1799) ascended to the [[throne]] and ruled in the wake of [[Yung-cheng]] from 1746-1795. He had been a [[student]] of lCang skya’s. This close [[friendship]] with the new [[emperor]] was the foremost [[reason]] for lCang skya’s widespread influence in [[Mongolia]], [[Manchuria]] and even [[China]] and [[Tibet]] as well. | |
+ | lCang skya learned {{Wiki|Manchu}}, {{Wiki|Chinese}} and {{Wiki|Mongolian}} in order to propagate [[dGe lugs pa]] teachings among the peoples who spoke and read these [[languages]]. He supervised the compilation of a bilingual glossary, the Dag yig mkhas pa’i ‘byung [[gnas]], which would serve as the foundation for some translations and | ||
− | + | corrections of a {{Wiki|Mongolian}} edition of the [[bsTan ‘gyur]], and lCang skya oversaw the translation of the entire bKa [[‘gyur]] into {{Wiki|Manchu}}. | |
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+ | A Beautiful Ornament for the [[Mt. Meru]] of the {{Wiki|Adept}} [[[Buddha’s]]] [[Teaching]]: a Clear [[Exposition]] Presenting the Limits of Proofs. lCang skya investigated the claims of various sects of [[Chinese Buddhism]] and concluded that the [[Buddhism]] of [[Hva shang]] [[Mahāyāna]] no longer existed in [[China]], and in his view, the most | ||
+ | prevalent [[philosophical]] standpoint held by proponents of {{Wiki|Chinese}} [[Buddhist]] sects was that of the [[Vijñānavāda]]. He wrote his opus magnum, the text to be studied here, in the period between 1736 and 1746. Smith states that it was his [[interest]] in the [[Vijñānavāda]] Schools preserved as {{Wiki|Chinese}} [[traditions]] which sparked his [[interest]] in [[writing]] his [[Grub mtha]]’, and it was this section which he completed first. | ||
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+ | [[Chapter]] “Kha” of the Clear [[Exposition]]: “The [[three realms]] are [[mind]] alone.” It is in this [[chapter]] that lCang skya presents the [[tenets]] of the [[Yogācāra School]]. The first two [[sections]] of his opus magnum deal with presentation of the [[doctrines]] of {{Wiki|Vedic}} ([[Hindu]]) and ([[Buddhist]]) [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools and the last presents the [[tradition]] which is his [[own]], the [[Madhyamaka]]. In this [[chapter]], lCang skya relies principally on the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]. | ||
− | [ | + | ===[[Identifying the two extremes: nihilism and positivism.]]=== |
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− | + | [237:4-6] There is no incompatibility between the two great [[[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]]] [[chariot]] systems with regard to the [[essentials]] of the great [[path]]. The second [point] regarding the [[stages of the path]] of the profound {{Wiki|theory}} [[[śūnyatā]]], [discusses] two ways of traversing the [[path]]: [1] the manner of | |
− | + | expounding (gtan la ‘bebs ) the [[selflessness of phenomena]], ([[dharmanairātmya]], [[chos]] gyi [[bdag med]],) and after having relied on that, [2] [[meditative cultivation]] of it. In the first [topic] are three [aspects]. Generally, there is [[taught]] [1] a way of [[abandoning]] (spong tshul ) the [[two extremes]], [2] | |
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− | [ | + | rejection in particular of the extreme of entical {{Wiki|mentation}}, (samāropa/adhyāropa, sgro ‘[[dogs]]) and [3] a way of entry into the [[reality]] ([[tattva]], [[de kho na nyid]]) of the Vijñāptimātra [[[Cognition-only]] school] (Tib. [[rnam rig tsam]]). |
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− | + | The [[two extremes]] are those of “positivism” or “entical {{Wiki|mentation}}” - the [[imputation]] of all [[phenomena]] as inherently, [[essentially]] or substantially [[existent]]. “Samāropa” indicates “[[imputation]],” as in the “[[imputation]]” of the concrete or [[inherent existence]] of entities. | |
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+ | The term ’[[dogs]] refers not to normal [[sense awareness]] from which images of the [[world]] arise and that implies subject/object interaction that [[initiates]] [[thought]]. Here, ‘[[dogs]] points to strictly {{Wiki|mentation}}, “intra-mental” or “subject-focused” [[thinking]], even “intellection.” Therefore, this kind of [[thinking]] | ||
− | + | applies to mentated [[thought]] ([[rtog pa]] yid shes) rather than [[sense-consciousness]] non-mentated [[thought]], ([[rtog pa]] [[med pa]] [[dbang]] shes [[rtog]] ) and “repudiation” (apavāda, skur ba ‘debs pa ) refers to the repudiation of any non-sensorial [[reality]] for [[perceived]] [[objects]] implying there is no basis for [[existence]] leading to a type of [[nominalism]]. By implication as we shall see, any [[ultimate truth]]; hence, in a crude way, this term translates as “[[nihilism]].” [[Robert Thurman]] | |
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− | + | translates these terms as “reificationism” and “repudiationism.” Though much objection has been raised to my employing the [[Western]] terms “[[nihilism]]” and “positivism,” in the [[relative]] context of [[Buddhist]] [[thought]], these terms are accurate. [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] on the whole is all relatively nihilismistic of course, from the standpoint of [[Western]] ([[Christian]], [[Wikipedia:Judaism|Jewish]] and [[Islamic]]) [[thought]]. | |
+ | Positivism. | ||
− | + | [237:6-238:2] “In the first [of the three aspects of the first method], is a way of rejecting and identifying the [[two extremes]]. In the first of the two [i.e. the identification,] is the mode of cleaving to an extreme of entical {{Wiki|mentation}}. This is cleaving to [a phenomenon’s] establishment by [[virtue]] of its [[existing]] from its [[own]] standpoint (rang gi [[gnas]] tsod) in those [[[phenomena]]] in which [[essence]] and [[particularity]] for the [[phenomena]] of [[form]], etc., are [[imputed]] | |
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+ | as [[essences]] ([[ngo bo nyid]]). That is the {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[object]] for entically [[conceptualizing]] and it is the extreme of entical {{Wiki|mentation}}. Moreover, according to the [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]] , it is said, “[Entical {{Wiki|mentation}} refers to] any strong [[attachment]] (abhinivewana, mgnon par [[zhen pa]] ) at all, from having [[imputed]] enticality to that which is not [[existing]]. It is [imputing the] [[existence]] of [[essential]] self-identical [[characteristics]] for words [[conceptualized]] as entities ([[bhava]], [[dngos po]] ) such as [[form]] etc., and [[phenomena]] such as [[form]] etc.” | ||
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+ | The [[Vijñānavāda]], according to [[Gelukpa]] [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[tradition]], assert that an [[entity]] does not [[exist]] by its [[own]] [[nature]] as being a basis in itself for the [[verbal]] designations we apply to them. A cup is not inherently a cup, but by [[imputation]], an [[entity]] becomes [[imputed]] as a basis for [[verbal]] and {{Wiki|conceptual}} designation by [[virtue]] of [[consciousness]]. | ||
+ | “[[Essence]]” and “[[particularity]]” are falsely attributed to entities; all of this arises from the [[imputation]] of the [[name]] - as the [[subject]] - to the [[form]] [[perceived]] - as an [[object]]. These names and [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] ascribed to the [[objects]] are said to be [[bden par grub pa]] - “truly established”, not however in and of themselves, but they are established [[rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa]] - established through their intrinsic [[characteristics]]. They are [[rang bzhin gyis grub pa]] - established automatically; [[rang gi ngo bo]] [[nyid]] [[kyis]] [[grub pa]] - established by their [[own essence]]; rang gi [[gnas]] tsod [[kyis]] [[grub pa]] - established by their [[own]] standpoint. | ||
− | This | + | This “establishment” is by means of these various [[characteristics]], which are wrongly [[thought]] to be “self-identical” with the [[object]] to which they refer. Though the [[characteristics]], etc. [[exist]] by [[virtue]] of [[consciousness]], falsehood arises when a handle is seen on a particular item and it is then called a |
− | + | “cup.” The ascription of general [[existent]] [[characteristics]] that are products of the [[mind]] and thus are “actual” or “truly established” in their [[existence]] as mere [[mental]] [[realities]], is [[imputation]] when ascribed to a particular cup, etc. In this case, when ascribed to an actual cup, they are [[ma grub]] pa - not established. | |
− | + | According to this [[Madhyamaka]] treatise, the [[Yogācāra]] system [[views]] “[[śūnyatā]]” as “[[empty]] of [[duality]]” (dvayaśūnya, [[gnyis]] stong ). [[Name]] and [[thought]] ([[nāmarūpa]], [[ming]] dang ‘[[dogs]] ) are taken to be [[truly existent]] ([[satyasiddhi]], [[bden par grub pa]] ) in themselves, so to speak, but [[imputed]] when ascribed to another [[entity]]. | |
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− | + | “[[Devadatta]]” [[exists]] truly as a [[name]] generally, however it is [[imputed]] when applied to a particular [[person]] with the [[name]] “[[Devadatta]].” [[Name]] and [[thought]] are the same within reifying or hypostasizing [[thinking]]. Holding the view that [[conceptualized]] [[phenomena]] [[exist]] in a reified way is “entically [[conceptualizing]]” and the [[object]] of that [[activity]] is the “extreme” or “end” of entical {{Wiki|mentation}}. | |
+ | The [[Vijñānavāda]] will ascribe this extreme to “realist” systems of [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] as are exemplified by [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools such as the [[Sautrāntika]], et. al. Within this frame of reference, both [[name and form]] imputedly, rather than truly, [[exist]]. One may cite [[Asaṅga’s]] statement from the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]] that asserts, | ||
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− | + | “Therefore prior to the [[name]], intellection does not [[exist]]” | |
− | + | and | |
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− | + | “Because of [the [[existence]] of] many, therefore no certain [single] one [[[exists]]]” | |
− | + | This has the implication that since there are many Devadattas, no single, {{Wiki|distinct}} [[Devadatta]] [[exists]] in and of himself as [[Devadatta]] [[per se]]. | |
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− | [ | + | ===[[Nihilism]]=== |
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− | + | [238:2-4] The manner of cleaving to the extreme of [[nihilism]] [is as follows]. The extreme of nihilismhas as its {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[object]] the refusal to accept that the [[phenomena]] of the fully perfected [[[nature]]] and the [[other-dependent]] [[[nature]]] [[exist]] with its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. Accordingly, it is [[taught]] in the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] , | |
+ | “To say that the foundation ([[āśraya]], [[gzhi]]) for [[characteristics]] of [[imputed]] words, the basis (rten) of [[characteristics]] for [[imputed]] words, through an inexpressible [[nature]] for entities [in their] purest [[existence]], ultimately does not [[exist]] everywhere (thams cad du) in all aspects, is [[nihilism]]. This itself makes for a great waste. Separated from [[religious]] [[discipline]], it should be known as extremely degenerate.” | ||
− | + | These three statements are ascribed to the second of the [[three natures]], the “inter-woven with other” or “other dependent” ([[paratantra]], [[gzhan dbang]]) [[nature]]. It serves as 1) a foundation for [[imputed]] [[characteristics]] of words, 2) a basis for [[imputed]] [[characteristics]] of words (btags p’ai tshig gi [[mtshan]] m’ai rten du) and 3) is an inexpressible [[nature]] which ultimately [[exists]] (brjod du med pa’i [[bdag nyid]] [[kyis]] [[don dam par]] [[yod pa]]). | |
− | + | The [[other-dependent nature]] is the ultimately [[existing]] basis for the first of the [[three natures]], the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]] ([[parikalpitasvabhāva]], kun bdags pa’i [[bdag nyid]]). Were it not ultimately [[existent]] as a basis for [[forms]], etc., then the enticalizing | |
+ | {{Wiki|mentation}} concerning [[forms]], etc., would also be [[non-existent]]. If these two are deemed [[non-existent]], then the third or perfected [[nature]] ([[parinispanna]], [[yongs grub]]) would also not [[exist]], being likewise devoid of any basis for its [[existence]]. For this [[reason]], the [[Madhyamaka]] standpoint was held to be relatively “nihilismistic”, repudiating the [[other-dependent nature]], hence the perfected [[nature]] and thereby, basic teachings of the [[Mahāyāna tradition]]. | ||
+ | Repudiation of the [[other-dependent nature]] is repudiation of the perfected [[nature]]. | ||
+ | [238:4-6] In the explicit teachings (dgnos bstan) of the last [[sūtra]] [i.e. the [[Bhūmi]]], though it did not discuss anything other than the interwoven-with-other [[[nature]], a repudiation of this [[nature]]] is also a basis of repudiation of the perfected [[[nature]]]. Therefore the [[doctrine]] according to the [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]] [is as follows], | ||
− | + | In the repudiation of the mere [[entity]] of [[form]] etc. [a reference to the interwoven-with-other [[nature]]], in that is the [[non-existence]] of even [[reality]] itself [i.e., the perfected [[nature]]]. | |
− | + | Moreover, generally if it is held, | |
− | + | The interwoven-with-other [[[nature]]] and the perfected [[[nature]]] do not [[exist]] even {{Wiki|conventionally}},” | |
− | + | This would be [[nihilism]], however, in this [[chapter]] which teaches of the system of [[nihilism]], it is “not [[existent]] {{Wiki|conventionally}},” but does not [[state]] that [the two natures] “do not [[exist]] in general.” It is held [by these [[Mādhyamika]]] that they neither [[exist]] through their [[own]] [[characteristics]], nor from their [[own]] [[actuality]] nor ultimately.” | |
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− | + | According to [[Yogācāra]] [[teaching]], mere [[forms]] have as their basis, the interwoven-with-other [[nature]]. If one rejects the [[idea]] that they have no truly established basis, then [[reality]] ([[tattva]], [[de kho na nyid]]), which has the interwoven-with-other [[nature]] as its basis, is also repudiated. The Cittamātrin, in lCang skya’s reconstruction of their argument, accuses the [[Mādhyamika]] of repudiating all three, as we shall see. | |
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− | + | ===[[Refutation of the extreme of nihilism]]=== | |
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− | + | [238:6-239:3] The second [topic] is the refutation of those [above-mentioned extremes]. Since the method of rejecting the extreme of entical {{Wiki|mentation}} will be explained below, here [we will] [[state]] the manner of rejecting the extreme of [[nihilism]]. | |
+ | On that [point], one who accepts the counter {{Wiki|thesis}} ([[phyogs]] snga, uttarapakṣa ) is not from another [[[non-Buddhist]]] school. Other schools assert “[[permanence]],” or assert the cutting off of the [[non-existence]] of [[thought]]. And the Śrāvakāyanists furthermore assert the establishment of [[form]], etc., by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] standpoint. It is not the two [[[Vaibhāṣika]] and [[Sautrāntika]] Schools] which assert [the [[existence]] of] [[objects]], because those two assert the true establishment of [[form]], etc. Therefore, it is a [[Mahāyānist]]. According to the [[[Mahāyāna]]] Saṃgrāha, | ||
− | [ | + | Some [[Mahāyānists]], themselves erroneously cleave to these words: |
− | + | ‘Conventionally, everything [[exists]]; ultimately, everything does not [[exist]].’ | |
− | + | it is said, by [[reason]] of this [[doctrine]]. Therefore, one who asserts essencelessness is a [[Mādhyamika]].” | |
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− | + | lCang skya’s Cittamātrin states that here, the extreme of [[nihilism]] will be refuted, for later the extreme of entical {{Wiki|mentation}} will be refuted. The earlier premise is the opposite of [[nihilism]]. The [[tīrthika]] or [[non-Buddhist]] schools, are seen as asserting [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[permanence]], and are not the focus of the refutation here. | |
− | + | The two [[Śrāvakayāna]] schools assert the [[existence]] of external entities and their [[existence]] by their [[own]] [[characteristics]], so they are not the [[object]] of refutation. The school is a [[Mahāyānist]] one, as lCang skya interprets [[Asaṅga]], for it is a school which asserts essencelessness - [[ngo bo nyid]] med par [[smra]] ba - namely, the niḥsvabhāvavāda of the [[Madhyamaka tradition]]. | |
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− | + | [239:3-240:1] “The manner of refuting that [is as follows]. The [[entity]] of [[form]], etc. is the [[subject]]. By merely imputing [it], it would follow that it does not [[exist]], by [[reason]] of the [[non-existence]] of a basis for the {{Wiki|mentation}} of the self-entity of [[form]] etc. Establishing the [[reason]], is derived from the non-establishment by means of its self-identical [[characteristics]] for [[form]], etc. There is a [mutual] pervasion. For example, if the [[aggregates]] of [[form]], etc., [[exist]], then it is proper to impute an {{Wiki|individual}} [based on them], however, if they do not [[exist]] then, ipso facto, any [[imputation]] of an {{Wiki|individual}} could not [[exist]].” According to the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] , | |
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− | + | ‘For example, [in] this type [of view], if the [[aggregates]] of [[form]], etc. [[exist]], then it is proper to impute an {{Wiki|individual}}. If they are held as [[non-existent]], then there is [[no existence]] in the [[imputation]] of an {{Wiki|individual}}, for there is no [[existent]] [[entity]] [upon which they are based]. Likewise, if the [[entity]] of the [[phenomena]] of [[form]], etc., [[exists]], then it is proper to impute words to the [[phenomena]] of [[form]], etc. If it is held as [[non-existent]], then in the [[non-existence]] of the [[entity]], there is [[no existence]] of {{Wiki|mentation}} by [[imputed]] words,’ it is [[taught]].” | |
− | + | Here, the Cittamātrin notes that if there is no basis for the {{Wiki|mentation}} of words, then they cannot [[exist]]. If this is so, [[conventional truths]] would be [[non-existent]], leading to annhilationism. Based on the fact of the [[non-existence]] of the [[other-dependent nature]] being a truly established basis for entical {{Wiki|mentation}}, then the perfected [[nature]], which is the [[other-dependent nature]] devoid of [[imputation]], also would not [[exist]]. | |
− | + | They do not accuse the [[Mādhyamika]] of asserting that “generally, nothing [[exists]]”, but attack their notion of rejecting the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] establishment, or establishment by itself, of the last two natures, without which the first which is based upon them would not [[exist]]. | |
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− | + | By rejecting a basis for {{Wiki|mentation}}, the [[Mādhyamika]] makes nonsense of [[verbal]] [[reality]]; all words become “sons of barren women”, utterly unable to {{Wiki|communicate}} meaning and completely false. There is no means to distinguish [[false convention]] from [[true convention]]. Of course, the [[Mādhyamika]] deny that this is the result of their {{Wiki|examination}} of these issues, as we shall see below. | |
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− | + | ===[[The logical error of the Madhyamaka rejection of a basis for phenomena]]=== | |
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+ | [240:1-2] “Furthermore, if a basis of {{Wiki|mentation}} does not [[exist]], then [[imputation]] would not [[exist]]. If that does not [[exist]] therefore, accordingly, since it is established that [[imputation]] [does not [[exist]]], then even the [[suchness]] of [[emptiness]] does not [[exist]]; by necessity, this would be the repudiation of [[the three characteristics]] [i.e all [[three natures]]]. Further, according to [the [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]]] itself, if according to them, this basis of {{Wiki|mentation}} which is merest [[entity]] [i.e. the [[other-dependent nature]]], by not [[existing]], when it would be [[non-existent]] everywhere in all [aspects], then how could [[reality]] of this sort [[exist]] if it is merely [[imputed]]?” | ||
− | + | For the [[Mādhyamika]], according to the Cittamātrin critique, [[the ultimate truth]] which is presented here as the “[[reality]] of [[emptiness]]” would be “merely an [[imputed]] [[suchness]]” . It is in this way the [[Mādhyamika]] are accused by Cittamātrins in lCang skya’s characterization of their position, of repudiating the ultimacy of the perfected [[nature]], for it has no basis apart from the “mediating” [[nature]], the “[[other-dependent]].” | |
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+ | Entities such as [[form]], etc., are held to be [[dependent upon]] that which is “other” to them for their [[existence]] in the Cittamātrin formulation. This [[dependence]] upon “other” must serve as an ultimately true basis for the [[imputation]] and entical {{Wiki|mentation}} of the first, or [[conceptualized]] [[nature]], within and upon which the [[imputation]] and {{Wiki|mentation}} may take place. | ||
+ | This is the implication of the mention of the pervasion ([[khyab pa]]) in the preceding section above: just as [[fire]] is [[other-dependent]] with the fuel which is its basis, so [[fire]] gives rise to smoke which is [[dependent upon]] and “[[other-dependent]]” with the [[fire]] which is its basis. Fuel > [[Fire]] > Smoke, then, rest in a mutually {{Wiki|pervasive}} relationship with each other just as Perfected > [[Other-dependent]] > [[Conceptualized]] do. Repudiating the true establishment of the first two results in the repudiation of all three, culminating in a nihilismistic position. | ||
+ | Adhering to a mistaken [[emptiness]]. | ||
− | + | [240:2-4] “Therefore, after having enumerated [the different arguments], it has been demonstrated that those [[[Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]]] would repudiate both [[reality]] and [[imputation]]. Through this, then, is entry into a mistaken view of [[emptiness]], one that is a nihilismistic view. Because it repudiates both the [[other-dependent]] and [[conceptualized]] [natures], it even repudiates the perfected [[[nature]]]. From the [[[Bodhisattvabhūmi]]], | |
+ | ‘When [[imputation]] and [[reality]] are repudiated, this should be known as being principally a nihilismistic view.” | ||
+ | If one asks, | ||
− | [ | + | ‘How is this adhering to a mistaken [[emptiness]]?’ |
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− | + | Certain [[ascetics]] and [[Brahmins]] moreover, do not accept “[[empty]] throughout of which” [i.e. [[empty]] throughout of the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]], and furthermore, do not accept “that which is [[empty]]” [i.e., the [[other-dependent nature]] which is emptied of the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]]; this type of view thus is called “adhering to a mistaken [or perverse] [[emptiness]]” it is [[taught]].” | |
+ | |||
− | + | “..gang gis [[stong pa]] de [[yang]] mi ‘[[dod]] la gang gis gang [[stong pa]] de [[yang]] mi ‘[[dod]] pa ‘di [[lta bu]] ‘di ni....” Literally, “by whatever [[empty]]”, an instrumental [[form]] which we have in English rendered in an {{Wiki|ablative}} rather than instrumental [[sense]] for ease of [[comprehension]]. “That is [[empty]] of which”, in this case “of which” or “by which” (gang gis=kun btags pa’i [[bdag nyid]]) which we are admittedly freely and clumsily yet perhaps more understandably translating as “throughout of which” refers to the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]. | |
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+ | That “which is [[empty]]” (gang stong) is the [[other-dependent nature]] ([[gzhan dbang]]) “which is [[empty]] of {{Wiki|mentation}}.” It is said here that the [[Mādhyamika]] hold a mistaken or perverse [[understanding]] of [[emptiness]] because they reject the bases for {{Wiki|mentation}} and whereby, {{Wiki|mentation}} itself. | ||
+ | [[Madhyamaka]] {{Wiki|conception}} of the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] and [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]. | ||
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− | + | [240:5-241:2] On that [point] are these words from the [[[Mahāyāna]]]Saṃgrāha, ‘Gentlemen [[[Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]]], ‘what is [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] and what is [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]?’ | |
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− | + | This should be expressed. Asking “What is [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]” to the [[Mādhyamika]], by this school [means] asking ‘What is ultimately true.’ Asking “What is [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]],” [means] asking, ‘What is {{Wiki|conventionally}} set out as [[truth]] from a certain point of view” for which one says it is ‘{{Wiki|conventionally}} true.’” | |
− | + | Ultimacy versus [[ultimate truth]]. Here, lCang skya II [[disputes]] the [[interpretation]] of [[Asaṅga’s]] commentary. The Cittamātrin, he asserts confuses two issues. [[Asaṅga]] discusses what is “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]” to the [[Madhyamaka]], which is not the same thing as that which is “ultimately true.” The difference involves whether there is an abstract [[assertion]] of “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]” or “[[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]” [[relative]] to “ultimately or {{Wiki|conventionally}} true.” For something to be true it must be true to an observer or, in our translation, “from a certain point of view” (gang gi [[ngor]]). | |
+ | [[Ultimate truth]] is found in the [[mind]] of the [[Āryan]] [[bodhisattva]]. What is [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]], e.g. composite [[phenomena]], is somewhat different than how those composite [[phenomena]] appear to a given {{Wiki|individual}}. Contrariwise, that which is [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] - [[suchness]] and [[emptiness]] - are to be {{Wiki|distinguished}} from [[the ultimate truth]] itself, which is [[suchness]] and [[emptiness]] as they are [[manifest]] in the [[mind]] of an [[Āryan]] [[bodhisattva]] in profound [[meditation]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Conventionality versus [[conventional truth]]. According to lCang skya, the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]] here in [[Asaṅga’s]] words, refers to that which is [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] rather than [[conventional truth]] which appears to a given {{Wiki|individual}}. The [[sūtra]] doesn’t say “{{Wiki|conventionally}} true” but just “[[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]” ([[kun dzob]] rather than [[kun dzob]] [[bden pa]]), etc. All [[phenomena]] have these two aspects: their conventionality and ultimacy - and both of these categories as they appear to {{Wiki|individuals}}. Thus, there is the concealing and concealing [[truth]]; ultimacy and [[ultimate truth]]. | ||
− | + | The face in the [[mirror]]. One example is that of a face in a [[mirror]]. The actual face is the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] face, whereas, the face in the [[mirror]] is a “concealing [[truth]].” It is a “face”, but a face which conceals its [[true reality]]. It is a concealing [[truth]] for the [[eyes]], but not, for example, the [[sense]] of {{Wiki|touch}}. The term [[ngor]] (“to” or “at” the “[[entity]]”) is the basis or [[yul can]] - the possessor of an [[object]], not the yul, or [[object]] itself. With regard to “concealing [[truth]]” one must then ask, “concealing for whom”? | |
+ | [[Asaṅga’s]] answer to the question of ultimacy. | ||
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+ | [240:6-:241:2] “The response to that, in accordance with the [[[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]] itself, if one asks these [questions] however, these statements [follow]: | ||
+ | That which is the non-self-existence of all [[phenomena]] - is [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]. That which is [[seeing]] as [[self-existent]] those [[phenomena]] which [are actually] [[non-self]] [[existent]], that is concealing. | ||
+ | |||
+ | If one asks, | ||
− | [ | + | ‘What is the [[reason]] for that?’ |
+ | |||
+ | Accordingly then, | ||
− | + | ‘it is because of conventionalizing, verbally expressing, [[conceptualizing]] and concealing [[existence]] for those [entities that are actually] non-entities,’ | |
− | + | This is how one should reply (lan ‘debs), it is [[taught]].” | |
+ | The two modes of the [[other-dependent]] are the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] and the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]. The answer to the question, “What is [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] and what is [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]?” in the [[Yogācāra]] system are the two aspects of the [[other-dependent]] - which points directly to the non-self-existence of [[phenomena]] in the [[Yogācāra]] system. In this case, this [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] is the other- | ||
− | + | dependent devoid of the discriminative [[bifurcation]] which sees these [[phenomena]] as “[[self-existent]].” This is the appropriation of Nāgārjunan “non-self-existence” in the framework of the [[doctrine]] concerning the [[other-dependent]] which is the mediating support for the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] and [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]. This support the [[Mādhyamika]] deny. | |
+ | [[Causation]] from a “{{Wiki|continuum}}” or from “mere [[imputation]]?” | ||
− | + | [241:2-5] “The the aim of that [statement is as follows]. The [[Mādhyamika]] assert that all [[phenomena]] are [[empty]] of being established inherently or by their [[own]] [[characteristics]] as [[ultimate truth]]. They assert that the concealing, which is set out as [[truth]] from a certain point of view, is cleaving to the establishment of all [[phenomena]] in such a way when they are not established truly or by their [[own]] [[characteristics]]. | |
+ | The {{Wiki|reasoning}} behind that is, that by [[virtue]] of this sort of [[mental]] [[concealment]], from having held all [[phenomena]] as purely established when they are not established purely, is the [[cause]] of “conventionalizing” and “[[verbal]] expression,” etc. | ||
− | The | + | With regard to that, is the {{Wiki|examination}} at the outset of the identification of the concealing by this [[[Madhyamaka]]] system? The question is, |
+ | ‘By you [[Mādhyamika]], that [[assertion]] of [[mental]] [[concealment]] is as [[truth]] set out from a certain point of view, [does a [[phenomenon]]] arise by means of an earlier [[cause]] of the same type as itself, or then, is it merely [[imputation]] by means of {{Wiki|mentation}}?’” | ||
− | [ | + | This is lCang skya’s {{Wiki|hypothetical}} Cittamātrin quoting from the Saṃgrāha in a passage he interprets as stating the [[Mādhyamika]] position. The meaning of the passage is explained from the [[Yogācāra]] standpoint. It is stated that the [[Mādhyamika]] accept that all [[phenomena]] are [[empty]] of being established by either their [[own]] [[inherent existence]] or by |
− | + | their [[own]] [[essential]] [[characteristics]]. They accept the [[idea]] that cleaving to the establishment of all [[phenomena]] by their [[own]] [[characteristics]] or as truly established, are in fact not so established; the concealing level of [[truth]] is that which appears true to a {{Wiki|perceiver}}, i.e., the [[inherent existence]] of [[phenomena]], etc. | |
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− | + | The [[reason]] for that is that [[grasping]] [[phenomena]] as purely established when in fact they are not is the “concealing” [[truth]] which is only true as much as it is [[perceived]] so by an observer. A deeper level of analysis will demonstrate | |
− | + | that things only {{Wiki|conventionally}} [[exist]] as they appear. This is the Saṃgrāha’s presentation of [[Mādhyamika]] [[tenets]] as interpreted by lCang skya’s {{Wiki|hypothetical}} Cittamātrin opponent. It is necessary at the beginning to examine the [[Madhyamaka]] [[understanding]] of the concealing in order to refute it. | |
− | + | Prior sates [[condition]] posterior states. The Cittamātrin questions the [[Mādhyamika]] concerning whether [[phenomena]] arise from [[causes]] which are previously of the same sort as themselves. This means, yesterday’s table will have given rise to today’s table by means of having a continuous relationship with the prior table. Or does it, according to the [[Mādhyamika]] as presented in this section, arise simply by mere [[imputation]] which emerges from {{Wiki|mentation}}? | |
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+ | ===[[Madhyamaka thought is a type of Buddhist nominalism]]=== | ||
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+ | [241:5-242:2] “From the [[[Mahāyāna]] Saṃgrāha] itself, | ||
− | + | ‘On that [point], these words should be expressed. The [[perception]] of [[inherent existence]] is either accepted as appearing from [[concealment]] and [[verbal]] expression as a [[cause]], or else it is accepted as [[verbal]] expression and [[concealment]] alone.’ | |
− | + | Furthermore, when some [[Mādhyamika]] say, | |
− | + | ‘[an [[entity]]] is generated by an earlier [[causes]] which [[[form]]] its [[own]] {{Wiki|continuum}}’ - this is incorrect. | |
− | + | ||
+ | That type of [[mental]] [[concealment]] is the [[subject]]. It would follow that it is not [the case] that it is not ultimately established, because of [[arising]] by its [[own]] [prior [[state]]] as a [[cause]];” in [this lies] the refutation. [[Other-dependent]] [[mind]] and [[mental phenomena]] arise from [[dependence]] upon their [[own]] [[causes and conditions]]. Since they arise from establishment by means of their [[own]] [[characteristics]], it is [[thought]] by this [[[Yogācāra]]] School as [a result of their] analysis, that they would thus arise ultimately.” | ||
+ | All is strictly [[imaginary]]? Here again is a quote from the Saṃgrāha. It asks the [[Mādhyamika]] if he accepts that [[phenomena]] appear from the concealing or from [[verbal]] expression as [[causes]], or do they arise as just [[verbal]] expression and the concealing merely, not [[causally]]. The implication is that the [[Mādhyamika]] cleave to a view which sees [[phenomena]] as completely unreal and [[imaginary]], that they assert what is the [[traditional]] “[[heresy]]” so to speak, of [[Indian Buddhism]] which is to assert “causelessness” (ahetukavāda) to establish a [[logical]] claim. | ||
− | + | The real basis of the concealing. The refutation is set up subsequently. If some [[Mādhyamika]] [[state]] that it is incorrect to say that [[phenomena]] do not have a causal continuity with their prior and subsequent states, then it would follow that the concealing, which is the [[subject]] of the prelimary {{Wiki|examination}}, | |
+ | would not be unestablished ultimately, which is to say that it would be ultimately established, in this case meaning that the basis for the {{Wiki|mentation}} - which is the [[other-dependent nature]] - of a table would be real, actual. This is the “[[grasping]] at the [[truth]]” or “[[true existence]]” ([[bden]] ‘[[dzin]]) of the table’s [[existence]] [[exists]], whether or not the “true {{Wiki|status}}” of the table is rightly or wrongly [[perceived]]. | ||
+ | This is to say that {{Wiki|mentation}} emerges as a result of [[causal conditions]] which arise from a true basis in the “[[other-dependent]]” [[nature]]. If they have no such basis, the Cittamātrin states that all is {{Wiki|arbitrarily}} [[imagined]]. This is the point of their [[Mādhyamika]] critique. Therefore, while a table may be falsely [[imputed]] (as gray when it is in fact [[red]], for example), the false [[imputation]] arises from [[causes and conditions]] which have a basis in [[reality]], and in this even mistaken [[sense]], these imputations are “actual”, “real” and hence, “ultimately [[existent]].” | ||
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− | + | ===[[Support for the Yogācāra stance in the Pramāṇavartikka]]=== | |
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+ | [242:2-4] “From the [[Pramāṇavarttika]], | ||
− | + | ‘One is able to see [[seeds]], etc., in sprouts, etc.; however, if that is concealing....’ | |
− | + | And so on, and this is the same point [as that made by [[Asaṅga]] in the MS]. | |
+ | Furthermore, from the [Saṃgrāha] itself, | ||
− | + | ‘However, if it is from [[concealment]] and [[verbal]] expression as [[causes]], if through this, then it does not [[exist]], since it is occurs [merely] from the concealing and from [[verbal]] expression as [[causes]]. It is not appropriate to do this.’ | |
− | |||
+ | This is the [[doctrine]]. | ||
− | + | [Again,] on this point, [are comments] from the {{Wiki|Legs}} bShad sNying po, | |
− | |||
− | + | ‘That concealing is inner [[verbal]] expression.’ | |
+ | This is the meaning of the [[doctrine]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[Mental]] [[concealment]], [which involves the {{Wiki|distinction}} of] ‘this’ [from] ‘that’, would be [[conceptualizing]] the apprehension in [one’s] [[thought]] of this [[[state]] of affairs], and in that case, that [[conceptualization]] either arises from its [[own]] {{Wiki|continuum}}, or does not so arise. This is the [type of] [[thinking]] which generates [[imputation]].” | ||
− | + | A [[Lotus]] arises from its seed. Here are two quotes, one from [[Dharmakīrti’s]] [[Pramāṇavarttika]], the other from [[Asaṅga]], again from the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]. These are both given [[as evidence]] of the Cittamātrin’s position that there must be a basis in causal fact for [[perceived]] events, whether they are rightly or wrongly [[perceived]]. | |
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− | + | One sees a [[Lotus]] seed sprout into a [[Lotus]] plant. One sees a kernal of corn sprout into a corn stalk. If these events were based merely on {{Wiki|mentation}}, why is it that one does not impute a {{Wiki|rice}} plant [[arising]] from a kernel of corn and vice-versa? Without a basis in the [[other-dependent nature]], as [[Asaṅga]] states, an [[entity]] could not [[exist]]; everything would be [[illusory]] and purely [[imagined]] - a Berkeleyianesque dream-world. | |
+ | [[Tsong kha pa]] inner versus outer [[mental]] [[concealment]]. The quote from [[Tsong kha pa’s]] [[Legs bshad snying po]] aims to supplement [[Asaṅga’s]] and [[Dharmakīrti’s]] commentary. The concealing of which the [[Mādhyamika]] speak is an inner [[mental]] [[concealment]], not a [[concealment]] which projects [[reality]] onto an “external” [[world]]. | ||
− | + | Nevertheless, an inner [[mental]] [[concealment]] requires causal foundation. All [[other-dependent]] entities, whether correctly or wrong [[perceived]] are dependent, and [[mind]] is equally [[dependent upon]] other than itself for its [[existence]]. | |
+ | Arguments in favor of establishing a basis for [[phenomena]]. | ||
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+ | [242:4-243:6] “However, according to some [[Mādhyamika]], if they should say, | ||
+ | ‘That concealing is merely [[imputation]] by means of {{Wiki|mentation}},’ | ||
− | + | …then that is incorrect. On this, [with regard to] the ‘[one whose [[awareness]] is] concealed,’ the [[reason]] is because of the [[non-existence]] of the [[other-dependent]] as a basis for effecting {{Wiki|mentation}}. If the [[other-dependent]] [[exists]], it is from the necessity of [its] [[existing]] by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. | |
− | + | Furthermore, when this [[[Yogācāra]]] School, maintains that the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]] is not established by its [[own]] [[characteristics]], [they] do not assert that it does not necessarily [[exist]], but [rather] that it is when the other two natures are not established by their [[own]] [[characteristics]], that it is through this point that one [must] accept [that the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]] of necessity does [[exist]]. According to the [[[Mahāyāna]] Saṃgrāha] itself, | |
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− | + | ‘However, if it is merely [[verbal]] expression and [[concealment]], then the basis for [[verbal]] expression and [[concealment]] does not [[exist]];’ this is improper.’” | |
+ | |||
+ | The [[conceptualized]]: [[imputation]] with a basis in [[reality]]. The [[Yogācāra School]] holds that the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]] is not established by means of [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. This means that [[thought]] patterns or verbalized {{Wiki|expressions}} etc., do not [[exist]] as they appear. However the bases for that [[nature]] - the [[other-dependent]] and the perfected natures - must [[exist]] as established by their [[own]] [[characteristics]]. Apart from that, the Cittamātrin deems the [[assertion]] that they do not [[exist]] established by their [[own]] [[characteristics]] a nihilismistic view (med par lta). | ||
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− | + | ===[[Identification and refutation of the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness]]=== | |
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− | + | [242:6-243:4] “Identification and refutation of the [[[Mādhyamika]] [[understanding]] of] the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]. You [[Mādhyamika]] [say], | |
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− | + | ‘The [[other-dependent]], [seen as] bereft of establishment by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], is the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]].’ | |
− | + | It is not proper to say [this]. To that [we say], it is because of the refutation by valid [[cognition]] by which it is known [that there are] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] for the [[other-dependent]]. From the [[[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]], | |
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− | + | ‘To that is this response: ‘Gentlemen [[[Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]]], what is the [[reason]] that anything known is [[non-existent]]?’ | |
− | + | Moreover, should some [[Mādhyamika]] assert, ‘There is no error [in] the [[mind]] [[seeing]] [entities [[existing]] in the mode of having their [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] and thereby creating the grounds of [[causation]] for those entities]. It is because that [[mind]] itself is mistaken [with regard to the actual [[nature]] of those entities].’ | |
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− | + | Well, does that mistaken [[mind]] [[exist]] or not [[exist]] [by means of [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]]? If it [[exists]], then, that it is [[non-existent]] through its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] [in its mode] as “[[other-dependent]],” would not be proper [with regard to its] “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]” [{{Wiki|status}}]. Therefore, the mistaken [[mind]] [[exists]] by means of its [[own]] [[characteristics]]. | |
+ | If it does not [[exist]] through its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], [things] are known by a confused [[mind]], although [if that [[mind]] itself] does not [[exist]] through its [[own]] [[characteristics]], it follows that [for the [[mind]]] to know [things to [[exist]]] through their [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] is not real because [the [[mind]]] does not [in that case] [[exist]] through its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. If this confused [[mind]] also does not [[exist]] through its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], then it is through this point that it [would] necessarily be [[non-existent]].” | ||
+ | Interwovenness-with-other is established by direct [[experience]]. The [[Mādhyamika]] view is that the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] (paramārthah, [[don dam pa]]) is the [[other-dependent nature]] being devoid of establishment by its [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. [[Asaṅga]] states that this is refuted by valid [[cognition]] (tsad ma, [[pramāṇa]]) which clearly [[knows]] that everything [[exists]] is “enmeshed-with” or “interwoven-with” what is “other” than itself. This is known by valid [[means of cognition]] (dmigs | ||
− | + | pa’i tsad ma, [[pratyakṣapramāṇa]]) by means of which this is evident. The three types of valid [[cognition]] are direct [[perception]], {{Wiki|inference}} and testimony. | |
− | + | The [[other-dependent]] is proven [[logically]]. Furthermore, there is [[logical]] valid [[cognition]] (rig pa’i tsad ma) which is not referred to here. In this case, it is not a question of a [[logical]] {{Wiki|contradiction}}, e.g., son of a barren woman, etc. That [[perceived]] [[phenomena]] are “[[other-dependent]]” is evident to direct [[perception]] in {{Wiki|conjunction}} with [[logical analysis]]. | |
− | + | Clearly, a sprout is [[dependent upon]] [[water]] and sunlight for its [[existence]]. This is evident both to direct [[perception]] and [[logical]] {{Wiki|reasoning}}. It is unlike a “rabbit’s horn”, an [[entity]] which [[logically]] violates the [[definition]] of “{{Wiki|rabbit}}” and can nowhere be seen by direct [[perception]]. This “[[dependence]] upon” or “other-dependentness with” what is “other” is the [[essential]] [[characteristic]] with which all entities are endowed in order to attain {{Wiki|status}} as an [[existent phenomena]]. | |
− | + | Otherness is [[causation]] and [[condition]]. The [[Madhyamaka]] response here is that the [[awareness]] of these [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] is due to a mistaken [[consciousness]]. [[Asaṅga]] says, “What is the [[reason]] for this mistaken [[consciousness]]’ [[existing]]?” He notes that the [[Mādhyamika]] themselves will consent to [[knowing]] [[objects]]. Have they no [[cause]]? The causational aspect is due to its “enmeshedness with other.” | |
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− | + | Mistaken [[consciousnesses]] [[exist]] though mistaken. The [[mind]] which [[perceives]] separate, {{Wiki|independent}} entities, etc., may be mistaken and confused in its [[perception]], but surely this [[mind]] itself [[exists]]. Thus the Cittamātrin has established the causelessness and groundlessness of the [[Mādhyamika]] [[understanding]] of [[conceptualization]] and {{Wiki|mentation}}; it is not enough to assert that [[consciousness]] comprehends [[phenomena]] in a mistaken manner, for one has to give answer as to how and why this mistakenness itself arises. lCang skya sets up the explanation above to clarify his quotation from [[Asanga]] in the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]] which follows and makes very nearly the same point. | |
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+ | ===[[Mistaken consciousnesses exist]]=== | ||
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+ | [243:4-6] “According to the [[[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]] itself, | ||
+ | ‘If one should question these statements, then there is this response. If one should answer, “It is because of its being a mistaken [[entity]].”’ | ||
− | + | To that, this response must be given. Does one assert that a mistaken [[[entity]]] [[exists]] or rather, does one hold that they do not [[exist]]? | |
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+ | However, if it [[exists]], therefore ‘the [[inherent]] [[non-existence]] of all [[phenomena]] is the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]’ is improper. However, if it does not [[exist]] by means of [its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]], because there is [in fact] a mistaken [[entity]] [which does [[exist]]], to say ‘any [[object]] is inherently [[non-existent]]’ is inappropriate, as it is [[taught]]. These [issues] should be examined in this [way].” | ||
− | + | If no [[entity]] [[exists]], then how could it be [[non-existent]]? This reiterates what lCang skya stated above. His words serve here as to elucidate [[Asaṅga’s]] words quoted above. Again, an [[entity]] may be mistakenly [[perceived]], however in its mistakenness, it nevertheless [[exists]] by [[virtue]] of being [[other-dependent]]. This generates a [[paradox]]: if no [[entity]] [[exists]], then to say it is inherently [[non-existent]] is incorrect. | |
− | + | The [[other-dependent]] [[exists]] ultimately. | |
− | + | [243:6-244:3] “Well then, [if] some opponent [asserts], | |
− | + | ‘It is incorrect that [[Yogācāra]] [[[scholars]]] accept that the [[other-dependent]] [[[nature]]] is established ultimately.’ | |
+ | According to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra, | ||
− | + | ‘If it is a composite [[[entity]]], it would not be [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]],’ | |
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− | + | Again, it is demonstrated to be a [mutual] pervasion to [reverse this and [[state]] that] therefore it is not [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] if it is a composite [[entity]]. | |
− | + | Further, according to the Madhyānta[[[vibhāga]]], | |
+ | ‘The [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]], is only [the perfected [[nature]]].’ | ||
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− | + | ===[[Also, the root text and commentary teach as ultimate truth only the perfected nature]]=== | |
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+ | Further, the [[chapter]] of the Sutrālaṃkara which elucidates the five [[characteristics]] of [[ultimate truth]], explains that [the perfected [[nature]]] is “[[non-arising]]” and “non-ceasing.” In the commentary [on the Sutrālaṃkara, it is said that] the [[conceptualized]] and [[other-dependent]] [natures] do not [[exist]] by means of their [[[own]] [[inherent]]] [[characteristics]], and through the explanation that the perfected [[[nature]]] is not [[non-existent]] by its [[own]] [[characteristics]], and [finally,] for the [[reason]] that these are the definitive texts of the [[Yogācāra]] [School]. When this has been stated, there is no error.” | ||
− | + | The [[other-dependent]]: not ultimately established? The opponent cites [[scriptures]] which he [[thinks]] refutes the [[idea]] that the [[other-dependent]] is ultimately established. The above texts as they are quoted, seem to indicate that only the perfected [[nature]] is [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]], not the [[other-dependent]]. From the | |
+ | Sutrālaṃkara he cites as two of the five [[characteristics]] of [[the ultimate truth]] elucidated in that text are those of “[[non-arising]]” and “[[non-cessation]].” | ||
+ | The [[other-dependent]], serving as a basis for entities which are [[dependent upon]] what is other to them for [[existence]] and thus, serving as a causal {{Wiki|nexus}} for the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]], etc., does not qualify as “[[non-arising]]” and “non-ceasing”, etc. These are definitive texts of the [[Yogācāra School]] and thus should be accepted as authoritative on this issue. | ||
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− | + | ===[[Distinction between ‘ultimate’ and ‘ultimate truth.]]=== | |
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+ | [244:3-244:6] “Earlier, it was explained that both the [[other-dependent]] and the perfected are ultimately [[existent]], but those texts [above] explain that the [[other-dependent]] is ultimately [[non-existent]]. There are two “ultimates” which are designated nominally, and therefore they are not of [[identical]] meaning. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Again, both the [[other-dependent]] and the perfected are explained as “ultimately [[existent]],” that is established [[existent]] ultimately through its [[own]] [[characteristics]] nominally, which is an establishment only by [[virtue]] of [[verbal]] expression. According to those [[scriptures]], the [[other-dependent]] is ultimately | ||
− | + | [[non-existent]], and only the perfected is [[taught]] as ultimately [[existent]]. Having generated the [[gnosis]] of stainless, profound [[meditation]] is the “supreme,” and this is called the ‘supreme goal’, then, since it is the [[object]] of that [[[meditation]]]. Therefore, that is the supreme goal which is so established. This [[latter]] one is the final [[objective]] of the [[pure]] [[path]]; both [aspects of the [[path]]] result in the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]], though the goal is the same. The [[proof]] for this will not be elucidated, for it is well known.” | |
+ | The perfected [[nature]]: neither [[existent]] nor [[non-existent]]. The opponent is said to fail to distinguish two types of ‘[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]’ {{Wiki|status}}: [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[existence]] and [[ultimate truth]]. The perfected is said to be [[yod]] min - not [[existent]] in the same manner as the [[conceptualized]] and [[other-dependent]], and it is said to be med min - not [[non-existent]], for it [[exists]] with its [[own]] [[characteristics]], eg., [[non-arising]], non-ceasing, etc. | ||
− | + | The [[other-dependent]]: ultimately [[existent]] but {{Wiki|conventionally}} true. The [[other-dependent]] is said to be [[don dam]] [[yod pa]], ultimately [[existent]], for all things arise by means of this [[nature]] as their causal {{Wiki|nexus}}. Nevertheless, it is said to be [[kun dzob]] du [[bden pa]] - {{Wiki|conventionally}} true - because contained within its [[essential]] [[characteristics]] are the fact of subject-object [[bifurcation]] [[inherent]] in its [[nature]] as “dependent-upon-other.” The implication of this is that | |
− | + | one is {{Wiki|speaking}} of an [[entity]] which is {{Wiki|conventionally}}, though not ultimately [[dependent upon]] an [[object]], so to speak, which is {{Wiki|conventionally}} - though not ultimately - seen as an “other” to that [[entity]]. | |
− | + | [[Ultimate truth]]: [[truth]] from a ‘certain point of view.’ [[Ultimate truth]] then, is a [[truth]] “from someone’s point of view” (gang gi [[ngor]] [[bden]]) mentioned above. In this case, [[the ultimate truth]] is the “inner [[samādhi]], {{Wiki|holy}} and uncontaminated” which is the final goal of an [[Āryan]] [[bodhisattva]]. | |
+ | [[Kleśa]] and [[jñeya]] āvaraṅa. The two aspects of the “[[pure]] [[path]]” are that which removes [[nyon sgrib]] - [[kleśāvaraṇa]] - delusive or “{{Wiki|afflictive}}” [[obscurations]] and that which removes [[shes sgrib]] - [[jñeyāvaraṇa]] or “[[obscurations]] to [[omniscience]].” The first entails shedding the notion of [[ego]] or ātmadṛṣṭi by means of [[meditation]] on the [[selflessness of the individual]] ([[gang zag gi bdag med]], puḍgalanairātmya). The second - [[obscurations]] to [[omniscience]] or [[obscurations]] of [[objects of knowledge]] - involves [[meditation]] on the [[selflessness of phenomena]] ([[chos kyi bdag med]], [[dharmanairātmya]]). | ||
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+ | The convergence of the two types of [[awareness]] of [[selflessness]] in the [[samādhi]] of an [[Āryan]] [[bodhisattva]] is [[ultimate truth]] - in this case, [[truth]] from the point of view of one who is highly [[realized]] and who has become directly {{Wiki|aware}} of the two aspects of [[śūnyatā]] - the [[emptiness of self]] and [[phenomena]]. | ||
+ | [[Mādhyamika]] Response. | ||
− | + | [[Candrakīrti]]: assent to lCang skya’s presentation of the [[other-dependent]]. [[Candrakīrti]] assents to this [[interpretation]] of the [[Yogācārin]] [[understanding]] of [[other-dependent]] entities in the sixth section of the Madhyamakāvatara. That [[interdependent]] [[forms]] appear in the asbsence of any [[external object]], that they [[exist]] in [[actuality]] and that at the level of [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[comprehension]], its [[nature]] cannot be conceptually grasped are features that are not in dispute. That is to say, it would seem that these are not features which are disputed as to whether or not these are positions actually taken by [[Yogācārin]] [[scholars]]. | |
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− | + | [[Candrakīrti]]: [[external objects]] [[exist]] in [[dreams]]. Whether [[reality]] is to be understood in this way is very much in dispute. As [[Huntington]] (1989) relates the [[Prāsaṅgika]] rebuttal, all these assertions are open to question. Candrakīrticontends that there is nothing like a [[thought]] which could occur devoid of an [[external object]]. He rejects the analogy of the [[dream]], i.e. the [[Yogācārin]] [[assertion]] that in [[dreams]], [[external objects]] are [[perceived]] but obviously do not [[exist]]. Why is this necessarily so? [[Candrakīrti]] asks. His point is that if the [[existence]] of [[consciousness]] in a [[dream]] is shown through the [[memory]] of the [[dream]] during waking hours, then so also is the [[existence]] of [[external objects]] in that [[dream]]. | |
− | + | ||
− | [ | + | [[External objects]] in [[dreams]] or waking [[reality]] are not produced. He acknowledges that the thrust of the [[Yogācārin]] position here is to demonstrate that just as in a [[dream]], externality and objectivity are [[perceived]] but do not in fact [[exist]], and that by analogy, our waking [[experience]] of [[external objects]] should be understood in the same way as figments of [[consciousness]]. The [[reason]] the [[Madhyamaka]], and in particular ardent [[Prāsaṅgikas]] like [[Candrakīrti]] are to be understood as repudiationists stems from the fact that, as he maintains, not only are [[external objects]] not produced, the [[consciousness]] that [[perceives]] them, whether in a [[Wikipedia:Dream|dreaming]] or waking [[state]], also is not produced. The [[sense consciousness]], the [[external object]] and the [[consciousness]] are all three false. |
+ | There is no [[thought]] in the absence of an [[object]]. There can be no [[thought]] in the absence of an [[external object]] and for a [[sense-consciousness]] to operate, it requires a [[sphere]] of operation, which implies a [[relative]] externality, though both of these do not, in the [[Madhyamaka]] [[understanding]], ultimately [[exist]]. | ||
− | + | Without an [[external object]], cataracts should be seen by those with healthy [[eyes]]. [[Candrakīrti]] cites the well-known example of the [[person]] afflicted with ophthalmia. According to the example, someone with a certain type of ophthalmia may {{Wiki|perceive}} hairs where none [[exist]] to anyone else. If [[consciousness]] takes place without an [[external object]], then even someone not afflicted with ophthalmia should {{Wiki|perceive}} the hairs someone who is so afflicted sees. Since this does not occur, this these - that of [[consciousness]] not being [[consciousness]] of an [[external object]] - is disproven. | |
+ | The false [[appearance]] [[exists]]. In the [[Bhāṣya]] or “commentary”, he adds that the [[appearance]] of hairs [[exist]] and not simply the [[consciousness]] of the hairs itself. Since both the [[consciousness]] and the [[hair]] are unproduced (as are all [[phenomena]] in [[Prāsaṅgika]] {{Wiki|theory}}), it is difficult to comprehend [[consciousness]] in the absence of an [[external object]]. If a [[person]] without this ophthalmia looks at the same place that a [[person]] afflicted with ophthalmia looks at, since there is no [[external object]] involved, why shouldn’t the [[person]] unafflicted see the same hairs that the afflicted [[person]] sees, for the [[non-existence]] of an [[external object]] is common to both? | ||
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− | + | [[Candrakīrti]] (MA) of course, disagrees. It is rather those who reject the [[truth]] of the concealing level of [[reality]] who fail to follow [[Master]] [[Nāgārjuna]] into the most profound depth of [[understanding]] and who maintain themselves in bondage to reified [[thought]]. Concealing [[truth]] is a means to [[the ultimate truth]] but is fully “true” nevertheless. He states that those who follow [[Nāgārjuna]] have a quite different {{Wiki|conception}} of concealing [[truth]] than do [[Yogācārins]] with regard to the [[other-dependent nature]]. | |
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− | + | The concealing [[truth]] points to the fact that though things do not ultimately [[exist]], our everyday [[experience]] of their [[existence]] is [[affirmed]]. For the [[arhats]] who have relinquished [[attachment]] to the [[aggregate]] constituents of [[existence]], “entities” indeed no longer [[exist]], but it is the [[experience]] of the ordinary {{Wiki|individual}} whose [[mental continuum]] is obscured by entical [[thinking]], it is this [[experience]] which rather than being negated, is upheld. As he says, one may wish to eradicate concealing [[truth]], however, in such a struggle, he places his [[wager]] on the persistence, value and necessity of concealing [[truth]]. | |
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+ | [[Candrakīrti]] (MAB) ascribes the [[two truths doctrine]] to the [[Buddha]] himself. The [[great master]] [[taught]] only [[two truths]] and no third alternative. The concealing [[truth]] was [[taught]] for the [[benefit]] of [[living beings]] among the [[six destinies]]. The [[truth]] of the concealing [[truth]] was [[taught]] by the [[Buddha]] to the rich and the poor, to men and to women, he declares. The [[truth]] of the concealing [[nature]] of everyday [[experience]] was [[taught]] as an antidote to the eight | ||
− | [ | + | [[mundane]] [[dharmas]] or “[[phenomena]]” which afflict [[beings]], inclusive of a [[desire]] for [[fame]], [[wealth]], etc. To see clearly the concealing aspect of these [[desires]] is to begin the process of [[liberation]] from them. What is concealed of course is [[the ultimate truth]] inhabiting a much more profound level of [[reality]], indeed, is finally, [[reality]]. “Ripping away” levels of [[concealment]] from those obscured by it through appropriately refuting “entical” [[conceptualization]] for |
− | |||
− | + | ordinary {{Wiki|individuals}} is accomplished by means of the consequential [[logic]] which finds the error in entical [[thought]] and reveals it, thereby revealing some aspect of [[the ultimate truth]]. As [[Tsong kha pa]] states, this method, the [[Prāsaṅgika]] method, is intended for students of the [[Madhyamaka tradition]] to eradicate [[philosophical]] [[views]] altogether, for properly {{Wiki|speaking}}, [[the ultimate truth]] is not a view, though it can be expressed verbally at the level of concealing [[truth]]. | |
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+ | [[Tsong kha pa]]. The [[Venerable]] [[Tsong kha pa]] elucidates the [[Prāsaṅgika]] standpoint with regard to the example of a sprout and the implications for notions of {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}}. He compares the [[Prāsaṅgika]] position with regard to the [[three aspects of time]] with that of the [[Vaiśeṣika]], with the important {{Wiki|distinction}} that the [[Prāsaṅgika]] standpoint “de-absolutizes” this {{Wiki|perspective}}. According to the [[Vaiśeṣika]] standpoint, the three times [[exist]] absolutely, and are further subdivided into a {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}} and so forth. | ||
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− | + | The [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools view the {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} as “[[absolute]]” negations of the {{Wiki|present}}, whereas the [[Prāsaṅgika]] accept the {{Wiki|past}} as being simply the {{Wiki|past}}. The {{Wiki|future}} of the sprout is not an [[absolute negation]] ([[med dgag]]) but an [[affirming]] or [[implicative negation]] ([[ma yin dgag]]), for in the [[Prāsaṅgika]] view, the f | |
+ | uture plant has a [[cause]] in the “non-completion” of the {{Wiki|present}} [[state of being]] a sprout. This {{Wiki|past}}, {{Wiki|present}} and {{Wiki|future}} are thus [[existent]] in a concealing manner, but through this method, the [[Prāsaṅgika]] avoid the complicated machinery of the [[Yogācārin]] theories with regard to the basal [[consciousness]] and the {{Wiki|maturation}} of seminal potentiality. | ||
+ | |||
+ | mKhas Grub. MKhas Grub notes that all [[Buddhist schools]] agree that the {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} do not [[exist]] as entities. From the [[Prāsaṅgika]] standpoint, the | ||
+ | Summation. | ||
+ | The main point to be made in this [[chapter]] is that [[relative]] to the [[Madhyamaka]], the [[Yogācāra]] system is more “foundationalist” in the [[sense]] that [[conceptualized]] entities and [[cognition]] with all its multifarious levels, are held to be “actual,” “real” or having an ultimately established basis in | ||
− | + | [[existence]]. This school [[views]] the [[Madhyamaka]] as repudiating any foundation for [[consciousness]] or experiential [[existence]] via its [[doctrine]] of “non-self-entity” (niḥsvabhāvavāda). This entails the repudiation of the [[path]] to [[full awakening]] and thus the [[Buddha’s]] basic [[teaching]]. | |
+ | Lack of a [[doctrine]] concerning a basal [[consciousness]] entails repudiation of [[karma]] {{Wiki|theory}}. Not discussed by lCang skya at this point in our text (see | ||
+ | [[chapter]] six four an in-depth analysis) is the repudiation of the [[doctrines]] concerning the [[existence]] of a basal [[consciousness]]. While as Harris correctly notes, according to [[Asaṅga]], even the basal or [[ālaya consciousness]] “dissolves” upon [[full awakening]] as [[karmic seeds]] and propensities are exhausted. However, | ||
+ | even {{Wiki|conventionally}}, this [[doctrine]] is lacking. As an [[upāya]] it [[suffers]] from the {{Wiki|distinct}} possibility that a [[Buddhist practitioner]] cleaving to this and related [[doctrines]] may fall into the [[mental]] trap of an “ego-view” (ātmadṛṣṭi). Certainly one notes that [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} as played out among {{Wiki|East Asian}} [[forms]] of [[Buddhism]] where the [[Yogācāra]] system arguably predominated, reveal a tendency to ātman-like [[characteristics]]. But this topic will await more thorough [[investigation]] in chapters to come (please see [[chapter]] six, the Conclusion and the first Appendix). | ||
+ | |||
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− | + | ===[[Chapter]] Four: [[Self-awareness]]=== | |
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− | + | We are employing this section of lCang skya’s work as an {{Wiki|epitome}} of [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]]. [[Self-awareness]] is true of many aspects of the {{Wiki|totality}} of [[sentient]] [[consciousness]], not only primary [[mental consciousnesses]] but [[sense consciousnesses]] as well. | |
+ | We [[feel]] that it is appropriate to focus on this notion as forming a central, [[vital]] feature of [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrine]] because without the | ||
+ | establishment of [[self-awareness]], much of this school’s systematic [[thought]] falls apart. Certainly it serves to attract some of [[Candrakīrti’s]] most vociferous objection. The [[idea]] of the centrality of [[mind]] and [[mental phenomena]] is [[ancient]] in [[Buddhism]], and “proto-Yogācāra” [[elements]] in the [[Pali canon]] are [[abundant]]. | ||
+ | Three topics: | ||
− | The | + | 1. The extreme view refuted, |
− | + | 2 the actual meaning established and | |
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+ | 3. warding off arguments. | ||
− | [ | + | [244:6-245:6] “From the [[Legs bshad snying po]]: |
− | |||
− | + | ‘If it is [[thought]] that even [[gnosis]] would be an [[object]], since this school accepts that that [[gnosis]] is [[self-aware]], then [that [[gnosis]],] is [[dependent upon]] this certain [[object]], the goal is [[reality]] itself which is then the [[object]] which is known, moreover, then, [one,] in being {{Wiki|aware}} of [this], incurs no fault.’ | |
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+ | If it is [[thought]] that the aim of this [[teaching]] is just as [discussed above], then the three [topics of] the [[imputed]] extreme [which should be] refuted, the real meaning established and disputation avoided [should be examined].” | ||
− | |||
− | + | The issue at hand concerns whether [[gnosis]] ([[jñāna]]) has an [[object]]. This presents a problems. If [[gnosis]] has an [[object]], then many qualites predicated of it would not apply. [[Full awakening]] to the [[reality]] of [[śūnyatā]] entails a lack of bifurcative [[consciousness]]. It is enmeshment with the [[Dharmakāya]]. This {{Wiki|status}} in profound inner [[samādhi]] allows no subject/object [[dualism]] so [[inherent]] at the level of the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]. | |
− | + | If [[gnosis]] is [[self-aware]], and if [[consciousness]] by [[definition]] of [[consciousness]] of something, then [[gnosis]] itself becomes an [[object]] of its [[own]] [[self-awareness]]. Yet if [[gnosis]] can be an [[object]], then this implies it could be some relatively reified [[entity]]. This is the [[subject]] to be investigated below. | |
− | + | ==1. Refuting an extreme view: [[self-aware]] [[gnosis]] [[knows]] itself as its [[own]] [[object]].== | |
− | |||
− | |||
+ | “As to the first [of the three], one opponent [asserts]: | ||
− | |||
+ | ‘In the [[Yogācāra]] system, [[gnosis]] in the [[samādhi]] of an [[Āryan]] is [[self-aware]]. If that is so, it would follow that the final [[object]] of the [[pure]] [[path]] is [[gnosis]] itself, since it [[knows]] itself by means of [[gnosis]] itself, and saying this introduces the [[assertion]] of the earlier premise...there does not [[exist]] a fault since what is understood as the [[object]] is [[knowing]] [[reality]]....’ | ||
+ | and he [[taught]] for this {{Wiki|purpose}}. Not only that, that answer [[[Tsong kha pa]] gave] would not be correct [if the issue is understood as according this prior premise]. By the outsider [[[non-Buddhist]]], | ||
− | |||
− | [ | + | ‘The [[object]] of stainless [[gnosis]] is stainless [[gnosis]] itself because of it being {{Wiki|aware}} of itself.’ |
+ | |||
− | + | This is a reply. He is not establishing stainless [[gnosis]] as the final [[object]] of the [[pure]] [[path]], since he says merely there does not [[exist]] a fault, since it is known with regard to that [point] [[gnosis]] [[knows]] [[reality]] as its [[object]]. In [[gnosis]] itself being [[self-aware]], there is not the slightest error and there does not [[exist]] any {{Wiki|purpose}} and ability [to reject the opponent’s [[assertion]]] any further.” | |
− | and | + | This passage aims to refute a false notion which might arise in the [[minds]] of some. [[Tsong kha pa]] states that there is no fault in the notion of “[[self-aware]] [[gnosis]],” for the [[object]] of [[gnosis]] in the [[samādhi]] of an [[Āryan]] is [[reality]] - [[śūnyatā]] - itself, and not that [[gnosis]] itself has itself as its [[object]]. |
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− | |||
+ | Three aspects: 1) refuting wrong notions, 2) establishing the actual meaning and 3) warding off objections. There will be three aspects to this [[discussion]]: 1) refuting wrong notions which are extreme [[views]] concerning this topic, 2) establishing the “actual meaning” i.e., [[Tsong kha pa’s]] [[own]] view and that, by implication, of the [[Yogācāra]] position and 3) warding off objections to his [[discussion]] of the actual meaning of “[[self-aware]] [[gnosis]].” | ||
− | |||
+ | The “earlier premise” stated that if [[gnosis]] is [[self-aware]], it should have itself as its [[own]] [[object]]. If that is so, then such [[gnosis]] could not be nondiscriminating [[gnosis]], for it has a [[subject]] and an [[object]] albeit, self-reflexive. To say this falls into a “Nāgārjunan trap,” which entails the impossibility of such a self-reflexive standpoint. | ||
− | + | ||
+ | If [[gnosis]] were [[self-aware]], then it stands to [[reason]], the [[eye]], {{Wiki|ear}}, etc. [[consciousnesses]] would also be [[self-aware]]. This is encapsulated by the notion that “the [[eye]] does not see itself, therefore it is the [[eye]]” and “[[fire]] does not burn itself, therefore it is [[fire]].” lCang skya asserts that [[seeing]] the [[Yogācāra]] [[idea]] in this {{Wiki|light}} is to equate it with [[views]] of [[non-Buddhist]] schools which do indeed assert [[gnosis]] as having itself as its [[own]] [[object]]. This is incorrect and invites “[[limitless]] [[logical]] errors” which are entailed by the fact that any [[knowing]] [[consciousness]] must have an [[object]], which is in this case as [[Tsong kha pa]] states, “the [[object]] is [[knowing]] [[reality]].” What is meant as the “actual meaning” of the passage will be discussed below. | ||
− | |||
+ | ===[[Error of asserting that self-awareness knows itself by means of itself]]=== | ||
− | |||
− | + | [245:6-247:1] “And another opponent [asserts]: | |
− | + | ‘The meaning of that [[teaching]] is [as follows]. It would follow that by the previous premise, the [[gnosis]] of [an Āryan’s] [[samādhi]] would know itself by itself, because of that [[gnosis]] of [[samādhi]] being a [[gnosis]] which is [[self-aware]] of each [thing] (so-so rang gis rig pa’i [[ye she]]). Therefore, it is an [[object]] of itself for the [[gnosis]] of [[samādhi]] itself.’ | |
+ | Thus it is said. The [[Venerable]] [[Self]] [[[Tsong kha pa]] said], | ||
− | + | ‘Though the [[gnosis]] of [[samādhi]] is a [[gnosis]] which is [[self-aware]] of each [thing], it does not know itself, because of being perfected as [[gnosis]] {{Wiki|aware}} of itself so having relied upon the manner of [[knowing]] [[reality]] ([[chos nyid]]) as its [[own]] [[object]]. This is [[taught]] as the answer which was stated.’ | |
+ | In stating the prior [[[assertion]]] one has not in the least now understood the [[Venerable]] [[[Tsong kha pa’s]]] [[thought]]. There are no {{Wiki|adherents}} to [[tenets]] who assert that the meaning of saying “[[gnosis]] which is [[self]] {{Wiki|aware}} of each [thing]” [[knows]] itself by itself, because there do not [[exist]] also among [[scholars]] of [[India]] or [[Tibet]] who say, | ||
− | |||
+ | ‘Accordingly, this is the goal [[desired]] by [[Yogācāra]] [[[scholars]]]’. | ||
− | |||
+ | Furthermore, it is incorrect even if one accepts making merely [[confusion]] which is necessary to accept as [[self-aware]] by merely the [[word]] stated as “[[gnosis]] which is [[self-aware]] of each... | ||
+ | Because such [[confusion]] as that would not arise in the {{Wiki|intelligent}}, however, if it did arise, by saying, “this school,” having proclaimed by means of this [[object]] the [[Yogācāra]] [School] because of there being no necessity to do this. However, even if [what is meant] is according to the manner of the previous premise, it is that is not the [[reason]] as correctly explained by the [[Venerable]] [[Omniscient]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]] as the meaning of [[self-aware]] of each [thing]... as his answer, but | ||
− | |||
− | + | ‘having depended upon any sort of [[object]] it is [[knowing]] on that [point] the [[object]] which [[knows]] [[reality]] as its aim.’ | |
− | |||
+ | There does not [[exist]] an aim to be examined in particular for general and specific [[objects]]. There does not [[exist]] even a [[proof]] of the necessity remaining and it does not [[exist]] in the text the [[word]] “[[self-aware]] of each.” Furthermore, it is [[thought]] upon {{Wiki|reflection}} done roughly in this [[chapter]] by the [[Venerable]] [[Mahātma]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]] does not appear to the {{Wiki|inferior}} [[minds]] who are weak in practice and schooling.” | ||
− | |||
− | + | The [[object]] of [[gnosis]] is not itself, but [[reality]]. This passage continues the first topic which is the refutation of extreme [[views]] with regard to the {{Wiki|concept}} “[[gnosis]] which is [[self-aware]].” lCang skya states that there do not [[exist]] any proponents of the view the opponent ascribes to the Cittamātrins. In any case, it is certainly not what [[Tsong kha pa]] himself was referring to, for he furthermore does not employ the specific term “[[gnosis]] which is [[self-aware]] of each [thing]...” but rather,merely, | |
− | + | “If it is [[thought]], that this school, since it accepts [[gnosis]] as [[self-aware]], that even [[gnosis]] itself would be an [[object]], having relied upon an [[object]], because it is understood that the [[object]] is [[knowing]] [[reality]], there does not [[exist]] a fault.” | |
− | + | Only those “weak in practice and schooling” would even think this is the meaning, is their [[idea]]. | |
+ | The second of three topics: establishing the actual meaning. | ||
− | + | [247:1-248:1] “Establishing his [[own]] system is the second [of the three topics]. The important point of the [[Venerable]] [[[Tsong kha pa’s]]] [[teaching]] in this [[chapter]] should be explained. [With regard] to that, are two [aspects]: [1] the manner in which [[confusion]] arises and [2] the explanation of his response. | |
− | ===[[The | + | ===1. [[The manner in which confusion arises]]=== |
− | [ | + | The first [of these]. It is [[taught]] in this manner in the [[chapter]] of the [[Madhyamakāloka]] which expresses the assertions of the [[Yogācāra]] [School], and likewise, according to the [[Saṃdhinirmocana]], Laṅkāvatara and the [[Gandavyuha]] [[[sūtras]]], it will be shown, |
− | + | ‘There is not [anything] other than mind-alone which ultimately [[exists]], wherefore all [[phenomena]] are [[taught]] as [[embodying]] merely [[mind]]. Therefore, that all [[phenomena]] are inherently [[non-existent]] would not be established.’ | |
− | + | With this last [quote], from the text of the [[Ratnakūṭa]][[[sūtra]]]. There is no [[doubt]] that the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[actuality]] ([[dngos po]]) will be [[self-awareness]] [in the [[gnosis]] of the [[samādhi]]] of [[Āryans]]. If it were otherwise, as it is expressed in the [[Saṃdhinirmocana]][[[sūtra]]], there is no [[non-existent]] [[actuality]]. If one asks | |
− | is | + | what that [[actuality]] is, it is the [[gnosis]] of the [[Āryan]] and what the [[Āryan]] sees which is {{Wiki|ineffable}}, perfected [[Buddhahood]], inexpressible [[dharmatā]] [[suchness]], because it is [[perfect enlightenment]], and is verbally conventionalized as “composite” and likewise, “non-composite,” which would be contradicting this [[teaching]].” it is [[taught]]. |
+ | |||
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− | + | [lCang skya continues:] Generally, [[Yogācāra]] [[scholars]], having relied upon the refutation [[logically]] of grasped [[external objects]], and the [[subject]], which is [[empty]] of being substantially different from the [[object]], there would be left remaining merely the [[experienced]] [[knowing]] of [[awareness]], and establishing substantially that mere [[knowing]] which is [[awareness]] of that type of [[experience]], it is not acceptable to reject this even by any sort of [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] {{Wiki|examination}} or [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|examination}} by valid [[cognition]].” | |
+ | |||
− | + | The second of these three topics then is the establishment of [[Tsong kha pa’s]] [[own]] system of [[thinking]] about these issues. With regard to this system then are the two aspects of demonstrating the way in which [[confusion]] about [[self-aware]] [[gnosis]] arises and [[Tsong kha pa’s]] [[own]] response to the issue. The first quote is from the [[Madhyamakāloka]], etc., in a section which discusses [[Yogācāra]] [[views]]. This refers to statements in which both [[subjective]] and [[objective]] aspects of [[reality]] are [[taught]] as “[[Yogācāra]],” or “[[Mind-only]].” The [[idea]] here is that there is an [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] “[[actuality]]” which is strictly [[consciousness]]. | |
− | |||
− | + | [[Ultimate reality]] in the [[Yogācāra]] system is that “{{Wiki|ineffable}},” “inexpressible” [[gnosis]] which is encompassed by the [[Āryan]] in deepest [[samādhi]]. This being inexpressible, to call it “composite” or “non-composite” would contradict the [[doctrine]]. Composite refers to the [[other-dependent]], non-composite to the perfected and “verbally conventionalized” to the [[conceptualized]]. Again, the [[other-dependent]] is composite because, being [[dependent upon]] other, it requires a basis and that with which it is interwoven to arise. The perfected is non-composite and is the [[other-dependent]] devoid of the [[conceptualized]]. | |
− | |||
− | |||
− | + | It is a basic [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrine]] that [[subject]] and [[object]], or more literally, “grasper” and “grasped” are not substantially different from one another. What is declared [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] in this case is the [[gnosis]] of the [[samādhi]] of an [[Āryan]], in which subject-object [[dualism]] ceases, yet the “mere [[knowing]] [[awareness]]” itself is real or actual. Therefore to say that all [[actuality]] is inherently [[non-existent]] is false, for that [[awareness]] of the [[Āryan]] is real or actual. | |
+ | This cannot be rejected by [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] {{Wiki|examination}}, which would include [[logical analysis]], or via [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] valid [[cognition]], which would be the experiential [[awareness]] of one who has [[attained]] to the {{Wiki|ineffable}} [[gnosis]] in the [[samādhi]] of an [[Āryan]]. In that Āryan’s [[samādhi]] , while it is taking place, [[non-dualism]] etc. is [[manifest]]; however after the [[meditative]] [[action]] which is the [[samādhi]] of the [[Āryan]] is over, the [[remembrance]] of the [[experience]] fails to attain to the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|status}} of the Āryan’s [[direct cognition]] of [[śūnyatā]] which was achieved during his [[experience]] of [[samādhi]] . | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | + | ===[[Memory as proof of self-aware consciousness.]]=== | |
− | |||
− | |||
− | |||
+ | [248:2-5] “Therefore, when [[dharmatā]] has been made into an [[object]] which is non-affirmingly negated by the stainless [[gnosis]] of the Āryan’s [[meditation]], then that [[gnosis]] [[knows]] [[dharmatā]] implicitly, and any other [positive] [[phenomenon]] is not asserted to be known. | ||
− | + | However, at that time, the [[meditative]] [[gnosis]] itself effects the [[experience]] of the valid [[cognition]] of direct [[perception]], which is necessary. If it were otherwise, then that [[meditative]] [[gnosis]] itself therefore is not established as valid [[cognition]], and later, even the [[memory]], ‘I [[realized]] [[dharmatā]] directly,’ would not arise as a [[memory]]. | |
− | |||
+ | In this manner, [[self-awareness]] is capable of being proven [[logically]]. If it were otherwise, if one were to have accepted as [[non-existent]] that [[self-awareness]] which effects one’s [[own]] [[experience]] [in [[memory]]] even for the valid [[cognition]] of direct [[perception]] of [[sense]][-[[consciousness]]], then according to [proponents of] the [[Yogācāra]] [School], this is incapable of refutation. | ||
− | + | Because of this, it is entirely the same [[reason]] [for both cases]. Accordingly, it is established that [[self-awareness]] [[exists]] at the time [of the Āryan’s [[meditative state]]]. That [[self-awareness]] is a [[knowing]] which does not abide even a bit corrupted by dual [[appearance]].” | |
+ | |||
+ | Here we have mention of “non-affirming {{Wiki|negation}}” ([[med dgag]]). Contraposed to this is what is known as an “[[affirming]] {{Wiki|negation}}.” An example of the [[latter]] would the statement, “[[empty]] wallet.” The {{Wiki|negation}}, “[[empty]]” establishes a positive [[existence]], in this case, a wallet. An example of the former would be “there is no [[money]] in an [[empty]] wallet,” which does not suggest a positive [[phenomenon]] which does lie within the wallet in place of [[money]]. What is “non-affirmingly negated” about “[[dharmatā]]” is its [[emptiness]] of [[duality]]. This absence is does not imply a positive [[phenomenon]] which [[exists]] in place of this absence. | ||
− | + | “[[Self-awareness]]” ([[rang rig]]) here refers to the [[awareness]] within [[consciousness]] of [[consciousness]] itself. This is demonstrated, according to [[Yogācāra]] proponents, by [[memory]]. When one remembers [[seeing]] the {{Wiki|color}} blue, one’s [[consciousness]] is not focused upon a currently perceptible external blue, but the picture of blue as it is retained in the [[consciousness]]. This is the [[self-awareness]] of [[sense consciousness]]. | |
− | |||
− | |||
− | + | The same {{Wiki|reasoning}} is [[offered]] for the ability of an [[Āryan]] to remember the [[state]] of [[meditative awareness]] of [[dharmatā]]. There must be a [[self-awareness]] which is {{Wiki|present}} in order for the [[memory]] of that [[experience]] to persist later in a post-meditative [[state]]. In this [[state]] of [[self-awareness]], the [[memory]] is not a [[state]] wherein one is [[conscious]] of an “other” ([[gzhan rig]]), but of internal [[consciousness]], [[conscious]] of itself. There is “a withdrawal of dual [[appearance]]” ([[gnyis snang]] nub) here, and one is {{Wiki|aware}} of only an inner [[state]] (kha [[nang]] kho nar [[phyogs]] pa). | |
− | + | This is the implication of the [[existence]] of [[subject]] and [[object]] in a [[dream state]]. Only an inner [[consciousness]] [[perceives]] - falsely - the [[real existence]] of [[subject]] and [[object]]. All the [[perceptions]] are products of one’s [[mind]]. This is of course what proponents of [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrines]] will want to affirm concerning our wakened [[state]] of distinguishing [[subject]] and [[object]] as well. | |
+ | The irrefutability of [[self-awareness]]. | ||
+ | [248:5-249:1] “Generally, according to the [[Yogācāra]] system, when one [[desires]] to no longer abide in the corruption of [[confusion]] with regard to the [[self-awareness]] for the {{Wiki|continuum}} of even an ordinary {{Wiki|individual}}, not to mention with regard to the [[self-awareness]] which arises in the direct [[experience]] of stainless [[gnosis]] which is the real antidote of [[ignorance]].” | ||
− | + | Therefore, this type of mere [[self-awareness]], would not be refuted even by [[logic]] of [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|examination}} ([[don dam]] dbyod [[byed]]). Because of the irrefutability even by any sort of [[logic]] which would refute the establishment by its [[own]] [[characteristics]] of the [[imputed]] which imputes [[attributes]] and [[essence]] and [[logically]] rejects grasper and grasped as different {{Wiki|substances}}. | |
− | + | Those who assert the [[existence]] of [[self-awareness]] for the ordinary {{Wiki|individual}} even moreso must admit the [[existence]] of [[self-awareness]] for the [[bodhisattva]] in [[meditation on emptiness]]. This [[self-awareness]] in the [[mental]] continua of even ordinary {{Wiki|individuals}} is necessary to remove [[confusion]] which derives from the false [[imputation]] of attributing [[essence]] and [[attributes]] to seemingly external entities, and of the basic [[paradigm]] of subject/object [[dualism]]. | |
+ | The [[imputation]] of [[essence]] in this context, entails the “fitness to be” something. For example, a table’s “[[essence]]” here refers to its [[nature]] as a table, which means it’s fulfilling the proper [[definition]] of what is meant by “table.” Its [[attributes]] involve of course, features such as its “having {{Wiki|legs}},” etc. This is [[dualistic]] [[thinking]] with regard to “external” [[objects]]. The false [[imputation]] of “grasper” and “grasped” derive from internal [[thinking]] which bifurcates the [[world]] into “I/it,” “self/other” [[dualism]]. | ||
− | |||
+ | [249:1- 3 ] “Therefore, according to [[Master]] [[Shakya]] blo, | ||
− | + | ‘A [[bodhisattva]], by [[knowing]] the [[selflessness of phenomena]], [[knows]] only [[self-awareness]] which is [[empty]] of [[duality]].’ | |
+ | And according to the [[Omniscient]] [[mKhas grub]], | ||
− | |||
− | + | ‘Having [[extinguished]] (gtan [[med pa]]) dual [[appearance]] on the external side, [[[bodhisattvas]]] realize grasper and grasped as truly [[empty]], [[knowing]] this implicitly by [[virtue]] of the [[manifestation]] of [[[reality]]] just as it is ([[ji lta ba]] bzhin) on the part of experiential [[awareness]] which [[knows]] inwardly no [[duality]]. When there is an ability to destroy the seed of that sort of ‘[[grasping]] as true,’ [that seed] is [[direct knowing]] which is the [[gnosis]] of the [[Āryan]],’ | |
+ | as he teaches this. There are {{Wiki|subtle}} [issues] to be understood (kho rgyu) in these texts.” | ||
+ | |||
− | |||
− | + | What is known explicitly by [[bodhisattvas]] is the lack of [[duality]] with regard to their [[own]] inner [[consciousness]]. Implicitly they become {{Wiki|aware}} of [[emptiness]] itself. This is known implicitly because they may know explicitly only through their [[own]] [[self-awareness]] of [[emptiness]]; actual [[śūnyatā]] is known as a result of this explicit or [[direct knowledge]]. The {{Wiki|subtle}} issues referred to here involve whether one’s [[knowledge]] of [[śūnyatā]] is direct, or whether one [[views]] one’s [[awareness]] of [[śūnyatā]] itself is the direct [[object of awareness]] here. | |
− | |||
− | + | The entical aspect of the dharmdhātu. | |
− | |||
− | [ | + | [249:4-250:3]] “According to the quotation from the [[Madhyamakāloka]] above, that |
+ | ‘Therefore it is demonstrated that all [[phenomena]] are embodiments of [[mind]] alone’ | ||
− | + | and if one asks, | |
+ | ‘What is that [[entity]] ([[dngos po]])?’ | ||
+ | |||
− | + | It is the [[gnosis]] of the [[Āryan]] and it is the inexpressible which is seen by an [[Āryan]]” from [this passage up to] “and for what are called composite and likewise, what are termed ‘non-composite’ are [[imputed]] nominally. | |
− | |||
− | + | By this [[doctrine]], the direct [[object]] (dngos yul) of stainless [[knowledge]] is the same [[entity]] as the [[knowledge]] [itself] which would be the direct [[object]] of this [[knowledge]] is shown. However, for this [[chapter]], what is meant by the [[word]] “[[Āryan]] gnosis”and what is meant by the words “what is seen by the [[Āryan]]” following that, are by necessity connected (‘grel dgos), and the goal to be [[attained]] by [[gnosis]] is the perfected [[[nature]]]. | |
− | |||
− | + | If one [[thinks]] the [[self-awareness]] of [[gnosis]] is the direct [[object]] - this is incorrect. When, according to that [[scripture]], the following [passage] which discusses the composite and is the [[imputation]] of a composite by necessity would therefore be without [[connection]] to the perfected [[[nature]]] as well. Otherwise, according to this [passage] from the section of the [[Madhyamakāloka]] which refutes the assertions of those who propound [the [[existence]] of] entities (dngos sma ba’i ‘[[dod]] pa), | |
− | |||
− | + | “Here, the [[sphere]] of [[knowledge]] ([[spyod yul]]) of the Āryan’s [[gnosis]] is the [[dharmadhātu]], which is asserted to be expressed by the [mere] [[word]] [[entity]] [but which] is the [[selflessness]] of all [[phenomena]]. Because it demonstrates the way to the goal which is the complete eradication of the basis of the {{Wiki|fear}} of those who [[cling]] to entities (mngon par [[zhen pa]] [[rnams]]); the aim of the [[scripture]] is not demonstrating by that [[word]] [[entity]] the [[self-aware]] [[knowledge]] asserted by the [proponents] of the [[Yogācāra]] [School], however, what is expressed by the [[word]] composite is only [[dharmatā]].” | |
− | [ | + | It would be incorrect to be [advocating] the viewpoint (gsungs pa) [of the opponent] along with this {{Wiki|reasoning}}, because of the [[assertion]] that only [[dharmatā]] is the aim of that, according to the [proponents of] [[Yogācāra]] themselves. |
+ | The term “[[entity]]” referred to in the [[Madhyamakāloka]] is discussed here. Composite [[phenomena]] ([[visible]], functional entities) and non-composite [[phenomena]] (such as [[space]]) are [[imputed]] nominally to [[ultimate reality]] ([[dharmatā]]). Some think that the term refers to the inner [[gnosis]] of the [[Āryan]] itself. This is incorrect. [[Dharmatā]] is the basis for all [[phenomena]] ([[dharmas]]) and is referred to as an “[[entity]]” in order to alleviate the {{Wiki|fear}} the term “[[non-entity]]” would incite in those who [[cling]] to being. | ||
− | = | + | “Those who propound [the [[existence]] of] entities” include the proponents of [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrines]], as well as those [[Buddhist schools]] which propound the [[existence]] of [[external objects]], which includes the [[Sautrāntika]], [[Vaibhāṣika]] but not the [[Yogācāra]] Schools. Furthermore, the term “[[entity]]” should not be seen as referring to the [[self-aware]] or “intra-mental” [[consciousness]] of the [[Yogācāra]] Schools, because it is connected to both the [[object]] (yul) of [[Āryan]] [[gnosis]], which is [[śūnyatā]] or “[[emptiness]]” (=[[dharmatā]]) which is “what is seen by the [[Āryan]],” and the [[subject]] ([[yul can]]) which is the Āryan’s [[gnosis]] itself. |
− | + | The term “[[entity]]” here is only a [[verbal]] designation in the [[Madhyamakāloka]] - not a reference to a real [[entity]] - for according to [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]], [[śūnyatā]] is a [[state]] devoid of [[entity]] ([[ngo bo nyid]] [[med pa]]). According to lCang skya, the term is used in this text only to avoid provoking antagonism to the relatively negative sounding term “[[non-entity]].” | |
− | |||
− | |||
+ | ===[[The sense in which dharmatā is called ‘composite.]]=== | ||
− | |||
− | |||
− | + | [250:4-251:1] “Again, it is incorrect to declare the [[word]] ‘composite’ as referring to only [[dharmatā]], as the answer to the [proponents of [[Yogācāra]] ,” for according to the [[Madhyamakāloka]], for the {{Wiki|purpose}} of refuting such an [[assertion]], | |
+ | ‘It is called ‘composite’ because it is [[dharmatā]] which is [the basis of] all composite [[[phenomena]]] without exception [and is called ‘composite’] by [[virtue]] of [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[discourse]], and is not to be designated [as a composite [[phenomenon]]] with regard to all aspects of its [[reality]].’ | ||
− | + | [[Teaching]] this would be incorrect. The ‘composite’ section of those texts, according to [[Yogācāra]] [proponents], when they assert that [it refers to] [[dharmatā]] only, because it would prove what is [already] established by those [[doctrines]], therefore these [[[sections]]] are a basis for generating [[confusion]] ([[dogs]] pa). | |
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− | + | The way questions arise [is as follows]. According to the [[Yogācāra]] system, [[gnosis]] [[exists]] as the valid [[cognition]] which is [[self-aware]] which comprehends (‘jal ba) the two [[methods]] of setting (‘jog tshul) the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] according to this [[chapter]], since it is stainless [[knowledge]] and that is [[self-aware]] for the necessity is [[gnosis]] and the [[object]] of that [[[gnosis]]]. | |
+ | “{{Wiki|Ultimate}}” ([[dam pa]]) [means] “having effected stainless deep [[meditative]] ([[nyam]] gzhag) [[gnosis]], and it is “the {{Wiki|holy}} goal” ([[don dam pa]]) since it is the [[object]] of that, and [those who] are [[thinking]] it is not pervaded by only the [[unchanging]] perfected [[[nature]]], generate [[confusion]] from [[thinking]] that stainless [[gnosis]] itself would be the final [[objective]] of the [[pure]] [[path]].” | ||
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− | The | + | The two ways of “setting” refer to the manner in which [[Āryan]] [[gnosis]] in [[meditation]] is effected. The two aspects of achieving this supreme goal involve the [[subjective]] and [[objective]] aspects of this [[ultimate reality]]. The [[subjective]] ([[yul can]]) is [[ultimate truth]], [[Āryan]] [[gnosis]] itself, or the recipient of the [[object]] (yul), which, as stated above, refers to the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]], [[emptiness]], or “that which is seen by the [[Āryan]].” Some opponents think that the perfected [[nature]] does not pervade the entirety of [[ultimate truth]], but that these two aspects characterize this [[state]].. |
+ | This is the explanation for the opponent, of the [[Tibetan]], don - “goal, aim” and [[dam pa]], “{{Wiki|holy}}, [[sublime]].” In the [[Sanskrit]] this is called, [[parama]] - supreme, and [[artha]]. - “goal.” The opponent in the text here distinguishes the two aspects of these terms, the “aim” or “goal” aspect referring to the | ||
− | + | [[object]] which is [[emptiness]], and the “supreme” or “{{Wiki|holy}}” aspect which refers to the [[subjective]] [[awareness]] which is the Āryan’s [[gnosis]]. The opponent here asserts that there are two aspects to [[ultimate truth]]: the [[subjective aspect]] which is the Āryan’s [[gnosis]] and an [[objective aspect]] which is [[emptiness]] or the perfected [[nature]]. Problems with this [[idea]] will be discussed in the following passage. | |
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− | + | ===[[The perfected nature is the appropriate object of the ultimate goal.]]=== | |
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− | + | [251:2-252:1] “Generally, to explain the answer for the second one, it is true that if one places as the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal which is effected by [[virtue]] of the second manner of setting by merely being the [[object]] of a certain stainless [[knowledge]], however, here, there is no fault, since it is not set up by merely that. | |
− | + | Well, if one wonders just how it is set up, it is by being the valid [[cognition]] which makes [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|examination}} for that [[object]] of that stainless [[knowledge]] which is the [[subject]] ([[yul can]]) for establishing the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal which is effected by [[virtue]] of the second way of setting, to be the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] which is finally obtained from {{Wiki|examination}} by that stainless [[knowledge]] which is the [[object]] of that [[[knowledge]]], and it is necessarily the two [[phenomena]] being assembled together [i.e., the [[subjective aspect]], stainless [[knowledge]], and its [[object]] which is [[emptiness]] which it [[ultimate truth]] which comprise the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal.] | |
− | + | That means, to refute [the opponent’s [[assertion]]], elucidating only [[unchanging]], non-affirmingly negated perfected [[nature]] as the appropriate [[[object]]]; the [[subject]], stainless [[gnosis]] is inappropriate. As established by the [[self-awareness]] which effects the [[experience]] of that stainless [[knowledge]], generally, if it | |
− | + | is [[knowledge]], it is not [[dependent upon]] an other [[substance]] for effectuating its [[own]] [[experience]], but it is necessarily established by the [[subjective aspect]] (‘[[dzin]] [[rnam]]) which is of the same [[nature]] and type (rang) [though it is not [[identical]]], and it is an [[understanding]] by means of the withdrawal of dual | |
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− | + | [[appearance]] ([[gnyis snang]] nub) by [[self-awareness]] which effectuates its [[own]] [[experience]] of stainless [[knowledge]] by [[reason]] of being only an inner [[seeing]] and a [[subjective aspect]], but, therefore, it is not finally discovered from {{Wiki|examination}}, from either {{Wiki|examination}} which proves or disproves the [[reality]] of the [[object]] which is stainless [[knowledge]] by means of [[self-awareness]]. By this {{Wiki|reasoning}}, there is no fault that that [[gnosis]] would be the final [[object]] of the [[pure]] [[path]] [for that fault is yours].” | |
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+ | These two aspects of the “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal” are again, the [[subjective]] ([[yul can]]) and the [[objective]] (yul). The [[objects]] of stainless [[knowledge]] are many. For example, a [[Buddha]] [[knows]] the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] which is [[emptiness]] but also is simultaneously {{Wiki|aware}} of the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] (e,g., [[saṃsāra]] , etc.). The only [[object]] appropriate to be called the “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal” of stainless [[knowledge]] is [[emptiness]], the “[[unchanging]], perfected [[nature]].” Some opponents assert that any [[object]] of stainless [[knowledge]] is appropriate as the “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | One example given is that of a {{Wiki|carpenter}}. A {{Wiki|carpenter}} may be {{Wiki|aware}} of many things (plumbing, auto mechanics, etc.), however, one is only a {{Wiki|carpenter}} in reference to his [[activity]] and [[knowledge]] with regard to wood-working. The same is true of “stainless [[knowledge]]”: it is only such when seen with regard to [[ultimate truth]] which is [[emptiness]]. The [[object]] of the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] goal is not [[gnosis]] itself but the [[object]] of that [[gnosis]], which is [[emptiness]]. | ||
− | + | [[Self-awareness]] arises with every type of [[consciousness]], from the [[eye consciousness]] up to stainless [[knowledge]]. This [[self-awareness]] does not examine whether it is [[conscious]] of [[seeing]] “blue” by the [[eye]] consciounsess or being {{Wiki|aware}} of the [[emptiness]] which is the [[objective]] of [[gnosis]]. Rather, it arises [[concomitant]] to those [[consciousnesses]]. It is of the same [[nature]] as these [[consciousnesses]], but unlike them, it is not {{Wiki|aware}} of a [[perceived]] external, substantial [[phenomenon]], but is “intra-mental,” perceiving [[only consciousness]] itself | |
+ | . | ||
+ | It is [[neutral]] in the [[sense]] that it is not {{Wiki|aware}} of the pleasantness the [[eye consciousness]] may associate with [[seeing]] blue or the [[bliss]] the [[stainless consciousness]] may [[experience]]. | ||
− | + | ===The [[self-awareness]] [[knows]] [[emptiness]] implicitly, not explicitly.=== | |
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− | + | [252:1-5] “Otherwise, the [[sense]] conciousnesses of the ordinary {{Wiki|individual}} would be irreversible ([[zlog]] tu [[med pa]]), even [[existing]] ultimately. Those [[[sense consciousnesses]]] [[exist]] [each] with a [[self-awareness]] which generates [[experience]], and with regard to the [[subjective]] mode (‘[[dzin]] tshul) of the [[self-awareness]], there is no abiding in confused corruption, in their mode of [[cognition]], because of being [[cognition]] [which takes place] in the [[extinction]] of dual [[appearance]]. | |
− | + | If one were to explain this in an abbreviated way, in this section [treating] of [[Yogācāra]] , even the [[realization]] of [[reality]], the perfected [[nature]], is necessarily [[realization]] in a mode of {{Wiki|negation}} of the [[object of negation]] which is a type of eradication of [the [[awareness]] of] a substantial difference of [[subject]] and [[object]]., however, this is a mere non-apprehension with regard to the substantial separateness of [[subject]] and [[object]]; it will not be a mere [[non-abiding]] error with regard to an [[object]].” It is said. According to the [[Venerable]] [[Omniscient]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]], | |
+ | ‘Having relied upon a certain [[object]], there is no fault, since it is understood that the [[object]] is the [[realization]] of [[reality]] [wherein the [[awareness]] of [[subject]] and [[object]] dissolve].’ | ||
+ | |||
+ | This is the perfectly explained meaning (don dpyis phyin) of [these] statements. Along these lines, according to the Ocean of [[Logic]], the [[Great Commentary]] on the [[Root]] [Text, the Madhyamakakarikāḥ] | ||
− | + | ‘On this [point], those [[Mādhyamika]] who hold the [[self]] [[awareness]] is [merely a] verbally designated [[[phenomenon]]] , and that [[object]] [which is [[perceived]]] by the valid [[cognition]] of [[inherent]] [[non-existence]] ([[rang bzhin med pa]] [[tshad]] mas) [which is [[śūnyatā]]] is held to be established implicitly by the [[self-awareness]] which generates the [[experience]] of that [[object]], though, since they hold that the [[self-awareness]] is [established] in the valid [[cognition]] of [[verbal]] expression, it is not established by [[logical]] [[knowledge]].’ | |
− | + | ===That is what is should be known and this is the meaning of the [[doctrine]].=== | |
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− | + | The [[self-awareness]] of [[sense consciousness]] would be irreversible because the opponent holds that since the [[self-awareness]] [[perceives]] [[pure]] [[gnosis]] which remembers the [[experience]] of the [[reality]] of [[emptiness]], then that [[self-awareness]] is also stainless. lCang skya’s response is that if that were the case, then all [[self-awareness]] for [[eye consciousness]], etc., would also be stainless and [[pure]]. While it is true that there is a lack of [[duality]] in what is known by the [[self-awareness]], which is said to be [[conscious]] only of [[mental phenomena]] and not of external [[phenomena]], this is a “mere non-apprehension” in the context of intra-mental events. | |
− | + | Accordingly, the [[self-awareness]] does not focus an [[external object]], hence it is not {{Wiki|aware}} of [[emptiness]] save implicitly, as it is remembered as an [[experience]] of [[attaining]] [[gnosis]] in deep [[meditation]]. Even the [[Yogācāra]] - [[Mādhyamika]] such as [[Śāntarakṣita]] and [[Kamalaśīla]], who, though acccepting the [[existence]] as [[verbal]] designation of a [[self-awareness]] for [[consciousness]], nevertheless declare it to have only an implicit [[awareness]] of [[emptiness]]. In this [[sense]], the [[self-awareness]] [[knows]] [[emptiness]] through the [[means of cognition]] which involve [[verbal]] designation, because [[emptiness]] [[exists]] thence as remembered [[experience]], not direct [[experience]]. The source for this is [[Tsong kha pa’s]] commentary on the Madhyamakakarikāḥ. | |
+ | The third of three topics: warding off opposing arguments. | ||
− | + | [252:5-253:2] “The third among those [three topics] is the warding off of opposing arguments. If it is said, | |
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+ | ‘If it were thus [as stated above], then it would follow that the [[unchanging]] perfected [[[nature]]] is an affirmingly negated ([[ma yin dgag]]) [[[reality]]] because the stainless [[knowledge]] of deep [[meditation]] realizes even the [[knowledge]] itself which implicitly realizes the perfected [[[nature]]] (khyod rtogs).’ | ||
− | + | But that {{Wiki|reasoning}} ([[rtags]]) is not proven, because the stainless [[gnosis]] in profound [[meditation]] is not held to be [[realizing]] [[gnosis]] itself directly. | |
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+ | And another opponent [states]: if it is said, | ||
− | + | ‘If it is that way, stainless [[gnosis]] would be unestablished even by [[self-aware]] [[knowledge]].’ | |
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− | + | That is not so, because the [[self-awareness]] established the [[subject]] ([[yul can]]) which is stainless [[knowledge]], though there is no need for it to establish the [[object]] which is [the [[reality]] of] [[dharmatā]]. Otherwise, it would follow that in identifying the [[self-awareness]] which generates the [[experience]] of [[visual]] [[awareness]] (mig shes) would occur prior to [[seeing]] [itself]. And again, another opponent [asserts that] it is incorrect [to think] that this section is engaged in the clarification of the [[self-awareness]]. If it is said, | |
− | + | ‘Those [proponents of] [[Yogācāra]] who adhere to [[scripture]] do not assert the [[[existence]] of] a [[self-awareness]].’ | |
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− | + | [Then in rebuttal,] it is not so that all scripturally-oriented [proponents of] [[Yogācāra]] do not accept the [[self]] [[awareness]], and though some [proponents of] [[Yogācāra]] adhering to [[scriptures]] of the [[bhūmi]] collection (sa sde’i), did not admit to a [[self-awareness]], [however,] there is no fault in examining [[confusion]] concerning [[self-awareness]] in this section, because this section explains the general system of the [[Yogācāra]] [School].” | |
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− | [ | + | Here begins a sequence of opposing arguments. The first opponent states that if the case is as lCang skya stated it, this would leave [[emptiness]] as an [[affirming]] {{Wiki|negation}}, because [[self-awareness]] establishes the positive [[existence]] of [[gnosis]] as the [[subject]] which [[experiences]] the perfected [[nature of emptiness]] as its [[object]]. |
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+ | This lCang skya rebuts this by noting that [[gnosis]] is not held to be {{Wiki|aware}} of [[gnosis]] itself, but that the [[self-awareness]] is {{Wiki|aware}} of only an implicit [[object]] - [[emptiness]]. | ||
− | + | Continuing this line of {{Wiki|reasoning}}, another contention holds that then the [[self-awareness]] does not establish stainless [[gnosis]]. lCang skya states that there is no need for the [[self-awareness]] to establish anything other than [[subjective]] [[experience]] which is an intra-mental event. There is no need to assert that it establishes an [[object]], save implicitly, through the [[experience]] of the [[primary consciousness]] which apprehends [[ultimate truth]]. If it did establish [[objects]], then it would be reasonable to hold that the [[self-awareness]] could establish [[objects]] prior to the primary [[mental consciousness]]’ ever experiencing it in the first place. | |
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− | + | Next, an opposing comment asserts that not all proponents of [[Yogācāra]] who adhere to [[scripture]] even accepted the [[existence]] of a [[self-awareness]]. lCang skya concedes that some of those who follow [[scripture]] - this means the [[traditions]] of [[Asaṅga]] and [[Vasubandhu]] - that cleave to the five [[scriptures]] of [[Maitreya]] did reject the {{Wiki|concept}} of a [[self-awareness]]. This [[lineage]] of [[Yogācāra]] is to be contrasted with that of proponents of [[Yogācāra]] who cleave to [[logic]], numbering | |
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− | [ | + | among them, [[Dignāga]] and [[Dharmakīrti]] - but this section is involved with setting out the general [[Yogācāra]] system and it is thus appropriate to discuss this [[doctrine]] which is so central to the [[Yogācāra tradition]] overall. |
+ | The [[self-awareness]] has no [[object]] but ‘mere [[mental]] [[experience]].’ | ||
− | + | [253:3-254:5] “Again, some will understand, ‘Your [[assertion]] is incorrect; though you based yourself on the [[acceptance]] of [[self-awareness]], therefore, in that time of profound [[meditation]] the stainless [[gnosis]] which comprehends (‘jal [[byed]]) itself would not be an [[object]] for the self-awaress. Accordingly, as [quoted] from the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]], | |
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+ | ===‘Realize non-grasping! Thereby, one contacts the objectlessness ([[dmigs pa med]] pa) [of [[emptiness]]].’=== | ||
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+ | And [the [[Path of Seeing]] which is] just above whatever [lies beyond] the dissolution ([[rnam]] par ‘[[jig pa]]) of the composite [[sentience]] (‘dus shes) [which is comprised] of the merest [[consciousness]], or from the {{Wiki|perspective}} of the station of the supreme [[mundane]] [[dharma]] (‘[[jig rten]] pa’i mchog gi [[gnas]]) which is the [[samādhi]] which does not [quite] reach that [[[Path of Seeing]]]” and “After having [[realized]] intellectually that nothing other than [[mind]] [[exists]], because of this even [[mind]] is [[realized]] as [[non-existent]],” by these statements, therefore, if one says, “because of the explanation of the [[non-existence]] of [[mental]] [[appearance]] in profound [[samādhi]] ” there is no [[logical]] fault. | ||
+ | Those [quotes above] explain the characterlessness of [[appearance]] to someone who is engaged in [[meditation]] of the [[path]] to [[reality]], but generally, at that time there is merely [[mental]] [[experience]], therefore this is not refuted. Having relied upon these [statements] the profound [[meditations]] which are asserted | ||
− | + | to be devoid of {{Wiki|conceptual}} strife ([[spros]] du [[med pa]]) by [proponents of] [[tenets]] of the lower [schools], even though in systems of [[tenets]] of the higher [schools] these would be [seen to be] accompanied by {{Wiki|conceptual}} strife, and if that is [the case], there is much to express on the [[reasons]] and so forth [how] it would not be accompanied by {{Wiki|conceptual}} strife by only that in our system. | |
+ | And likewise, it is rare for those who explained the [[doctrines]] of the [[Venerable]] [[Omniscient]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]] in prior [periods] to proceed to the [[essential]] points and meaning of those [[doctrines]]. It seems necessary to know the thorough explanations [found in] the [[Madhyamakāloka]], the [[Tarkajvāla]] (rTog ge ‘Bar ba) and among the [{{Wiki|literary}}] corpi of the [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] [systems], and [where] the establishment of [[self-awareness]] occurs in the *Pramāṇavartikka, etc.. | ||
+ | By certain earlier explicators, those texts were not seen, and by some, though they saw [those texts], they did not examine [the issues] [[logically]], having held the opponent ([[phyogs]] snga ma) and the refutation [of the opponent’s positions] as [[identical]], though too, such explanations are rare, however, by me, I am [able] to [[state]] just as much as I am capable (dpogs tshod), and moreover, since in the words of (ji skad du) the {{Wiki|luminous}} (grags) [[virtuous]] advisor, the son of the [[Jina]], there [[exists]] no [[confusion]] in such [[minds]] which possess the difficult meanings. If it is not so, then by [whom] else?” | ||
− | [ | + | Here, lCang skya answers opponents’ propositions. In the first instance, he states that the [[self-awareness]] with regard to the Āryan’s [[gnosis]] has no [[object]], because the [[object]] of [[gnosis]] is objectlessness ([[dmigs pa med]] pa). In the [[state]] of profound [[meditation]], everything is [[realized]] as [[non-existent]], even [[mind]] itself. The [[self-awareness]] is {{Wiki|aware}} only of a [[subject]] - the [[state]] of [[gnosis]] - and only a mere [[experience]] of [[consciousness]] takes place. |
− | + | The opponent asserts that since there is no [[mental]] [[appearance]] in the [[state]] of profound [[meditation on emptiness]], there would be nothing for the [[self-awareness]] to {{Wiki|perceive}}. This is not so, responds lCang skya, because the “merely [[mental]] [[experience]]” does occur. He continues to explain that what one school may consider a [[state]] “devoid of {{Wiki|conceptual}} strife’ ([[spros]] du [[med pa]]), another school may consider a [[state]] where some measure of {{Wiki|mentation}} is taking place. There is much to say on this [[subject]], he says, and continues to explain that he is capable of only so much acuity in his explanation. The reader is urged to investigate the issues him/herself by examining the [[Madhyamakāloka]], etc. - works by greater [[minds]] than his [[own]], as he puts it. | |
− | + | [254:5] “Moreover, in the words of those sons of the Victor, famed [[virtuous]] advisors, those who possess intellects which possess the meaning of the difficulties, since no [[confusion]] [[exists]] [for them], if that is not so, then for whom else?” Therefore it is [[taught]] in this way demonstrating this standpoint value from this {{Wiki|examination}} by greater intellects. | |
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− | + | ===[[Mādhyamika]] response=== | |
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+ | ==[[Candrakīrti]]== | ||
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+ | [[Mind-only]] eradicates the view of an [[agentive]] [[self]]. According to [[Candrakīrti]], the [[realization]] that the three ([[Desire]], [[Form]] and [[Formless]]) [[realms]] are [[mind]] alone occurs at the sixth [[bodhisattva]] level, called the Directly Facing ([[abhimukhi]]). The aim of this [[realization]] is to enable the [[bodhisattva]] to eradicate the last traces of [[thinking]] of the [[volitional]] agent as a [[permanent]] [[self]]. This is accomplished by the [[realization]] that this agent is merely {{Wiki|mentation}}. In spite of the persistence of his critique of the [[Yogācārin]] position, he nonetheless has only high esteem for the Laṅkāvatarasūtra wherein this [[doctrine]] is perhaps most famously presented. | ||
− | [ | + | Refuting the [[agentive]] [[self]] of [[non-Buddhist]] schools. The [[Buddha]] elucidated the “[[mind-only]]” [[doctrine]] for the {{Wiki|purpose}} of refuting the notion of an agent as it is presented in the [[doctrines]] of non-Buddhists. This [[mind-only doctrine]] was [[taught]] to inculcate the fact that in the [[realm]] of everyday [[experience]], {{Wiki|mentation}} is preeminent. This should not be taken as a {{Wiki|denial}} of [[form]], however. If this were intended, then one must [[wonder]] at his statements in the same [[sūtra]], that [[desire]] and [[ignorance]] produce that which is merely [[mind]], according to [[Candrakīrti]]. . |
− | + | [[Memory]] is no different from other types of [[cognition]]. [[Candrakīrti]] (MA) disagrees with the [[idea]] that [[consciousness]] can be [[self-aware]]. He claims that [[memory]] (smṛtijñāna) is no different from any other type of [[experience]] {{Wiki|lying}} within a {{Wiki|continuum}} of [[thought]]. This is to say, a [[memory]] is subsequent [[cognition]] like any other [[cognition]] which might not be a [[cognition]] of a [[cognition]]. The [[remembrance]] of a previous [[experience]] is as different from the {{Wiki|present}} [[memory]] of that [[experience]] and is a “reified” [[object]] as “[[past experience]]” in a manner not dissimilar to the [[perception]] of a difference between a presently engaged [[consciousness]] and an [[entity]] such as a table. | |
− | + | [[Memory]] is neither different from nor the same as the remembered event. On the one hand, a [[memory]] is different from the actual [[past experience]], on the other, it is not different in the [[sense]] that we claim [[experience]] of it as our [[experience]]. Devoid of a {{Wiki|concept}} of [[self-awareness]] however, how could the [[Yogācārin]] maintain that [[other-dependent]] entities are [[Wikipedia:Cognition|cognized]]? Just as [[Nāgārjuna]] demonstrated the impossibility of the agent, act and [[activity]] being [[identical]], so the same line of {{Wiki|reasoning}} should be applied to [[self-awareness]]: How could it be {{Wiki|aware}} of itself and yet avoid being [[identical]] to itself? Yet if it is different how could be it be classified as a [[self]] [[awareness]]? | |
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− | + | [[Fire]] does not burn itself, nor does [[consciousness]] ‘think’ itself. [[Candrakīrti]] adds (MAB) that if, according to [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrine]], the [[other-dependent]] [[exists]] substantially [[empty]] of self-other {{Wiki|distinction}}, then what [[consciousness]] is {{Wiki|aware}} of what [[other-dependent]] [[entity]]? He applies [[traditional]] [[Madhyamaka]] {{Wiki|reasoning}} to this problem. The [[idea]] that there is [[self-awareness]] [[suffers]] from the same problem as the classical issues [[Nāgārjuna]] elucidates in the MMK. [[Consciousness]] can no more be {{Wiki|aware}} of itself than [[fire]] could burn itself, or in [[Candrakīrti’s]] [[own]] example, of the impossibility of a sword edge cutting itself, or other well-known examples of the tip of the finger [[touching]] itself, the [[eye]] [[seeing]] itself, and so forth. | |
+ | In the absence of [[external objects]], [[consciousness]] itself cannot be an [[object]]. If we have understood his {{Wiki|reasoning}} correctly, to say that the [[primary consciousness]] apprehends an [[entity]] which is itself apprehended by this secondary [[self-awareness]], then this makes for a situation whereby the primary apprehending [[consciousness]] is made an [[object]] of this [[self-awareness]]. Given the [[Yogācārin]] [[tenet]] of the [[non-existence]] of [[external objects]], it would seem to be a consequence that the [[primary consciousness]] viewed as the [[object]] of the secondary [[self-awareness]], would be [[non-existent]]. | ||
− | + | {{Wiki|Identity}} or difference: [[memory]] [[relative]] to the original [[experience]]. As [[Huntington]] admits the argument here is somewhat hard to follow, but the primary focus of his argument is not hard to [[grasp]]. His line of argument follows [[traditional]] [[Madhyamaka]] concerns. Whether or not a [[self-awareness]] [[exists]], a [[memory]] is {{Wiki|distinct}} from or at least not [[identical]] to the original [[experience]]. Because it arises subsequently, it is not [[identical]], and just as if it were to belong to the [[mental continuum]] of another [[consciousness]], it does not share a direct cause-effect relationship. This relationship would need to be explained, just as does that which pertains to the relationship of fuel to [[fire]]. Both seemingly {{Wiki|distinct}} entities are not [[identical]], for they can be {{Wiki|conventionally}} {{Wiki|distinguished}}. However, they are not different because they are intrinsically related. | |
− | + | Subject/object [[dualism]] in all [[forms]] of [[consciousness]]. [[Candrakīrti]] notes that both the original event and the [[memory]] are similar in that both require a {{Wiki|perceiver}} and a [[perceived]] [[object]]. This is acceptable as an explanation for the way things are established as [[conventional truth]], but more thorough analysis reveals the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] incoherency of this [[understanding]] of how [[consciousness]] can be said to be “[[self-aware]].” To say “[[self-aware]]” is to assert that the agent, [[activity]] and act are [[identical]] by implication. This [[sameness]] is nowhere [[perceived]] but simply [[exists]] as a reified {{Wiki|concept}} in the [[Yogācārin]] system. | |
− | + | The [[fallacy]] of [[infinite]] regression: [[cognition]] of a [[cognition]] of a [[cognition]].... Futhermore, this [[idea]] [[suffers]] from the [[fallacy]] of [[infinite]] regression. [[Candrakīrti]] notes (MAB) if [[memory]] involves “[[memory]] of an [[experience]] of an [[object]]” then the [[self-awareness]] should [[experience]] this, but also, [[self-awareness]] should [[experience]] itself as well. In this case, one would have the [[memory]] of the [[memory]] of an [[experience]]. If all [[memory]] and [[consciousness]] is [[self-aware]], this process should continue ad infinitum. He notes a circularity of {{Wiki|reasoning}} in these proofs for [[self-awareness]]. It seems that [[self-awareness]] is given as a [[proof]] of [[memory]] and [[memory]] is used to prove the [[existence]] of [[self-awareness]]. | |
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− | [ | + | [[Memory]] explained by recourse to [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[phenomena]]. One may account for [[memory]] from strictly [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[phenomena]]. [[Candrakīrti]] notes that the [[existence]] of a “[[magic]] [[water]] {{Wiki|crystal}}” cannot be inferred merely from the presence of [[water]], but [[water]] may be postulated merely from the fact of clouds heavy with [[water]], raining down. Both [[memory]] and [[self-awareness]] are unsubstantiated theses. [[Cognition]] is given as producing [[memory]], [[memory]] is claimed as that which demonstrates [[self-awareness]]. But [[self-awareness]] is said to be established by means of subsequently [[arising]] [[memories]]* |
− | + | [[Tsong kha pa]]: [[memory]] occurs due to the primary [[experience]]. [[Tsong kha pa]] of course completely accepts [[Candrakīrti’s]] arguments on this topic. He accepts as fact that Candrakīrtidisproves the notion of [[self-awareness]] being proven through an argument from [[memory]]. According to him, the [[memory]] “I saw something” occurs not via any [[self-awareness]], but by the first direct [[experience]] of an [[object]] and a subsequent [[memory]] of that very same [[object]]. | |
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+ | The [[fallacy]] of two [[consciousnesses]]. If two types of [[conscious awareness]] were required, then [[experience]] and [[memory]] would be different. He argues, elucidating [[Candrakīrti’s]] stance, that [[memory]] would be impossible, for [[consciousness]] would be directed at two different [[objects]]. If [[memory]] and direct [[experience]] are different [[consciousnesses]], then it would not be absurd for one [[person]] to have another person’s [[memory]]. | ||
− | + | [[Tsong kha pa]] and [[infinite]] regression: there is no primary [[experience]]. [[Candrakīrti]] and [[Tsong kha pa]] are agreed here, and both cite the problem of [[infinite]] regress with regard to this aspect of the [[Yogācārin]] [[doctrine]] of [[self-awareness]]. In his [[dGongs pa Rab gSal]], [[Tsong kha pa]] notes that if a former [[cognition]] needs a subsequent [[cognition]] to discern it, then does not the subsequent [[cognition]] need another [[cognition]] to discern it? If this is not the case then it is fair to argue that the initial [[cognition]] of blueness does not require a [[self-awareness]] to validate it either. This is to reiterate [[Candrakīrti’s]] [[own]] argument, save that he adds that with this [[Yogācārin]] scheme, it would be impossible for [[consciousness]] to [[experience]] anything other than subsequent [[consciousness]]. | |
+ | The provisional validity of [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrine]]. That [[Candrakīrti]] does not reject [[Mind-only]] [[doctrine]] can be seen from his words in his autocommentary (MAbh). He acknowledges that the [[world]] is comprised of [[karma]] and that [[karma]] and [[volitional]] {{Wiki|mentation}} are mutually [[interdependent]]. Nevertheless, while [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrines]] hold a [[relative]] validity, they do not withstand [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] analysis. | ||
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− | [ | + | Without external entities, there is no stage upon which the [[consciousness]] may act. [[Huntington]] explains that among the various schools opposed to the [[Prāsaṅgika]], some ([[Non-Buddhist]]) schools maintain that an agent is ultimately [[God]], for others it is [[action]] viewed as [[principle]] and the [[Yogācārins]] define it as merely [[mind]]. As he translates from the autocommentary, the [[sūtras]] never deny the [[existence]] of external [[form]]. He employs as an example, the [[idea]] of two |
− | + | [[kings]] vying for power in a single [[realm]]. These [[kings]] [[symbolize]] the agent. No {{Wiki|matter}} which [[king]] should come to {{Wiki|rule}} the [[realm]], all would depend upon the [[people]] of the [[realm]] in their role as would-be [[king]]. The [[people]] [[symbolize]] external entities. Apart from these, any agent has no [[sphere]] of [[activity]] and no role to play, no stage upon which to act. Therefore, there is no [[doubt]] that [[form]] [[exists]] - though its [[existence]] is seen only from the {{Wiki|perspective}} of concealing [[truth]]. . | |
− | + | Concomitancy cohering [[mind]] and [[form]]. By ordinary {{Wiki|individuals}}, the five {{Wiki|psychophysical}} [[aggregates]] {{Wiki|conventionally}} [[exist]], but by the [[Āryan]] [[meditator]] in [[deep awareness]], they do not. A concomitancy coheres [[form]] and [[mind]]. If one does not [[exist]], how then could the other? He asserts that in the [[Abhidharma]] corpus, both are [[affirmed]]. The [[idea]] that in stainless [[gnosis]] only a [[mental]] [[substance]] [[exists]] anniḥilates the whole {{Wiki|conception}} of the [[two truths]], in his view. | |
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+ | [[Consciousness]] as real, actual ultimately [[existent]] fact is refuted. [[Candrakīrti]] states that this [[mind]] as an actual, real, substantially [[existent]] [[entity]] has been refuted through a number of [[reasons]]. The [[two truths]] reveal that, though {{Wiki|conventionally}}, entities [[exist]], ultimately they do not. [[Mind-only]] [[doctrine]] is intended for those who are strongly [[attached]] to entities, thus serving as an [[upāya]], are meant to be further elucidated ([[neyārtha]]) in order to demonstrate a deeper, more [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] standpoint. | ||
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− | + | As the [[object of knowledge]] falls, so falls the knower. [[Buddhas]] have demonstrated that once the [[object of knowledge]] ([[jñeya]], [[shes bya]]) has been rejected, the knower falls along with it, and this refutation of the knower is the [[reason]] for refuting the [[object of knowledge]]. Maintaining basic [[Mādhyamika]] [[doctrine]], [[discourse]] on [[emptiness]] itself should be taken as definitive (nitārtha), while [[doctrines]] elucidating the [[existence]] of [[reality]] being mere [[consciousness]] should be more critically reflected upon and are [[subject]] to further elucidation ([[neyārtha]]). | |
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− | + | ===[[Chapter]] Five: [[Refutation of the Extreme of (Śrāvakayāna ) Positivism]]=== | |
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− | + | It is on this issue of positivism that the two [[Mahāyāna]] Schools will more or less agree, even employ more or less similar arguments to establish the ultimately non-entical [[nature of reality]]. The [[subject]] of this [[chapter]] are certain key [[doctrines]] of the [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools lCang skya focuses on one school in particular, the [[Sautrāntika]] for the refutation of [[Buddhist]] “positivism.” | |
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− | [ | + | As discussed in the Preface, we are [[mindful]] that when the term positivism is used, it has a full range and context of meaning in the [[West]]. One [[thinks]] of the works of {{Wiki|John Stuart Mill}}, or of the [[logical]] positivism of {{Wiki|Bertrand Russell}}. [[Relative]] to arguably the majority of {{Wiki|occidental}} [[philosophies]], all three [[schools of Buddhism]] are [[Wikipedia:Nihilism|nihilistic]], rejecting as they do, the [[self]], “[[essences]]” and the like. |
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− | + | In fact, it would be a [[concern]] of all three to vigorously avoid being charged with advocating a “[[self]]” notion of any sort, notably the [[selfhood]] of the [[person]], avoiding the dread puḍgalavāda error which asserted the [[existence]] of the {{Wiki|individual}} and became the bane of [[Buddhist]] writers. Nevertheless, [[relative]] to the [[Mahāyāna]] Schools, these schools appear to reify [[phenomena]], as we shall see. | |
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− | + | We employ the term “Positivism” as a convenience for [[Western]] readers who will be familiar with this term though perhaps not with this alleged [[Buddhist]] [[form]] of it. Our term [[samaropa]] and its [[Tibetan translation]] sgro ‘[[dogs]] refer to “superimposition,” “[[exaggeration]],” “[[imputation]],” “entical [[conceptualization]]” and the like. Therefore one “posits” the [[existence]] of entities. As long as the fact that this is a positivism as seen “intra-Buddhism,” we see no problem with the use of this term. | |
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− | + | ===[[The Sautrāntika and their doctrines.]]=== | |
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− | + | The [[name]] “[[Sautrāntika]].” According to [[Hsuan tsang]], {{Wiki|adherents}} of the [[Sautrāntika School]] venerated [[Ānanda]] as their [[master]]. According to certain [[Tibetan]] authorities, they were also known as the Uttarīya, because they were {{Wiki|superior}} with regard to the [[Dharma]], however, [[Bhavya]] states that they were so named after a dissident [[Sarvāstivāda]] [[scholar]] named Uttarīya. | |
+ | The place of the [[Sautrāntika]] among the early sects of [[Buddhism]]. The [[Sautrāntika]] in nearly all sources are the same as the school known as the Saṃkrantivādin, for this school held that the [[five aggregates]] {{Wiki|transmigrated}} ([[Saṃkrānti]]) from one [[existence]] to another. Only the Śāriputraparipṛcchasūtra distinguishes the two. | ||
− | + | [[Wikipedia:Louis de La Vallée-Poussin|La Vallee Poussin]] demonstrated that the Darśtantika denounced as {{Wiki|heretics}} in the Vibhāśa were probably this same school. [[Vasumitra]] states that their [[doctrine]] approached that of the [[Sarvāstivāda]]. He notes that they rejected the [[doctrine]] of the {{Wiki|individual}} (puḍgalavāda). | |
− | the | + | Summary of the [[Sautrāntika]] position. To condense in summary [[form]] a great [[doctrinal]] system such as that promulgated by the [[Sautrāntika School]] is a formidable task. Some of their [[doctrines]] were roughly as follows. This school [[affirmed]] that the uncomposite ([[asaṃskṛta]]) does not really [[exist]] as {{Wiki|distinct}} [[entity]], but as [[pure]] absence. For example, [[space]] is the absence of the {{Wiki|tangible}}. [[Nirvāṇa]] is the absence of a tendency towards [[existence]]; {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} entities do not really [[exist]], for if they were to really [[exist]], then composite entities (Saṃskrta) would [[exist]] always and would be hence, eternal, which is not the case. The uncognized (avijñāpti) also does not |
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− | + | Summary of the [[Sautrāntika]] position. To condense in summary [[form]] a great [[doctrinal]] system such as that promulgated by the [[Sautrāntika School]] is a formidable task. Some of their [[doctrines]] were roughly as follows. This school [[affirmed]] that the uncomposite (aSaṃskrta) does not really [[exist]] as {{Wiki|distinct}} | |
− | [ | + | [[entity]], but as [[pure]] absence. For example, [[space]] is the absence of the {{Wiki|tangible}}. [[Nirvāṇa]] is the absence of a tendency towards [[existence]]; {{Wiki|past}} and {{Wiki|future}} entities do not really [[exist]], for if they were to really [[exist]], then composite entities ([[Saṃskṛta]]) would [[exist]] always and would be hence, eternal, which is not the case. The uncognized (avijñāpti) also does not truly [[exist]] according to the [[doctrines]] of this school. [[Prāpti]] also does not really [[exist]], for they are [[perceived]] neither directly nor by their effect, and hence, an important [[doctrine]] of the [[Sarvāstivāda School]] was refuted by them. |
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+ | Continuity and [[transformation]]. A series is the Saṃskara of the {{Wiki|past}}, of the {{Wiki|present}} and the {{Wiki|future}} in [[relation]] to [[causality]] and which constitutes an uninterrupted continuity. Parināma is the [[transformation]] of such a continuity which is the continual “becoming otherness” ([[anyathātva]]) of the [[aggregate]] {{Wiki|individual}}. [[Causes]] do not co-exist with their effect. This school holds that the non-composite is not causational, for [[causes]] ([[hetu]]) and [[conditions]] ([[pratyaya]]) are [[taught]] as [[impermanent]] and are by consequence, composite. | ||
− | + | [[Mind and Body]]. [[Bodily actions]] also do not ultimately [[exist]] for this school, for these so-called corporeal functions are aspects of [[Wikipedia:Volition (psychology)|volition]] which place the [[body]] in [[action]] and thence one calls them [[bodily]] [[actions]]. [[Thought]] and the [[body]] and its {{Wiki|organs}} are mutually seminal (semences=bijas). If a [[person]] is born in the Arupyadhātu, their [[form]] or material aspect is dormant. If however posterior to that, s/he is born into the [[Desire Realm]], for example, the new [[form]] proceeds from the [[mind]] of the {{Wiki|individual}}. | |
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− | + | In particular, lCang skya focuses on this school’s [[assertion]] of the “real” or “{{Wiki|factual}}” [[existence]] of external entities postulated by this school. For our purposes here however, we will set out [[elements]] of this school’s [[philosophical]] stance which proves most problematic for the [[Mahāyānist]]. This is the [[doctrine]] concerning [[dharmas]] or for this school, fundamental time/space units the agglomeration of which comprise all [[perceived]] [[phenomena]]. | |
− | + | Ātmostic [[phenomena]] ultimately and actually [[exist]]. This school holds that these atomistic units are really [[existent]] and that the images we [[form]] based on the agglomeration of these units are also true and “uncorrupt” to the extent that they are based on unimpaired [[perception]] of [[aggregate]] | |
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− | + | If a configuration or were a thing in itself, it would be [[perceived]] by two {{Wiki|organs}}, meaning that one [[visual consciousness]] would {{Wiki|perceive}} the unit and another would {{Wiki|perceive}} the subunits. A configuration is a part of [[form]], which is defined as a particular [[object]] of the [[eye consciousness]]. Since one sees numerous configurations in a complex configuration, then it would have many [[forms]] ([[rūpa]]) in the same place, which is impossible. There are then properly {{Wiki|speaking}}, no [[atoms]] [[perceived]] in a configuration. | |
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− | + | An {{Wiki|atom}} is considered to be extended and it comports to spatial [[division]]. [[Atoms]] {{Wiki|touch}} each other by [[reason]] of their extension. (Digdeśābheda-pratighāta). The [[condition]] regarding the [[quality]] of an [[object]] ([[alambanapratyaya]]) is the [[atoms]] (paramānu) which are agglomerated (Saṃghātita). When [[visual consciousness]] is {{Wiki|aware}} of {{Wiki|color}}, it does not {{Wiki|perceive}} [[atoms]] but only their agglomeration, since it ascertains the aspect of this agglomeration (tadākaratvāt), and hence one sees a {{Wiki|mass}} of blue rather than [[atoms]] of blue. A [[discussion]] of these matters can be found below under the subheading, “the self-isolate and the referent category.” | |
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− | + | Rejection of [[atomism]] by both [[Mahāyāna]] Schools. Both [[Mahāyāna]] Schools find this highly problematic. For the [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholar]], entities are true as [[perceived]] - {{Wiki|conventionally}}. They are not true as [[perceived]] ultimately. In the case of the [[Yogācārin]], [[perceived]] entities are sheer {{Wiki|mentation}}. | |
+ | [[Vasubandhu’s]] anti-atomism. While the groundwork for a critique of this type of [[dharma]] {{Wiki|theory}} was set out by [[Nāgārjuna]] in the MMK, [[Vasubandhu]] sets forth a | ||
− | + | notable explicit refutation of [[Śrāvakayāna]] “[[atomism]]” by observing that given that [[atoms]] are [[conceived]] to have six sides through which to connect to neighboring [[atoms]], then they are not by this fact, ultimately indivisible, for the regions of the [[atomic]] [[dharma]] or [[phenomenon]] are themselves clearly smaller divisions. The problem of the fundamental constituents of our [[reality]] for the Cittamātrin is concerned with the [[Mind]], for it is that which discriminates, bifurcates and categorizes [[reality]] into entical and discrete particularities. | |
+ | [[Conceptualized]] and innate positivism. | ||
− | + | [254:5-255:1] “For the first [topic, the identification], generally, both positivism and [[nihilism]] are [here] the [[objects]] of [[logical]] refutation. With regard to positivism, there are two [major aspects]: [1] the [[conceptualized]] and [2] the innate. [And again,] for the innate [aspect] are the two [features] of [[grasping]] at the [[self]] of [1] the {{Wiki|individual}} and [2] of [[phenomena]]. With regard to the [[latter]], [again] are the two aspects of apprehending [[subject]] and [[object]] as substantially different which will be examined later.” | |
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+ | Now we arrive at lCang skya’s [[discussion]] of the manner in which Cittamātrins reject “positivism,” for lack of a better [[word]]. The [[Tibetan]] term sgro ‘[[dogs]] refers to what we are translating as “entical [[conceptualization]],” the [[idea]] that what is [[perceived]] is real as given. | ||
+ | The innate aspect. There are two aspects of this stance, deemed a [[form]] of {{Wiki|extremism}}, from the Cittamātrin standpoint: an innate and a [[conceptualized]] aspect. The first is “built-in,” and applies to all [[sentient beings]] in some [[form]] or other. For example, a [[lion]], to hunt prey, has an innate [[awareness]] of the “real” or “actual” [[existence]] of its prey. | ||
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− | [ | + | The [[conceptualized]] aspect. The [[conceptualized]] aspect of positivism refers to positivism involving [[conceptual thought]]. This would include something as simple as the [[thought]], “the chair really, [[essentially]] [[exists]]” on up to the very abstruse [[philosophical]] systems which aim to prove the [[objective]], [[essential reality]] of entities understood to be “external, different, substantial” entities. |
− | + | The [[conceptualized]] aspect is more easily eradicated. Of the two categories, the [[conceptualized]] aspect is considered by far the easier of the two to eliminate. [[Buddhist traditions]] affirm that the innate reifying tendency of [[beings]] is only eliminated at the [[Arhat]] level, according to some schools, or at the [[highest]] [[bodhisattva levels]] in [[Mahāyāna]] Schools. | |
− | The | + | The innate aspect of positivism is not relinquished until the tenth [[bodhisattva]] level whereat the subtle-most [[self-view]] or egotistic stance is eradicated. More accessible is a [[grasp]] of lCang skya’s analysis of the [[conceptualized]] aspect of the [[mind’s]] tendency to reify [[objects]] with regard to the {{Wiki|naive}} “ordinary {{Wiki|individual}}” and the more {{Wiki|subtle}} [[form]] of positivism found in the two [[Śrāvakayāna]] [a.k.a. “[[Hīnayāna]]”] Schools, the [[Sautrāntika]] and Vaibhaṣika. |
+ | Positivism as the enticalization of [[phenomena]]. | ||
+ | [255:1-255:4] “The manner in which one cleaves to the [[selfhood]] of [[phenomena]], which is adhering to the establishment of the [[conceptualized]] [[[nature]]] by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], is this. “This [[form]] is one of the aggregrate [constituents of a [[sentient being]]]” is the [[essence]], and “this [[form]] | ||
− | + | arises” is the [[imputation]] of a particular [[definition]] and signifier to that mere [[essence]], and [thus, on this level] the [[aggregates]], etc., are established. However, though, establishing the [[aggregates]], etc., by [[virtue]] of their [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint or by their [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] to that [[essence]], [lies] within the extreme of positivism. | |
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+ | This is an apprehension in the following manner: in this section, positivism will entail cleaving to the [[selfhood]] of [[phenomena]]. Here, according to the {{Wiki|Legs}} bShad sNying po [where [[Tsong kha pa]]] engages in an abbreviated refutation which [accomplishes] the goal (don) of the extensive [[doctrine]] by way of warding off the arguments of outsiders, will be restated here.” | ||
− | [ | + | The [[essence]] and its [[attributes]]. There are again, two aspects to [[conceptualized]] positivism: an [[idea]] of the “[[essence]]” and the “[[attributes]]” which are [[imputed]] to that which [[initiates]] [[conceptualization]] (i.e. the “[[essence]]”). “[[Form]]” is taken as the major example, though it applies to all entical [[conceptualization]]. |
− | + | “[[Form]]” is the [[essence]] or basis for the particular [[characteristics]] applied to it, and in this case, “[[form]] arises” is one of its signifiers, along with “extension” etc.. “[[Form]]” is established in this manner, but not ultimately. This is a Cittamātrin deployment of the concealing [[truth]]. However, when one asserts that “[[form]]” [[exists]] “by way of its [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint” or “by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]” - this is the extreme of positivism. | |
− | + | [[Tsong kha pa’s]] [[understanding]] of this topic in the MS. Following will be an elucidation of [[Tsong kha pa’s]] clarification of this extremist [[thinking]] in the section of The [[Heart]] of Thorough Elucidation (LSN), wherein he refutes the [[thinking]] of opponents [[thinking]] with regard to how the MS is to be understood. By doing this, he establishes the proper [[understanding]] of [[Asaṅga’s]] [[thought]], in his view. First is an analysis of the Saṃgrāha itself and following this, a [[logical]] [[investigation]] of the issues. | |
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− | + | ===[[The self-isolate and the referent category]]=== | |
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− | + | [255:4-256:1] “Again, if a certain [opponent] should say, | |
+ | ‘By you, [[form]], etc., are incorrectly asserted as the [type of] positivism which is the [[object]] of refutation in this section, [i.e., holding] the basis of an [[essence]] and particular [[characteristics]] as established by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. It is also incorrect to further assert the [[[existence]] of the] self-isolate for the direct [[object]] of words and of [[conceptualization]] that manner. [This is so] because it is incorrect to assert along with that the [[form]] and so forth which would be the basal isolate for that [[[form]] and so forth]. | ||
− | [ | + | The first [[proof]]. If one establishes the direct [[object]] of words and {{Wiki|expressions}} ([[brjod bya]]) by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], then, even the [[Sautrāntika]] therefore hold this [[conceptualization]] as positivism, because to the [[Sautrāntika]], the [[assertion]] of [[form]] as the direct [[object]] of [[conceptualization]] is as a [[generic image]] ([[don spyi]]) which does not in [[reality]] [[exist]]. For this [[reason]], it is very improper to assert the [[selflessness of phenomena]] by proving their [[emptiness]] through merely that [argument]. |
− | [ | + | The second central [[proof]] (tsa ba’i [[rtags]] [[gnyis]] pa grub). When one [[desires]] to refute the establishment of [[form]], etc., by its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], it would be the basal category for those [[characteristics]], therefore it would be [[nihilism]] according to this [[[Yogācāra]]] system, since it would not establish the [[other-dependent]] [[[nature]]] by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]].’ |
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− | + | An opponent’s mistaken notion of the self-isolate. The opponent has a mistaken notion of the self-isolate. He states that positivism is not the [[object]] of refutation in this section of the Saṃgrāha. [[Asaṅga]] is referring neither to the self-isolate nor to the basal isolate. | |
− | + | Even the [[Sautrāntika]] hold the [[generic image]] to be positivism. If it were referring to the self-isolate, then the [[generic image]] which arises from a composite {{Wiki|structure}} such as [[form]] has already been examined and determined to be false from the “lower” schools (as [[Mahāyānists]] refer to the [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools): “even the [[Sautrāntika]]” who are among those schools [[Asaṅga]] claims are guilty of “positivism” due to their [[dharma]] {{Wiki|theory}}, hold that this [[mental]] [[generic image]] is false because it arises from [[atomic]] substructures which are actually [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]. | |
+ | The opponent’s second argument: the basal referent and the [[other-dependent]]. The second [[proof]] that positivism is not the aim of the refutation is that if [[Asaṅga]] is rejecting the [[idea]] that the basal referent as [[existing]] by way of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], then this would violate the Cittamātrin’s [[own]] [[assertion]] of the [[other-dependent nature]] [[existing]] by way of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. If this is rejected, then one would be maintaining “[[nihilism]]” as analyzed in [[chapter]] three. | ||
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− | + | ===[[Positivism as correspondence between signifier and signified.]]=== | |
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− | Many names equate to many entities. The idea here is that if names correspond to objects on a one-to-one basis, then for each of these epithets of Brahma there should be either a different Brahma for each activity for which the epithet was received, or a different aspect of Brahma within Brahma, so to speak, which corresponds to each epithet. | + | [256:1-5] In this section, where the [[Venerable]] [[Omniscient]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]] explains the answer to that, it is not held to be a [[proof]] for the [[Sautrāntika]], and not only that, this method of cleaving to the [[selfhood]] of [[phenomena]] which is the reverse {{Wiki|theory}} (bzlog [[phyogs]]) of that, is contradicted in the [[doctrine]] of both schools of the [[Śrāvaka]][[[yāna]]]. Further, the identification of positivism according to the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]] [is as follows]: |
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+ | On that [point], the {{Wiki|naive}}, it should be known, are strongly [[attached]] to an [[essence]] [for a [[phenomenon]]] [an [[essence]]] which conforms exactly to the [[name]] and exactly to the expression [applied to it] according to the five [[reasons]] (rgyu lngas) [applied] to entities (dngos la) which [serve] as [[objects]] of expression. | ||
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+ | Well, with the exception of the [[Venerable]] [[Lama]] of {{Wiki|Myriad}} [[Doctrines]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]], because of great unfirmness [in [[understanding]]], [[awareness]] (gtol ma) [of the meaning of these issues] has not occurred to many. Therefore, the [[[spiritual]]] Sons of the [[Venerable]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]], Thu po [[mKhas grub]], with the [[illumination]] of the statements ([[smra]] ba’i nyi mas), the [[sTong]] Thun [[[Chen]] mo], the beautiful [[eye]] (sKal [[bSang]] mig) for the {{Wiki|examination}} (‘[[byed]] du) of a [[mind]] | ||
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+ | to which appeared the [[consciousness]] to which appears the [[objective]] by the power of a {{Wiki|propensity}} to express the [[doctrines]] of the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]], and the aspect of the [[appearance]] by the power of a {{Wiki|propensity}} towards an egotistic standpoint ([[bdag]] du [[lta ba]], ātmadṛṣṭi) and [[appearance]] to the [[consciousness]] due to a {{Wiki|propensity}} towards the limbs of [[existence]], from the three [of them].” | ||
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+ | It has been noted that there are two dangers as recounted in the Kathāvatthuppakānam. [[Logical]] formulations were intended to avoid [[two extremes]] which he locates as the [[realms]] of the extreme sceptism to which [[Śūnyavāda]] could lead versus the possibility of [[absorption]] into Brahminist systems on the other. | ||
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+ | Further, Singh continues, [[Sautrāntika School]] is anti-idealistic. The fact of the [[reality]] of [[atoms]] which comprise [[sense]] {{Wiki|data}} is enought to distinguish this school from that of the [[Yogācāra]], who do, of course, deny the [[existence]] of [[external objects]]. He upholds [[Sautrāntika]] basic [[understanding]] by pointing out that this school’s approach “shakes the foundations” of [[Yogācārin]] “[[Idealism]]” by its turning away from “mere [[mentality]]” in favor of objectivity. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [[Tsong kha pa’s]] response. [[Tsong kha pa]] explains that [[Asaṅga]] is not providing a [[proof]] to refute the [[Sautrāntika]] position here. He is providing the identification of positivism in the Saṃgrāha. He is simply expressing the fact that “positivism” refers to a {{Wiki|naive}} [[belief]] in things [[existing]] the way they | ||
+ | |||
+ | appear and in the [[concomitant]] naivete which ascribes the same [[reality]] to words and {{Wiki|expressions}} which are employed to characterize an [[entity]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | lCang skya then proceeds to praise [[Tsong kha pa’s]] [[deep awareness]] of the issues and the [[lamp]] which illumines {{Wiki|obscurity}} in even his [[own]] [[thought]], which is the [[sTong]] Thun [[Chen]] mo, written by one of his foremost [[disciples]], [[mKhas grub]]. | ||
+ | {{Wiki|Naive}} versus sophisticated positivism. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [256:5-257:1] “The first [issue] is the manner of [[appearance]] of appearing by [[virtue]] of a {{Wiki|propensity}} towards [[verbal]] expression. To the [[eye consciousness]], etc., the mode of [[appearance]] and the [[appearance]] itself of [[form]], etc., [[exists]] as real. Having discerned the clarification of the dissimilarity of that from the [[Sautrāntika]] system, [[[mKhas grub]]] engages in a precise clarification of the [[thought]] of the [[Venerable]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | If such is [the case], still, when researching the [[understanding]] of the great texts, from an inner method ([[ngang]] tshul) of the [[intellect]] which does not distinguish what is accepted by a child, even though along with being not even a little bit an [[Āryan]], [they] elucidate, dispute and compose holding | ||
+ | |||
+ | themselves, (pur ‘[[dzin]]) and it appears that there barely [[exist]] (srid mtha tsam) [those] who know the exact explanation of the [[thought]] in the {{Wiki|myriad}} [[doctrines]] of the [[[spiritual]]] father [and] both [his] sons, since [these] would be like slivers of [[diamonds]] ([[rdo rje]] tshig) [since they are so difficult to crack].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[mKhas grub]] elucidates the differences in [[thinking]] between [[Asanga’s]] description of the type of positivism which characterizes the {{Wiki|naive}} and that of more astute [[Sautrāntika]] analysis. To the {{Wiki|naive}}, the mode of an entities [[appearance]] to the [[eye consciousness]] [[exists]] as real because of a {{Wiki|conceptual}} {{Wiki|propensity}} to [[verbal]] expression. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | lCang skya laments the fact that so many who (erroneously) deem themselves great [[scholars]], have missed the point. They aim, like children, to decipher the difficult points of [[doctrine]] which are to them like shards of [[diamonds]], impossible to crack. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | Corrupt versus uncorrupt modes of [[appearance]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | [257:1-257:4] “Now, I myself, should express to some small extent the definitive approach. The most important point ([[shin]] tu gal che ba’i [[gnas]]) for [[understanding]] the meaning of the great [[doctrine]] of the [[Venerable]] [[Mahātma]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]] is this. The [[Sautrāntika]] hold that an [[object]] appearing to the | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[sense consciousness]] is not corrupt. An [[appearance]] [[exists]] as established by means of its [[own]] [[characteristics]] as a basis for the [[essence]] and [[particularity]] of [[form]], etc., and the [[Sautrāntika]] themselves, accept that [the [[perception]] of [[form]], etc.] are not corrupt in that manner. | ||
+ | |||
+ | In this [[[Yogācāra]]] system, that mode of [[appearance]] itself is corrupt, and [this system] asserts that mode of [[appearance]] is established in an accordingly [corrupt manner] since it is [[conceptualized]] later. The [[reason]] for refutation in this section is positivism and cleaving to the [[selfhood]] of [[phenomena]], and | ||
+ | |||
+ | it is only this [[doctrine]] of the [[omniscient]] [[mKhas grub]] which one needs to identify that mode of [[appearance]] in the beginning, since it is difficult for the [[intellect]] to engage [this [[subject]]] of the way in which the mode of [[appearance]] is accordingly [appearing] to the [[sense consciousness]].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | The definitive approach according to lCang skya II. He then attempts to express what he [[thinks]] is the definitive approach, to the best of his ability. He identifies the following as one of the most important [[doctrinal]] topics of [[Tsong kha pa’s]] corpus, employing [[mKhas grub’s]] [[insights]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The manner in which the [[Sautrāntika]] cleave to positivism. He states that the [[Sautrāntika]] accept that the [[sense consciousnesses]] are correct in their ascertainment of the [[appearance]] of an [[entity]] and that it is the [[conceptualized]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | image which appears immediately after [[sense perception]]. The [[Sautrāntika]] system asserts the “[[real existence]]” of external entities. [[Objects]] are “out there” (as opposed to being purely mentated [[realities]]) and appear to the [[sense]] conscousnesses objectively by [[virtue]] of their being composed of the fundamental time-space [[atomic]] building blocks called “[[dharmas]].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | This tendency to “positivism” in [[Sautrāntika]] [[thought]] is bolstered by Amar Singh’s appellation in the title of his [[book]], The [[Sautrāntika]] Analytical [[Philosophy]]. He states that all [[Sautrāntika]] thinkers were [[empiricists]]. [[Direct cognition]] [[pratyakṣa]] - which he calls “[[sensation]],” is the foundation of this school’s [[thought]]. His study verifies the [[interpretation]] above by noting that sensible [[objects]] are real, and that {{Wiki|denial}} of [[sensorial]] [[awareness]] is the “{{Wiki|denial}} of all [[knowledge]].” The five types of [[objects]] are real by way of being conglomerations of [[atoms]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The Cittamātrins: even [[sense perception]] is corrupt. Proponents of “mere {{Wiki|mentation}}” themselves hold that even this [[appearance]] itself is corrupt. The difficulty is the juncture between the [[conceptualizing]] [[mind]] and its {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[object]]. According to the [[Yogācāra]], even this very process of [[sensation]] is corrupt with regard to appehending [[the way things really are]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | [257:4-258:1] “The mode of [[appearance]] of those [[[phenomena]]] is this. According to [[[mKhas grub]]], when we see something like a pot by means of [[mental focus]], the belly of the pot is made [[manifest]] to the [[eye consciousness]], and not only that, the belly appears as the basis of the verbalized [[conceptualization]] which declares, ‘this is a pot.’ | ||
+ | |||
+ | Furthermore, the belly is not merely established by the [[name]] and signifier, but we call it a pot by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] standpoint, and this appears as the establishment as a basis for locating (‘[[jug pa]]) the signifier. | ||
+ | |||
+ | If one should inquire how [one can be] certain that [[appearance]] [occurs] in that manner, [then the response is that,] having become [[attached]] ([[zhen]] nas) to that mode of [[appearance]] to the [[sense consciousness]], later [[conceptualization]] declares, “This is a pot.” The [[conceptualization]], verbalization and [[sense consciousness]] are certain [[knowledge]]; therefore there is no necessity of another {{Wiki|continuum}} but it is elicited bey means of its [[own]] power.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [[Sautrāntika]]: {{Wiki|immediacy}} of [[sense perception]]. When one sees even simply the belly of a pot, one’s [[mind]] immediately [[thinks]], “This is a pot.” “No other {{Wiki|continuum}}” refers to this {{Wiki|immediacy}}: there is no need for another mediating [[consciousness]] or [[cause]] to inspire this [[thought]] in the [[mind]] other than this objectively, really [[existent]] pot-belly. It is not the case that [[appearances]] are simply names and signifiers [[imputed]] by the [[mind]] onto [[phenomena]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | [258:1-258:4] “Then if that is the {{Wiki|reasoning}}, when others ask, what is the [[essence]] of the [[object]] of the expression, “This is a pot”? The mode of [[appearance]] and manner of [[attachment]] ([[zhen]] tshul) [are uncorrupt] by [[virtue]] of the | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[reality]] of the [[essence]] of the [[object]]. One says, “The belly [[exists]]” and “due to the belly, there is a pot;” one would not say, “there is a pot due to nominal [[imputation]].” | ||
+ | According to the {{Wiki|Legs}} bShad sNying po, | ||
+ | |||
+ | ‘One says, “[[Form]] is the [[essence]] for that [[object]] of the expression we call ‘[[form]],’” and one does not say, “the [[essence]] of that [[object]] of expression ‘[[form]]’ is merely some nominal [[imputation]]. Therefore, when {{Wiki|conventionally}} imputing what | ||
+ | |||
+ | one calls ‘[[form]],’ there is a basis for the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[conceptualization]] of a blue [[form]], and when one sees an [[appearance]] such as this, it appears just as established by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] [[inherent reality]] and not as established nominally or by a signifier.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | Cleaving to the establishment [of a [[phenomenon]]] as it appears, just as that blueness, for it is positivism which cleaves to the establishment by its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] in nominally imputing, ‘[[form]] [[exists]] for blueness’ and this statement is the meaning. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Does one strictly [[imagine]] entities? Again, to [[ordinary perception]], things are as they appear and names [[attached]] to things seem to have an [[inherent]] [[connection]] to them. In {{Wiki|distinction}} to what is (wrongly) commonly understood to be the [[Madhyamaka]] position, this view asserts that it occurs to no one to think that entities [[exist]] by [[Wikipedia:Imagination|imagining]] them into their particular [[existence]]. This seems absurd. | ||
+ | |||
+ | There must be a basis for [[phenomena]]. Unlike the [[Yogācāra]] position however, the basis is not the “dependent-upon-other” which serves as the basis for all [[perceived]] entities, for this second of the [[three natures]] is only fully [[realized]] when one has “emptied” it of [[conceptualization]]. For “positivism,” the basis for entities is their [[appearance]] just as they appear. [[Means of cognition]] ([[pramāṇa]], tsad ma) validly establish entities. | ||
+ | |||
+ | For Singh, this [[Sautrāntika School]] is “anti-sceptical,” by which he means, among other things, anti-Madhyamaka. He interpretes [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]] as asserting that no definite [[knowledge]] is possible and nothing is true. This type of | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[thinking]] is self-contradictory, undermining the very foundation ([[logic]]) upon which it stands. While we do not agree with his [[interpretation]] of [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]], the above aids the [[interpretation]] of [[Sautrāntika]] [[thought]] as related by lCang skya II. | ||
+ | |||
+ | [258:4-259:1] The [[reason]] [[Sautrāntika]] [[[scholars]]] accept this mode of [[appearance]] as correct [is this]. Since [[form]], etc., is an [[external object]], it is of a different [[nature]] than the [[awareness]] [of it], and it is [therefore] truly established. Therefore, when [an [[external object]]] appears to the non-erroneous | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[sense consciousness]], it of necessity appears by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] standpoint, for that mode of [[appearance]] is the basis of nominal designation since it necessarily appears just like it [[exists]], by way of its [[own]] standpoint. Therefore, it [[exists]] as a mode of [[appearance]] by means of focus ([[gtad]] pa) upon an [[external object]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Because of this, that mode of [[appearance]] is not only uncorrupted, (ma ‘khrul ba) since the [[conceptualization]] of the mode of [[appearance]] [occurs] later, likewise the [[attachment]] ([[zhen pa]]) and mode of apprehension ([[zhen]] tshul) are | ||
+ | |||
+ | unmistaken (ma ‘khrul ba), although the [[conceptualization]] of that [[entity]] (ngos yul ) which is the referent of the [[word]] [[vase]] [which is a [[mental]]] is not established by its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] and that this is the sole superimposition; these statements are what is asserted [by [[Sautrāntika]] [[scholars]]].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [[Sautrāntika]]: the fundamental difference of [[consciousness]] and its [[object]]. According to the [[Sautrāntika School]], [[appearances]] are based on the fact of [[external objects]], which are fundamentally different in [[nature]] from the [[sense consciousness]] which first acquires raw [[sense]] date. The [[sense consciousness]] acquires {{Wiki|data}} based on this {{Wiki|factual}} [[existence]] of external entities, and in this [[sense]] what it [[perceives]] is as it appears, and serves as a true basis for | ||
+ | |||
+ | the nominal designations applied to them by the fixated ([[zhen pa]]) [[consciousness]]. | ||
+ | Unmistaken and uncorrupt [[consciousness]]. There are three features of [[consciousness]] referred to here. One is that the | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[sense consciousness]] is uncorrupted, meaning what it [[perceives]] is not itself a superimposition of the [[consciousness]] onto the “[[external world]],” as [[Yogācārins]] will maintain, and further, the mode of fixation or apprehension is unmistaken, meaning that the immediate term we apply to “[[vase]]” is also based on fact. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [[Sautrāntika]]: the [[generic image]] is not ultimately established. The only aspect of [[consciousness]] which the [[Sautrāntika]] maintain is not truly established in fact is the [[conceptualization]] at a later time when the [[entity]] is not {{Wiki|present}} to [[initiate]] first the [[sense consciousness]] into perceiving the [[entity]], and second, the apprehending | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[consciousness]] into applying a [[name]] and [[mental]] image to it. The third process refers to the [[generic image]] one employs to think abstractly about a “pot” or “[[form]].” This is a “mixture” or “corruption” which fuses {{Wiki|past}} [[awareness]] of entities into one [[generic image]], which is a relatively false picture when compared to the image one [[perceives]] from direct [[sense]] [[experience]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | [259:1-259:5] In this system, since an [[external object]] is not established, an [[external object]] arises as an [[appearance]] from [[consciousness]] by [[virtue]] of habituation towards [[external objects]]. On that [point], endlessly [one is {{Wiki|aware}} that] “this blue [[exists]] as this blue,” and so on, again and again, and an | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[appearance]] as a basis for verbalization of such [a thing] occurs by [[virtue]] of a {{Wiki|propensity}} for [[verbal]] expression. Accordingly, that [[appearance]] of [[form]] is merely of the [[nature]] of inner [[consciousness]], but because of this, it is not an [[external object]] which is unrelated (‘brel ba [[med pa]]) [to [[consciousness]]] having been proven (gtan nas) as such. That appears as a basis of nominal designation, however therefore, it is an [[appearance]] by [[virtue]] of habituation towards inner [[verbal]] expression. | ||
+ | |||
+ | That mode of [[appearance]] is not proper as a mode of [[appearance]] which appears by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint, as an {{Wiki|independent}} [[object]] for establishment nominally and through a signifier. [It follows] from that, that otherwise, that sort of [[form]], etc., being a basis for [[verbal]] designation, | ||
+ | |||
+ | even though it would not proven [[dependent upon]] [[consciousness]], and if that is the case, that [[form]] and the [[consciousness]] would be substantially different; this is incorrect by way of refutability through many [[reasons]].” and these statements [are those this system] accepts. | ||
+ | |||
+ | The [[Yogācārin]] position concerning external entities: propensities and habituation. Again, we have a restatement of the [[Yogācārin]] position. “[[External objects]]” according to this school, arise through the {{Wiki|maturation}} of seminal [[mental]] propensities towards their [[perception]]. They appear as the basis of our [[thought]] and nominal designation of them, however, were they truly external and {{Wiki|independent}}, this would lead to the conclusion that the [[object]] and the | ||
+ | |||
+ | [[consciousness]] which apprehends it are of fundamentally different natures. | ||
+ | The place wherefrom propensities arise is the basal or [[ālaya consciousness]]. These propensities are seminal potentialities which lie latent in the basal [[consciousness]] and “mature” or “ripen” when [[causes and conditions]] permit. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [259:5-260:1] “[With regard to] those [points], according to the {{Wiki|Legs}} bShad sNying po, | ||
+ | |||
+ | ‘There is for the [[Śrāvaka]] [Schools], this very [[acceptance]] of the [[tenet]] of cleaving to the establishment by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] of [[form]], etc., on which [[essence]] and [[particularity]] are nominally {{Wiki|superimposed}} and which is positivism, which is the counter-thesis ([[zlog]] [[phyogs]]) of that [position taken by [[Yogācāra]] [[scholars]]]’ | ||
+ | |||
+ | And | ||
+ | |||
+ | ‘That manner of apprehension is held to be correct by the two [schools] which assent to the [[existence]] of [[external objects]], however, since they assert that the self-isolate, which is the [[object]] of [[verbal]] expression, is {{Wiki|superimposed}} conceptually, ([[rtog]] btags) but then the basal isolate [or referent [[object]] is said to] emerge inherently characterized; and how are [these two isolates] the same? | ||
+ | This is the [[thought]] [of [[Tsong kha pa]]].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | The [[Yogācāra]] position: no external entities. Basically, this passage by [[Tsong kha pa]] reiterates themes elucidated by lCang skya above. The [[Yogācārin]] position is a position opposite to that of the two schools which assert the fundamental, {{Wiki|factual}} [[existence]] of [[external objects]]. This {{Wiki|thesis}} is of course in particular opposed to the [[Yogācārin]] [[doctrine]] of the substantial non-differentiation of [[subject]] and [[object]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Agreement of all [[schools of Buddhism]]: the [[generic image]] is a false construct. There are two types of [[objects]] of expression ([[brjod bya]]): the [[self]] isolate and the basal isolate. These two schools ([[Yogācāra]] and [[Sautrāntika]], and thus all [[Buddhist schools]]) will affirm with their [[Mahāyāna]] counterparts that the | ||
+ | |||
+ | rang ltog or “self-isolate” which is the generic term ([[sgra spyi]]) or [[generic image]] ([[spyi]] don) which is conjured up in the [[mind]] when one sees the belly of a pot and [[thinks]], “this is a pot” or the image one has when one [[mentally]] [[visualizes]] a pot separate from any concrete, [[visible]] and specific example of a | ||
+ | |||
+ | pot, agree that this is “[[imputation]] by [[thought]]” and thus [[illusory]]. | ||
+ | [[Buddhist]] disagreement concerning the referent [[object]]. However, the two major systems (both [[Mahāyāna]] and [[Śrāvakayāna]] schools) disagree about the basal | ||
+ | |||
+ | isolate ([[gzhi]] ltog) which is an actual pot experienceable by direct [[perception]]. This pot is actual, real, fact, according to the [[Śrāvaka]] Schools, while it too is [[imputation]] or superimposition [[arising]] from habituations as “[[seeds]]” in the sub or basal [[consciousness]], at least according to the [[Yogācāra School]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [260:1-2] Therefore, the manner of assertions of both the [[Sautrāntika]] and [[Yogācāra]] Schools are dissimilar, and the [issue] rests only on whether or not [[form]], etc., itself and the apprehending [[awareness]] are [considered] substantially different. | ||
+ | |||
+ | When one [[understands]] the issues in this way, then it is also easy to know the way to enter into [the [[doctrine]] of] [[consciousness-only]] by this method of [[emptiness]], and then even the [[logical]] refutation of positivism according to the teachings of the Saṃgrāha and its method of refutation are easily known.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | The final {{Wiki|distinction}} for positivism: the [[existence]] or [[non-existence]] of [[external objects]]. Here we have the pivotal issue by which lCang skya has the [[Yogācāra School]] class the [[Śrāvakayāna]] Schools as “positivism.” The two schools clearly are to be {{Wiki|distinguished}} primarily as to whether or not the [[existence]] of [[external objects]] is asserted. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | The [[two extremes]] in [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] - according to the [[Yogācāra]] - have been laid out. The [[Madhyamaka]] system is said to deny any basis whatsoever for [[phenomena]], asserting a mere [[nominalism]] of sorts. The [[Sautrāntika]] position, which is though hardly “positivist” or “realist” in a [[Western]] [[sense]] by [[virtue]] of its [[assertion]] that the [[generic image]] is | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | indeed [[illusory]] superimposition, is nevertheless realist from the point of view of the other two schools. Within the [[Buddhist]] framework of [[thought]] - at least according to both [[Mahāyāna]] Schools - this system is one touting what we are translating as “entical [[conceptualization]].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | [260:2-5] “Therefore, according to the [[Omniscient]] [[mKhas grub]]: | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | ‘In this section, in the same [[appearance]] to a [[sense consciousness]] which originates from firm habituation, the [[object]] of such a mode of [[appearance]] [1] [[exists]] established by its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] as [[other-dependent]] and it [2] [[exists]] in [the [[nature]] of] superimposition from its mere establishment by [[name]] and signifier, and [3] as a strictly [intramental] {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[imputation]] [as an [[object]]] which cannot be established as [[existent]] even by means of [[name]] and signifier, thus [a [[perceived]] [[object]]] is explained as [[existent]] in this third of three parts. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Among the [[four conditions]], [[Asaṅga]] and his brother [[[Vasubandhu]]] held the habituation towards similar types ([[rigs]] mthun) to be a [[causal condition]] (rgyu [[rkyen]], [[hetupratyaya]]) [in their] elucidation [of these issues]. This may appear to be the unsurpassable, excellently clear [[intention]] ([[dgongs pa]]) of the [[Mahātma]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]], however, there are | ||
+ | |||
+ | {{Wiki|individuals}} who mainly repeat the words of the texts, who may recite the text a hundred or a thousand times, though indeed, it appears difficult to generate {{Wiki|certainty}} in the full measure of the complete elucidation [as occurs] in [many] explanatory [treatises].” | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [[Yogācāra]]: the three aspects for the [[existence]] of an apparently [[external object]]. This passage explains, according to [[mKhas grub]], the three aspects for the [[existence]] of an [[object]]. This does not refer to all of the [[three natures]], for in the final, perfected [[nature]], one attains to objectlessness ([[dmigs pa med]] pa). As we have read above, an [[object]] | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | has establishment by means of its [[own]] [[characteristics]] at the level of being enmeshed-with-other. It has a bare, basic establishment as [[verbal]] expression at the level of the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]], though at this level it is not established “by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]” but by mere [[imputation]] or superimposition. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Finally, the third of these three parts refers to the [[existence]] of an [[object]] as strictly [[imaginary]], purely a [[mental]] concoction with no [[connection]] to an [[other-dependent nature]] aiding the generation of this third, completely fictitious | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [[object]]. Among these sorts of [[objects]] one must include the famous “rabbit’s horn” or “tortoise’s [[hair]]” - classical examples regularly employed in [[Buddhist]] [[philosophical works]] to illustrate the [[existence]] of that which does not by [[definition]], [[exist]]. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | Habituation towards similar types of [[object]]. The “habituation towards similar types” ([[rigs]] mthun) refers to the fact of similar types of [[objects]] engender [[verbal]] reference to other [[objects]] of a similar kind. One may see, in our example, only the belly of a [[vase]]. Because the belly is commonly associated with | ||
+ | |||
+ | vases, one concludes, “This is a [[vase]]” when in [[reality]], upon further {{Wiki|reflection}}, one might wish to conclude that it would be better labelled a “[[bowl]]” or a “cup.” That [[idea]], according to the text, is allocated by [[Asanga]] and his brother [[Vasubandhu]] to the {{Wiki|classification}} of the [[four conditions]] under the sub-heading “[[causal condition]],” (hetupratyāya) because the similarity of one thing to another becomes a [[cause]] for associating the two. | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | [260:5-261:2] “Since the [[logical]] points of the [[doctrines]] of the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] and the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha are the same with regard to elucidating the [[[Yogācāra]]] method of refutation [of positivism], which is the second [topic], and is [thus given] as follows. According to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasamgrāha, | ||
+ | |||
+ | [1] ‘Prior to a [[name]], intellection does not [[exist]]. [2] Because of the multiplicity [of names], therefore [an [[entity]]] is not mixed-up with [many entities] and [3] it would establish a {{Wiki|contradiction}} that that [entity’s] [[nature]] is [both a] multiple [[nature]] and an adulterated [[nature]]’, | ||
+ | as it is [[taught]].’ | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | Among the three [[logical]] [[[reasons]]], the first is [as follows]. A pot belly is the [[subject]]. It would follow that [the pot] completely does not depend upon the sign (rda) [which is the pot belly] which is set up (‘[[jog pa]]) as the basis of the [[verbal]] expression “pot,” because that [pot-belly] is established by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] [[inherent reality]] ([[gnas lugs]]) which [[exists]] as the basis of such a [[verbal]] expression [i.e., in [[connection]] with “pot.”] | ||
+ | |||
+ | If that is asserted, then it follows that the [[arising]] in the [[intellect]] of the [[thought]] “this is a pot” emerges {{Wiki|independent}} of the sign which is that [pot-belly which serves as signifier for “pot”]. If that is accepted, it follows that there arises in the [[intellect]] the [[thought]], ‘this is a pot’ from merely [[seeing]] the pot-belly even though prior to this there is no [[imputation]] of the [[word]] ‘pot.’” | ||
+ | |||
+ | |||
+ | Three [[principal]] arguments establishing the [[imputation]] of names. These are central points establishing the [[Mind-only]] {{Wiki|perspective}} in the MS. lCang skya will address each issue more extensively, so we shall take them in turn in successive paragraphs. | ||
+ | |||
+ | Prior to a sign, no intellection [[exists]]. The first issue is to be understood as follows. [1] Before one ascribes a [[name]] to a [[perceived]] [[phenomenon]], the [[intellectual]] distinguishing of it does not [[exist]]. This pot-belly is our continuing example. When one glances at a part of a pot, in this case the belly, then from this, an image emerges in one’s [[mind]] of some sign that “this is a pot.” | ||
+ | |||
+ | The [[logical]] {{Wiki|structure}} of the argument here is somewhat terse and hard to follow. It may be verbally expressed explicitly or simply that the signifier of a pot may arise as part of the intellection of the pot-belly as denoting a “pot.” If the belly is demonstrated to be [[existent]] by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] [[inherent reality]] and not simply imputedly, then it should not [[form]] the basis for the expression “pot” for both should [[exist]] inherently. If the pot arises in the [[intellect]] devoid of [[imputation]] and so does the pot-belly, then to [[state]] “this is a pot” based on observing the pot-belly is impossible. Therefore, prior to the [[name]] or signifier, intellection does not [[exist]]. | ||
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+ | [261:2-261:4] “The second [[reason]] [is as follows]. Furthermore, there is no approach to the {{Wiki|epithets}}, “powerful,” “widely traversing” to the same {{Wiki|individual}}. Locating (‘[[jug pa]]) those {{Wiki|epithets}} by [[virtue]] of the standpoint [that | ||
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+ | they are] functional entities for that [same] {{Wiki|individual}} would result [as a consequence] through establishing this by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint as a basis for locating those names to that {{Wiki|individual}}. If that is asserted, then to that [same] {{Wiki|individual}}, it would follow that there would be many standpoints [[gnas pa]] even to [one] [[object]] which would not correspond to (ma bzhin du) [each] [[name]].” | ||
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+ | Many names equate to many entities. The [[idea]] here is that if names correspond to [[objects]] on a one-to-one basis, then for each of these {{Wiki|epithets}} of [[Brahma]] there should be either a different [[Brahma]] for each [[activity]] for which the [[epithet]] was received, or a different aspect of [[Brahma]] within [[Brahma]], so to speak, which corresponds to each [[epithet]]. | ||
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+ | The [[Wikipedia:The Incoherence of the Philosophers|incoherence]] of [[sphoṭa]] {{Wiki|theory}}. This [[idea]] lies in [[opposition]] to a view of [[language]] and words prevalent among {{Wiki|Vedic}} Schools of [[philosophy]], the [[sphoṭa]] {{Wiki|theory}}. This [[idea]] asserted that words emerge spontaneously due to the [[inherent nature]] of the [[objective]] referent. This is in contrast to the [[idea]], in particular elucidated by [[Dharmakīrti]] of [[apoha]] whereby words merely “cleave away” what an [[entity]] is not rather than inherently [[emerging]] from the entity’s [[essence]]. In this case, to say that [[Brahma]] is “widely striding” is to say that he is not widely swimming nor weakly striding. | ||
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+ | [261:4-6] “The third [[reason]] [is as follows]. When one applies an [[identical]] [[name]] [shared] in common, say, to two {{Wiki|individuals}}, there is an [unwanted] consequence of locating those by [[virtue]] of the enticality (or [[actuality]]) of that [[name]] to those two [{{Wiki|individuals}}], which is the result of establishment by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint as the basis for applying that same [[name]] to those two {{Wiki|individuals}}. If that is asserted, it would follow that one | ||
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+ | [[object]] is applied to whatever that same [[name]] to those two. If that is accepted, it would follow that those two {{Wiki|individuals}} would be mixed up into one [[[mental]]] {{Wiki|continuum}}. Since this {{Wiki|reasoning}} is even proven by the implicit | ||
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+ | [proofs known as [[prasaṅgas]] or consequential [[logic]]] by all three arguments, then as a result of those errors, it is not established by its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] as a basis for the location of the [[verbal]] {{Wiki|expressions}} referring to entities.” | ||
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+ | Point three: a single [[name]] applied to several entities. If one ascribes enticality and one-to-one correspondence between [[name]] and [[entity]], then it would follow that two persons with one [[name]], in this case, then if they are inherently or intrinsically their “[[essence]]” (in this case defined as their [[mental continuum]]) should be [[identical]]. | ||
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+ | [[Syllogism]] and consequential {{Wiki|reasoning}}. The type of {{Wiki|argumentation}} employed here is [[rang rgyud]] or [[svatantra]] - arguments which stand alone to demonstrate [[logical]] proofs. This is a type of [[syllogism]] which has these three parts: | ||
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+ | 1) the [[subject]], the 2) mark and 3) predicate. | ||
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+ | lCang skya’s point is that these three proofs are easily accomplished by the [[Prāsaṅgika]] approach. No one will deny the absurd results [[arising]] from this type of {{Wiki|theory}} of [[language]] when put into the context of this framework. In consequential or [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[logical]] [[discourse]], one need not revers the mark to the predicate and predicate to mark, for implicitly, by stating the mark, one establishes the predicate. | ||
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+ | [261:6-262:1] “According to the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] , | ||
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+ | ‘When the posterior [[conceptualization]] of the term for pot [arises] from the [[existence]] of the pot-belly which is prior, then when that [[name]] is not [understood as] [[imputed]], then the intrinsic [[essence]] of that [[object]] would not [[exist]]. However, when not [[imputed]], even in the posterior [[conceptualization]] for the [[existence]] of the [[essence]], there would arise in the [[intellect]] the [[thought]] ‘this is a pot’ even prior to the [supposedly] unimputed [[name]].’ | ||
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+ | And thus this [view] is refuted.” | ||
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+ | ==[[Madhyamaka]] response== | ||
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+ | [[Opposition]] to the {{Wiki|conception}} of a “basal” [[consciousness]]: the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]]. The notion of this basal [[consciousness]] was vigorously rejected by notables of the [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[Madhyamaka]]. If we accept it as authentically Nāgārjunan, the [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] presents the most direct and polemical attack on this notion. | ||
+ | Agreement among the [[Madhyamaka]] [[Masters]]: the basal [[consciousness]] is [[illusory]]. [[Opposition]] continues through the [[writing]] of [[Candrakīrti]] and [[Tsong kha pa]]. [[Tsong kha pa]] cites [[Bhāvaviveka’s]] [[opposition]] to this sort of fundamental [[consciousness]]. | ||
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+ | [[Candrakīrti]]: [[logically]], ultimately there is no such thing as potentiality. [[Candrakīrti]] (MA) sets out the [[Yogācārin]] position which he contends postulates the [[consciousness]] of blue [[arising]] from the potentiality to {{Wiki|perceive}} blue, which has as its source, its [[own]] [[cognition]]. [[Candrakīrti]] relates the [[Yogācāra]] position as maintaining that the [[perception]] of blue arises from the seed of this potentiality to {{Wiki|perceive}} blue apart from any externally apprehended “real” or “actual” blue. | ||
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+ | The [[blind]] would see blue. Again, in his [[Prāsaṅgika]] formulation of this {{Wiki|theory}}, “blue” arises not from an [[external object]]. As part of his [[Prāsaṅgika]] response, he notes that if blue appears from the seed of an inner [[consciousness]], then why does not a [[blind]] man also {{Wiki|perceive}} the [[existence]] of blueness? | ||
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+ | [[Candrakīrti]] (MA) rejects this whole notion of the ripening of propensities towards certain habitual [[actions]]. [[Concomitant]] to the [[Yogācārin]] {{Wiki|thesis}} of the [[arising]] of, in our text, a [[consciousness]] of blue being [[dependent upon]] its [[emergence]] from the basal [[consciousness]] is strictly [[dependent upon]] a notion of | ||
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+ | potentiality. Potentiality is an erroneous notion, ultimately. He states that [[objects]] which have already been produced cannot possess potentiality for [[existence]], neither could the opposite possibility, that unproduced entities could have a potential for [[existence]]. A basis of a qualification cannot [[exist]] separated from that which qualifies it and by which it is known. If that were so, one might presume, as he puts it, that there might be potential for the son of a barren woman. | ||
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+ | The inefficaciousness of [[Yogācārin]] [[meditation]]: the basal [[consciousness]] as “[[hindrance]].” As [[Candrakīrti]] states, [[Yogācārins]] do negate a substantially [[existent]] [[self]], but assert that the basal [[consciousness]] [[exists]] by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]]. Their [[meditations]] on the lack of a substantially [[existent]] [[self]] or “[[soul]]” are not efficacious however because they have not eradicated the notion of a basal [[consciousness]] which is the repository of habitual propensities towards the [[perception]] of [[form]], etc., as presented by lCang skya. | ||
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+ | [[Tsong kha pa]]: the difficulties of no [[doctrine]] concerning a basal [[consciousness]]. [[Tsong kha pa]] admits that inborn propensities are difficult to interpret in the absence of a [[doctrine]] concerning a repository of [[consciousness]]. [[Tsong kha pa]] (TKP) adds that when blue arises in a [[dream]] of one who is possessed | ||
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+ | of good [[vision]], then it should arise in the [[consciousness]] of a [[blind]] man who [[is awake]]. Along with [[Candrakīrti]], he [[understands]] the [[Yogācārin]] position to maintain that the [[blind]] man’s inability to {{Wiki|perceive}} blue arises not from his lack of an [[eye]], but rather from the latent but unmanifest potentiality for the [[arising]] of this [[perception]]. | ||
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+ | [[Tsong kha pa]] quotes [[Candrakīrti]] with regard to the lack of necessity of a basal [[consciousness]]. For the [[Prāsaṅgika]], ultimately, nothing ceases. An [[entity]] or event which has ceased, has only apparently or {{Wiki|conventionally}} ceased. Since this is so, it can still be efficacious, its {{Wiki|subtle}} [[influences]] are still felt. | ||
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+ | The “interpretable” [[nature]] of the [[doctrine]] of the basal [[consciousness]]. For [[Candrakīrti]] as for [[Tsong kha pa]], a basal [[consciousness]] is an “interpretable” rather than definitive [[doctrine]]. [[Tsong kha pa]] quotes from [[Candrakīrti’s]] autocommentary (the MAV) to establish this. The basal [[consciousness]] is a provisional [[doctrine]] the [[intention]] of which is to [[initiate]] the elimination of the notion of a {{Wiki|naive}} [[reality]] of [[external objects]] as this [[idea]] might [[exist]] for certain would-be [[disciples]] of the [[Mahāyāna]] who [[cling]] ardently to the [[existence]] of such. | ||
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+ | The {{Wiki|evidence}} for this is cited by [[Tsong kha pa]] (LSN) in that most central of texts which establish the [[Yogācārin]] standpoint: the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. Therein one finds the explanation the [[Buddha]] gives to [[Mahāmati]] that the “inner meaning” of all his [[doctrines]] point to [[emptiness]], [[including]] that central [[tenet]] of the [[Prāsaṅgika]] School, niḥsvabhāvavāda, or the “[[doctrine]] of non-self-entity.” | ||
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+ | Both [[Mahāyāna]] Schools are in agreement about the concrete, real, actual, etc., [[existence]] of atomistic [[dharmas]] understood in the “positivistic” or reifying manner lCang skya described above. The disagreement about the precise [[nature]] of [[external objects]] hinges on the [[root]] source of all aspects of the “[[great debate]]” between the two schools: the [[nature]] of [[consciousness]]. | ||
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+ | ===[[Chapter]] Six: [[Preliminary Conclusions: The Middle Way Between the Extremes]]=== | ||
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+ | “A great [[Yogin]] without {{Wiki|learning}} is like one with mutilated hands climbing a craggy cliff. Thus, it is said that one who wishes to be a great [[yogin]] without any study is like a man with his fingers cut off trying to climb to the peak of a high mountain. | ||
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+ | A [[scholar]] who does not practice [[meditation]] but only engages in the study of the texts, is like a man without {{Wiki|legs}}, who sees the [[path]] laid out, but cannot traverse it.” | ||
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+ | There is a level at which the [[disputes]] between the two schools can to some extent be summed up generally by the above passage. The ‘[[two extremes]]’ of [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] can from one {{Wiki|perspective}} be seen as an overemphasis on praxis to the detriment of {{Wiki|theory}} or vice-versa. To the extent that these [[disputes]] involve a dispute over the primacy of {{Wiki|theory}} versus praxis, the two schools can be viewed as representing a polar tension which [[exists]], arguably, in all [[religions]]. We will {{Wiki|touch}} upon this issue below. A major aim of our conclusion is to tentatively answer the question: are the two schools [[essentially]] [[identical]] or [[essentially]] different? Or both? Or neither? | ||
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+ | I think it is clear that at this point the fact of the distinctiveness of the two schools has been effectively demonstrated in spite of the fact that much more could have been stated. | ||
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+ | In passages following, we will set out the [[Mind-only School]] position as lCang skya demonstrates it and conclude with a [[discussion]] of various authoritative presentations by {{Wiki|modern}} thinkers about the [[nature]] of the relationship of the two schools. Some [[views]] affirm the harmonious aspect of their relationship, while others {{Wiki|emphasize}} the {{Wiki|distinctive}} qualities. | ||
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+ | The last three chapters demonstrated primarily negative proofs for the [[Yogācāra]] position. Rejection of [[nihilism]] and positivism leave one with the [[Middle Path]] as construed by the [[Mind-only School]]. What remains to be considered is a positive demonstration of the definitive [[truth]] of the [[Yogācārin]] system. This lCang skya does through [[discussion]] of the four “complete investigations” and the four “complete [[knowledges]].” Through this four-fold analysis and conclusion, respectively, a [[disciple]] is led to firm, positively established fact of the [[truth]] of [[Yogācārin]] [[doctrine]]. | ||
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+ | [262:1-263:1] “By means of the the third, is the actual manner of entry into the [[reality]] of the [[Consciousness-only School]] and is the explanation in particular of the {{Wiki|reasoning}} ([[rigs pa]]) which refutes the substantial difference of [[subject]] and [[object]] ([[gzung ‘dzin]]). | ||
− | + | [With regard to] the first [of the four investigations - the complete [[investigation of the object]] (don yong su tshol ba)], furthermore, entry into the [[Consciousness-only]] [School] is [[emptiness]] throughout of a substantial difference of [[subject]] and [[object]] by way of this manner of [[emptiness]] which was just immediately fully explained as elucidated as according to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha and the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] and it is [[taught]] also by the [[Venerable Father]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]] and his [[[spiritual]]] sons [rGyal tsab and [[mKhas grub]]]. | |
+ | Having relied upon them, continuing on, a certain [opponent] among some [[scholars]] explains that there is the [[selflessness of phenomena]] which is the [[emptiness]] of establishment by means of its [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]] as the basis of [[attachment]] which conceptualizes the cleaving to the [[self]] of [[form]], and the [[selflessness of phenomena]] which is [[empty]] of the substantial difference of cleaving to the [[selfhood]] of [[form]]; the former is more coarse than the [[latter]] which is more {{Wiki|subtle}}. | ||
− | [ | + | [According to another] certain [opponent], |
− | + | ‘Since both those [types of] [[selflessness]] are {{Wiki|subtle}}, the category of coarse and {{Wiki|subtle}} do not [[exist]], however, the category of the difficulty or ease of [[realization]] does exist,’he explains. | |
− | + | On that [point], even both [types of [[selflessness]]] are the [[unchanging]] perfected [[[nature]]] and are the {{Wiki|subtle}} [[selflessness of phenomena]]; this appears to be the [[intention]] of the [great [[scholars]] of the] [[Mahāyāna]] and the [[Venerable]] [[[Tsong kha pa]]]. It appears that the category of the difficulty or ease of inner [[realization]] ([[nang]] gsas kyi rtogs) does [[exist]]. | |
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+ | According to the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]], | ||
+ | ‘When one does not see as [[characteristics]] of an [[object]] an [[essence]] along with [[particularity]], one enters into mere [[consciousness]] in [[realizing]] ([[rnam]] par [[rtog pa]]) the [[mental]] [[appearance]] of the [[object]] and its referents ([[yi ge]]) by means of the the four complete investigations and the four complete [[knowledges]] which [apprehend] [[purity]], [[[reality]]] just as it is.’ | ||
− | + | Having examined that prior category definitively and [[logically]], therefore the [[doctrine]] applies to the [[latter]] [category, i.e., the difficulty or ease of [[realization]]].” | |
+ | Here, as stated above, is the positive approach to entry into the [[Mind-only]] system as presented by lCang skya. The first of the four investigations examines the [[emptiness]] of the substantial difference of [[subject]] and [[object]], and these are presented in the MS and the BB as well as in the {{Wiki|myriad}} texts of [[Tsong kha pa]], rGyal tsab and [[mKhas grub]]. | ||
+ | The first “opponent” suggests that the two types of the [[selflessness of phenomena]] - one [[conceptualized]] and the other, innate, i.e., the [[awareness]] of even the [[sense consciousnesses]] that there is no fundamental [[existence]] of [[subject]] and [[object]] - that the former of these two is a more coarse type of [[selflessness of phenomena]] and the [[latter]], the innate, is a more {{Wiki|subtle}} type of [[selflessness of phenomena]]. This [[idea]] is to be rejected. | ||
− | + | The next opponent states that both types of [[selflessness]] the [[unchanging]], perfected [[nature]], or [[pariniṣpannasvabhāva]] also also referred to in its [[perceived]] [[form]] as the perfected [[characteristic]] pariniṣpannalakṣana - are extremely | |
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− | + | {{Wiki|subtle}}. This is the [[thought]] of the [[Venerable]] [[Tsong kha pa]]. lCang skya agrees that rather than the coarseness or subtlety of the [[selflessness]], it is the [[relative]] difficulty or ease of inner [[realization]] of the two types of [[selflessness]] which is at issue. | |
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− | + | When one has sought the end result of the four investigations, one enters into “[[consciousness-only]]” in viewing both words and [[objects]] as merely {{Wiki|mentation}}. At this point, one attains to [[reality]] “just as it is” which is ultimately [[pure]]. The innate aspect of [[realizing]] the [[selflessness of phenomena]] is the more difficult, and is [[attained]] to at only the [[highest]] among the [[bodhisattva levels]]. | |
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− | + | [263:1-263:4] “The way of entry into the [[cognition-only]] [system], is this. When refuting establishment by it [[own]] [[inherent]] [[characteristics]], that basis for [[conceptualized]] [[attachment]] and the standpoint of nominal verbalization for the [[phenomena]] from [[form]] on up to [[omniscience]] [with regard to all] aspects, through the earlier explanation of the three reasonings in that manner, having relied upon the [[name]] which [[initiates]] [[[verbal]]] expression, the [[object]] which | |
− | of | + | is the [[object]] of expression, and the [[connection]] (‘brel pa) of the [[name]] and [[object]], and having identified (ngos nas) its manner of [[existence]] ([[gnas tshul]]) and that [[object]] as the [[particularity]] and [[essence]] of the [[object]] of expression, having appeared established in this way, the [[conceptualization]] of the [[mind]] of [[attachment]] is [[confusion]] in the manner of [its] apprehension in that manner. |
− | + | Therefore, the [[object]] of [[attachment]] ([[zhen]] ba’i don) does not [[exist]] just as it appears. Blue, etc., since it is fully understood out of [[confusion]], [i.e.] that [[form]], etc., [[exist]] as cut-off and at a distance (gyang chad du) and | |
+ | externally. For the manner of [[attachment]] of inner [[awareness]], since it is [[conceptualized]] in that manner, it is only on the part of [[appearance]] ([[snang]] cha) which is internal, but, from that, an [[object]] as [“]other[“] does not [[exist]]; this is entry into [[cognition-only]], which is the [[non-duality]] of [[subject]] and [[object]] in [[thought]].” | ||
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− | + | Here begins this positive establishment of the [[doctrine]] of [[Mind-only]], [[Consciousness-only]] or [[Cognition-only]], all of which are here referred to virtually synonymously as a convenience, by the term [[Yogācāra]]. Having rejected possible ways in which [[objects]] might [[exist]] (“by [[virtue]] of their [[own]] standpont” or “by means of their [[own]] [[inherent]] | |
− | + | [[characteristics]],” etc.), all of this is pulled together by means of the four thorough investigations, which would not be established [[logically]] apart from the prior refutation of positivist or [[Wikipedia:Nihilist|nihilist]] approaches. | |
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+ | These four categories are the [[subject]] of the investigations: the [[name]], its [[object]] and [[dependent upon]] these two, the “[[essence]]” and [[particularity]] [[imputed]] to these. The way these are normally [[conceptualized]] is “[[confusion]]” meaning that [[mental]] [[attachment]] to [[objects]] seen as having names inherently tied to them, and both [[name]] and [[object]] together maintaining [[inherently existent]] [[essential]] and particular qualities. | ||
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+ | [[Seeing]] these [[four elements]] of [[phenomena]] as “cut-off” from oneself, and “at a distance” is an internal [[mental]] [[confusion]], for things only appear in this manner, for [[objects]] as “other” than or different from one’s [[own mind]] are falsely construed. Each of these [[four elements]] are recapitulated by means of the quotes from the MS and BB below. | ||
+ | [263:4--263:6] “On that point, the [[investigation]] of a [[name]] as it is explained according to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha, | ||
− | + | ‘...as entry by means of the four [[knowledges]] and the four investigations. A [[name]] is not [[imputed]] by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] real standpoint ([[gnas lugs]]) for its [[object]], is [[imputation]] only. Therefore, a [[name]] as an [[object]] of expression is adventitious ([[glo]] bur), as one investigates.’ | |
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+ | According to the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] , | ||
− | + | ‘Any [[bodhisattva]] regards a [[name]] as [just] merely a [[name]]’ | |
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− | + | and according to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha, | |
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− | + | One conceptualizes properly as [[mental]] [[conceptualization]], for that is all there is for that [[name]] which is [comprised] of {{Wiki|syllables}}. | |
+ | The [[investigation]] of names. Here then is the first of the four investigations, the [[investigation]] of names. That a [[name]] is “adventitious” means that it is temporary and somewhat capriciously applied to an [[object]]. Names are simply “slapped on” through mere [[imputation]] or superimposition, not because of some [[inherent]] [[quality]] of the [[object]] that elicits a particular [[name]] over another. | ||
− | + | The BB concurs: [[bodhisattvas]] see names as merely names and nothing else, i.e., they regard names as strictly [[illusory]], with no further claim to [[reality]] except in their function as an aspect of the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]. | |
− | + | The MS phrases this differently but maintains the same point. A [[name]] is stricly [[mentally]] [[conceptualized]] and has no [[reality]] apart from [[consciousness]]. Names are “[[mental]] composites” one might say, made up as they are of further “[[mentally]] constituted” {{Wiki|syllables}} and letters. | |
− | + | [263:6-264:2] “The complete [[investigation of the object]] [is as follows]. This is investigating whether or not that [[object]] is established from its real standpoint or beginninglessly as a basis of application (‘jug gzhir) for that [[name]]. Furthermore, just as was [explained] earlier [with regard to a [[name]]], it is in an adventitious way a basis of application for that. | |
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+ | According to the [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]] , | ||
− | + | ‘Likewise, regarding as merely [[entity]] ([[dngos po]]), is the complete [[investigation]] of [[entity]].’ | |
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+ | According to the [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]], | ||
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− | + | ‘One regards properly as strictly [[mental]] expression (yid kyi brjod pa) moreover, that [[object]] which relies on [mere] {{Wiki|syllables}}.’” | |
− | The | + | The [[investigation of the object]]. Basically the points to be made about the {{Wiki|status}} of the [[object]] to which names are applied are the same as those to be made concerning the [[name]] itself. “[[Objects]]” are not established inherently “from their [[own]] side” or “objectively” (so to speak), but again, are adventitious - “temporary,” more or less randomly {{Wiki|distinguished}}, as in the {{Wiki|distinction}} made in arguments above concerning the pot-belly in [[relation]] to a pot. |
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+ | An “[[object]]” (don) is that upon which one superimposes a [[name]], rather than a [[permanent]], “functional,” [[entity]] ([[dngos po]]), “beginninglessly” a basis for the application of the appropriate names. It is strictly a [[mentally]] expressed | ||
− | + | [[reality]], which relies upon composite [[elements]] as do names. When one refers to [[objects]], one may distinguish the {{Wiki|syllables}} with which one refers to the [[object]] as “pot” or “pot-belly,” for the [[name]] and [[object]] are linked, though conceptually they may be {{Wiki|distinguished}}. | |
− | + | [264:2-264:4] “The [[investigation]] of the [[conceptualization]] as [[essence]] [is as follows]. Having relied upon the mutual [[connection]] of the [[object]] which is the [[object]] of expression and the [[name]] which effects expression, [this is] investigating whether or not there is a standpoint by [[virtue]] of [[reality]] with regard to even the [[connection]] or | |
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+ | juncture of [both] the [[object]] of an expression and that which effects the expression. When, having investigated [the issue] accordingly, one conceptualizes [this] as mere [[imputation]], as not established by [[virtue]] of [[reality]] ([[gnas]] tshod) as the [[essence]] of what is to be expressed for that [[name]]. | ||
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− | + | According to the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] , | |
+ | ‘Regarding as mere [[imputation]] as an [[essence]] for the [[imputation]] of an [[essence]], is the complete [[investigation]] of the [[imputation]] of [[essence]].’” | ||
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− | [ | + | ===[[The investigation of particularity]]=== |
+ | [264:4-6] “Investigating the [[conceptualization]] of [[particularity]] [is as follows]. Having relied upon the mutual [[connection]] of that which effects expression and the [[object]] of expression, [this is] investigating whether or not it is established by [[virtue]] of its [[own]] real standpoint ([[gnas]] tshod) as a basis of [[conceptualization]] of the [[inherent]] [[particularity]] for that [[object]]. One regards as merely [[imputation]], unestablished by its [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint even that, by investigating it that way. | ||
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− | + | According to the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]][[bhūmi]] , | |
− | + | ‘Regarding as mere [[imputation]] the distinctiveness ([[bye brag]] tu) which is the [[imputation]] of [[particularity]], is the [[investigation]] of the mere [[imputation]] of distinctiveness.’ | |
+ | According to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha, | ||
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− | + | ‘One realizes [these issues] properly as indeed, it is merely [[imputation]] without exception this [[name]], this [[particularity]], and this [[essence]].’ | |
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− | ‘One realizes [these issues] properly as indeed, it is merely imputation without exception this name, this particularity, and this essence.’ | ||
The last two are demonstrated together.” | The last two are demonstrated together.” | ||
− | Finally, comes the investigation of the particular or | + | Finally, comes the [[investigation]] of the particular or “{{Wiki|distinctive}} qualities” of an “[[entity]]” or a [[phenomenon]] [[essentially]] [[conceived]]. “That which effects expression” is a [[name]] and the “[[object]] of expression” is the [[entity]] [[conceptualized]] [[mentally]]. [[Dependent upon]] a [[conceptualized]] or [[mental]] [[connection]] of [[name]] and [[object]], [[essence]] and here, [[particularity]] arise. This too is “unestablished by its [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint.” |
− | This distinctiveness (bye brag tu as the BB states it) or particularity (khyad par du in the words of the MS) is, like the above four topics, existent as mere imputation only. Finally, lCang skya notes that these two are to be analyzed and included together, for both are dependent upon the prior connection | + | This distinctiveness ([[bye brag]] tu as the BB states it) or [[particularity]] ([[khyad par]] du in the words of the MS) is, like the above four topics, [[existent]] as mere [[imputation]] only. Finally, lCang skya notes that these two are to be analyzed and included together, for both are [[dependent upon]] the prior [[connection]] |
− | between the name and its object. After one has nominally designated the name “circle” to, for example, a perception of the moon, one may assert “roundness” as the essence of that circle and “this circle arises” as a characteristic, attribute or particular feature of that circle. Prior to this connection of name and object, to assert the essential or particular is not possible. | + | between the [[name]] and its [[object]]. After one has nominally designated the [[name]] “circle” to, for example, a [[perception]] of the [[moon]], one may assert “roundness” as the [[essence]] of that circle and “this circle arises” as a [[characteristic]], attribute or particular feature of that circle. Prior to this [[connection]] of [[name]] and [[object]], to assert the [[essential]] or particular is not possible. |
− | [264:6-265:2] “Accordingly, by the four investigations, a name and object are the basis of expression and having relied upon the connection of name and object, there is investigation of the imputation of distinctiveness and the imputing of essence, and having relied upon thorough, logical investigation accordingly, the four knowledges [arise], when one disestablishes [the above as existent] by virtue of their own inherent standpoint those four [aspects investigated], the complete knowledges [regard them] as mere imputation. | + | [264:6-265:2] “Accordingly, by the four investigations, a [[name]] and [[object]] are the basis of expression and having relied upon the [[connection]] of [[name]] and [[object]], there is [[investigation]] of the [[imputation]] of distinctiveness and the imputing of [[essence]], and having relied upon thorough, [[logical]] [[investigation]] accordingly, the four [[knowledges]] [arise], when one disestablishes [the above as [[existent]]] by [[virtue]] of their [[own]] [[inherent]] standpoint those four [aspects investigated], the complete [[knowledges]] [regard them] as mere [[imputation]]. |
− | With regard to the the manner of [acquiring] this knowledge, [first,] it is through a generic image at the time of the [paths of] Accumulation and Preparation, and as both direct knowledge [and as generic image] exist at the time of the Āryan [on the path of Vision]. | + | With regard to the the manner of [acquiring] this [[knowledge]], [first,] it is through a [[generic image]] at the time of the [[[paths]] of] [[Accumulation]] and Preparation, and as both [[direct knowledge]] [and as [[generic image]]] [[exist]] at the time of the [[Āryan]] [on the [[path]] of [[Vision]]]. |
− | The Four Investigations establish the Mind-only position negatively. It is clear then that the Four Investigations aim to demonstrate positively the lack of inherent existence of the name, object, essence and particularity of any phenomenon, to demonstrate that all phenomena and all aspects of phenomena are mentalized imputation, mere conceptualized | + | The Four Investigations establish the [[Mind-only]] position negatively. It is clear then that the Four Investigations aim to demonstrate positively the lack of [[inherent existence]] of the [[name]], [[object]], [[essence]] and [[particularity]] of any [[phenomenon]], to demonstrate that all [[phenomena]] and all aspects of [[phenomena]] are mentalized [[imputation]], mere [[conceptualized]] “[[realities]].” |
− | At the point a sentient being enters the first of the five paths, the | + | At the point a [[sentient being]] enters the first of the [[five paths]], the “[[Path of Accumulation]]” ([[sambhāramārga]], [[tshogs lam]]), these [[ideas]] are merely “generic images,” i.e., one may have acquired an [[intellectual]] [[awareness]] of the arguments stated above. Still, the [[idea]] that names, [[objects]], [[essences]] and |
− | particularities are strictly imputed remains a | + | particularities are strictly [[imputed]] remains a “[[generic image]]” for that [[person]]. When a being has progressed to the third of the [[five paths]], the “[[Path of Seeing]],” ([[darśanamārga]], [[mthong lam]]) [[attaining]] the {{Wiki|status}} of an “[[Āryan]]” in [[Mahāyānist]] {{Wiki|terminology}}, then beyond a mere [[generic image]], it is said that a [[bodhisattva]] attains to a “direct [[perception]]” of the fact of these aspects of a phenomenon’s [[existence]] as “mere [[imputation]]” and can see the [[name]], [[object]], [[essence]] and [[particularity]] for what they are, i.e., mere mentated, [[conceptualized]] [[phenomena]]. |
− | [265:2-265:5] Furthermore, according to the Bodhi[sattva]-bhūmi , | + | [265:2-265:5] Furthermore, according to the [[Bodhi]][[[sattva]]]-[[bhūmi]] , |
− | ‘If one asks, “What are the four complete knowledges as purity, [i.e. reality] ‘just- as- it-is’ (ji lta ba bzhin du), “it is ‘The complete knowledge exactly and properly would be or the investigation of the name,’ etc.”, and the remaining three [elements, object, essence and particularity] are conjoined together (sbyar ba) also in the same way.’ | + | ‘If one asks, “What are the four complete [[knowledges]] as [[purity]], [i.e. [[reality]]] ‘just- as- it-is’ ([[ji lta ba]] bzhin du), “it is ‘The complete [[knowledge]] exactly and properly would be or the [[investigation]] of the [[name]],’ etc.”, and the remaining three [[[elements]], [[object]], [[essence]] and [[particularity]]] are conjoined together (sbyar ba) also in the same way.’ |
− | ===[[According to the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha | + | ===[[According to the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]=== |
− | ‘Therefore, since it is stated that it is as well regarding as strictly (zad pa nyid) mere mentalized expression, this complete knowledge of the investigation of the name, and through stating also that the imputation as a particular and essential object along with the name, is the complete knowledge of the investigation of the object, and when one does not see the [objective] characteristic of the object along with the essence and particularity, then both the complete knowledge of the imputation of essence and the complete knowledge of the imputation of particularity are shown.’ | + | ‘Therefore, since it is stated that it is as well regarding as strictly ([[zad]] pa [[nyid]]) mere mentalized expression, this complete [[knowledge]] of the [[investigation]] of the [[name]], and through stating also that the [[imputation]] as a particular and [[essential]] [[object]] along with the [[name]], is the complete [[knowledge]] of the [[investigation of the object]], and when one does not see the [[[objective]]] [[characteristic]] of the [[object]] along with the [[essence]] and [[particularity]], then both the complete [[knowledge]] of the [[imputation]] of [[essence]] and the complete [[knowledge]] of the [[imputation]] of [[particularity]] are shown.’ |
− | What is ascertained with regard to | + | What is ascertained with regard to “[[name]]” is the same for the other three complete [[knowledges]]. While there are four aspects with regard to [[perceived]] [[phenomena]], i.e., “[[name]],” “[[object]],” “[[essence]]” and “[[particularity]],” at a fundamental level, these are all mentated, [[conceptualized]] [[phenomena]] according to the [[Yogācāra School]]. |
− | In demonstrating the imputation of | + | In demonstrating the [[imputation]] of “[[name]],” the other four follow. That which is known as an “[[object]]” is known as such via the [[mental]] [[imputation]] of a [[mental]] signifier or “[[name]].” The [[object]] and [[name]] together give rise to the [[imputation]] of two categories which characterize what is known as an [[object]], i.e., its [[essence]] and particular [[characteristics]]. These also, are demonstrated as mere [[mental]] fictions following upon the demonstration of [[name]] and [[object]] as “entities” comprised of [[cognition]], [[consciousness]], or in short, as “[[mind-only]].” |
− | [265:5-] “If that is the case, the Four Investigations, even though one does not abide on the path, the Four Knowledges exist, having obtained a bit of certainty with regard to the selflessness of phenomena, it is necessarily applied, however (‘jog dgos kyi), the assertion that the Four Knowledges are not existent at the level of the ordinary individual is incorrect, because of the doctrine that the Four Knowledges exist in superior insight (lhag mthong, vipawyāna) meditation (bsgom pa) which is the realization of emptiness. Therefore from this, this doctrine is an entry into the cognition-only by way of the four knowledges.” | + | [265:5-] “If that is the case, the Four Investigations, even though one does not abide on the [[path]], the Four [[Knowledges]] [[exist]], having obtained a bit of {{Wiki|certainty}} with regard to the [[selflessness of phenomena]], it is necessarily applied, however (‘jog dgos kyi), the [[assertion]] that the Four [[Knowledges]] are not [[existent]] at the level of the ordinary {{Wiki|individual}} is incorrect, because of the [[doctrine]] that the Four [[Knowledges]] [[exist]] in {{Wiki|superior}} [[insight]] ([[lhag mthong]], vipawyāna) [[meditation]] (bsgom pa) which is the [[realization of emptiness]]. Therefore from this, this [[doctrine]] is an entry into the [[cognition-only]] by way of the four [[knowledges]].” |
− | The terminology “the Four Complete | + | The {{Wiki|terminology}} “the Four Complete [[Knowledges]]” are meant in no way to indicate that one must be a [[realized master]] to acquire them. These terms do not refer to [[full awakening]] or any of the omnisciences. Certainly it does not imply the eradication of the innate aspect of positivism which afflicts the [[sense consciousnesses]] which refers to the inborn “ego-view” (ātma-dṛṣṭi) afflicting all [[sentient]] [[existences]]. Rather, the four complete [[knowledges]] are accessible to one beginning on the [[path]]. |
− | Is this the Yogācāra system? With this, the positive demonstration of the Yogācāra stance is concluded. One begins on a negative path and ends with positive affirmation. The question has arisen whether this presentation of the school is really the standpoint of the school. | + | Is this the [[Yogācāra]] system? With this, the positive demonstration of the [[Yogācāra]] stance is concluded. One begins on a negative [[path]] and ends with positive [[affirmation]]. The question has arisen whether this presentation of the school is really the standpoint of the school. |
− | Here with lCang skya’s presentation of the tenets of the Mind-only tradition, we conclude he avoided presenting the tradition as a simple | + | Here with lCang skya’s presentation of the [[tenets]] of the [[Mind-only]] [[tradition]], we conclude he avoided presenting the [[tradition]] as a simple “[[Idealism]].” This [[Western]] term connotes “[[essentially]] [[existent]] [[mental]] [[essences]]” and ur-ideen. DesCartes’ well-known cogito with a basis in these notions. One of the entries in Webster’s {{Wiki|dictionary}} would appear at first glance to apply: “a {{Wiki|theory}} that the [[essential nature]] of [[reality]] lies in [[consciousness]] or [[reason]]” does not apply to a [[tradition]] that [[roots]] the [[conceptualization]] of the [[ego]] in “interwovenness-with-other,” or [[paratantra]]. [[Consciousness]] itself, though principally forming the [[world]] we {{Wiki|perceive}}, is not the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] basis of [[reality]] in [[Yogācāra tradition]]. |
− | Where among the Western Idealisms does the notion of the | + | Where among the [[Western]] Idealisms does the notion of the “[[other-dependent]],” a [[doctrine]] of a basal [[consciousness]] and its propensities, etc., among many other [[doctrines]], arise in the occident? Where are the [[doctrines]] of [[rebirth]] and [[karma]], and where to we find as a goal, the “snuffing” or [[nirvāṇa]] of the |
− | cogito. Analogues may exist, however the subtle and gross distinctions should be kept in mind. In our opinion, one should eschew simple comparisons of philosophical systems separated by such vast geographical and mythic worlds as Christian Idealist traditions and Buddhist mentalist traditions. In spite of the overemphasis (from the Madhyamaka standpoint) of the Yogācāra School on consciousness, the two share a common pedigree. One should never lose sight of the fact that these two traditions share membership in the same family of traditions, the Mahāyāna traditions. | + | cogito. Analogues may [[exist]], however the {{Wiki|subtle}} and gross {{Wiki|distinctions}} should be kept in [[mind]]. In our opinion, one should eschew simple comparisons of [[philosophical]] systems separated by such vast geographical and [[mythic]] [[worlds]] as [[Christian]] Idealist [[traditions]] and [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|mentalist}} [[traditions]]. In spite of the overemphasis (from the [[Madhyamaka]] standpoint) of the [[Yogācāra School]] on [[consciousness]], the two share a common pedigree. One should never lose [[sight]] of the fact that these two [[traditions]] share membership in the same [[family]] of [[traditions]], the [[Mahāyāna traditions]]. |
− | Scholars inclined to a Yogācārin stance. There are those who see the Madhyamaka School useful for establishing certain negative critique, but criticize this school for what is seen as its strict “negativism.” It hardly engenders a positive regard for the Path. Some scholars are more willing to emphasize the similarities between the two schools, while basically subordinating the Madhyamaka into the Yogācāra system. | + | [[Scholars]] inclined to a [[Yogācārin]] stance. There are those who see the [[Madhyamaka School]] useful for establishing certain negative critique, but criticize this school for what is seen as its strict “negativism.” It hardly engenders a positive regard for the [[Path]]. Some [[scholars]] are more willing to {{Wiki|emphasize}} the similarities between the two schools, while basically subordinating the [[Madhyamaka]] into the [[Yogācāra]] system. |
− | Nagao. Nagao Gadjin is one of the better known examples. As J. W. de Jong states, Nagao is one of the foremost interpreters of Yogācāra philosophy in the modern period, and “has always attempted to see the connections between the philosophies of both schools.” He asserts that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu “complemented the śūnyatā philosophy with various positive theories...” [my emphasis]. | + | [[Nagao]]. [[Nagao]] Gadjin is one of the better known examples. As J. W. de Jong states, [[Nagao]] is one of the foremost interpreters of [[Yogācāra philosophy]] in the {{Wiki|modern}} period, and “has always attempted to see the connections between the [[philosophies]] of both schools.” He asserts that [[Asaṅga]] and [[Vasubandhu]] “complemented the [[śūnyatā]] [[philosophy]] with various positive theories...” [my {{Wiki|emphasis}}]. |
− | The Yogācāra maintains a positive approach. This school is said to be “positive” because | + | The [[Yogācāra]] maintains a positive approach. This school is said to be “positive” because |
− | “by accepting the negative idea of śūnyatā as a whole, the Yogācāra established the positive affirmative aspect of śūnyatā (abhāvasya bhavaḥ). | + | “by accepting the negative [[idea]] of [[śūnyatā]] as a whole, the [[Yogācāra]] established the positive affirmative aspect of [[śūnyatā]] (abhāvasya bhavaḥ). |
− | Here, Nagao hints at the Yogācāra theme of the Madhyamaka preaching a relative “negativism” if not outright | + | Here, [[Nagao]] hints at the [[Yogācāra]] theme of the [[Madhyamaka]] preaching a [[relative]] “negativism” if not outright “[[nihilism]],” just as lCang skya phrased the issues above in the third [[chapter]] of this study. |
− | Nagao cites Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (Treatise on the Three Natures) which affirms that the other-dependent is that which appears, while how it appears is the conceptualized (kalpita). Finally, the point at which that which appears (khyātṛ) is devoid of appearance (yat khyānam) is the perfected (pariniṣpannasvabhāva). This certainly does not negate anything lCang skya’s Yogācārin affirmed, as far as we are able to ascertain. The appearer is devoid of appearance finally, but not devoid of entity. | + | [[Nagao]] cites [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[Trisvabhāvanirdeśa]] ([[Treatise on the Three Natures]]) which affirms that the [[other-dependent]] is that which appears, while how it appears is the [[conceptualized]] ([[kalpita]]). Finally, the point at which that which appears (khyātṛ) is devoid of [[appearance]] (yat khyānam) is the perfected ([[pariniṣpannasvabhāva]]). This certainly does not negate anything lCang skya’s [[Yogācārin]] [[affirmed]], as far as we are able to ascertain. The appearer is devoid of [[appearance]] finally, but not devoid of [[entity]]. |
− | The other dependent is a foundation and mediator. The other-dependent is the “basis” or āśraya for the other two natures. Nagao defines the other-dependent as an “axis” or | + | The other dependent is a foundation and [[mediator]]. The [[other-dependent]] is the “basis” or [[āśraya]] for the other two natures. [[Nagao]] defines the [[other-dependent]] as an “axis” or “[[mediator]]” around which “the [[world]] turns.” It serves as a support ([[āśraya]]), ground or basis for all that is [[conceptualized]], all [[appearance]] in [[Saṃsāra]] and yet through which the perfected [[nature]] also becomes [[manifest]]. |
− | The other-dependent, according to Nagao, becomes the basis for cryptic statements found particularly in Mahāyāna literature such as | + | The [[other-dependent]], according to [[Nagao]], becomes the basis for cryptic statements found particularly in [[Mahāyāna]] {{Wiki|literature}} such as “[[Saṃsāra]] is no different from [[nirvāṇa]].” In any ordinary, {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[sense]], this statement is [[Wikipedia:Coherentism|incoherent]], however, from the standpoint of the [[other-dependent]], the pivot of the [[transformation]] from profane to [[sacred]], these enigmatic {{Wiki|aphorisms}} make [[sense]]. |
− | This notion of it being a basis leads to the idea of the transformation or convertability of that basis. The other-dependent, in its role as a basis, can be transformed into either the conceptualized nature or imagined world, or into the perfected nature, which Nagao calls the | + | This notion of it being a basis leads to the [[idea]] of the [[transformation]] or convertability of that basis. The [[other-dependent]], in its role as a basis, can be [[transformed]] into either the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]] or [[imagined]] [[world]], or into the perfected [[nature]], which [[Nagao]] calls the “[[consummate nature]].” It is in this way a “[[mediator]].” |
− | The bridge between the sacred and profane. Nagao refers to it as the “bridge” between the sacred and profane world, and credits the Vijñānavāda with being nearly the only religious tradition to establish the “bridge” from the profane to sacred on a firm logical footing. The “leap” is not possible in the conceptualized world, for the imagined world, for this is the nexus of the problem, and likewise, from the standpoint of the perfected or consummate nature, the problem has been solved. | + | The bridge between the [[sacred]] and profane. [[Nagao]] refers to it as the “bridge” between the [[sacred]] and profane [[world]], and credits the [[Vijñānavāda]] with being nearly the only [[religious]] [[tradition]] to establish the “bridge” from the profane to [[sacred]] on a firm [[logical]] footing. The “leap” is not possible in the [[conceptualized]] [[world]], for the [[imagined]] [[world]], for this is the {{Wiki|nexus}} of the problem, and likewise, from the standpoint of the perfected or [[consummate nature]], the problem has been solved. |
− | Madhyamaka: nihilism with regard to the subject. He states that the idea of the other-dependent “is the appearer, a subjective existence.” The “-er” (-tṛ) in appearer, he continues, was “totally denied in the Mādhyamika treatise” and was “revived in the Vijñānavāda treatise as a | + | [[Madhyamaka]]: [[nihilism]] with regard to the [[subject]]. He states that the [[idea]] of the [[other-dependent]] “is the appearer, a [[subjective]] [[existence]].” The “-er” (-tṛ) in appearer, he continues, was “totally denied in the [[Mādhyamika]] treatise” and was “revived in the [[Vijñānavāda]] treatise as a ‘[[subject]].’” Without such a [[subject]], there could be no “turning around” from [[defilement]] to [[nirvāṇa]]. |
− | Madhyamaka: nihilism with regard to existence. Nagao states that while Nāgārjuna denied essence, he did not fully explain the nature of existence, as did the Vijñānavāda, by way of clarifying the nature of subjectivity with regard to soteriological interests. | + | [[Madhyamaka]]: [[nihilism]] with regard to [[existence]]. [[Nagao]] states that while [[Nāgārjuna]] denied [[essence]], he did not fully explain the [[nature]] of [[existence]], as did the [[Vijñānavāda]], by way of clarifying the [[nature]] of [[subjectivity]] with regard to [[soteriological]] interests. |
− | Nagao declares the other-dependent to be virtually a synonym for the classic Buddhist notion of co-originating inter-relationship (pratītyasamutpāda). He states that this central concept of Buddhism is that by which the relativity of all things was taught by the Buddha and all absolutes were thence denied. | + | [[Nagao]] declares the [[other-dependent]] to be virtually a {{Wiki|synonym}} for the classic [[Buddhist]] notion of co-originating inter-relationship ([[pratītyasamutpāda]]). He states that this central {{Wiki|concept}} of [[Buddhism]] is that by which the [[relativity]] of all things was [[taught]] by the [[Buddha]] and all absolutes were thence denied. |
− | It was Nāgārjuna, he affirms, who elucidated the “zero” or | + | It was [[Nāgārjuna]], he affirms, who elucidated the “zero” or “[[empty]]” ([[śūnya]]) [[nature]] of [[phenomena]] by way of [[interdependent co-arising]], devoid of any [[absolute]]. This [[universe]] of the [[other-dependent]] is only accessible by a [[Buddha]], while ordinary {{Wiki|individuals}}, through [[attachment]] to [[ego]], etc., [[grasp]] what they {{Wiki|perceive}} by means of ordinary [[faculties]] as absolutes, and thus live in an [[imaginary]] [[world]]. Only when [[imagination]] is eradicated and the actual fact of “other-dependence” is apprehended does the [[imagined]] [[nature]] [[transform]] into the perfected. |
− | Alex Wayman. Wayman corroborates the above interpretation. Asaṅga does not deny that nothing external to mind exists, but as lCang skya relates it, he speaks of the | + | {{Wiki|Alex Wayman}}. [[Wayman]] corroborates the above [[interpretation]]. [[Asaṅga]] does not deny that nothing external to [[mind]] [[exists]], but as lCang skya relates it, he speaks of the “[[emptiness]] of a substantial difference of grasper and grasped” - i.e., the “grasped” or what is deemed the [[external world]] is not fundamentally separated from [[consciousness]] and vice-versa. |
− | He notes what he terms the “Genesis” story in the Aggabbasutta asserts the existence of a sentient world (sattvaloka) and what he translates as a “support | + | He notes what he terms the “Genesis” story in the Aggabbasutta asserts the [[existence]] of a [[sentient]] [[world]] (sattvaloka) and what he translates as a “support [[world]]” (bhājanaloka). Therefore, to hold that [[Vasubandhu]] would in such a way contradict an important [[doctrine]] like this not to be believed, according to [[Wayman]]. |
− | The basal consciousness is required to provide a logical foundation for rebirth theory. This is the principal reason it was formulated by Asaṅga in the manner he did. | + | The basal [[consciousness]] is required to provide a [[logical]] foundation for [[rebirth]] {{Wiki|theory}}. This is the [[principal]] [[reason]] it was formulated by [[Asaṅga]] in the manner he did. |
− | Professor Wayman continues on to relate the important distinction to be made between the two schools. He states that the three natures theory | + | [[Professor]] [[Wayman]] continues on to relate the important {{Wiki|distinction}} to be made between the two schools. He states that the [[three natures]] {{Wiki|theory}} |
− | “...is very close to what is found in the writings of the earlier and famous Nāgārjuna, with the difference that the Yogācāra thought it was improving in describing what is going on.” | + | “...is very close to what is found in the writings of the earlier and famous [[Nāgārjuna]], with the difference that the [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]] it was improving in describing what is going on.” |
− | He cites Nāgārjuna’s Acintyāstava, 44-45, wherein it is stated that “an entity (bhava) when imagined does not exist, but (exists) when its dependence on others is found.” Wayman, agreeing with lCang skya’s account, notes that the only difference of this verse of Nāgārjuna’s and that of Vasubandhu’s assertion that the perfected nature emerges when the other-dependent nature is bereft of the conceptualized nature. These are the terms lCang skya employs to describe the perfected nature. | + | He cites [[Nāgārjuna’s]] Acintyāstava, 44-45, wherein it is stated that “an [[entity]] ([[bhava]]) when [[imagined]] does not [[exist]], but ([[exists]]) when its [[dependence]] on others is found.” [[Wayman]], agreeing with lCang skya’s account, notes that the only difference of this verse of [[Nāgārjuna’s]] and that of [[Vasubandhu’s]] [[assertion]] that the perfected [[nature]] emerges when the [[other-dependent nature]] is bereft of the [[conceptualized]] [[nature]]. These are the terms lCang skya employs to describe the perfected [[nature]]. |
− | Wayman sees the Mind-only tradition as improving upon Madhyamaka initial success. This is a view common among East Asian forms of Buddhism where one may plausibly argue that Yogācāra tradition held sway. Among East Asian schools where the Yogācāra School has had its biggest career, the schools are not equated, but rather the Yogācāra School is seen as a more comprehensive advance over the Madhyamaka. This a quite common ranking among the pan chiao systems which delineated the evolution of increasingly awakened states of personhood, and which virtually invariably place the Yogācārin personality “ahead” of or “above” the Mādhyamika. | + | [[Wayman]] sees the [[Mind-only]] [[tradition]] as improving upon [[Madhyamaka]] initial [[success]]. This is a view common among {{Wiki|East Asian}} [[forms]] of [[Buddhism]] where one may plausibly argue that [[Yogācāra tradition]] held sway. Among {{Wiki|East Asian}} schools where the [[Yogācāra School]] has had its biggest career, the schools are not equated, but rather the [[Yogācāra School]] is seen as a more comprehensive advance over the [[Madhyamaka]]. This a quite common ranking among the pan [[chiao]] systems which delineated the [[evolution]] of increasingly [[awakened]] states of {{Wiki|personhood}}, and which virtually invariably place the [[Yogācārin]] [[personality]] “ahead” of or “above” the [[Mādhyamika]]. |
− | Keenan. John Keenan seeks support for Nagao’s | + | Keenan. {{Wiki|John Keenan}} seeks support for Nagao’s “{{Wiki|thesis}} of the organic relationship between [[Yogācāra]] and [[Mādhyamika]]....” He focuses on the Hsung-Chung -[[Lun]], a commentary on the MMK ascribed to [[Asaṅga]]. Though it has no [[corresponding]] [[Sanskrit]] nor [[Tibetan translation]], he notes that “{{Wiki|modern}} [[Japanese]] [[scholars]]” accept [[Asaṅga]] as its author.” |
− | The commentary states that Asaṅga understood points in the works of Nāgārjuna not clarified by the great master. He in no way rejected Mādhyamika thought but remained faithful to it throughout his career. The work may reflect an early stage of the development of Asaṅga’s thought. Of course, it may represent a later period, for according to certain Tibetan traditions, Asaṅga was at heart a Mādhyamika. The Yogācāra is for dGe Lugs pa like lCang skya, an upāya, a useful but provisional approach, prone to reification. | + | The commentary states that [[Asaṅga]] understood points in the works of [[Nāgārjuna]] not clarified by the [[great master]]. He in no way rejected [[Mādhyamika]] [[thought]] but remained [[faithful]] to it throughout his career. The work may reflect an early stage of the [[development]] of [[Asaṅga’s]] [[thought]]. Of course, it may represent a later period, for according to certain [[Tibetan traditions]], [[Asaṅga]] was at [[heart]] a [[Mādhyamika]]. The [[Yogācāra]] is for dGe [[Lugs]] pa like lCang skya, an [[upāya]], a useful but provisional approach, prone to [[reification]]. |
− | Professor Keenan affirms the fact that Nagao understands the Yogācāra through the major work, the MV, as the “text used by Nagao to outline the Yogācāra developments [my emphasis] of the Mādhyamika notion of the middle path.” The picture that emerges from Keenan’s remarks, is that of an Asaṅga deeply appreciative of the Madhyamaka tradition. This was true especially in the earlier years of his intellectual development, after which he embarked upon the path of his true genius, the Yogācāra, elements of which can be seen in his commentary on the MMK. | + | [[Professor]] Keenan affirms the fact that [[Nagao]] [[understands]] the [[Yogācāra]] through the major work, the MV, as the “text used by [[Nagao]] to outline the [[Yogācāra]] developments [my {{Wiki|emphasis}}] of the [[Mādhyamika]] notion of the [[middle path]].” The picture that emerges from Keenan’s remarks, is that of an [[Asaṅga]] deeply appreciative of the [[Madhyamaka tradition]]. This was true especially in the earlier years of his [[intellectual development]], after which he embarked upon the [[path]] of his true genius, the [[Yogācāra]], [[elements]] of which can be seen in his commentary on the MMK. |
− | Harris. Harris’ reliance on Japanese sources is a feature of his efforts to harmonize the two schools. Basically, in his presentation one has only the Yogācārin position itself represented. This position relegates the Madhyamaka to the position of clarifying only the emptiness of phenomena and the artificiality of language, not as its adherents claim, the full range of existence and reality. No Buddhist tradition known denies itself the role of definitive interpreter of the Buddhadarma. | + | Harris. Harris’ reliance on [[Japanese]] sources is a feature of his efforts to harmonize the two schools. Basically, in his presentation one has only the [[Yogācārin]] position itself represented. This position relegates the [[Madhyamaka]] to the position of clarifying only the [[emptiness of phenomena]] and the artificiality of [[language]], not as its {{Wiki|adherents}} claim, the full range of [[existence]] and [[reality]]. No [[Buddhist tradition]] known denies itself the role of definitive interpreter of the Buddhadarma. |
− | There are a multitude of arguments which exist among Tibetan traditions which affirm that the Madhyamaka School itself is the repository of the definitive, ultimate truth of the Buddha. A strict cleaving to the tenets of the Yogācāra School would be a “falling away” from the most profound doctrine. These arguments are missing from Harris’ work, or where it is addressed, this idea is rather summarily dismissed. | + | There are a multitude of arguments which [[exist]] among [[Tibetan traditions]] which affirm that the [[Madhyamaka School]] itself is the repository of the definitive, [[ultimate truth]] of the [[Buddha]]. A strict cleaving to the [[tenets]] of the [[Yogācāra School]] would be a “falling away” from the most profound [[doctrine]]. These arguments are missing from Harris’ work, or where it is addressed, this [[idea]] is rather summarily dismissed. |
− | The other extreme is represented by Theravāda scholars and occidental scholars of Buddhism who are informed by these scholars. Here, the two Mahāyāna Schools are over-differentiated, in our view. It has been and continues to be a commonplace notion that the Madhyamaka represents a Buddhist nihilism or skepticism and the Yogācāra School is a type of Buddhist Idealism or Phenomenalism. This extreme view is also patently false. Nāgārjuna nowhere claims to be skeptical about how one demonstrates as best one can through conventional verbal expression, the ultimate truth of the Buddha and the final truths of the path. | + | The other extreme is represented by [[Theravāda]] [[scholars]] and {{Wiki|occidental}} [[scholars]] of [[Buddhism]] who are informed by these [[scholars]]. Here, the two [[Mahāyāna]] Schools are over-differentiated, in our view. It has been and continues to be a commonplace notion that the [[Madhyamaka]] represents a [[Buddhist]] [[nihilism]] or {{Wiki|skepticism}} and the [[Yogācāra School]] is a type of [[Buddhist]] [[Idealism]] or [[Phenomenalism]]. This extreme view is also patently false. [[Nāgārjuna]] nowhere claims to be skeptical about how one demonstrates as best one can through [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[verbal]] expression, [[the ultimate truth]] of the [[Buddha]] and the final [[truths]] of the [[path]]. |
− | While certainly lCang skya’s Yogācārin sketch presents the Madhyamaka School as a type of | + | While certainly lCang skya’s [[Yogācārin]] sketch presents the [[Madhyamaka School]] as a type of “[[nihilism]] ” (med par [[lta ba]]), but this is with regard to what [[scholars]] of other [[Buddhist schools]] will argue is the basic unwanted, unforeseen result of [[Madhyamaka views]]. It is not the case that anyone would claim |
− | that the Mādhyamika refer to themselves in these terms. In fact, they emphatically deny that the doctrine of non-self-entity or essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvavāda, ngo bo nyid med par smra ba) is nihilismistic save to those inclined to positivistic viewpoints who do not understand its world-view. Rather, failure to accept this doctrine in favor of essentialist perspectives leads ultimately to a nihilistic view, in the sense that a non-acceptance of Madhyamaka doctrine is a denial of reality as it really is. | + | that the [[Mādhyamika]] refer to themselves in these terms. In fact, they emphatically deny that the [[doctrine]] of non-self-entity or essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvavāda, [[ngo bo nyid]] med par [[smra]] ba) is nihilismistic save to those inclined to positivistic viewpoints who do not understand its world-view. Rather, failure to accept this [[doctrine]] in favor of essentialist perspectives leads ultimately to a [[Wikipedia:Nihilism|nihilistic]] view, in the [[sense]] that a non-acceptance of [[Madhyamaka]] [[doctrine]] is a {{Wiki|denial}} of [[reality]] as it really is. |
− | Likewise, those who refer to the Yogācāra School as a type of Idealism are, in our view, falsely superimposing an occidental system onto an Asian philosophical school. While there exists a superficial similarity between Berkeleyian, Kantian or Husserlian ideas, a deeper level of analysis demonstrates the deep kinship with the Madhyamaka School which ultimately makes this label inaccurate. One might as well say that all Mahāyāna Schools are Idealist, or, as some have suggested, that all Buddhism is a type of Idealism or even as was said, a form of Nihilism . | + | Likewise, those who refer to the [[Yogācāra School]] as a type of [[Idealism]] are, in our view, falsely superimposing an {{Wiki|occidental}} system onto an {{Wiki|Asian}} [[philosophical]] school. While there [[exists]] a [[superficial]] similarity between Berkeleyian, [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]] or Husserlian [[ideas]], a deeper level of analysis demonstrates the deep kinship with the [[Madhyamaka School]] which ultimately makes this label inaccurate. One might as well say that all [[Mahāyāna]] Schools are Idealist, or, as some have suggested, that all [[Buddhism]] is a type of [[Idealism]] or even as was said, a [[form]] of [[Nihilism]] . |
− | The elucidation of numerous disputed issues notwithstanding, one ought never to lose sight of the fact that these two schools are contained within the larger system of Mahāyāna Buddhism. As we say in the last section on positivism, both schools argue more or less in unison for the refutation of the Buddhist “positivism” represented by the Sautrāntika. If any occidental label at all were to be applied to both Mahāyāna Schools it would be something akin to “anti-positivism.” | + | The elucidation of numerous disputed issues notwithstanding, one ought never to lose [[sight]] of the fact that these two schools are contained within the larger system of [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]]. As we say in the last section on positivism, both schools argue more or less in [[unison]] for the refutation of the [[Buddhist]] “positivism” represented by the [[Sautrāntika]]. If any {{Wiki|occidental}} label at all were to be applied to both [[Mahāyāna]] Schools it would be something akin to “anti-positivism.” |
− | Affirmation of the two schools’ identity as Mahāyāna traditions does not dismiss, however, the very important distinctions between them. We have established just above the affirmation that the Yogācāra tradition affirms the existence of a pivot, bridge, support, basis, etc., variously describing in these terms the other-dependent nature or the basal consciousness. This is a tremendous distinction from the world-view of the Madhyamaka that asserts no such foundation for reality. | + | [[Affirmation]] of the two schools’ [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]] as [[Mahāyāna traditions]] does not dismiss, however, the very important {{Wiki|distinctions}} between them. We have established just above the [[affirmation]] that the [[Yogācāra tradition]] affirms the [[existence]] of a pivot, bridge, support, basis, etc., variously describing in these terms the [[other-dependent nature]] or the basal [[consciousness]]. This is a tremendous {{Wiki|distinction}} from the world-view of the [[Madhyamaka]] that asserts no such foundation for [[reality]]. |
− | One can see here an echo of the long-standing dispute over the puḍgala or personal self asserted by the so-called puḍgalavāda traditions. Indeed, the role of a support or pivot for reality is tempting and useful as a heuristic device. In the end however, it might and has been argued by our representatives of the Prāsaṅgika scholars in the chapters above that these Mind-only traditions fail to demonstrate at the most profound level of verbal expression, the depths of the selflessness of self and phenomena. | + | One can see here an {{Wiki|echo}} of the long-standing dispute over the puḍgala or personal [[self]] asserted by the so-called puḍgalavāda [[traditions]]. Indeed, the role of a support or pivot for [[reality]] is tempting and useful as a {{Wiki|heuristic}} device. In the end however, it might and has been argued by our representatives of the [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[scholars]] in the chapters above that these [[Mind-only]] [[traditions]] fail to demonstrate at the most profound level of [[verbal]] expression, the depths of the [[selflessness of self]] and [[phenomena]]. |
− | While the tradition is no Idealism, we can say along with [pseudo?]Nāgārjuna that the tradition inhabits a place in the spectrum of possible world-views that is “svacitta.” This does not mean that particular Yogācārin thinkers necessarily come to realize the most profound revelation of selflessness, as definitively expressed by the Prāsaṅgika tradition. | + | While the [[tradition]] is no [[Idealism]], we can say along with [pseudo?][[Nāgārjuna]] that the [[tradition]] inhabits a place in the spectrum of possible world-views that is “svacitta.” This does not mean that particular [[Yogācārin]] thinkers necessarily come to realize the most profound [[revelation]] of [[selflessness]], as definitively expressed by the [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[tradition]]. |
− | Mind-only traditions: an upāya and love for the system qua system? We agree with Huntington: the Mind-only traditions demonstrate a system and a world-view which are relatively prone to reification and, as this term is employed in our text, positivism. | + | [[Mind-only]] [[traditions]]: an [[upāya]] and [[love]] for the system qua system? We agree with [[Huntington]]: the [[Mind-only]] [[traditions]] demonstrate a system and a world-view which are relatively prone to [[reification]] and, as this term is employed in our text, positivism. |
− | Later ramifications of the dispute. Certainly the Zen tradition (quite subsumed in Yogācāra view) in particular relates many stories where reason and the study of scriptures are denigrated in favor of direct intuition, one might say, of | + | Later ramifications of the dispute. Certainly the [[Zen tradition]] (quite subsumed in [[Yogācāra]] view) in particular relates many stories where [[reason]] and the study of [[scriptures]] are denigrated in favor of direct [[intuition]], one might say, of “[[no mind]]” etc., in deep [[samādhi]] . While this is not necessarily our view, some have maintained that the various [[dhyāna]] or [[Meditation]] Schools ([[Chin]]. [[Chan]]; Jap. [[Zen]]) of [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] extant in the {{Wiki|modern}} [[world]] share a mistrust of rationcination and verbalized [[reality]] that borders on anti-intellectualism. |
− | From the Gelukpa Madhyamaka standpoint, if emptiness is truly an omnipresent reality, it should be manifest in language and logic, and however obscured, should be evident through careful examination. A Mahāyāna disciple should train in the disciplines of logic and language to hone his/her comprehension of ultimate truth as well as increasing the intensity of mental focus as is obtained through meditative praxis, or dhyāna. | + | From the [[Gelukpa]] [[Madhyamaka]] standpoint, if [[emptiness]] is truly an {{Wiki|omnipresent}} [[reality]], it should be [[manifest]] in [[language]] and [[logic]], and however obscured, should be evident through careful {{Wiki|examination}}. A [[Mahāyāna]] [[disciple]] should train in the [[disciplines]] of [[logic]] and [[language]] to hone his/her [[comprehension]] of [[ultimate truth]] as well as increasing the intensity of [[mental focus]] as is obtained through [[meditative]] praxis, or [[dhyāna]]. |
− | The danger in this, according to our dhyāna adherent, is that one may fall into the mental trap of reifying words and the dogma construed from them. The very use of language entails the risk of being ensnared by it. Certainly if the ultimate truth is not to be contained in systems of dogmatic statements, but rather lies in the meditative state of the highly realized, then it is perhaps preferable to avoid doctrine, theory and verbalized convention altogether. | + | The [[danger]] in this, according to our [[dhyāna]] adherent, is that one may fall into the [[mental]] trap of reifying words and the {{Wiki|dogma}} construed from them. The very use of [[language]] entails the [[risk]] of being ensnared by it. Certainly if [[the ultimate truth]] is not to be contained in systems of [[dogmatic]] statements, but rather lies in the [[meditative state]] of the highly [[realized]], then it is perhaps preferable to avoid [[doctrine]], {{Wiki|theory}} and verbalized convention altogether. |
− | While to some extent the relative emphasis on praxis versus theory in the Zen and Gelukpa traditions is evident, the connection between these two highly influential modern schools and ancient Madhyamaka and Yogācāra disputes may not be so evident. Tracing the distinctions of the two modern schools back to the classical debates in India would be the subject of another book, provisionally I would like to state that at the core of differences between Central and East Asian forms of Buddhism, lies the dispute over the nature of consciousness. | + | While to some extent the [[relative]] {{Wiki|emphasis}} on praxis versus {{Wiki|theory}} in the [[Zen]] and [[Gelukpa]] [[traditions]] is evident, the [[connection]] between these two highly influential {{Wiki|modern}} schools and [[ancient]] [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] [[disputes]] may not be so evident. Tracing the {{Wiki|distinctions}} of the two {{Wiki|modern}} schools back to the classical [[debates]] in [[India]] would be the [[subject]] of another [[book]], provisionally I would like to [[state]] that at the core of differences between Central and {{Wiki|East Asian}} [[forms]] of [[Buddhism]], lies the dispute over the [[nature]] of [[consciousness]]. |
− | What finally can we say of the disputes between the two schools? We think we have demonstrated that these two schools should in no way be seen as identical. Obviously, were they identical, there would be no good reason to name them differently. | + | What finally can we say of the [[disputes]] between the two schools? We think we have demonstrated that these two schools should in no way be seen as [[identical]]. Obviously, were they [[identical]], there would be no good [[reason]] to [[name]] them differently. |
− | Yogācāra translates from the Sanskrit as “Yoga-praxis” with the inclusive of “meditation-praxis. As a number of scholars have maintained, elements can be found in the earliest Buddhist writings which evolved into what became known as the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka Schools. | + | [[Yogācāra]] translates from the [[Sanskrit]] as “Yoga-praxis” with the inclusive of “meditation-praxis. As a number of [[scholars]] have maintained, [[elements]] can be found in the earliest [[Buddhist]] writings which evolved into what became known as the [[Yogācāra]] and the [[Madhyamaka]] Schools. |
− | The roots of the Great Debate lie deep in Buddhist tradition. Whether one affirms a relative something or a relative nothing is indeed itself, a relative truth from a certain point of view. One person’s nihilism is another’s positivism. Arguably all schools of Buddhism are relatively “nihilismistic” when | + | The [[roots]] of the [[Great Debate]] lie deep in [[Buddhist tradition]]. Whether one affirms a [[relative]] something or a [[relative]] nothing is indeed itself, a [[relative truth]] from a certain point of view. One person’s [[nihilism]] is another’s positivism. Arguably all [[schools of Buddhism]] are relatively “nihilismistic” when |
− | compared with other traditions. This would seem to be the case for Thomistic and Augustinian theologies, in which real discrete entities are posited. They are relatively “positivist” from the point of view of the classical materialist ancient Cārvaka School, which repudiated the existence of karma, rebirth, deities and salvation beyond this world, and as well perhaps with regard to Deconstructionist perspectives which over-negate the possibility of | + | compared with other [[traditions]]. This would seem to be the case for Thomistic and Augustinian theologies, in which real discrete entities are posited. They are relatively “positivist” from the point of view of the classical {{Wiki|materialist}} [[ancient]] [[Cārvaka]] School, which repudiated the [[existence]] of [[karma]], [[rebirth]], [[deities]] and {{Wiki|salvation}} beyond this [[world]], and as well perhaps with regard to Deconstructionist perspectives which over-negate the possibility of |
− | the expression of truth in verbal terms. This the Prāsaṅgika even reject. Nietzsche made a God of the concrete, historical self, having only one opportunity to acquire an ultimate reality defined in finite, historical, individualistic terms. These comments just touch upon subjects that are worthy of continuing study and reflection to help place Madhyamaka tradition within the spectrum of global philosophies. | + | the expression of [[truth]] in [[verbal]] terms. This the [[Prāsaṅgika]] even reject. [[Nietzsche]] made a [[God]] of the concrete, historical [[self]], having only one opportunity to acquire an [[ultimate reality]] defined in finite, historical, individualistic terms. These comments just {{Wiki|touch}} upon [[subjects]] that are worthy of continuing study and {{Wiki|reflection}} to help place [[Madhyamaka tradition]] within the spectrum of global [[philosophies]]. |
− | Demonstration of our thesis. We sought here to provide evidence of the existence of major disputes between the two schools. This was done throughout the chapters of this work. A major aim of this work was to balance interpretations of the distinctions to be made of the two schools which “over-harmonize” the two, ignoring obvious distinctions and avoiding a presentation that mistakes a supposed Madhyamaka | + | Demonstration of our {{Wiki|thesis}}. We sought here to provide {{Wiki|evidence}} of the [[existence]] of major [[disputes]] between the two schools. This was done throughout the chapters of this work. A major aim of this work was to [[balance]] interpretations of the {{Wiki|distinctions}} to be made of the two schools which “over-harmonize” the two, ignoring obvious {{Wiki|distinctions}} and avoiding a presentation that mistakes a supposed [[Madhyamaka]] “[[nihilism]]” opposed to a [[Yogācāra]] “[[Idealism]].” In short, we have attempted to {{Wiki|present}} our [[own]] [[Madhyāntavibhāga]] – Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes – with regard to this topic, aiming to avoid the extremes. |
− | Whether the Mind-only traditions as defined in this work are evolutions or devolutions relative to the Madhyamaka remains a disputed topic and is most likely defined in the terms of Tibetan philosophical traditions as ngor bden pa - | + | Whether the [[Mind-only]] [[traditions]] as defined in this work are evolutions or devolutions [[relative]] to the [[Madhyamaka]] remains a disputed topic and is most likely defined in the terms of [[Tibetan]] [[philosophical]] [[traditions]] as [[ngor]] [[bden pa]] - “[[truth]] from a certain point of view.” |
− | Arguments can and will continue to be made asserting the claim to “definitive” status among the three major wings of Buddhist tradition, i.e., the Vibhajyavāda/Theravāda, Yogācāra /Ch’an-Zen and Madhyamaka/dGe lugs pa ancient and modern traditions. Perhaps though this investigation may not claim “definitive” status in the sense of having exhausted all the issues, it may initiate further investigation of the claims and counter-claims each tradition has made and continues to make against the other | + | Arguments can and will continue to be made asserting the claim to “definitive” {{Wiki|status}} among the three major wings of [[Buddhist tradition]], i.e., the Vibhajyavāda/Theravāda, [[Yogācāra]] /Ch’an-Zen and Madhyamaka/dGe [[lugs]] pa [[ancient]] and {{Wiki|modern}} [[traditions]]. Perhaps though this [[investigation]] may not claim “definitive” {{Wiki|status}} in the [[sense]] of having exhausted all the issues, it may [[initiate]] further [[investigation]] of the claims and counter-claims each [[tradition]] has made and continues to make against the other |
. | . | ||
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− | The idea of the Tathāgatagarbha, the womb or embryo of Buddha, is a central theme of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Without exhaustively investigating the origin of the notion, in this appendix, we will aim to further elucidate differences in understanding of the two schools as they approach the notion of the tathāgatagarbha, the | + | The [[idea]] of the [[Tathāgatagarbha]], the [[womb]] or [[embryo]] of [[Buddha]], is a central theme of [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]]. Without exhaustively investigating the origin of the notion, in this appendix, we will aim to further elucidate differences in [[understanding]] of the two schools as they approach the notion of the [[tathāgatagarbha]], the “[[womb]]” or “[[embryo]]” of full-awakening, said to reside within each [[sentient being]]. |
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− | Of the five scriptures of Maitreya, two are held by Gelukpa scholars to be principally establishing a Madhyamaka position. These two are the Abhisamayālaṃkara and the Ratnagotravibhāga. The latter is, known to Tibetan tradition as the Uttaratantra, is one of our principle sources for elucidating the nature of the Tathāgatagarbha. | + | Of the five [[scriptures]] of [[Maitreya]], two are held by [[Gelukpa]] [[scholars]] to be principally establishing a [[Madhyamaka]] position. These two are the [[Abhisamayālaṃkara]] and the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]]. The [[latter]] is, known to [[Tibetan tradition]] as the [[Uttaratantra]], is one of our [[principle]] sources for elucidating the [[nature]] of the [[Tathāgatagarbha]]. |
+ | |||
+ | “..the [[Abhisamayālaṃkara]] purported to explain not the literal meaning, but the “hidden meaning” of [[Prajñāpāramitā]], and it was here that {{Wiki|synthesis}} of [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] might be effected. The [[Prajñāpāramitā]] [[scriptures]] are the earliest known [[Mahāyāna]] works, and their [[teaching]] of [[emptiness]] is central | ||
+ | |||
+ | to all [[Mahāyāna]] works, and their [[teaching]] of [[emptiness]] is central to all [[Mahāyāna]]. However, their literal meaning having close links with [[Nāgārjuna]], [[Yogācārins]] had to account for these [[ideas]] in their [[own]] {{Wiki|distinct}} way and the AA afforded them an opportunity to do that. Disregarding the literal meaning of the [[scriptures]], they could derive their [[own]] [[doctrines]] from the same source as their [[Mādhyamika]] rivals.” | ||
− | + | [[Madhyamaka]] the definitive view of [[Asaṅga]] and [[Maitreya]]? Of course, the fact that [[Maitreya]] related the [[Abhisamayālaṃkara]] to [[Asanga]], is the basis by which [[Gelukpa]] claim that indeed, the definitive (nitārtha) [[interpretation]] of Maitreya/Asaṅga’s [[philosophical]] standpoint, is that of the [[Madhyamaka]]. In fact, it is their contention that indeed, [[Yogācārin]] [[philosophers]] were basically “disregarding the literal meaning of the [[scriptures]].” | |
− | |||
− | + | Discrepancy between [[no-self]] [[doctrine]] and that of [[primordially]] [[awakened nature]]. One of the seeming discrepancies in [[Mahāyāna]] [[Buddhist]] [[thinking]] for the [[student]] of [[Buddhism]] is the [[existence]] on the one hand of the [[doctrine]] of “[[no self]]” ([[anātman]]) and on the other, the [[doctrine]] of the [[existence]] of an innate [[Buddha Nature]], said to be an “aboriginally [[pure mind]]” of [[awakening]] [[existing]] within all [[sentient]] [[life]]. It is a complicated issue and [[tathāgatagarbha]] | |
+ | [[thought]] is connected with both [[views]]. It is incorrect to view the [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} as a school in the [[sense]] that [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] are Schools. Both of these schools have their [[own]] interpretations of this [[doctrine]], in fact. The [[root text]] for this [[idea]] is the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] Mahāyanôttaratantraśāstra, called as well in an abbreviated way, the “[[Uttara Tantra]]” ({{Wiki|Ultimate}} [[Tantra]]). [[Tibetan tradition]] ascribes this work to Maitreyānatha, and by [[Chinese tradition]] to have been written by a certain [[Saramati]] seven centuries after the [[Buddha’s]] [[nirvana]]. | ||
− | |||
− | + | [[Madhyamaka]]: the definitive stance of [[Asaṅga]] and [[Maitreya]]. In [[Tibet]], there have existed sharp [[disputes]] concerning the issue of which school should be connected with the RGV. While [[Gelukpa]] [[scholars]] [[acknowledge]] that [[Maitreya]], through Asavga [[initiated]] the [[Yogācāra]] system, their [[own]] view was in the end, that of the [[Madhyamaka]]. [[Mind-only]] was promulgated as an extensive [[Wikipedia:scientific method|methodology]] by which to [[initiate]] certain types of [[disciples]] into the [[Mahāyāna tradition]]. | |
+ | The lack of [[doctrine]] concerning the basal [[consciousness]] in TGG {{Wiki|literature}}. In [[China]], [[Fa-tsang]] (7th century) founder of the [[Hua-yen]] ([[Avataṃsaka]]) School, connected the [[doctrine]] with neither school. It was a {{Wiki|distinct}} [[teaching]], so {{Wiki|distinct}} he declared it the “fourth [[turning of the wheel of dharma]].” It is notable however, that key [[Yogācāra]] [[doctrines]] such as the [[three natures]], the ālayavijñana, are nowhere mentioned among this earliest [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|literature}}. | ||
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− | + | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] was absorbed by the [[Mind-only]] system. [[Yogācārin]] [[scholars]] maintaining the [[existence]] of the [[ālayavijñāna]] claim that the [[gotra]] governs the [[ālaya]] . The [[tathāgatagarbha]] is an “agent” that removes defilments from the [[ālaya]]. | |
− | + | [[Jikido]] {{Wiki|Takasaki}} states that the [[tradition]] started as a {{Wiki|distinct}} [[tradition]], but was later absorbed into the [[Yogācāra School]] via the growing tendency to equate the [[Tathāgatagarbha]] with the [[ālayavijñāna]], most notably in the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. He sees the RGV as a [[criticism]] of the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] {{Wiki|literature}}. At the end of [[chapter]] one it is observed the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] expresses its {{Wiki|purpose}} which is to “establish the [[existence]] (astitva) of buddhadhātu so that one could avoid the faults created by the {{Wiki|theory}} of “śūnyam [[sarvam]]” [all is [[empty]]]....” | |
+ | In his view, the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] emphasizes “[[asti]]” - [[existence]] - in contrast to the “[[śūnya]]” of the [[Prajñāpāramitā]]. He says, | ||
− | + | “this ‘asti-vāda’ does not mean the {{Wiki|negation}} of ‘śūnya-vāda’. Rather, the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] regards itself as the real successor to the śūnya-vāda of the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] declaring that the real meaning of ‘[[śūnyatā]]’ is to know the ‘astitva’ of the Germ having within itself both the ‘[[śūnya]] of [[defilements]] and the ‘[[aśūnya]]’ of the [[Buddha’s]] Qualities.” | |
− | + | He then takes the meaning of ‘śūnyam [[sarvam]]’ as “[[empty]] of all [[[kleśas]]].” The [[tathāgatagarbha]] is [[empty]] of [[defilements]]. | |
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− | + | [[Danger]] of [[nihilism]] in the [[Perfection of Wisdom]] {{Wiki|literature}}. The [[criticism]] of the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] is a [[criticism]] not of the works [[per se]], but rather of its “short or unclear explanation.” As stated in previous chapters, the [[Yogācāra tradition]] sees itself as a “[[middle path]]” between [[views]] such as that exemplified by the [[Sarvāstivāda]] notion of an [[ātmavāda]] of [[dharmas]], which is “abhūtagrāha” - the [[grasping]] of what is unreal, and the śūnyatāviksiptacitta - those [[Madhyamaka]] whose [[minds]] are hurled into [[emptiness]] and who reject the [[existence]] of the [[Dharma]] (bhūtadharmāpavāda). In its terms, [[jñāna]] and [[prajñā]] are [[antidotes]] to both [[wrong views]]. | |
+ | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} clarifies [[emptiness]]. {{Wiki|Takasaki}} sees the [[root cause]] in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra’s formulation of the [[three natures]] ([[trisvabhāva]]) {{Wiki|theory}} which elucidates the “[[niḥsvabhāva]]” or “[[non-self-nature]]” {{Wiki|theory}} of [[the second turning]] of the [[wheel of dharma]], i.e. the [[Prajñāpāramitā]]. Clarifying | ||
− | + | [[śūnyatā]] is a chief aspect of the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]]. In fact, of it, {{Wiki|Takasaki}} states that the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] unravels the [[thought]] of [[prajña]] with regard to nihsvabhāva [[doctrine]] and thus is a “[[Saṃdhinirmocana]]” (unravelling the [[intention]]) of [[Prajña]] just as the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is the “[[uttaratantra]]” as “the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] expression of the [[śūnyavāda]].....” | |
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− | + | ===[[Relative essentialism in the Yogācāra.]]=== | |
− | Relative essentialism in the Yogācāra. | ||
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+ | By comparison then, with the [[Prajñāpāramitā]], the [[Tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}}, in correlation with [[Vijñānavāda]] [[thought]] came to aquire an aspect of [[relative]] “[[astivāda]]”, [[relative]] “[[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]].” [[Arising]] from this occurred an amalgam of [[Vijñānavāda]] with [[tathāgatagarbha]]. “Āśrayaparavṛtti” (“turning about of the basis”), which describes the [[awakened state]] of one who has eliminated all defiling [[seeds]] ([[bijas]]) according to the [[Vijñānavāda]] system, were “borrowed by the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]]” from that system. | ||
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+ | There are key [[Yogācāra]] terms missing from the RGV. However, despite such interrelationships, from the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]], key [[Yogācāra]] terms are missing. There is no mention of the [[ālayavijñāna]] or [[trisvabhāva]]. {{Wiki|Takasaki}} concludes, | ||
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+ | ==[[“the Ratnagotravibhāga cannot be regarded as a work of the Vijñānavāda.”]]== | ||
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− | + | From this, he asserts that the [[garbha]] {{Wiki|theory}}, though critical of the [[Prajñāpāramitā]] view, cannot be linked strictly with the [[Yogācāra School]], and probably precedes it. | |
− | + | There is a weakness of a [[garbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} devoid of the basal [[consciousness doctrine]]. The ālayavijñana is seen as the “complete basis” of all [[phenomena]] which are mentated [[realities]]. Because the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] did not include this {{Wiki|concept}}, {{Wiki|Takasaki}} sees a weakness in the [[garbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} of the text in its | |
− | + | explanation of the [[gotra]] {{Wiki|theory}} as the [[substratum]] ([[ādhāra]]) of the [[phenomenal world]]. Because of this weakness, it was seemingly inevitable that a text would emerge to equate the [[tathāgatagarbha]] with the [[ālaya consciousness]]. This of course happened with the advent of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra and the Mahāyānaśraddhôtpadasūtra. This event effectively absorbed [[garbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} into the [[Vijñānavāda]] system, preventing its [[development]] as an {{Wiki|independent}} school. | |
+ | The Laṅkāvatarasūtra expresses the equation of the basal [[consciousness]] with the [[tathāgatagarbha]]. In the Laṅkāvatarasūtra, the [[Buddha]], when asked whether the [[tathāgatagarbha]] is the same as the ego-soul or [[ātman]] [[taught]] by [[Indian]] [[philosophical]] schools, he replies, | ||
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− | + | “No, [[Mahāmati]], my [[tathāgatagarbha]] is not the same as the [[ego]] [[taught]] by the [[philosophers]]; for what the [[tathāgatas]] teach is the [[tathāgatagarbha]] in the [[sense]], [[Mahāmati]], that it is [[emptiness]], reality-limit, [[Nirvāṇa]], being {{Wiki|unborn}}, unqualified, and devoid of will-effort...tathāgatas...teach the [[doctrine]] pointing to the [[tathāgatagarbha]] to make the [[ignorant]] cast aside their {{Wiki|fear}} when they listen to the [[teaching]] of [[egolessness]]....” | |
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− | “[But] when a revulsion [or turning back] has not taken place in the ālayavijñāna known under the name of Tathāgatagarbha, there is no cessation of the seven evolving vijñānas.” | + | This passage seems to indicate the provisional or introductory [[nature]] of [[tathāgatagarbha]] [[thought]]. It is an approach to lessen the {{Wiki|fear}} of the [[ignorant]]. |
+ | However, the [[tathāgatagarbha]] is [[taught]] as equated with the ālayavijñana in the following passage: | ||
+ | |||
+ | “[But] when a revulsion [or turning back] has not taken place in the [[ālayavijñāna]] known under the [[name]] of [[Tathāgatagarbha]], there is no [[cessation]] of the seven evolving [[vijñānas]].” | ||
and below this, | and below this, | ||
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− | “..let those Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who are seeking after the exalted truth effect the purification of the Tathāgatagarbha which is known as ālayavijñana.” | + | “..let those [[Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas]] who are seeking after the [[exalted]] [[truth]] effect the [[purification]] of the [[Tathāgatagarbha]] which is known as ālayavijñana.” |
+ | |||
+ | “Revulsion” is [[Suzuki’s]] idiosyncratic [[interpretation]] of “āśrayaparāvṛtti”, the “turning about of the basis” of the [[ālaya consciousness]]. At this point, according to [[Yogācāra]] [[teaching]], the ālayavijñana dissolves into [[pure]] [[jñāna]]; discriminative, bifurcating [[consciousness]] ceases. | ||
+ | ‘Monstrous’ importing of ‘[[self]]’ into [[Buddhism]]. This equation of the [[ālayavijñāna]] with [[tathāgatagarbha]] [[thought]], has disastrous implications according to {{Wiki|Conze}}. He states that | ||
− | + | “All these {{Wiki|theoretical}} {{Wiki|assumptions}} are attempts to combine the [[doctrine]] of ‘not [[self]]’ with the almost instinctive [[belief]] in a ‘[[self]]’, [[empirical]] or true. The climax of this combination of the uncombinable is reached in such {{Wiki|conceptual}} monstrosities as the ‘[[store-consciousness]]’ (ālayavijñāna)...which performs all the functions of a ‘[[self]]’ in a {{Wiki|theory}} which almost vociferously proclaims the [[non-existence]] of such a ‘[[self]].’” | |
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+ | The [[Madhyamaka]] [[interpretation]] of the [[tathāgatagarbha]]. The [[Madhyamaka]] view of these issues is significantly different. [[Mādhyamika]] [[scholars]] reject the [[existence]] of the [[ālayavijñāna]], allowing for only the [[six vijñānas]] of classical [[Buddhism]]; there is a [[danger]] in it being taken as an “[[ego]] [[self]].” Nevertheless, they retain the notion of [[tathāgatagarbha]]. | ||
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+ | Is the [[doctrine]] of [[tathāgatagarbha]] an ‘alien’ infiltration into [[Madhyamaka]]? Some say that if a school accepts [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[teaching]] as the supreme [[doctrine]] of the [[Buddha]], then, since [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} was so prevalent in [[Mahāyāna scriptures]], there was a necessity to re-interpret [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]] in {{Wiki|light}} of [[Madhyamaka]] concerns to reject “[[svabhāva]]” [[thinking]]. | ||
− | + | We disagree with this view. Many notions are appropriated, for example, by both [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] Schools, from [[doctrines]] associated with the [[First Turning of the Wheel]] discussed above, and these are all a way of avoiding of the literal interpretations associated with those [[doctrines]]. [[Tathāgatagarbha]] [[thought]] no less, if it is deemed pragmatically useful, may be appropriated within the [[sphere]] of [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]]. | |
− | + | The [[inherent]] ‘[[Wikipedia:Essentialism|essentialism]]’ in [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]]. The difficulty involves the [[language]] used to describe these [[ideas]]. As R. F. Olsen notes, the problem for the [[Mādhyamika]] with [[Yogācāra]] notions of [[ālaya]], vijñāptimātra, etc., is that they are discussed with an [[air]] of “[[realism]]” and “[[inherent existence]]” [[language]]. This indeed is a problem, exemplified by comments such as the following from [[Sthiramati’s]] [[Bhāṣya]] on [[Vasubandhu’s]] Triṃśika: | |
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+ | [Others may assert] “The [[self]] and [[phenomena]] do not [[exist]] from the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] level” - just like [[consciousness]], “and that which is [[Wikipedia:Cognition|cognized]] (vijñeya) also,” thus they have said. This extreme {{Wiki|perspective}} is not admissable. And because of the impossibility that that which [[initiates]] [[conceptualization]] ([[upacāra]]) has no basis for [[existence]] (nirādhārasya), then by all means the [[transformation of consciousness]] (vijñānaparināma) [[exists]] as fact (vastūtaḥ).” | ||
− | [ | + | Furthermore this approach is [[Wikipedia:Coherentism|incoherent]]: “[[Consciousness]] too, like that which is [[Wikipedia:Cognition|cognized]] [[exists]] as {{Wiki|conventionally}} true, but not ultimately.” |
− | + | [[Essentialism]] [[relative]] to [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]]: [[Sthiramati]]. In the passage preceding the above in [[Sthiramati’s]] commentary, he refuted a “{{Wiki|realistic}}” or “substantialist” (dravyataḥ) notion with regard to the [[self]] and [[phenomena]]. | |
− | + | Clearly, in this classical commentary on the [[doctrine]] of vijñāptimātratā, he has rejected a “Vedāntinesque” view of [[consciousness]], but he seems to imply by this apparent rejection of what in our view are clearly discerned as [[Madhyamaka]] [[tenets]], to associate them with a nihilismistic view. Without some basis (adhāra) for [[conceptualization]], [[consciousness]] could not take place. | |
− | ==Candrakīrti’s counterclaim: the ‘syllableless’ dharma. Candrakīrti rejects this idea in his Madhyamakāvatara.== | + | ==[[Candrakīrti’s counterclaim: the ‘syllableless’ dharma. Candrakīrti rejects this idea in his Madhyamakāvatara.]]== |
− | “What hearing and what teaching (can there be) of the syllableless Dharma? Nevertheless the syllableless is heard and taught by means of superimposition (samāropa).” | + | “What hearing and what [[teaching]] (can there be) of the syllableless [[Dharma]]? Nevertheless the syllableless is heard and [[taught]] by means of superimposition (samāropa).” |
− | From the Madhyamaka perspective, teaching doctrines such as the ālaya, tathāgatagarbha, are all well and good, as long as the awareness that they are all saṃvṛtisatya is maintained. Avoiding realism even with regard to his own arguments, Nāgārjuna states, | + | From the [[Madhyamaka]] {{Wiki|perspective}}, [[teaching]] [[doctrines]] such as the [[ālaya]], [[tathāgatagarbha]], are all well and good, as long as the [[awareness]] that they are all [[saṃvṛtisatya]] is maintained. Avoiding [[realism]] even with regard to his [[own]] arguments, [[Nāgārjuna]] states, |
− | “Suppose that a magic man created by a magician should prevent another magic man created by his own magic [from] doing something....the magic man who is prevented is empty and the magic man who prevents is also empty. In like manner, a negation of the self-entity of all entities by my statement is possible, even though this statement [itself] is empty.” | + | “Suppose that a [[magic]] man created by a [[Wikipedia:Magician(paranormal)|magician]] should prevent another [[magic]] man created by his [[own]] [[magic]] [from] doing something....the [[magic]] man who is prevented is [[empty]] and the [[magic]] man who prevents is also [[empty]]. In like manner, a {{Wiki|negation}} of the self-entity of all entities by my statement is possible, even though this statement [itself] is [[empty]].” |
− | The Final issue: is the tathāgatagarbha doctrine definitive or provisional? This is the issue at hand in discussion of tathāgatagarbha: is it taken as realistic or conventional? A clever heuristic device, or a Brahmanical ātman in disguise? How one reads Yogācāra thought will determine one’s view here. | + | The Final issue: is the [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]] definitive or provisional? This is the issue at hand in [[discussion]] of [[tathāgatagarbha]]: is it taken as {{Wiki|realistic}} or [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]? A clever {{Wiki|heuristic}} device, or a [[Brahmanical]] [[ātman]] in disguise? How one reads [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]] will determine one’s view here. |
− | Candrakīrti’s false accusation? Ian Harris contends, | + | [[Candrakīrti’s]] false accusation? Ian Harris contends, |
+ | |||
+ | “The [[criticism]] would be all very well if the [[Yogācāra]] of [[Vasubandhu]] and [[Asaṅga]] held the [[views]] attributed to it by [[Candrakīrti]], but this is just not so. They actually agree with him that all {{Wiki|dogmas}} must be, by [[definition]], non-ultimate. They hold that the ālayavijñana itself is overthrown on the [[path]] to [[nirvāṅa]].” | ||
− | + | While it is true that [[Yogācāra]] thinkers declare their [[doctrines]], “verbalized designation” ([[vyavahāra]]), what can [[Sthiramati]] mean by declaring [[consciousness]] “actual” (vastūtaḥ) and reject as [[Wikipedia:Nihilism|nihilistic]], the notion that it is merely [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]? | |
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+ | Provisional [[nature]] of [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]]: [[Tsong kha pa]]. Even the Laṅkāvatarasūtra is not free from dispute. We noted the equation of the [[ālaya]] with [[tathāgatagarbha]] in that [[sūtra]], but [[Tsong kha pa’s]] [[interpretation]] of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra in the GSR cites [[sections]] of the [[sūtra]] whereby it is said that the [[Buddha]] [[taught]] [[tathāgatagarbha]] through his [[compassion]] to entice non-Buddhists to [[Buddhism]], like luring {{Wiki|deer}} to a lake by their [[seeing]] their [[own]] {{Wiki|reflection}} in the [[water]]. | ||
− | + | The [[tathāgatagarbha]] is a quasi-ātman. If the [[doctrine]] is taken literally, it would be little different from the [[ātman]] {{Wiki|theory}} of {{Wiki|Vedic}} Schools. The real [[truth]] behind the [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]] is [[śūnyatā]]; apart from all [[phenomena]] being [[śūnya]], no [[sentient being]] could relinquish defiling obstructions and attain [[full awakening]]. | |
− | + | Provisionality of the [[tathāgatagarbha]]: [[mKhas grub]]. [[mKhas grub rje]], in his [[sTong thun chen mo]] states that those [[beings]] who lack clear [[vision]] | |
− | + | “…cannot employ {{Wiki|reasoning}} under their [[own]] power to understand the [[tathāgatagarbha]], but following the teachings of the [[Tathāgata]] they are said to come to an [[understanding]] of it gradually by [[faith]].” | |
− | + | The Laṅkāvatarasūtra’s [[teaching]] of the [[non-existence]] of [[external objects]] and that all is “[[mind-only]]” is said to be provisional or interpretable. [[mKhas grub rje]] finds [[scriptural]] {{Wiki|evidence}} within the Laṅkāvatarasūtra itself which demonstrates the provisionality of the [[teaching]] of the [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]]. He quotes the relevant passage: | |
− | + | “Likewise, the [[doctrine]] of a [[tathāgatagarbha]] has been [[taught]] within the [[sūtras]] spoken by the Lord; and this the Lord has said to be inherently [[pure]] [[clear light]], and hence [[primordial purity]] itself, possessing the thirty-two exemplary marks and [[existing]] within the [[body]] of every [[sentient being]]. | |
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− | ==How is this tathāgatagarbha advocated by the Lord any different from the self advocated by the heterodox?== | + | ===[[How is this tathāgatagarbha advocated by the Lord any different from the self advocated by the heterodox?]]=== |
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+ | The Lord spoke. ‘[[Mahāmati]], the tathāgatas...teach by the [[word]] [[tathāgatagarbha]] notions such as [[emptiness]], the {{Wiki|perfect}} end, [[nirvāṇa]], [[nonarising]], marklessness, and wishlessness. To eliminate the abode of the {{Wiki|fear}} that the childish have in [[selflessness]], we have [[taught]], via the teachings on the [[tathāgatagarbha]], the [[state]] of nonconceptualization... the [[tathāgatas]], in a variety of ways, possessing [[skill in means]], and [[wisdom]] of the [[reality]] that is the reversion of all misconceived [[characteristics]], that is, of the fact that [[phenomena]] lack a [[self]]....” | ||
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+ | [[Selflessness]] reconciled with [[tathāgatagarbha]]. Along with that, | ||
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− | + | “The teachings of other [[sūtras]] that there [[exists]] a [[permanent]], {{Wiki|stable}}, and [[truly existent]] tathāgatagarbha...that is the {{Wiki|totality}} of the [[Buddha’s]] qualities and that has existed inherently in the [[mental continuum]] of every being since [[beginningless]] time, is also said to be only a provisional view, requiring further elucidation. | |
− | The Yogācāra approach is a useful, provisional approach upāya. The Yogācāra teach the non-existence of external objects as an upāya, an approach for those who are excessively attached to external forms. However, “based on the ascertainment that external objects are essenceless, [Cittamātrins] will [eventually] come to ascertain that consciousness [too] is essenceless.” | + | Ruegg affirms [[mKhas grub]] rje’s view by noting that [[Buddhists]] had two [[Wikipedia:Hermeneutics|hermeneutical]] [[methods]] available to them. To make tathatāgarbha {{Wiki|theory}} conform to the pan-Buddhist notions of the [[selflessness]] of [[person]] (puḍgalanairātmya), they had to teach the [[doctrine]] as “interpretable”, “needing further elucidation” ([[neyārtha]], [[drang don]]). Its “intentional ground” ([[dgongs]] [[gzhi]]) is [[nairātmya]], [[śūnyatā]], etc. |
+ | |||
+ | The [[Yogācāra]] approach is a useful, provisional approach [[upāya]]. The [[Yogācāra]] teach the [[non-existence]] of [[external objects]] as an [[upāya]], an approach for those who are excessively [[attached]] to external [[forms]]. However, “based on the ascertainment that [[external objects]] are [[essenceless]], [Cittamātrins] will [eventually] come to ascertain that [[consciousness]] [too] is [[essenceless]].” | ||
− | Crypto-ātman. Ruegg, in distinction to Takasaki, takes up the Gelukpa interpretation. Tathāgatagarbha does not refer to any entity (bhava), but is a “metatheoretical expression.” He addresses the dispute over this doctrine. Was it a syncretism, or “a symbiotic accommodation, with the ātman-doctrine of Brahmanical thought - that is, in effect, a crypto-Brahmanical ‘soul’-theory in Buddhism?” | + | Crypto-ātman. Ruegg, in {{Wiki|distinction}} to {{Wiki|Takasaki}}, takes up the [[Gelukpa]] [[interpretation]]. [[Tathāgatagarbha]] does not refer to any [[entity]] ([[bhava]]), but is a “metatheoretical expression.” He addresses the dispute over this [[doctrine]]. Was it a [[syncretism]], or “a symbiotic accommodation, with the ātman-doctrine of [[Brahmanical]] [[thought]] - that is, in effect, a crypto-Brahmanical ‘soul’-theory in [[Buddhism]]?” |
− | He notes that the similarities in the description of the tathāgatagarbha and the Brahmanical ātman are striking. The tathāgatagarbha is said to be permanent (nitya), immutable (dhrūva), blissful (sukha), and eternal (śāśvatā). The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (likely composed in China) even goes so far as to say | + | He notes that the similarities in the description of the [[tathāgatagarbha]] and the [[Brahmanical]] [[ātman]] are striking. The [[tathāgatagarbha]] is said to be [[permanent]] ([[nitya]]), immutable (dhrūva), [[blissful]] ([[sukha]]), and eternal (śāśvatā). The [[Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra]] (likely composed in [[China]]) even goes so far as to say |
− | What is called | + | What is called ‘[[self]]’ is the [[tathāgata]]. Why is this so? The [[[Buddha]]-][[body]] being [[infinite]] is free from the blemish of [[doubt]], and it neither acts nor [[grasps]], so that it is said to be ‘[[permanent]]’. In [[virtue]] of non-production and [[non-cessation]] ([[anutpāda]]) it is said to be ‘[[blissful]]’ ([[sukha]]). In [[virtue]] of the absence of the [[impurities]] of [[kleśa]] it is said to be ‘very [[pure]]’ ([[viśuddha]]). In [[virtue]] of the absence of ten marks, it is said to be ‘[[empty]]’ ([[śūnya]]). Consequently, the [[tathāgata]] is [[permanent]], [[blissful]], [[self]], very [[pure]], [[empty]] and without marks.” |
− | The Intentional ground of tathāgatagarbha doctrine. That this doctrine is to be taken as “interpretable” (neyārtha) is affirmed by three facts. | + | The Intentional ground of [[tathāgatagarbha doctrine]]. That this [[doctrine]] is to be taken as “interpretable” ([[neyārtha]]) is [[affirmed]] by three facts. |
− | 1] The doctrine as literal is simply to be rejected by the fact of the pan-Mahāyāna teaching of the selflessness of person and phenomenon, this teaching is universally recognized as definitive (nitārtha, nges don). | + | 1] The [[doctrine]] as literal is simply to be rejected by the fact of the pan-Mahāyāna [[teaching]] of the [[selflessness]] of [[person]] and [[phenomenon]], this [[teaching]] is universally [[recognized]] as definitive (nitārtha, [[nges don]]). |
− | 2] Further, the non-definitive apparent meaning is related intentionally (abhiprāyika, dgongs pa can) to the deeper implications (e.g. śūnyatā, etc.). | + | 2] Further, the non-definitive apparent meaning is related intentionally (abhiprāyika, [[dgongs pa can]]) to the deeper implications (e.g. [[śūnyatā]], etc.). |
− | 3] Finally, there are countless references among Mahāyāna scriptures which relate the Buddha’s upāya as a means to attract and reach those whose mental continuum is not yet ripe to receive the deepest meanings of his teachings. In this case, the purpose is to attract those who cling tenaciously to the ātman view. | + | 3] Finally, there are countless references among [[Mahāyāna scriptures]] which relate the [[Buddha’s]] [[upāya]] as a means to attract and reach those whose [[mental continuum]] is not yet ripe to receive the deepest meanings of his teachings. In this case, the {{Wiki|purpose}} is to attract those who [[cling]] tenaciously to the [[ātman]] view. |
− | Emptiness in tathāgatagarbha theory refers to the individual mental continuum. The śūnyatā with regard to tathāgatagarbha theory in the Prāsaṅgika system, is emptiness applied to a sentient being’s mental continuum (saṃtāna, rgyud), not the emptiness of phenomena (dharmanairātmya). Only if a sentient being’s consciousness is empty can it change; if it cannot change and evolve, it cannot attain to full awakening. | + | [[Emptiness]] in [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} refers to the {{Wiki|individual}} [[mental continuum]]. The [[śūnyatā]] with regard to [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} in the [[Prāsaṅgika]] system, is [[emptiness]] applied to a [[sentient]] being’s [[mental continuum]] ([[saṃtāna]], rgyud), not the [[emptiness of phenomena]] ([[dharmanairātmya]]). Only if a [[sentient]] being’s [[consciousness]] is [[empty]] can it change; if it cannot change and evolve, it cannot attain to [[full awakening]]. |
− | This emptiness of the mental continuum is what is meant in this system of the mind’s intrinsic purity. As long as the mind remains obscured by karma and kleśa, it is referred to as | + | This [[emptiness]] of the [[mental continuum]] is what is meant in this system of the [[mind’s]] [[intrinsic purity]]. As long as the [[mind]] remains obscured by [[karma]] and [[kleśa]], it is referred to as “[[tathāgatagarbha]];” upon [[purification]] by means of the [[path]] system, it attains to the “[[svabhāvikakāya]]”, the “[[essence body]]” of the [[Buddhas]]. The [[Buddha’s]] [[pure mind]] in that [[pure]] [[state]] is his [[wisdom body]] ([[jñānakāya]]), and the two together, “the [[Buddha’s mind]] as a flow [[empty of inherent existence]], is what this [[tradition]] calls the [[dharmakāya]].” |
− | From the Gelukpa standpoint as evinced by mKhas grub’s comments, the teachings concerning tathāgatagarbha which teach that sentient beings are already enlightened are wrong, literally speaking. If this were the case, then there would be no need to practice Buddhism. | + | From the [[Gelukpa]] standpoint as evinced by [[mKhas grub’s]] comments, the teachings concerning [[tathāgatagarbha]] which teach that [[sentient beings]] are already [[enlightened]] are wrong, literally {{Wiki|speaking}}. If this were the case, then there would be no need to [[practice Buddhism]]. |
− | Tathāgatagarbha as definitive doctrine. Many authorities of course accept the tathāgatagarbha theory as definitive teaching (nitārtha). This has been a source of constant dispute in Tibet, particularly with regard to the gzhan stong - rang stong controversy. Gelukpa scholars accept the | + | [[Tathāgatagarbha]] as definitive [[doctrine]]. Many authorities of course accept the [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} as definitive [[teaching]] (nitārtha). This has been a source of [[constant]] dispute [[in Tibet]], particularly with regard to the [[gzhan stong]] - [[rang stong]] [[controversy]]. [[Gelukpa]] [[scholars]] accept the “[[rang stong]]” view. Briefly stated, this is the [[teaching]] that all entities - the {{Wiki|individual}} and [[phenomena]] - are intrinsically [[empty]] of [[inherent nature]] (svabhāvaśūnya). |
− | gZhan stong: empty of ‘other.’ Jonangpa scholars assert the doctrine of gzhan stong - | + | [[gZhan stong]]: [[empty]] of ‘other.’ [[Jonangpa]] [[scholars]] assert the [[doctrine]] of [[gzhan stong]] - “[[empty]] of ‘other’” . According to this view, there is an [[inherently existent]] [[Absolute]]. What it is [[empty]] of is “other” in the [[sense]] of [[defilements]] ([[kleśa]]). This view is compared to a “jar without [[water]]” or a “monastary without [[monks]]”. The [[dharmakāya]] is [[conceived]] by this school as [[empty]] of {{Wiki|delusional}} [[conceptualization]] of the [[phenomenal world]]. It is [[empty]] of [[illusion]] in its [[own]] ultimately [[pure]] [[state]]. |
− | They interpret the tathāgatagarbha theory as given in the Śrimāladevisiṃāhanādasūtra as teaching that adventitious defilements (āgantuka) are intrinsically other than the ultimate, but this ultimate (dharmakāya) is not inherently empty of its own essential nature. This view is what these traditions refer to as the Great Madhyamaka; Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka is simply a conventional teaching which is neyārtha - needing interpretation, although useful for clearing away erroneous views initially. | + | They interpret the [[tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|theory}} as given in the Śrimāladevisiṃāhanādasūtra as [[teaching]] that [[adventitious defilements]] ([[āgantuka]]) are intrinsically other than the [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]], but this [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] ([[dharmakāya]]) is not inherently [[empty]] of its [[own]] [[essential nature]]. This view is what these [[traditions]] refer to as the [[Great Madhyamaka]]; [[Prāsaṅgika]] [[Madhyamaka]] is simply a [[conventional teaching]] which is [[neyārtha]] - needing [[interpretation]], although useful for clearing away erroneous [[views]] initially. |
− | gZhan stong the definitive view of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga? This view is the final view of not only Nāgārjuna but that of Maitreya and Asaga as well. They claim, that while texts such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ teach rang stong, but they cite the Dharmadhātustava, which they attribute to him for their claim that he taught gzhan stong. | + | [[gZhan stong]] the definitive view of [[Nāgārjuna]] and [[Asaṅga]]? This view is the final view of not only [[Nāgārjuna]] but that of [[Maitreya]] and Asaga as well. They claim, that while texts such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ teach [[rang stong]], but they cite the [[Dharmadhātustava]], which they attribute to him for their claim that he [[taught]] [[gzhan stong]]. |
− | Empty of essence or of defilements. As we have seen however, more or less this view of a positively expressed tathāgatagarbha as | + | [[Empty]] of [[essence]] or of [[defilements]]. As we have seen however, more or less this view of a positively expressed [[tathāgatagarbha]] as “[[empty]] of [[defilements]]” ([[gzhan stong]]) rather than “intrinsically [[empty]]” ([[rang stong]]) is prevalent throughout {{Wiki|East Asia}}. Yet, as we have seen, the issue remains unclear in the field of [[western]] [[Buddhology]] if resolved elsewhere. |
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===Glossary=== | ===Glossary=== | ||
− | Below is an abbreviated glossary of Tibetan terms employed by lCang skya in the passages we translated, and in some cases, Sanskrit equivalents. These equivalents follow the Tibetan. All the terms below are to be found in lCang skya’s text with the following abbreviations for sources: SCD = Sarat Chandra | + | Below is an abbreviated glossary of [[Tibetan]] terms employed by lCang skya in the passages we translated, and in some cases, [[Sanskrit]] equivalents. These equivalents follow the [[Tibetan]]. All the terms below are to be found in lCang skya’s text with the following abbreviations for sources: SCD = [[Sarat Chandra Das]], Tibetan-English {{Wiki|Dictionary}}; NRY = Nitārtha [[Rangjung Yeshe]] On-line {{Wiki|Dictionary}}; and MW = {{Wiki|Monier Williams}} Sanskrit-English {{Wiki|Dictionary}}. |
− | + | Unless otherwise stated, the source for definitions are found under entries in SDC or are more extensively defined in the text through work with [[Geshe Sopa]] (some of the significant definitions from this source are initialed “GS”). Not all possible meanings are given. Only the meaning of terms as they relate to our text are [[offered]] here. | |
− | Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary; NRY = Nitārtha Rangjung Yeshe On-line Dictionary; and MW = Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary. | ||
− | Unless otherwise stated, the source for definitions are found under entries in SDC or are more extensively defined in the text through work with Geshe Sopa (some of the significant definitions from this source are initialed “GS”). Not all possible meanings are given. Only the meaning of terms as they relate to our text are offered here. | ||
− | KA | + | [[KA]] |
− | kun brtags, parikalpita - The first of the three natures (trisvabhāva). These are central notions of Yogācāra, this first refers to the imagined, imputed or conceptualized nature, and designates life in saṃsāra or the world of sorrow. The idea of the “convolution” the literal meaning of saṃsāra “turning about,” “revolving” hence “convolution” indicating confusion and lack of perspicacity is hinted at by the prefix “pari,” that, like its cognate in Greek peri, means “surrounding,” “thoroughly” and the Latin “com” or “con” meaning “coextensive,” or “together with” ; this along with | + | [[kun brtags]], [[parikalpita]] - The first of the [[three natures]] ([[trisvabhāva]]). These are central notions of [[Yogācāra]], this first refers to the [[imagined]], [[imputed]] or [[conceptualized]] [[nature]], and designates [[life]] in [[saṃsāra]] or the [[world]] of [[sorrow]]. The [[idea]] of the “convolution” the literal meaning of [[saṃsāra]] “turning about,” “revolving” hence “convolution” indicating [[confusion]] and lack of perspicacity is hinted at by the prefix “pari,” that, like its {{Wiki|cognate}} in {{Wiki|Greek}} peri, means “surrounding,” “thoroughly” and the {{Wiki|Latin}} “com” or “con” meaning “coextensive,” or “together with” ; this along with “{{Wiki|concept}}” more at “[[conceive]]” from com + capere (to heave, to take in) corresponds to “conceptualize” when we relate this to the [[Sanskrit]] [[root]] klṛp that has among its many meanings “to partake of, to prepare , arrange, to declare as, consider as” |
− | means “wished for , expected , made , created , imagined , invented , contrived” Hence we find the following connotations for this term in Buddhist thought: 1) imaginary, imputed entity; learned, philosophical, intellectual; imagined character; conceptual imputation; intellectual imputation; artificial imputation or labeling; misconception of a true nature of phenomena developed through reasoning dependent on philosophical study etc.; taking things as having a truly existent nature, among others. | + | means “wished for , expected , made , created , [[imagined]] , invented , contrived” Hence we find the following connotations for this term in [[Buddhist]] [[thought]]: 1) [[imaginary]], [[imputed]] [[entity]]; learned, [[philosophical]], [[intellectual]]; [[imagined]] [[character]]; {{Wiki|conceptual}} [[imputation]]; [[intellectual]] [[imputation]]; artificial [[imputation]] or labeling; {{Wiki|misconception}} of a [[true nature of phenomena]] developed through {{Wiki|reasoning}} dependent on [[philosophical]] study etc.; taking things as having a [[truly existent]] [[nature]], among others. |
− | kun brtags p’ai ngo bo nyid – conceptualized essence; essentialistically or entically conceived | + | [[kun brtags]] p’ai [[ngo bo nyid]] – [[conceptualized]] [[essence]]; essentialistically or entically [[conceived]] |
− | kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛitisatya - concealing truth; literally, the Sanskrit root verb vrt means “surrounding , enclosing , obstructing” and with the prefix saṃ means “covering , concealing , keeping secret.” This imparts an idea of truths conveyed by thought or language as “concealing” the | + | [[kun rdzob bden pa]], saṃvṛitisatya - concealing [[truth]]; literally, the [[Sanskrit]] [[root]] verb vrt means “surrounding , enclosing , obstructing” and with the prefix [[saṃ]] means “covering , concealing , keeping secret.” This imparts an [[idea]] of [[truths]] conveyed by [[thought]] or [[language]] as “concealing” the “[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]” [[truth]] that lies beyond ordinary [[awareness]]; the [[Tibetan]] literally means “completely false.” There is a [[sense]] in the [[Sanskrit]] of “masking” the [[truth]] that may |
− | be the understanding the Tibetans applied to this Sanskrit term. We took a translation closer to the original idea behind the Sanskrit. We reason that because the Tibetan ngor bden that refers to the recipient of a concealing truth, the translation | + | be the [[understanding]] the [[Tibetans]] applied to this [[Sanskrit]] term. We took a translation closer to the original [[idea]] behind the [[Sanskrit]]. We [[reason]] that because the [[Tibetan]] [[ngor]] [[bden]] that refers to the recipient of a concealing [[truth]], the translation “[[truth]]” must be part of the translation. Since “concealing” is more literal than “masking” and “[[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]” [[truth]], and because “covering” [[truth]] {{Wiki|sounds}} too unusual, we went here with “concealing” though we have at times found it useful to translate as “[[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]]” [[truth]] at times. |
dKon mChog brTSegs pa’i mdo – Mahāratnakūṭasūtra | dKon mChog brTSegs pa’i mdo – Mahāratnakūṭasūtra | ||
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bkag pa’i tshul - method or manner of refutation | bkag pa’i tshul - method or manner of refutation | ||
− | skur ‘debs; apavāda - an extreme viewpoint which repudiates the idea that there is any basis for existence other than “mere names” and ordinary consciousnessness. The Sanskrit and Tibetan both agree that the meaning has to do with | + | skur ‘debs; apavāda - an extreme viewpoint which repudiates the [[idea]] that there is any basis for [[existence]] other than “mere names” and ordinary consciousnessness. The [[Sanskrit]] and [[Tibetan]] both agree that the meaning has to do with “{{Wiki|denial}},” “[[slander]],” “belittling,” in the [[sense]] in this context of the {{Wiki|denial}} of the [[dharma]], for [[Buddhists]], [[the ultimate truth]] of things, along with [[mārga]], or the [[path]] to [[nirvāṇa]] We take an interpretive leap by choosing |
− | the term | + | the term “[[nihilism]].” The [[definition]] of skur ‘debs in lCang skya’s text is med par [[lta ba]] – “a view to [[non-existence]].” It is in this [[sense]] that our term applies, but the [[relative]] [[nature]] of the [[nihilism]] spoken of in a [[Buddhist]] context is not to be equated with the [[thought]] of [[Nietzsche]], though it would appear to have had similar negative connotations. The [[Sanskrit]] and [[Tibetan]] both refer to the [[idea]] that when any basis for [[existence]] is foresworn, a mere “[[nominalism]]” results which “repudiates” such a basis, and by implication, it repudiates the value and efficacy of {{Wiki|soteriology}}. |
<poem> | <poem> | ||
− | skur ‘debs kyi mtha’ - “the extreme of | + | skur ‘debs kyi mtha’ - “the extreme of [[nihilism]]” |
− | skur ‘debs kyi mthar | + | skur ‘debs kyi mthar ‘[[dzin]] tshul - “the manner (or method) of [[grasping]] at the extreme of [[nihilism]]” |
− | skur ‘debs pa’i gzhi - the basis of nihilism | + | skur ‘debs pa’i [[gzhi]] - the basis of [[nihilism]] |
− | skye b’ai gnas basis of generation or arising | + | skye b’ai [[gnas]] basis of generation or [[arising]] |
− | skyon; dosa - logical and/or moral fault or error | + | skyon; [[dosa]] - [[logical]] and/or [[moral]] fault or error |
− | skrag pa – fear | + | skrag pa – {{Wiki|fear}} |
KHA | KHA | ||
− | kha cig - a certain person, usually, an opponent | + | [[kha cig]] - a certain [[person]], usually, an opponent |
− | kha nang - inner, internal | + | kha [[nang]] - inner, internal |
− | kha phyir - outer, external | + | kha [[phyir]] - outer, external |
− | khas len – acceptance | + | [[khas len]] – [[acceptance]] |
khas lan mkhan - proponent, i.e. “one who accepts” | khas lan mkhan - proponent, i.e. “one who accepts” | ||
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kho na - only, strictly | kho na - only, strictly | ||
− | khyab pa – pervasion; (NRY) to pervade, permeate | + | [[khyab pa]] – pervasion; (NRY) to pervade, permeate |
− | khyad par du - particularity | + | [[khyad par]] du - [[particularity]] |
− | mKHas grub - mKhas grub, one of two of Tsong kha pa’s major disciples, lived in the 14th and 15th centuries. His work, the sTong mThun Chen mo, among others, was a major influence on lCang skya’s own thought. | + | mKHas grub - [[mKhas grub]], one of two of [[Tsong kha pa’s]] major [[disciples]], lived in the 14th and 15th centuries. His work, the [[sTong]] mThun [[Chen]] mo, among others, was a major influence on lCang skya’s [[own]] [[thought]]. |
− | mkhyen pa – knowledgeable, wise | + | [[mkhyen pa]] – [[knowledgeable]], [[wise]] |
‘khrul pa – confused, mistaken | ‘khrul pa – confused, mistaken | ||
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GA | GA | ||
− | gang zag – individual | + | [[gang zag]] – {{Wiki|individual}} |
− | gang zag tu gtags pa – to impute an individual | + | [[gang zag]] tu gtags pa – to impute an {{Wiki|individual}} |
− | gong du - above, higher | + | [[gong]] du - above, higher |
− | grub | + | [[grub mtha]]’ [[smra]] ba - advocate of [a particular] [[philosophical view]] or [[tenet]], [[philosopher]]; (NRY:) [[grub mtha]]’: [[tenet]] system; school; {{Wiki|scholastic}} {{Wiki|sectarianism}}; [[philosophical]] system; system of [[philosophy]], [[philosophical tenets]], [[[siddhānta]]], [[philosophical]] [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] |
− | grub pa - establish, exist, proven | + | [[grub pa]] - establish, [[exist]], proven |
− | dgag pa - refutation | + | [[dgag pa]] - refutation |
− | dgag bya - object of refutation | + | [[dgag bya]] - [[object]] of refutation |
− | dgag tu thal - refutation would follow, result in refutation | + | dgag tu [[thal]] - refutation would follow, result in refutation |
− | dge sbyong - ascetic, monk | + | dge sbyong - [[ascetic]], [[monk]] |
− | dgongs pa - intention, purport | + | [[dgongs pa]] - [[intention]], purport |
− | dgos pa - necessity, purpose | + | [[dgos pa]] - necessity, {{Wiki|purpose}} |
− | ‘gog pa – refuted, stifled, to pull up from the root (SCD) i.e. suppression of an argument, also: NRY: 1) cessation, anniḥilation, extinction, stopping, exhaustion, final extinction. 3.) {‘gog pa, bkag pa, dgag pa, khog} trans. v.; to halt, cease, stop, block, hamper, hinder, impede, inhibit, prevent, repress; to block, obstruct, stop, hinder, limit; to hinder, | + | [[‘gog pa]] – refuted, stifled, to pull up from the [[root]] (SCD) i.e. suppression of an argument, also: NRY: 1) [[cessation]], anniḥilation, [[extinction]], stopping, exhaustion, final [[extinction]]. 3.) {[[‘gog pa]], bkag pa, [[dgag pa]], khog} trans. v.; to halt, cease, stop, block, hamper, hinder, impede, inhibit, prevent, repress; to block, obstruct, stop, hinder, limit; to hinder, |
− | ‘gog pa’i phyogs, pratisedhapakṣa - premise of refutation | + | ‘gog pa’i [[phyogs]], pratisedhapakṣa - premise of refutation |
‘gog tshul - manner or method of refutation or suppression [of an argument] | ‘gog tshul - manner or method of refutation or suppression [of an argument] | ||
− | ‘gyur med – unchanging | + | [[‘gyur]] med – [[unchanging]] |
− | ‘gyur med yongs grub - the unchanging pefected nature, unchanging real | + | [[‘gyur]] med [[yongs grub]] - the [[unchanging]] pefected [[nature]], [[unchanging]] real |
− | rgyu; hetu cause | + | rgyu; [[hetu]] [[cause]] |
− | rgyu mtshan – reason | + | [[rgyu mtshan]] – [[reason]] |
− | rgyud; saṃtāna - [mental] continuum | + | rgyud; [[saṃtāna]] - [[[mental]]] {{Wiki|continuum}} |
− | sgra, śabda - word, sound | + | [[sgra]], [[śabda]] - [[word]], [[sound]] |
− | sgrub byed - establishing, proving, effecting a proof | + | [[sgrub byed]] - establishing, proving, effecting a [[proof]] |
− | sgro | + | sgro ‘[[dogs]], samāropa – We choose the controversial translation “positivism.” The implications of this extreme position in [[Buddhism]] are quite similar to those in [[Western]] Positivist Schools, i.e., that external entities [[exist]], hence this is a [[form]] of “entical [[conceptualization]]” or superimposition. Webster’s informs us that the {{Wiki|Latin}} [[root]] is derived from ponere – “to place,” or “lay down.” Various definitions of “positive” include “1 a : formally laid down or |
− | imposed 2: not fictitious : real 4 a : having or expressing actual existence or quality as distinguished from deprivation or deficiency <positive change in temperature>: as (1) : capable of being constructively applied (2) : not speculative : | + | imposed 2: not fictitious : real 4 a : having or expressing actual [[existence]] or [[quality]] as {{Wiki|distinguished}} from deprivation or deficiency <positive change in temperature>: as (1) : capable of being constructively applied (2) : not speculative : [[empirical]]“ and interestingly from the [[Mahāyāna]] standpoint, “4 e : real and numerically greater than zero <+2 is a positive integer>“ i.e., “not [[śūnya]].” These definitions are corroborated by our [[Tibetan]] and [[Sanskrit]] |
− | dictionary sources. NRY: 1) imputation, misinterpretation, exaggeration, superimposition, uncertainty, [ascription, hypostatized, misconception, preconceptions, attribution, conceptualization]. 2) doubts; 3) superimposition [lit. “attaching a feather” i.e. adding what was not there to begin with]); MW: placing in or upon (loc.) (a bow); transference to (loc.), attribution. A common choice to translate this term is | + | {{Wiki|dictionary}} sources. NRY: 1) [[imputation]], misinterpretation, [[exaggeration]], superimposition, uncertainty, [ascription, [[Wikipedia:Hypostasis (philosophy and religion)|hypostatized]], {{Wiki|misconception}}, preconceptions, attribution, [[conceptualization]]]. 2) [[doubts]]; 3) superimposition [lit. “attaching a feather” i.e. adding what was not there to begin with]); MW: placing in or upon (loc.) (a [[bow]]); [[transference]] to (loc.), attribution. A common choice to translate this term is “[[imputation]]” having the meaning “to attribute” something that is not there. Superimpose has a similar meaning: “to place or lay over or above something” |
− | sgro | + | sgro ‘[[dogs]] kyi mtha - extreme of entical [[conceptualization]]; {{Wiki|fiction}}, invention, positivism |
NGA | NGA | ||
− | ngo bo, svabhāva - essence (GS: more accurately, “fitness to be something.” For example, gzugs kyi ngo bo or the | + | [[ngo bo]], [[svabhāva]] - [[essence]] (GS: more accurately, “fitness to be something.” For example, [[gzugs]] kyi [[ngo bo]] or the “[[essence]]” of [[form]] is [[gzugs]] su rung ba or “that which is appropriate as [[form]].” NRY: 1) [[essence]], [[nature]], [[character]], attribute, [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]], [[entity]], intrinsic / central / [[essential nature]], [[vital]] [[substance]], core, being, inmost [[nature]]. 2) [[principle]], [[existence]], fact. 3) [[entity]], fact of being, [[Wikipedia:Identity (social science)|identity]]. 4) [[definition]], main [[principle]]. 5) what it comes down to, at bottom, in fact, 5) [[essential meaning]] [in textual introduction]. |
− | ngo bo nyid kyi rang gi mtshan nyid yod pa - existing by way of its own essential characteristics | + | [[ngo bo nyid]] kyi [[rang gi mtshan nyid]] [[yod pa]] - [[existing]] by way of its [[own]] [[essential]] [[characteristics]] |
− | ngo bo nyid med pa - essentially non-existent | + | [[ngo bo nyid]] [[med pa]] - [[essentially]] [[non-existent]] |
− | ngo bo nyid med pa nyid - essential non-existence | + | [[ngo bo nyid]] [[med pa]] [[nyid]] - [[essential]] [[non-existence]] |
− | ngor bden, ngor bden pa - truth from a certain point of view; perspectival truth; relative truth. The strict definition has to do with ngo (SCD) “face,” or | + | [[ngor]] [[bden]], [[ngor]] [[bden pa]] - [[truth]] from a certain point of view; perspectival [[truth]]; [[relative truth]]. The strict [[definition]] has to do with ngo (SCD) “face,” or “[[countenance]],” with the [[locative]] “-r” means literally “to a face” hence, “perspectival.” |
− | ngos | + | ngos ‘[[dzin]], [[ngos bzung]] ba – identify, identification |
− | dngos po, vastu - entity; thing, impermanent phenomenon, functional phenomenon; | + | [[dngos po]], [[vastu]] - [[entity]]; thing, [[impermanent phenomenon]], functional [[phenomenon]]; |
− | dngos po med pa - non-existence of entity | + | [[dngos po]] [[med pa]] - [[non-existence]] of [[entity]] |
− | dngos po tsam – “merest entity.” (GS:)This is a reference to the other-dependent, which in Yogācāra thought, is the basis for all functional things or “entities.” | + | [[dngos po]] tsam – “merest [[entity]].” (GS:)This is a reference to the [[other-dependent]], which in [[Yogācāra]] [[thought]], is the basis for all functional things or “entities.” |
− | dngos smra ba - “Proponents of entity.” This refers to schools classed as Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika as well as the Yogācāra, because finally, the latter as well asserts the entical existence of consciousness. | + | [[dngos smra ba]] - “Proponents of [[entity]].” This refers to schools classed as [[Vaibhāṣika]] and [[Sautrāntika]] as well as the [[Yogācāra]], because finally, the [[latter]] as well asserts the entical [[existence]] of [[consciousness]]. |
− | mngon sum tsad ma - direct means of cognition | + | [[mngon sum]] tsad ma - direct [[means of cognition]] |
− | mngon du gyur pa - manifesting | + | mngon du gyur pa - [[manifesting]] |
− | mngon par brjod pa vyavahāra, abhilāpya (?) - verbal expression | + | mngon par brjod pa [[vyavahāra]], abhilāpya (?) - [[verbal]] expression |
− | mngon par zhen pa - subsumed in (NRY) habitual adherence, to completely cling, complete clinging, settling down, inclination | + | mngon par [[zhen pa]] - subsumed in (NRY) habitual adherence, to completely [[cling]], complete [[clinging]], settling down, inclination |
− | mngon par zhen pa - overt clinging/ fixation; to cling overtly | + | mngon par [[zhen pa]] - overt [[clinging]]/ fixation; to [[cling]] overtly |
− | mngon rdzogs - perfected | + | mngon [[rdzogs]] - perfected |
− | mngon sum du - direct, manifest | + | [[mngon sum]] du - direct, [[manifest]] |
− | sngo | + | sngo ‘[[dzin]] mig shes – identification by ocular or [[visual consciousness]] |
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CA | CA | ||
− | cung zad drag - of little use | + | cung [[zad]] drag - of little use |
CHA | CHA | ||
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chud gzon pa - ruination | chud gzon pa - ruination | ||
− | chos, dharma - phenomenon; ultimate reality; religion; holiness | + | [[chos]], [[dharma]] - [[phenomenon]]; [[ultimate reality]]; [[religion]]; holiness |
− | chos kyi dbyings, dharmadhātu – phenomenal realm, the universe | + | [[chos kyi dbyings]], [[dharmadhātu]] – [[phenomenal]] [[realm]], the [[universe]] |
− | chos gyi bdag med; dharmanairātmya - the selflessness of phenomena | + | [[chos]] gyi [[bdag med]]; [[dharmanairātmya]] - the [[selflessness of phenomena]] |
− | chos can, dharmin – subject (of a discussion) | + | [[chos can]], [[dharmin]] – [[subject]] (of a [[discussion]]) |
− | chos nyid, dharmatā - variously translated as | + | [[chos nyid]], [[dharmatā]] - variously translated as “[[reality]]” or “[[truth]],” etc., we chose to maintain the original [[Sanskrit]] term, viewing it as one of those cases where a translation cannot capture the original [[sense]]. “[[Dharmatā]]” is derived from the [[Sanskrit]] [[root]] “dhr” - “to hold” - and “[[Dharma]]” |
− | chos nyid kho na - merely or strictly dharmatā | + | [[chos nyid]] kho na - merely or strictly [[dharmatā]] |
− | chos ‘dul pa - religious training | + | [[chos]] ‘dul pa - [[religious]] {{Wiki|training}} |
− | chos rnams, dharma - | + | [[chos]] [[rnams]], [[dharma]] - [[phenomena]]” |
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− | ji lta ba bzhin - exactly, precisely | + | [[ji lta ba]] bzhin - exactly, precisely |
− | ‘jug tshul - “way” or “manner of entry” or | + | ‘jug tshul - “way” or “manner of entry” or “[[initiation]].” In the case of our text, “entrance into a [[philosophical view]]” is often the [[sense]] in context |
− | ‘jog pa - establish; place; (Cabezon, 1992:)posit | + | [[‘jog]] pa - establish; place; ([[Cabezon]], 1992:)posit |
− | ‘jog tshul - method of establishing | + | [[‘jog]] tshul - method of establishing |
− | + | ‘[[joms]] [[nus pa]] - capable of destruction | |
− | brjod du med pa - inexpressible, ineffable | + | brjod du [[med pa]] - inexpressible, {{Wiki|ineffable}} |
− | brjod du med pa bdag nyid kyis don dam par yod pa - ultimately existing as an inexpressible nature | + | brjod du [[med pa]] [[bdag nyid]] [[kyis]] [[don dam par]] [[yod pa]] - ultimately [[existing]] as an inexpressible [[nature]] |
brjod pa - expression | brjod pa - expression | ||
− | rJe bDag Nyid Chen po - Mahātma, | + | rJe bDag [[Nyid]] [[Chen po]] - [[Mahātma]], “[[Venerable]] [[Great Self]],” i.e, lCang skya’s honorific for [[Tsong kha pa]] |
NYA | NYA | ||
− | nyam gzhag gi gnas skabs - “time” or “occasion” of profound meditation.” | + | [[nyam]] gzhag gi [[gnas]] skabs - “time” or “occasion” of profound [[meditation]].” |
− | nyams su myong pa - mental experience | + | [[nyams]] su myong pa - [[mental]] [[experience]] |
− | gnyis snang - dual appearance, dualism | + | [[gnyis snang]] - dual [[appearance]], [[dualism]] |
− | gnyis snang nub pa - extinction or withdrawal of dual appearance (NRY:) nub pa - to sink, collapse, decline, decay; disappear, fall gradualy, go down, set, subside, vanish | + | [[gnyis snang]] [[nub pa]] - [[extinction]] or withdrawal of dual [[appearance]] (NRY:) [[nub pa]] - to sink, collapse, {{Wiki|decline}}, [[decay]]; disappear, fall gradualy, go down, set, subside, vanish |
− | mnyam gzhag zag med yeshe - the stainless gnosis of profound meditation | + | [[mnyam]] gzhag [[zag]] med yeshe - the stainless [[gnosis]] of profound [[meditation]] |
− | mnyam gzhag yeshe - the gnosis of profound meditation | + | [[mnyam]] gzhag yeshe - the [[gnosis]] of profound [[meditation]] |
rnyed don - the goal to be obtained | rnyed don - the goal to be obtained | ||
− | snyam pa - thinking, thought | + | snyam pa - [[thinking]], [[thought]] |
TA | TA | ||
− | ting nge ‘dzin, samādhi - concentration, meditation | + | [[ting nge ‘dzin]], [[samādhi]] - [[concentration]], [[meditation]] |
− | gtags pa tsam de kho na lta - viewpoint of the “thatness” or reality of mere imputation | + | gtags pa tsam [[de kho na]] lta - viewpoint of the “thatness” or [[reality]] of mere [[imputation]] |
− | gtags pa’i tshig - imputation of words | + | gtags pa’i tshig - [[imputation]] of words |
− | gtan la ‘bebs tshul - method of detailed explanation or resolution (NRY:) to establish, settle, ascertain, resolve, determine, come to a conclusion, arrive at certainty about, ascertaining the real condition; resolve, settle, establish, determine, conclude, put in order, ascertain, understand; systematize, set down systematically; ascertain, resolve; [sm. {gtan ‘bebs byed} establishment. to come to/ reach a definitive conclusion/ understanding; to codify | + | gtan la ‘bebs tshul - method of detailed explanation or resolution (NRY:) to establish, settle, ascertain, resolve, determine, come to a conclusion, arrive at {{Wiki|certainty}} about, ascertaining the real [[condition]]; resolve, settle, establish, determine, conclude, put in order, ascertain, understand; systematize, set down systematically; ascertain, resolve; [sm. {gtan ‘bebs [[byed]]} establishment. to come to/ reach a definitive conclusion/ [[understanding]]; to codify |
− | gtan med pa – extinguishing | + | gtan [[med pa]] – [[extinguishing]] |
− | btags pa stongs pa’i de kho na nyid – the thatness or (reality) which is devoid of imputation | + | [[btags pa]] stongs pa’i [[de kho na nyid]] – the thatness or ([[reality]]) which is devoid of [[imputation]] |
− | btags pa tsam - mere imputation | + | [[btags pa]] tsam - mere [[imputation]] |
− | btags pa’i tshig gi mtshan ma’i rten – the basis of characteristics of imputed words | + | btags pa’i tshig gi [[mtshan]] ma’i rten – the basis of [[characteristics]] of [[imputed]] words |
− | btags pa’i tshig tshan ma’i gzhi – the foundation of characteristics of words which are imputed | + | btags pa’i tshig tshan ma’i [[gzhi]] – the foundation of [[characteristics]] of words which are [[imputed]] |
− | rtags - reason, mark, | + | [[rtags]] - [[reason]], mark, |
− | rtags grub - establishment of the mark or reason | + | [[rtags]] grub - establishment of the mark or [[reason]] |
− | rtags pa’i yul - object of a reason or mark (of an argument = proof) | + | [[rtags]] pa’i yul - [[object]] of a [[reason]] or mark (of an argument = [[proof]]) |
− | rtogs pa - conceptual thought, conceptual consciousness, realization, (NRY:) comprehension | + | [[rtogs pa]] - [[conceptual thought]], [[conceptual consciousness]], [[realization]], (NRY:) [[comprehension]] |
− | rtogs p’ai yul - object of conceptual thought | + | rtogs p’ai yul - [[object]] of [[conceptual thought]] |
− | rtogs pa mdor bsdus - summary of the thought | + | [[rtogs pa]] mdor bsdus - summary of the [[thought]] |
− | lta’i shes - visual knowledge | + | lta’i shes - [[visual]] [[knowledge]] |
ltos nas - having relied upon | ltos nas - having relied upon | ||
− | sTug po bKod pa’i mdo, Gandavyuhasūtra – Compact Arrangement Sūtra (NRY:) Sūtra of the Dense Array | + | sTug po bKod pa’i mdo, Gandavyuhasūtra – Compact Arrangement [[Sūtra]] (NRY:) [[Sūtra]] of the Dense Array |
− | stongs pa nyid; śūnyatā - | + | stongs pa [[nyid]]; [[śūnyatā]] - “[[emptiness]]” or “[[emptiness]].” We opted for “[[zeroness]],” though while certainly idiosyncratic, is literally more accurate, avoids the negative connotations of “[[emptiness]]” and is a more [[neutral]] term, and finally, is rather more sonorous than many other translations, in our opinion. Further, just as the number zero occupies the middle place among the negative and positive integers, so does [[śūnya]] (zero) occupy the basis for the [[Middle Way]] of [[Buddhism]]. Finally, the English term “cipher” is derived from the [[Arabic]] sifra and this is in turn derived from the [[word]] [[śūnya]] from the [[Sanskrit]]. Webster’s gives the following for cipher: 1 a : zero1a b : one that has no {{Wiki|weight}}, worth, or influence : nonentity |
− | ston pa - show, teach, instruct; instruction, teaching | + | [[ston pa]] - show, teach, instruct; instruction, [[teaching]] |
− | bstan pa - doctrine or teaching, demonstrating | + | [[bstan pa]] - [[doctrine]] or [[teaching]], demonstrating |
TA | TA | ||
− | tha snyad – verbal designation | + | [[tha snyad]] – [[verbal]] designation |
− | tha snyad du byed pa – verbalize | + | [[tha snyad du]] [[byed pa]] – verbalize |
− | tha snyad gdags - verbal imputation | + | [[tha snyad]] gdags - [[verbal]] [[imputation]] |
− | tha dad - different or diverse | + | [[tha dad]] - different or diverse |
− | tham cad med pa - all is non-existent | + | tham cad [[med pa]] - all is [[non-existent]] |
− | theg chen, theg pa chen po pa – Mahāyāna , Mahāyānist | + | [[theg chen]], [[theg pa chen po]] pa – [[Mahāyāna]] , [[Mahāyānist]] |
− | Theg ba Chen po’i bsDus ba, Mahāyānasaṃgrāha - Compendium of the Great Vehicle | + | Theg ba [[Chen]] po’i bsDus ba, [[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]] - [[Compendium of the Great Vehicle]] |
− | mtha’, anta – extreme (lit. “end”) | + | mtha’, [[anta]] – extreme (lit. “end”) |
mtha’ dgag - refutation of an extreme [view] | mtha’ dgag - refutation of an extreme [view] | ||
− | mtha’ ‘gog tshul - method of refuting extreme [views] | + | mtha’ ‘gog tshul - method of refuting extreme [[[views]]] |
− | mtha’ gnyis - “the two | + | mtha’ [[gnyis]] - “the [[two extremes]]” of [[nihilism]] and positivism. |
− | mtha’ yas pa - limitless | + | mtha’ yas pa - [[limitless]] |
mthar rnyed - obtaining the final [result] | mthar rnyed - obtaining the final [result] | ||
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mthar thug - final | mthar thug - final | ||
− | mthar | + | mthar ‘[[dzin]] tshul - manner of cleaving to an extreme |
DA | DA | ||
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da dung - currently, “now” | da dung - currently, “now” | ||
− | de kho na nyid, tattva - | + | [[de kho na nyid]], [[tattva]] - “[[reality]].” (literally, “that-only-ness”) |
− | don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya - ultimate truth | + | [[don dam bden pa]], [[paramārthasatya]] - [[ultimate truth]] |
− | don dam pa - ultimate, ultimacy | + | [[don dam pa]] - [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]], ultimacy |
− | don dam par grub - ultimately established | + | [[don dam par]] grub - ultimately established |
− | don dam par med pa - non-existence ultimately | + | [[don dam par]] [[med pa]] - [[non-existence]] ultimately |
− | don dam dpyod byed kyi tsad ma - the means of cognition which effect ultimate examination | + | [[don dam]] dpyod [[byed]] kyi tsad ma - the [[means of cognition]] which effect [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] {{Wiki|examination}} |
− | don smra gnyis - the two [schools] which propound [the existence of] objects | + | don [[smra]] [[gnyis]] - the two [schools] which propound [the [[existence]] of] [[objects]] |
− | bdag nyid - nature, selfhood | + | [[bdag nyid]] - [[nature]], [[selfhood]] |
− | bdag med, nairātmya - selfless, selflessness | + | [[bdag med]], [[nairātmya]] - [[selfless]], [[selflessness]] |
− | bden pa - true, truth | + | [[bden pa]] - true, [[truth]] |
− | bden par grub pa – established as true | + | [[bden par grub pa]] – established as true |
− | bden par ma grub pa - not established as true | + | [[bden par]] [[ma grub]] pa - not established as true |
− | bden | + | [[bden]] ‘[[dzin]] - apprehension as truly [[[existent]]] |
− | mDo sde rGyan, Sutrālaṃkara - Ornament of the Sūtras | + | [[mDo]] sde rGyan, Sutrālaṃkara - Ornament of the [[Sūtras]] |
− | + | ‘[[dogs]] pa skye [[lugs]] - the manner of generating [[conceptualization]] | |
− | + | ‘[[dogs]] pa [[med pa]] - conceptionlessness | |
− | + | ‘[[dogs]] p’ai tshig - [[conceptualized]] term | |
− | + | ‘[[dogs]] pa’i [[gzhi]] - basis or foundation of [[conceptualization]] | |
− | ‘du shes, saṃjñā - composite consciousness | + | [[‘du shes]], [[saṃjñā]] - composite [[consciousness]] |
− | ‘dus byas - composite [phenomena] | + | ‘dus byas - composite [[[phenomena]]] |
− | ‘dus ma byas - non-composite [phenomena] (e.g. space) | + | ‘dus [[ma byas]] - non-composite [[[phenomena]]] (e.g. [[space]]) |
NA | NA | ||
− | ni - This peculiar Tibetan term might well be translated with a simple exclamation point, semi-colon or colon. It has no explicit meaning, but numerous implied meanings. Sometimes it is either introducing a new subject or restating a topic mentioned earlier but reintroduced. In our translation, at times we may simply italicize words set off by ni to indicate emphasis, or at other times, in brackets employ a number of words or punctuation marks to communicate this small but meaningful particle. | + | ni - This peculiar [[Tibetan]] term might well be translated with a simple exclamation point, semi-colon or colon. It has no explicit meaning, but numerous implied meanings. Sometimes it is either introducing a new [[subject]] or restating a topic mentioned earlier but reintroduced. In our translation, at times we may simply italicize words set off by ni to indicate {{Wiki|emphasis}}, or at other times, in brackets employ a number of words or punctuation marks to {{Wiki|communicate}} this small but meaningful {{Wiki|particle}}. |
− | gnas lugs – reality; (NRY:) Natural State, natural condition; fundamental nature (of reality); abiding nature [of reality]. the nature of the buddha body of reality. circumstances, condition, situation, fundamental nature, mode of being, natural condition / state, mode of being, natural situation, natural state, things as they are, news, ontological status, the actual condition of existing, situation, principle, truth, the natural state, mode of subsistence, the basic condition; nature. See also syn {yin lugs, gnas tshul}. Ex. {sems kyi + } the nature of mind | + | [[gnas lugs]] – [[reality]]; (NRY:) Natural [[State]], natural [[condition]]; fundamental [[nature]] (of [[reality]]); abiding [[nature]] [of [[reality]]]. the [[nature of the buddha]] [[body of reality]]. circumstances, [[condition]], situation, fundamental [[nature]], mode of being, natural [[condition]] / [[state]], mode of being, natural situation, natural [[state]], things as they are, news, [[Wikipedia:Ontology|ontological]] {{Wiki|status}}, the actual [[condition]] of [[existing]], situation, [[principle]], [[truth]], the natural [[state]], mode of subsistence, the basic [[condition]]; [[nature]]. See also syn {[[yin lugs]], [[gnas tshul]]}. Ex. {[[sems]] kyi + } the [[nature of mind]] |
− | gnod – [logical] error, fault | + | [[gnod]] – [[[logical]]] error, fault |
− | rnam grangs – enumeration | + | [[rnam grangs]] – {{Wiki|enumeration}} |
− | rnam ‘grel - sub-commentary | + | [[rnam]] ‘grel - [[sub-commentary]] |
− | rnam dag lam - the pure path | + | [[rnam dag]] lam - the [[pure]] [[path]] |
− | rnam par | + | [[rnam]] par ‘[[jig pa]] - destroyed, eliminated |
− | rnam rig tsam - mere cognition, cognition-only | + | [[rnam rig tsam]] - mere [[cognition]], [[cognition-only]] |
− | snang gi blad pa - corrupt appearance | + | [[snang]] gi blad pa - corrupt [[appearance]] |
− | snang gnyis - dual appearance | + | [[snang]] [[gnyis]] - dual [[appearance]] |
PA | PA | ||
− | dpyis phyin pa - perfect, unmistaken | + | dpyis phyin pa - {{Wiki|perfect}}, unmistaken |
spangs pa - eradicating or rejecting | spangs pa - eradicating or rejecting | ||
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PHA | PHA | ||
− | Phags pa dGongs pa NGes par ‘Grel pa, Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra – The Sūtra Unravelling the Intention [of the Buddha] | + | [[Phags pa]] dGongs pa NGes par ‘Grel pa, Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra – The [[Sūtra]] Unravelling the [[Intention]] [of the [[Buddha]]] |
− | phags pa’i gzigs pa - the vision of or what is seen by an Āryan [bodhisattva] | + | phags pa’i gzigs pa - the [[vision]] of or what is seen by an [[Āryan]] [[[bodhisattva]]] |
− | phags pa’i yeshe - the gnosis of an Āryan, Āryajñāna | + | phags pa’i yeshe - the [[gnosis]] of an [[Āryan]], [[Āryajñāna]] |
− | phung po rnams, skandhas - aggregates [of sentient existence] | + | [[phung po]] [[rnams]], [[skandhas]] - [[aggregates]] [of [[sentient]] [[existence]]] |
phyi rol tu - external, outside, outer | phyi rol tu - external, outside, outer | ||
− | phyin ci log gi dngos po - mistaken entity | + | phyin ci log gi [[dngos po]] - mistaken [[entity]] |
− | phyogs snga ma - prior premise or predicate | + | [[phyogs]] snga ma - prior premise or predicate |
− | phra mo - subtle | + | [[phra]] mo - {{Wiki|subtle}} |
BA | BA | ||
− | Bod – Tibet | + | Bod – [[Tibet]] |
− | Bram ze - Brahmin | + | [[Bram ze]] - [[Brahmin]] |
− | BYang sa, Bodhisattvabhūmi – The Stage or Ground of the Bodhisattva | + | BYang sa, [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]] – The Stage or Ground of the [[Bodhisattva]] |
− | byang sems or byang chub sems dpa’ – bodhisattva | + | [[byang sems]] or [[byang chub sems dpa’]] – [[bodhisattva]] |
− | byung ba - occurrence, happening, event, manifestiation, element | + | byung ba - occurrence, happening, event, manifestiation, [[element]] |
− | dbang po mngon sum tsad ma - the direct or sensorial means of cognition | + | [[dbang po mngon sum]] tsad ma - the direct or [[sensorial]] [[means of cognition]] |
− | dbang shes - sensory awareness, sense faculties | + | [[dbang]] shes - sensory [[awareness]], [[sense faculties]] |
− | dBu ma, Madhyamaka - Middle Way | + | dBu ma, [[Madhyamaka]] - [[Middle Way]] |
− | dBu ma pa (sg.) dbu ma pa rnams (pl), Mādhyamika - proponent(s) of the Middle Way | + | dBu ma pa (sg.) [[dbu ma pa]] [[rnams]] (pl), [[Mādhyamika]] - proponent(s) of the [[Middle Way]] |
− | dBu ma sNang ba, Madhyamakāloka - Clarification of the Middle Way | + | dBu ma sNang ba, [[Madhyamakāloka]] - Clarification of the [[Middle Way]] |
− | dBus mTha’, Madhyāntavibhāga; - Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes | + | [[dBus]] mTha’, [[Madhyāntavibhāga]]; - Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes |
− | sbyod yul - sphere of knowledge, object of practice | + | sbyod yul - [[sphere]] of [[knowledge]], [[object]] of practice |
MA | MA | ||
− | ma yin pa dag - non-existents | + | ma [[yin]] pa dag - non-existents |
− | ma yin dgag - affirming negation (NRY:) 1) affirming negation, deductive reasoning [negation]. 2) “the denial that, even if a certain something can be said to exist, it has any given property or nature.” This is the second of Nāgārjuna’s two famous denials, dealt with in the opening stanza of his Madhyamakakarikā; provisional/ qualified negation; affirming negative, affirmative negation, “rejected as not being such and such”. comp. {med dgag} or | + | [[ma yin dgag]] - [[affirming]] {{Wiki|negation}} (NRY:) 1) [[affirming]] {{Wiki|negation}}, [[deductive reasoning]] [{{Wiki|negation}}]. 2) “the {{Wiki|denial}} that, even if a certain something can be said to [[exist]], it has any given property or [[nature]].” This is the second of [[Nāgārjuna’s]] two famous denials, dealt with in the opening [[stanza]] of his Madhyamakakarikā; provisional/ qualified {{Wiki|negation}}; [[affirming]] negative, affirmative {{Wiki|negation}}, “rejected as not being such and such”. comp. {[[med dgag]]} or “[[absolute negation]]” (see below). |
mi mthun pa - unharmonious, incongruous | mi mthun pa - unharmonious, incongruous | ||
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mi ‘thad - incorrect | mi ‘thad - incorrect | ||
− | mi dod - non-assertion, non-acceptance, undesirable | + | mi [[dod]] - non-assertion, non-acceptance, undesirable |
− | mi rigs - incorrect, unaware, ignorant | + | [[mi rigs]] - incorrect, unaware, [[ignorant]] |
− | ming du btags - nominally imputed | + | [[ming]] du btags - nominally [[imputed]] |
− | med dgag - non-affirming negation (NRY:) refutation as nonexistent; flat/ total negation; absolute negation, non-affirming negative, exclusion negation; explicit negation; refuting as being nonexistent, direct / non-affirming negation, [comp. with {ma yin dgag} med dgag dang ma yin dgag - negation of all and beyond negation, negation of all and negation of negation itself, reputing as non-existent and reputing as not being such and such (see above) | + | [[med dgag]] - non-affirming {{Wiki|negation}} (NRY:) refutation as [[Wikipedia:Nothing|nonexistent]]; flat/ total {{Wiki|negation}}; [[absolute negation]], non-affirming negative, exclusion {{Wiki|negation}}; explicit {{Wiki|negation}}; refuting as being [[Wikipedia:Nothing|nonexistent]], direct / non-affirming {{Wiki|negation}}, [comp. with {[[ma yin dgag]]} [[med dgag]] dang [[ma yin dgag]] - {{Wiki|negation}} of all and beyond {{Wiki|negation}}, {{Wiki|negation}} of all and {{Wiki|negation}} of {{Wiki|negation}} itself, reputing as [[non-existent]] and reputing as not being such and such (see above) |
− | med dgag yul - object of non-affirming negation | + | [[med dgag]] yul - [[object]] of non-affirming {{Wiki|negation}} |
− | med dgos - necessarily non-existent | + | med dgos - necessarily [[non-existent]] |
− | med du zin pa - cleaving to non-existence | + | med du [[zin pa]] - cleaving to [[non-existence]] |
− | med pa - non-existence | + | [[med pa]] - [[non-existence]] |
med par lta – nihilismistic view | med par lta – nihilismistic view | ||
− | med par thal - non-existence as a consequence | + | med par [[thal]] - [[non-existence]] as a consequence |
− | myong - experience | + | myong - [[experience]] |
− | myong rig - experiential awareness | + | myong rig - experiential [[awareness]] |
− | dman pa rnams - inferiors, inferior people | + | dman pa [[rnams]] - inferiors, {{Wiki|inferior}} [[people]] |
− | dmigs pa - object | + | dmigs pa - [[object]] |
− | smra rgyang, Śrāvakāyanist – (GS:) alternative form of theg dman or nyan thos kyi theg pa, the “Hearer’s Vehicle,” synonomous with the unpolitically correct and out-dated term Hinayānist or Proponent of the | + | [[smra]] rgyang, Śrāvakāyanist – (GS:) alternative [[form]] of [[theg dman]] or [[nyan thos kyi theg pa]], the “Hearer’s [[Vehicle]],” synonomous with the unpolitically correct and out-dated term Hinayānist or Proponent of the “{{Wiki|Inferior}}” or “Lesser” [[Vehicle]] |
− | smra ba – stating | + | [[smra]] ba – stating |
TSA | TSA | ||
− | rtsa ‘grel - root text and commentary | + | rtsa ‘grel - [[root text]] and commentary |
TSHa | TSHa | ||
− | tshig tsam - mere verbalization, strictly verbal | + | tshig tsam - mere verbalization, strictly [[verbal]] |
− | tshe dang ldan pa, ayuṣman - “gentleman” (literally, “one possessing life;”) | + | [[tshe]] dang ldan pa, ayuṣman - “gentleman” (literally, “one possessing [[life]];”) |
− | mtshan nyid gsum - the three characteristics (these refer to the characteristics of the three natures) | + | [[mtshan nyid gsum]] - [[the three characteristics]] (these refer to the [[characteristics]] of the [[three natures]]) |
− | mtshan nyid kho na - strictly or only characteristics | + | [[mtshan nyid]] kho na - strictly or only [[characteristics]] |
− | mtshan nyid kyis med pa - non-existent by means of characteristics | + | [[mtshan nyid]] [[kyis]] [[med pa]] - [[non-existent]] by means of [[characteristics]] |
− | mtshan nyid kyis yod pa - existent by means of characteristics | + | [[mtshan nyid]] [[kyis]] [[yod pa]] - [[existent]] by means of [[characteristics]] |
− | mtshan ma med pa - signlessness, characterlessness | + | [[mtshan ma med pa]] - signlessness, characterlessness |
DZA | DZA | ||
− | + | ‘[[dzin]] [[rnam]] - the [[subjective]] or apprehending aspect | |
− | + | ‘[[dzin pa]] - apprehending or [[grasping]] | |
− | + | ‘[[dzin]] tshul - mode or means of apprehension | |
− | rdzas – substance, substantial, material | + | [[rdzas]] – [[substance]], substantial, material |
− | rdzas su grub pa - substantially established | + | [[rdzas]] su [[grub pa]] - substantially established |
ZHA | ZHA | ||
− | zhen yul - object of attachment | + | [[zhen yul]] - [[object]] of [[attachment]] |
zhes p’ai don - the aim or meaning of a statement | zhes p’ai don - the aim or meaning of a statement | ||
− | gzhan dbang - the other-dependent [nature] | + | [[gzhan dbang]] - the [[other-dependent]] [[[nature]]] |
− | bzhed pa - acceptance, adherence | + | bzhed pa - [[acceptance]], adherence |
ZA | ZA | ||
− | zab mo lta ba’i lam gyi rim pa - the stage of the path of the profound view | + | zab mo lta ba’i lam gyi rim pa - the stage of the [[path]] of the [[profound view]] |
− | zag med - stainless | + | [[zag]] med - stainless |
− | zag med yeshe - stainless gnosis | + | [[zag]] med yeshe - stainless [[gnosis]] |
− | gzugs - form | + | [[gzugs]] - [[form]] |
− | gzugs sogs kyi chos rnams - the phenomena of form, etc. | + | [[gzugs]] [[sogs]] kyi [[chos]] [[rnams]] - the [[phenomena]] of [[form]], etc. |
− | gzung ‘dzin - subject/object, grasper, grasped | + | [[gzung ‘dzin]] - subject/object, grasper, grasped |
− | gzung ‘dzin rdzas gzhan - the substantial difference [between] subject and object | + | [[gzung ‘dzin]] [[rdzas]] [[gzhan]] - the substantial difference [between] [[subject]] and [[object]] |
− | bzlog tu med pa – irreversible | + | bzlog tu [[med pa]] – irreversible |
YA | YA | ||
− | yang dag par grub pa - completely or purely established | + | [[yang dag]] par [[grub pa]] - completely or purely established |
− | yang dag par ma grub pa - incompletely or impurely established | + | [[yang dag]] [[par ma]] [[grub pa]] - incompletely or impurely established |
− | yul can - subject, (possessor of an object) | + | [[yul can]] - [[subject]], (possessor of an [[object]]) |
− | yeshe - gnosis, wisdom | + | yeshe - [[gnosis]], [[wisdom]] |
− | yongs grup - the perfected [nature] (NRY:) the absolute, corresponds to absolute truth, absolute, | + | yongs grup - the perfected [[[nature]]] (NRY:) the [[absolute]], corresponds to [[absolute truth]], [[absolute]], ‘[[fully established]]’. [[consummate]], established [[reality]], established [[phenomena]], full presence, [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[cognition]] of [[reality]], brought to [[perfection]], [[fully established]], synonium [[absolute]], the ideally [[absolute]], totally real, perfected, thoroughly established [[phenomena]], thoroughly established [esp. in context of {[[mtshan nyid gsum]]}. full presence, thoroughly established, the ideally [[absolute]]. {[[yongs su grub pa]]} the [[absolute]], corresponds to [[absolute truth]], [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] [[cognition]] of [[reality]], brought to [[perfection]], totally real, perfected, thoroughly established [[phenomena]], thoroughly established [esp. in context of {[[mtshan nyid gsum]]}. [[fully established]], synonium [[absolute]]; gdod ma’i [[don dam]] [[chos thams cad]] kyi [[chos nyid]]} [[rang rig]] [[rang gsal]] [[spros pa]] thams cad [[dang bral ba]] de [[yin]] te/ [[chos nyid]] dang [[chos dbyings]] dang/ [[de bzhin nyid]] dang/ [[don dam pa]] [[rnams]] [[ming]] gi [[rnam grangs]] so} the [[absolute]]; [[don dam par]] [[yod pa]] [[ste]] [[rnam]] par [[mi rtog]] pa’i yul [[yin]] pa’i [[phyir]] ro} thoroughly established |
− | yod, yod pa - existent, existing | + | [[yod]], [[yod pa]] - [[existent]], [[existing]] |
RA | RA | ||
− | rang gi rgyus bskyed pa - originating or generated from itself as a cause | + | rang gi rgyus [[bskyed pa]] - originating or generated from itself as a [[cause]] |
− | rang gi ngo bo med pa - devoid of or non-existent with regard to its own essence | + | [[rang gi ngo bo]] [[med pa]] - devoid of or [[non-existent]] with regard to its [[own essence]] |
− | rang gi mtshan nyid - possessing its own characteristics | + | [[rang gi mtshan nyid]] - possessing its [[own]] [[characteristics]] |
− | rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa - established or demonstrated by its own characteristics | + | [[rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa]] - established or demonstrated by its [[own]] [[characteristics]] |
− | rang gi mtshan nyid kyis ma grub pa - not established or demonstrated by its own characteristics | + | [[rang gi mtshan nyid]] [[kyis]] [[ma grub]] pa - not established or demonstrated by its [[own]] [[characteristics]] |
− | rang gi gnas tsod - its own standpoint | + | rang gi [[gnas]] tsod - its [[own]] standpoint |
− | rang gi rigs ‘dra snga ma’i rgyus bskyed pa - originating or generated through the cause of its own prior continuum | + | rang gi [[rigs]] ‘dra snga ma’i rgyus [[bskyed pa]] - originating or generated through the [[cause]] of its [[own]] prior {{Wiki|continuum}} |
− | rang ngos nas - from its own essence | + | rang ngos nas - from its [[own essence]] |
− | rang mtshan dmigs p’ai tsad ma – means of cognition that experience or see its own characteristic or sign. | + | [[rang mtshan]] dmigs p’ai tsad ma – [[means of cognition]] that [[experience]] or see its [[own]] [[characteristic]] or sign. |
− | rang mtshan gyis grub - proven or demonstrated by means of its own characteristics | + | [[rang mtshan]] gyis grub - proven or demonstrated by means of its [[own]] [[characteristics]] |
− | rang bzhin med pa’i tshad ma - means of the cognition of the non-existence of inherent existence | + | [[rang bzhin med]] pa’i [[tshad ma]] - means of the [[cognition]] of the [[non-existence]] of [[inherent existence]] |
− | rang rig - self-awareness | + | [[rang rig]] - [[self-awareness]] |
− | rang rig khas len pa - assertion or acceptance of the self-awareness | + | [[rang rig]] [[khas len]] pa - [[assertion]] or [[acceptance]] of the [[self-awareness]] |
− | rang rig gis yul can - the subject with self-awareness | + | [[rang rig]] gis [[yul can]] - the [[subject]] with [[self-awareness]] |
− | rang rig sgrub byed - effecting the proof of the self-awareness | + | [[rang rig]] [[sgrub byed]] - effecting the [[proof]] of the [[self-awareness]] |
− | rang rig tsam - mere self-awareness | + | [[rang rig]] tsam - mere [[self-awareness]] |
− | rig gi shes pa - logical knowledge | + | rig gi [[shes pa]] - [[logical]] [[knowledge]] |
− | rigs pa - logic, awareness (NRY:) logical, tenable, appropriate, fits, makes sense; it is fitting. 2) philosophy, reasoning, reason, rational thinking - the type of reasoning that employs logical principles and analysis, logical arguement, suitably correct method, the right method, reasoning | + | [[rigs pa]] - [[logic]], [[awareness]] (NRY:) [[logical]], tenable, appropriate, fits, makes [[sense]]; it is fitting. 2) [[philosophy]], {{Wiki|reasoning}}, [[reason]], [[rational thinking]] - the type of {{Wiki|reasoning}} that employs [[logical]] {{Wiki|principles}} and analysis, [[logical]] arguement, suitably correct method, the right method, {{Wiki|reasoning}} |
− | rigs pa’i gnod pa - logically faulty | + | [[rigs]] pa’i [[gnod]] pa - [[logically]] faulty |
− | rigs pa las - logically, logical outcome | + | [[rigs pa]] las - [[logically]], [[logical]] outcome |
rung, rung ba - appropriate, proper | rung, rung ba - appropriate, proper | ||
− | reg - touch, reach | + | reg - {{Wiki|touch}}, reach |
LA | LA | ||
Line 3,697: | Line 3,923: | ||
lan du - in response, as an answer | lan du - in response, as an answer | ||
− | Lang kar gShegs pa, Laṅkāvatara-sūtra – Descent to [Śrī] Laṅkā | + | Lang kar gShegs pa, Laṅkāvatara-sūtra – Descent to [[[Śrī]]] {{Wiki|Laṅkā}} |
− | lam bgrod tshul gnyis - the two means of traversing the path | + | [[lam bgrod tshul]] [[gnyis]] - the two means of traversing the [[path]] |
− | lugs - system, school | + | [[lugs]] - system, school |
− | lung - scripture | + | lung - [[scripture]] |
− | lung gi rjes ‘brang - adherents of scripture | + | lung gi rjes ‘brang - {{Wiki|adherents}} of [[scripture]] |
− | lus nyid du – embodiment | + | lus [[nyid]] du – [[embodiment]] |
− | Legs bShad sNying po - The Heart of Superb Elucidation | + | {{Wiki|Legs}} bShad sNying po - The [[Heart]] of Superb Elucidation |
log pa - mistaken, perverse | log pa - mistaken, perverse | ||
− | log par zhugs pa - mistakenly or perversely abiding, steadfast in error | + | log par [[zhugs pa]] - mistakenly or perversely abiding, steadfast in error |
− | log par zin pa - mistakenly or perversely apprehending | + | log par [[zin pa]] - mistakenly or perversely apprehending |
− | blo - intellect | + | blo - [[intellect]] |
− | blo kun rdzob pa - mental concealment | + | blo [[kun rdzob]] pa - [[mental]] [[concealment]] |
− | blo ldan – sentient | + | [[blo ldan]] – [[sentient]] |
− | slob dpon - Master | + | [[slob dpon]] - [[Master]] |
bslad pa - corrupt, mixed up | bslad pa - corrupt, mixed up | ||
Line 3,731: | Line 3,957: | ||
SA | SA | ||
− | so so skye bo - ordinary individual, “everyman,” generic person, one who is not at Āryan bodhisattva | + | [[so so skye bo]] - ordinary {{Wiki|individual}}, “everyman,” generic [[person]], one who is not at [[Āryan]] [[bodhisattva]] |
− | so so rang gis rig p’ai yeshe – Wisdom aware by itself of each and everything (NRY:) discriminating awareness wisdom so so rang gi rig pa - particularising, intrinsic awareness, believed to exist in absolute truth by {sems tsam} | + | so so rang gis rig p’ai yeshe – [[Wisdom]] {{Wiki|aware}} by itself of each and everything (NRY:) [[discriminating awareness wisdom]] so so [[rang gi rig pa]] - particularising, [[intrinsic awareness]], believed to [[exist]] in [[absolute truth]] by {[[sems tsam]]} |
− | gsungs pa - doctrine, teaching | + | gsungs pa - [[doctrine]], [[teaching]] |
− | bsam pa - thinking, keeping in mind | + | [[bsam pa]] - [[thinking]], keeping in [[mind]] |
bsu ba - invite, inviting | bsu ba - invite, inviting | ||
Line 3,743: | Line 3,969: | ||
SHA | SHA | ||
− | shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis - the two approaches of the Great Chariot | + | [[shing rta]] [[chen]] po’i srol [[gnyis]] - the two approaches of the [[Great Chariot]] |
− | shugs la - implicitly | + | [[shugs]] la - implicitly |
− | shes pa - knowledge, understanding | + | [[shes pa]] - [[knowledge]], [[understanding]] |
− | bshad pa - explanation | + | [[bshad pa]] - explanation |
− | Appendix C: Select Bibliography | + | Appendix C: Select [[Bibliography]] |
− | Asaṅga The Summary of the Great Vehicle | + | [[Asaṅga]] The [[Summary of the Great Vehicle]] |
− | (as translated from the Chinese by John Keenan) | + | (as translated from the {{Wiki|Chinese}} by {{Wiki|John Keenan}}) |
− | (Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992) | + | ([[Berkeley]]: [[Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research]], 1992) |
− | Baird, Robert (1972) Bloom, Alfred, Indian and Far Eastern Religious Traditions (from the preface to Baird’s work), (New York: Harper and Row), 1972. | + | Baird, Robert (1972) Bloom, Alfred, [[Indian]] and Far Eastern [[Religious]] [[Traditions]] (from the preface to Baird’s work), ([[New York]]: Harper and Row), 1972. |
Bareau, André (1955) Les Sectes Bouddhique du Petit Vehicule, (Saïgon: l’Ucole Française d’Uxtrême-Orient, 1955) Publications de l’Ucole Française d’Uxtrême-Orient, Vol. XXVIII. | Bareau, André (1955) Les Sectes Bouddhique du Petit Vehicule, (Saïgon: l’Ucole Française d’Uxtrême-Orient, 1955) Publications de l’Ucole Française d’Uxtrême-Orient, Vol. XXVIII. | ||
Line 3,764: | Line 3,990: | ||
Baur, F. C. (1863) Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche, Erster Band, Kirchengeschichte der Drei Ersten Jahrhunderte | Baur, F. C. (1863) Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche, Erster Band, Kirchengeschichte der Drei Ersten Jahrhunderte | ||
(Tübingen: Verlag und Druck von L. Fr. Fues.) 1863 | (Tübingen: Verlag und Druck von L. Fr. Fues.) 1863 | ||
− | Third edition (From an unaltered photocopied printing of the original, Berlin, DDR: Nationales Druckhaus), 1969. | + | Third edition (From an [[unaltered]] photocopied [[printing]] of the original, [[Berlin]], DDR: Nationales Druckhaus), 1969. |
− | Bhattacārya, Kamaleswar (1985) “The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna ” | + | Bhattacārya, Kamaleswar (1985) “The [[Dialectical Method]] of [[Nāgārjuna]] ” |
− | Journal of Indian Philosophy 1 | + | [[Journal of Indian Philosophy]] 1 |
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971) [I have reworked the section quoted]. | (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971) [I have reworked the section quoted]. | ||
− | Brubaker, Rogers Theory and Society, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers), 1985 | + | Brubaker, Rogers {{Wiki|Theory}} and [[Society]], ({{Wiki|Amsterdam}}: Elsevier [[Science]] Publishers), 1985 |
− | Cabezon, Jose A Dose of Emptiness: an Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas-grub dGe-legs-dpal-bzang | + | [[Cabezon]], Jose A Dose of [[Emptiness]]: an Annotated Translation of the [[sTong thun chen mo]] of [[mKhas-grub]] dGe-legs-dpal-bzang |
− | (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992) | + | ([[Albany]]: [[State University of New York Press]], 1992) |
− | Candrakīrti | + | [[Candrakīrti]] |
− | Prāsaṅnapada - seminar translations, worked through with my B. A. and Master’s Advisor, Isshi Yamada | + | Prāsaṅnapada - seminar translations, worked through with my B. A. and [[Master’s]] Advisor, [[Isshi]] Yamada |
− | Doniger, Wendy Criterion, Journal of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, | + | Doniger, Wendy Criterion, Journal of the [[Divinity]] School of the [[University of Chicago]], |
− | (Chicago: University of Chicago Divinity School, Winter, 1991). | + | ({{Wiki|Chicago}}: [[University of Chicago]] [[Divinity]] School, Winter, 1991). |
− | Eliade, Mircea Encyclopedia of Religion, , editor. (New York: Macmillan) 1987 | + | [[Wikipedia:Mircea Eliade|Eliade]], Mircea {{Wiki|Encyclopedia}} of [[Religion]], , editor. ([[New York]]: Macmillan) 1987 |
Everding, Karl-Heinz Der Präexistenzen der lCang. skya Qutuqtus: Untersuchungen zur Konstruktion und Historischen Enwicklung einer Lamaisschen Existenzenlinie | Everding, Karl-Heinz Der Präexistenzen der lCang. skya Qutuqtus: Untersuchungen zur Konstruktion und Historischen Enwicklung einer Lamaisschen Existenzenlinie | ||
(Weisbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988) | (Weisbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988) | ||
− | Fenner, Peter Ontology of the Middle Way | + | Fenner, Peter {{Wiki|Ontology}} of the [[Middle Way]] |
− | (Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990) | + | (Dordrecht; [[Boston]]: Kluwer {{Wiki|Academic}} Publishers, 1990) |
− | Frauwallner, Erich On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu | + | {{Wiki|Frauwallner}}, Erich On the Date of the [[Buddhist Master]] of the Law [[Vasubandhu]] |
− | (Rome : Istituto Italiano per il Medio e Estremo Oriente, 1951 ) | + | ({{Wiki|Rome}} : Istituto Italiano per il Medio e Estremo Oriente, 1951 ) |
− | Gill, Sam Mother Earth: an American Story, | + | Gill, Sam [[Mother Earth]]: an [[American]] Story, |
− | (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). | + | ({{Wiki|Chicago}}: [[University of Chicago Press]], 1987). |
− | Gomez, Luis O. “Proto-Madhyamaka in the Pali | + | Gomez, Luis O. “Proto-Madhyamaka in the [[Pali canon]]” |
− | (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press) 26, no. 2 April 1976, pages 137-165. | + | ([[Honolulu]]: {{Wiki|University of Hawaii Press}}) 26, no. 2 April 1976, pages 137-165. |
Griffiths, Paul On Being Mindless | Griffiths, Paul On Being Mindless | ||
(La Salle: Open Court, 1986). | (La Salle: Open Court, 1986). | ||
− | Harker, Richard, editor An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: the Theory of Practice | + | Harker, Richard, editor An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: the {{Wiki|Theory}} of Practice |
− | (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). | + | ([[New York]]: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). |
Harnack, Adolf von Das Wesen des Christentums | Harnack, Adolf von Das Wesen des Christentums | ||
− | (Berlin, 1900) | + | ([[Berlin]], 1900) |
− | as translated by T. Saunders, What is Christianity? | + | as translated by T. Saunders, What is [[Christianity]]? |
− | (New York: Harper), 1957. | + | ([[New York]]: Harper), 1957. |
− | Harris, Ian Charles, The Continuity of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra in Mahāyāna Buddhism | + | Harris, Ian Charles, The Continuity of [[Mādhyamika]] and [[Yogācāra]] in [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] |
− | (Leiden : E. J. Brill), 1991 | + | ([[Leiden]] : E. J. Brill), 1991 |
− | Hopkins, Jeffrey Emptiness Yoga: The Middle Way Consequence School | + | Hopkins, Jeffrey [[Emptiness]] [[Yoga]]: The [[Middle Way Consequence School]] |
− | (Ithaca: | + | (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1987). |
− | __________ Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism | + | __________ [[Compassion]] in [[Tibetan Buddhism]] |
− | (London: Rider, 1980) | + | ([[London]]: Rider, 1980) |
− | Huntington, Christopher The Emptiness of Emptiness: an Introduction to early Indian Mādhyamika | + | [[Huntington]], Christopher The [[Emptiness of Emptiness]]: an Introduction to early [[Indian Mādhyamika]] |
− | (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989). | + | ([[Honolulu]]: {{Wiki|University of Hawaii Press}}, 1989). |
− | Husserl, Edmund The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology | + | [[Wikipedia:Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl|Husserl]], Edmund The Crisis of {{Wiki|European}} [[Sciences]] and [[Transcendental]] {{Wiki|Phenomenology}} |
as translated by David Carr | as translated by David Carr | ||
− | (Evanston: Northwestern University Press) 1970 | + | (Evanston: Northwestern {{Wiki|University}} Press) 1970 |
(originally published in the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.) | (originally published in the Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.) | ||
− | Ichigo, Masamichi Madhyamkālaṃkara of Śāntarakṣita | + | Ichigo, Masamichi Madhyamkālaṃkara of [[Śāntarakṣita]] |
− | Chugan Shogonron no kenkyu Kyoto, 1985, pages LXXXV Jñānagarbha and svasamvedana lxxxi english intro | + | Chugan Shogonron no kenkyu {{Wiki|Kyoto}}, 1985, pages LXXXV [[Jñānagarbha]] and [[svasamvedana]] lxxxi english intro |
− | Iida, Shotaro Reason and Emptiness: a Study in Logic and Mysticism | + | Iida, Shotaro [[Reason]] and [[Emptiness]]: a Study in [[Logic]] and [[Mysticism]] |
− | (Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980) | + | ([[Tokyo]]: Hokuseido Press, 1980) |
− | Inada, Kenneth Nāgārjuna : a Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥs | + | Inada, Kenneth [[Nāgārjuna]] : a Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥs |
− | (Albany : State University of New York Press), 1973 | + | ([[Albany]] : [[State University of New York Press]]), 1973 |
Jong, J.W. de “Review of Karl-Heinz Everding’s Der Präexistenzen der lCang. skya Qutuqtus,” | Jong, J.W. de “Review of Karl-Heinz Everding’s Der Präexistenzen der lCang. skya Qutuqtus,” | ||
− | Indo-Iranian Journal, | + | [[Indo-Iranian Journal]], |
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), vol. 34, no. 2, April 1991. | (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), vol. 34, no. 2, April 1991. | ||
− | __________ “Notes on the Bodhisattvabhūmi ” | + | __________ “Notes on the [[Bodhisattvabhūmi]] ” |
Hinduismus und Buddhismus: Festschrift for Ulrich Schneider | Hinduismus und Buddhismus: Festschrift for Ulrich Schneider | ||
edited by Harry Falk | edited by Harry Falk | ||
(Freiburg: Hedwig Falk, 1987), pages 163-172 | (Freiburg: Hedwig Falk, 1987), pages 163-172 | ||
− | __________ Jong, J. W. de (1994), Review of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: a Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies (IIJ, vol. 37, Jan. 1994) pp. 63-64. | + | __________ Jong, J. W. de (1994), Review of [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]]: a Study of [[Mahāyāna]] [[Philosophies]] (IIJ, vol. 37, Jan. 1994) pp. 63-64. |
− | __________ de Jong, (1994), Review of Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācara in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. (IIJ, no. 4, 1994) | + | __________ de Jong, (1994), Review of Continuity of [[Madhyamaka]] and Yogācara in [[Indian]] [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]]. (IIJ, no. 4, 1994) |
− | Krmpfe Hans Rainer Bi ma’i ‘od zer: die Biographie des 2. Pekinger lCang skya Qutuqtu Rol pa’i rdo rje (1717 - 1786 | + | Krmpfe Hans Rainer Bi ma’i ‘od zer: [[die]] Biographie des 2. Pekinger lCang skya Qutuqtu [[Rol pa’i rdo rje]] (1717 - 1786 |
Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und zusammengefasst von Hans Rainer Krmpfe | Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und zusammengefasst von Hans Rainer Krmpfe | ||
(St. Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag, 1976). | (St. Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag, 1976). | ||
− | Kalupahana, David, Nāgārjuna : the Philosophy of the Middle Way | + | [[Kalupahana]], David, [[Nāgārjuna]] : the [[Philosophy]] of the [[Middle Way]] |
− | (Albany: SUNY Press), 1986 | + | ([[Albany]]: SUNY Press), 1986 |
Kern, Hendrick Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l’Inde (2 vols.) | Kern, Hendrick Histoire du Bouddhisme dans l’Inde (2 vols.) | ||
− | (Paris: Ministère de l’Instruction Publique, 1901). | + | ({{Wiki|Paris}}: Ministère de l’Instruction Publique, 1901). |
Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliotèque d’Études, tom. 11. | Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliotèque d’Études, tom. 11. | ||
− | King, Sallie The Active Self: A Philosophical Study of the Buddha Nature Treatise and Other Chinese Buddhist Texts | + | [[King]], Sallie The Active [[Self]]: A [[Philosophical]] Study of the [[Buddha Nature]] Treatise and Other {{Wiki|Chinese}} [[Buddhist Texts]] |
− | (Ann Arbor : University Microfilms International) Dissertation, 1981. | + | ([[Ann Arbor]] : {{Wiki|University}} Microfilms International) {{Wiki|Dissertation}}, 1981. |
− | Klein, Anne Carolyn Knowing, Naming and Negation: a Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrantika | + | Klein, Anne Carolyn [[Knowing]], Naming and {{Wiki|Negation}}: a Sourcebook on [[Tibetan]] [[Sautrantika]] |
− | Translations in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism | + | Translations in [[Indo-Tibetan Buddhism]] |
− | (Ithaca: | + | (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1991) |
− | Kochumuttom, Thomas A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience : a New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Cittamātrin (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass), 1989 [1982] | + | {{Wiki|Kochumuttom}}, Thomas [[A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience]] : a [[New Translation]] and Interpretation of the Works of [[Vasubandhu]] the Cittamātrin ([[Delhi]] : {{Wiki|Motilal Banarsidass}}), 1989 [1982] |
− | Koester, Helmut “The History of Religions School, Gnosis and the Gospel of John,” | + | Koester, Helmut “The History of [[Religions]] School, [[Gnosis]] and the {{Wiki|Gospel}} of John,” |
− | (Copenhagen: Studia Theologica vol. 40, 1986, page 118.) | + | ([[Copenhagen]]: Studia Theologica vol. 40, 1986, page 118.) |
− | Lamotte, Étienne La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asaṅga (Mahāyāna Saṃgrāha) (Vols.1-2) | + | [[Wikipedia:Étienne Lamotte|Lamotte]], Étienne La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asaṅga ([[Mahāyāna]] Saṃgrāha) (Vols.1-2) |
(Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1938). | (Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1938). | ||
Bibliothèque du Muséon, (Vol.) 7. | Bibliothèque du Muséon, (Vol.) 7. | ||
− | lCang skya II Rol pa’i rdo rje Yeshe bstan pa’i sgron me Grub pa’i mTha’i rNam par bZhag pa gSal bar bShad pa Thub bsTan Lhun po’i mDzes rGyan: A survey of the Buddhist philosophical systems by the Second lCang-skya Rol-pa’i-rdo-rje | + | lCang skya II [[Rol pa’i rdo rje]] Yeshe bstan pa’i [[sgron me]] Grub pa’i mTha’i rNam par [[bZhag]] pa gSal bar bShad pa Thub bsTan Lhun po’i mDzes rGyan: A survey of the [[Buddhist]] [[philosophical]] systems by the Second lCang-skya Rol-pa’i-rdo-rje |
− | Reproduced from a set of clear impressions from the Se-ra Smad Grwa-tshang blocks | + | Reproduced from a set of clear [[impressions]] from the [[Se-ra]] [[Smad]] [[Grwa-tshang]] blocks |
− | (Dharamsala: Rnam-rgyal Grwa-tshang, 1983). | + | ({{Wiki|Dharamsala}}: Rnam-rgyal [[Grwa-tshang]], 1983). |
− | Lin, Yutang From Pagan to Christian | + | Lin, Yutang From {{Wiki|Pagan}} to [[Christian]] |
− | (Cleveland: World Publishing Company), 1959. | + | ([[Cleveland]]: [[World]] Publishing Company), 1959. |
− | Lindtner, Christian Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nāgārjuna | + | [[Lindtner]], [[Christian]] [[Nagarjuniana]]: Studies in the Writings and [[Philosophy]] of [[Nāgārjuna]] |
− | (Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, | + | ([[Copenhagen]]: Akademisk Forlag, |
Loisy, Alfred L’Eglise et Evangile | Loisy, Alfred L’Eglise et Evangile | ||
− | (London: Isbister), 1903, as translated by C. Home in | + | ([[London]]: Isbister), 1903, as translated by C. Home in |
− | The Gospel and the Church, | + | The {{Wiki|Gospel}} and the {{Wiki|Church}}, |
edited by B. Scott, (Philadelphia: Fortress), 1976. | edited by B. Scott, (Philadelphia: Fortress), 1976. | ||
− | Miyabayashi, Akihiko “I-Ching’s criticism of Chinese | + | Miyabayashi, Akihiko “I-Ching’s [[criticism]] of [[Chinese Buddhism]]” |
− | Taisho Daigaku 72 Kenkyu Kiyo (1986), pages 27-44 | + | [[Taisho]] [[Daigaku]] 72 Kenkyu Kiyo (1986), pages 27-44 |
− | Nagao, Gadjin M. Madhyamaka and Yogācāra : A Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies | + | [[Nagao]], Gadjin M. [[Madhyamaka]] and [[Yogācāra]] : A Study of [[Mahāyāna]] [[Philosophies]] |
− | Translated by Leslie Kawamura | + | Translated by [[Leslie Kawamura]] |
− | (Albany: State University of New York Press), 1991. | + | ([[Albany]]: [[State University of New York Press]]), 1991. |
− | Nishitani, Keiji Religion and Nothingness | + | Nishitani, Keiji [[Religion]] and [[Nothingness]] |
− | (Berkeley: University of California Press), 1982, pages 9-10. | + | ([[Berkeley]]: {{Wiki|University of California Press}}), 1982, pages 9-10. |
− | Obeysekere, Gananath Medusa’s Hair | + | Obeysekere, Gananath Medusa’s [[Hair]] |
− | (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press), 1981. | + | ({{Wiki|Chicago}} and [[London]]: [[University of Chicago Press]]), 1981. |
− | Olsen, R. F. | + | Olsen, R. F. “[[Candrakīrti’s]] critique of Vijñanavāda” |
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− | Otto, Rudolf The Idea of the Holy | + | Otto, Rudolf The [[Idea]] of the {{Wiki|Holy}} |
− | (New York: Oxford University Press) 1923. | + | ([[New York]]: [[Oxford University Press]]) 1923. |
− | Powers, John Wisdom of | + | [[Powers]], John [[Wisdom of the Buddha]]: the Saṃdhinirmocaṇasūtra, ([[Berkeley]] : [[Dharma Publishing]]), 1995 |
− | Rahula, Walpola “Vijñāptimātratā: Philosophy in the Yogācāra System and Some Wrong Notions” | + | [[Rahula, Walpola]] “Vijñāptimātratā: [[Philosophy]] in the [[Yogācāra]] System and Some Wrong Notions” |
− | rGyal tsab Dar ma Rin chen rNam bShad SNying po’i rGyan | + | rGyal tsab Dar ma [[Rin chen]] rNam bShad SNying po’i rGyan |
Sk. Abhisamayālaṃkarabhāṣya | Sk. Abhisamayālaṃkarabhāṣya | ||
− | John Makransky has an edition – Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet; [this is not the one I used and alas, lost the original source.] | + | [[John Makransky]] has an edition – [[Buddhahood]] [[Embodied]]: Sources of Controversy in [[India]] and [[Tibet]]; [this is not the one I used and alas, lost the original source.] |
− | (Albany: SUNY Press), 1997 | + | ([[Albany]]: SUNY Press), 1997 |
− | Ruegg, David Seyfort Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981) | + | Ruegg, David Seyfort {{Wiki|Literature}} of the [[Madhyamaka School]] of [[Philosophy]] in [[India]] (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981) |
− | __________ La Theorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra: Etudes sur la Soturiologie et la Gnosuologie du Bouddhisme | + | __________ La Theorie du [[Tathāgatagarbha]] et du [[Gotra]]: Etudes sur la Soturiologie et la Gnosuologie du Bouddhisme |
− | (Paris: Ecole Francaise d’Extreme-Orient, 1969) | + | ({{Wiki|Paris}}: Ecole Francaise d’Extreme-Orient, 1969) |
− | __________ Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective : On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet | + | __________ [[Buddha-nature]], [[Mind]] and the Problem of [[Gradualism]] in a Comparative {{Wiki|Perspective}} : On the [[Transmission]] and {{Wiki|Reception}} of [[Buddhism in India]] and [[Tibet]] |
− | (New Delhi : Heritage Publishers), 1992 | + | ({{Wiki|New Delhi}} : Heritage Publishers), 1992 |
− | Sakai, Shinten “On Nāgārjuna’s Bodhicittavivāraṇa | + | [[Sakai]], Shinten “On [[Nāgārjuna’s]] [[Bodhicittavivāraṇa]] [[nāma]]” |
− | Naritasan buddkyo kenkyujo kiyo | + | [[Naritasan]] buddkyo kenkyujo kiyo |
− | Journal of the Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies) 11, 1, pages 89-139 Naritasan | + | Journal of the [[Naritasan]] Institute for [[Buddhist Studies]]) 11, 1, pages 89-139 [[Naritasan shinshoji]], 1988 |
− | Schmithausen, Lambert “On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in | + | [[Schmithausen]], Lambert “On the Problem of the [[Relation]] of [[Spiritual Practice]] and [[Philosophical]] {{Wiki|Theory}} in [[Buddhism]]” |
− | (New Delhi : German Scholars on India), 1976 | + | ({{Wiki|New Delhi}} : [[German]] [[Scholars]] on [[India]]), 1976 |
− | Singh, Amar The Sautrāntika Analytical Philosophy | + | Singh, Amar The [[Sautrāntika]] Analytical [[Philosophy]] |
− | (New Delhi: Dharmacakra Publications, 1995. | + | ({{Wiki|New Delhi}}: [[Dharmacakra]] Publications, 1995. |
− | Sopa Geshe Lhundhup Lectures on Tibetan Religious Culture | + | [[Sopa]] [[Geshe]] Lhundhup Lectures on [[Tibetan]] [[Religious]] {{Wiki|Culture}} |
− | (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives), 1983 | + | ({{Wiki|Dharamsala}}: {{Wiki|Library of Tibetan Works and Archives}}), 1983 |
− | __________ Cutting Through Appearances : Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism | + | __________ Cutting Through [[Appearances]] : Practice and {{Wiki|Theory}} of [[Tibetan Buddhism]] |
− | (with Jeffrey Hopkins). | + | (with [[Jeffrey Hopkins]]). |
− | (Ithaca : Snow Lion) 1989 | + | ([[Ithaca]] : [[Snow Lion]]) 1989 |
− | Sthiramati Triṃsikabhāṣyam seminar translations, worked through with my B. A. and Master’s Advisor, Isshi Yamada. | + | [[Sthiramati]] Triṃsikabhāṣyam seminar translations, worked through with my B. A. and [[Master’s]] Advisor, [[Isshi]] Yamada. |
Suzuki, Daisetz Lavkavatarasūtra | Suzuki, Daisetz Lavkavatarasūtra | ||
− | (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1932,1966 | + | ([[London]] : Routledge and Kegan Paul), 1932,1966 |
− | Takakusu, J A Record of the Buddhist Religion as Practised in India and the Malay Archipelago (A.D. 671-695) | + | [[Takakusu]], J A Record of the [[Buddhist]] [[Religion]] as Practised in [[India]] and the {{Wiki|Malay}} Archipelago (A.D. 671-695) |
− | (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1966; orig. Pub. London: Clarendon, 1896). | + | ([[Delhi]]: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1966; orig. Pub. [[London]]: Clarendon, 1896). |
− | Takasaki, Jikido, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra) : Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism | + | {{Wiki|Takasaki}}, [[Jikido]], A Study on the [[Ratnagotravibhāga]] ([[Uttaratantra]]) : Being a Treatise on the [[Tathāgatagarbha]] {{Wiki|Theory}} of [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] |
− | (Rome : Instituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente), 1966 | + | ({{Wiki|Rome}} : Instituto per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente), 1966 |
− | Thu’u bkwan Collected Works of Thu’u-bKwan blo bzang Chos kyi Nyima | + | Thu’u bkwan Collected Works of Thu’u-bKwan blo bzang [[Chos kyi]] [[Nyima]] |
Volume 1(Ka) | Volume 1(Ka) | ||
− | Edited and Reproduced by Ngawang Gelek Demo with Introduction by E. Gene Smith. | + | Edited and Reproduced by [[Ngawang Gelek Demo]] with Introduction by [[E. Gene Smith]]. |
(Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series, volume 1), | (Gedan Sungrab Minyam Gyunphel Series, volume 1), | ||
− | (Delhi: Jayyed Press,1969) | + | ([[Delhi]]: Jayyed Press,1969) |
− | Thurman, R. A. F. The Central Philosophy of Tibet: A Study and Translation of Jey Tsong Khapa’s Essence of True Eloquence | + | Thurman, R. A. F. [[The Central Philosophy of Tibet]]: A Study and Translation of Jey [[Tsong Khapa’s]] [[Essence of True Eloquence]] |
− | (Princeton: Princeton University Press,) 1984. | + | ([[Princeton]]: [[Princeton University Press]],) 1984. |
Troeltsch Ernst Gesammelte Schriften II | Troeltsch Ernst Gesammelte Schriften II | ||
Line 3,967: | Line 4,193: | ||
(Tuebingen) 1913 | (Tuebingen) 1913 | ||
as translated by Morgan and Pye | as translated by Morgan and Pye | ||
− | “What does | + | “What does ‘[[Essence]] of [[Christianity]]’ Mean?” |
(U. K.: Duckworth,)1977 | (U. K.: Duckworth,)1977 | ||
− | van der Leeuw, Gerardus Religion in Essence and Manifestation, | + | van der Leeuw, Gerardus [[Religion]] in [[Essence]] and [[Manifestation]], |
− | (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row), 1963 | + | ([[New York]] and Evanston: Harper and Row), 1963 |
(originally published Tübingen: 1933) | (originally published Tübingen: 1933) | ||
− | Vasubandhu Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣyam | + | [[Vasubandhu]] Abhidharmakoṣabhāṣyam |
− | English translation by Leo Pruden of de la Vallee Poussin’s French original | + | English translation by Leo Pruden of de la Vallee Poussin’s {{Wiki|French}} original |
− | (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press), 1988. | + | ([[Berkeley]]: [[Asian Humanities Press]]), 1988. |
Von Campenhausen, | Von Campenhausen, | ||
− | Hans Freiherr Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries | + | Hans Freiherr {{Wiki|Ecclesiastical}} Authority and [[Spiritual Power]] in the {{Wiki|Church}} of the First Three Centuries |
− | (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969 | + | ([[Stanford]]: [[Stanford University Press]], 1969 |
− | translated by J. A. Baker from the original, | + | translated by J. A. [[Baker]] from the original, |
Kirchliches Amt und Geistliche Vollmacht in den Ersten Drei Jahrhunderten | Kirchliches Amt und Geistliche Vollmacht in den Ersten Drei Jahrhunderten | ||
(Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)), 1963 | (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck)), 1963 | ||
− | Warder, A. K. Indian Buddhism | + | Warder, A. K. [[Indian Buddhism]] |
− | (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970) | + | ([[Delhi]]: {{Wiki|Motilal Banarsidass}}, 1970) |
− | Wayman, Alex Philosophy East and West (PEW), (1996), Vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 447-476 | + | [[Wayman, Alex]] [[Philosophy East and West]] (PEW), (1996), Vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 447-476 |
Weber, Max “Grundformen der Herrschaft” | Weber, Max “Grundformen der Herrschaft” | ||
in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1925) | in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1925) | ||
</poem> | </poem> | ||
− | Wiebe, Donald, The Irony of Theology and the Nature of Religious Thought, (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 1991. | + | Wiebe, Donald, The Irony of {{Wiki|Theology}} and the [[Nature]] of [[Religious]] [[Thought]], (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s {{Wiki|University}} Press), 1991. |
− | Williams, Paul Mahāyāna Buddhism : the Doctrinal Foundations | + | [[Williams]], Paul [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] : the [[Doctrinal]] Foundations |
(London/New York: Routledge), 1989. | (London/New York: Routledge), 1989. | ||
Latest revision as of 19:56, 1 February 2020
Rev. Dr. James Kenneth Powell II received his Ph. D. in Buddhist Studies from the University of Wisconsin – Madison (1997) through advisor Geshe Lhundhup Sopa and he was the last graduate of a once internationally renowned program. He also studied theology at Cambridge, received his Master of Divinity (MDIV) degree from the University of Chicago and received his BA in Religion with a focus on Buddhism (1985) with his advisor Dr. Isshi Yamada.
This work evolved from a dissonance in interpreting the two principle Mahāyāna schools ascertained through studies first with Dr. Yamada and Geshe Sopa. The former, Dr. Yamada imparted an East Asian interpretation that privileged the Yogācāra as the more sophisticated and evolved awareness among the two
schools, incorporating the core Mahāyāna doctrine of śūnyatā, “zeroness” or more commonly known as “emptiness” within the framework of an extensive system of understanding the nature of consciousness. The latter Madhyamaka school will insist that even consciousness is a “centaur castle in the sky” a “sky flower” and hence, has no ultimate existence. This I learned from my Tibetan and hence, Central Asian teacher, Geshe Sopa. Resolving this dispute over consciousness is the aim of this book.
By Unknown - Controversy at Panadura or Panadura Vadaya by Pranith Abhayasundra - 1990 (Book), Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=19224
...however, I myself state just as much as I am capable....
Kho bos ni rang gis ji ltar dpogs tshod smras pa yin lags
This work is dedicated to the magnificent tradition of scholarship of the Madhyamaka tradition, from Nāgārjuna to my kalyānamitra, Geshe Sopa.
Acknowledgments
This work arises from a period of five years of puzzlement at the diverging interpretations of the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka Schools which I received from my teachers, Geshe Lhundhup Sopa and Dr. Isshi Yamada, for whom I must reserve my deepest gratitude out of great respect for their guidance through the extremely difficult jungle which is Mahāyāna philosophical tradition.
The extent to which the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools are to be harmonized or differentiated is the subject of this investigation. Is the Yogācāra School a synthesis of Abhidharma and Madhyamaka and a more extensive yet harmonious elaboration of both, as I was taught by Dr. Yamada during the course of my B.A. studies at Northwestern and M.Div. studies at the University of Chicago?
Or is the Yogācāra tradition an “extensive method,” a preliminary approach, or upāya, for disciples of the Mahāyāna tradition to enter ultimately into the definitive expression of the Buddha’s truth - as found in the Madhyamaka tradition - as can be captured by verbal expression, as I was taught by Geshe Sopa?
_______________________
Further expressions of gratitude must be extended to Professor Minoru Kiyota, who encouraged a balanced view of the two schools, which kept my sympathies toward the Madhyamaka School in proper perspective, keeping students mindful of Japanese perspectives on a wide variety of topics, including those relevant to this study. To Professor Gudrun Bühnemann, for her emphasis on precision and caution in translating Tibetan and Sanskrit terms, but absolutely without fault for errors found in this work. _______________________
In addition to these professors in our department, I also wish to express thanks to Professor Christopher Rowland, formerly of Jesus College, Cambridge who endowed me with a much deeper appreciation of the multivalence of meaning and the implications of social realities impacting ancient religious texts; to Professor David Tracy of the University of Chicago, my Master’s dissertation advisor whose profound plumbing of philosophical depths, helped to deepen my own awareness of philosophical complexities as they arise in the new context of this investigation. Professor Arthur Droge at the University instilled an awareness of the depth of implicit meanings to be found among religious texts. ____________________
I must further express deepest gratitude to my late father, whose debate and argumentation with me about religious issues doubtless inspired the allure the debates within the Mahāyāna tradition have held for me. Concomitantly, I am grateful to my mother for imbuing me with some modicum of compassion to balance this great love of debate, so that I might more effectively avoid polemics here. I hope that in some small measure, I may represent something of what I have learned from my superb teachers.
Addendum: I wrote this far back in 1997 and feared to publish it due to imperfection. Evolving my online teaching expertise has been my goal almost since my graduation. One of my schools is seeking evidence of publishing, so here it goes…self-publishing a book should suffice for my lecturer status. I have
been absorbed by instruction and neglected the field, but perhaps some knowledgeable lay person will get some benefit from my old work. Who knows? There might be insight to some degree for current scholars in the field. After all, many of the insights I share are due to learning from my eminent teachers,
Dr. Isshi Yamada and Geshe Lhundhup Sopa. All the diacritics disappeared from the old file, but with some perseverance, I believe I got them all correctly done. Pardon any errors. This is already overdue for a revision! I will hope the extensive outline of contents here will provide easy access to the many arguments as well as the overall import of this book.
Finally, please let me clarify that when I use the terms “Mind Only” or “Cittamātrin” it is in the more pejorative context of Gelukpa abuse of these many schools, implying the existence of a mind that functions like a “soul”, anathema to the Buddha’s teaching. I employ a number of finessed terms for a
variety of “Yogācāra” (the better word), along with “Vijñāptivāda”, even Vijñāptimātravādin”. So please do not be confused. It is a fallacy to thin of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra as opposing schools. One should think of them more as one would yin and yang…they blend and merge and oppose each other in a tremendous variety of ways. Here is one perspective, largely a Mongolian one, but I offer counter-arguments also I believe.
I seek to simplify these arguments in time, but for now, please appreciate my attempt at unpacking the work on the Cittamātra section of the great lCang kya II’s great treasury of Buddhist debates, his “Beautiful Ornament of the Limits of Proofs. (sGrub mTHa DZes rGyan) and to some extent, adjudicating a core dispute between the two principal Mahāyāna Schools, the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, and the nature of consciousness, but more intriguingly, the nature of self-awareness.
Contents
Some words concerning terminology.
A Nāgārjunan critique of essentialism . . The first leg of the tetralemma: negation of essence
The second leg of the tetralemma: negation of ‘no-essence’
The third leg of the tetralemma: negation of ‘there both is and is not an essence’
Fourth leg of the tetralemma: negation of ‘neither essence nor non-essence’
Conventional essentialism relative to ultimate non-essentialism
A MAHĀYĀNIST METHODOLOGY FOR THE STUDY OF RELIGION
Occidental sympathizers: van der Leeuw and Bourdieu
Proposal of a Mahayanist metatheory
YOGĀCĀRIN INSIGHTS INTO THE RELATIONSHIP OF RELIGIOUS PRAXIS TO NON-ESSENTIALISM
The three natures and their implications for the relationship of theory to practice in the Mahāyāna tradition and for religious studies in general.
The application of these for our study
CHAPTER 2: INTRODUCTION: YOGĀCĀRA - MADHYAMAKA DISPUTES FROM NĀGĀRJUNA TO ROL PA’I RDO RJE LCANG SKYA II
COMMENCEMENT OF THE DISPUTES
The multivalent aspects of this study.
THE TWO SCHOOLS: ESSENTIALLY IDENTICAL OR ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT?
THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS: THE PIVOT AROUND WHICH THE GREAT DEBATES UNFOLD
Is this school 'Idealist?'
The definitive and interpretable.
THE MAHĀYĀNASAṂGRĀHA: COUNTERACTING THE EXTREMES OF POSITIVISM AND REPUDIATION
THREE CYCLES OF DOCTRINE: THE SAṂDHINIRMOCANASŪTRA
Legendary origin of the three cycles.
Definitive versus provisional doctrines.
The first cycle of doctrine: the Śrāvakayāna.
Interpretable nature of the first cycle.
Nirvana as ‘unconditioned’ phenomenon.
Entical nature of First Cycle doctrines.
The Second Cyle of doctrine: Madhyamaka.
Nihilism in the Second Cycle?
The Second Cycle: for the prideful who ‘lack roots of virtue.
Two wrong attitudes with regard to the Second Cycle doctrines.
The Third Cycle of doctrine: Yogācāra.
The whole of Buddhist teaching is encapsulated by the doctrine of the three natures.
The first of the three natures: conceptualization.
The second of the three natures: the other-dependent.
The third of the three natures: the perfected.
Cittamātra: school of definitive interpretation.
One Vasubandhu.
Cittamātra critique of Madhyamaka.
Mādhyamika response to Cittamātra critique.
The third cycle is taught to forestall falling into the ‘Great Nihilism.’
The Sajdhinirmocanasūtra as definitive Madhyamaka text.
TEXTS AND AUTHORS
Nāgārjuna’s Bodhicittavivāraṇa.
Interpreting Candrakīrti’s ‘Abhimukhi’ Chapter: directed to ‘outsiders’ or ‘insiders?’ Bhāvaviveka
CHAPTER THREE: THE CITTAMĀTRA EXAMINATION AND REFUTATION OF (MADHYAMAKA) (NIHILISM)
THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF LCANG SKYA II, ROL PA'I RDO RJE
Patronage of Manchu emperor Qianlong.
Chapter ‘Kha’ of the Ornament: ‘The three realms are mind alone.
IDENTIFYING THE TWO EXTREMES: NIHILISM AND POSITIVISM
Positivism.
Repudiation of the other-dependent nature is repudiation of the perfected nature.
REFUTATION OF THE EXTREME OF NIHILISM
The logical error of Madhyamaka rejection of a basis for phenomena
Adhering to a mistaken emptiness.
Madhyamaka conception of the conventional and ultimate
Ultimacy versus ultimate truth.
Ultimate truth is found in the mind of the Aryan bodhisattva.
Conventionality versus conventional truth.
The face in the mirror.
Asaṅga's answer to the question of ultimacy.
The two modes of the other-dependent are the conventional and the ultimate.
Causation from a ‘continuum’ or from ‘mere imputation?
Prior states condition posterior states.
Madhyamaka thought is mere nominalism.
All is strictly imaginary?
The real basis of the concealing.
Support for the Yogācāra stance in the Pramāṇavartikka.
A Lotus arises from its seed.
Tsong kha pa: inner versus outer mental concealment.
Arguments in favor of establishing a basis for phenomena
The conceptualized: imputation with a basis in reality.
Identification and refutation of the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness.
Interwovenness-with-other is established by direct experience.
The other-dependent is demonstrated logically.
Otherness is causation and condition.
Mistaken consciousnesses exist though mistaken.
Mistaken consciousnesses exist.
If no entity exists, then how could it be non-existent?
The other-dependent exists ultimately.
The other-dependent: not ultimately established?
DISTINCTION BETWEEN 'ULTIMATE' AND 'ULTIMATE TRUTH
The perfected nature: neither existent nor non-existent.
The other-dependent: ultimately existent but conventionally true.
Ultimate truth: truth from a 'certain point of view.
MĀDHYAMIKA RESPONSE
Candrakīrti: assent to lCang skya's presentation of the other-dependent.
Candrakīrti: external objects exist in dreams.
External objects in dreams or waking reality are not produced.
There is no thought in the absence of an object.
Without an external object, cataracts should be seen by those with healthy eyes.
The false appearance exists.
mKhas Grub.
SUMMATION
Lack of a doctrine concerning a basal consciousness entails repudiation of karma theory.
CHAPTER FOUR: SELF-AWARENESS
THREE TOPICS: 1. THE EXTREME VIEW REFUTED, 2. THE ACTUAL MEANING ESTABLISHED AND 3. WARDING OFF ARGUMENTS.
1. Refuting an extreme view: self-aware gnosis knows itself as its own object.
Three aspects:
1) refuting wrong notions,
2)establishing the actual meaning and
3) warding off objections
Error of asserting that self-awareness knows itself by means of itself.
The object of gnosis is not itself, but reality.
The second of three topics: establishing the actual meaning.
1. The manner in which confusion arises.
MEMORY AS PROOF OF SELF-AWARE CONSCIOUSNESS
The irrefutability of self-awareness.
THE ETHICAL ASPECT OF THE DHARMADHĀTU
The sense in which dharmatā is called 'composite.'
The perfected nature is the appropriate object of the ultimate goal.
The self-awareness knows emptiness implicitly, not explicitly.
==THE THIRD OF THREE TOPICS: WARDING OFF OPPOSING ARGUMENTS.
The self-awareness has no object but 'mere mental experience.'
MĀDHYAMIKA RESPONSE
Mind-only eradicates the view of an agentive self.
Refuting the agentive self of non-Buddhist schools.
Memory is no different from other types of cognition.
Memory is neither different from nor the same as the remembered event.
Fire does not burn itself, nor does consciousness 'think' itself.
In the absence of external objects, consciousness itself cannot be an object.
Identity or difference: memory relative to the original experience.
Subject/object dualism in all forms of consciousness.
The fallacy of infinite regression: cognition of a cognition of a cognition....
Memory explained by recourse to conventional phenomena.
Tsong kha pa: memory occurs due to the primary experience.
The fallacy of two consciousnesses.
Tsong kha pa and infinite regression: there is no primary experience.
The provisional validity of Yogācāra doctrine.
Without external entities, there is no stage upon which the consciousness may act.
Concomitancy cohering mind and form.
Consciousness as real, actual ultimately existent fact is refuted.
As the object of knowledge falls, so falls the knower.
CHAPTER FIVE: REFUTATION OF THE EXTREME OF (ŚRĀVAKAYĀNA) POSITIVISM
THE SAUTRĀNTIKA AND THEIR DOCTRINES
The name 'Sautrāntika.'
The place of the Sautrāntika among the early sects of Buddhism.
Summary of the Sautrāntika position.
Summary of the Sautrāntika position.
Continuity and transformation.
Atomistic phenomena ultimately and actually exist.
Rejection of atomism by both Mahāyāna schools.
Vasubandhu's anti-atomism.
CONCEPTUALIZED AND INNATE POSITIVISM
The innate aspect.
The conceptualized aspect.
The conceptualized aspect is more easily eradicated.
POSITIVISM AS THE ENTICALIZATION OF PHENOMENA
The essence and its attributes.
Tsong kha pa's understanding of this topic in the MS. The self-isolate and the referent category. An opponent’s mistaken notion of the self-isolate. Even the Sautrāntika hold the generic image to be positivism. The opponent's second argument: the basal referent and the other-dependent.
POSITIVISM AS CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIGNIFIER AND SIGNIFIED
Tsong kha pa's response. Naive versus sophisticated positivism. Sautrāntika: exemplars of a sophisticated refication.
CORRUPT VERSUS UNCORRUPT MODES OF APPEARANCE
The definitive approach according to lCang skya II The manner in which the Sautrāntika cleave to positivism. The Cittamātrin position: even sense perception is corrupt. Sautrāntika: immediacy of sense perception. Does one strictly imagine entities? The basis of phenomena.
Sautrāntika: the fundamental difference of consciousness and its object.
Unmistaken and uncorrupt consciousness.
Sautrāntika: the generic image is not ultimately established.
The Yogācārin position concerning external entities: propensities and habituation.
The Yogācāra position: no external entities.
Agreement of all schools of Buddhism: the generic image is a false construct.
Buddhist disagreement concerning the referent object.
THE FINAL DISTINCTION FOR POSITIVISM: THE EXISTENCE OR NON-EXISTENCE OF EXTERNAL OBJECTS.
Yogācāra: the three aspects for the existence of an apparently external object.
Habituation towards similar types of objects.
Three principal arguments establishing the imputation of names.
Prior to a sign, no intellection exists.
Many names equate to many entities?
The incoherence of sphota theory.
Point three: a single name applied to several entities.
Syllogism and consequential reasoning.
MĀDHYAMIKA RESPONSE.
Opposition to the conception of a 'basal' consciousness: the Bodhicittavivāraṇa. Agreement among the Madhyamaka Masters: the basal consciousness is illusory. Candrakīrti: logically, ultimately there is no such thing as potentiality. The blind would see blue.
The inefficaciousness of Yogācārin meditation: the basal consciousness as 'hindrance.' Tsong kha pa: the difficulties of no doctrine concerning a basal consciousness. The 'interpretable' nature of the doctrine of the basal consciousness.
CHAPTER 6: PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: THE MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN THE EXTREMES
The investigation of names. The Investigation of the object. The investigation of particularity. The Four Investigations establish the Mind-only position negatively.
IS THIS THE YOGĀCĀRA SYSTEM? SCHOLARS INCLINED TO A YOGĀCĀRIN STANCE
The Yogācāra maintains a positive approach. The other-dependent is a foundation and mediator. The bridge between the sacred and profane. Madhyamaka: nihilism with regard to the subject. Wayman. Keenan. Harris.
MIND-ONLY TRADITIONS: AN UPĀYA PRONE TO REIFICATION LOVE FOR THE SYSTEM QUA SYSTEM?
Later ramifications of the dispute.
[[DEMONSTRATION OF OUR THESIS]
APPENDIX A. THE SCHOOLS AND TATHĀGATAGARBHA
THE RATNAGOTRAVIBHĀGA/UTTARATANTRA: MĀDHYAMAKA OR YOGĀCĀRA?
Madhyamaka the definitive view of Asaṅga and Maitreya? Discrepancy between no-self doctrine and that of primordially enlightened nature. Tathāgatagarbha thought is connected with both views. Madhyamaka: the definitive stance of Asaṅga and Maitreya. The lack of doctrine concerning the basal consciousness in TGG literature. Tathāgatagarbha absorbed in Mind-only system. Danger of nihilism in the Perfection of Wisdom literature. Tathāgatagarbha theory clarifies emptiness. Relative essentialism in the Cittamātra. Key Cittamātra terms missing from the RGV. Weakness of a garbha theory devoid of the basal consciousness doctrine. Equation of the basal consciousness with the tathāgatagarbha: the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. 'Monstrous' importing of 'self' into Buddhism. The Madhyamaka interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha. Tathāgatagarbha 'alien' infiltration into Madhyamaka? Inherent 'essentialism' in tathāgatagarbha doctrine. Essentialism relative to Madhyamaka thought: Sthiramati. Candrakīrti's counterclaim: the 'syllableless' dharma. The Final issue: is the tathāgatagarbha doctrine definitive or provisional? Candrakīrti's false accusation?
Provisional nature of tathāgatagarbha doctrine: Tsong kha pa.
The tathāgatagarbha is a quasi-ātman.
Provisionality of the tathāgatagarbha: mKhas grup.
Selflessness reconciled with tathāgatagarbha.
The Cittamatra approach is upāya.
Crypto-ātman.
Intentional ground of tathāgatagarbha doctrine.
Emptiness in tathāgatagarbha theory refers to the individual mental continuum.
Tathāgatagarbha as definitive doctrine.
gZhan stong empty of 'other.'
gZhan stong: the definitive view of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga?
Empty of essence or of defilements?
APPENDIX B: SELECTED TIBETAN-SANSKRIT-ENGLISH GLOSSARY
APPENDIX C: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbreviations
P. Pāli
Sk. Sanskrit
Tib. Tibetan
Chin. Chinese
Jap. Japanese
Principal texts
Aks. Akśayamatinirdeśasūtra
BB Bodhisattvabhūmi
BCA Bodhicaryāvatara
BV Bodhicittavivāraṇa
CS Catuḥśatakastava
DDV Dharmadharmatāvibhāga
GV Gandavyuhasūtra
MA Madhyamakāvatara
MAB Madhyamakāvatarabhāṣya
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ
MMV Mūlamadhyamakavṛttibuddhapālita
MS Mahāyāna Saṃgrāha
LA Laṅkāvatarasūtra
PP Prasannapadā
SN Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra
Tbh Triṃśikabhāṣyam
VV Vigrāhavyāvartaṇī
TSN Trisvabhāvanirdeśa
RGV Ratnagotravibhāga
=Tibetan Primary sources=
GRS dBu m a la ‘jug pa’i rgya cher bshad pa dgongs pa rab gsal or also simply known as the dGongs pa Rab gSal of Tsong kha pa.
LSN Legs bShad sNying po
GTDG sGrub mTHa DZes rGyan
Principal Journals
IIJ Indo-Iranian Journal
JIAB Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIP Journal of Indian Philosophy
PEW Philosophy East and West
TJ Tibet Journal
Preface.
This dissertation is the result of more than thirteen years of study and reflection upon the two central schools of Mahāyāna philosophical tradition and the many issues over which scholars of those traditions debated and for the most part, agreed.
I was first introduced to the basic doctrines of the two schools by Dr. Isshi Yamada while an undergraduate at Northwestern, and later, as a travelling scholar from the University of Chicago. Under his tutelage, I was taught that the two schools co-abide harmoniously within Mahāyāna tradition. The Yogācāra tradition was taught as an enormous expansion and synthesis of the best insights of both the Abhidharma and Prajñāpāramitā traditions. At the ultimate level, at the limits of verbal expression, as Dr. Yamada always reminded us, the last recourse was “finally, then, Nāgārjuna .”
Nāgārjuna’s works elucidated the illusory, falsely bifurcating and discriminating fact of the type of truth that can be expressed in signs, that is to say, syllables, words and sentences, i.e., verbal expression, and through images, both sensorially and conceptually represented. Since all verbal expression is falsely dichotomizing, Nāgārjuna’s efforts demonstrate a “definitive” philosophical stance, in the sense of “the last word” about words, applicable to all standpoints, including the Madhyamaka, particularly when it is falsely seen as a view itself, something Nāgārjuna rejected.
Nevertheless, one may accept the fact of the illusory qualities of language. When one has come to understand that words are useful tools, without which the dharma could not be communicated, then one may well conclude that works of the Yogācāra tradition are no more a distortion of reality by its use of words than are the works of Mādhyamika scholars. The Yogācāra tradition elaborates the categories of the Abhidharma traditions, meditative traditions and the
“negational” approach of the Prajñāpāramitā corpi into one very persuasive, extensive and well-ordered systematic treatment. It orders the “two truths” of Madhyamaka concern into its three-tiered scheme, explicitly inclusive of praxis.
Upon learning of the existence of a living Madhyamaka tradition embodied in the person of Geshe Lhundhup Sopa at the University of Wisconsin at Madison, I endeavored to discover what else I might learn of the tradition with which I had become completely transfixed. Expecting to hear roughly the same things to which I had become accustomed with Dr. Yamada, I was somewhat shocked to discover the basic presentation of the schools to be reversed from that which Dr. Yamada had taught me.
Rather than viewing the Yogācāra system as more comprehensive, it was seen rather as more “essentialist” or “foundationalist” Buddhist tradition for lack of better words, than the Madhyamaka. Its doctrines focusing on the centrality of consciousness, the basal consciousness, etc., were all rough preliminaries to the real issue, which is the definitive awareness of śūnyatā as presented by Nāgārjuna and particularly, his Prāsaṅgika followers.
Confronted by these two presentations, I felt distinct cognitive dissonance: which of the two schools is preliminary and which definitive? Is in fact, one of the traditions “superior” to the other, or is this a false and not very useful conception?
Faced with some confusion, I endeavored to resolve it. This is elaborated in the conclusion of this dissertation. Suffice it to say, all three major branches of Buddhist philosophical tradition - Śrāvakayāna, Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools, evince a strong desire to demonstrate that their own positions inhabit the true middle path, are definitive and reveal the most profound intentions of the Buddha.
In some sense, all three are correct. They are correct, as Tibetan writers would say, ngor bden pa - “true from a certain point of view.” To determine the provisional and preliminary versus the ultimate and definitive truth of the Buddha, the three traditions rely on logic, example and scripture. Rather than simply negate the truth as presented
by the other schools, each will simply point to its own definitive status and attempt to demonstrate the preliminary status of the others, with the implication that the others serve a purpose - for disciples of relatively inferior mental faculties.
Disclaimer. This study is “interpretable” and “non-definitive” to use Mahāyāna vernacular. Its scope encompasses knowledge for those who aspire to better than average comprehension of the intricacies of the tradition known in the West as “Mahāyāna philosophy.”
This work itself aspires to present in a summary and basic way some of the issues over which the two schools contended. Thus, it is our hope that the trained lay-person and the beginning graduate student may have their awareness of the two main schools of the Mahāyāna tradition enhanced and that perhaps some of the fog surrounding these complex issues may lift.
Whether there is a dispute at all is itself a disputed issue among many modern scholars. While the schools argue about which is the definitive teaching of the Buddha, all will agree that admit that insofar as their doctrines
remain written words and are merely conceptualized by adherents as dogma, their doctrines are indeed yet provisional with regard to the ultimate goal (paramārtha). In this sense the doctrines of all three schools are upāya - useful approaches but not ultimate in and of themselves.
What this work is not. This work is not intended to be a great accomplishment of philological rigor. This work contains very few references to sociological or historical data, for as with most Buddhist philosophical texts, there is no mention of politicians or generals. Although we do elucidate to some extent the development of the disputes from [pseudo?]Nāgārjuna’s terse Bodhicittavivāraṇa to the compendious work of lCang skya II, this is not properly speaking, a history of ideas or of the historical study of the texts. It is philosophy.
Furthermore, this work is not complete in other ways. While engaged in the task of preparing this dissertation, I received very many suggestions for additional comments from other great pundits of Buddhist Studies tradition, and many more scholars and texts which address these subjects were mentioned. Rather than taking on too much, here, I have chosen to present some basic understanding of disputed issues.
What this work is. It is both a descriptive account and yet in other ways, a “normative” account. The focus of this study is a translation of a major Gelukpa summa with a sub-commentary elucidated to the best of my abilities, the meaning of which was recounted to me by a renowned lha rampa Geshe, Geshe Sopa.
This account is descriptive in the sense that it presents straightforwardly a major Geluk interpretation of the Yogācāra system, which itself, aims to be descriptive, even pro-active in presenting the school “from its own side” as it were, i.e. fairly and even aggressively. lCang skya’s Yogācāra siddhānta is no “straw-man” accounting.
Some words concerning terminology. We are employing both terms Yogācāra - Yoga-praxis [School], and Yogācāra the “Mind-only [School]” for our work here somewhat interchangeably except with regard to the translation of our central
text in the sub-commentary and chapters not taken from the translation of our main text. The former term is that with which most are familiar, and the latter is arguably the most inclusive reference to the traditions scholars variously refer to as Vijñānavāda - the “Consciousness [School],” Vijñāptimātravāda - the “Cognition-only School.”
Certainly, many if not most doctrines are shared in common by the schools designated by the above labels, but important distinctions must be made. The consciousness doctrines found in the Laṅkāvatarasūtra are unequivocally not to be simply conflated with the doctrines of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati and so forth, though one finds much interplay among the scholars and texts which are considered to be allied with Mahāyāna doctrines which assert the primacy of consciousness.
Generally however, except for exact usage in the translation of lCang skya’s text which is usually (though not strictly) referring to what he calls most often as the Sems tsam pa or Mind-only system, I will use the term simply Yogācāra , Yoga-praxis, Mind-alone/only, Sems tsam pa, Yogācāra rNam par Shes pa, Vijñānavāda, Conscious alone/only,
Cognition alone/only rNam par rigs pa, Vijñāptimātravāda, and use interchangeably, understanding that the distinctions to be made among these various terms, is dependent upon context and one’s own approach, though efforts have been made towards consistency. A thorough discussion of the issue of the origins or distinctions to be made among these sub-schools belongs to the efforts of others. What is clear however, is that we have at least a “family” of related traditions regardless of distinctions adherents or others might wish to make.
This is, I should hope, an accurate, if not strictly word for word translation. Brackets are supplied with the aim of clarifying thoughts that are again, terse and abbreviated. These may of course be ignored if one seeks a sense of the Tibetan phrasing, etc.
In this dissertation, we propose to present a descriptive textual study that will present the Yogācāra School as seen from the vantage point of the Madhyamaka. We employ as our primary text passages from the Beautiful
Ornament. This work was composed in the middle of the eighteenth century by Rol pa’i rdo rje lCang skya the second, preceptor of the Manchu empire and instructor for arguably its greatest emperor, Qianlong, we will present a preliminary portrait of the school known in the text generally as the “Mind-only” School.
The points at which primary text translation stops and sub-commentary begins follow for the most part points at which Geshe Sopa felt were units of thought. The commentary presents his views as best as I was able to relate them. Often I have used Geshe Sopa’s own terminology in the translation. Equally often I have used synonyms if this aided comprehension. Like many students of Buddhist tradition, I have coined idiosyncratic but useful terms for a number of key terms.
With regard to the use of the terms “positivist” and “nihilismist,” our argument as follows. Initially we took Robert Thurman’s insight that these schools are unlike any Western schools, therefore there is an advantage in
avoiding existing terms. Hence his choices of “reificationism” and “repudiationism” respectively. In discussion with Geshe Sopa I discussed the manner in which the choice of terms was at issue. I explained that the terms nihilismand positivism had a specific context in the occident.
Some may associate the term “nihilism” and think immediately of the works of Nietzsche and others. Others may think of Mill and so forth when the term “positivism” is mentioned. We in almost no way associate our usage of these in this text with specific works of Western scholars to whom we give this appellation. The only connection is in a general sense with the idea of things seen as either existing or non-existing. These connections, if they are at all suitable admittedly deserve fuller treatment than is or purpose here to give.
In the text, “skur ba debs pa” is explicitly defined as med par lta ba or a “view as non-existent.” As with other types of nihilism, the over-negation of the role of consciousness by the Madhyamaka School leads literally to a repudiation of the Buddhadharma and a concomitant undermining of the bodhimārga. Without a foundation of some sort, many may contend that it is difficult to maintain an ethical code, or a focus
This investigation is ordered as followed. Following the initial chapters of methodology and introduction, we have presented these three topics from lCang skya’s summa. We have translated and elucidated a commentary on the main
section of the Ornament which present the Mind-only School’s position on three central topics: nihilism, self-awareness and positivism. We have presented at the end of each chapter, classical Madhyamaka critical examinations of the relevant Yogācāra doctrines and within the footnotes, modern opinions on appropriate aspects of our study.
It will be our purpose to present at least at a preliminary and probing manner, the complexities involved in this issue. The inter-relationship and commonality shared by the two schools will not be obscured in our study simply because we are focusing on disputed issues. I hope that this will be an outcome of our study: we will have presented what have been seen as vital distinctions among elements of the Mahāyānist textual traditions, but the essential unity and shared values and perspectives of the two schools will hopefully have been made clear.
Chapter One: Methodology
[In my book, I argue] against the old-fashioned method of dialogue, which I satirize as ‘Take a Buddhist to Dinner’
One [question] is, which Buddhist are you going to get? Maybe you get a Buddhist from one school which is very atypical. There are a lot of reasons why any common or garden-variety Buddhist is not the Buddhist you want, and also why the Dalai Lama is not the one you want either, because he’s not a typical Tibetan Buddhist. So which Buddhist are going to take to dinner?
Wendy Doniger in Criterion
Refutation of essentialist approaches found among Western scholars of religion.
Doniger’s quote presents of course, a highly Euro-centric position. It implies that Buddhologists from Asia are mere “believers”, and have no “scholars”. Certainly my studies with Isshi Yamada and Lhundhup Sopa proved very much otherwise to me, and in fact, these two made me aware of the biases from the “Western” side of this gulf. One sees in
the vast and diverse ocean of contending paradigms often an incompatibility among them. This methodological section emerges out of a concern that in the area of Buddhist studies, many approaches have been applied in the west to study Buddhism which fail to incorporate the full scope of epistemological and methodological concerns which have motivated Buddhist scholars themselves.
We will begin our examination of the issues by taking on the epistemological task of describing early efforts by western historians of religion to expose the “essence” of a religion (Christianity in this case). We will then move
on to provisionally outlining a methodology which corresponds to the Mahāyānist epistemology we describe at the outset. Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of how traditional western and traditional “eastern” approaches should be conceived from the standpoint of a Mahāyānist approach to the study of religion.
Essentialism in Occidental approaches to the study of religion. The arising of the “scientific” study of religion. In a sense, we can trace the origin of the scientific study of religion back to the attempts of Protestant scholars during the Reformation (ca. 16th century) to render vernacular translations of the Bible and determine objectively exactly what Jesus really said, rather than relying on papal authority to determine biblical truths.
The scientific study of the History of Religions really gets underway in the wake of the philosophical work of Kant (1724-1804) and Hegel (1770-1831). Roughly speaking, Kant held that humans have pre-determined mental categories
which filter reality. Through these categories, one can know nothing of a “thing-in-itself” (Ding-an-sich), one can only know a “thing” or “existent entity” as it appears or manifests itself as a phenomenon. Opposed to phenomena are noumena or “things of the mind” which are beyond the ken of the mental categories.
Such a concept, though taken as a given for a large number of scholars throughout the Occident for nigh two centuries, is scarcely comprehensible to one raised in East Asia, the cultures of which operate under very different understandings of epistemology.
Dr. Lin, a Chinese Christian philosopher had this to say about Kant’s Ding-an-sich:
“I have sometimes asked myself, ‘Did China ever produce a mind like Kant’s?’ The answer is, obviously, No. Moreover, she could not. A Chinese Kant would laugh at himself the moment he talked of the Ding-an-sich, the thing
in itself....the Chinese philosopher should feel that there must be qualities and differences in the pear skin and the banana skin corresponding to the resulting differences in touch. Isn’t this knowledge ‘real’? What do you want to know the banana-in-itself and the pear-in-itself for?”
“Divine things” were said by western Idealists to be unknowable noumena and hence a scholar should not be concerned with transcendent categories, e.g. asking questions like “How many angels can sit on the head of a pin?” (a serious debate in medieval Europe).
And, just to nuance the issue a bit further, we have Dr. Lin’s “outside” (therefore “objective”?) comments about western philosophy re Aristotle:
“A Chinese is well-prepared to hear about Aristotle’s’ Ethics and Politics and Poetics, and is amazed and duly impressed at his breadth, at his knowledge of botany and astronomy and meteorology and biology, crude as his notions often are. The dispassionate inquiry, the curious objective dissection of life
in all its segments in physics and biology (for Aristotle was a medical doctor), is astounding....[however] Confucius had a disciple, Tseshia, who had a propensity for accumulating facts of information, and who was interested in the
birds and insects mentioned in the Book of Songs. Confucius said to him: “Be a gentleman scholar; do not be a petty scholar. That type of knowledge which consists in memorizing facts to answer questions is not worthy to make one a teacher. The Chinese, in fact, are given to the intuitive comprehension of the totality....”
Lin here is more influenced by Confucian thought than Buddhist. One thinks of Confucius’ well-known declaration that he refused to speak of “divine things.” It is hard to imagine that the occidental preference for homing in on
“essences” is a cultural phenomenon, however so it seems when viewed from “outside the system.” This is not to say that “essences” were not elucidated by Vedic and other traditions, but even these are to be distinguished from seemingly similar occidental notions.
Moving on in this brief history of the History of Religions, Hegel took Kant’s skepticism about the mind’s ability to know “ideal” things or “things of the mind” (again, noumena) and historicized this understanding. Hegel’s view was that history was a dynamical process of the ever-unfolding self-revelation of Geist - “Mind” or “Spirit” - into
historical concreteness. He thought that history had a beginning and an end, and that the end of history would be the final development of Absolute Geist in time/space.
In a way reminiscent of the approach taken by the materialist Carvāka School of ancient India, Feuerbach (1804-1872) took a materialist approach to the study of religions, asserting that the only thing to study with regard to religion were material phenomena. Transcendentally metaphysical issues (e.g. the existence of angels, etc.) were to be studied
as projections of the mind onto the material world. Religion was just a projection of the desires and wishful thinking of the materially composed mind onto the material world.
In the progression of theories about the nature of religion from Kant to Feuerbach, one can see an increasing tendency towards a materialist and rationalist stance. With Max Weber, a self-consciously sociological construal of
religion emerged. For example, one may the mention well-known Weberian thesis that holds that Calvinism as a religious phenomenon prepared the soil from which modern western capitalism sprang. Religion is an aspect of primarily social interaction.
F. C. Baur (1792-1850) had first applied Hegel’s notion of the development of Geist-in-time to Christianity, seeing Christianity as the synthesis of the two anti-theses of Greek religious philosophy and Judaism. Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) took Baur’s (and others’) pioneering work into this century. Troeltsch applied Weber’s sociological approaches to the already existent Hegelian approach.
These tools and new philological approaches were in vogue at the time (including a fascination with Sanskrit and the reconstruction of the original Indo-European language). Certain, mostly German scholars at the end of the last century paved the way for the study of religion in the west for decades to come. It is an issue among these scholars of those newly modern times on which I want to focus.
Das Unwesen des Christentums. Again, the Religionsgeschichtliche Schule emerged in opposition to old approaches taken to study Christianity that focused on the study of doctrine and scripture. For the founders of the school, reform was required. Moving away from Hegel’s view of Christianity as the “absolute religion,” the founders of the
History of Religions school relativized (or one might say, “de-absolutized”) Christianity, placing it among the world’s religions as just a “religion among religions.” Its basic insight was that by means of tracing historical developments among religious traditions one might best know their “essence” and character.
By employing the latest scientific techniques, incorporating the sciences of archaeology, anthropology, sociology, newly established linguistic approaches and so forth, these scholars focused western scientific modes of analysis on the world’s religions (beginning naturally with Christianity as its first specimen) to determine the “essences” of the various religions “scientifically.”
While we applaud the break with the old style of narrow, dogmatic study of religion, we note there was certainly not total break with Christian world-view. The founders of the History of Religions School were “with one exception...from North Germany’ with the exception of one farmer’s son and one New Testament professor’s son, all were pastor’s children.”
Basic Protestant theological notions underlie the approach of the History of Religions School. Elements of anthropocentrism, historo-centrism, essentialist thinking and a peculiarly western emphasis on a collective social understanding of religion belie the claim of the History of Religions School to be engaged in “objective”
“scientific” studies of religion. They are clearly “subjective” accounts when seen from the perspective of religions outside the traditional European and Euro-American framework, whether Native American, African, or in our case, Mahāyānist.
Von Harnack, Loisy and Troeltsch: the “essence” of Christianity. Protestant scholar of the history of Christian doctrine, Adolf von Harnack in 1898 wrote Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of Christianity), a pioneering work in the historical/critical approach to the study of Christianity. In this work, it was Harnack’s major thesis
that from research into the history of Christian Doctrines and biblical studies, it was possible to determine scientifically the “essential” truth of the Christian faith. The term “unwesen” of our subject heading is a negation of the term “wesen,” German for “essence.” The term was used in a work of monumental import. Adolf von Harnack used the term “Wesen” with regard to Christianity.
Out of intense research, Harnack whittled away the “husk” (e.g. doctrines and rituals) of Christian truth to one “essential” kernel of truth:
“…it is that disposition which the Father of Jesus Christ awakens in men’s hearts through the Gospel. It is an ‘inward’ and ‘personal’ moral conviction; what part can philosophy then have in it?” “No one knows the Son but the Father and no one knows the Father but the Son and those to whom the Son may choose to reveal him.”
This is the pure “kernel” or “essential” truth of Christianity Harnack took from Chapter 11, verse 27b of the Gospel of Matthew in the Christian New Testament.
In a manner both westernly scientific and Protestant at the same time, he determined that all hope of a Jewish-style “coming Kingdom” and all the Roman Catholic rituals and ecclesiastical structures were the outward “husk,” to be
discarded in favor of the essential truth given above. It is Harnack’s self-styled “non-philosophical” internal disposition of faith which comprises the Absolute truth which is the essential kernel of the religion which again, is itself, in Harnack’s conception, the vital kernel of the religions of the earth.
French Catholic scholar, Alfred Loisy rose to meet this Protestant challenge. In L’Église et l’ Évangile, Loisy declared that what Harnack claims is the discardable “husk” of the historical development of Christianity (i.e. the Jewish and Catholic elements) in fact forms the centrality if not the entirety of the continual metamorphoses of the religion as it develops ritually, theologically and politically. Harnack’s so-called “essence” is just the reflection of his own Protestant beliefs read back into history as the pure “essence” of the tradition, found in Jesus’ alleged “original, pure” teachings.
Protestant historian of religions Ernst Troeltsch, the foremost among the founders of the Religionsgeschliche Schule, had problems with the stance taken by both of the above scholars. In his response to both Harnack and Loisy, “Wie heisst ‘Wesen Christentums’?” he agrees with Loisy: Harnack “Protestantizes and modernizes the Gospel.” He agrees with Loisy’s criticism of Harnack’s Protestant presupposition that the essence is to be
“…considered as a criterion to be drawn from ‘original Christianity’, thereby attacking what to a Roman Catholic scholar appears as a glaring example of ‘one-sided Protestant Biblicism’.
Against Loisy however,“...Loisy’s views about the ‘necessity of Catholicism are interesting and largely correct as an exercise in historical induction; but they have nothing to do with the essence.”
Troeltsch notes that Loisy relegates Protestantism to the role of external critic of the abuses of the “main branch” of tradition - defined as the medieval Roman Catholic church - and this is where his argument militates against his own view of the organic, necessary evolution of Christianity from pre-Christian elements through the New Testament to an “essence” albeit defined loosely and as impermanent.
By placing the Protestant revolt in the role of external critic of Catholic abuses, he admits to a “falling away” from the original teaching. This is a falling away” from what? Troeltsch asks. From an essence! He concludes. To put a complex argument in a nutshell, Troeltsch concludes that the Protestant interpretation of Christian tradition is basically a
“…purer, deeper understanding of Christianity and is a catastrophe which invalidates this [Loisy’s] whole theory....”
Troeltsch expands the notion of an essence of religion from Harnack’s narrow “kernel” notion that the essence of Christianity is to be found in the Gospel of Matthew quote given above. The essence should include the views of the “heretics” of the tradition, the art, the ritual, and the “pagan” philosophies of Platonism and Aristotelianism which fuel the various Christian theologies which arose.
But finally, there is an “essence” of Christianity for Troeltsch. In a manner reminiscent of Hegel’s own “evolving Geist notion, Troeltsch’s essence is a “driving ideal,” as a critical tool which is a
“…discrimination between that which corresponds to the essence and that which is contrary to it.” We must be able “to detach the inner drive of the essence from its temporary individualization conditioned by other factors.”
Yet Troeltsch is also aware that the radical historicism of the modern age has led to an “inescapable relativism” and “subjectivity” affecting all modern critical inquiries into the truth of religion, and thus, he stumbles onto a core Buddhist truth viz our topic at hand, the nature of consciousness, and objective and subjective awareness.
“The unified idea of the essence only exists after all in the mind of the historian summarizing the material [my emphases throughout].”
Modern theories concerning the “essence” of religion. We will examine below the above debate via Madhyamaka argumentation to elucidate a “middle path” to a Mahāyānist epistemological framework for understanding what the goal is for a scholar in studying religions. But first, let us fill out in a bit more detail the issues involved in this discussion by bringing our brief history of the History of Religions study in the West up to modern times.
Max Mueller (1823-1900), a German scholar of religions working at Oxford, was among the very first to thoroughly research “oriental” religions.” Though like the others discussed above, Mueller sought a scientific study of religions, he himself was comfortable with Kantian notions. And he shared with his
Protestant German colleague the idea that the studying the sources of a religion could disclose that religion. Further for Mueller, Christian notions such as the ideas of belief in God, the immortality of the soul and ideas of a final retribution were characteristics of all religions in some form.
Rudolf Otto’s notion was that all people experience an “idea of the holy.” Religion is not “contained...in any series of rational assertions.” Rather, religious reality was a sense of the numinous, the mysterium tremendum whose focus is being and
“…starts from a consciousness of the absolute superiority or supremacy of a power other than myself...transmuted into a plenitude of being.”
Of course, Rudolf Otto was among the first to apply Husserl’s phenomenology to the study of religion itself. Though Otto is sympathetic to “eastern” mysticism, and even speaks of śūnyatā, comparing it with western nature mysticism,
Otto was not free from cultural constraints and neither was his teacher. Listen to this proud declaration by Otto’s seminal influence, Edmund Husserl as he compares Indian philosophy with Greek, and note how his view corroborates that of Lin Yutang’s cited at the beginning:
“[[[Wikipedia:oriental|oriental]] philosophies]...are and remain mythical and practical, and it is a mistake, a falsification of their sense, for those raised in the scientific ways of thinking created in Greece and developed in the modern period, to speak of Indian and Chinese philosophy and science (astronomy, mathematics), i.e., to interpret India, Babylonia, China in a European way. Sharply distinguished from this is the
‘theoretical’ attitude, which is not practical in any sense used so far, it is the attitude of ‘thaumasein’, to which the great figures of the first culminating period of Greek philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, traced the origin of
philosophy. Man becomes gripped by the passion of a world-view and world-knowledge that turns away from all practical interests and, within the closed sphere of its cognitive activity, in the times devoted to it, strives for and achieves nothing but pure theoria [my emphases].”
While traditionally in the west some circles have maintained a sharp distinction between theory and practice, faith and reason, theology and philosophy, science and religion, in fact upon analysis, the interplay and mutual dependency among these seeming opposites is obvious, the ultimate distinctions, illusory. The religious background of the
objective “scientists” of religion of a century ago are obvious to those who read these fellows today. We are reminded of Schweitzer’s remark that German biblical scholars had peered down the dark well of time to find the historical Jesus and had seen their own reflections at the bottom of that well.
The development of these basic patterns of thought in History of Religions research continues in the work of Mircea Eliade. Eliade’s great achievement was to uncover the vast treasury of mythological patterns shared among all the world’s peoples. He applied the notion of “archetypes” developed by German psychologist C. G. Jung to the religious imagination.
To put it briefly (and hopefully avoid distortion), psychological archetypes are phenomenological structures of the mind deeply ingrained within people of all cultures, this school argues. For instance, all religions have myths of birth. The birth myths of Moses, Christ, the Buddha, Kṛṣṇa, etc. elaborate in a sense, the meaning of the individual’s own birth in cosmological and mythological terms.
There has been in recent years a growing reaction to the dominance of the “History of Religions” approach as practiced by the Chicago School and related German-style approaches. Some scholars of the so-called “Religious Studies” approach (I think rightly to some extent) take issue with the idea of religious structures of the brain guiding the development of the religions of the world.
Sam Gill, Don Wiebe, Robert Baird, among others, point out that these religious structures have not been demonstrated scientifically. Where in the brain do they reside? How can the non-theism of Buddhism be reconciled with Christian Theism? The “essentialist/intuitionalist” as Baird puts it, concerning the Eliade School, is ill-equipped to deal with the significant differences among the religions.
Baird makes the case that the generalizing theories employed by the Eliade School cannot be either falsified or verified. They are normative assertions to be accepted or rejected. They are not scientific enough. His school seeks “descriptive” studies of religion which
report on the archaeological and written evidence and resists incorporating such evidence into large metaphysical systems. His is a strictly non-normative (as he puts it) historical approach. Baird defines the study of religions somewhat in the manner of Cantwell Smith, long-time scholar at Harvard: religious studies are the study of what is ultimately important to persons and communities. Baird, almost sounding Nāgārjunan, declares that
“The possibility of sifting an ‘essence’ from the variety of material here presented is questionable.”
Don Wiebe seeks a study of religion that is free of any theological concerns. A secularized study of religion can best transcend cultural boundaries. Sam Gill has refuted earlier scholarship that posited a universal “earth mother” worship among the tribes of Native Americans. He saw only particular feminine deities in the tribal religious traditions he studies, not a universal “earth-mother.”
However the Mādhyamika scholar will want to inquire as to whether the Religious Studies thinkers have achieved the objectivity that eluded the Eliade scholars. In their struggle to oppose the positing of “identical religious structures” (to use Baird’s terminology) of the Eliade school, haven’t these
scholars gone over to the other extreme, over-stressing the differentiation among religious traditions as they descriptively study their particular manifestations? Is this not a recapitulation of the Harnack-Loisy debate in a more sophisticated form, one side emphasizing essential features, the other, the particular characteristics?
The two above methodologies (i.e. Eliade and the Baird/Gill/Wiebe approaches) are opposed to each other. Each asserts the other lacks genuine objectivity. If we might pretend for a moment to speak for them, scholars following Eliade would say the Religious Studies people lack objectivity because they ignore the fact of their own social
conditioning, and that pre-conceived notions and religious categories of thought biases are inescapable and scientifically demonstrable. Every religious tradition has, for example, some type of birth narrative as part of their religious story. Who would deny then, that at some level, these types of stories are “essential” features of every religion?
The Religious Studies people assert that they are the true scientists, detachedly analyzing the data only, not fitting it into the pre-conceived notions of a Jungianesque phenomenological paradigm. The scholar of religions, they assert, can put aside his/her conditioning and render strictly objective accounts.
While we will take issue with Baird’s complete denial of an essence - even at the level of conventional verbal discourse - we concur in doubting one can ultimately cleave to this idea. Certain scholars who we might say generally follow Eliade’s approach seem not to have
fully clarified the confusion surrounding this problem of an “essence” of religions which so perplexed Troeltsch, many decades ago. As evidence for this, we cite this from the Encyclopedia of Religion, of which Eliade was editor states this as recently as 1987: General requirements for a “more adequate classification of religions” include that
“Judgments should be made in order to distinguish what is essential or fundamental in religions from what is accidental or incidental.”
Still, the issue of the relationship of an essence to its manifestations would seem to be problematic given our above analysis.
We do not want to make a blanket statement here, but there is a sense when one encounters texts from both of the above traditions an inclination to take the view that adherents of Asian traditions of scholarship on religion have been pre-scientific, lacking the scientist’s objectivity to be found in the traditions emerging from the Religionsgeschichtliche movement in Europe, not so long ago.
Towards a Madhyamaka Historiography.
A Nāgārjunan critique of essentialism. The logical schools emerged in Indian Buddhism at least in part if not in the main, to defend the tradition against the arguments of other schools. Texts such as the MūlaMadhyamakakārikāḥ emerged to translate the poetic and cryptic descriptions of śūnyatā in the Prajñāpāramitā literature into a rigorous logical form which demonstrated the actuality of śūnyatā and pratītya-samutpāda in a manner which enabled the employment of these ideas in the debates with scholars of the Vedic and Jain traditions, among others.
An encounter with Madhyamaka logic offers an “outsider” the possibility for dialogue with the Mahāyāna tradition and by means of this, either demonstrate or disprove the western bias against there being a scientific objectivity in traditional Buddhist scholarship. It has always been a maxim among Indian
philosophers that through logical analysis of causal connections among conceptual systems, people from different cultures may discuss issues and perhaps demonstrate their views among those of other traditions of inquiry. Among the many schools of Buddhism, Madhyamaka logic is fairly said to be the most prone to engaging in this sort of dialogue with other schools.
As we will show below, if one can demonstrate that the four-fold negation (in the form of what is known as the “tetralemma”) is not logically valid with regard to the assertion that there neither is nor is not an “essence” for a given religion, and that, ultimately events neither arise, nor abide nor cease, then the critical historian from
these above-mentioned schools may uphold his or her notion of history of a religion as either a temporal progression continually unfolding phenomena from out of essentially existent, recurrent features, or conversely, if the results of Nāgārjunan reasoning are rejected, perhaps the Religious Studies scholars may uphold their own view of the history of a religion as the manifestation of discrete facts which have no “essential” features.
Arguments from the kārikāḥ. In outlining an understanding of religious history, one must have some theory with regard to what identifies and differentiates one religion from another. This was the motivation for seeking an essence of those scholars we discussed above. It is not an issue which can be dismissed.
We will focus on Nāgārjuna ’s arguments concerning the “svabhāva” or “self-entity” - “essence” - from his Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ, the Root [-stanzas] on the Middle Way, to elucidate a Mahāyānist answer to the difficulties discussed above. We will employ Nāgārjuna’s method of the so-called “tetralemma,” or four-fold negation to a modern discussion to address these issues.
The first leg of the tetralemma: negation of “essence.” To begin, Nāgārjunanotes that if one assumes that an essence or self-nature, self-entity, (svabhāva), etc., emerges by means of causes and conditions, it would be
something created. But how is this possible? If it is uncreated, it would not be contingent upon an “other.” If Harnack’s essence is not contingent to any “other entities” (e.g., Jewish eschatology, Catholic rituals, etc.) how could it even be known? It is only in connection to its manifestations as “external” forms that Harnack’s “vital kernel” could be known.
Obviously, an uncreated entity does not exist. A created thing is, according to Madhyamaka logic, something that comes into being by means of causes and conditions. If an “essence” is contingent upon those other elements, it cannot exist alone and apart as Harnack asserts. If it is independent of causes and conditions, it is uncreated and cannot exist and cannot be known. Clearly it is dependent upon causes and conditions: for one thing, his “essence” is dependent upon Jesus’ utterances as a primary cause and upon later authors having written it down as auxiliary conditions.
The second leg of the tetralemma: negation of “no-essence.” What of Loisy’s contention that there is no essential teaching of the New Testament? That it is only the manifestations we can know or study? Troeltsch’s response, in
our view suffices to demonstrate the Madhyamaka stance at this juncture. While there can be no ultimate essence along Harnack’s line, there can indeed be a verbal distinction of an essence which is true conventionally (saṃvṛtitaḥ) but not ultimately (paramārthataḥ). Ultimately, Harnack’s essence is dependent upon causes and conditions.
Conventionally or provisionally, Martin Luther could act from a standpoint whereupon faith was an essential and central standpoint to oppose abuses and a “falling away” of what were conceptualized as “essential truths,” even though this idea falls apart when carried to a logical extreme. Therefore, there is an essence based on the mere
fact of people conceiving an essence and verbally distinguishing it; in this way such views share in “conventional truth.” It is at this stage the Mādhyamika scholar avoids the charge of “nihilism.” Indeed, “essence” is negated at the level of ultimate analysis, but the fact and truth of conventionally determined essences are affirmed by the negation of “no-essence.”
The third leg of the tetralemma: negation of “there both is and is not an essence.” This is the negation of Troeltsch’s standpoint, and it is here that what is intended becomes increasingly difficult to conceptualize, for the increasing level of difficulty to conceptualize phenomena is a primary aim of the Prāsaṅgika project. Nāgārjuna’s
line of reasoning holds that two mutually incompatible states cannot co-abide within the same entity. They would conflict at their point of contact or integration. That is to say, that while Troeltsch negates Harnack’s notion of a simple essence and negates Loisy’s negation of Harnack’s essence, he incorporates both with the idea that there is an essence, but it exists in the mind of the historian and is inclusive of much more “accidental” phenomena than Harnack allowed.
On the face of it this seems quite reasonable, but this more or less Idealist picture runs into the same problem. If we posit a mental essence, how can it be “permanent,” “individual” or “fundamental” - usual attributes for the definition of “essence”? For even in the mind of the historian, the “essence” is a changing composite phenomenon created by means of causes and conditions.
For Nāgārjuna, Troeltsch’s mentalized essence is a figment of the imagination. Troeltsch more or less admits to this, but he still cleaves to the idea of an essence as a “driving ideal,” something the Mādhyamika scholar ultimately rejects - even as a mentalized phenomenon.
Fourth leg of the tetralemma: negation of “neither essence nor non-essence.” This is the most difficult aspect of Nāgārjuna’s philosophy for the occidental mind to fathom. This is the level that points directly to the wordlessness and ultimate non-existence of phenomena posited by the Mahāyāna tradition.
The third leg noted that the mutually contradictory states of “both is and is not an essence” cannot co-abide within one entity, or they would cancel each other out. The fourth leg is concerned to avoid a nihilismistic conclusion, recapitulating to a certain extent the second leg. It aims to expose a
“neutral” middle state poised between being and non-being, ultimately neither alternative. There is not a “non-essence” (because one can be conceptually and verbally elucidated at the conventional level), and because one should not conceive of “non-essence” or “niḥility” as some sort of entity either, nor is there “not a non-essence,” which is impossible to conceive. This is the point of the “emptiness of emptiness itself.”
Through this final negation, one is left at a point of conceptionlessness. Certainly, Nāgārjuna’s approach leaves one far from the standpoint of Husserl’s pure theoria, however it can hardly be said that the Madhyamaka approach
sidesteps logical analysis even as it aims to undermine the ultimate validity of any conventional discourse, even logical discourse. Logical discourse is nevertheless central to the conventional elucidation of the Madhyamaka “system of no system.”
Conventional essentialism relative to ultimate non-essentialism. In sum at the ultimate level of logical analysis, we have in the Madhyamaka tradition a complete rejection of any “essentialist” stance whatsoever. The extreme of “being” is negated as is the other extreme of “nihilism.” What is left? A system of thought which can provide for verbal distinctions, such as the elucidation of “essences” of religion, yet is self-aware as it does so, that these
essences are figments, and that they do not exist as essences even in one’s own mind. Hence I can assert both “Nāgārjuna’s thought is essential to Mahāyānist thought (conventionally)” and at the same time, “there is not ultimately any such thing as Mahāyānist thought (for ultimately, it has no essence).”
The two truths cut a path between the extremes of either existence or non-existence. One colleague critical of Madhyamaka thought, which he deems paradoxical and by its own admission, illogical, accuses Nāgārjuna of negating his
own argument, and that he therefore proves nothing. This is the point. Nāgārjuna was accused of the same thing by ancient Nyāya scholars. Nāgārjuna anticipated this charge (of negating his own stance) in his “Apology,” the Vigrāhavyāvartaṇī. Here are his words:
“You have not understood the meaning of the emptiness of entities, yet you have set out to criticize me, saying, ‘Since your statement is devoid of self-entity, the negation of the intrinsic nature of entities is not valid’.”
“Suppose that a magic man created by a magician should prevent another magic man created by his own magic [from] doing something...the magic man who is prevented is empty and the magic man who prevents is also empty. In like manner, a negation of the self-entity of all entities by my statement is possible, even though this statement [itself] is empty.”
This concludes the first part of our study. The historian of religion operating from a Madhyamaka standpoint should not seek to define a normative essence, but may conventionally assert phenomena s/he deems essential to knowing a religious tradition. This holds as long as the historian is aware that an “essence” is a verbally designated phenomenon originating from his/her own mind as imputation, and that on the ultimate level, even the given tradition
studied does not exist with its own identity in a “positivistic” sense, given the infinite inter-relationships which tie that tradition to traditions other than itself and among which it evolves. This is the logic of pratītya-samutpāda - co-originating inter-relationship the proof of which is a central aim as well of Nāgārjuna’s proofs.
A Mahāyānist Methodology for Religious Studies
In this second section, 1) we shall be presenting the problem of subject/object dualism in the study of Buddhism as exemplified in the writings of certain modern occidental scholars. That this is a problem is apparent to those who study with teachers indigenous to the tradition we are investigating. 2) We will be elucidating the views of two occidental scholars who have rendered attempts aimed at solving difficulties inherent in the assumption by many
occidental scholars of a so-called “objective” stance and 3) finally, we will aim to propose a methodology from the standpoint of the Madhyamaka philosophical tradition, inclusive of certain elements of Yogācārin insights. We will propose this both as appropriate means by which to understand Buddhism and further, any religion deemed an “other” or an “object” of study.
I come to this subject as one with a lot of frustration and a thought to resolve it. I have encountered a number of arenas where western tools used to study Buddhism were simply not comprehensive enough to fully engage the tradition. For instance, to hearken back to a statement problematic for me, let me repeat Dr. Wendy Doniger’s statement. In her book she argues
“...against the old-fashioned method of dialogue, which I satirize as “Take a Buddhist to Dinner.” One [question] is, which Buddhist are you going to get? Maybe you get a stupid Buddhist, or maybe you get a Buddhist from one school which is very atypical. There are a lot of reasons why any common or garden-variety Buddhist is not the Buddhist you want, and also why the Dalai Lama is not the one you want either because he’s not a typical Tibetan Buddhist. So which Buddhist are you going to take to dinner?”
To speak frankly, and giving due regard to her achievements, the above quote by one of America’s most celebrated Indologists stands out to those who study with Asian scholars of Buddhism as frankly - absurd. Basically, if we
should not study with “garden-variety” Buddhists nor “stupid” Buddhists nor even brilliant Buddhists (i.e. the Dalai Lama), maybe the implication of her statements is to say that study with no Buddhists is the most appropriate means by which to engage in Buddhist studies.
While somewhat outrageous to anyone from a Buddhist culture, this view is prevalent among certain scholars engaging in the western academic study of religion. If we reversed the idea and placed it in our cultural context, and one imagines a Chinese student asking, “Which place in the world is the best
to study the New Testament?” according to Professor Doniger, the Pope would not be the best, for he is not typical. Engaging church-goers (say, anthropologically) in the meaning of the New Testament for them is not of value, for they are typical, but might be “stupid.” Studying the New Testament at Tubingen would not be wise, for it too is “very atypical.”
Her point that religious study should be undertaken in a manner as “scientific” and “objective” as possible is well-taken. Conventionally, this works. A scholar of religion should might be well-advised not to engage in a mindless, polemical apologetic for his/her tradition. Ultimately, however there is no pure, removed, utterly objective standpoint. One may seek at most a standpoint which is relatively objective; an utterly objective standpoint is a “view from nowhere.”
Gananath Obeyesekere, while a native Sinhalese, employs an occidental paradigm. He conceptualizes Buddhism as an “other” in his discussion of hair in Medusa’s Hair. He describes in a Neo-Freudian way, how the shaven heads of Buddhist monks unconsciously represent “castration or the loss of the penis,” while the ascetics’ matted hair symbolizes the emergence through the head of a “sub-lated penis.”
While there is no inherent problem in employing what we might call the “sex-o-centric” conceptual apparatus of Freudian psychology, for we acknowledge the two hair styles could be interpreted that way and his discussion contributes to the general discussion in a provocative way, we feel that besides demonstrating a lack of respect for those in the tradition who would be offended by such a description (as they would the impudence of assuming one knows
the unconscious motivations of the Buddha who is said to have instigated these rules), that it would have been more comprehensive a discussion of the issues involved for Obeyesekere to have informed readers of the native interpretation of their shaven heads. Perhaps then we would have a more complete understanding of the practice. To balance one’s own hermeneutical approach with an investigation of the native self-interpretation seems to me to be the more relatively “objective” approach.
A more subtle example of the imposition of one’s own self and culture on another occurs in the work of Paul Griffiths. In his book, On Being Mindless, he states that the Yogācāra philosophical system is “strictly idealist” though he acknowledges it is devoid of a substantialist or essentialist basis in its thinking. To use a culturally loaded term like “Idealist” with regard to an Asian system is once again to impute one’s own categories onto another system without regard to how proponents of the tradition itself would respond.
How can Yogācāra thought be termed “Idealist” when it identifies the “ātmadṛṣṭi” - the “self-view” or “ego-centric standpoint” as an affliction to be resolved, or better, dissolved into the higher standpoint of the absence of the real existence of apprehender and apprehended? Hence the notion, Yogācāra, Mind-only and Vijñāptimātra, cognition-only should not be simply conflated with Berkeleyian or any other western idealism.
The Yogācārin notion of the other-dependent (paratantra) can ultimately be known. Is it then to be equated with Kant’s noumenal realm? Where is anything like śūnyatā to be found among Western Idealist systems? With so many differences, is it accurate to call Yogācāra thought “Idealism”? And if so, might we not just as accurately call Kantian or Hegelian thought examples of Western Yogācāra? The Western proponents of these traditions would, methinks, protest too much.
Occidental Sympathizers: van der Leeuw and Bourdieu. Gerardus van der Leeuw is widely known for his stress on the importance of the inter-play found in what he calls the “object and subject in this reciprocal operation.” He discusses the “reality” of dream consciousness, a state wherein “the supporting pillar of conscious experience, while
we are awake, the tension between subject and object disappears....” In his discussion of the reality of dream consciousness, and his citing cases among certain tribespeople where dreams are regarded as more real than waking consciousness, van der Leeuw dissolves the hard boundary between subject and object so cherished by classical historians of religion and by many of their successors today.
As Rogers Brubaker sums up Bourdieu’s thought, he notes that,
“Every sociological practice, theoretical or empirical, rests on an implicit or explicit metatheory - a general conceptual framework for the understanding of human social life. Metatheory matters: it is consequential for substantive work, determining (in part) the kind of problems that are posed, the kinds of explanations that are offered, and the kinds of techniques of empirical study that are employed.”
He describes Bourdieu’s approach as contending with a set of problems subsumed within the framework of “objectivism vs. subjectivism.”
“Objectivism explains social life in terms of mind-independent existence; subjectivism, by contrast, appeals to mind-dependent and agent-dependent elements such as the conceptions and beliefs of individuals. Neither of these one-sided modes of thought can comprehend the intrinsically double nature of social reality.
Subjectivism ignores the external constraints placed on agents by thing-like social facts and the social formation of every ‘subject’ but objectivism ignores the ‘objectivity of the subjective’ and the ‘reality of the representation’, because it does not recognize that the experience individuals have in and of social reality and the conceptions they form about it are partly constitutive of that reality.
Only a theory based on a conceptualization of the relation between material and symbolic properties, and between external, constraining social facts and experiencing, apprehending acting individuals, can be adequate for the human sciences.”
Certainly, the Harnack-Loisy debate fits into these two categories.
While we do not want to make the same mistake we accused Griffiths of making, and overlay our own prejudices onto another system and equating the two systems - i.e., in our case, to say Cittamātrin metatheory and Bourdieusian metatheory are basically the same, our goal in this section of our paper is to point out that the two share in common an insistence that one deny the ultimate existence of grasper and grasped, (grāhya, grāhaka), subject and object. Madhyamaka and Yogācāra thought merit consideration on their own terms as their reflection could be applied to constructing a metatheory of religions study based on their thought.
Proposal of a Mahāyānist Metatheory. Keiji Nishitani is one of Heidegger’s least-acknowledged students, but among Heidegger’s many students who were Christian or raised Christian, Nishitani was his only Buddhist pupil. East Asian Buddhism is very heavily dependent on Yogācāra thought, more so than the Central Asian traditions which incline more
towards a Madhyamaka standpoint, generally speaking. Nishitani in some sense then, could be viewed as among the first Cittamātrin scholars of religion in the west, since certainly he was a western thinker in at least as many ways as Obeyesekere, having incorporated a Neo-Heideggerian paradigm as opposed to a Neo-Freudian model.
“Plato, it will be recalled, likened our ordinary relationship to things to being tied up inside a cave, watching the shadows passing to and fro across its walls, and calling those shadows ‘reality.’ To look at things from the standpoint of the self is always to see things merely as objects, that is, to look at things without from a field
within the self. It means assuming a position vis-a-vis things from which self and things remain fundamentally separated from one another. This standpoint of separation of subject and object, or opposition between within and without is what we call the field of consciousness.”
Continuing further in these passages, Nishitani displays a pure Yogācāra view of reality. Things, the self, are “real” he says,
“On the field of consciousness where they are ordinarily taken for real, however, they are not present in their true reality but only in the form of representations. So long as the field of separation between within and without is not broken through, and so long as a conversion from that standpoint does not take place, the lack of unity and contradiction spoken of earlier cannot help but prevail among the things we take as real. This sort of contradiction shows up, for example, in the opposition between materialism and idealism....”
Yogācārin insights into the relationship of religious praxis to non-essentialism: The three natures and their implications for the relationship of theory to practice in the Mahāyāna tradition and for religious studies in general.
Central to the Yogācāra system is the notion of the “three natures” (Sk. trisvabhāva). These three natures, along with some other basic features of Cittamātrin thought will serve as an outline for a metatheory of understanding the reality of religions deemed an “other” to oneself.
The field of consciousness wherein subject and object dualism operate mentioned above by Nishitani designates the first of the three natures and is called “conceptualized nature.” All consciousnesses naively operate at this level, according to Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, (founders of the Yogācāra school) et. al. from the standpoint of the “ātmadṛṣṭi” or “self-view” or better translated for our purposes here as the “subject [-centered]-theory.”
This conceptualized nature takes as inherently existing the bifurcation of subject and object. One assumes that forms, etc., are external to one’s own mind, and all sorts of mental states arise from that basic “subject-theory,” among them being aversion, jealousy, prejudice and bigotry, etc..
From the Cittamātrin standpoint, analysis coming from out of a naive thought that subject and object exist alone and apart from each other and that one’s own theorizing about, in our case, the reality of a religion deemed an “other”
constitutes that “other” religion is mistaken. This first of the three natures aims to elucidate the view that our false imputation of inherent existence to the subject or to excessively emphasize the inherent existence of the
object - are extremes which miss the Middle view which is that, for the Cittamātrins, the subject (grāhaka) and object (grāhya) exist as only from the level of immediate, un-reflected-upon consciousness and do not exist ultimately separate upon the further analysis at the second of the three natures, the “paratantrasvabhāva” or as we translate this, the (literally) “other-dependent” nature.
This second aspect of analysis aims at revealing the fact that only “enmeshed with” or “interwoven-with” what is conceptualized as an “other” can that which is conceptualized as “self” exist. The external forms the internal, yet
the internal construes and configures the external. Therefore it is said that through the mistaken impression of there being a dual reality of subject and object, this misconception is nevertheless actual in spite of its being a misconception.
The mistaken consciousness is really apprehending something in its false imputation of a bifurcation - the bifurcation itself is illusory and falls away at the second level of reflection - the other-dependent - wherein one realizes that one’s own perceptions are built upon that which is “other” than itself for all its assumptions and world-view-making abilities.
Religious studies taken on from within this standpoint would acknowledge readily that, in our case, our own summing up of Indian religious reality is going to be fundamentally constructed on the basis of our own prejudices and from
factors of our own environment growing up as Protestants, Catholics or Jews, etc. in America, but that India’s religious reality, as we meet with it, configures our own internal mental matrix as it were, whether or not we reject or accept features of Indian religious world-view as our own.
In short, the two - the student of Indian religion and Indian religion itself - mutually create each other. Far from rendering our judgments void - our analyses are more valuable when taken in their context - i.e. as Native American, African-American construal of Indian religion, or in my case, a Scots-Irish-German liberal Protestant Midwestern construal of Buddhism.
Only a “full disclosure” of one’s own biases and only a full disclosure of the “other” tradition’s internal view of its own reality, can further the cause of achieving increasingly comprehensive modes of analyzing Indian religious systems, or for that matter, any religious system deemed an “other” to one’s own.
The “perfected” or “thoroughly established” nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) - is the state of having realized fully in practice the illusory nature of subject-object dualism. In Cittamātrin theory, this is the state of perfected realization. The implication of Mahāyānist insight here is that one must go beyond mere theory and embody one’s
theory in practice if one seeks a complete awareness of given subject matter. I have been more informed about Judaism and Islam by engaging in certain practices of those traditions, though I never accepted for myself the ideological standpoint of those traditions.
If one is to understand an “other” religion as comprehensively as possible, one really should engage in the practice to the extent one is able and is permitted to do so, to deepen one’s awareness of that tradition. This notion fits in with another Bourdieusian notion:
“...the basic requirement of a scientific sociology is its theory and methodology are both interdependent and totally reflexive.”
And so we have it. Nāgārjunan epistemology elucidates the fact of there being ultimately no separation between entities on the ultimate level. There is ultimately no essence apart from its manifestations; this is in
correspondence with his examination of many commonly experienced phenomena, e.g. his examination of the creator’s relationship to its creation, the lack of ultimate distinction between the temporal states of origination, abiding and cessation, and so forth.
The Cittamātrins extended, in their view, the epistemological implications of Madhyamaka insight into their notion of the three natures which are explicitly inclusive of praxis, denoting the problem (the conceptualized nature), the theoretical means to solve it (awareness of the other-dependent nature) and the combination of theory and practice which perfects the system (the thoroughly established or perfected nature).
I feel that a religious study can proceed along the above grounds. Perhaps there might be something of value for scholars of religion coming from other traditions. Certainly this relationship is reciprocal: Mahāyānist scholars in this country will be greatly benefitted by incorporating where relevant the insights of sociology, history,
anthropology, and, specific to religious studies, the insights proffered by Eliade scholars into the commonalities of religious experience and the insights of Baird, (et. al.) scholars into being sensitive to differences among the traditions and concerned to document “just the facts” at least, as in the case of this study, before evaluative judgments are made.
Of course, one employing a Mahāyānist hermeneutic will use these methodologies on a conventional level, but on an ultimate level will of course conclude that the various traditions of the world are neither the same, nor different, nor both, nor neither - and finally, to realize that even this scheme is “mere verbal convention.”
The application of these to our study. As should be apparent from the foregoing, we shall be elucidating essential elements of the Yoga-praxis School which distinguish it from the two other primary Buddhist schools, the Madhyamaka and the two major Śrāvakayāna Schools, the Sautrāntika and Vaibhāṣika. However, these will be the essential elements
as seen from the perspective of a Madhyamaka writer. Since such is the case, one may only say that we will be describing the “essential” elements of Yoga-praxis doctrine, as Troeltsch would say, as they exist “in the mind of the historian summarizing the material,” who in this case is lCang skya II and those scholars he chooses to quote.
In keeping with what we said above, a more thorough investigation would entail examining the ideas of those who consider themselves Yoga-praxis adherents with regard to defining the “essence” of their school. It is in the exchange of views of the critical outsider and the “believing” insider that one may find whatsoever essence that may exist - conventionally speaking, of course.
Again, in the twentieth century, to say “Yoga-praxis School doctrine” is quite a different thing than it was in lCang skya’s day. To him, Sanskrit materials were inaccessible, as were many other texts. He had available to him sufficient Tibetan texts to make his comments authoritative and well worthy
of consideration, but when one realizes that he is writing about texts fifteen hundred years prior to his age and before the two schools had fully solidified, so to speak, then one sees that his “essence” or “essential themes” are certainly subjective along with being authoritative. This essence or any other of course, is not ultimately
existent, yet this idea does not render our study meaningless. Precisely because Yoga-praxis thought is seen from many diverse angles is lCang skya’s contribution very meaningful as an admixture into the cauldron of roiling interpretations of Yoga praxis doctrine.
Chapter Two: Introduction: Yogācāra - Madhyamaka disputes from Nāgārjuna to Rol pa’i rdo rje lCang skya II.
These two systems are perfectly in accordance with the noble doctrine. Can we then say which of the two is right? Both equally conform to truth and lead us to Nirvāṇa. Nor can we find out which is true or false? Both aim at the destruction of passion (kleśa) and the salvation of all beings. We must not, in trying to settle the comparative merits of these two, create great confusion and fall further into perplexity. For, if we act conformably with any of these doctrines, we are enabled to attain the Other Shore (Nirvāṇa), and if we turn away from them, we remain drowned, as it were, in the ocean of transmigration. The two systems are, in like manner, taught in India, for in essential points they do not differ from each other.-
I-tsing
Commencement of the disputes. There can be no doubt that by the time of I-tsing at the latest, Mahāyāna was fragmented into two specific schools: The Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra. It will be one major aim of this study to investigate the origins of this cleavage. We will be examining Tibetan claims of a very early date and we will be examining the severity of the disagreements.
Certain works tend to highly under-exaggerate the discrepancies, while other, especially early occidental works, and tend to over-exaggerate the differences between Madhyamaka and Yogācāra systems, often in the framework of “nihilism” versus “Idealism,” respectively.
Having reflected on this issue for some years, and while by no means having at all fully resolved it, it is our contention that truth lies in both the under- and over- exaggerated positions mentioned above - and yet, neither. We will be demonstrating both the perspectives shared by the two schools, especially relative to the Śrāvakayāna Schools. By implication more than explicitly, we will unveil the common ground of all these Buddhist schools share relative to non-Buddhist schools.
The multivalent aspects of this study. As evinced from the title of this study, we will be primarily concerned with the “Great Debate” engaged by the two schools over the course of some centuries, as recorded in the work of lCang skya Rol pa’i rdo rje (whose biography we will relate below). In chapters three, four and five, the heart of this work, is the translation and sub-commentary of lCang skya II’s opus magnum, A Beautiful Ornament for Mt. Meru of the Adept [[[Buddha’s]]] Teaching, a Clear Exposition Presenting the Limits of Proofs.
There are four textual layers employed in this study. Doubly indented are textual citations lCang skya himself employs to make his arguments. The translation of his own work immediately surrounds those citations of earlier works he cites.
Below the translation is a sub-commentary that is an elaboration of obscure points in his work. This sub-commentary in a descriptive manner sets out the meaning of the text from the standpoint of authoritative Gelukpa interpretation from two years’ work on it with Geshe Lhundhup Sopa.
A translator can only hope to eliminate obscurity in his/her translation to as great an extent possible. To help ensure clarity we have included this extensive sub-commentary partly as a control, for sometimes we are merely repeating the translation to affirm that what it states need be interpreted no
further. At other times we have included additional information without which the text, abbreviated as it often is, would be incomprehensible. Without the insights of Geshe Sopa’s tradition of scholarship to help flesh out the meaning of the root text, I would have been stymied in my efforts to translate at all accurately or fully.
Finally, the footnotes in this study contain not only additional information from secondary sources and other primary sources. It is in this format that we have presented views of certain modern scholars relevant to this study. These may be the insights of others that may conflict with the primary text of this study.
The two schools: essentially identical or essentially different? It is a pan-Mahāyānist philosophical standpoint to reject notions of “self-identity.” To say, for example, the two Mahāyāna Schools are identical would be to violate one of their own basic principles in defining them. In Nāgārjunan analysis, something strictly identical to another thing could not be ipso facto, differentiated at all, in thought, name or experiential reality.
To assert the identity of or even to say that they are “virtually” identical is to negate another vital aspect of Mahāyāna and all Buddhist doctrine, the doctrine of upāya: the “approach” or “method” a Buddha or any teacher employs
to gradually train disciples. The manifold variety of approaches are all part of Buddha’s enticements into the dharma, all valid to varying degrees and intended for sentient beings who are also manifold and variegated. The final aim of the Buddha’s teaching is nirvāṇa itself, and this is inconceivable. All the schools are hence “interpretable” and “provisional.”
The nature of consciousness: the pivot around which the great debates unfold. The nature of consciousness is the primary subject of the great issues which distinguish a Madhyamaka stance from that of a Yogācārin. Does the Yogācārin possess an outlook that is svacitta - “mind-in-itself?” This is what [pseudo?] Nāgārjuna claims.
Is this school “Idealist?” The Yogacārin position hinges on its discusion of the self-awareness (rang rig), which is the subject of chapter four. Is this notion of a “self-aware” consciousness constitutive of some type of idealism? We offer arguments in our chapter on methodology as to why this occidental term is inaccurate. As we shall see, perhaps “Consciousnessism,” (Vijñānavāda), “Mentalism” or “Mentationism” (Yogācāra), or “Cognitionism”
(Vijñāptimātravāda) are more accurate, though some will contend that we are quibbling. The implications of the two schools’ contentions over the greater or lesser importance accorded mentation in the role of attaining liberation is central to this study. Connected with that is the relative emphasis on either theory or practice.
There exist major difficulties viewing either of the two schools strictly objectively. One always has an initial reference point. In the case of Gadjin Nagao, that reference point was that of the Yogācāra School. He admits that his study of that school was heavily influenced by his prior knowledge of Yoga-praxis positions.
No scholar of any tradition, to our knowledge, maintains that the two schools are either exactly the same or that they are utterly to be differentiated. Relatively speaking, assertions of the gulf cleaving the two schools however, diverge widely.
There are definitive and interpretable doctrines. The Buddhist schools never in theory simply condemn the doctrines of other schools, however, they do rank them according to relative depth of insight, etc. In the case of these disputes, each claims the other’s doctrine “needs further elucidation” to hit the mark of the Buddha’s intention.
David Seyfort Ruegg, standing outside a particular Buddhist tradition, terms the disputes as between a positive or mystical current (cataphatic) and a negative theory (apophatic) theory concerning these issues. The notion that some texts and ideas are “interpretable,” having a different intention (abhiprāya) than the apparent meaning, rather than “definitive” meaning must be used with care. He states,
“...so powerful a hermeneutical instrument as the idea of an intentionally motivated ‘surface’ teaching of provisional or non-definitive meaning requiring interpretation in a sense other than the obvious surface one, and opposed to a ‘deep’ teaching of final and definitive meaning, had to be handled with care and restraint - and no doubt also as sparingly as possible - in order not to be tainted with arbitrariness and disregard for a canonical corpus.”
Finally, as Geshe Lhundhup Sopa has put it, all of the schools whose doctrines are included among the three cycles (which we will discuss below) have arguments as to the reasons and methods by which they avoid falling into the classical chasm of either nihilism or substantialism, anniḥiliationism or “permanence” thinking.
The Mahāyānasaṃgrāha: Counteracting the extremes of positivism and repudiation. We have consulted Etienne Lamotte’s work to help “enflesh” our understanding of certain issues as evinced in the Saṃgrāha. The Sanskrit originals of these three works have been lost, leaving readers to rely on the Chinese and Tibetan translations. The Mahāyāna Saṃgrāha and the Bodhisattvabhūmi are the two most often quoted textual sources for lCang skya.
Three cycles of doctrine: the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. This issue of the Three Cycles of the Wheel of Dharma (dharmacakrapravartaṇa) defines the entirety of Buddhist doctrines - from the Mahāyāna perspective. This
systematization of Buddhist schools is famously elucidated in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra. The Sanskrit edition was lost most likely already by the thirteenth century. Numerous Tibetan (at least ten) and Chinese editions (at least three) exist, attesting to this sūtra’s widespread influence and authority.
Legendary origin of the three cycles. Why are the doctrines of the three major divisions of Buddhist schools - according to the Mahāyāna Schools - called “cycles” or “wheels?”
“If [one asks] ‘[Why] is it a “wheel”?’ it is because it is a wheel of all the teachings of complete realization and scriptural teachings for the purpose of cutting off unharmonious [[[elements]]] in the mental continuum of the disciple by the Bhāgavan. It is like the precious wheel of the cakravartin kings that travelled gradually from one region to another, conquering unharmonious elements through its power. Therefore, the [[[Buddhadharma]]] is similar to that wheel, since it conquers unharmonious elements such as attachment, etc., travelling gradually to the mental continua of disciples.”
Definitive versus provisional doctrines. The first cycle of doctrine: the Śrāvakayāna. Needless to say, representatives of what the Mahāyāna Schools term the so-called Hīnayāna (“Lesser” or even “Inferior” Vehicle) do not accept this elucidation of the Buddha’s teaching in the form of “three cycles of the wheel of Dharma.” The only remaining school among the eighteen original schools included under this designation “Hīnayāna” are the various Theravāda traditions found in Wri Lavka and most of Southeast Asia. They accept only the teachings of the Buddha as found in the three baskets of the Pali canon as authoritative and view what they deem later Mahāyāna developments as imaginative fictions. On the other hand, certain scholars find śūnyatā and numerous other doctrines in the Pali canon itself.
Scholars of Mahāyāna traditions have viewed the Hīnayāna as a teaching for śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. These aspirants to Buddhist awakening have a self-serving agenda. They pursue only their own awakening to the selflessness of the individual among the skandhas, without regard to the suffering of fellow sentient beings. This system of the three cycles involves elements controversial to all forms of Buddhism.
The section of the sūtra elucidating the three turnings of the wheel (tricakra, khor lo gsum) appears in chapter seven, the questions of Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata to the Buddha. Paramārthasamudgata begins his inquiry of the Buddha by noting,
“Bhāgavan, when I was in seclusion there arose this thought: ‘The Bhāgavan has spoken in many ways of the own-character of the aggregates and further spoken of their character of production, their character of disintegration, and their abandonment and realization. Just as he has spoken of the aggregates, he has also spoken of the sense spheres….[etc.]’”
Paramārthasamudgata continue, listing features of sentient consciousness the Buddha taught as having their “own characteristics” (svalaksana, rang gi mtshan nyid). Continuing, he refers to the Buddha’s teaching concerning the “own-characteristics” of the Buddhist Noble Eight-fold Path etc.
Interpretable nature of the first cycle. Here is a reference to what the sūtra exposes as the first turning of the Cycle of Dharma. All Mahāyāna traditions view doctrines contained within this wheel as “provisional” or
“interpretable” - “requiring further elucidation” (neyartha). The reason for this is the realism concerning dharma theory found in the Abhidhammapiṭaka. In the Abhidharmakoṣa, a commentary on and compendium of theories from the piṭaka, dharmas (phenomena) are said to be the fundamental constituents of time/space reality.
A selection from the Abhidharmakosabhāṣyam by Vasubandhu depicting a dispute between two now non-existent so-called (by the Mahāyāna) “Hīnayāna” or “inferior” schools, the Vaibhāṣikas and Sautrāntika (with the former we can class the modern Theravāda tradition), illustrates the “realism” of dharma theory which served as one of many targets for the criticism of later Mahāyāna thinkers.
“[The Vaibhāṣikas say: the Sūtra teaches that] all rūpa...is, individually, called skandha...thus each ‘real’ (atomic) element of past rūpa...present...and future...receives the name of skandha. Thus the skandhas have real existence and not merely nominal existence.
[The Sautrāntika:] If this is the case, then the material āyatanas...have only a nominal existence, for the quality of being a ‘gate of arising of the mind...’ does not belong to atoms taken one by one, which are solely real, but to collections of atoms which constitute an organ of sight, a visible object, etc.”
Though both schools may disagree about the true reality or nominally reality of composite phenomena, both adhere to the teaching that dharmas (“atoms” in the translation) are the fundamental time/space constituents of reality. The view was demolished later by Vasubandhu by means of his critique of this “atom/dharma” theory.
Nirvāṇa as ‘unconditioned’ phenomenon. Further, nirvāṇa in the conception of the Hīnayāna School, was asserted to be an unconditioned state, an assertion rejected by Nāgārjuna in his Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ in chapter 25 (the “nirvāṇapārīksā”). This notion of nirvana as “unconditioned” (asaṃskṛta) was rejected as violating the notion of pratītyasamutpāda; nirvāṇa and saṃsāra are co-arising and mutually interdependent, according to Madhyamaka view.
Entical nature of First Cycle doctrines. Therefore, the Buddha promulgated this Turning of the Wheel for Śrāvaka disciples who adhered to “entical” or “essentialist” thinking, unprepared for the deeper truths of the Buddhadharma concerned with śūnyatā. In the seventh chapter, the Buddha explains to Paramārthasamudgata the reason for not explaining the lack of self-nature (“own being” in the translation) to certain types of beings:
“Paramārthasamudgata, I do not designate the three types of lack of own being because sentient beings in the realm of sentient beings...because of being bound to conventional designations or due to predispositions toward conventional designations, they strongly adhere to the character of the own-being of the imputational as the own-being of the other-dependent and the thoroughly established.”
He elucidates the view that sentient beings experience the world as having “inherent existence” or “self-nature” (svabhāva). They attach true existence to that which is merely conceptualized (parikalpita) and perceive “entities”
where there are none. This is the “conceptualization” or “imagination” of the “unreal” (abhutaparikalpa). They equate this level of comprehension with the deeper “own being” or “self-entity” of the interwoven-with-other. To teach the lack of self-nature (niḥsvabhāva) to such sentient beings would be to generate within them further afflictions for which they are unprepared to cope.
The Second Cyle of doctrine: Madhyamaka. The Second Turning of the Wheel refers to the rise of systems of thought associated with the Prajñāpāramitā literature. Within this corpus, ideas appear which seem to contradict teachings in the corpus of literature associated with the first Turning. Among the various Prajñāpāramitā sūtras, we read that the paths to awakening do not arise, that nirvāṇa, rather than being an unconditioned realm is directly accessible, and in fact, all phenomena are “quiescent from the beginning.”
Nihilism in the Second Cycle? The doctrine of śūnyatā is that which stands as the foremost teaching among these systems of thought. This doctrine seems like “nihilism” to both Hīnayāna Buddhists and non-Buddhists alike. To
Mahāyānist proponents of Madhyamaka doctrines, this is an extension of the Buddha’s teaching of anattā - the lack of an individual self among the skandhas - to the lack of selfhood for all phenomena (sarvadharmanairātmya) as well. The Buddha responds to Paramārtha’s confusion as to why he would teach such doctrines that seem so to contradict his earlier teachings. The Buddha replies as follows:
“Paramārthasamudgata, I initially teach doctrines starting with the lack of own-being in terms of production to those beings who have not generated roots of virtue, who have not purified obstructions, who have not ripened their
continuums.... They know [[[phenomena]]] as being impermanent...unstable, unworthy of confidence...whereupon they develope aversion and antipathy toward all compounded phenomena...their understanding is not infused with conventional designations.”
The Second Cycle: for the prideful who ‘lack roots of virtue. Therefore, while it is said that sentient beings who were unripe to receive teaching concerning śūnyatā. These disciples of the Second Turning are said to be those who lack “roots of virtue” etc. and develop an understanding of language and sense-perception as “conventional
designation only” (Saṃvṛtimātra). Their basis of understanding of reality needs to be demolished, and these doctrines are useful for reducing the pride of those too prone to adhere to the obstructions of entical views. The doctrines associated with the Second Wheel, as that of the First Wheel, are said to be “interpretable,” “needing elucidation” (neyārtha), as the Buddha states in the following:
“With respect to this well-taught doctrine, degrees of conviction appear among sentient beings. Paramārthasamudgata, thinking of just these three types of lack of own-being, through the teachings that are Sūtras of interpretable meaning, the Tathāgata taught such doctrines as: “All phenomena lack own-being; all phenomena are unproduced, unceasing, quiescent from the start, and naturally in a state of nirvana.”
The danger with the Buddha’s doctrines connected with the Second Turning is that
“[[[Disciples]]] believe in the doctrine, they strongly adhere just to the literal meaning of the doctrine, [[[thinking]]], ‘All phenomena just lack own-being; all phenomena are just unproduced, just unceasing, just quiescent from the start,
just naturally in a state of nirvana.’ Based on this, they adopt the view that all phenomena do not exist...they perceive what is not the meaning to be the meaning....”
Therefore, the meaning of these doctrines needs to be interpreted lest “undeveloped” mental continua misinterprete “sarvam śūnyam” (all is empty) as a nihilismistic doctrine.
Two wrong attitudes with regard to the Second Cycle doctrines. The Buddha in these passages also chides those who reject this doctrine as a doctrine taught not by the Buddha, but by Māra. So there are two wrong attitudes to Second Wheel doctrines: 1] to accept them, but in a nihilismistic manner, and 2] to reject them as not taught by the Buddha and view as enemies those who propound these views.
The Third Cycle of doctrine: Yogācāra. The Bodhisattva Paramārthasamudgata comprehended the Buddha’s teachings in the following way:
Initially, in the Varanāsi area, in the Deer Park...the Bhāgavan taught the aspects of the four truths of the Āryas for those who were genuinely engaged in the Śrāvaka vehicle. The wheel of doctrine you turned at first is wondrous...however, this wheel of doctrine that the Bhāgavan turned is surpassable, provides an opportunity [for refutation], is of interpretable meaning, and serves as a basis for dispute.
Then the Bhāgavan turned a second wheel of doctrine which is more wondrous still for those who are genuinely engaged in the Great Vehicle, because of the aspect of teaching emptiness...however this wheel of doctrine...is surpassable....[etc.]”
So the third wheel, from the standpoint of the Yogācāra School, is definitive (nitārtha) because it distinguishes the boundary between the first and second wheels, encapsulating all their doctrines. How is this done?
The whole of Buddhist teaching is encapsulated by the doctrine of the three natures. From the Yogācāra standpoint, the whole of Buddhist teaching is reinterpreted by means of the three natures (trisvabhāva) theory. They take the notion of “non-self-nature” (niḥsvabhāva) elaborated in Nāgārjuna’s works (foremost among them, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥs) and apply it in a three-fold way.
The first of the three natures: conceptualization. The first of these three natures is the “conceptualized nature” (parikalpitasvabhāva). It involves the imputation of conceptual constructs creating “enticalized” objects. In fact,
they do not exist of their own accord or concretely. This is the “conceptualization or imagination of the unreal.’ This is the Yogācāra evolution of the saṃvṛtisatya notion of the schools of the Second Turning (i.e. the various Madhyamaka Schools).
The second of the three natures: the other-dependent. The coining of the term paratantra was its expression of Nāgārjunan śūnyatā, expressing the idea elucidated logically by Nāgārjuna that entities exist only as “mutually dependent” (parasparāpekṣā), not as independent entities. “Interwoven-with-other” sums up the notion of niḥsvabhāva, in their view, because the implication of this notions is that no “entity” is self-existent though they are falsely imputed as being so; in reality, they are radically interwoven with what is mentated as “other” to itself. Hence they subsume the idea of the selflessness of the individual and phenomena (ātmadhrmanairātmya) under this notion.
The third of the three natures: the “perfected.” The Yogācāra assert their definitiveness as Mahāyāna teaching further by the term “pariniṣpannasvabhāva.” The term implies perfection of practice - the actualization of the
awareness of paratantra through practice in meditation. Further it has been said that the Yogācāra School is a continuation of the Abhidhamma period having gone through the filter of Mahāyāna logic, etc. and by means of this, a “de-enticalization” of the Abhidhamma system occurred.
Yogācāra: school of definitive interpretation. They are a school of definitive interpretation, it is said, because they incorporate the Abhidhamma. If we accept the story as given by the tradition, the same Vasubandhu began his career as the great scholar of the Abhidharmakosa fame, who converted to the Mahāyāna upon learning of his half brother’s doctrine brought back from the Tuṣitā realm. If this is true pre-Mahāyāna Abhidhamma thought is directly
connected with Yogācāra thought in the works of one of its central thinkers. One Vasubandhu. Frauwallner’s arguments to the contrary, it is not at all philosophically improbable that the author of the Koṣa is one and the same person as who wrote the Triṃsika, et. al.. Differences in style can be accounted for by the fact that different issues rose to concern. Specifically, how does one integrate the three-nature theory and the compelling standpoint of śūnyatā with abhidhamma categories? How does one then account for different meditative states and the various levels of consciousness realized through them?
Yogācāra critique of Madhyamaka. Rebirth: without the ālaya consciousness, how does one account for that psychic reality which is reborn? Vasubandhu’s thought enabled the new Mahāyānist synthesis of classical doctrines such as the twelve-fold chain of causation (dvādaṣaṅgapratītyasamutpāda). Further, from the Yogācāra standpoint, the
Madhyamaka system is explanatorily weak. It illuminates the distinction between the conventional and ultimate relative to śūnyatā, but cannot incorpate all the teachings of the Buddha as the sūtra states. Finally, the śūnya doctrine is positively dangerous for those mental continuum is immature and for whom it would be “poisonous.’
Mādhyamika response to Yogācāra critique. The Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka can agree that the Madhyamaka doctrine is not for all trainees in the Mahāyāna system. Employing a type of “snob appeal,” They can indicate that Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka can indeed lead to a nihilismistic view for some mental continua (see Tsong kha pa’s view just below). Therefore, they may assent to the notion that the Yogācāra elucidates an “extensive method” and venerate Asavga whom
they see as of the lineage of Maitreya as on a par with Nāgārjuna, of the lineage of Mañjuwri. However, in their view, Asavga held as his ultimate view, the standpoint of Mādhyamika śūnyatā The third cycle is taught to forestall falling into the ‘Great Nihilism.’ Tsong kha pa himself states:
“Finally, [in the third wheel], the statements of the lack of intrinsic identifiability of the first nature and of the intrinsically identifiable existence of the latter two natures [are interpretable in meaning]. [They are] taught
for those [[[disciples]]] of the Mahāyāna who would find no ground to establish cause-effect...in the intrinsic realitylessness that is emptiness with respect to intrinsically identifiable status, in order to forestall their falling into the great nihilism ....”
The Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra as definitive Madhyamaka text. Some Mādhyamika have held that the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is a definitive text because it basically assents to the notion that the Second Turning is definitive, though too hard to comprehend for the trainee of less than superb faculties. In the end, even all holders of Vijñānavāda lineage will come to the profound view (of śūnyatā) in the end, when their mental continua are matured.
Here, our investigation requires some preferatory remarks. At times in past and present one finds sometimes a tendency to draw rather simple comparisons among schools. It has been and is in many circles still common to refer to the Yogācāra School as a form of “Idealism” because of its emphasis on the doctrine of “cognition-only” Vijñāpti- or vijñānamātra.
Variously called “Mind-only” (Yogācāra), “consciousness-only” (vijñānamātra) and more generically perhaps, the “Yoga-praxis” (Yogācāra) school, this philosophical system has received diverse treātment at the hands of occidental scholars struggling to find footholds of meaning in the craggy edifice of its centuries-long development textually.
Complicating matters further is the fact that one’s definition of the school’s doctrines will depend greatly upon whether one is employing Central or East Asian sources for one’s interpretation. In the hands of Gelukpa Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika scholars of Tibet and Mongolia, the Yogācāra seems more greatly to resemble occidental “Idealisms” (of necessity generally defined). The interpretation differs from the interpretations one is likely to find among the investigation of the original Indian Yogācāra systems to be found among Japanese scholars of the twentieth century.
Texts and authors. Nāgārjuna’s Bodhicittavivāraṇa. In this work we have an early and biting critique of Cittamātrin thinking. Whether this work is pseudepigraphal or not remains to be determined. Christian Lindtner holds that it is
not. He notes that the Bodhicittavivāraṇa is referred to neither by Buddhapālita nor Candrakīrti, yet it serves as a basic authority for Bhavya “in his most mature work, the Ratnapradīpa.” He neglects quoting it in his earlier works, the Tarkajvāla, Prajñāpradīpa, however Asvabhāva and Śāntarakṣita both refer to this text.
It is Lindtner’s opinion that the Yuktiśāstika, the Catuḥśatakastava and the Bodhicittavivāraṇa “are the most frequently quoted among all works ascribed to Nāgārjuna in later Indian literature.” Lindtner holds that the
consciousness-only doctrines Nāgārjuna refutes are likely derived from those extant in the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. On this point he states,
“Having seen how vehemently Nāgārjuna attacks any kind of acceptance of svabhāva one would also expect him to have criticized those who might have thought themselves justified in maintaining the absolute existence of vijñāna (citta). But in the texts dealt with hitherto this has only happened incidentally. Here Bodhicittavivāraṇa provides us with the missing link.”
For evidence that Nāgārjuna was indeed familiar with the doctrines of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra, Lindtner cites the following parallels:
The allusions to Vijñānavāda - or more precisely to the Vijñānavāda of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra...generally held to be posterior to Nāgārjuna - are quite consistent with the fact that Nāgārjuna also refers to this sūtra elsewhere.”
However, Lindtner’ comments are dubious, given that some will assert that holding Bhavya as genuine author of the Ratnapradīpa is itself open to question. Furthermore, Ruegg however holds that this text is the product of the so-called “tantric Nāgārjuna.” This Nāgārjuna seems to have lived in the seventh (or at the latest in the eighth) century. The Bodhicittavivarana may well be his composition....”
He makes mention of the fact that Indian and Tibetan records identify the writers of Tantric works with the writers of wastras with the same name living centuries earlier. The traditions hold that Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, etc., lived enormously long lives, even for several centuries. These records do sharply differentiate between the philosophical and tantric corpi associated with these writers however.
The issues involved are a bit like those associated with the “two Vasubandhus” theory, or the elusive “search for the historical Maitreya.” As discussed above, Frauwallner analyzed differences in the style of writing as found in the works of Vasubandhu the author of the Abhidharmakoṣa versus that of the Cittamātrin master of the same name. But
perhaps there were also two Beethovens, one pre and one post Eroica; perhaps there were two Kants, one pre and one post Hume. If we compare a Beethoven Sonata with a symphony, again one could conclude that there were two Beethovens, even though the pieces may have been written contemporaneously.
The same may be said for a great number of authors whose views shifted during the course of their careers. In the case of the tantric Nāgārjuna versus the philosopher original, the issue is concerned with divergent materials and genres. If the Bodhicittavivāraṇa fits in with “Nāgārjuna.” The Prāsaṅgika
Madhayamika renders more or less the same critique of a number of East Asian Buddhist schools influenced heavily by Yogācāra thought of the same kind of relatively substantialist “entity”-view. The problems with notions such as
hongaku and Buddha Nature as seen in many of these schools are problems similar to that Gelukpa have with gZhan stong (or “zeroness of other”). Thinking in their own culture. It leads to a form of nihilism in the declaration of a pure nature which is empty - not inherently - but empty of defilements (kleśa).
How does this seemingly more positive doctrine lead to nihilism? Conceptualizing the Dharmakāya and the Buddha Nature within as the only real truth, concomitant with the notion of the non-existence of external objects lead to a
devaluation of this world’s reality in declaring it all illusion and leads to a nihilism in the sense that language, observed phenomena are viewed as simply false. Such a view loses the notion of two truths. Saṃvṛti is a form of truth, albeit conventional.
With regard to the authenticity of the Bodhicittavivāraṇa and its professed Nāgārjunan authorship, with its grave opposition to Cittamātrin notions is a subject of dispute.
Ruegg notes that this work was familiar to Haribhadra who lived in the ninth century. This tantric Nāgārjuna he asserts, lived in the seventh century or eighth century at the latest. This means that in a span of no more than two centuries, the existence of this second Nāgārjuna would have been gone from memory and works of his authorship conflated with that of the original. The theories about all sorts of “multiple-personalitied” Masters is overly-involved. Ruegg himself cites the existence of a tantric Candrakīrti, a tantric Āryadeva, and so on.
One must note that it is odd that such a severe critique of the Yogācāra School, if known to Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti, would not receive reference from them, especially in the passages ascribed by Tibetan tradition as
critiques of Yogācāra by Candrakīrti, i.e., the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakāvatara. But then, one must posit the existence of a tantric Bhāvaviveka to escape the reference to the Bodhicittavivāraṇa in his Ratnapradīpa.
The history and lineages of the Siddhas and Tantrin masters remains very obscure for us, and our sources sometimes give quite divergent accounts of them so that it is not yet possible to fit them coherently into the history of Indian and Buddhist thought.
While the major focus of our work here does not entail detailed redaction-critical work, it is important to make inquiry into whether this text is authentically Nāgārjunan because of the role it will play in our study. This brief text does set the themes for works which later appear on this topic and if we are to engage in historical investigation of these disputes, it is surely important to get our chronological ordering correct. While some will criticize us for dodging the issue, we accept Thurman’s arguments with regard to the tantric versus sastric Buddhist masters.
Thurman however puts this whole type of controversy into a post-modernesque framework which we find intellectually satisfying. He notes that with numerous authors of sastras, it has been fashionable to assert the existence of corollary “tantric” counterparts who are considered specious or pseudonymous of these given tantric texts. For
example, while Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka, et. al. are accepted as the genuine authors of certain treatises, so-called “tantric Nāgārjuna ” and “tantric Bhāvaviveka” are seen as later, pseudepigraphical authors.
He notes that since tantric traditions were oral for centuries and only entered written form near the close of the first millenium of the Common Era, it may be reasonable to hold that these later texts were the orally passed down teachings of the great Masters, the words of whom were written down only centuries later.
It is our aim to clarify this issues and others through the course of this study. For our purposes though, we find it highly aesthetically pleasing to accept the tradition at its word for now, and will examine the Bodhicittavivarana as an acceptable first manifestation of a Madhyamaka critique of key Yogācāra notions. We will prescind from making a judgment on this issue until the conclusion of our study.
Interpreting Candrakīrti’s ‘Abhimukhi’ Chapter: directed to ‘outsiders’ or ‘insiders?
Candrakīrti: Madhyamakāvatara and its Bhāṣya
While Candrakīrti and Bhāvaviveka were by no means in full agreement on a number of issues, both nevertheless accounted themselves Mādhyamika scholars and held Nāgārjuna in highest esteem as an authority. Equally, they wrote critiques of Cittamātrin notions and are more or less in agreement concerning what they felt were problems with Yogācāra systems.
We have seen the initial stages of the disputes which are the subject of this investigation took place perhaps in the writings of Nāgārjuna himself. A short period of time later, critiques of “Mind-only” systems were written in more extensive fashion, by two of the most famous earlier disciples of Nāgārjuna, Bhāvaviveka and Candrakīrti. Later Tibetan tradition styles the first scholar “Svatantrika-Mādhyamika” and the latter, “Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika,” but in their own day relative to the adherents of “Cognition-only,” they were of like-mind.
There are three major aspects of Candrakīrti’s disagreement with Yogācārins with regard to the other-dependent nature. That it is manifest apart from apprehended external objects, that is exists in actuality and that its own inherent reality is lies beyond conceptual analysis.
Bhāvaviveka. In Bhāvaviveka’s commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Stanzas [Concerning] the Root of the Middle Way, he “castigates the followers of “Mind Only” as introducing the heretical notion of a ‘self’ (ātman) under another name.”
“If you say that tathatā (Suchness), although beyond words, is a real thing, then this is the ātman of the heretics which you designate with the different name of tathatā. Your tathatā is a real thing, and yet from the viewpoint of absolute truth it does not belong to the categories of being or nonbeing; but such is the ātman. The heretics also believe that the ātman, a real thing, is omnipresent, eternal,
acting, feeling, and yet beyond all categories and concepts (nirvikalpa). Because it does not pertain to the sphere of words, because it presents no object ot the discursive intellect (vikalpa-buddhi), it is said to be beyond categories. The teaching of the heretics says: ‘Words do not reach there; thought (manas-citta) does not present itself; this is why it is called ātman.”
“Although such is the character of the ātman, you say non the less; ‘Knowledge that relies on the ātman does not.’ But what is the difference between your tathatā and the ātman, since both of them are ineffable and yet possess real self-nature? It is only out of a partisan spirit that you speak as you do. Therefore I cannot accept this tathatā, the same as the ātman, real yet nonexisting.”
Snellgrove feels that Bhāvaviveka’s “argument can only be pressed by taking ātman in a purified Vedanta sense and dissociating it from all notion of a personal sense.” He credits the “Mind Only” School with attempting to solve the problem of continuity over successive births, a basic Buddhist doctrine seemingly at odds with the doctrine of anātman. He notes that the issue of personality for the Cittamātrin is resolved at the level of the conceptualized nature (parikalpitasvabhāva).
At this relatively superficial level, an imaginary or imputed self-identity does indeed exist. At the next stage, the “interwoven-with-other” nature, the problem of individual personality dissolves, the second nature’s emphasis on all entities’ being dependent on what is “other” to themselves for their existence. Here, “the problem of differentiating individual streams of consciousness from the universal stream need not arise.”
With regard to the nature of the ālaya consciousness, he cites the passage of the Saṃdhinirmocana sūtra wherein it is discussed.
“This consciousness is known as the ‘apprehending consciousness’ in that it grasps at and comprehends this bodily form. It is also called “basic consciousness” in that it adheres and clings to this bodily form with a single sense of security. It is also called ‘mind’ in that it is an acucmulation and aggregation of appearances, sounds, smells, tastes, sensations of touch and of thoughts.”
He cites Scherbatsky’s reading of the ālaya as “one of the best descriptions” of the “basic consciousness” to be found among European works. While many will wish to contest this view given Scherbatsky’s “datedness,” nevertheless, he expresses features of the ālaya which serve as objects of Mādhyamika refutation. He calls it
“...a step towards the reintroduction of the dethroned Soul. Uddyotakara and Vacaspatimishra reject it as a poor substitute for their substitute for their Substantial Soul. ...This sacrifice Buddhism could not make. The anātma-vāda could not become ātma-vāda.
Buddhism continued to be a pluralistic dharma theory, but a monistic subway was added to it...[the ālaya] replaces both the external (nimitta-bhāga) and the internal (darśana-bhāga) worlds. But it is not a substance; it is a process; it runs underground of actual experience.”
He goes on to differentiate it from the Greek psyche, the Vedāntic ātman, etc., but nevertheless concludes “that it is a substitute for an individual’s surviving Soul is clear from the words of Uddyotakara and Vacaspati.”
We would personally refrain from employing the views of Vedic scholars to interpret a Buddhist term as complex as that of the basal consciousness, but as we shall have seen from the critiques of this notion rendered by Mādhyamika
scholars, this is more or less their own problem with it: it is an idea promulgated for the purpose of attracting those afraid of relinquishing the ātman to Buddhist doctrine of a relatively less profound view than that outlined in the Prajñāpāramitā literature and upon which Mādhyamika scholars wrote extensive commentaries.
Having investigated Bhāvaviveka’s discussion of basic Cittamātrin notions, we turn to Candrakīrti on the same theme. Living approximately one century after Bhāvya, Candrakīrti’s critique of Cittamātrin notions is more extensive than that of Bhāvaviveka.
When these disputes became issues of concern is not easily or uncontroversially to be determined. Whether pseudepigraphal or not, we do have in hand a work by Nāgārjuna containing within it a hard-handed critique of basic Yogācāra notions. Indeed, whether spurious or authentically Nāgārjunan, the work at the very least indicates the seriousness with which the disciples of Nāgārjuna who attributed the work to him took Yogācāra doctrines. Like other great
Tibetan Madhyamaka texts, lCang skya’s work is it should be kept in mind that the Beautiful Ornament is in large part apologetical. All the sections of the text culminate in the exposition of the definitive truth, which in lCang skya’s Gelukpa tradition is that established
first by Nāgārjuna, descending through Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti through Tsong kha pa and his heirs. We might add, the Gelukpa incorporate the works of Dharmakīrti as an almost equally authoritative interpretation of Mahāyāna notions of śūnyatā, and while conventionally he employs some highly useful understandings, one might well argue if he belongs with Nāgārjuna at the “ultimate level” of analysis.
Chapter Three: The Yogācāra examination and refutation of (Madhyamaka) nihilism.
The life and writings of lCang skya II, Rol pa’i rdo rje
The next section introduces the work of Rol pa’i rdo rje lCang skya II, a high lama serving as court advisor to the Qing or Manchu emperor, Qianlong (1711-1799). The first lCang skya Qutuqtu (1642-1714) arrived in Peking at the request of the emperor, and the second was born in 1717 to Mongol nomads in Amdo, a region lying in the area
spanning the borders between Tibet and Mongolia, though properly lying within the political boundaries of Tibet. His is the second and perhaps most notable of of the lCang skya lamas. His full title is rDo rje ‘chang lCang skya Rol pai rdo rje Ye shes bstan pa’i sgron me dpal bzang po.
Monastic studies in Beijing. He began his monastic studies in Beijing after a Chinese unit destroyed his home monastery of dGon lung and among his teachers there was the second Thu’u bkwan Qutuqtu Ngag dbang Chos kyi rGya mTSHo (1680-1736). lCang skya in turn would instruct the third incarnation of Thu’u bkwan. He spent some time engaged in study in Tibet as well, studying with the seventh Dalai Lama and receiving final monastic vows from the second Panchen lama.
Patronage of Manchu emperor Qianlong. The previous emperor, Yung-cheng (1722-1735) had been favorable to indigenous Chinese Buddhism, though even this interest was not great. However a great and life-long patron of lCang skya and the Gelukpa order emerged as the emperor Qianlong (1711-1799) ascended to the throne and ruled in the wake of Yung-cheng from 1746-1795. He had been a student of lCang skya’s. This close friendship with the new emperor was the foremost reason for lCang skya’s widespread influence in Mongolia, Manchuria and even China and Tibet as well.
lCang skya learned Manchu, Chinese and Mongolian in order to propagate dGe lugs pa teachings among the peoples who spoke and read these languages. He supervised the compilation of a bilingual glossary, the Dag yig mkhas pa’i ‘byung gnas, which would serve as the foundation for some translations and
corrections of a Mongolian edition of the bsTan ‘gyur, and lCang skya oversaw the translation of the entire bKa ‘gyur into Manchu.
A Beautiful Ornament for the Mt. Meru of the Adept [[[Buddha’s]]] Teaching: a Clear Exposition Presenting the Limits of Proofs. lCang skya investigated the claims of various sects of Chinese Buddhism and concluded that the Buddhism of Hva shang Mahāyāna no longer existed in China, and in his view, the most
prevalent philosophical standpoint held by proponents of Chinese Buddhist sects was that of the Vijñānavāda. He wrote his opus magnum, the text to be studied here, in the period between 1736 and 1746. Smith states that it was his interest in the Vijñānavāda Schools preserved as Chinese traditions which sparked his interest in writing his Grub mtha’, and it was this section which he completed first.
Chapter “Kha” of the Clear Exposition: “The three realms are mind alone.” It is in this chapter that lCang skya presents the tenets of the Yogācāra School. The first two sections of his opus magnum deal with presentation of the doctrines of Vedic (Hindu) and (Buddhist) Śrāvakayāna Schools and the last presents the tradition which is his own, the Madhyamaka. In this chapter, lCang skya relies principally on the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha.
Identifying the two extremes: nihilism and positivism.
[237:4-6] There is no incompatibility between the two great [[[Madhyamaka]] and Yogācāra] chariot systems with regard to the essentials of the great path. The second [point] regarding the stages of the path of the profound theory [[[śūnyatā]]], [discusses] two ways of traversing the path: [1] the manner of
expounding (gtan la ‘bebs ) the selflessness of phenomena, (dharmanairātmya, chos gyi bdag med,) and after having relied on that, [2] meditative cultivation of it. In the first [topic] are three [aspects]. Generally, there is taught [1] a way of abandoning (spong tshul ) the two extremes, [2]
rejection in particular of the extreme of entical mentation, (samāropa/adhyāropa, sgro ‘dogs) and [3] a way of entry into the reality (tattva, de kho na nyid) of the Vijñāptimātra [[[Cognition-only]] school] (Tib. rnam rig tsam).
The two extremes are those of “positivism” or “entical mentation” - the imputation of all phenomena as inherently, essentially or substantially existent. “Samāropa” indicates “imputation,” as in the “imputation” of the concrete or inherent existence of entities.
The term ’dogs refers not to normal sense awareness from which images of the world arise and that implies subject/object interaction that initiates thought. Here, ‘dogs points to strictly mentation, “intra-mental” or “subject-focused” thinking, even “intellection.” Therefore, this kind of thinking
applies to mentated thought (rtog pa yid shes) rather than sense-consciousness non-mentated thought, (rtog pa med pa dbang shes rtog ) and “repudiation” (apavāda, skur ba ‘debs pa ) refers to the repudiation of any non-sensorial reality for perceived objects implying there is no basis for existence leading to a type of nominalism. By implication as we shall see, any ultimate truth; hence, in a crude way, this term translates as “nihilism.” Robert Thurman
translates these terms as “reificationism” and “repudiationism.” Though much objection has been raised to my employing the Western terms “nihilism” and “positivism,” in the relative context of Buddhist thought, these terms are accurate. Buddhist thought on the whole is all relatively nihilismistic of course, from the standpoint of Western (Christian, Jewish and Islamic) thought. Positivism.
[237:6-238:2] “In the first [of the three aspects of the first method], is a way of rejecting and identifying the two extremes. In the first of the two [i.e. the identification,] is the mode of cleaving to an extreme of entical mentation. This is cleaving to [a phenomenon’s] establishment by virtue of its existing from its own standpoint (rang gi gnas tsod) in those [[[phenomena]]] in which essence and particularity for the phenomena of form, etc., are imputed
as essences (ngo bo nyid). That is the conceptual object for entically conceptualizing and it is the extreme of entical mentation. Moreover, according to the Bodhisattvabhūmi , it is said, “[Entical mentation refers to] any strong attachment (abhinivewana, mgnon par zhen pa ) at all, from having imputed enticality to that which is not existing. It is [imputing the] existence of essential self-identical characteristics for words conceptualized as entities (bhava, dngos po ) such as form etc., and phenomena such as form etc.”
The Vijñānavāda, according to Gelukpa Prāsaṅgika tradition, assert that an entity does not exist by its own nature as being a basis in itself for the verbal designations we apply to them. A cup is not inherently a cup, but by imputation, an entity becomes imputed as a basis for verbal and conceptual designation by virtue of consciousness.
“Essence” and “particularity” are falsely attributed to entities; all of this arises from the imputation of the name - as the subject - to the form perceived - as an object. These names and concepts ascribed to the objects are said to be bden par grub pa - “truly established”, not however in and of themselves, but they are established rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa - established through their intrinsic characteristics. They are rang bzhin gyis grub pa - established automatically; rang gi ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa - established by their own essence; rang gi gnas tsod kyis grub pa - established by their own standpoint.
This “establishment” is by means of these various characteristics, which are wrongly thought to be “self-identical” with the object to which they refer. Though the characteristics, etc. exist by virtue of consciousness, falsehood arises when a handle is seen on a particular item and it is then called a
“cup.” The ascription of general existent characteristics that are products of the mind and thus are “actual” or “truly established” in their existence as mere mental realities, is imputation when ascribed to a particular cup, etc. In this case, when ascribed to an actual cup, they are ma grub pa - not established.
According to this Madhyamaka treatise, the Yogācāra system views “śūnyatā” as “empty of duality” (dvayaśūnya, gnyis stong ). Name and thought (nāmarūpa, ming dang ‘dogs ) are taken to be truly existent (satyasiddhi, bden par grub pa ) in themselves, so to speak, but imputed when ascribed to another entity.
“Devadatta” exists truly as a name generally, however it is imputed when applied to a particular person with the name “Devadatta.” Name and thought are the same within reifying or hypostasizing thinking. Holding the view that conceptualized phenomena exist in a reified way is “entically conceptualizing” and the object of that activity is the “extreme” or “end” of entical mentation.
The Vijñānavāda will ascribe this extreme to “realist” systems of Buddhist thought as are exemplified by Śrāvakayāna Schools such as the Sautrāntika, et. al. Within this frame of reference, both name and form imputedly, rather than truly, exist. One may cite Asaṅga’s statement from the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha that asserts,
“Therefore prior to the name, intellection does not exist”
and
“Because of [the existence of] many, therefore no certain [single] one [[[exists]]]”
This has the implication that since there are many Devadattas, no single, distinct Devadatta exists in and of himself as Devadatta per se.
Nihilism
[238:2-4] The manner of cleaving to the extreme of nihilism [is as follows]. The extreme of nihilismhas as its conceptual object the refusal to accept that the phenomena of the fully perfected [[[nature]]] and the other-dependent [[[nature]]] exist with its own inherent characteristics. Accordingly, it is taught in the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi ,
“To say that the foundation (āśraya, gzhi) for characteristics of imputed words, the basis (rten) of characteristics for imputed words, through an inexpressible nature for entities [in their] purest existence, ultimately does not exist everywhere (thams cad du) in all aspects, is nihilism. This itself makes for a great waste. Separated from religious discipline, it should be known as extremely degenerate.”
These three statements are ascribed to the second of the three natures, the “inter-woven with other” or “other dependent” (paratantra, gzhan dbang) nature. It serves as 1) a foundation for imputed characteristics of words, 2) a basis for imputed characteristics of words (btags p’ai tshig gi mtshan m’ai rten du) and 3) is an inexpressible nature which ultimately exists (brjod du med pa’i bdag nyid kyis don dam par yod pa).
The other-dependent nature is the ultimately existing basis for the first of the three natures, the conceptualized nature (parikalpitasvabhāva, kun bdags pa’i bdag nyid). Were it not ultimately existent as a basis for forms, etc., then the enticalizing
mentation concerning forms, etc., would also be non-existent. If these two are deemed non-existent, then the third or perfected nature (parinispanna, yongs grub) would also not exist, being likewise devoid of any basis for its existence. For this reason, the Madhyamaka standpoint was held to be relatively “nihilismistic”, repudiating the other-dependent nature, hence the perfected nature and thereby, basic teachings of the Mahāyāna tradition. Repudiation of the other-dependent nature is repudiation of the perfected nature.
[238:4-6] In the explicit teachings (dgnos bstan) of the last sūtra [i.e. the Bhūmi], though it did not discuss anything other than the interwoven-with-other [[[nature]], a repudiation of this nature] is also a basis of repudiation of the perfected [[[nature]]]. Therefore the doctrine according to the Bodhisattvabhūmi [is as follows],
In the repudiation of the mere entity of form etc. [a reference to the interwoven-with-other nature], in that is the non-existence of even reality itself [i.e., the perfected nature].
Moreover, generally if it is held,
The interwoven-with-other [[[nature]]] and the perfected [[[nature]]] do not exist even conventionally,”
This would be nihilism, however, in this chapter which teaches of the system of nihilism, it is “not existent conventionally,” but does not state that [the two natures] “do not exist in general.” It is held [by these Mādhyamika] that they neither exist through their own characteristics, nor from their own actuality nor ultimately.”
According to Yogācāra teaching, mere forms have as their basis, the interwoven-with-other nature. If one rejects the idea that they have no truly established basis, then reality (tattva, de kho na nyid), which has the interwoven-with-other nature as its basis, is also repudiated. The Cittamātrin, in lCang skya’s reconstruction of their argument, accuses the Mādhyamika of repudiating all three, as we shall see.
Refutation of the extreme of nihilism
[238:6-239:3] The second [topic] is the refutation of those [above-mentioned extremes]. Since the method of rejecting the extreme of entical mentation will be explained below, here [we will] state the manner of rejecting the extreme of nihilism.
On that [point], one who accepts the counter thesis (phyogs snga, uttarapakṣa ) is not from another [[[non-Buddhist]]] school. Other schools assert “permanence,” or assert the cutting off of the non-existence of thought. And the Śrāvakāyanists furthermore assert the establishment of form, etc., by virtue of its own standpoint. It is not the two [[[Vaibhāṣika]] and Sautrāntika Schools] which assert [the existence of] objects, because those two assert the true establishment of form, etc. Therefore, it is a Mahāyānist. According to the [[[Mahāyāna]]] Saṃgrāha,
Some Mahāyānists, themselves erroneously cleave to these words:
‘Conventionally, everything exists; ultimately, everything does not exist.’
it is said, by reason of this doctrine. Therefore, one who asserts essencelessness is a Mādhyamika.”
lCang skya’s Cittamātrin states that here, the extreme of nihilism will be refuted, for later the extreme of entical mentation will be refuted. The earlier premise is the opposite of nihilism. The tīrthika or non-Buddhist schools, are seen as asserting ultimate permanence, and are not the focus of the refutation here.
The two Śrāvakayāna schools assert the existence of external entities and their existence by their own characteristics, so they are not the object of refutation. The school is a Mahāyānist one, as lCang skya interprets Asaṅga, for it is a school which asserts essencelessness - ngo bo nyid med par smra ba - namely, the niḥsvabhāvavāda of the Madhyamaka tradition.
[239:3-240:1] “The manner of refuting that [is as follows]. The entity of form, etc. is the subject. By merely imputing [it], it would follow that it does not exist, by reason of the non-existence of a basis for the mentation of the self-entity of form etc. Establishing the reason, is derived from the non-establishment by means of its self-identical characteristics for form, etc. There is a [mutual] pervasion. For example, if the aggregates of form, etc., exist, then it is proper to impute an individual [based on them], however, if they do not exist then, ipso facto, any imputation of an individual could not exist.” According to the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi ,
‘For example, [in] this type [of view], if the aggregates of form, etc. exist, then it is proper to impute an individual. If they are held as non-existent, then there is no existence in the imputation of an individual, for there is no existent entity [upon which they are based]. Likewise, if the entity of the phenomena of form, etc., exists, then it is proper to impute words to the phenomena of form, etc. If it is held as non-existent, then in the non-existence of the entity, there is no existence of mentation by imputed words,’ it is taught.”
Here, the Cittamātrin notes that if there is no basis for the mentation of words, then they cannot exist. If this is so, conventional truths would be non-existent, leading to annhilationism. Based on the fact of the non-existence of the other-dependent nature being a truly established basis for entical mentation, then the perfected nature, which is the other-dependent nature devoid of imputation, also would not exist.
They do not accuse the Mādhyamika of asserting that “generally, nothing exists”, but attack their notion of rejecting the ultimate establishment, or establishment by itself, of the last two natures, without which the first which is based upon them would not exist.
By rejecting a basis for mentation, the Mādhyamika makes nonsense of verbal reality; all words become “sons of barren women”, utterly unable to communicate meaning and completely false. There is no means to distinguish false convention from true convention. Of course, the Mādhyamika deny that this is the result of their examination of these issues, as we shall see below.
The logical error of the Madhyamaka rejection of a basis for phenomena
[240:1-2] “Furthermore, if a basis of mentation does not exist, then imputation would not exist. If that does not exist therefore, accordingly, since it is established that imputation [does not exist], then even the suchness of emptiness does not exist; by necessity, this would be the repudiation of the three characteristics [i.e all three natures]. Further, according to [the Bodhisattvabhūmi] itself, if according to them, this basis of mentation which is merest entity [i.e. the other-dependent nature], by not existing, when it would be non-existent everywhere in all [aspects], then how could reality of this sort exist if it is merely imputed?”
For the Mādhyamika, according to the Cittamātrin critique, the ultimate truth which is presented here as the “reality of emptiness” would be “merely an imputed suchness” . It is in this way the Mādhyamika are accused by Cittamātrins in lCang skya’s characterization of their position, of repudiating the ultimacy of the perfected nature, for it has no basis apart from the “mediating” nature, the “other-dependent.”
Entities such as form, etc., are held to be dependent upon that which is “other” to them for their existence in the Cittamātrin formulation. This dependence upon “other” must serve as an ultimately true basis for the imputation and entical mentation of the first, or conceptualized nature, within and upon which the imputation and mentation may take place.
This is the implication of the mention of the pervasion (khyab pa) in the preceding section above: just as fire is other-dependent with the fuel which is its basis, so fire gives rise to smoke which is dependent upon and “other-dependent” with the fire which is its basis. Fuel > Fire > Smoke, then, rest in a mutually pervasive relationship with each other just as Perfected > Other-dependent > Conceptualized do. Repudiating the true establishment of the first two results in the repudiation of all three, culminating in a nihilismistic position. Adhering to a mistaken emptiness.
[240:2-4] “Therefore, after having enumerated [the different arguments], it has been demonstrated that those [[[Mādhyamika]] scholars] would repudiate both reality and imputation. Through this, then, is entry into a mistaken view of emptiness, one that is a nihilismistic view. Because it repudiates both the other-dependent and conceptualized [natures], it even repudiates the perfected [[[nature]]]. From the [[[Bodhisattvabhūmi]]],
‘When imputation and reality are repudiated, this should be known as being principally a nihilismistic view.”
If one asks,
‘How is this adhering to a mistaken emptiness?’
Certain ascetics and Brahmins moreover, do not accept “empty throughout of which” [i.e. empty throughout of the conceptualized nature], and furthermore, do not accept “that which is empty” [i.e., the other-dependent nature which is emptied of the conceptualized nature]; this type of view thus is called “adhering to a mistaken [or perverse] emptiness” it is taught.”
“..gang gis stong pa de yang mi ‘dod la gang gis gang stong pa de yang mi ‘dod pa ‘di lta bu ‘di ni....” Literally, “by whatever empty”, an instrumental form which we have in English rendered in an ablative rather than instrumental sense for ease of comprehension. “That is empty of which”, in this case “of which” or “by which” (gang gis=kun btags pa’i bdag nyid) which we are admittedly freely and clumsily yet perhaps more understandably translating as “throughout of which” refers to the conceptualized nature.
That “which is empty” (gang stong) is the other-dependent nature (gzhan dbang) “which is empty of mentation.” It is said here that the Mādhyamika hold a mistaken or perverse understanding of emptiness because they reject the bases for mentation and whereby, mentation itself.
Madhyamaka conception of the conventional and ultimate.
[240:5-241:2] On that [point] are these words from the [[[Mahāyāna]]]Saṃgrāha, ‘Gentlemen [[[Mādhyamika]] scholars], ‘what is conventional and what is ultimate?’
This should be expressed. Asking “What is ultimate” to the Mādhyamika, by this school [means] asking ‘What is ultimately true.’ Asking “What is conventional,” [means] asking, ‘What is conventionally set out as truth from a certain point of view” for which one says it is ‘conventionally true.’”
Ultimacy versus ultimate truth. Here, lCang skya II disputes the interpretation of Asaṅga’s commentary. The Cittamātrin, he asserts confuses two issues. Asaṅga discusses what is “ultimate” to the Madhyamaka, which is not the same thing as that which is “ultimately true.” The difference involves whether there is an abstract assertion of “ultimate” or “conventional” relative to “ultimately or conventionally true.” For something to be true it must be true to an observer or, in our translation, “from a certain point of view” (gang gi ngor).
Ultimate truth is found in the mind of the Āryan bodhisattva. What is conventional, e.g. composite phenomena, is somewhat different than how those composite phenomena appear to a given individual. Contrariwise, that which is ultimate - suchness and emptiness - are to be distinguished from the ultimate truth itself, which is suchness and emptiness as they are manifest in the mind of an Āryan bodhisattva in profound meditation.
Conventionality versus conventional truth. According to lCang skya, the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha here in Asaṅga’s words, refers to that which is conventional rather than conventional truth which appears to a given individual. The sūtra doesn’t say “conventionally true” but just “conventional” (kun dzob rather than kun dzob bden pa), etc. All phenomena have these two aspects: their conventionality and ultimacy - and both of these categories as they appear to individuals. Thus, there is the concealing and concealing truth; ultimacy and ultimate truth.
The face in the mirror. One example is that of a face in a mirror. The actual face is the ultimate face, whereas, the face in the mirror is a “concealing truth.” It is a “face”, but a face which conceals its true reality. It is a concealing truth for the eyes, but not, for example, the sense of touch. The term ngor (“to” or “at” the “entity”) is the basis or yul can - the possessor of an object, not the yul, or object itself. With regard to “concealing truth” one must then ask, “concealing for whom”?
Asaṅga’s answer to the question of ultimacy.
[240:6-:241:2] “The response to that, in accordance with the [[[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]] itself, if one asks these [questions] however, these statements [follow]:
That which is the non-self-existence of all phenomena - is ultimate. That which is seeing as self-existent those phenomena which [are actually] non-self existent, that is concealing.
If one asks,
‘What is the reason for that?’
Accordingly then,
‘it is because of conventionalizing, verbally expressing, conceptualizing and concealing existence for those [entities that are actually] non-entities,’
This is how one should reply (lan ‘debs), it is taught.”
The two modes of the other-dependent are the conventional and the ultimate. The answer to the question, “What is ultimate and what is conventional?” in the Yogācāra system are the two aspects of the other-dependent - which points directly to the non-self-existence of phenomena in the Yogācāra system. In this case, this ultimate is the other-
dependent devoid of the discriminative bifurcation which sees these phenomena as “self-existent.” This is the appropriation of Nāgārjunan “non-self-existence” in the framework of the doctrine concerning the other-dependent which is the mediating support for the ultimate and conventional. This support the Mādhyamika deny. Causation from a “continuum” or from “mere imputation?”
[241:2-5] “The the aim of that [statement is as follows]. The Mādhyamika assert that all phenomena are empty of being established inherently or by their own characteristics as ultimate truth. They assert that the concealing, which is set out as truth from a certain point of view, is cleaving to the establishment of all phenomena in such a way when they are not established truly or by their own characteristics.
The reasoning behind that is, that by virtue of this sort of mental concealment, from having held all phenomena as purely established when they are not established purely, is the cause of “conventionalizing” and “verbal expression,” etc.
With regard to that, is the examination at the outset of the identification of the concealing by this [[[Madhyamaka]]] system? The question is,
‘By you Mādhyamika, that assertion of mental concealment is as truth set out from a certain point of view, [does a phenomenon] arise by means of an earlier cause of the same type as itself, or then, is it merely imputation by means of mentation?’”
This is lCang skya’s hypothetical Cittamātrin quoting from the Saṃgrāha in a passage he interprets as stating the Mādhyamika position. The meaning of the passage is explained from the Yogācāra standpoint. It is stated that the Mādhyamika accept that all phenomena are empty of being established by either their own inherent existence or by
their own essential characteristics. They accept the idea that cleaving to the establishment of all phenomena by their own characteristics or as truly established, are in fact not so established; the concealing level of truth is that which appears true to a perceiver, i.e., the inherent existence of phenomena, etc.
The reason for that is that grasping phenomena as purely established when in fact they are not is the “concealing” truth which is only true as much as it is perceived so by an observer. A deeper level of analysis will demonstrate
that things only conventionally exist as they appear. This is the Saṃgrāha’s presentation of Mādhyamika tenets as interpreted by lCang skya’s hypothetical Cittamātrin opponent. It is necessary at the beginning to examine the Madhyamaka understanding of the concealing in order to refute it.
Prior sates condition posterior states. The Cittamātrin questions the Mādhyamika concerning whether phenomena arise from causes which are previously of the same sort as themselves. This means, yesterday’s table will have given rise to today’s table by means of having a continuous relationship with the prior table. Or does it, according to the Mādhyamika as presented in this section, arise simply by mere imputation which emerges from mentation?
Madhyamaka thought is a type of Buddhist nominalism
[241:5-242:2] “From the [[[Mahāyāna]] Saṃgrāha] itself,
‘On that [point], these words should be expressed. The perception of inherent existence is either accepted as appearing from concealment and verbal expression as a cause, or else it is accepted as verbal expression and concealment alone.’
Furthermore, when some Mādhyamika say,
‘[an entity] is generated by an earlier causes which [[[form]]] its own continuum’ - this is incorrect.
That type of mental concealment is the subject. It would follow that it is not [the case] that it is not ultimately established, because of arising by its own [prior state] as a cause;” in [this lies] the refutation. Other-dependent mind and mental phenomena arise from dependence upon their own causes and conditions. Since they arise from establishment by means of their own characteristics, it is thought by this [[[Yogācāra]]] School as [a result of their] analysis, that they would thus arise ultimately.”
All is strictly imaginary? Here again is a quote from the Saṃgrāha. It asks the Mādhyamika if he accepts that phenomena appear from the concealing or from verbal expression as causes, or do they arise as just verbal expression and the concealing merely, not causally. The implication is that the Mādhyamika cleave to a view which sees phenomena as completely unreal and imaginary, that they assert what is the traditional “heresy” so to speak, of Indian Buddhism which is to assert “causelessness” (ahetukavāda) to establish a logical claim.
The real basis of the concealing. The refutation is set up subsequently. If some Mādhyamika state that it is incorrect to say that phenomena do not have a causal continuity with their prior and subsequent states, then it would follow that the concealing, which is the subject of the prelimary examination,
would not be unestablished ultimately, which is to say that it would be ultimately established, in this case meaning that the basis for the mentation - which is the other-dependent nature - of a table would be real, actual. This is the “grasping at the truth” or “true existence” (bden ‘dzin) of the table’s existence exists, whether or not the “true status” of the table is rightly or wrongly perceived.
This is to say that mentation emerges as a result of causal conditions which arise from a true basis in the “other-dependent” nature. If they have no such basis, the Cittamātrin states that all is arbitrarily imagined. This is the point of their Mādhyamika critique. Therefore, while a table may be falsely imputed (as gray when it is in fact red, for example), the false imputation arises from causes and conditions which have a basis in reality, and in this even mistaken sense, these imputations are “actual”, “real” and hence, “ultimately existent.”
Support for the Yogācāra stance in the Pramāṇavartikka
[242:2-4] “From the Pramāṇavarttika,
‘One is able to see seeds, etc., in sprouts, etc.; however, if that is concealing....’
And so on, and this is the same point [as that made by Asaṅga in the MS].
Furthermore, from the [Saṃgrāha] itself,
‘However, if it is from concealment and verbal expression as causes, if through this, then it does not exist, since it is occurs [merely] from the concealing and from verbal expression as causes. It is not appropriate to do this.’
This is the doctrine.
[Again,] on this point, [are comments] from the Legs bShad sNying po,
‘That concealing is inner verbal expression.’
This is the meaning of the doctrine.
Mental concealment, [which involves the distinction of] ‘this’ [from] ‘that’, would be conceptualizing the apprehension in [one’s] thought of this [[[state]] of affairs], and in that case, that conceptualization either arises from its own continuum, or does not so arise. This is the [type of] thinking which generates imputation.”
A Lotus arises from its seed. Here are two quotes, one from Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavarttika, the other from Asaṅga, again from the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha. These are both given as evidence of the Cittamātrin’s position that there must be a basis in causal fact for perceived events, whether they are rightly or wrongly perceived.
One sees a Lotus seed sprout into a Lotus plant. One sees a kernal of corn sprout into a corn stalk. If these events were based merely on mentation, why is it that one does not impute a rice plant arising from a kernel of corn and vice-versa? Without a basis in the other-dependent nature, as Asaṅga states, an entity could not exist; everything would be illusory and purely imagined - a Berkeleyianesque dream-world.
Tsong kha pa inner versus outer mental concealment. The quote from Tsong kha pa’s Legs bshad snying po aims to supplement Asaṅga’s and Dharmakīrti’s commentary. The concealing of which the Mādhyamika speak is an inner mental concealment, not a concealment which projects reality onto an “external” world.
Nevertheless, an inner mental concealment requires causal foundation. All other-dependent entities, whether correctly or wrong perceived are dependent, and mind is equally dependent upon other than itself for its existence. Arguments in favor of establishing a basis for phenomena.
[242:4-243:6] “However, according to some Mādhyamika, if they should say,
‘That concealing is merely imputation by means of mentation,’
…then that is incorrect. On this, [with regard to] the ‘[one whose awareness is] concealed,’ the reason is because of the non-existence of the other-dependent as a basis for effecting mentation. If the other-dependent exists, it is from the necessity of [its] existing by means of its own inherent characteristics.
Furthermore, when this [[[Yogācāra]]] School, maintains that the conceptualized nature is not established by its own characteristics, [they] do not assert that it does not necessarily exist, but [rather] that it is when the other two natures are not established by their own characteristics, that it is through this point that one [must] accept [that the conceptualized nature] of necessity does exist. According to the [[[Mahāyāna]] Saṃgrāha] itself,
‘However, if it is merely verbal expression and concealment, then the basis for verbal expression and concealment does not exist;’ this is improper.’”
The conceptualized: imputation with a basis in reality. The Yogācāra School holds that the conceptualized nature is not established by means of inherent characteristics. This means that thought patterns or verbalized expressions etc., do not exist as they appear. However the bases for that nature - the other-dependent and the perfected natures - must exist as established by their own characteristics. Apart from that, the Cittamātrin deems the assertion that they do not exist established by their own characteristics a nihilismistic view (med par lta).
Identification and refutation of the Madhyamaka understanding of emptiness
[242:6-243:4] “Identification and refutation of the [[[Mādhyamika]] understanding of] the ultimate. You Mādhyamika [say],
‘The other-dependent, [seen as] bereft of establishment by means of its own inherent characteristics, is the ultimate.’
It is not proper to say [this]. To that [we say], it is because of the refutation by valid cognition by which it is known [that there are] inherent characteristics for the other-dependent. From the [[[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]],
‘To that is this response: ‘Gentlemen [[[Mādhyamika]] scholars], what is the reason that anything known is non-existent?’
Moreover, should some Mādhyamika assert, ‘There is no error [in] the mind seeing [entities existing in the mode of having their own inherent characteristics and thereby creating the grounds of causation for those entities]. It is because that mind itself is mistaken [with regard to the actual nature of those entities].’
Well, does that mistaken mind exist or not exist [by means of inherent characteristics]? If it exists, then, that it is non-existent through its own inherent characteristics [in its mode] as “other-dependent,” would not be proper [with regard to its] “ultimate” [[[Wikipedia:status|status]]]. Therefore, the mistaken mind exists by means of its own characteristics.
If it does not exist through its own inherent characteristics, [things] are known by a confused mind, although [if that mind itself] does not exist through its own characteristics, it follows that [for the mind] to know [things to exist] through their own inherent characteristics is not real because [the mind] does not [in that case] exist through its own inherent characteristics. If this confused mind also does not exist through its own inherent characteristics, then it is through this point that it [would] necessarily be non-existent.”
Interwovenness-with-other is established by direct experience. The Mādhyamika view is that the ultimate (paramārthah, don dam pa) is the other-dependent nature being devoid of establishment by its inherent characteristics. Asaṅga states that this is refuted by valid cognition (tsad ma, pramāṇa) which clearly knows that everything exists is “enmeshed-with” or “interwoven-with” what is “other” than itself. This is known by valid means of cognition (dmigs
pa’i tsad ma, pratyakṣapramāṇa) by means of which this is evident. The three types of valid cognition are direct perception, inference and testimony. The other-dependent is proven logically. Furthermore, there is logical valid cognition (rig pa’i tsad ma) which is not referred to here. In this case, it is not a question of a logical contradiction, e.g., son of a barren woman, etc. That perceived phenomena are “other-dependent” is evident to direct perception in conjunction with logical analysis.
Clearly, a sprout is dependent upon water and sunlight for its existence. This is evident both to direct perception and logical reasoning. It is unlike a “rabbit’s horn”, an entity which logically violates the definition of “rabbit” and can nowhere be seen by direct perception. This “dependence upon” or “other-dependentness with” what is “other” is the essential characteristic with which all entities are endowed in order to attain status as an existent phenomena.
Otherness is causation and condition. The Madhyamaka response here is that the awareness of these inherent characteristics is due to a mistaken consciousness. Asaṅga says, “What is the reason for this mistaken consciousness’ existing?” He notes that the Mādhyamika themselves will consent to knowing objects. Have they no cause? The causational aspect is due to its “enmeshedness with other.”
Mistaken consciousnesses exist though mistaken. The mind which perceives separate, independent entities, etc., may be mistaken and confused in its perception, but surely this mind itself exists. Thus the Cittamātrin has established the causelessness and groundlessness of the Mādhyamika understanding of conceptualization and mentation; it is not enough to assert that consciousness comprehends phenomena in a mistaken manner, for one has to give answer as to how and why this mistakenness itself arises. lCang skya sets up the explanation above to clarify his quotation from Asanga in the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha which follows and makes very nearly the same point.
Mistaken consciousnesses exist
[243:4-6] “According to the [[[Mahāyānasaṃgrāha]]] itself,
‘If one should question these statements, then there is this response. If one should answer, “It is because of its being a mistaken entity.”’
To that, this response must be given. Does one assert that a mistaken [[[entity]]] exists or rather, does one hold that they do not exist?
However, if it exists, therefore ‘the inherent non-existence of all phenomena is the ultimate’ is improper. However, if it does not exist by means of [its own inherent characteristics], because there is [in fact] a mistaken entity [which does exist], to say ‘any object is inherently non-existent’ is inappropriate, as it is taught. These [issues] should be examined in this [way].”
If no entity exists, then how could it be non-existent? This reiterates what lCang skya stated above. His words serve here as to elucidate Asaṅga’s words quoted above. Again, an entity may be mistakenly perceived, however in its mistakenness, it nevertheless exists by virtue of being other-dependent. This generates a paradox: if no entity exists, then to say it is inherently non-existent is incorrect.
The other-dependent exists ultimately.
[243:6-244:3] “Well then, [if] some opponent [asserts],
‘It is incorrect that Yogācāra [[[scholars]]] accept that the other-dependent [[[nature]]] is established ultimately.’
According to the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra,
‘If it is a composite [[[entity]]], it would not be ultimate,’
Again, it is demonstrated to be a [mutual] pervasion to [reverse this and state that] therefore it is not ultimate if it is a composite entity.
Further, according to the Madhyānta[[[vibhāga]]],
‘The ultimate, is only [the perfected nature].’
Also, the root text and commentary teach as ultimate truth only the perfected nature
Further, the chapter of the Sutrālaṃkara which elucidates the five characteristics of ultimate truth, explains that [the perfected nature] is “non-arising” and “non-ceasing.” In the commentary [on the Sutrālaṃkara, it is said that] the conceptualized and other-dependent [natures] do not exist by means of their [[[own]] inherent] characteristics, and through the explanation that the perfected [[[nature]]] is not non-existent by its own characteristics, and [finally,] for the reason that these are the definitive texts of the Yogācāra [School]. When this has been stated, there is no error.”
The other-dependent: not ultimately established? The opponent cites scriptures which he thinks refutes the idea that the other-dependent is ultimately established. The above texts as they are quoted, seem to indicate that only the perfected nature is ultimate, not the other-dependent. From the
Sutrālaṃkara he cites as two of the five characteristics of the ultimate truth elucidated in that text are those of “non-arising” and “non-cessation.” The other-dependent, serving as a basis for entities which are dependent upon what is other to them for existence and thus, serving as a causal nexus for the conceptualized nature, etc., does not qualify as “non-arising” and “non-ceasing”, etc. These are definitive texts of the Yogācāra School and thus should be accepted as authoritative on this issue.
Distinction between ‘ultimate’ and ‘ultimate truth.
[244:3-244:6] “Earlier, it was explained that both the other-dependent and the perfected are ultimately existent, but those texts [above] explain that the other-dependent is ultimately non-existent. There are two “ultimates” which are designated nominally, and therefore they are not of identical meaning.
Again, both the other-dependent and the perfected are explained as “ultimately existent,” that is established existent ultimately through its own characteristics nominally, which is an establishment only by virtue of verbal expression. According to those scriptures, the other-dependent is ultimately
non-existent, and only the perfected is taught as ultimately existent. Having generated the gnosis of stainless, profound meditation is the “supreme,” and this is called the ‘supreme goal’, then, since it is the object of that [[[meditation]]]. Therefore, that is the supreme goal which is so established. This latter one is the final objective of the pure path; both [aspects of the path] result in the ultimate, though the goal is the same. The proof for this will not be elucidated, for it is well known.”
The perfected nature: neither existent nor non-existent. The opponent is said to fail to distinguish two types of ‘ultimate’ status: ultimate existence and ultimate truth. The perfected is said to be yod min - not existent in the same manner as the conceptualized and other-dependent, and it is said to be med min - not non-existent, for it exists with its own characteristics, eg., non-arising, non-ceasing, etc.
The other-dependent: ultimately existent but conventionally true. The other-dependent is said to be don dam yod pa, ultimately existent, for all things arise by means of this nature as their causal nexus. Nevertheless, it is said to be kun dzob du bden pa - conventionally true - because contained within its essential characteristics are the fact of subject-object bifurcation inherent in its nature as “dependent-upon-other.” The implication of this is that
one is speaking of an entity which is conventionally, though not ultimately dependent upon an object, so to speak, which is conventionally - though not ultimately - seen as an “other” to that entity.
Ultimate truth: truth from a ‘certain point of view.’ Ultimate truth then, is a truth “from someone’s point of view” (gang gi ngor bden) mentioned above. In this case, the ultimate truth is the “inner samādhi, holy and uncontaminated” which is the final goal of an Āryan bodhisattva.
Kleśa and jñeya āvaraṅa. The two aspects of the “pure path” are that which removes nyon sgrib - kleśāvaraṇa - delusive or “afflictive” obscurations and that which removes shes sgrib - jñeyāvaraṇa or “obscurations to omniscience.” The first entails shedding the notion of ego or ātmadṛṣṭi by means of meditation on the selflessness of the individual (gang zag gi bdag med, puḍgalanairātmya). The second - obscurations to omniscience or obscurations of objects of knowledge - involves meditation on the selflessness of phenomena (chos kyi bdag med, dharmanairātmya).
The convergence of the two types of awareness of selflessness in the samādhi of an Āryan bodhisattva is ultimate truth - in this case, truth from the point of view of one who is highly realized and who has become directly aware of the two aspects of śūnyatā - the emptiness of self and phenomena.
Mādhyamika Response.
Candrakīrti: assent to lCang skya’s presentation of the other-dependent. Candrakīrti assents to this interpretation of the Yogācārin understanding of other-dependent entities in the sixth section of the Madhyamakāvatara. That interdependent forms appear in the asbsence of any external object, that they exist in actuality and that at the level of ultimate comprehension, its nature cannot be conceptually grasped are features that are not in dispute. That is to say, it would seem that these are not features which are disputed as to whether or not these are positions actually taken by Yogācārin scholars.
Candrakīrti: external objects exist in dreams. Whether reality is to be understood in this way is very much in dispute. As Huntington (1989) relates the Prāsaṅgika rebuttal, all these assertions are open to question. Candrakīrticontends that there is nothing like a thought which could occur devoid of an external object. He rejects the analogy of the dream, i.e. the Yogācārin assertion that in dreams, external objects are perceived but obviously do not exist. Why is this necessarily so? Candrakīrti asks. His point is that if the existence of consciousness in a dream is shown through the memory of the dream during waking hours, then so also is the existence of external objects in that dream.
External objects in dreams or waking reality are not produced. He acknowledges that the thrust of the Yogācārin position here is to demonstrate that just as in a dream, externality and objectivity are perceived but do not in fact exist, and that by analogy, our waking experience of external objects should be understood in the same way as figments of consciousness. The reason the Madhyamaka, and in particular ardent Prāsaṅgikas like Candrakīrti are to be understood as repudiationists stems from the fact that, as he maintains, not only are external objects not produced, the consciousness that perceives them, whether in a dreaming or waking state, also is not produced. The sense consciousness, the external object and the consciousness are all three false.
There is no thought in the absence of an object. There can be no thought in the absence of an external object and for a sense-consciousness to operate, it requires a sphere of operation, which implies a relative externality, though both of these do not, in the Madhyamaka understanding, ultimately exist.
Without an external object, cataracts should be seen by those with healthy eyes. Candrakīrti cites the well-known example of the person afflicted with ophthalmia. According to the example, someone with a certain type of ophthalmia may perceive hairs where none exist to anyone else. If consciousness takes place without an external object, then even someone not afflicted with ophthalmia should perceive the hairs someone who is so afflicted sees. Since this does not occur, this these - that of consciousness not being consciousness of an external object - is disproven.
The false appearance exists. In the Bhāṣya or “commentary”, he adds that the appearance of hairs exist and not simply the consciousness of the hairs itself. Since both the consciousness and the hair are unproduced (as are all phenomena in Prāsaṅgika theory), it is difficult to comprehend consciousness in the absence of an external object. If a person without this ophthalmia looks at the same place that a person afflicted with ophthalmia looks at, since there is no external object involved, why shouldn’t the person unafflicted see the same hairs that the afflicted person sees, for the non-existence of an external object is common to both?
Candrakīrti (MA) of course, disagrees. It is rather those who reject the truth of the concealing level of reality who fail to follow Master Nāgārjuna into the most profound depth of understanding and who maintain themselves in bondage to reified thought. Concealing truth is a means to the ultimate truth but is fully “true” nevertheless. He states that those who follow Nāgārjuna have a quite different conception of concealing truth than do Yogācārins with regard to the other-dependent nature.
The concealing truth points to the fact that though things do not ultimately exist, our everyday experience of their existence is affirmed. For the arhats who have relinquished attachment to the aggregate constituents of existence, “entities” indeed no longer exist, but it is the experience of the ordinary individual whose mental continuum is obscured by entical thinking, it is this experience which rather than being negated, is upheld. As he says, one may wish to eradicate concealing truth, however, in such a struggle, he places his wager on the persistence, value and necessity of concealing truth.
Candrakīrti (MAB) ascribes the two truths doctrine to the Buddha himself. The great master taught only two truths and no third alternative. The concealing truth was taught for the benefit of living beings among the six destinies. The truth of the concealing truth was taught by the Buddha to the rich and the poor, to men and to women, he declares. The truth of the concealing nature of everyday experience was taught as an antidote to the eight
mundane dharmas or “phenomena” which afflict beings, inclusive of a desire for fame, wealth, etc. To see clearly the concealing aspect of these desires is to begin the process of liberation from them. What is concealed of course is the ultimate truth inhabiting a much more profound level of reality, indeed, is finally, reality. “Ripping away” levels of concealment from those obscured by it through appropriately refuting “entical” conceptualization for
ordinary individuals is accomplished by means of the consequential logic which finds the error in entical thought and reveals it, thereby revealing some aspect of the ultimate truth. As Tsong kha pa states, this method, the Prāsaṅgika method, is intended for students of the Madhyamaka tradition to eradicate philosophical views altogether, for properly speaking, the ultimate truth is not a view, though it can be expressed verbally at the level of concealing truth.
Tsong kha pa. The Venerable Tsong kha pa elucidates the Prāsaṅgika standpoint with regard to the example of a sprout and the implications for notions of past, present and future. He compares the Prāsaṅgika position with regard to the three aspects of time with that of the Vaiśeṣika, with the important distinction that the Prāsaṅgika standpoint “de-absolutizes” this perspective. According to the Vaiśeṣika standpoint, the three times exist absolutely, and are further subdivided into a past, present and future and so forth.
The Śrāvakayāna Schools view the past and future as “absolute” negations of the present, whereas the Prāsaṅgika accept the past as being simply the past. The future of the sprout is not an absolute negation (med dgag) but an affirming or implicative negation (ma yin dgag), for in the Prāsaṅgika view, the f
uture plant has a cause in the “non-completion” of the present state of being a sprout. This past, present and future are thus existent in a concealing manner, but through this method, the Prāsaṅgika avoid the complicated machinery of the Yogācārin theories with regard to the basal consciousness and the maturation of seminal potentiality.
mKhas Grub. MKhas Grub notes that all Buddhist schools agree that the past and future do not exist as entities. From the Prāsaṅgika standpoint, the Summation.
The main point to be made in this chapter is that relative to the Madhyamaka, the Yogācāra system is more “foundationalist” in the sense that conceptualized entities and cognition with all its multifarious levels, are held to be “actual,” “real” or having an ultimately established basis in
existence. This school views the Madhyamaka as repudiating any foundation for consciousness or experiential existence via its doctrine of “non-self-entity” (niḥsvabhāvavāda). This entails the repudiation of the path to full awakening and thus the Buddha’s basic teaching. Lack of a doctrine concerning a basal consciousness entails repudiation of karma theory. Not discussed by lCang skya at this point in our text (see
chapter six four an in-depth analysis) is the repudiation of the doctrines concerning the existence of a basal consciousness. While as Harris correctly notes, according to Asaṅga, even the basal or ālaya consciousness “dissolves” upon full awakening as karmic seeds and propensities are exhausted. However,
even conventionally, this doctrine is lacking. As an upāya it suffers from the distinct possibility that a Buddhist practitioner cleaving to this and related doctrines may fall into the mental trap of an “ego-view” (ātmadṛṣṭi). Certainly one notes that tathāgatagarbha theory as played out among East Asian forms of Buddhism where the Yogācāra system arguably predominated, reveal a tendency to ātman-like characteristics. But this topic will await more thorough investigation in chapters to come (please see chapter six, the Conclusion and the first Appendix).
Chapter Four: Self-awareness
We are employing this section of lCang skya’s work as an epitome of Yogācāra thought. Self-awareness is true of many aspects of the totality of sentient consciousness, not only primary mental consciousnesses but sense consciousnesses as well. We feel that it is appropriate to focus on this notion as forming a central, vital feature of Yogācāra doctrine because without the
establishment of self-awareness, much of this school’s systematic thought falls apart. Certainly it serves to attract some of Candrakīrti’s most vociferous objection. The idea of the centrality of mind and mental phenomena is ancient in Buddhism, and “proto-Yogācāra” elements in the Pali canon are abundant.
Three topics:
1. The extreme view refuted,
2 the actual meaning established and
3. warding off arguments.
[244:6-245:6] “From the Legs bshad snying po:
‘If it is thought that even gnosis would be an object, since this school accepts that that gnosis is self-aware, then [that gnosis,] is dependent upon this certain object, the goal is reality itself which is then the object which is known, moreover, then, [one,] in being aware of [this], incurs no fault.’
If it is thought that the aim of this teaching is just as [discussed above], then the three [topics of] the imputed extreme [which should be] refuted, the real meaning established and disputation avoided [should be examined].”
The issue at hand concerns whether gnosis (jñāna) has an object. This presents a problems. If gnosis has an object, then many qualites predicated of it would not apply. Full awakening to the reality of śūnyatā entails a lack of bifurcative consciousness. It is enmeshment with the Dharmakāya. This status in profound inner samādhi allows no subject/object dualism so inherent at the level of the conceptualized nature.
If gnosis is self-aware, and if consciousness by definition of consciousness of something, then gnosis itself becomes an object of its own self-awareness. Yet if gnosis can be an object, then this implies it could be some relatively reified entity. This is the subject to be investigated below.
1. Refuting an extreme view: self-aware gnosis knows itself as its own object.
“As to the first [of the three], one opponent [asserts]:
‘In the Yogācāra system, gnosis in the samādhi of an Āryan is self-aware. If that is so, it would follow that the final object of the pure path is gnosis itself, since it knows itself by means of gnosis itself, and saying this introduces the assertion of the earlier premise...there does not exist a fault since what is understood as the object is knowing reality....’
and he taught for this purpose. Not only that, that answer [[[Tsong kha pa]] gave] would not be correct [if the issue is understood as according this prior premise]. By the outsider [[[non-Buddhist]]],
‘The object of stainless gnosis is stainless gnosis itself because of it being aware of itself.’
This is a reply. He is not establishing stainless gnosis as the final object of the pure path, since he says merely there does not exist a fault, since it is known with regard to that [point] gnosis knows reality as its object. In gnosis itself being self-aware, there is not the slightest error and there does not exist any purpose and ability [to reject the opponent’s assertion] any further.”
This passage aims to refute a false notion which might arise in the minds of some. Tsong kha pa states that there is no fault in the notion of “self-aware gnosis,” for the object of gnosis in the samādhi of an Āryan is reality - śūnyatā - itself, and not that gnosis itself has itself as its object.
Three aspects: 1) refuting wrong notions, 2) establishing the actual meaning and 3) warding off objections. There will be three aspects to this discussion: 1) refuting wrong notions which are extreme views concerning this topic, 2) establishing the “actual meaning” i.e., Tsong kha pa’s own view and that, by implication, of the Yogācāra position and 3) warding off objections to his discussion of the actual meaning of “self-aware gnosis.”
The “earlier premise” stated that if gnosis is self-aware, it should have itself as its own object. If that is so, then such gnosis could not be nondiscriminating gnosis, for it has a subject and an object albeit, self-reflexive. To say this falls into a “Nāgārjunan trap,” which entails the impossibility of such a self-reflexive standpoint.
If gnosis were self-aware, then it stands to reason, the eye, ear, etc. consciousnesses would also be self-aware. This is encapsulated by the notion that “the eye does not see itself, therefore it is the eye” and “fire does not burn itself, therefore it is fire.” lCang skya asserts that seeing the Yogācāra idea in this light is to equate it with views of non-Buddhist schools which do indeed assert gnosis as having itself as its own object. This is incorrect and invites “limitless logical errors” which are entailed by the fact that any knowing consciousness must have an object, which is in this case as Tsong kha pa states, “the object is knowing reality.” What is meant as the “actual meaning” of the passage will be discussed below.
Error of asserting that self-awareness knows itself by means of itself
[245:6-247:1] “And another opponent [asserts]:
‘The meaning of that teaching is [as follows]. It would follow that by the previous premise, the gnosis of [an Āryan’s] samādhi would know itself by itself, because of that gnosis of samādhi being a gnosis which is self-aware of each [thing] (so-so rang gis rig pa’i ye she). Therefore, it is an object of itself for the gnosis of samādhi itself.’
Thus it is said. The Venerable Self [[[Tsong kha pa]] said],
‘Though the gnosis of samādhi is a gnosis which is self-aware of each [thing], it does not know itself, because of being perfected as gnosis aware of itself so having relied upon the manner of knowing reality (chos nyid) as its own object. This is taught as the answer which was stated.’
In stating the prior [[[assertion]]] one has not in the least now understood the Venerable [[[Tsong kha pa’s]]] thought. There are no adherents to tenets who assert that the meaning of saying “gnosis which is self aware of each [thing]” knows itself by itself, because there do not exist also among scholars of India or Tibet who say,
‘Accordingly, this is the goal desired by Yogācāra [[[scholars]]]’.
Furthermore, it is incorrect even if one accepts making merely confusion which is necessary to accept as self-aware by merely the word stated as “gnosis which is self-aware of each...
Because such confusion as that would not arise in the intelligent, however, if it did arise, by saying, “this school,” having proclaimed by means of this object the Yogācāra [School] because of there being no necessity to do this. However, even if [what is meant] is according to the manner of the previous premise, it is that is not the reason as correctly explained by the Venerable Omniscient [[[Tsong kha pa]]] as the meaning of self-aware of each [thing]... as his answer, but
‘having depended upon any sort of object it is knowing on that [point] the object which knows reality as its aim.’
There does not exist an aim to be examined in particular for general and specific objects. There does not exist even a proof of the necessity remaining and it does not exist in the text the word “self-aware of each.” Furthermore, it is thought upon reflection done roughly in this chapter by the Venerable Mahātma [[[Tsong kha pa]]] does not appear to the inferior minds who are weak in practice and schooling.”
The object of gnosis is not itself, but reality. This passage continues the first topic which is the refutation of extreme views with regard to the concept “gnosis which is self-aware.” lCang skya states that there do not exist any proponents of the view the opponent ascribes to the Cittamātrins. In any case, it is certainly not what Tsong kha pa himself was referring to, for he furthermore does not employ the specific term “gnosis which is self-aware of each [thing]...” but rather,merely,
“If it is thought, that this school, since it accepts gnosis as self-aware, that even gnosis itself would be an object, having relied upon an object, because it is understood that the object is knowing reality, there does not exist a fault.”
Only those “weak in practice and schooling” would even think this is the meaning, is their idea. The second of three topics: establishing the actual meaning.
[247:1-248:1] “Establishing his own system is the second [of the three topics]. The important point of the Venerable [[[Tsong kha pa’s]]] teaching in this chapter should be explained. [With regard] to that, are two [aspects]: [1] the manner in which confusion arises and [2] the explanation of his response.
1. The manner in which confusion arises
The first [of these]. It is taught in this manner in the chapter of the Madhyamakāloka which expresses the assertions of the Yogācāra [School], and likewise, according to the Saṃdhinirmocana, Laṅkāvatara and the Gandavyuha [[[sūtras]]], it will be shown,
‘There is not [anything] other than mind-alone which ultimately exists, wherefore all phenomena are taught as embodying merely mind. Therefore, that all phenomena are inherently non-existent would not be established.’
With this last [quote], from the text of the Ratnakūṭa[[[sūtra]]]. There is no doubt that the ultimate actuality (dngos po) will be self-awareness [in the gnosis of the samādhi] of Āryans. If it were otherwise, as it is expressed in the Saṃdhinirmocana[[[sūtra]]], there is no non-existent actuality. If one asks
what that actuality is, it is the gnosis of the Āryan and what the Āryan sees which is ineffable, perfected Buddhahood, inexpressible dharmatā suchness, because it is perfect enlightenment, and is verbally conventionalized as “composite” and likewise, “non-composite,” which would be contradicting this teaching.” it is taught.
[lCang skya continues:] Generally, Yogācāra scholars, having relied upon the refutation logically of grasped external objects, and the subject, which is empty of being substantially different from the object, there would be left remaining merely the experienced knowing of awareness, and establishing substantially that mere knowing which is awareness of that type of experience, it is not acceptable to reject this even by any sort of conventional examination or ultimate examination by valid cognition.”
The second of these three topics then is the establishment of Tsong kha pa’s own system of thinking about these issues. With regard to this system then are the two aspects of demonstrating the way in which confusion about self-aware gnosis arises and Tsong kha pa’s own response to the issue. The first quote is from the Madhyamakāloka, etc., in a section which discusses Yogācāra views. This refers to statements in which both subjective and objective aspects of reality are taught as “Yogācāra,” or “Mind-only.” The idea here is that there is an ultimate “actuality” which is strictly consciousness.
Ultimate reality in the Yogācāra system is that “ineffable,” “inexpressible” gnosis which is encompassed by the Āryan in deepest samādhi. This being inexpressible, to call it “composite” or “non-composite” would contradict the doctrine. Composite refers to the other-dependent, non-composite to the perfected and “verbally conventionalized” to the conceptualized. Again, the other-dependent is composite because, being dependent upon other, it requires a basis and that with which it is interwoven to arise. The perfected is non-composite and is the other-dependent devoid of the conceptualized.
It is a basic Yogācāra doctrine that subject and object, or more literally, “grasper” and “grasped” are not substantially different from one another. What is declared ultimate in this case is the gnosis of the samādhi of an Āryan, in which subject-object dualism ceases, yet the “mere knowing awareness” itself is real or actual. Therefore to say that all actuality is inherently non-existent is false, for that awareness of the Āryan is real or actual.
This cannot be rejected by conventional examination, which would include logical analysis, or via ultimate valid cognition, which would be the experiential awareness of one who has attained to the ineffable gnosis in the samādhi of an Āryan. In that Āryan’s samādhi , while it is taking place, non-dualism etc. is manifest; however after the meditative action which is the samādhi of the Āryan is over, the remembrance of the experience fails to attain to the ultimate status of the Āryan’s direct cognition of śūnyatā which was achieved during his experience of samādhi .
Memory as proof of self-aware consciousness.
[248:2-5] “Therefore, when dharmatā has been made into an object which is non-affirmingly negated by the stainless gnosis of the Āryan’s meditation, then that gnosis knows dharmatā implicitly, and any other [positive] phenomenon is not asserted to be known.
However, at that time, the meditative gnosis itself effects the experience of the valid cognition of direct perception, which is necessary. If it were otherwise, then that meditative gnosis itself therefore is not established as valid cognition, and later, even the memory, ‘I realized dharmatā directly,’ would not arise as a memory.
In this manner, self-awareness is capable of being proven logically. If it were otherwise, if one were to have accepted as non-existent that self-awareness which effects one’s own experience [in memory] even for the valid cognition of direct perception of sense[-consciousness], then according to [proponents of] the Yogācāra [School], this is incapable of refutation.
Because of this, it is entirely the same reason [for both cases]. Accordingly, it is established that self-awareness exists at the time [of the Āryan’s meditative state]. That self-awareness is a knowing which does not abide even a bit corrupted by dual appearance.”
Here we have mention of “non-affirming negation” (med dgag). Contraposed to this is what is known as an “affirming negation.” An example of the latter would the statement, “empty wallet.” The negation, “empty” establishes a positive existence, in this case, a wallet. An example of the former would be “there is no money in an empty wallet,” which does not suggest a positive phenomenon which does lie within the wallet in place of money. What is “non-affirmingly negated” about “dharmatā” is its emptiness of duality. This absence is does not imply a positive phenomenon which exists in place of this absence.
“Self-awareness” (rang rig) here refers to the awareness within consciousness of consciousness itself. This is demonstrated, according to Yogācāra proponents, by memory. When one remembers seeing the color blue, one’s consciousness is not focused upon a currently perceptible external blue, but the picture of blue as it is retained in the consciousness. This is the self-awareness of sense consciousness.
The same reasoning is offered for the ability of an Āryan to remember the state of meditative awareness of dharmatā. There must be a self-awareness which is present in order for the memory of that experience to persist later in a post-meditative state. In this state of self-awareness, the memory is not a state wherein one is conscious of an “other” (gzhan rig), but of internal consciousness, conscious of itself. There is “a withdrawal of dual appearance” (gnyis snang nub) here, and one is aware of only an inner state (kha nang kho nar phyogs pa).
This is the implication of the existence of subject and object in a dream state. Only an inner consciousness perceives - falsely - the real existence of subject and object. All the perceptions are products of one’s mind. This is of course what proponents of Yogācāra doctrines will want to affirm concerning our wakened state of distinguishing subject and object as well. The irrefutability of self-awareness.
[248:5-249:1] “Generally, according to the Yogācāra system, when one desires to no longer abide in the corruption of confusion with regard to the self-awareness for the continuum of even an ordinary individual, not to mention with regard to the self-awareness which arises in the direct experience of stainless gnosis which is the real antidote of ignorance.”
Therefore, this type of mere self-awareness, would not be refuted even by logic of ultimate examination (don dam dbyod byed). Because of the irrefutability even by any sort of logic which would refute the establishment by its own characteristics of the imputed which imputes attributes and essence and logically rejects grasper and grasped as different substances.
Those who assert the existence of self-awareness for the ordinary individual even moreso must admit the existence of self-awareness for the bodhisattva in meditation on emptiness. This self-awareness in the mental continua of even ordinary individuals is necessary to remove confusion which derives from the false imputation of attributing essence and attributes to seemingly external entities, and of the basic paradigm of subject/object dualism. The imputation of essence in this context, entails the “fitness to be” something. For example, a table’s “essence” here refers to its nature as a table, which means it’s fulfilling the proper definition of what is meant by “table.” Its attributes involve of course, features such as its “having legs,” etc. This is dualistic thinking with regard to “external” objects. The false imputation of “grasper” and “grasped” derive from internal thinking which bifurcates the world into “I/it,” “self/other” dualism.
[249:1- 3 ] “Therefore, according to Master Shakya blo,
‘A bodhisattva, by knowing the selflessness of phenomena, knows only self-awareness which is empty of duality.’
And according to the Omniscient mKhas grub,
‘Having extinguished (gtan med pa) dual appearance on the external side, [[[bodhisattvas]]] realize grasper and grasped as truly empty, knowing this implicitly by virtue of the manifestation of [[[reality]]] just as it is (ji lta ba bzhin) on the part of experiential awareness which knows inwardly no duality. When there is an ability to destroy the seed of that sort of ‘grasping as true,’ [that seed] is direct knowing which is the gnosis of the Āryan,’
as he teaches this. There are subtle [issues] to be understood (kho rgyu) in these texts.”
What is known explicitly by bodhisattvas is the lack of duality with regard to their own inner consciousness. Implicitly they become aware of emptiness itself. This is known implicitly because they may know explicitly only through their own self-awareness of emptiness; actual śūnyatā is known as a result of this explicit or direct knowledge. The subtle issues referred to here involve whether one’s knowledge of śūnyatā is direct, or whether one views one’s awareness of śūnyatā itself is the direct object of awareness here.
The entical aspect of the dharmdhātu.
[249:4-250:3]] “According to the quotation from the Madhyamakāloka above, that
‘Therefore it is demonstrated that all phenomena are embodiments of mind alone’
and if one asks,
‘What is that entity (dngos po)?’
It is the gnosis of the Āryan and it is the inexpressible which is seen by an Āryan” from [this passage up to] “and for what are called composite and likewise, what are termed ‘non-composite’ are imputed nominally.
By this doctrine, the direct object (dngos yul) of stainless knowledge is the same entity as the knowledge [itself] which would be the direct object of this knowledge is shown. However, for this chapter, what is meant by the word “Āryan gnosis”and what is meant by the words “what is seen by the Āryan” following that, are by necessity connected (‘grel dgos), and the goal to be attained by gnosis is the perfected [[[nature]]].
If one thinks the self-awareness of gnosis is the direct object - this is incorrect. When, according to that scripture, the following [passage] which discusses the composite and is the imputation of a composite by necessity would therefore be without connection to the perfected [[[nature]]] as well. Otherwise, according to this [passage] from the section of the Madhyamakāloka which refutes the assertions of those who propound [the existence of] entities (dngos sma ba’i ‘dod pa),
“Here, the sphere of knowledge (spyod yul) of the Āryan’s gnosis is the dharmadhātu, which is asserted to be expressed by the [mere] word entity [but which] is the selflessness of all phenomena. Because it demonstrates the way to the goal which is the complete eradication of the basis of the fear of those who cling to entities (mngon par zhen pa rnams); the aim of the scripture is not demonstrating by that word entity the self-aware knowledge asserted by the [proponents] of the Yogācāra [School], however, what is expressed by the word composite is only dharmatā.”
It would be incorrect to be [advocating] the viewpoint (gsungs pa) [of the opponent] along with this reasoning, because of the assertion that only dharmatā is the aim of that, according to the [proponents of] Yogācāra themselves.
The term “entity” referred to in the Madhyamakāloka is discussed here. Composite phenomena (visible, functional entities) and non-composite phenomena (such as space) are imputed nominally to ultimate reality (dharmatā). Some think that the term refers to the inner gnosis of the Āryan itself. This is incorrect. Dharmatā is the basis for all phenomena (dharmas) and is referred to as an “entity” in order to alleviate the fear the term “non-entity” would incite in those who cling to being.
“Those who propound [the existence of] entities” include the proponents of Yogācāra doctrines, as well as those Buddhist schools which propound the existence of external objects, which includes the Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika but not the Yogācāra Schools. Furthermore, the term “entity” should not be seen as referring to the self-aware or “intra-mental” consciousness of the Yogācāra Schools, because it is connected to both the object (yul) of Āryan gnosis, which is śūnyatā or “emptiness” (=dharmatā) which is “what is seen by the Āryan,” and the subject (yul can) which is the Āryan’s gnosis itself.
The term “entity” here is only a verbal designation in the Madhyamakāloka - not a reference to a real entity - for according to Madhyamaka thought, śūnyatā is a state devoid of entity (ngo bo nyid med pa). According to lCang skya, the term is used in this text only to avoid provoking antagonism to the relatively negative sounding term “non-entity.”
The sense in which dharmatā is called ‘composite.
[250:4-251:1] “Again, it is incorrect to declare the word ‘composite’ as referring to only dharmatā, as the answer to the [proponents of Yogācāra ,” for according to the Madhyamakāloka, for the purpose of refuting such an assertion,
‘It is called ‘composite’ because it is dharmatā which is [the basis of] all composite [[[phenomena]]] without exception [and is called ‘composite’] by virtue of conventional discourse, and is not to be designated [as a composite phenomenon] with regard to all aspects of its reality.’
Teaching this would be incorrect. The ‘composite’ section of those texts, according to Yogācāra [proponents], when they assert that [it refers to] dharmatā only, because it would prove what is [already] established by those doctrines, therefore these [[[sections]]] are a basis for generating confusion (dogs pa).
The way questions arise [is as follows]. According to the Yogācāra system, gnosis exists as the valid cognition which is self-aware which comprehends (‘jal ba) the two methods of setting (‘jog tshul) the ultimate according to this chapter, since it is stainless knowledge and that is self-aware for the necessity is gnosis and the object of that [[[gnosis]]].
“Ultimate” (dam pa) [means] “having effected stainless deep meditative (nyam gzhag) gnosis, and it is “the holy goal” (don dam pa) since it is the object of that, and [those who] are thinking it is not pervaded by only the unchanging perfected [[[nature]]], generate confusion from thinking that stainless gnosis itself would be the final objective of the pure path.”
The two ways of “setting” refer to the manner in which Āryan gnosis in meditation is effected. The two aspects of achieving this supreme goal involve the subjective and objective aspects of this ultimate reality. The subjective (yul can) is ultimate truth, Āryan gnosis itself, or the recipient of the object (yul), which, as stated above, refers to the ultimate, emptiness, or “that which is seen by the Āryan.” Some opponents think that the perfected nature does not pervade the entirety of ultimate truth, but that these two aspects characterize this state..
This is the explanation for the opponent, of the Tibetan, don - “goal, aim” and dam pa, “holy, sublime.” In the Sanskrit this is called, parama - supreme, and artha. - “goal.” The opponent in the text here distinguishes the two aspects of these terms, the “aim” or “goal” aspect referring to the
object which is emptiness, and the “supreme” or “holy” aspect which refers to the subjective awareness which is the Āryan’s gnosis. The opponent here asserts that there are two aspects to ultimate truth: the subjective aspect which is the Āryan’s gnosis and an objective aspect which is emptiness or the perfected nature. Problems with this idea will be discussed in the following passage.
The perfected nature is the appropriate object of the ultimate goal.
[251:2-252:1] “Generally, to explain the answer for the second one, it is true that if one places as the ultimate goal which is effected by virtue of the second manner of setting by merely being the object of a certain stainless knowledge, however, here, there is no fault, since it is not set up by merely that.
Well, if one wonders just how it is set up, it is by being the valid cognition which makes ultimate examination for that object of that stainless knowledge which is the subject (yul can) for establishing the ultimate goal which is effected by virtue of the second way of setting, to be the ultimate which is finally obtained from examination by that stainless knowledge which is the object of that [[[knowledge]]], and it is necessarily the two phenomena being assembled together [i.e., the subjective aspect, stainless knowledge, and its object which is emptiness which it ultimate truth which comprise the ultimate goal.]
That means, to refute [the opponent’s assertion], elucidating only unchanging, non-affirmingly negated perfected nature as the appropriate [[[object]]]; the subject, stainless gnosis is inappropriate. As established by the self-awareness which effects the experience of that stainless knowledge, generally, if it
is knowledge, it is not dependent upon an other substance for effectuating its own experience, but it is necessarily established by the subjective aspect (‘dzin rnam) which is of the same nature and type (rang) [though it is not identical], and it is an understanding by means of the withdrawal of dual
appearance (gnyis snang nub) by self-awareness which effectuates its own experience of stainless knowledge by reason of being only an inner seeing and a subjective aspect, but, therefore, it is not finally discovered from examination, from either examination which proves or disproves the reality of the object which is stainless knowledge by means of self-awareness. By this reasoning, there is no fault that that gnosis would be the final object of the pure path [for that fault is yours].”
These two aspects of the “ultimate goal” are again, the subjective (yul can) and the objective (yul). The objects of stainless knowledge are many. For example, a Buddha knows the ultimate which is emptiness but also is simultaneously aware of the conventional (e,g., saṃsāra , etc.). The only object appropriate to be called the “ultimate goal” of stainless knowledge is emptiness, the “unchanging, perfected nature.” Some opponents assert that any object of stainless knowledge is appropriate as the “ultimate goal.”
One example given is that of a carpenter. A carpenter may be aware of many things (plumbing, auto mechanics, etc.), however, one is only a carpenter in reference to his activity and knowledge with regard to wood-working. The same is true of “stainless knowledge”: it is only such when seen with regard to ultimate truth which is emptiness. The object of the ultimate goal is not gnosis itself but the object of that gnosis, which is emptiness.
Self-awareness arises with every type of consciousness, from the eye consciousness up to stainless knowledge. This self-awareness does not examine whether it is conscious of seeing “blue” by the eye consciounsess or being aware of the emptiness which is the objective of gnosis. Rather, it arises concomitant to those consciousnesses. It is of the same nature as these consciousnesses, but unlike them, it is not aware of a perceived external, substantial phenomenon, but is “intra-mental,” perceiving only consciousness itself
. It is neutral in the sense that it is not aware of the pleasantness the eye consciousness may associate with seeing blue or the bliss the stainless consciousness may experience.
The self-awareness knows emptiness implicitly, not explicitly.
[252:1-5] “Otherwise, the sense conciousnesses of the ordinary individual would be irreversible (zlog tu med pa), even existing ultimately. Those [[[sense consciousnesses]]] exist [each] with a self-awareness which generates experience, and with regard to the subjective mode (‘dzin tshul) of the self-awareness, there is no abiding in confused corruption, in their mode of cognition, because of being cognition [which takes place] in the extinction of dual appearance.
If one were to explain this in an abbreviated way, in this section [treating] of Yogācāra , even the realization of reality, the perfected nature, is necessarily realization in a mode of negation of the object of negation which is a type of eradication of [the awareness of] a substantial difference of subject and object., however, this is a mere non-apprehension with regard to the substantial separateness of subject and object; it will not be a mere non-abiding error with regard to an object.” It is said. According to the Venerable Omniscient [[[Tsong kha pa]]],
‘Having relied upon a certain object, there is no fault, since it is understood that the object is the realization of reality [wherein the awareness of subject and object dissolve].’
This is the perfectly explained meaning (don dpyis phyin) of [these] statements. Along these lines, according to the Ocean of Logic, the Great Commentary on the Root [Text, the Madhyamakakarikāḥ]
‘On this [point], those Mādhyamika who hold the self awareness is [merely a] verbally designated [[[phenomenon]]] , and that object [which is perceived] by the valid cognition of inherent non-existence (rang bzhin med pa tshad mas) [which is śūnyatā] is held to be established implicitly by the self-awareness which generates the experience of that object, though, since they hold that the self-awareness is [established] in the valid cognition of verbal expression, it is not established by logical knowledge.’
That is what is should be known and this is the meaning of the doctrine.
The self-awareness of sense consciousness would be irreversible because the opponent holds that since the self-awareness perceives pure gnosis which remembers the experience of the reality of emptiness, then that self-awareness is also stainless. lCang skya’s response is that if that were the case, then all self-awareness for eye consciousness, etc., would also be stainless and pure. While it is true that there is a lack of duality in what is known by the self-awareness, which is said to be conscious only of mental phenomena and not of external phenomena, this is a “mere non-apprehension” in the context of intra-mental events.
Accordingly, the self-awareness does not focus an external object, hence it is not aware of emptiness save implicitly, as it is remembered as an experience of attaining gnosis in deep meditation. Even the Yogācāra - Mādhyamika such as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, who, though acccepting the existence as verbal designation of a self-awareness for consciousness, nevertheless declare it to have only an implicit awareness of emptiness. In this sense, the self-awareness knows emptiness through the means of cognition which involve verbal designation, because emptiness exists thence as remembered experience, not direct experience. The source for this is Tsong kha pa’s commentary on the Madhyamakakarikāḥ. The third of three topics: warding off opposing arguments.
[252:5-253:2] “The third among those [three topics] is the warding off of opposing arguments. If it is said,
‘If it were thus [as stated above], then it would follow that the unchanging perfected [[[nature]]] is an affirmingly negated (ma yin dgag) [[[reality]]] because the stainless knowledge of deep meditation realizes even the knowledge itself which implicitly realizes the perfected [[[nature]]] (khyod rtogs).’
But that reasoning (rtags) is not proven, because the stainless gnosis in profound meditation is not held to be realizing gnosis itself directly.
And another opponent [states]: if it is said,
‘If it is that way, stainless gnosis would be unestablished even by self-aware knowledge.’
That is not so, because the self-awareness established the subject (yul can) which is stainless knowledge, though there is no need for it to establish the object which is [the reality of] dharmatā. Otherwise, it would follow that in identifying the self-awareness which generates the experience of visual awareness (mig shes) would occur prior to seeing [itself]. And again, another opponent [asserts that] it is incorrect [to think] that this section is engaged in the clarification of the self-awareness. If it is said,
‘Those [proponents of] Yogācāra who adhere to scripture do not assert the [[[existence]] of] a self-awareness.’
[Then in rebuttal,] it is not so that all scripturally-oriented [proponents of] Yogācāra do not accept the self awareness, and though some [proponents of] Yogācāra adhering to scriptures of the bhūmi collection (sa sde’i), did not admit to a self-awareness, [however,] there is no fault in examining confusion concerning self-awareness in this section, because this section explains the general system of the Yogācāra [School].”
Here begins a sequence of opposing arguments. The first opponent states that if the case is as lCang skya stated it, this would leave emptiness as an affirming negation, because self-awareness establishes the positive existence of gnosis as the subject which experiences the perfected nature of emptiness as its object.
This lCang skya rebuts this by noting that gnosis is not held to be aware of gnosis itself, but that the self-awareness is aware of only an implicit object - emptiness.
Continuing this line of reasoning, another contention holds that then the self-awareness does not establish stainless gnosis. lCang skya states that there is no need for the self-awareness to establish anything other than subjective experience which is an intra-mental event. There is no need to assert that it establishes an object, save implicitly, through the experience of the primary consciousness which apprehends ultimate truth. If it did establish objects, then it would be reasonable to hold that the self-awareness could establish objects prior to the primary mental consciousness’ ever experiencing it in the first place.
Next, an opposing comment asserts that not all proponents of Yogācāra who adhere to scripture even accepted the existence of a self-awareness. lCang skya concedes that some of those who follow scripture - this means the traditions of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu - that cleave to the five scriptures of Maitreya did reject the concept of a self-awareness. This lineage of Yogācāra is to be contrasted with that of proponents of Yogācāra who cleave to logic, numbering
among them, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti - but this section is involved with setting out the general Yogācāra system and it is thus appropriate to discuss this doctrine which is so central to the Yogācāra tradition overall. The self-awareness has no object but ‘mere mental experience.’
[253:3-254:5] “Again, some will understand, ‘Your assertion is incorrect; though you based yourself on the acceptance of self-awareness, therefore, in that time of profound meditation the stainless gnosis which comprehends (‘jal byed) itself would not be an object for the self-awaress. Accordingly, as [quoted] from the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha,
‘Realize non-grasping! Thereby, one contacts the objectlessness (dmigs pa med pa) [of emptiness].’
And [the Path of Seeing which is] just above whatever [lies beyond] the dissolution (rnam par ‘jig pa) of the composite sentience (‘dus shes) [which is comprised] of the merest consciousness, or from the perspective of the station of the supreme mundane dharma (‘jig rten pa’i mchog gi gnas) which is the samādhi which does not [quite] reach that [[[Path of Seeing]]]” and “After having realized intellectually that nothing other than mind exists, because of this even mind is realized as non-existent,” by these statements, therefore, if one says, “because of the explanation of the non-existence of mental appearance in profound samādhi ” there is no logical fault.
Those [quotes above] explain the characterlessness of appearance to someone who is engaged in meditation of the path to reality, but generally, at that time there is merely mental experience, therefore this is not refuted. Having relied upon these [statements] the profound meditations which are asserted
to be devoid of conceptual strife (spros du med pa) by [proponents of] tenets of the lower [schools], even though in systems of tenets of the higher [schools] these would be [seen to be] accompanied by conceptual strife, and if that is [the case], there is much to express on the reasons and so forth [how] it would not be accompanied by conceptual strife by only that in our system.
And likewise, it is rare for those who explained the doctrines of the Venerable Omniscient [[[Tsong kha pa]]] in prior [periods] to proceed to the essential points and meaning of those doctrines. It seems necessary to know the thorough explanations [found in] the Madhyamakāloka, the Tarkajvāla (rTog ge ‘Bar ba) and among the [[[Wikipedia:literary|literary]]] corpi of the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra [systems], and [where] the establishment of self-awareness occurs in the *Pramāṇavartikka, etc..
By certain earlier explicators, those texts were not seen, and by some, though they saw [those texts], they did not examine [the issues] logically, having held the opponent (phyogs snga ma) and the refutation [of the opponent’s positions] as identical, though too, such explanations are rare, however, by me, I am [able] to state just as much as I am capable (dpogs tshod), and moreover, since in the words of (ji skad du) the luminous (grags) virtuous advisor, the son of the Jina, there exists no confusion in such minds which possess the difficult meanings. If it is not so, then by [whom] else?”
Here, lCang skya answers opponents’ propositions. In the first instance, he states that the self-awareness with regard to the Āryan’s gnosis has no object, because the object of gnosis is objectlessness (dmigs pa med pa). In the state of profound meditation, everything is realized as non-existent, even mind itself. The self-awareness is aware only of a subject - the state of gnosis - and only a mere experience of consciousness takes place.
The opponent asserts that since there is no mental appearance in the state of profound meditation on emptiness, there would be nothing for the self-awareness to perceive. This is not so, responds lCang skya, because the “merely mental experience” does occur. He continues to explain that what one school may consider a state “devoid of conceptual strife’ (spros du med pa), another school may consider a state where some measure of mentation is taking place. There is much to say on this subject, he says, and continues to explain that he is capable of only so much acuity in his explanation. The reader is urged to investigate the issues him/herself by examining the Madhyamakāloka, etc. - works by greater minds than his own, as he puts it.
[254:5] “Moreover, in the words of those sons of the Victor, famed virtuous advisors, those who possess intellects which possess the meaning of the difficulties, since no confusion exists [for them], if that is not so, then for whom else?” Therefore it is taught in this way demonstrating this standpoint value from this examination by greater intellects.
Mādhyamika response
Candrakīrti
Mind-only eradicates the view of an agentive self. According to Candrakīrti, the realization that the three (Desire, Form and Formless) realms are mind alone occurs at the sixth bodhisattva level, called the Directly Facing (abhimukhi). The aim of this realization is to enable the bodhisattva to eradicate the last traces of thinking of the volitional agent as a permanent self. This is accomplished by the realization that this agent is merely mentation. In spite of the persistence of his critique of the Yogācārin position, he nonetheless has only high esteem for the Laṅkāvatarasūtra wherein this doctrine is perhaps most famously presented.
Refuting the agentive self of non-Buddhist schools. The Buddha elucidated the “mind-only” doctrine for the purpose of refuting the notion of an agent as it is presented in the doctrines of non-Buddhists. This mind-only doctrine was taught to inculcate the fact that in the realm of everyday experience, mentation is preeminent. This should not be taken as a denial of form, however. If this were intended, then one must wonder at his statements in the same sūtra, that desire and ignorance produce that which is merely mind, according to Candrakīrti. .
Memory is no different from other types of cognition. Candrakīrti (MA) disagrees with the idea that consciousness can be self-aware. He claims that memory (smṛtijñāna) is no different from any other type of experience lying within a continuum of thought. This is to say, a memory is subsequent cognition like any other cognition which might not be a cognition of a cognition. The remembrance of a previous experience is as different from the present memory of that experience and is a “reified” object as “past experience” in a manner not dissimilar to the perception of a difference between a presently engaged consciousness and an entity such as a table.
Memory is neither different from nor the same as the remembered event. On the one hand, a memory is different from the actual past experience, on the other, it is not different in the sense that we claim experience of it as our experience. Devoid of a concept of self-awareness however, how could the Yogācārin maintain that other-dependent entities are cognized? Just as Nāgārjuna demonstrated the impossibility of the agent, act and activity being identical, so the same line of reasoning should be applied to self-awareness: How could it be aware of itself and yet avoid being identical to itself? Yet if it is different how could be it be classified as a self awareness?
Fire does not burn itself, nor does consciousness ‘think’ itself. Candrakīrti adds (MAB) that if, according to Yogācāra doctrine, the other-dependent exists substantially empty of self-other distinction, then what consciousness is aware of what other-dependent entity? He applies traditional Madhyamaka reasoning to this problem. The idea that there is self-awareness suffers from the same problem as the classical issues Nāgārjuna elucidates in the MMK. Consciousness can no more be aware of itself than fire could burn itself, or in Candrakīrti’s own example, of the impossibility of a sword edge cutting itself, or other well-known examples of the tip of the finger touching itself, the eye seeing itself, and so forth.
In the absence of external objects, consciousness itself cannot be an object. If we have understood his reasoning correctly, to say that the primary consciousness apprehends an entity which is itself apprehended by this secondary self-awareness, then this makes for a situation whereby the primary apprehending consciousness is made an object of this self-awareness. Given the Yogācārin tenet of the non-existence of external objects, it would seem to be a consequence that the primary consciousness viewed as the object of the secondary self-awareness, would be non-existent.
Identity or difference: memory relative to the original experience. As Huntington admits the argument here is somewhat hard to follow, but the primary focus of his argument is not hard to grasp. His line of argument follows traditional Madhyamaka concerns. Whether or not a self-awareness exists, a memory is distinct from or at least not identical to the original experience. Because it arises subsequently, it is not identical, and just as if it were to belong to the mental continuum of another consciousness, it does not share a direct cause-effect relationship. This relationship would need to be explained, just as does that which pertains to the relationship of fuel to fire. Both seemingly distinct entities are not identical, for they can be conventionally distinguished. However, they are not different because they are intrinsically related.
Subject/object dualism in all forms of consciousness. Candrakīrti notes that both the original event and the memory are similar in that both require a perceiver and a perceived object. This is acceptable as an explanation for the way things are established as conventional truth, but more thorough analysis reveals the ultimate incoherency of this understanding of how consciousness can be said to be “self-aware.” To say “self-aware” is to assert that the agent, activity and act are identical by implication. This sameness is nowhere perceived but simply exists as a reified concept in the Yogācārin system.
The fallacy of infinite regression: cognition of a cognition of a cognition.... Futhermore, this idea suffers from the fallacy of infinite regression. Candrakīrti notes (MAB) if memory involves “memory of an experience of an object” then the self-awareness should experience this, but also, self-awareness should experience itself as well. In this case, one would have the memory of the memory of an experience. If all memory and consciousness is self-aware, this process should continue ad infinitum. He notes a circularity of reasoning in these proofs for self-awareness. It seems that self-awareness is given as a proof of memory and memory is used to prove the existence of self-awareness.
Memory explained by recourse to conventional phenomena. One may account for memory from strictly conventional phenomena. Candrakīrti notes that the existence of a “magic water crystal” cannot be inferred merely from the presence of water, but water may be postulated merely from the fact of clouds heavy with water, raining down. Both memory and self-awareness are unsubstantiated theses. Cognition is given as producing memory, memory is claimed as that which demonstrates self-awareness. But self-awareness is said to be established by means of subsequently arising memories*
Tsong kha pa: memory occurs due to the primary experience. Tsong kha pa of course completely accepts Candrakīrti’s arguments on this topic. He accepts as fact that Candrakīrtidisproves the notion of self-awareness being proven through an argument from memory. According to him, the memory “I saw something” occurs not via any self-awareness, but by the first direct experience of an object and a subsequent memory of that very same object.
The fallacy of two consciousnesses. If two types of conscious awareness were required, then experience and memory would be different. He argues, elucidating Candrakīrti’s stance, that memory would be impossible, for consciousness would be directed at two different objects. If memory and direct experience are different consciousnesses, then it would not be absurd for one person to have another person’s memory.
Tsong kha pa and infinite regression: there is no primary experience. Candrakīrti and Tsong kha pa are agreed here, and both cite the problem of infinite regress with regard to this aspect of the Yogācārin doctrine of self-awareness. In his dGongs pa Rab gSal, Tsong kha pa notes that if a former cognition needs a subsequent cognition to discern it, then does not the subsequent cognition need another cognition to discern it? If this is not the case then it is fair to argue that the initial cognition of blueness does not require a self-awareness to validate it either. This is to reiterate Candrakīrti’s own argument, save that he adds that with this Yogācārin scheme, it would be impossible for consciousness to experience anything other than subsequent consciousness.
The provisional validity of Yogācāra doctrine. That Candrakīrti does not reject Mind-only doctrine can be seen from his words in his autocommentary (MAbh). He acknowledges that the world is comprised of karma and that karma and volitional mentation are mutually interdependent. Nevertheless, while Yogācāra doctrines hold a relative validity, they do not withstand ultimate analysis.
Without external entities, there is no stage upon which the consciousness may act. Huntington explains that among the various schools opposed to the Prāsaṅgika, some (Non-Buddhist) schools maintain that an agent is ultimately God, for others it is action viewed as principle and the Yogācārins define it as merely mind. As he translates from the autocommentary, the sūtras never deny the existence of external form. He employs as an example, the idea of two
kings vying for power in a single realm. These kings symbolize the agent. No matter which king should come to rule the realm, all would depend upon the people of the realm in their role as would-be king. The people symbolize external entities. Apart from these, any agent has no sphere of activity and no role to play, no stage upon which to act. Therefore, there is no doubt that form exists - though its existence is seen only from the perspective of concealing truth. .
Concomitancy cohering mind and form. By ordinary individuals, the five psychophysical aggregates conventionally exist, but by the Āryan meditator in deep awareness, they do not. A concomitancy coheres form and mind. If one does not exist, how then could the other? He asserts that in the Abhidharma corpus, both are affirmed. The idea that in stainless gnosis only a mental substance exists anniḥilates the whole conception of the two truths, in his view.
Consciousness as real, actual ultimately existent fact is refuted. Candrakīrti states that this mind as an actual, real, substantially existent entity has been refuted through a number of reasons. The two truths reveal that, though conventionally, entities exist, ultimately they do not. Mind-only doctrine is intended for those who are strongly attached to entities, thus serving as an upāya, are meant to be further elucidated (neyārtha) in order to demonstrate a deeper, more ultimate standpoint.
As the object of knowledge falls, so falls the knower. Buddhas have demonstrated that once the object of knowledge (jñeya, shes bya) has been rejected, the knower falls along with it, and this refutation of the knower is the reason for refuting the object of knowledge. Maintaining basic Mādhyamika doctrine, discourse on emptiness itself should be taken as definitive (nitārtha), while doctrines elucidating the existence of reality being mere consciousness should be more critically reflected upon and are subject to further elucidation (neyārtha).
Chapter Five: Refutation of the Extreme of (Śrāvakayāna ) Positivism
It is on this issue of positivism that the two Mahāyāna Schools will more or less agree, even employ more or less similar arguments to establish the ultimately non-entical nature of reality. The subject of this chapter are certain key doctrines of the Śrāvakayāna Schools lCang skya focuses on one school in particular, the Sautrāntika for the refutation of Buddhist “positivism.”
As discussed in the Preface, we are mindful that when the term positivism is used, it has a full range and context of meaning in the West. One thinks of the works of John Stuart Mill, or of the logical positivism of Bertrand Russell. Relative to arguably the majority of occidental philosophies, all three schools of Buddhism are nihilistic, rejecting as they do, the self, “essences” and the like.
In fact, it would be a concern of all three to vigorously avoid being charged with advocating a “self” notion of any sort, notably the selfhood of the person, avoiding the dread puḍgalavāda error which asserted the existence of the individual and became the bane of Buddhist writers. Nevertheless, relative to the Mahāyāna Schools, these schools appear to reify phenomena, as we shall see.
We employ the term “Positivism” as a convenience for Western readers who will be familiar with this term though perhaps not with this alleged Buddhist form of it. Our term samaropa and its Tibetan translation sgro ‘dogs refer to “superimposition,” “exaggeration,” “imputation,” “entical conceptualization” and the like. Therefore one “posits” the existence of entities. As long as the fact that this is a positivism as seen “intra-Buddhism,” we see no problem with the use of this term.
The Sautrāntika and their doctrines.
The name “Sautrāntika.” According to Hsuan tsang, adherents of the Sautrāntika School venerated Ānanda as their master. According to certain Tibetan authorities, they were also known as the Uttarīya, because they were superior with regard to the Dharma, however, Bhavya states that they were so named after a dissident Sarvāstivāda scholar named Uttarīya.
The place of the Sautrāntika among the early sects of Buddhism. The Sautrāntika in nearly all sources are the same as the school known as the Saṃkrantivādin, for this school held that the five aggregates transmigrated (Saṃkrānti) from one existence to another. Only the Śāriputraparipṛcchasūtra distinguishes the two.
La Vallee Poussin demonstrated that the Darśtantika denounced as heretics in the Vibhāśa were probably this same school. Vasumitra states that their doctrine approached that of the Sarvāstivāda. He notes that they rejected the doctrine of the individual (puḍgalavāda).
Summary of the Sautrāntika position. To condense in summary form a great doctrinal system such as that promulgated by the Sautrāntika School is a formidable task. Some of their doctrines were roughly as follows. This school affirmed that the uncomposite (asaṃskṛta) does not really exist as distinct entity, but as pure absence. For example, space is the absence of the tangible. Nirvāṇa is the absence of a tendency towards existence; past and future entities do not really exist, for if they were to really exist, then composite entities (Saṃskrta) would exist always and would be hence, eternal, which is not the case. The uncognized (avijñāpti) also does not
Summary of the Sautrāntika position. To condense in summary form a great doctrinal system such as that promulgated by the Sautrāntika School is a formidable task. Some of their doctrines were roughly as follows. This school affirmed that the uncomposite (aSaṃskrta) does not really exist as distinct
entity, but as pure absence. For example, space is the absence of the tangible. Nirvāṇa is the absence of a tendency towards existence; past and future entities do not really exist, for if they were to really exist, then composite entities (Saṃskṛta) would exist always and would be hence, eternal, which is not the case. The uncognized (avijñāpti) also does not truly exist according to the doctrines of this school. Prāpti also does not really exist, for they are perceived neither directly nor by their effect, and hence, an important doctrine of the Sarvāstivāda School was refuted by them.
Continuity and transformation. A series is the Saṃskara of the past, of the present and the future in relation to causality and which constitutes an uninterrupted continuity. Parināma is the transformation of such a continuity which is the continual “becoming otherness” (anyathātva) of the aggregate individual. Causes do not co-exist with their effect. This school holds that the non-composite is not causational, for causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya) are taught as impermanent and are by consequence, composite.
Mind and Body. Bodily actions also do not ultimately exist for this school, for these so-called corporeal functions are aspects of volition which place the body in action and thence one calls them bodily actions. Thought and the body and its organs are mutually seminal (semences=bijas). If a person is born in the Arupyadhātu, their form or material aspect is dormant. If however posterior to that, s/he is born into the Desire Realm, for example, the new form proceeds from the mind of the individual.
In particular, lCang skya focuses on this school’s assertion of the “real” or “factual” existence of external entities postulated by this school. For our purposes here however, we will set out elements of this school’s philosophical stance which proves most problematic for the Mahāyānist. This is the doctrine concerning dharmas or for this school, fundamental time/space units the agglomeration of which comprise all perceived phenomena.
Ātmostic phenomena ultimately and actually exist. This school holds that these atomistic units are really existent and that the images we form based on the agglomeration of these units are also true and “uncorrupt” to the extent that they are based on unimpaired perception of aggregate
If a configuration or were a thing in itself, it would be perceived by two organs, meaning that one visual consciousness would perceive the unit and another would perceive the subunits. A configuration is a part of form, which is defined as a particular object of the eye consciousness. Since one sees numerous configurations in a complex configuration, then it would have many forms (rūpa) in the same place, which is impossible. There are then properly speaking, no atoms perceived in a configuration.
An atom is considered to be extended and it comports to spatial division. Atoms touch each other by reason of their extension. (Digdeśābheda-pratighāta). The condition regarding the quality of an object (alambanapratyaya) is the atoms (paramānu) which are agglomerated (Saṃghātita). When visual consciousness is aware of color, it does not perceive atoms but only their agglomeration, since it ascertains the aspect of this agglomeration (tadākaratvāt), and hence one sees a mass of blue rather than atoms of blue. A discussion of these matters can be found below under the subheading, “the self-isolate and the referent category.”
Rejection of atomism by both Mahāyāna Schools. Both Mahāyāna Schools find this highly problematic. For the Mādhyamika scholar, entities are true as perceived - conventionally. They are not true as perceived ultimately. In the case of the Yogācārin, perceived entities are sheer mentation. Vasubandhu’s anti-atomism. While the groundwork for a critique of this type of dharma theory was set out by Nāgārjuna in the MMK, Vasubandhu sets forth a
notable explicit refutation of Śrāvakayāna “atomism” by observing that given that atoms are conceived to have six sides through which to connect to neighboring atoms, then they are not by this fact, ultimately indivisible, for the regions of the atomic dharma or phenomenon are themselves clearly smaller divisions. The problem of the fundamental constituents of our reality for the Cittamātrin is concerned with the Mind, for it is that which discriminates, bifurcates and categorizes reality into entical and discrete particularities. Conceptualized and innate positivism.
[254:5-255:1] “For the first [topic, the identification], generally, both positivism and nihilism are [here] the objects of logical refutation. With regard to positivism, there are two [major aspects]: [1] the conceptualized and [2] the innate. [And again,] for the innate [aspect] are the two [features] of grasping at the self of [1] the individual and [2] of phenomena. With regard to the latter, [again] are the two aspects of apprehending subject and object as substantially different which will be examined later.”
Now we arrive at lCang skya’s discussion of the manner in which Cittamātrins reject “positivism,” for lack of a better word. The Tibetan term sgro ‘dogs refers to what we are translating as “entical conceptualization,” the idea that what is perceived is real as given. The innate aspect. There are two aspects of this stance, deemed a form of extremism, from the Cittamātrin standpoint: an innate and a conceptualized aspect. The first is “built-in,” and applies to all sentient beings in some form or other. For example, a lion, to hunt prey, has an innate awareness of the “real” or “actual” existence of its prey.
The conceptualized aspect. The conceptualized aspect of positivism refers to positivism involving conceptual thought. This would include something as simple as the thought, “the chair really, essentially exists” on up to the very abstruse philosophical systems which aim to prove the objective, essential reality of entities understood to be “external, different, substantial” entities.
The conceptualized aspect is more easily eradicated. Of the two categories, the conceptualized aspect is considered by far the easier of the two to eliminate. Buddhist traditions affirm that the innate reifying tendency of beings is only eliminated at the Arhat level, according to some schools, or at the highest bodhisattva levels in Mahāyāna Schools.
The innate aspect of positivism is not relinquished until the tenth bodhisattva level whereat the subtle-most self-view or egotistic stance is eradicated. More accessible is a grasp of lCang skya’s analysis of the conceptualized aspect of the mind’s tendency to reify objects with regard to the naive “ordinary individual” and the more subtle form of positivism found in the two Śrāvakayāna [a.k.a. “Hīnayāna”] Schools, the Sautrāntika and Vaibhaṣika. Positivism as the enticalization of phenomena.
[255:1-255:4] “The manner in which one cleaves to the selfhood of phenomena, which is adhering to the establishment of the conceptualized [[[nature]]] by means of its own inherent characteristics, is this. “This form is one of the aggregrate [constituents of a sentient being]” is the essence, and “this form
arises” is the imputation of a particular definition and signifier to that mere essence, and [thus, on this level] the aggregates, etc., are established. However, though, establishing the aggregates, etc., by virtue of their own inherent standpoint or by their own inherent characteristics to that essence, [lies] within the extreme of positivism.
This is an apprehension in the following manner: in this section, positivism will entail cleaving to the selfhood of phenomena. Here, according to the Legs bShad sNying po [where Tsong kha pa] engages in an abbreviated refutation which [accomplishes] the goal (don) of the extensive doctrine by way of warding off the arguments of outsiders, will be restated here.”
The essence and its attributes. There are again, two aspects to conceptualized positivism: an idea of the “essence” and the “attributes” which are imputed to that which initiates conceptualization (i.e. the “essence”). “Form” is taken as the major example, though it applies to all entical conceptualization.
“Form” is the essence or basis for the particular characteristics applied to it, and in this case, “form arises” is one of its signifiers, along with “extension” etc.. “Form” is established in this manner, but not ultimately. This is a Cittamātrin deployment of the concealing truth. However, when one asserts that “form” exists “by way of its own inherent standpoint” or “by virtue of its own inherent characteristics” - this is the extreme of positivism.
Tsong kha pa’s understanding of this topic in the MS. Following will be an elucidation of Tsong kha pa’s clarification of this extremist thinking in the section of The Heart of Thorough Elucidation (LSN), wherein he refutes the thinking of opponents thinking with regard to how the MS is to be understood. By doing this, he establishes the proper understanding of Asaṅga’s thought, in his view. First is an analysis of the Saṃgrāha itself and following this, a logical investigation of the issues.
The self-isolate and the referent category
[255:4-256:1] “Again, if a certain [opponent] should say,
‘By you, form, etc., are incorrectly asserted as the [type of] positivism which is the object of refutation in this section, [i.e., holding] the basis of an essence and particular characteristics as established by means of its own inherent characteristics. It is also incorrect to further assert the [[[existence]] of the] self-isolate for the direct object of words and of conceptualization that manner. [This is so] because it is incorrect to assert along with that the form and so forth which would be the basal isolate for that [[[form]] and so forth].
The first proof. If one establishes the direct object of words and expressions (brjod bya) by means of its own inherent characteristics, then, even the Sautrāntika therefore hold this conceptualization as positivism, because to the Sautrāntika, the assertion of form as the direct object of conceptualization is as a generic image (don spyi) which does not in reality exist. For this reason, it is very improper to assert the selflessness of phenomena by proving their emptiness through merely that [argument].
The second central proof (tsa ba’i rtags gnyis pa grub). When one desires to refute the establishment of form, etc., by its own inherent characteristics, it would be the basal category for those characteristics, therefore it would be nihilism according to this [[[Yogācāra]]] system, since it would not establish the other-dependent [[[nature]]] by means of its own inherent characteristics.’
An opponent’s mistaken notion of the self-isolate. The opponent has a mistaken notion of the self-isolate. He states that positivism is not the object of refutation in this section of the Saṃgrāha. Asaṅga is referring neither to the self-isolate nor to the basal isolate.
Even the Sautrāntika hold the generic image to be positivism. If it were referring to the self-isolate, then the generic image which arises from a composite structure such as form has already been examined and determined to be false from the “lower” schools (as Mahāyānists refer to the Śrāvakayāna Schools): “even the Sautrāntika” who are among those schools Asaṅga claims are guilty of “positivism” due to their dharma theory, hold that this mental generic image is false because it arises from atomic substructures which are actually ultimate.
The opponent’s second argument: the basal referent and the other-dependent. The second proof that positivism is not the aim of the refutation is that if Asaṅga is rejecting the idea that the basal referent as existing by way of its own inherent characteristics, then this would violate the Cittamātrin’s own assertion of the other-dependent nature existing by way of its own inherent characteristics. If this is rejected, then one would be maintaining “nihilism” as analyzed in chapter three.
Positivism as correspondence between signifier and signified.
[256:1-5] In this section, where the Venerable Omniscient [[[Tsong kha pa]]] explains the answer to that, it is not held to be a proof for the Sautrāntika, and not only that, this method of cleaving to the selfhood of phenomena which is the reverse theory (bzlog phyogs) of that, is contradicted in the doctrine of both schools of the Śrāvaka[[[yāna]]]. Further, the identification of positivism according to the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha [is as follows]:
On that [point], the naive, it should be known, are strongly attached to an essence [for a phenomenon] [an essence] which conforms exactly to the name and exactly to the expression [applied to it] according to the five reasons (rgyu lngas) [applied] to entities (dngos la) which [serve] as objects of expression.
Well, with the exception of the Venerable Lama of Myriad Doctrines [[[Tsong kha pa]]], because of great unfirmness [in understanding], awareness (gtol ma) [of the meaning of these issues] has not occurred to many. Therefore, the [[[spiritual]]] Sons of the Venerable [[[Tsong kha pa]]], Thu po mKhas grub, with the illumination of the statements (smra ba’i nyi mas), the sTong Thun [[[Chen]] mo], the beautiful eye (sKal bSang mig) for the examination (‘byed du) of a mind
to which appeared the consciousness to which appears the objective by the power of a propensity to express the doctrines of the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha, and the aspect of the appearance by the power of a propensity towards an egotistic standpoint (bdag du lta ba, ātmadṛṣṭi) and appearance to the consciousness due to a propensity towards the limbs of existence, from the three [of them].”
It has been noted that there are two dangers as recounted in the Kathāvatthuppakānam. Logical formulations were intended to avoid two extremes which he locates as the realms of the extreme sceptism to which Śūnyavāda could lead versus the possibility of absorption into Brahminist systems on the other.
Further, Singh continues, Sautrāntika School is anti-idealistic. The fact of the reality of atoms which comprise sense data is enought to distinguish this school from that of the Yogācāra, who do, of course, deny the existence of external objects. He upholds Sautrāntika basic understanding by pointing out that this school’s approach “shakes the foundations” of Yogācārin “Idealism” by its turning away from “mere mentality” in favor of objectivity.
Tsong kha pa’s response. Tsong kha pa explains that Asaṅga is not providing a proof to refute the Sautrāntika position here. He is providing the identification of positivism in the Saṃgrāha. He is simply expressing the fact that “positivism” refers to a naive belief in things existing the way they
appear and in the concomitant naivete which ascribes the same reality to words and expressions which are employed to characterize an entity.
lCang skya then proceeds to praise Tsong kha pa’s deep awareness of the issues and the lamp which illumines obscurity in even his own thought, which is the sTong Thun Chen mo, written by one of his foremost disciples, mKhas grub.
Naive versus sophisticated positivism.
[256:5-257:1] “The first [issue] is the manner of appearance of appearing by virtue of a propensity towards verbal expression. To the eye consciousness, etc., the mode of appearance and the appearance itself of form, etc., exists as real. Having discerned the clarification of the dissimilarity of that from the Sautrāntika system, [[[mKhas grub]]] engages in a precise clarification of the thought of the Venerable [[[Tsong kha pa]]].
If such is [the case], still, when researching the understanding of the great texts, from an inner method (ngang tshul) of the intellect which does not distinguish what is accepted by a child, even though along with being not even a little bit an Āryan, [they] elucidate, dispute and compose holding
themselves, (pur ‘dzin) and it appears that there barely exist (srid mtha tsam) [those] who know the exact explanation of the thought in the myriad doctrines of the [[[spiritual]]] father [and] both [his] sons, since [these] would be like slivers of diamonds (rdo rje tshig) [since they are so difficult to crack].”
mKhas grub elucidates the differences in thinking between Asanga’s description of the type of positivism which characterizes the naive and that of more astute Sautrāntika analysis. To the naive, the mode of an entities appearance to the eye consciousness exists as real because of a conceptual propensity to verbal expression.
lCang skya laments the fact that so many who (erroneously) deem themselves great scholars, have missed the point. They aim, like children, to decipher the difficult points of doctrine which are to them like shards of diamonds, impossible to crack.
Corrupt versus uncorrupt modes of appearance.
[257:1-257:4] “Now, I myself, should express to some small extent the definitive approach. The most important point (shin tu gal che ba’i gnas) for understanding the meaning of the great doctrine of the Venerable Mahātma [[[Tsong kha pa]]] is this. The Sautrāntika hold that an object appearing to the
sense consciousness is not corrupt. An appearance exists as established by means of its own characteristics as a basis for the essence and particularity of form, etc., and the Sautrāntika themselves, accept that [the perception of form, etc.] are not corrupt in that manner.
In this [[[Yogācāra]]] system, that mode of appearance itself is corrupt, and [this system] asserts that mode of appearance is established in an accordingly [corrupt manner] since it is conceptualized later. The reason for refutation in this section is positivism and cleaving to the selfhood of phenomena, and
it is only this doctrine of the omniscient mKhas grub which one needs to identify that mode of appearance in the beginning, since it is difficult for the intellect to engage [this subject] of the way in which the mode of appearance is accordingly [appearing] to the sense consciousness.”
The definitive approach according to lCang skya II. He then attempts to express what he thinks is the definitive approach, to the best of his ability. He identifies the following as one of the most important doctrinal topics of Tsong kha pa’s corpus, employing mKhas grub’s insights.
The manner in which the Sautrāntika cleave to positivism. He states that the Sautrāntika accept that the sense consciousnesses are correct in their ascertainment of the appearance of an entity and that it is the conceptualized
image which appears immediately after sense perception. The Sautrāntika system asserts the “real existence” of external entities. Objects are “out there” (as opposed to being purely mentated realities) and appear to the sense conscousnesses objectively by virtue of their being composed of the fundamental time-space atomic building blocks called “dharmas.”
This tendency to “positivism” in Sautrāntika thought is bolstered by Amar Singh’s appellation in the title of his book, The Sautrāntika Analytical Philosophy. He states that all Sautrāntika thinkers were empiricists. Direct cognition pratyakṣa - which he calls “sensation,” is the foundation of this school’s thought. His study verifies the interpretation above by noting that sensible objects are real, and that denial of sensorial awareness is the “denial of all knowledge.” The five types of objects are real by way of being conglomerations of atoms.
The Cittamātrins: even sense perception is corrupt. Proponents of “mere mentation” themselves hold that even this appearance itself is corrupt. The difficulty is the juncture between the conceptualizing mind and its conceptual object. According to the Yogācāra, even this very process of sensation is corrupt with regard to appehending the way things really are.
[257:4-258:1] “The mode of appearance of those [[[phenomena]]] is this. According to [[[mKhas grub]]], when we see something like a pot by means of mental focus, the belly of the pot is made manifest to the eye consciousness, and not only that, the belly appears as the basis of the verbalized conceptualization which declares, ‘this is a pot.’
Furthermore, the belly is not merely established by the name and signifier, but we call it a pot by virtue of its own standpoint, and this appears as the establishment as a basis for locating (‘jug pa) the signifier.
If one should inquire how [one can be] certain that appearance [occurs] in that manner, [then the response is that,] having become attached (zhen nas) to that mode of appearance to the sense consciousness, later conceptualization declares, “This is a pot.” The conceptualization, verbalization and sense consciousness are certain knowledge; therefore there is no necessity of another continuum but it is elicited bey means of its own power.”
Sautrāntika: immediacy of sense perception. When one sees even simply the belly of a pot, one’s mind immediately thinks, “This is a pot.” “No other continuum” refers to this immediacy: there is no need for another mediating consciousness or cause to inspire this thought in the mind other than this objectively, really existent pot-belly. It is not the case that appearances are simply names and signifiers imputed by the mind onto phenomena.
[258:1-258:4] “Then if that is the reasoning, when others ask, what is the essence of the object of the expression, “This is a pot”? The mode of appearance and manner of attachment (zhen tshul) [are uncorrupt] by virtue of the
reality of the essence of the object. One says, “The belly exists” and “due to the belly, there is a pot;” one would not say, “there is a pot due to nominal imputation.” According to the Legs bShad sNying po,
‘One says, “Form is the essence for that object of the expression we call ‘form,’” and one does not say, “the essence of that object of expression ‘form’ is merely some nominal imputation. Therefore, when conventionally imputing what
one calls ‘form,’ there is a basis for the conventional conceptualization of a blue form, and when one sees an appearance such as this, it appears just as established by virtue of its own inherent reality and not as established nominally or by a signifier.”
Cleaving to the establishment [of a phenomenon] as it appears, just as that blueness, for it is positivism which cleaves to the establishment by its own inherent characteristics in nominally imputing, ‘form exists for blueness’ and this statement is the meaning.
Does one strictly imagine entities? Again, to ordinary perception, things are as they appear and names attached to things seem to have an inherent connection to them. In distinction to what is (wrongly) commonly understood to be the Madhyamaka position, this view asserts that it occurs to no one to think that entities exist by imagining them into their particular existence. This seems absurd.
There must be a basis for phenomena. Unlike the Yogācāra position however, the basis is not the “dependent-upon-other” which serves as the basis for all perceived entities, for this second of the three natures is only fully realized when one has “emptied” it of conceptualization. For “positivism,” the basis for entities is their appearance just as they appear. Means of cognition (pramāṇa, tsad ma) validly establish entities.
For Singh, this Sautrāntika School is “anti-sceptical,” by which he means, among other things, anti-Madhyamaka. He interpretes Madhyamaka thought as asserting that no definite knowledge is possible and nothing is true. This type of
thinking is self-contradictory, undermining the very foundation (logic) upon which it stands. While we do not agree with his interpretation of Madhyamaka thought, the above aids the interpretation of Sautrāntika thought as related by lCang skya II.
[258:4-259:1] The reason Sautrāntika [[[scholars]]] accept this mode of appearance as correct [is this]. Since form, etc., is an external object, it is of a different nature than the awareness [of it], and it is [therefore] truly established. Therefore, when [an external object] appears to the non-erroneous
sense consciousness, it of necessity appears by virtue of its own standpoint, for that mode of appearance is the basis of nominal designation since it necessarily appears just like it exists, by way of its own standpoint. Therefore, it exists as a mode of appearance by means of focus (gtad pa) upon an external object.
Because of this, that mode of appearance is not only uncorrupted, (ma ‘khrul ba) since the conceptualization of the mode of appearance [occurs] later, likewise the attachment (zhen pa) and mode of apprehension (zhen tshul) are
unmistaken (ma ‘khrul ba), although the conceptualization of that entity (ngos yul ) which is the referent of the word vase [which is a mental] is not established by its own inherent characteristics and that this is the sole superimposition; these statements are what is asserted [by Sautrāntika scholars].”
Sautrāntika: the fundamental difference of consciousness and its object. According to the Sautrāntika School, appearances are based on the fact of external objects, which are fundamentally different in nature from the sense consciousness which first acquires raw sense date. The sense consciousness acquires data based on this factual existence of external entities, and in this sense what it perceives is as it appears, and serves as a true basis for
the nominal designations applied to them by the fixated (zhen pa) consciousness. Unmistaken and uncorrupt consciousness. There are three features of consciousness referred to here. One is that the
sense consciousness is uncorrupted, meaning what it perceives is not itself a superimposition of the consciousness onto the “external world,” as Yogācārins will maintain, and further, the mode of fixation or apprehension is unmistaken, meaning that the immediate term we apply to “vase” is also based on fact.
Sautrāntika: the generic image is not ultimately established. The only aspect of consciousness which the Sautrāntika maintain is not truly established in fact is the conceptualization at a later time when the entity is not present to initiate first the sense consciousness into perceiving the entity, and second, the apprehending
consciousness into applying a name and mental image to it. The third process refers to the generic image one employs to think abstractly about a “pot” or “form.” This is a “mixture” or “corruption” which fuses past awareness of entities into one generic image, which is a relatively false picture when compared to the image one perceives from direct sense experience.
[259:1-259:5] In this system, since an external object is not established, an external object arises as an appearance from consciousness by virtue of habituation towards external objects. On that [point], endlessly [one is aware that] “this blue exists as this blue,” and so on, again and again, and an
appearance as a basis for verbalization of such [a thing] occurs by virtue of a propensity for verbal expression. Accordingly, that appearance of form is merely of the nature of inner consciousness, but because of this, it is not an external object which is unrelated (‘brel ba med pa) [to consciousness] having been proven (gtan nas) as such. That appears as a basis of nominal designation, however therefore, it is an appearance by virtue of habituation towards inner verbal expression.
That mode of appearance is not proper as a mode of appearance which appears by virtue of its own inherent standpoint, as an independent object for establishment nominally and through a signifier. [It follows] from that, that otherwise, that sort of form, etc., being a basis for verbal designation,
even though it would not proven dependent upon consciousness, and if that is the case, that form and the consciousness would be substantially different; this is incorrect by way of refutability through many reasons.” and these statements [are those this system] accepts.
The Yogācārin position concerning external entities: propensities and habituation. Again, we have a restatement of the Yogācārin position. “External objects” according to this school, arise through the maturation of seminal mental propensities towards their perception. They appear as the basis of our thought and nominal designation of them, however, were they truly external and independent, this would lead to the conclusion that the object and the
consciousness which apprehends it are of fundamentally different natures. The place wherefrom propensities arise is the basal or ālaya consciousness. These propensities are seminal potentialities which lie latent in the basal consciousness and “mature” or “ripen” when causes and conditions permit.
[259:5-260:1] “[With regard to] those [points], according to the Legs bShad sNying po,
‘There is for the Śrāvaka [Schools], this very acceptance of the tenet of cleaving to the establishment by means of its own inherent characteristics of form, etc., on which essence and particularity are nominally superimposed and which is positivism, which is the counter-thesis (zlog phyogs) of that [position taken by Yogācāra scholars]’
And
‘That manner of apprehension is held to be correct by the two [schools] which assent to the existence of external objects, however, since they assert that the self-isolate, which is the object of verbal expression, is superimposed conceptually, (rtog btags) but then the basal isolate [or referent object is said to] emerge inherently characterized; and how are [these two isolates] the same? This is the thought [of Tsong kha pa].”
The Yogācāra position: no external entities. Basically, this passage by Tsong kha pa reiterates themes elucidated by lCang skya above. The Yogācārin position is a position opposite to that of the two schools which assert the fundamental, factual existence of external objects. This thesis is of course in particular opposed to the Yogācārin doctrine of the substantial non-differentiation of subject and object.
Agreement of all schools of Buddhism: the generic image is a false construct. There are two types of objects of expression (brjod bya): the self isolate and the basal isolate. These two schools (Yogācāra and Sautrāntika, and thus all Buddhist schools) will affirm with their Mahāyāna counterparts that the
rang ltog or “self-isolate” which is the generic term (sgra spyi) or generic image (spyi don) which is conjured up in the mind when one sees the belly of a pot and thinks, “this is a pot” or the image one has when one mentally visualizes a pot separate from any concrete, visible and specific example of a
pot, agree that this is “imputation by thought” and thus illusory. Buddhist disagreement concerning the referent object. However, the two major systems (both Mahāyāna and Śrāvakayāna schools) disagree about the basal
isolate (gzhi ltog) which is an actual pot experienceable by direct perception. This pot is actual, real, fact, according to the Śrāvaka Schools, while it too is imputation or superimposition arising from habituations as “seeds” in the sub or basal consciousness, at least according to the Yogācāra School.
[260:1-2] Therefore, the manner of assertions of both the Sautrāntika and Yogācāra Schools are dissimilar, and the [issue] rests only on whether or not form, etc., itself and the apprehending awareness are [considered] substantially different.
When one understands the issues in this way, then it is also easy to know the way to enter into [the doctrine of] consciousness-only by this method of emptiness, and then even the logical refutation of positivism according to the teachings of the Saṃgrāha and its method of refutation are easily known.”
The final distinction for positivism: the existence or non-existence of external objects. Here we have the pivotal issue by which lCang skya has the Yogācāra School class the Śrāvakayāna Schools as “positivism.” The two schools clearly are to be distinguished primarily as to whether or not the existence of external objects is asserted.
The two extremes in Buddhist thought - according to the Yogācāra - have been laid out. The Madhyamaka system is said to deny any basis whatsoever for phenomena, asserting a mere nominalism of sorts. The Sautrāntika position, which is though hardly “positivist” or “realist” in a Western sense by virtue of its assertion that the generic image is
indeed illusory superimposition, is nevertheless realist from the point of view of the other two schools. Within the Buddhist framework of thought - at least according to both Mahāyāna Schools - this system is one touting what we are translating as “entical conceptualization.”
[260:2-5] “Therefore, according to the Omniscient mKhas grub:
‘In this section, in the same appearance to a sense consciousness which originates from firm habituation, the object of such a mode of appearance [1] exists established by its own inherent characteristics as other-dependent and it [2] exists in [the nature of] superimposition from its mere establishment by name and signifier, and [3] as a strictly [intramental] conceptual imputation [as an object] which cannot be established as existent even by means of name and signifier, thus [a perceived object] is explained as existent in this third of three parts.
Among the four conditions, Asaṅga and his brother [[[Vasubandhu]]] held the habituation towards similar types (rigs mthun) to be a causal condition (rgyu rkyen, hetupratyaya) [in their] elucidation [of these issues]. This may appear to be the unsurpassable, excellently clear intention (dgongs pa) of the Mahātma [[[Tsong kha pa]]], however, there are
individuals who mainly repeat the words of the texts, who may recite the text a hundred or a thousand times, though indeed, it appears difficult to generate certainty in the full measure of the complete elucidation [as occurs] in [many] explanatory [treatises].”
Yogācāra: the three aspects for the existence of an apparently external object. This passage explains, according to mKhas grub, the three aspects for the existence of an object. This does not refer to all of the three natures, for in the final, perfected nature, one attains to objectlessness (dmigs pa med pa). As we have read above, an object
has establishment by means of its own characteristics at the level of being enmeshed-with-other. It has a bare, basic establishment as verbal expression at the level of the conceptualized nature, though at this level it is not established “by means of its own inherent characteristics” but by mere imputation or superimposition.
Finally, the third of these three parts refers to the existence of an object as strictly imaginary, purely a mental concoction with no connection to an other-dependent nature aiding the generation of this third, completely fictitious
object. Among these sorts of objects one must include the famous “rabbit’s horn” or “tortoise’s hair” - classical examples regularly employed in Buddhist philosophical works to illustrate the existence of that which does not by definition, exist.
Habituation towards similar types of object. The “habituation towards similar types” (rigs mthun) refers to the fact of similar types of objects engender verbal reference to other objects of a similar kind. One may see, in our example, only the belly of a vase. Because the belly is commonly associated with
vases, one concludes, “This is a vase” when in reality, upon further reflection, one might wish to conclude that it would be better labelled a “bowl” or a “cup.” That idea, according to the text, is allocated by Asanga and his brother Vasubandhu to the classification of the four conditions under the sub-heading “causal condition,” (hetupratyāya) because the similarity of one thing to another becomes a cause for associating the two.
[260:5-261:2] “Since the logical points of the doctrines of the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi and the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha are the same with regard to elucidating the [[[Yogācāra]]] method of refutation [of positivism], which is the second [topic], and is [thus given] as follows. According to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasamgrāha,
[1] ‘Prior to a name, intellection does not exist. [2] Because of the multiplicity [of names], therefore [an entity] is not mixed-up with [many entities] and [3] it would establish a contradiction that that [entity’s] nature is [both a] multiple nature and an adulterated nature’, as it is taught.’
Among the three logical [[[reasons]]], the first is [as follows]. A pot belly is the subject. It would follow that [the pot] completely does not depend upon the sign (rda) [which is the pot belly] which is set up (‘jog pa) as the basis of the verbal expression “pot,” because that [pot-belly] is established by virtue of its own inherent reality (gnas lugs) which exists as the basis of such a verbal expression [i.e., in connection with “pot.”]
If that is asserted, then it follows that the arising in the intellect of the thought “this is a pot” emerges independent of the sign which is that [pot-belly which serves as signifier for “pot”]. If that is accepted, it follows that there arises in the intellect the thought, ‘this is a pot’ from merely seeing the pot-belly even though prior to this there is no imputation of the word ‘pot.’”
Three principal arguments establishing the imputation of names. These are central points establishing the Mind-only perspective in the MS. lCang skya will address each issue more extensively, so we shall take them in turn in successive paragraphs.
Prior to a sign, no intellection exists. The first issue is to be understood as follows. [1] Before one ascribes a name to a perceived phenomenon, the intellectual distinguishing of it does not exist. This pot-belly is our continuing example. When one glances at a part of a pot, in this case the belly, then from this, an image emerges in one’s mind of some sign that “this is a pot.”
The logical structure of the argument here is somewhat terse and hard to follow. It may be verbally expressed explicitly or simply that the signifier of a pot may arise as part of the intellection of the pot-belly as denoting a “pot.” If the belly is demonstrated to be existent by virtue of its own inherent reality and not simply imputedly, then it should not form the basis for the expression “pot” for both should exist inherently. If the pot arises in the intellect devoid of imputation and so does the pot-belly, then to state “this is a pot” based on observing the pot-belly is impossible. Therefore, prior to the name or signifier, intellection does not exist.
[261:2-261:4] “The second reason [is as follows]. Furthermore, there is no approach to the epithets, “powerful,” “widely traversing” to the same individual. Locating (‘jug pa) those epithets by virtue of the standpoint [that
they are] functional entities for that [same] individual would result [as a consequence] through establishing this by means of its own inherent standpoint as a basis for locating those names to that individual. If that is asserted, then to that [same] individual, it would follow that there would be many standpoints gnas pa even to [one] object which would not correspond to (ma bzhin du) [each] name.”
Many names equate to many entities. The idea here is that if names correspond to objects on a one-to-one basis, then for each of these epithets of Brahma there should be either a different Brahma for each activity for which the epithet was received, or a different aspect of Brahma within Brahma, so to speak, which corresponds to each epithet.
The incoherence of sphoṭa theory. This idea lies in opposition to a view of language and words prevalent among Vedic Schools of philosophy, the sphoṭa theory. This idea asserted that words emerge spontaneously due to the inherent nature of the objective referent. This is in contrast to the idea, in particular elucidated by Dharmakīrti of apoha whereby words merely “cleave away” what an entity is not rather than inherently emerging from the entity’s essence. In this case, to say that Brahma is “widely striding” is to say that he is not widely swimming nor weakly striding.
[261:4-6] “The third reason [is as follows]. When one applies an identical name [shared] in common, say, to two individuals, there is an [unwanted] consequence of locating those by virtue of the enticality (or actuality) of that name to those two [[[Wikipedia:individuals|individuals]]], which is the result of establishment by virtue of its own inherent standpoint as the basis for applying that same name to those two individuals. If that is asserted, it would follow that one
object is applied to whatever that same name to those two. If that is accepted, it would follow that those two individuals would be mixed up into one [[[mental]]] continuum. Since this reasoning is even proven by the implicit
[proofs known as prasaṅgas or consequential logic] by all three arguments, then as a result of those errors, it is not established by its own inherent characteristics as a basis for the location of the verbal expressions referring to entities.”
Point three: a single name applied to several entities. If one ascribes enticality and one-to-one correspondence between name and entity, then it would follow that two persons with one name, in this case, then if they are inherently or intrinsically their “essence” (in this case defined as their mental continuum) should be identical.
Syllogism and consequential reasoning. The type of argumentation employed here is rang rgyud or svatantra - arguments which stand alone to demonstrate logical proofs. This is a type of syllogism which has these three parts:
1) the subject, the 2) mark and 3) predicate.
lCang skya’s point is that these three proofs are easily accomplished by the Prāsaṅgika approach. No one will deny the absurd results arising from this type of theory of language when put into the context of this framework. In consequential or Prāsaṅgika logical discourse, one need not revers the mark to the predicate and predicate to mark, for implicitly, by stating the mark, one establishes the predicate.
[261:6-262:1] “According to the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi ,
‘When the posterior conceptualization of the term for pot [arises] from the existence of the pot-belly which is prior, then when that name is not [understood as] imputed, then the intrinsic essence of that object would not exist. However, when not imputed, even in the posterior conceptualization for the existence of the essence, there would arise in the intellect the thought ‘this is a pot’ even prior to the [supposedly] unimputed name.’
And thus this [view] is refuted.”
Madhyamaka response
Opposition to the conception of a “basal” consciousness: the Bodhicittavivāraṇa. The notion of this basal consciousness was vigorously rejected by notables of the Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka. If we accept it as authentically Nāgārjunan, the Bodhicittavivāraṇa presents the most direct and polemical attack on this notion. Agreement among the Madhyamaka Masters: the basal consciousness is illusory. Opposition continues through the writing of Candrakīrti and Tsong kha pa. Tsong kha pa cites Bhāvaviveka’s opposition to this sort of fundamental consciousness.
Candrakīrti: logically, ultimately there is no such thing as potentiality. Candrakīrti (MA) sets out the Yogācārin position which he contends postulates the consciousness of blue arising from the potentiality to perceive blue, which has as its source, its own cognition. Candrakīrti relates the Yogācāra position as maintaining that the perception of blue arises from the seed of this potentiality to perceive blue apart from any externally apprehended “real” or “actual” blue.
The blind would see blue. Again, in his Prāsaṅgika formulation of this theory, “blue” arises not from an external object. As part of his Prāsaṅgika response, he notes that if blue appears from the seed of an inner consciousness, then why does not a blind man also perceive the existence of blueness?
Candrakīrti (MA) rejects this whole notion of the ripening of propensities towards certain habitual actions. Concomitant to the Yogācārin thesis of the arising of, in our text, a consciousness of blue being dependent upon its emergence from the basal consciousness is strictly dependent upon a notion of
potentiality. Potentiality is an erroneous notion, ultimately. He states that objects which have already been produced cannot possess potentiality for existence, neither could the opposite possibility, that unproduced entities could have a potential for existence. A basis of a qualification cannot exist separated from that which qualifies it and by which it is known. If that were so, one might presume, as he puts it, that there might be potential for the son of a barren woman.
The inefficaciousness of Yogācārin meditation: the basal consciousness as “hindrance.” As Candrakīrti states, Yogācārins do negate a substantially existent self, but assert that the basal consciousness exists by means of its own inherent characteristics. Their meditations on the lack of a substantially existent self or “soul” are not efficacious however because they have not eradicated the notion of a basal consciousness which is the repository of habitual propensities towards the perception of form, etc., as presented by lCang skya.
Tsong kha pa: the difficulties of no doctrine concerning a basal consciousness. Tsong kha pa admits that inborn propensities are difficult to interpret in the absence of a doctrine concerning a repository of consciousness. Tsong kha pa (TKP) adds that when blue arises in a dream of one who is possessed
of good vision, then it should arise in the consciousness of a blind man who is awake. Along with Candrakīrti, he understands the Yogācārin position to maintain that the blind man’s inability to perceive blue arises not from his lack of an eye, but rather from the latent but unmanifest potentiality for the arising of this perception.
Tsong kha pa quotes Candrakīrti with regard to the lack of necessity of a basal consciousness. For the Prāsaṅgika, ultimately, nothing ceases. An entity or event which has ceased, has only apparently or conventionally ceased. Since this is so, it can still be efficacious, its subtle influences are still felt.
The “interpretable” nature of the doctrine of the basal consciousness. For Candrakīrti as for Tsong kha pa, a basal consciousness is an “interpretable” rather than definitive doctrine. Tsong kha pa quotes from Candrakīrti’s autocommentary (the MAV) to establish this. The basal consciousness is a provisional doctrine the intention of which is to initiate the elimination of the notion of a naive reality of external objects as this idea might exist for certain would-be disciples of the Mahāyāna who cling ardently to the existence of such.
The evidence for this is cited by Tsong kha pa (LSN) in that most central of texts which establish the Yogācārin standpoint: the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. Therein one finds the explanation the Buddha gives to Mahāmati that the “inner meaning” of all his doctrines point to emptiness, including that central tenet of the Prāsaṅgika School, niḥsvabhāvavāda, or the “doctrine of non-self-entity.”
Both Mahāyāna Schools are in agreement about the concrete, real, actual, etc., existence of atomistic dharmas understood in the “positivistic” or reifying manner lCang skya described above. The disagreement about the precise nature of external objects hinges on the root source of all aspects of the “great debate” between the two schools: the nature of consciousness.
Chapter Six: Preliminary Conclusions: The Middle Way Between the Extremes
“A great Yogin without learning is like one with mutilated hands climbing a craggy cliff. Thus, it is said that one who wishes to be a great yogin without any study is like a man with his fingers cut off trying to climb to the peak of a high mountain.
A scholar who does not practice meditation but only engages in the study of the texts, is like a man without legs, who sees the path laid out, but cannot traverse it.”
There is a level at which the disputes between the two schools can to some extent be summed up generally by the above passage. The ‘two extremes’ of Mahāyāna Buddhism can from one perspective be seen as an overemphasis on praxis to the detriment of theory or vice-versa. To the extent that these disputes involve a dispute over the primacy of theory versus praxis, the two schools can be viewed as representing a polar tension which exists, arguably, in all religions. We will touch upon this issue below. A major aim of our conclusion is to tentatively answer the question: are the two schools essentially identical or essentially different? Or both? Or neither?
I think it is clear that at this point the fact of the distinctiveness of the two schools has been effectively demonstrated in spite of the fact that much more could have been stated.
In passages following, we will set out the Mind-only School position as lCang skya demonstrates it and conclude with a discussion of various authoritative presentations by modern thinkers about the nature of the relationship of the two schools. Some views affirm the harmonious aspect of their relationship, while others emphasize the distinctive qualities.
The last three chapters demonstrated primarily negative proofs for the Yogācāra position. Rejection of nihilism and positivism leave one with the Middle Path as construed by the Mind-only School. What remains to be considered is a positive demonstration of the definitive truth of the Yogācārin system. This lCang skya does through discussion of the four “complete investigations” and the four “complete knowledges.” Through this four-fold analysis and conclusion, respectively, a disciple is led to firm, positively established fact of the truth of Yogācārin doctrine.
[262:1-263:1] “By means of the the third, is the actual manner of entry into the reality of the Consciousness-only School and is the explanation in particular of the reasoning (rigs pa) which refutes the substantial difference of subject and object (gzung ‘dzin).
[With regard to] the first [of the four investigations - the complete investigation of the object (don yong su tshol ba)], furthermore, entry into the Consciousness-only [School] is emptiness throughout of a substantial difference of subject and object by way of this manner of emptiness which was just immediately fully explained as elucidated as according to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha and the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi and it is taught also by the Venerable Father [[[Tsong kha pa]]] and his [[[spiritual]]] sons [rGyal tsab and mKhas grub].
Having relied upon them, continuing on, a certain [opponent] among some scholars explains that there is the selflessness of phenomena which is the emptiness of establishment by means of its own inherent characteristics as the basis of attachment which conceptualizes the cleaving to the self of form, and the selflessness of phenomena which is empty of the substantial difference of cleaving to the selfhood of form; the former is more coarse than the latter which is more subtle.
[According to another] certain [opponent],
‘Since both those [types of] selflessness are subtle, the category of coarse and subtle do not exist, however, the category of the difficulty or ease of realization does exist,’he explains.
On that [point], even both [types of selflessness] are the unchanging perfected [[[nature]]] and are the subtle selflessness of phenomena; this appears to be the intention of the [great scholars of the] Mahāyāna and the Venerable [[[Tsong kha pa]]]. It appears that the category of the difficulty or ease of inner realization (nang gsas kyi rtogs) does exist.
According to the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha,
‘When one does not see as characteristics of an object an essence along with particularity, one enters into mere consciousness in realizing (rnam par rtog pa) the mental appearance of the object and its referents (yi ge) by means of the the four complete investigations and the four complete knowledges which [apprehend] purity, [[[reality]]] just as it is.’
Having examined that prior category definitively and logically, therefore the doctrine applies to the latter [category, i.e., the difficulty or ease of realization].”
Here, as stated above, is the positive approach to entry into the Mind-only system as presented by lCang skya. The first of the four investigations examines the emptiness of the substantial difference of subject and object, and these are presented in the MS and the BB as well as in the myriad texts of Tsong kha pa, rGyal tsab and mKhas grub.
The first “opponent” suggests that the two types of the selflessness of phenomena - one conceptualized and the other, innate, i.e., the awareness of even the sense consciousnesses that there is no fundamental existence of subject and object - that the former of these two is a more coarse type of selflessness of phenomena and the latter, the innate, is a more subtle type of selflessness of phenomena. This idea is to be rejected.
The next opponent states that both types of selflessness the unchanging, perfected nature, or pariniṣpannasvabhāva also also referred to in its perceived form as the perfected characteristic pariniṣpannalakṣana - are extremely
subtle. This is the thought of the Venerable Tsong kha pa. lCang skya agrees that rather than the coarseness or subtlety of the selflessness, it is the relative difficulty or ease of inner realization of the two types of selflessness which is at issue.
When one has sought the end result of the four investigations, one enters into “consciousness-only” in viewing both words and objects as merely mentation. At this point, one attains to reality “just as it is” which is ultimately pure. The innate aspect of realizing the selflessness of phenomena is the more difficult, and is attained to at only the highest among the bodhisattva levels.
[263:1-263:4] “The way of entry into the cognition-only [system], is this. When refuting establishment by it own inherent characteristics, that basis for conceptualized attachment and the standpoint of nominal verbalization for the phenomena from form on up to omniscience [with regard to all] aspects, through the earlier explanation of the three reasonings in that manner, having relied upon the name which initiates [[[verbal]]] expression, the object which
is the object of expression, and the connection (‘brel pa) of the name and object, and having identified (ngos nas) its manner of existence (gnas tshul) and that object as the particularity and essence of the object of expression, having appeared established in this way, the conceptualization of the mind of attachment is confusion in the manner of [its] apprehension in that manner.
Therefore, the object of attachment (zhen ba’i don) does not exist just as it appears. Blue, etc., since it is fully understood out of confusion, [i.e.] that form, etc., exist as cut-off and at a distance (gyang chad du) and
externally. For the manner of attachment of inner awareness, since it is conceptualized in that manner, it is only on the part of appearance (snang cha) which is internal, but, from that, an object as [“]other[“] does not exist; this is entry into cognition-only, which is the non-duality of subject and object in thought.”
Here begins this positive establishment of the doctrine of Mind-only, Consciousness-only or Cognition-only, all of which are here referred to virtually synonymously as a convenience, by the term Yogācāra. Having rejected possible ways in which objects might exist (“by virtue of their own standpont” or “by means of their own inherent
characteristics,” etc.), all of this is pulled together by means of the four thorough investigations, which would not be established logically apart from the prior refutation of positivist or nihilist approaches.
These four categories are the subject of the investigations: the name, its object and dependent upon these two, the “essence” and particularity imputed to these. The way these are normally conceptualized is “confusion” meaning that mental attachment to objects seen as having names inherently tied to them, and both name and object together maintaining inherently existent essential and particular qualities.
Seeing these four elements of phenomena as “cut-off” from oneself, and “at a distance” is an internal mental confusion, for things only appear in this manner, for objects as “other” than or different from one’s own mind are falsely construed. Each of these four elements are recapitulated by means of the quotes from the MS and BB below.
[263:4--263:6] “On that point, the investigation of a name as it is explained according to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha,
‘...as entry by means of the four knowledges and the four investigations. A name is not imputed by virtue of its own real standpoint (gnas lugs) for its object, is imputation only. Therefore, a name as an object of expression is adventitious (glo bur), as one investigates.’
According to the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi ,
‘Any bodhisattva regards a name as [just] merely a name’
and according to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha,
One conceptualizes properly as mental conceptualization, for that is all there is for that name which is [comprised] of syllables.
The investigation of names. Here then is the first of the four investigations, the investigation of names. That a name is “adventitious” means that it is temporary and somewhat capriciously applied to an object. Names are simply “slapped on” through mere imputation or superimposition, not because of some inherent quality of the object that elicits a particular name over another.
The BB concurs: bodhisattvas see names as merely names and nothing else, i.e., they regard names as strictly illusory, with no further claim to reality except in their function as an aspect of the conceptualized nature.
The MS phrases this differently but maintains the same point. A name is stricly mentally conceptualized and has no reality apart from consciousness. Names are “mental composites” one might say, made up as they are of further “mentally constituted” syllables and letters.
[263:6-264:2] “The complete investigation of the object [is as follows]. This is investigating whether or not that object is established from its real standpoint or beginninglessly as a basis of application (‘jug gzhir) for that name. Furthermore, just as was [explained] earlier [with regard to a name], it is in an adventitious way a basis of application for that.
According to the Bodhisattvabhūmi ,
‘Likewise, regarding as merely entity (dngos po), is the complete investigation of entity.’
According to the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha,
‘One regards properly as strictly mental expression (yid kyi brjod pa) moreover, that object which relies on [mere] syllables.’”
The investigation of the object. Basically the points to be made about the status of the object to which names are applied are the same as those to be made concerning the name itself. “Objects” are not established inherently “from their own side” or “objectively” (so to speak), but again, are adventitious - “temporary,” more or less randomly distinguished, as in the distinction made in arguments above concerning the pot-belly in relation to a pot.
An “object” (don) is that upon which one superimposes a name, rather than a permanent, “functional,” entity (dngos po), “beginninglessly” a basis for the application of the appropriate names. It is strictly a mentally expressed
reality, which relies upon composite elements as do names. When one refers to objects, one may distinguish the syllables with which one refers to the object as “pot” or “pot-belly,” for the name and object are linked, though conceptually they may be distinguished.
[264:2-264:4] “The investigation of the conceptualization as essence [is as follows]. Having relied upon the mutual connection of the object which is the object of expression and the name which effects expression, [this is] investigating whether or not there is a standpoint by virtue of reality with regard to even the connection or
juncture of [both] the object of an expression and that which effects the expression. When, having investigated [the issue] accordingly, one conceptualizes [this] as mere imputation, as not established by virtue of reality (gnas tshod) as the essence of what is to be expressed for that name.
According to the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi ,
‘Regarding as mere imputation as an essence for the imputation of an essence, is the complete investigation of the imputation of essence.’”
The investigation of particularity
[264:4-6] “Investigating the conceptualization of particularity [is as follows]. Having relied upon the mutual connection of that which effects expression and the object of expression, [this is] investigating whether or not it is established by virtue of its own real standpoint (gnas tshod) as a basis of conceptualization of the inherent particularity for that object. One regards as merely imputation, unestablished by its own inherent standpoint even that, by investigating it that way.
According to the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]bhūmi ,
‘Regarding as mere imputation the distinctiveness (bye brag tu) which is the imputation of particularity, is the investigation of the mere imputation of distinctiveness.’
According to the [[[Mahā]]]yānasaṃgrāha,
‘One realizes [these issues] properly as indeed, it is merely imputation without exception this name, this particularity, and this essence.’
The last two are demonstrated together.”
Finally, comes the investigation of the particular or “distinctive qualities” of an “entity” or a phenomenon essentially conceived. “That which effects expression” is a name and the “object of expression” is the entity conceptualized mentally. Dependent upon a conceptualized or mental connection of name and object, essence and here, particularity arise. This too is “unestablished by its own inherent standpoint.”
This distinctiveness (bye brag tu as the BB states it) or particularity (khyad par du in the words of the MS) is, like the above four topics, existent as mere imputation only. Finally, lCang skya notes that these two are to be analyzed and included together, for both are dependent upon the prior connection
between the name and its object. After one has nominally designated the name “circle” to, for example, a perception of the moon, one may assert “roundness” as the essence of that circle and “this circle arises” as a characteristic, attribute or particular feature of that circle. Prior to this connection of name and object, to assert the essential or particular is not possible.
[264:6-265:2] “Accordingly, by the four investigations, a name and object are the basis of expression and having relied upon the connection of name and object, there is investigation of the imputation of distinctiveness and the imputing of essence, and having relied upon thorough, logical investigation accordingly, the four knowledges [arise], when one disestablishes [the above as existent] by virtue of their own inherent standpoint those four [aspects investigated], the complete knowledges [regard them] as mere imputation.
With regard to the the manner of [acquiring] this knowledge, [first,] it is through a generic image at the time of the [[[paths]] of] Accumulation and Preparation, and as both direct knowledge [and as generic image] exist at the time of the Āryan [on the path of Vision].
The Four Investigations establish the Mind-only position negatively. It is clear then that the Four Investigations aim to demonstrate positively the lack of inherent existence of the name, object, essence and particularity of any phenomenon, to demonstrate that all phenomena and all aspects of phenomena are mentalized imputation, mere conceptualized “realities.”
At the point a sentient being enters the first of the five paths, the “Path of Accumulation” (sambhāramārga, tshogs lam), these ideas are merely “generic images,” i.e., one may have acquired an intellectual awareness of the arguments stated above. Still, the idea that names, objects, essences and
particularities are strictly imputed remains a “generic image” for that person. When a being has progressed to the third of the five paths, the “Path of Seeing,” (darśanamārga, mthong lam) attaining the status of an “Āryan” in Mahāyānist terminology, then beyond a mere generic image, it is said that a bodhisattva attains to a “direct perception” of the fact of these aspects of a phenomenon’s existence as “mere imputation” and can see the name, object, essence and particularity for what they are, i.e., mere mentated, conceptualized phenomena.
[265:2-265:5] Furthermore, according to the Bodhi[[[sattva]]]-bhūmi ,
‘If one asks, “What are the four complete knowledges as purity, [i.e. reality] ‘just- as- it-is’ (ji lta ba bzhin du), “it is ‘The complete knowledge exactly and properly would be or the investigation of the name,’ etc.”, and the remaining three [[[elements]], object, essence and particularity] are conjoined together (sbyar ba) also in the same way.’
According to the Mahāyānasaṃgrāha
‘Therefore, since it is stated that it is as well regarding as strictly (zad pa nyid) mere mentalized expression, this complete knowledge of the investigation of the name, and through stating also that the imputation as a particular and essential object along with the name, is the complete knowledge of the investigation of the object, and when one does not see the [[[objective]]] characteristic of the object along with the essence and particularity, then both the complete knowledge of the imputation of essence and the complete knowledge of the imputation of particularity are shown.’
What is ascertained with regard to “name” is the same for the other three complete knowledges. While there are four aspects with regard to perceived phenomena, i.e., “name,” “object,” “essence” and “particularity,” at a fundamental level, these are all mentated, conceptualized phenomena according to the Yogācāra School.
In demonstrating the imputation of “name,” the other four follow. That which is known as an “object” is known as such via the mental imputation of a mental signifier or “name.” The object and name together give rise to the imputation of two categories which characterize what is known as an object, i.e., its essence and particular characteristics. These also, are demonstrated as mere mental fictions following upon the demonstration of name and object as “entities” comprised of cognition, consciousness, or in short, as “mind-only.”
[265:5-] “If that is the case, the Four Investigations, even though one does not abide on the path, the Four Knowledges exist, having obtained a bit of certainty with regard to the selflessness of phenomena, it is necessarily applied, however (‘jog dgos kyi), the assertion that the Four Knowledges are not existent at the level of the ordinary individual is incorrect, because of the doctrine that the Four Knowledges exist in superior insight (lhag mthong, vipawyāna) meditation (bsgom pa) which is the realization of emptiness. Therefore from this, this doctrine is an entry into the cognition-only by way of the four knowledges.”
The terminology “the Four Complete Knowledges” are meant in no way to indicate that one must be a realized master to acquire them. These terms do not refer to full awakening or any of the omnisciences. Certainly it does not imply the eradication of the innate aspect of positivism which afflicts the sense consciousnesses which refers to the inborn “ego-view” (ātma-dṛṣṭi) afflicting all sentient existences. Rather, the four complete knowledges are accessible to one beginning on the path.
Is this the Yogācāra system? With this, the positive demonstration of the Yogācāra stance is concluded. One begins on a negative path and ends with positive affirmation. The question has arisen whether this presentation of the school is really the standpoint of the school.
Here with lCang skya’s presentation of the tenets of the Mind-only tradition, we conclude he avoided presenting the tradition as a simple “Idealism.” This Western term connotes “essentially existent mental essences” and ur-ideen. DesCartes’ well-known cogito with a basis in these notions. One of the entries in Webster’s dictionary would appear at first glance to apply: “a theory that the essential nature of reality lies in consciousness or reason” does not apply to a tradition that roots the conceptualization of the ego in “interwovenness-with-other,” or paratantra. Consciousness itself, though principally forming the world we perceive, is not the ultimate basis of reality in Yogācāra tradition.
Where among the Western Idealisms does the notion of the “other-dependent,” a doctrine of a basal consciousness and its propensities, etc., among many other doctrines, arise in the occident? Where are the doctrines of rebirth and karma, and where to we find as a goal, the “snuffing” or nirvāṇa of the
cogito. Analogues may exist, however the subtle and gross distinctions should be kept in mind. In our opinion, one should eschew simple comparisons of philosophical systems separated by such vast geographical and mythic worlds as Christian Idealist traditions and Buddhist mentalist traditions. In spite of the overemphasis (from the Madhyamaka standpoint) of the Yogācāra School on consciousness, the two share a common pedigree. One should never lose sight of the fact that these two traditions share membership in the same family of traditions, the Mahāyāna traditions.
Scholars inclined to a Yogācārin stance. There are those who see the Madhyamaka School useful for establishing certain negative critique, but criticize this school for what is seen as its strict “negativism.” It hardly engenders a positive regard for the Path. Some scholars are more willing to emphasize the similarities between the two schools, while basically subordinating the Madhyamaka into the Yogācāra system.
Nagao. Nagao Gadjin is one of the better known examples. As J. W. de Jong states, Nagao is one of the foremost interpreters of Yogācāra philosophy in the modern period, and “has always attempted to see the connections between the philosophies of both schools.” He asserts that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu “complemented the śūnyatā philosophy with various positive theories...” [my emphasis].
The Yogācāra maintains a positive approach. This school is said to be “positive” because
“by accepting the negative idea of śūnyatā as a whole, the Yogācāra established the positive affirmative aspect of śūnyatā (abhāvasya bhavaḥ).
Here, Nagao hints at the Yogācāra theme of the Madhyamaka preaching a relative “negativism” if not outright “nihilism,” just as lCang skya phrased the issues above in the third chapter of this study.
Nagao cites Vasubandhu’s Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (Treatise on the Three Natures) which affirms that the other-dependent is that which appears, while how it appears is the conceptualized (kalpita). Finally, the point at which that which appears (khyātṛ) is devoid of appearance (yat khyānam) is the perfected (pariniṣpannasvabhāva). This certainly does not negate anything lCang skya’s Yogācārin affirmed, as far as we are able to ascertain. The appearer is devoid of appearance finally, but not devoid of entity.
The other dependent is a foundation and mediator. The other-dependent is the “basis” or āśraya for the other two natures. Nagao defines the other-dependent as an “axis” or “mediator” around which “the world turns.” It serves as a support (āśraya), ground or basis for all that is conceptualized, all appearance in Saṃsāra and yet through which the perfected nature also becomes manifest.
The other-dependent, according to Nagao, becomes the basis for cryptic statements found particularly in Mahāyāna literature such as “Saṃsāra is no different from nirvāṇa.” In any ordinary, conceptual sense, this statement is incoherent, however, from the standpoint of the other-dependent, the pivot of the transformation from profane to sacred, these enigmatic aphorisms make sense.
This notion of it being a basis leads to the idea of the transformation or convertability of that basis. The other-dependent, in its role as a basis, can be transformed into either the conceptualized nature or imagined world, or into the perfected nature, which Nagao calls the “consummate nature.” It is in this way a “mediator.”
The bridge between the sacred and profane. Nagao refers to it as the “bridge” between the sacred and profane world, and credits the Vijñānavāda with being nearly the only religious tradition to establish the “bridge” from the profane to sacred on a firm logical footing. The “leap” is not possible in the conceptualized world, for the imagined world, for this is the nexus of the problem, and likewise, from the standpoint of the perfected or consummate nature, the problem has been solved.
Madhyamaka: nihilism with regard to the subject. He states that the idea of the other-dependent “is the appearer, a subjective existence.” The “-er” (-tṛ) in appearer, he continues, was “totally denied in the Mādhyamika treatise” and was “revived in the Vijñānavāda treatise as a ‘subject.’” Without such a subject, there could be no “turning around” from defilement to nirvāṇa.
Madhyamaka: nihilism with regard to existence. Nagao states that while Nāgārjuna denied essence, he did not fully explain the nature of existence, as did the Vijñānavāda, by way of clarifying the nature of subjectivity with regard to soteriological interests.
Nagao declares the other-dependent to be virtually a synonym for the classic Buddhist notion of co-originating inter-relationship (pratītyasamutpāda). He states that this central concept of Buddhism is that by which the relativity of all things was taught by the Buddha and all absolutes were thence denied.
It was Nāgārjuna, he affirms, who elucidated the “zero” or “empty” (śūnya) nature of phenomena by way of interdependent co-arising, devoid of any absolute. This universe of the other-dependent is only accessible by a Buddha, while ordinary individuals, through attachment to ego, etc., grasp what they perceive by means of ordinary faculties as absolutes, and thus live in an imaginary world. Only when imagination is eradicated and the actual fact of “other-dependence” is apprehended does the imagined nature transform into the perfected.
Alex Wayman. Wayman corroborates the above interpretation. Asaṅga does not deny that nothing external to mind exists, but as lCang skya relates it, he speaks of the “emptiness of a substantial difference of grasper and grasped” - i.e., the “grasped” or what is deemed the external world is not fundamentally separated from consciousness and vice-versa.
He notes what he terms the “Genesis” story in the Aggabbasutta asserts the existence of a sentient world (sattvaloka) and what he translates as a “support world” (bhājanaloka). Therefore, to hold that Vasubandhu would in such a way contradict an important doctrine like this not to be believed, according to Wayman.
The basal consciousness is required to provide a logical foundation for rebirth theory. This is the principal reason it was formulated by Asaṅga in the manner he did.
Professor Wayman continues on to relate the important distinction to be made between the two schools. He states that the three natures theory
“...is very close to what is found in the writings of the earlier and famous Nāgārjuna, with the difference that the Yogācāra thought it was improving in describing what is going on.”
He cites Nāgārjuna’s Acintyāstava, 44-45, wherein it is stated that “an entity (bhava) when imagined does not exist, but (exists) when its dependence on others is found.” Wayman, agreeing with lCang skya’s account, notes that the only difference of this verse of Nāgārjuna’s and that of Vasubandhu’s assertion that the perfected nature emerges when the other-dependent nature is bereft of the conceptualized nature. These are the terms lCang skya employs to describe the perfected nature.
Wayman sees the Mind-only tradition as improving upon Madhyamaka initial success. This is a view common among East Asian forms of Buddhism where one may plausibly argue that Yogācāra tradition held sway. Among East Asian schools where the Yogācāra School has had its biggest career, the schools are not equated, but rather the Yogācāra School is seen as a more comprehensive advance over the Madhyamaka. This a quite common ranking among the pan chiao systems which delineated the evolution of increasingly awakened states of personhood, and which virtually invariably place the Yogācārin personality “ahead” of or “above” the Mādhyamika.
Keenan. John Keenan seeks support for Nagao’s “thesis of the organic relationship between Yogācāra and Mādhyamika....” He focuses on the Hsung-Chung -Lun, a commentary on the MMK ascribed to Asaṅga. Though it has no corresponding Sanskrit nor Tibetan translation, he notes that “modern Japanese scholars” accept Asaṅga as its author.”
The commentary states that Asaṅga understood points in the works of Nāgārjuna not clarified by the great master. He in no way rejected Mādhyamika thought but remained faithful to it throughout his career. The work may reflect an early stage of the development of Asaṅga’s thought. Of course, it may represent a later period, for according to certain Tibetan traditions, Asaṅga was at heart a Mādhyamika. The Yogācāra is for dGe Lugs pa like lCang skya, an upāya, a useful but provisional approach, prone to reification.
Professor Keenan affirms the fact that Nagao understands the Yogācāra through the major work, the MV, as the “text used by Nagao to outline the Yogācāra developments [my emphasis] of the Mādhyamika notion of the middle path.” The picture that emerges from Keenan’s remarks, is that of an Asaṅga deeply appreciative of the Madhyamaka tradition. This was true especially in the earlier years of his intellectual development, after which he embarked upon the path of his true genius, the Yogācāra, elements of which can be seen in his commentary on the MMK.
Harris. Harris’ reliance on Japanese sources is a feature of his efforts to harmonize the two schools. Basically, in his presentation one has only the Yogācārin position itself represented. This position relegates the Madhyamaka to the position of clarifying only the emptiness of phenomena and the artificiality of language, not as its adherents claim, the full range of existence and reality. No Buddhist tradition known denies itself the role of definitive interpreter of the Buddhadarma.
There are a multitude of arguments which exist among Tibetan traditions which affirm that the Madhyamaka School itself is the repository of the definitive, ultimate truth of the Buddha. A strict cleaving to the tenets of the Yogācāra School would be a “falling away” from the most profound doctrine. These arguments are missing from Harris’ work, or where it is addressed, this idea is rather summarily dismissed.
The other extreme is represented by Theravāda scholars and occidental scholars of Buddhism who are informed by these scholars. Here, the two Mahāyāna Schools are over-differentiated, in our view. It has been and continues to be a commonplace notion that the Madhyamaka represents a Buddhist nihilism or skepticism and the Yogācāra School is a type of Buddhist Idealism or Phenomenalism. This extreme view is also patently false. Nāgārjuna nowhere claims to be skeptical about how one demonstrates as best one can through conventional verbal expression, the ultimate truth of the Buddha and the final truths of the path.
While certainly lCang skya’s Yogācārin sketch presents the Madhyamaka School as a type of “nihilism ” (med par lta ba), but this is with regard to what scholars of other Buddhist schools will argue is the basic unwanted, unforeseen result of Madhyamaka views. It is not the case that anyone would claim
that the Mādhyamika refer to themselves in these terms. In fact, they emphatically deny that the doctrine of non-self-entity or essencelessness (niḥsvabhāvavāda, ngo bo nyid med par smra ba) is nihilismistic save to those inclined to positivistic viewpoints who do not understand its world-view. Rather, failure to accept this doctrine in favor of essentialist perspectives leads ultimately to a nihilistic view, in the sense that a non-acceptance of Madhyamaka doctrine is a denial of reality as it really is.
Likewise, those who refer to the Yogācāra School as a type of Idealism are, in our view, falsely superimposing an occidental system onto an Asian philosophical school. While there exists a superficial similarity between Berkeleyian, Kantian or Husserlian ideas, a deeper level of analysis demonstrates the deep kinship with the Madhyamaka School which ultimately makes this label inaccurate. One might as well say that all Mahāyāna Schools are Idealist, or, as some have suggested, that all Buddhism is a type of Idealism or even as was said, a form of Nihilism .
The elucidation of numerous disputed issues notwithstanding, one ought never to lose sight of the fact that these two schools are contained within the larger system of Mahāyāna Buddhism. As we say in the last section on positivism, both schools argue more or less in unison for the refutation of the Buddhist “positivism” represented by the Sautrāntika. If any occidental label at all were to be applied to both Mahāyāna Schools it would be something akin to “anti-positivism.”
Affirmation of the two schools’ identity as Mahāyāna traditions does not dismiss, however, the very important distinctions between them. We have established just above the affirmation that the Yogācāra tradition affirms the existence of a pivot, bridge, support, basis, etc., variously describing in these terms the other-dependent nature or the basal consciousness. This is a tremendous distinction from the world-view of the Madhyamaka that asserts no such foundation for reality.
One can see here an echo of the long-standing dispute over the puḍgala or personal self asserted by the so-called puḍgalavāda traditions. Indeed, the role of a support or pivot for reality is tempting and useful as a heuristic device. In the end however, it might and has been argued by our representatives of the Prāsaṅgika scholars in the chapters above that these Mind-only traditions fail to demonstrate at the most profound level of verbal expression, the depths of the selflessness of self and phenomena.
While the tradition is no Idealism, we can say along with [pseudo?]Nāgārjuna that the tradition inhabits a place in the spectrum of possible world-views that is “svacitta.” This does not mean that particular Yogācārin thinkers necessarily come to realize the most profound revelation of selflessness, as definitively expressed by the Prāsaṅgika tradition.
Mind-only traditions: an upāya and love for the system qua system? We agree with Huntington: the Mind-only traditions demonstrate a system and a world-view which are relatively prone to reification and, as this term is employed in our text, positivism.
Later ramifications of the dispute. Certainly the Zen tradition (quite subsumed in Yogācāra view) in particular relates many stories where reason and the study of scriptures are denigrated in favor of direct intuition, one might say, of “no mind” etc., in deep samādhi . While this is not necessarily our view, some have maintained that the various dhyāna or Meditation Schools (Chin. Chan; Jap. Zen) of Mahāyāna Buddhism extant in the modern world share a mistrust of rationcination and verbalized reality that borders on anti-intellectualism.
From the Gelukpa Madhyamaka standpoint, if emptiness is truly an omnipresent reality, it should be manifest in language and logic, and however obscured, should be evident through careful examination. A Mahāyāna disciple should train in the disciplines of logic and language to hone his/her comprehension of ultimate truth as well as increasing the intensity of mental focus as is obtained through meditative praxis, or dhyāna.
The danger in this, according to our dhyāna adherent, is that one may fall into the mental trap of reifying words and the dogma construed from them. The very use of language entails the risk of being ensnared by it. Certainly if the ultimate truth is not to be contained in systems of dogmatic statements, but rather lies in the meditative state of the highly realized, then it is perhaps preferable to avoid doctrine, theory and verbalized convention altogether.
While to some extent the relative emphasis on praxis versus theory in the Zen and Gelukpa traditions is evident, the connection between these two highly influential modern schools and ancient Madhyamaka and Yogācāra disputes may not be so evident. Tracing the distinctions of the two modern schools back to the classical debates in India would be the subject of another book, provisionally I would like to state that at the core of differences between Central and East Asian forms of Buddhism, lies the dispute over the nature of consciousness.
What finally can we say of the disputes between the two schools? We think we have demonstrated that these two schools should in no way be seen as identical. Obviously, were they identical, there would be no good reason to name them differently.
Yogācāra translates from the Sanskrit as “Yoga-praxis” with the inclusive of “meditation-praxis. As a number of scholars have maintained, elements can be found in the earliest Buddhist writings which evolved into what became known as the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka Schools.
The roots of the Great Debate lie deep in Buddhist tradition. Whether one affirms a relative something or a relative nothing is indeed itself, a relative truth from a certain point of view. One person’s nihilism is another’s positivism. Arguably all schools of Buddhism are relatively “nihilismistic” when
compared with other traditions. This would seem to be the case for Thomistic and Augustinian theologies, in which real discrete entities are posited. They are relatively “positivist” from the point of view of the classical materialist ancient Cārvaka School, which repudiated the existence of karma, rebirth, deities and salvation beyond this world, and as well perhaps with regard to Deconstructionist perspectives which over-negate the possibility of
the expression of truth in verbal terms. This the Prāsaṅgika even reject. Nietzsche made a God of the concrete, historical self, having only one opportunity to acquire an ultimate reality defined in finite, historical, individualistic terms. These comments just touch upon subjects that are worthy of continuing study and reflection to help place Madhyamaka tradition within the spectrum of global philosophies.
Demonstration of our thesis. We sought here to provide evidence of the existence of major disputes between the two schools. This was done throughout the chapters of this work. A major aim of this work was to balance interpretations of the distinctions to be made of the two schools which “over-harmonize” the two, ignoring obvious distinctions and avoiding a presentation that mistakes a supposed Madhyamaka “nihilism” opposed to a Yogācāra “Idealism.” In short, we have attempted to present our own Madhyāntavibhāga – Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes – with regard to this topic, aiming to avoid the extremes.
Whether the Mind-only traditions as defined in this work are evolutions or devolutions relative to the Madhyamaka remains a disputed topic and is most likely defined in the terms of Tibetan philosophical traditions as ngor bden pa - “truth from a certain point of view.”
Arguments can and will continue to be made asserting the claim to “definitive” status among the three major wings of Buddhist tradition, i.e., the Vibhajyavāda/Theravāda, Yogācāra /Ch’an-Zen and Madhyamaka/dGe lugs pa ancient and modern traditions. Perhaps though this investigation may not claim “definitive” status in the sense of having exhausted all the issues, it may initiate further investigation of the claims and counter-claims each tradition has made and continues to make against the other
.
Appendix A. The Two Schools and Tathāgatagarbha
The idea of the Tathāgatagarbha, the womb or embryo of Buddha, is a central theme of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Without exhaustively investigating the origin of the notion, in this appendix, we will aim to further elucidate differences in understanding of the two schools as they approach the notion of the tathāgatagarbha, the “womb” or “embryo” of full-awakening, said to reside within each sentient being.
The Ratnagotravibhāga/Uttaratantra: Madhyamaka or Yogācāra?
Of the five scriptures of Maitreya, two are held by Gelukpa scholars to be principally establishing a Madhyamaka position. These two are the Abhisamayālaṃkara and the Ratnagotravibhāga. The latter is, known to Tibetan tradition as the Uttaratantra, is one of our principle sources for elucidating the nature of the Tathāgatagarbha.
“..the Abhisamayālaṃkara purported to explain not the literal meaning, but the “hidden meaning” of Prajñāpāramitā, and it was here that synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra might be effected. The Prajñāpāramitā scriptures are the earliest known Mahāyāna works, and their teaching of emptiness is central
to all Mahāyāna works, and their teaching of emptiness is central to all Mahāyāna. However, their literal meaning having close links with Nāgārjuna, Yogācārins had to account for these ideas in their own distinct way and the AA afforded them an opportunity to do that. Disregarding the literal meaning of the scriptures, they could derive their own doctrines from the same source as their Mādhyamika rivals.”
Madhyamaka the definitive view of Asaṅga and Maitreya? Of course, the fact that Maitreya related the Abhisamayālaṃkara to Asanga, is the basis by which Gelukpa claim that indeed, the definitive (nitārtha) interpretation of Maitreya/Asaṅga’s philosophical standpoint, is that of the Madhyamaka. In fact, it is their contention that indeed, Yogācārin philosophers were basically “disregarding the literal meaning of the scriptures.”
Discrepancy between no-self doctrine and that of primordially awakened nature. One of the seeming discrepancies in Mahāyāna Buddhist thinking for the student of Buddhism is the existence on the one hand of the doctrine of “no self” (anātman) and on the other, the doctrine of the existence of an innate Buddha Nature, said to be an “aboriginally pure mind” of awakening existing within all sentient life. It is a complicated issue and tathāgatagarbha
thought is connected with both views. It is incorrect to view the tathāgatagarbha theory as a school in the sense that Madhyamaka and Yogācāra are Schools. Both of these schools have their own interpretations of this doctrine, in fact. The root text for this idea is the Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyanôttaratantraśāstra, called as well in an abbreviated way, the “Uttara Tantra” (Ultimate Tantra). Tibetan tradition ascribes this work to Maitreyānatha, and by Chinese tradition to have been written by a certain Saramati seven centuries after the Buddha’s nirvana.
Madhyamaka: the definitive stance of Asaṅga and Maitreya. In Tibet, there have existed sharp disputes concerning the issue of which school should be connected with the RGV. While Gelukpa scholars acknowledge that Maitreya, through Asavga initiated the Yogācāra system, their own view was in the end, that of the Madhyamaka. Mind-only was promulgated as an extensive methodology by which to initiate certain types of disciples into the Mahāyāna tradition.
The lack of doctrine concerning the basal consciousness in TGG literature. In China, Fa-tsang (7th century) founder of the Hua-yen (Avataṃsaka) School, connected the doctrine with neither school. It was a distinct teaching, so distinct he declared it the “fourth turning of the wheel of dharma.” It is notable however, that key Yogācāra doctrines such as the three natures, the ālayavijñana, are nowhere mentioned among this earliest tathāgatagarbha literature.
Tathāgatagarbha was absorbed by the Mind-only system. Yogācārin scholars maintaining the existence of the ālayavijñāna claim that the gotra governs the ālaya . The tathāgatagarbha is an “agent” that removes defilments from the ālaya.
Jikido Takasaki states that the tradition started as a distinct tradition, but was later absorbed into the Yogācāra School via the growing tendency to equate the Tathāgatagarbha with the ālayavijñāna, most notably in the Laṅkāvatarasūtra. He sees the RGV as a criticism of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. At the end of chapter one it is observed the Ratnagotravibhāga expresses its purpose which is to “establish the existence (astitva) of buddhadhātu so that one could avoid the faults created by the theory of “śūnyam sarvam” [all is empty]....”
In his view, the Ratnagotravibhāga emphasizes “asti” - existence - in contrast to the “śūnya” of the Prajñāpāramitā. He says,
“this ‘asti-vāda’ does not mean the negation of ‘śūnya-vāda’. Rather, the Ratnagotravibhāga regards itself as the real successor to the śūnya-vāda of the Prajñāpāramitā declaring that the real meaning of ‘śūnyatā’ is to know the ‘astitva’ of the Germ having within itself both the ‘śūnya of defilements and the ‘aśūnya’ of the Buddha’s Qualities.”
He then takes the meaning of ‘śūnyam sarvam’ as “empty of all [[[kleśas]]].” The tathāgatagarbha is empty of defilements.
Danger of nihilism in the Perfection of Wisdom literature. The criticism of the Prajñāpāramitā is a criticism not of the works per se, but rather of its “short or unclear explanation.” As stated in previous chapters, the Yogācāra tradition sees itself as a “middle path” between views such as that exemplified by the Sarvāstivāda notion of an ātmavāda of dharmas, which is “abhūtagrāha” - the grasping of what is unreal, and the śūnyatāviksiptacitta - those Madhyamaka whose minds are hurled into emptiness and who reject the existence of the Dharma (bhūtadharmāpavāda). In its terms, jñāna and prajñā are antidotes to both wrong views.
Tathāgatagarbha theory clarifies emptiness. Takasaki sees the root cause in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra’s formulation of the three natures (trisvabhāva) theory which elucidates the “niḥsvabhāva” or “non-self-nature” theory of the second turning of the wheel of dharma, i.e. the Prajñāpāramitā. Clarifying
śūnyatā is a chief aspect of the Ratnagotravibhāga. In fact, of it, Takasaki states that the Ratnagotravibhāga unravels the thought of prajña with regard to nihsvabhāva doctrine and thus is a “Saṃdhinirmocana” (unravelling the intention) of Prajña just as the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra is the “uttaratantra” as “the ultimate expression of the śūnyavāda.....”
Relative essentialism in the Yogācāra.
By comparison then, with the Prajñāpāramitā, the Tathāgatagarbha theory, in correlation with Vijñānavāda thought came to aquire an aspect of relative “astivāda”, relative “essentialism.” Arising from this occurred an amalgam of Vijñānavāda with tathāgatagarbha. “Āśrayaparavṛtti” (“turning about of the basis”), which describes the awakened state of one who has eliminated all defiling seeds (bijas) according to the Vijñānavāda system, were “borrowed by the Ratnagotravibhāga” from that system.
There are key Yogācāra terms missing from the RGV. However, despite such interrelationships, from the Ratnagotravibhāga, key Yogācāra terms are missing. There is no mention of the ālayavijñāna or trisvabhāva. Takasaki concludes,
From this, he asserts that the garbha theory, though critical of the Prajñāpāramitā view, cannot be linked strictly with the Yogācāra School, and probably precedes it.
There is a weakness of a garbha theory devoid of the basal consciousness doctrine. The ālayavijñana is seen as the “complete basis” of all phenomena which are mentated realities. Because the Ratnagotravibhāga did not include this concept, Takasaki sees a weakness in the garbha theory of the text in its
explanation of the gotra theory as the substratum (ādhāra) of the phenomenal world. Because of this weakness, it was seemingly inevitable that a text would emerge to equate the tathāgatagarbha with the ālaya consciousness. This of course happened with the advent of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra and the Mahāyānaśraddhôtpadasūtra. This event effectively absorbed garbha theory into the Vijñānavāda system, preventing its development as an independent school.
The Laṅkāvatarasūtra expresses the equation of the basal consciousness with the tathāgatagarbha. In the Laṅkāvatarasūtra, the Buddha, when asked whether the tathāgatagarbha is the same as the ego-soul or ātman taught by Indian philosophical schools, he replies,
“No, Mahāmati, my tathāgatagarbha is not the same as the ego taught by the philosophers; for what the tathāgatas teach is the tathāgatagarbha in the sense, Mahāmati, that it is emptiness, reality-limit, Nirvāṇa, being unborn, unqualified, and devoid of will-effort...tathāgatas...teach the doctrine pointing to the tathāgatagarbha to make the ignorant cast aside their fear when they listen to the teaching of egolessness....”
This passage seems to indicate the provisional or introductory nature of tathāgatagarbha thought. It is an approach to lessen the fear of the ignorant. However, the tathāgatagarbha is taught as equated with the ālayavijñana in the following passage:
“[But] when a revulsion [or turning back] has not taken place in the ālayavijñāna known under the name of Tathāgatagarbha, there is no cessation of the seven evolving vijñānas.”
and below this,
“..let those Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas who are seeking after the exalted truth effect the purification of the Tathāgatagarbha which is known as ālayavijñana.”
“Revulsion” is Suzuki’s idiosyncratic interpretation of “āśrayaparāvṛtti”, the “turning about of the basis” of the ālaya consciousness. At this point, according to Yogācāra teaching, the ālayavijñana dissolves into pure jñāna; discriminative, bifurcating consciousness ceases. ‘Monstrous’ importing of ‘self’ into Buddhism. This equation of the ālayavijñāna with tathāgatagarbha thought, has disastrous implications according to Conze. He states that
“All these theoretical assumptions are attempts to combine the doctrine of ‘not self’ with the almost instinctive belief in a ‘self’, empirical or true. The climax of this combination of the uncombinable is reached in such conceptual monstrosities as the ‘store-consciousness’ (ālayavijñāna)...which performs all the functions of a ‘self’ in a theory which almost vociferously proclaims the non-existence of such a ‘self.’”
The Madhyamaka interpretation of the tathāgatagarbha. The Madhyamaka view of these issues is significantly different. Mādhyamika scholars reject the existence of the ālayavijñāna, allowing for only the six vijñānas of classical Buddhism; there is a danger in it being taken as an “ego self.” Nevertheless, they retain the notion of tathāgatagarbha.
Is the doctrine of tathāgatagarbha an ‘alien’ infiltration into Madhyamaka? Some say that if a school accepts Prāsaṅgika teaching as the supreme doctrine of the Buddha, then, since tathāgatagarbha theory was so prevalent in Mahāyāna scriptures, there was a necessity to re-interpret tathāgatagarbha doctrine in light of Madhyamaka concerns to reject “svabhāva” thinking.
We disagree with this view. Many notions are appropriated, for example, by both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools, from doctrines associated with the First Turning of the Wheel discussed above, and these are all a way of avoiding of the literal interpretations associated with those doctrines. Tathāgatagarbha thought no less, if it is deemed pragmatically useful, may be appropriated within the sphere of Madhyamaka thought.
The inherent ‘essentialism’ in tathāgatagarbha doctrine. The difficulty involves the language used to describe these ideas. As R. F. Olsen notes, the problem for the Mādhyamika with Yogācāra notions of ālaya, vijñāptimātra, etc., is that they are discussed with an air of “realism” and “inherent existence” language. This indeed is a problem, exemplified by comments such as the following from Sthiramati’s Bhāṣya on Vasubandhu’s Triṃśika:
[Others may assert] “The self and phenomena do not exist from the ultimate level” - just like consciousness, “and that which is cognized (vijñeya) also,” thus they have said. This extreme perspective is not admissable. And because of the impossibility that that which initiates conceptualization (upacāra) has no basis for existence (nirādhārasya), then by all means the transformation of consciousness (vijñānaparināma) exists as fact (vastūtaḥ).”
Furthermore this approach is incoherent: “Consciousness too, like that which is cognized exists as conventionally true, but not ultimately.”
Essentialism relative to Madhyamaka thought: Sthiramati. In the passage preceding the above in Sthiramati’s commentary, he refuted a “realistic” or “substantialist” (dravyataḥ) notion with regard to the self and phenomena.
Clearly, in this classical commentary on the doctrine of vijñāptimātratā, he has rejected a “Vedāntinesque” view of consciousness, but he seems to imply by this apparent rejection of what in our view are clearly discerned as Madhyamaka tenets, to associate them with a nihilismistic view. Without some basis (adhāra) for conceptualization, consciousness could not take place.
Candrakīrti’s counterclaim: the ‘syllableless’ dharma. Candrakīrti rejects this idea in his Madhyamakāvatara.
“What hearing and what teaching (can there be) of the syllableless Dharma? Nevertheless the syllableless is heard and taught by means of superimposition (samāropa).”
From the Madhyamaka perspective, teaching doctrines such as the ālaya, tathāgatagarbha, are all well and good, as long as the awareness that they are all saṃvṛtisatya is maintained. Avoiding realism even with regard to his own arguments, Nāgārjuna states,
“Suppose that a magic man created by a magician should prevent another magic man created by his own magic [from] doing something....the magic man who is prevented is empty and the magic man who prevents is also empty. In like manner, a negation of the self-entity of all entities by my statement is possible, even though this statement [itself] is empty.”
The Final issue: is the tathāgatagarbha doctrine definitive or provisional? This is the issue at hand in discussion of tathāgatagarbha: is it taken as realistic or conventional? A clever heuristic device, or a Brahmanical ātman in disguise? How one reads Yogācāra thought will determine one’s view here.
Candrakīrti’s false accusation? Ian Harris contends,
“The criticism would be all very well if the Yogācāra of Vasubandhu and Asaṅga held the views attributed to it by Candrakīrti, but this is just not so. They actually agree with him that all dogmas must be, by definition, non-ultimate. They hold that the ālayavijñana itself is overthrown on the path to nirvāṅa.”
While it is true that Yogācāra thinkers declare their doctrines, “verbalized designation” (vyavahāra), what can Sthiramati mean by declaring consciousness “actual” (vastūtaḥ) and reject as nihilistic, the notion that it is merely conventional?
Provisional nature of tathāgatagarbha doctrine: Tsong kha pa. Even the Laṅkāvatarasūtra is not free from dispute. We noted the equation of the ālaya with tathāgatagarbha in that sūtra, but Tsong kha pa’s interpretation of the Laṅkāvatarasūtra in the GSR cites sections of the sūtra whereby it is said that the Buddha taught tathāgatagarbha through his compassion to entice non-Buddhists to Buddhism, like luring deer to a lake by their seeing their own reflection in the water.
The tathāgatagarbha is a quasi-ātman. If the doctrine is taken literally, it would be little different from the ātman theory of Vedic Schools. The real truth behind the tathāgatagarbha doctrine is śūnyatā; apart from all phenomena being śūnya, no sentient being could relinquish defiling obstructions and attain full awakening.
Provisionality of the tathāgatagarbha: mKhas grub. mKhas grub rje, in his sTong thun chen mo states that those beings who lack clear vision
“…cannot employ reasoning under their own power to understand the tathāgatagarbha, but following the teachings of the Tathāgata they are said to come to an understanding of it gradually by faith.”
The Laṅkāvatarasūtra’s teaching of the non-existence of external objects and that all is “mind-only” is said to be provisional or interpretable. mKhas grub rje finds scriptural evidence within the Laṅkāvatarasūtra itself which demonstrates the provisionality of the teaching of the tathāgatagarbha doctrine. He quotes the relevant passage:
“Likewise, the doctrine of a tathāgatagarbha has been taught within the sūtras spoken by the Lord; and this the Lord has said to be inherently pure clear light, and hence primordial purity itself, possessing the thirty-two exemplary marks and existing within the body of every sentient being.
How is this tathāgatagarbha advocated by the Lord any different from the self advocated by the heterodox?
The Lord spoke. ‘Mahāmati, the tathāgatas...teach by the word tathāgatagarbha notions such as emptiness, the perfect end, nirvāṇa, nonarising, marklessness, and wishlessness. To eliminate the abode of the fear that the childish have in selflessness, we have taught, via the teachings on the tathāgatagarbha, the state of nonconceptualization... the tathāgatas, in a variety of ways, possessing skill in means, and wisdom of the reality that is the reversion of all misconceived characteristics, that is, of the fact that phenomena lack a self....”
Selflessness reconciled with tathāgatagarbha. Along with that,
“The teachings of other sūtras that there exists a permanent, stable, and truly existent tathāgatagarbha...that is the totality of the Buddha’s qualities and that has existed inherently in the mental continuum of every being since beginningless time, is also said to be only a provisional view, requiring further elucidation.
Ruegg affirms mKhas grub rje’s view by noting that Buddhists had two hermeneutical methods available to them. To make tathatāgarbha theory conform to the pan-Buddhist notions of the selflessness of person (puḍgalanairātmya), they had to teach the doctrine as “interpretable”, “needing further elucidation” (neyārtha, drang don). Its “intentional ground” (dgongs gzhi) is nairātmya, śūnyatā, etc.
The Yogācāra approach is a useful, provisional approach upāya. The Yogācāra teach the non-existence of external objects as an upāya, an approach for those who are excessively attached to external forms. However, “based on the ascertainment that external objects are essenceless, [Cittamātrins] will [eventually] come to ascertain that consciousness [too] is essenceless.”
Crypto-ātman. Ruegg, in distinction to Takasaki, takes up the Gelukpa interpretation. Tathāgatagarbha does not refer to any entity (bhava), but is a “metatheoretical expression.” He addresses the dispute over this doctrine. Was it a syncretism, or “a symbiotic accommodation, with the ātman-doctrine of Brahmanical thought - that is, in effect, a crypto-Brahmanical ‘soul’-theory in Buddhism?”
He notes that the similarities in the description of the tathāgatagarbha and the Brahmanical ātman are striking. The tathāgatagarbha is said to be permanent (nitya), immutable (dhrūva), blissful (sukha), and eternal (śāśvatā). The Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra (likely composed in China) even goes so far as to say
What is called ‘self’ is the tathāgata. Why is this so? The [[[Buddha]]-]body being infinite is free from the blemish of doubt, and it neither acts nor grasps, so that it is said to be ‘permanent’. In virtue of non-production and non-cessation (anutpāda) it is said to be ‘blissful’ (sukha). In virtue of the absence of the impurities of kleśa it is said to be ‘very pure’ (viśuddha). In virtue of the absence of ten marks, it is said to be ‘empty’ (śūnya). Consequently, the tathāgata is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, empty and without marks.”
The Intentional ground of tathāgatagarbha doctrine. That this doctrine is to be taken as “interpretable” (neyārtha) is affirmed by three facts.
1] The doctrine as literal is simply to be rejected by the fact of the pan-Mahāyāna teaching of the selflessness of person and phenomenon, this teaching is universally recognized as definitive (nitārtha, nges don).
2] Further, the non-definitive apparent meaning is related intentionally (abhiprāyika, dgongs pa can) to the deeper implications (e.g. śūnyatā, etc.).
3] Finally, there are countless references among Mahāyāna scriptures which relate the Buddha’s upāya as a means to attract and reach those whose mental continuum is not yet ripe to receive the deepest meanings of his teachings. In this case, the purpose is to attract those who cling tenaciously to the ātman view.
Emptiness in tathāgatagarbha theory refers to the individual mental continuum. The śūnyatā with regard to tathāgatagarbha theory in the Prāsaṅgika system, is emptiness applied to a sentient being’s mental continuum (saṃtāna, rgyud), not the emptiness of phenomena (dharmanairātmya). Only if a sentient being’s consciousness is empty can it change; if it cannot change and evolve, it cannot attain to full awakening.
This emptiness of the mental continuum is what is meant in this system of the mind’s intrinsic purity. As long as the mind remains obscured by karma and kleśa, it is referred to as “tathāgatagarbha;” upon purification by means of the path system, it attains to the “svabhāvikakāya”, the “essence body” of the Buddhas. The Buddha’s pure mind in that pure state is his wisdom body (jñānakāya), and the two together, “the Buddha’s mind as a flow empty of inherent existence, is what this tradition calls the dharmakāya.”
From the Gelukpa standpoint as evinced by mKhas grub’s comments, the teachings concerning tathāgatagarbha which teach that sentient beings are already enlightened are wrong, literally speaking. If this were the case, then there would be no need to practice Buddhism.
Tathāgatagarbha as definitive doctrine. Many authorities of course accept the tathāgatagarbha theory as definitive teaching (nitārtha). This has been a source of constant dispute in Tibet, particularly with regard to the gzhan stong - rang stong controversy. Gelukpa scholars accept the “rang stong” view. Briefly stated, this is the teaching that all entities - the individual and phenomena - are intrinsically empty of inherent nature (svabhāvaśūnya).
gZhan stong: empty of ‘other.’ Jonangpa scholars assert the doctrine of gzhan stong - “empty of ‘other’” . According to this view, there is an inherently existent Absolute. What it is empty of is “other” in the sense of defilements (kleśa). This view is compared to a “jar without water” or a “monastary without monks”. The dharmakāya is conceived by this school as empty of delusional conceptualization of the phenomenal world. It is empty of illusion in its own ultimately pure state.
They interpret the tathāgatagarbha theory as given in the Śrimāladevisiṃāhanādasūtra as teaching that adventitious defilements (āgantuka) are intrinsically other than the ultimate, but this ultimate (dharmakāya) is not inherently empty of its own essential nature. This view is what these traditions refer to as the Great Madhyamaka; Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka is simply a conventional teaching which is neyārtha - needing interpretation, although useful for clearing away erroneous views initially.
gZhan stong the definitive view of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga? This view is the final view of not only Nāgārjuna but that of Maitreya and Asaga as well. They claim, that while texts such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ teach rang stong, but they cite the Dharmadhātustava, which they attribute to him for their claim that he taught gzhan stong.
Empty of essence or of defilements. As we have seen however, more or less this view of a positively expressed tathāgatagarbha as “empty of defilements” (gzhan stong) rather than “intrinsically empty” (rang stong) is prevalent throughout East Asia. Yet, as we have seen, the issue remains unclear in the field of western Buddhology if resolved elsewhere.
Glossary
Below is an abbreviated glossary of Tibetan terms employed by lCang skya in the passages we translated, and in some cases, Sanskrit equivalents. These equivalents follow the Tibetan. All the terms below are to be found in lCang skya’s text with the following abbreviations for sources: SCD = Sarat Chandra Das, Tibetan-English Dictionary; NRY = Nitārtha Rangjung Yeshe On-line Dictionary; and MW = Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Unless otherwise stated, the source for definitions are found under entries in SDC or are more extensively defined in the text through work with Geshe Sopa (some of the significant definitions from this source are initialed “GS”). Not all possible meanings are given. Only the meaning of terms as they relate to our text are offered here.
kun brtags, parikalpita - The first of the three natures (trisvabhāva). These are central notions of Yogācāra, this first refers to the imagined, imputed or conceptualized nature, and designates life in saṃsāra or the world of sorrow. The idea of the “convolution” the literal meaning of saṃsāra “turning about,” “revolving” hence “convolution” indicating confusion and lack of perspicacity is hinted at by the prefix “pari,” that, like its cognate in Greek peri, means “surrounding,” “thoroughly” and the Latin “com” or “con” meaning “coextensive,” or “together with” ; this along with “concept” more at “conceive” from com + capere (to heave, to take in) corresponds to “conceptualize” when we relate this to the Sanskrit root klṛp that has among its many meanings “to partake of, to prepare , arrange, to declare as, consider as”
means “wished for , expected , made , created , imagined , invented , contrived” Hence we find the following connotations for this term in Buddhist thought: 1) imaginary, imputed entity; learned, philosophical, intellectual; imagined character; conceptual imputation; intellectual imputation; artificial imputation or labeling; misconception of a true nature of phenomena developed through reasoning dependent on philosophical study etc.; taking things as having a truly existent nature, among others.
kun brtags p’ai ngo bo nyid – conceptualized essence; essentialistically or entically conceived
kun rdzob bden pa, saṃvṛitisatya - concealing truth; literally, the Sanskrit root verb vrt means “surrounding , enclosing , obstructing” and with the prefix saṃ means “covering , concealing , keeping secret.” This imparts an idea of truths conveyed by thought or language as “concealing” the “ultimate” truth that lies beyond ordinary awareness; the Tibetan literally means “completely false.” There is a sense in the Sanskrit of “masking” the truth that may
be the understanding the Tibetans applied to this Sanskrit term. We took a translation closer to the original idea behind the Sanskrit. We reason that because the Tibetan ngor bden that refers to the recipient of a concealing truth, the translation “truth” must be part of the translation. Since “concealing” is more literal than “masking” and “conventional” truth, and because “covering” truth sounds too unusual, we went here with “concealing” though we have at times found it useful to translate as “conventional” truth at times.
dKon mChog brTSegs pa’i mdo – Mahāratnakūṭasūtra
bkag pa’i tshul - method or manner of refutation
skur ‘debs; apavāda - an extreme viewpoint which repudiates the idea that there is any basis for existence other than “mere names” and ordinary consciousnessness. The Sanskrit and Tibetan both agree that the meaning has to do with “denial,” “slander,” “belittling,” in the sense in this context of the denial of the dharma, for Buddhists, the ultimate truth of things, along with mārga, or the path to nirvāṇa We take an interpretive leap by choosing
the term “nihilism.” The definition of skur ‘debs in lCang skya’s text is med par lta ba – “a view to non-existence.” It is in this sense that our term applies, but the relative nature of the nihilism spoken of in a Buddhist context is not to be equated with the thought of Nietzsche, though it would appear to have had similar negative connotations. The Sanskrit and Tibetan both refer to the idea that when any basis for existence is foresworn, a mere “nominalism” results which “repudiates” such a basis, and by implication, it repudiates the value and efficacy of soteriology.
skur ‘debs kyi mtha’ - “the extreme of nihilism”
skur ‘debs kyi mthar ‘dzin tshul - “the manner (or method) of grasping at the extreme of nihilism”
skur ‘debs pa’i gzhi - the basis of nihilism
skye b’ai gnas basis of generation or arising
skyon; dosa - logical and/or moral fault or error
skrag pa – fear
KHA
kha cig - a certain person, usually, an opponent
kha nang - inner, internal
kha phyir - outer, external
khas len – acceptance
khas lan mkhan - proponent, i.e. “one who accepts”
khegs, khegs pa – refute, refutation
kho na - only, strictly
khyab pa – pervasion; (NRY) to pervade, permeate
khyad par du - particularity
mKHas grub - mKhas grub, one of two of Tsong kha pa’s major disciples, lived in the 14th and 15th centuries. His work, the sTong mThun Chen mo, among others, was a major influence on lCang skya’s own thought.
mkhyen pa – knowledgeable, wise
‘khrul pa – confused, mistaken
GA
gang zag – individual
gang zag tu gtags pa – to impute an individual
gong du - above, higher
grub mtha’ smra ba - advocate of [a particular] philosophical view or tenet, philosopher; (NRY:) grub mtha’: tenet system; school; scholastic sectarianism; philosophical system; system of philosophy, philosophical tenets, [[[siddhānta]]], philosophical concepts
grub pa - establish, exist, proven
dgag pa - refutation
dgag bya - object of refutation
dgag tu thal - refutation would follow, result in refutation
dge sbyong - ascetic, monk
dgongs pa - intention, purport
dgos pa - necessity, purpose
‘gog pa – refuted, stifled, to pull up from the root (SCD) i.e. suppression of an argument, also: NRY: 1) cessation, anniḥilation, extinction, stopping, exhaustion, final extinction. 3.) {‘gog pa, bkag pa, dgag pa, khog} trans. v.; to halt, cease, stop, block, hamper, hinder, impede, inhibit, prevent, repress; to block, obstruct, stop, hinder, limit; to hinder,
‘gog pa’i phyogs, pratisedhapakṣa - premise of refutation
‘gog tshul - manner or method of refutation or suppression [of an argument]
‘gyur med – unchanging
‘gyur med yongs grub - the unchanging pefected nature, unchanging real
rgyu; hetu cause
rgyu mtshan – reason
rgyud; saṃtāna - [[[mental]]] continuum
sgra, śabda - word, sound
sgrub byed - establishing, proving, effecting a proof
sgro ‘dogs, samāropa – We choose the controversial translation “positivism.” The implications of this extreme position in Buddhism are quite similar to those in Western Positivist Schools, i.e., that external entities exist, hence this is a form of “entical conceptualization” or superimposition. Webster’s informs us that the Latin root is derived from ponere – “to place,” or “lay down.” Various definitions of “positive” include “1 a : formally laid down or
imposed 2: not fictitious : real 4 a : having or expressing actual existence or quality as distinguished from deprivation or deficiency <positive change in temperature>: as (1) : capable of being constructively applied (2) : not speculative : empirical“ and interestingly from the Mahāyāna standpoint, “4 e : real and numerically greater than zero <+2 is a positive integer>“ i.e., “not śūnya.” These definitions are corroborated by our Tibetan and Sanskrit
dictionary sources. NRY: 1) imputation, misinterpretation, exaggeration, superimposition, uncertainty, [ascription, hypostatized, misconception, preconceptions, attribution, conceptualization]. 2) doubts; 3) superimposition [lit. “attaching a feather” i.e. adding what was not there to begin with]); MW: placing in or upon (loc.) (a bow); transference to (loc.), attribution. A common choice to translate this term is “imputation” having the meaning “to attribute” something that is not there. Superimpose has a similar meaning: “to place or lay over or above something”
sgro ‘dogs kyi mtha - extreme of entical conceptualization; fiction, invention, positivism
NGA
ngo bo, svabhāva - essence (GS: more accurately, “fitness to be something.” For example, gzugs kyi ngo bo or the “essence” of form is gzugs su rung ba or “that which is appropriate as form.” NRY: 1) essence, nature, character, attribute, identity, entity, intrinsic / central / essential nature, vital substance, core, being, inmost nature. 2) principle, existence, fact. 3) entity, fact of being, identity. 4) definition, main principle. 5) what it comes down to, at bottom, in fact, 5) essential meaning [in textual introduction].
ngo bo nyid kyi rang gi mtshan nyid yod pa - existing by way of its own essential characteristics
ngo bo nyid med pa - essentially non-existent
ngo bo nyid med pa nyid - essential non-existence
ngor bden, ngor bden pa - truth from a certain point of view; perspectival truth; relative truth. The strict definition has to do with ngo (SCD) “face,” or “countenance,” with the locative “-r” means literally “to a face” hence, “perspectival.”
ngos ‘dzin, ngos bzung ba – identify, identification
dngos po, vastu - entity; thing, impermanent phenomenon, functional phenomenon;
dngos po med pa - non-existence of entity
dngos po tsam – “merest entity.” (GS:)This is a reference to the other-dependent, which in Yogācāra thought, is the basis for all functional things or “entities.”
dngos smra ba - “Proponents of entity.” This refers to schools classed as Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika as well as the Yogācāra, because finally, the latter as well asserts the entical existence of consciousness.
mngon sum tsad ma - direct means of cognition
mngon du gyur pa - manifesting
mngon par brjod pa vyavahāra, abhilāpya (?) - verbal expression
mngon par zhen pa - subsumed in (NRY) habitual adherence, to completely cling, complete clinging, settling down, inclination
mngon par zhen pa - overt clinging/ fixation; to cling overtly
mngon rdzogs - perfected
mngon sum du - direct, manifest
sngo ‘dzin mig shes – identification by ocular or visual consciousness
CA
cung zad drag - of little use
CHA
chud gzon pa - ruination
chos, dharma - phenomenon; ultimate reality; religion; holiness
chos kyi dbyings, dharmadhātu – phenomenal realm, the universe
chos gyi bdag med; dharmanairātmya - the selflessness of phenomena
chos can, dharmin – subject (of a discussion)
chos nyid, dharmatā - variously translated as “reality” or “truth,” etc., we chose to maintain the original Sanskrit term, viewing it as one of those cases where a translation cannot capture the original sense. “Dharmatā” is derived from the Sanskrit root “dhr” - “to hold” - and “Dharma”
chos nyid kho na - merely or strictly dharmatā
chos ‘dul pa - religious training
chos rnams, dharma - phenomena”
JA
ji lta ba bzhin - exactly, precisely
‘jug tshul - “way” or “manner of entry” or “initiation.” In the case of our text, “entrance into a philosophical view” is often the sense in context
‘jog pa - establish; place; (Cabezon, 1992:)posit
‘jog tshul - method of establishing
‘joms nus pa - capable of destruction
brjod du med pa - inexpressible, ineffable
brjod du med pa bdag nyid kyis don dam par yod pa - ultimately existing as an inexpressible nature
brjod pa - expression
rJe bDag Nyid Chen po - Mahātma, “Venerable Great Self,” i.e, lCang skya’s honorific for Tsong kha pa
NYA
nyam gzhag gi gnas skabs - “time” or “occasion” of profound meditation.”
nyams su myong pa - mental experience
gnyis snang - dual appearance, dualism
gnyis snang nub pa - extinction or withdrawal of dual appearance (NRY:) nub pa - to sink, collapse, decline, decay; disappear, fall gradualy, go down, set, subside, vanish
mnyam gzhag zag med yeshe - the stainless gnosis of profound meditation
mnyam gzhag yeshe - the gnosis of profound meditation
rnyed don - the goal to be obtained
snyam pa - thinking, thought
TA
ting nge ‘dzin, samādhi - concentration, meditation
gtags pa tsam de kho na lta - viewpoint of the “thatness” or reality of mere imputation
gtags pa’i tshig - imputation of words
gtan la ‘bebs tshul - method of detailed explanation or resolution (NRY:) to establish, settle, ascertain, resolve, determine, come to a conclusion, arrive at certainty about, ascertaining the real condition; resolve, settle, establish, determine, conclude, put in order, ascertain, understand; systematize, set down systematically; ascertain, resolve; [sm. {gtan ‘bebs byed} establishment. to come to/ reach a definitive conclusion/ understanding; to codify
gtan med pa – extinguishing
btags pa stongs pa’i de kho na nyid – the thatness or (reality) which is devoid of imputation
btags pa tsam - mere imputation
btags pa’i tshig gi mtshan ma’i rten – the basis of characteristics of imputed words
btags pa’i tshig tshan ma’i gzhi – the foundation of characteristics of words which are imputed
rtags - reason, mark,
rtags grub - establishment of the mark or reason
rtags pa’i yul - object of a reason or mark (of an argument = proof)
rtogs pa - conceptual thought, conceptual consciousness, realization, (NRY:) comprehension
rtogs p’ai yul - object of conceptual thought
rtogs pa mdor bsdus - summary of the thought
lta’i shes - visual knowledge
ltos nas - having relied upon
sTug po bKod pa’i mdo, Gandavyuhasūtra – Compact Arrangement Sūtra (NRY:) Sūtra of the Dense Array
stongs pa nyid; śūnyatā - “emptiness” or “emptiness.” We opted for “zeroness,” though while certainly idiosyncratic, is literally more accurate, avoids the negative connotations of “emptiness” and is a more neutral term, and finally, is rather more sonorous than many other translations, in our opinion. Further, just as the number zero occupies the middle place among the negative and positive integers, so does śūnya (zero) occupy the basis for the Middle Way of Buddhism. Finally, the English term “cipher” is derived from the Arabic sifra and this is in turn derived from the word śūnya from the Sanskrit. Webster’s gives the following for cipher: 1 a : zero1a b : one that has no weight, worth, or influence : nonentity
ston pa - show, teach, instruct; instruction, teaching
bstan pa - doctrine or teaching, demonstrating
TA
tha snyad – verbal designation
tha snyad du byed pa – verbalize
tha snyad gdags - verbal imputation
tha dad - different or diverse
tham cad med pa - all is non-existent
theg chen, theg pa chen po pa – Mahāyāna , Mahāyānist
Theg ba Chen po’i bsDus ba, Mahāyānasaṃgrāha - Compendium of the Great Vehicle
mtha’, anta – extreme (lit. “end”)
mtha’ dgag - refutation of an extreme [view]
mtha’ ‘gog tshul - method of refuting extreme [[[views]]]
mtha’ gnyis - “the two extremes” of nihilism and positivism.
mtha’ yas pa - limitless
mthar rnyed - obtaining the final [result]
mthar thug - final
mthar ‘dzin tshul - manner of cleaving to an extreme
DA
da dung - currently, “now”
de kho na nyid, tattva - “reality.” (literally, “that-only-ness”)
don dam bden pa, paramārthasatya - ultimate truth
don dam pa - ultimate, ultimacy
don dam par grub - ultimately established
don dam par med pa - non-existence ultimately
don dam dpyod byed kyi tsad ma - the means of cognition which effect ultimate examination
don smra gnyis - the two [schools] which propound [the existence of] objects
bdag nyid - nature, selfhood
bdag med, nairātmya - selfless, selflessness
bden pa - true, truth
bden par grub pa – established as true
bden par ma grub pa - not established as true
bden ‘dzin - apprehension as truly [[[existent]]]
mDo sde rGyan, Sutrālaṃkara - Ornament of the Sūtras
‘dogs pa skye lugs - the manner of generating conceptualization
‘dogs pa med pa - conceptionlessness
‘dogs p’ai tshig - conceptualized term
‘dogs pa’i gzhi - basis or foundation of conceptualization
‘du shes, saṃjñā - composite consciousness
‘dus byas - composite [[[phenomena]]]
‘dus ma byas - non-composite [[[phenomena]]] (e.g. space)
NA
ni - This peculiar Tibetan term might well be translated with a simple exclamation point, semi-colon or colon. It has no explicit meaning, but numerous implied meanings. Sometimes it is either introducing a new subject or restating a topic mentioned earlier but reintroduced. In our translation, at times we may simply italicize words set off by ni to indicate emphasis, or at other times, in brackets employ a number of words or punctuation marks to communicate this small but meaningful particle.
gnas lugs – reality; (NRY:) Natural State, natural condition; fundamental nature (of reality); abiding nature [of reality]. the nature of the buddha body of reality. circumstances, condition, situation, fundamental nature, mode of being, natural condition / state, mode of being, natural situation, natural state, things as they are, news, ontological status, the actual condition of existing, situation, principle, truth, the natural state, mode of subsistence, the basic condition; nature. See also syn {yin lugs, gnas tshul}. Ex. {sems kyi + } the nature of mind
gnod – [[[logical]]] error, fault
rnam grangs – enumeration
rnam ‘grel - sub-commentary
rnam dag lam - the pure path
rnam par ‘jig pa - destroyed, eliminated
rnam rig tsam - mere cognition, cognition-only
snang gi blad pa - corrupt appearance
snang gnyis - dual appearance
PA
dpyis phyin pa - perfect, unmistaken
spangs pa - eradicating or rejecting
spong tshul - method or means of eradication or rejection
PHA
Phags pa dGongs pa NGes par ‘Grel pa, Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra – The Sūtra Unravelling the Intention [of the Buddha]
phags pa’i gzigs pa - the vision of or what is seen by an Āryan [[[bodhisattva]]]
phags pa’i yeshe - the gnosis of an Āryan, Āryajñāna
phung po rnams, skandhas - aggregates [of sentient existence]
phyi rol tu - external, outside, outer
phyin ci log gi dngos po - mistaken entity
phyogs snga ma - prior premise or predicate
phra mo - subtle
BA
Bod – Tibet
Bram ze - Brahmin
BYang sa, Bodhisattvabhūmi – The Stage or Ground of the Bodhisattva
byang sems or byang chub sems dpa’ – bodhisattva
byung ba - occurrence, happening, event, manifestiation, element
dbang po mngon sum tsad ma - the direct or sensorial means of cognition
dbang shes - sensory awareness, sense faculties
dBu ma, Madhyamaka - Middle Way
dBu ma pa (sg.) dbu ma pa rnams (pl), Mādhyamika - proponent(s) of the Middle Way
dBu ma sNang ba, Madhyamakāloka - Clarification of the Middle Way
dBus mTha’, Madhyāntavibhāga; - Analysis of the Middle and the Extremes
sbyod yul - sphere of knowledge, object of practice
MA
ma yin pa dag - non-existents
ma yin dgag - affirming negation (NRY:) 1) affirming negation, deductive reasoning [[[Wikipedia:negation|negation]]]. 2) “the denial that, even if a certain something can be said to exist, it has any given property or nature.” This is the second of Nāgārjuna’s two famous denials, dealt with in the opening stanza of his Madhyamakakarikā; provisional/ qualified negation; affirming negative, affirmative negation, “rejected as not being such and such”. comp. {med dgag} or “absolute negation” (see below).
mi mthun pa - unharmonious, incongruous
mi ‘thad - incorrect
mi dod - non-assertion, non-acceptance, undesirable
mi rigs - incorrect, unaware, ignorant
ming du btags - nominally imputed
med dgag - non-affirming negation (NRY:) refutation as nonexistent; flat/ total negation; absolute negation, non-affirming negative, exclusion negation; explicit negation; refuting as being nonexistent, direct / non-affirming negation, [comp. with {ma yin dgag} med dgag dang ma yin dgag - negation of all and beyond negation, negation of all and negation of negation itself, reputing as non-existent and reputing as not being such and such (see above)
med dgag yul - object of non-affirming negation
med dgos - necessarily non-existent
med du zin pa - cleaving to non-existence
med pa - non-existence
med par lta – nihilismistic view
med par thal - non-existence as a consequence
myong - experience
myong rig - experiential awareness
dman pa rnams - inferiors, inferior people
dmigs pa - object
smra rgyang, Śrāvakāyanist – (GS:) alternative form of theg dman or nyan thos kyi theg pa, the “Hearer’s Vehicle,” synonomous with the unpolitically correct and out-dated term Hinayānist or Proponent of the “Inferior” or “Lesser” Vehicle
smra ba – stating
TSA
rtsa ‘grel - root text and commentary
TSHa
tshig tsam - mere verbalization, strictly verbal
tshe dang ldan pa, ayuṣman - “gentleman” (literally, “one possessing life;”)
mtshan nyid gsum - the three characteristics (these refer to the characteristics of the three natures)
mtshan nyid kho na - strictly or only characteristics
mtshan nyid kyis med pa - non-existent by means of characteristics
mtshan nyid kyis yod pa - existent by means of characteristics
mtshan ma med pa - signlessness, characterlessness
DZA
‘dzin rnam - the subjective or apprehending aspect
‘dzin pa - apprehending or grasping
‘dzin tshul - mode or means of apprehension
rdzas – substance, substantial, material
rdzas su grub pa - substantially established
ZHA
zhen yul - object of attachment
zhes p’ai don - the aim or meaning of a statement
gzhan dbang - the other-dependent [[[nature]]]
bzhed pa - acceptance, adherence
ZA
zab mo lta ba’i lam gyi rim pa - the stage of the path of the profound view
zag med - stainless
zag med yeshe - stainless gnosis
gzugs - form
gzugs sogs kyi chos rnams - the phenomena of form, etc.
gzung ‘dzin - subject/object, grasper, grasped
gzung ‘dzin rdzas gzhan - the substantial difference [between] subject and object
bzlog tu med pa – irreversible
YA
yang dag par grub pa - completely or purely established
yang dag par ma grub pa - incompletely or impurely established
yul can - subject, (possessor of an object)
yeshe - gnosis, wisdom
yongs grup - the perfected [[[nature]]] (NRY:) the absolute, corresponds to absolute truth, absolute, ‘fully established’. consummate, established reality, established phenomena, full presence, ultimate cognition of reality, brought to perfection, fully established, synonium absolute, the ideally absolute, totally real, perfected, thoroughly established phenomena, thoroughly established [esp. in context of {mtshan nyid gsum}. full presence, thoroughly established, the ideally absolute. {yongs su grub pa} the absolute, corresponds to absolute truth, ultimate cognition of reality, brought to perfection, totally real, perfected, thoroughly established phenomena, thoroughly established [esp. in context of {mtshan nyid gsum}. fully established, synonium absolute; gdod ma’i don dam chos thams cad kyi chos nyid} rang rig rang gsal spros pa thams cad dang bral ba de yin te/ chos nyid dang chos dbyings dang/ de bzhin nyid dang/ don dam pa rnams ming gi rnam grangs so} the absolute; don dam par yod pa ste rnam par mi rtog pa’i yul yin pa’i phyir ro} thoroughly established
yod, yod pa - existent, existing
RA
rang gi rgyus bskyed pa - originating or generated from itself as a cause
rang gi ngo bo med pa - devoid of or non-existent with regard to its own essence
rang gi mtshan nyid - possessing its own characteristics
rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa - established or demonstrated by its own characteristics
rang gi mtshan nyid kyis ma grub pa - not established or demonstrated by its own characteristics
rang gi gnas tsod - its own standpoint
rang gi rigs ‘dra snga ma’i rgyus bskyed pa - originating or generated through the cause of its own prior continuum
rang ngos nas - from its own essence
rang mtshan dmigs p’ai tsad ma – means of cognition that experience or see its own characteristic or sign.
rang mtshan gyis grub - proven or demonstrated by means of its own characteristics
rang bzhin med pa’i tshad ma - means of the cognition of the non-existence of inherent existence
rang rig - self-awareness
rang rig khas len pa - assertion or acceptance of the self-awareness
rang rig gis yul can - the subject with self-awareness
rang rig sgrub byed - effecting the proof of the self-awareness
rang rig tsam - mere self-awareness
rig gi shes pa - logical knowledge
rigs pa - logic, awareness (NRY:) logical, tenable, appropriate, fits, makes sense; it is fitting. 2) philosophy, reasoning, reason, rational thinking - the type of reasoning that employs logical principles and analysis, logical arguement, suitably correct method, the right method, reasoning
rigs pa’i gnod pa - logically faulty
rigs pa las - logically, logical outcome
rung, rung ba - appropriate, proper
reg - touch, reach
LA
lan ‘debs - response, answer
lan du - in response, as an answer
Lang kar gShegs pa, Laṅkāvatara-sūtra – Descent to [[[Śrī]]] Laṅkā
lam bgrod tshul gnyis - the two means of traversing the path
lugs - system, school
lung - scripture
lung gi rjes ‘brang - adherents of scripture
lus nyid du – embodiment
Legs bShad sNying po - The Heart of Superb Elucidation
log pa - mistaken, perverse
log par zhugs pa - mistakenly or perversely abiding, steadfast in error
log par zin pa - mistakenly or perversely apprehending
blo - intellect
blo kun rdzob pa - mental concealment
blo ldan – sentient
slob dpon - Master
bslad pa - corrupt, mixed up
SA
so so skye bo - ordinary individual, “everyman,” generic person, one who is not at Āryan bodhisattva
so so rang gis rig p’ai yeshe – Wisdom aware by itself of each and everything (NRY:) discriminating awareness wisdom so so rang gi rig pa - particularising, intrinsic awareness, believed to exist in absolute truth by {sems tsam}
gsungs pa - doctrine, teaching
bsam pa - thinking, keeping in mind
bsu ba - invite, inviting
SHA
shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis - the two approaches of the Great Chariot
shugs la - implicitly
shes pa - knowledge, understanding
bshad pa - explanation
Appendix C: Select Bibliography
Asaṅga The Summary of the Great Vehicle
(as translated from the Chinese by John Keenan)
(Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1992)
Baird, Robert (1972) Bloom, Alfred, Indian and Far Eastern Religious Traditions (from the preface to Baird’s work), (New York: Harper and Row), 1972.
Bareau, André (1955) Les Sectes Bouddhique du Petit Vehicule, (Saïgon: l’Ucole Française d’Uxtrême-Orient, 1955) Publications de l’Ucole Française d’Uxtrême-Orient, Vol. XXVIII.
Baur, F. C. (1863) Geschichte der Christlichen Kirche, Erster Band, Kirchengeschichte der Drei Ersten Jahrhunderte
(Tübingen: Verlag und Druck von L. Fr. Fues.) 1863
Third edition (From an unaltered photocopied printing of the original, Berlin, DDR: Nationales Druckhaus), 1969.
Bhattacārya, Kamaleswar (1985) “The Dialectical Method of Nāgārjuna ”
Journal of Indian Philosophy 1
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1971) [I have reworked the section quoted].
Brubaker, Rogers Theory and Society, (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers), 1985
Cabezon, Jose A Dose of Emptiness: an Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas-grub dGe-legs-dpal-bzang
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992)
Candrakīrti
Prāsaṅnapada - seminar translations, worked through with my B. A. and Master’s Advisor, Isshi Yamada
Doniger, Wendy Criterion, Journal of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago,
(Chicago: University of Chicago Divinity School, Winter, 1991).
Eliade, Mircea Encyclopedia of Religion, , editor. (New York: Macmillan) 1987
Everding, Karl-Heinz Der Präexistenzen der lCang. skya Qutuqtus: Untersuchungen zur Konstruktion und Historischen Enwicklung einer Lamaisschen Existenzenlinie
(Weisbaden: Harrassowitz, 1988)
Fenner, Peter Ontology of the Middle Way
(Dordrecht; Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990)
Frauwallner, Erich On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu
(Rome : Istituto Italiano per il Medio e Estremo Oriente, 1951 )
Gill, Sam Mother Earth: an American Story,
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Gomez, Luis O. “Proto-Madhyamaka in the Pali canon”
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Griffiths, Paul On Being Mindless
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Harnack, Adolf von Das Wesen des Christentums
(Berlin, 1900)
as translated by T. Saunders, What is Christianity?
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Harris, Ian Charles, The Continuity of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra in Mahāyāna Buddhism
(Leiden : E. J. Brill), 1991
Hopkins, Jeffrey Emptiness Yoga: The Middle Way Consequence School
(Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1987).
__________ Compassion in Tibetan Buddhism
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Huntington, Christopher The Emptiness of Emptiness: an Introduction to early Indian Mādhyamika
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989).
Husserl, Edmund The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology
as translated by David Carr
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Ichigo, Masamichi Madhyamkālaṃkara of Śāntarakṣita
Chugan Shogonron no kenkyu Kyoto, 1985, pages LXXXV Jñānagarbha and svasamvedana lxxxi english intro
Iida, Shotaro Reason and Emptiness: a Study in Logic and Mysticism
(Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1980)
Inada, Kenneth Nāgārjuna : a Translation of his Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥs
(Albany : State University of New York Press), 1973
Jong, J.W. de “Review of Karl-Heinz Everding’s Der Präexistenzen der lCang. skya Qutuqtus,”
Indo-Iranian Journal,
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991), vol. 34, no. 2, April 1991.
__________ “Notes on the Bodhisattvabhūmi ”
Hinduismus und Buddhismus: Festschrift for Ulrich Schneider
edited by Harry Falk
(Freiburg: Hedwig Falk, 1987), pages 163-172
__________ Jong, J. W. de (1994), Review of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra: a Study of Mahāyāna Philosophies (IIJ, vol. 37, Jan. 1994) pp. 63-64.
__________ de Jong, (1994), Review of Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācara in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. (IIJ, no. 4, 1994)
Krmpfe Hans Rainer Bi ma’i ‘od zer: die Biographie des 2. Pekinger lCang skya Qutuqtu Rol pa’i rdo rje (1717 - 1786
Herausgegeben, eingeleitet und zusammengefasst von Hans Rainer Krmpfe
(St. Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag, 1976).
Kalupahana, David, Nāgārjuna : the Philosophy of the Middle Way
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Annales du Musée Guimet, Bibliotèque d’Études, tom. 11.
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Klein, Anne Carolyn Knowing, Naming and Negation: a Sourcebook on Tibetan Sautrantika
Translations in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism
(Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1991)
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Koester, Helmut “The History of Religions School, Gnosis and the Gospel of John,”
(Copenhagen: Studia Theologica vol. 40, 1986, page 118.)
Lamotte, Étienne La Somme du Grand Véhicule d’Asaṅga (Mahāyāna Saṃgrāha) (Vols.1-2)
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Bibliothèque du Muséon, (Vol.) 7.
lCang skya II Rol pa’i rdo rje Yeshe bstan pa’i sgron me Grub pa’i mTha’i rNam par bZhag pa gSal bar bShad pa Thub bsTan Lhun po’i mDzes rGyan: A survey of the Buddhist philosophical systems by the Second lCang-skya Rol-pa’i-rdo-rje
Reproduced from a set of clear impressions from the Se-ra Smad Grwa-tshang blocks
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Lin, Yutang From Pagan to Christian
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The Gospel and the Church,
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Taisho Daigaku 72 Kenkyu Kiyo (1986), pages 27-44
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rGyal tsab Dar ma Rin chen rNam bShad SNying po’i rGyan
Sk. Abhisamayālaṃkarabhāṣya
John Makransky has an edition – Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet; [this is not the one I used and alas, lost the original source.]
(Albany: SUNY Press), 1997
Ruegg, David Seyfort Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India (Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981)
__________ La Theorie du Tathāgatagarbha et du Gotra: Etudes sur la Soturiologie et la Gnosuologie du Bouddhisme
(Paris: Ecole Francaise d’Extreme-Orient, 1969)
__________ Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective : On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet
(New Delhi : Heritage Publishers), 1992
Sakai, Shinten “On Nāgārjuna’s Bodhicittavivāraṇa nāma”
Naritasan buddkyo kenkyujo kiyo
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Schmithausen, Lambert “On the Problem of the Relation of Spiritual Practice and Philosophical Theory in Buddhism”
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Sopa Geshe Lhundhup Lectures on Tibetan Religious Culture
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__________ Cutting Through Appearances : Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism
(with Jeffrey Hopkins).
(Ithaca : Snow Lion) 1989
Sthiramati Triṃsikabhāṣyam seminar translations, worked through with my B. A. and Master’s Advisor, Isshi Yamada.
Suzuki, Daisetz Lavkavatarasūtra
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Takasaki, Jikido, A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga (Uttaratantra) : Being a Treatise on the Tathāgatagarbha Theory of Mahāyāna Buddhism
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Thu’u bkwan Collected Works of Thu’u-bKwan blo bzang Chos kyi Nyima
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Troeltsch Ernst Gesammelte Schriften II
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Von Campenhausen,
Hans Freiherr Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries
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