Is Svasaṃvitti Intentional?

In a recent series of articles and monographs by Dan Arnold, Christian Coseru, and others, a picture has begun to emerge of the Buddhist epistemological term svasaṃvitti as a “first-personal,” object-oriented kind of awareness. On these accounts, svasaṃvitti sometimes refers to a cognizing subject’s first-person knowledge of her own mental states; at other times, it refers to phenomenological subjectivity, the subject-pole of an intentional relation. What these positions have in common is that svasaṃvitti is described either as an intentional form of cognition, or just intentionality itself. This is reflected in Arnold’s and Coseru’s choice to translate the term as “self-awareness,” i.e. the awareness of one’s subjectivity or one’s own (subjectively-apprehended) mental states. Although reflexive awareness is indeed a feature of all intentional cognitions, my

contention is that a thorough and textually-faithful account of Dharmakīrti’s epistemological theory reveals a rather different picture of svasaṃvitti, which I will for this reason insist on translating as “reflexive awareness.” Once Dharmakīrti shifts from External Realism to Epistemic Idealism, in particular, reflexive awareness must be understood as non-dual and therefore non-intentional. Not only is this point explicitly stated in the Pramāṇavārttika, the coherence of his entire epistemological (and

soteriological) project ultimately depends on it. Dharmakīrti’s position may be wrong, but there can be no question as to what his position actually is. I will begin with a brief overview of intentionality in general. Following this, I will provide an account of intentionality, and the relationship between reflexive awareness and perceptual cognitions, in Buddhist epistemological theory. Through a close reading of Dharmakīrti and his earliest commentators, I will subsequently demonstrate that the coherence of reflexive awareness as a feature of Indian Buddhist epistemological theory demands that it be understood as non-dual or non-intentional. Finally, I conclude with some reflections on the problems inherent in any study of reflexive awareness.

Two Senses of Intentionality

The locus classicus for the concept of intentionality in Western philosophy of mind is Brentano's Psychology, wherein he writes:

Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as an object within itself...1

This passage neatly encapsulates one of the fundamental difficulties in discussing what it means to claim that svasaṃvitti is intentional or non-intentional. The problem is that, as we see from Brentano’s “not wholly unambiguous” definition, there is from the outset a certain equivocation: on the one hand, intentionality is characterized as reference or direction toward an object, while on the other hand it is simultaneously defined as the inclusion of an object within itself—that is, as the presence of mental content. In the first case, the object is portrayed as being in some way separate from the intending consciousness—at least in its subjective or first-person aspect—while, in the second case, the object is understood to lie within consciousness. In other words, to the extent that intentionality denotes direction toward an object, that object must at the very least be conceptually or analytically separable, and perhaps even ontologically distinct, from the intending consciousness;

but if intentionality means that the intending consciousness includes some kind of content within itself, then we are by definition talking about one single thing. This ambiguity is reflected in contemporary discussions of intentionality as “aboutness”;2 does “aboutness” denote a relationship with something external or something internal to the mind? That is to say, does “intentionality” denote directedness toward an object, or the contentfulness of a cognition? Put slightly differently, are intentional cognitions “about” external objects in an unmediated way, or are they in fact “about” their own contents? At a first approximation, this constitutes the difference between direct realist and representationalist theories of perception. It also reflects the tendency of some contemporary philosophers to attempt to remove consciousness from intentionality per se,

as for example in the eliminativist position that phenomenal content can be accounted for, in the final analysis, without anything like real first-person subjectivity. As will become clear, though, for Dharmakīrti and his mainstream Indian Buddhist interpreters, it is impossible for any mental content to exist in the absence of phenomenological duality. That is to say, there is no sense in which cognitions can be “about” anything, if they are not structured by subject-object duality. Superficially, this may seem to align Dharmakīrti with the tradition of phenomenology descending from Brentano and Husserl, which makes a similar point about the necessity of intentionality qua directedness for intentionality qua mental content. Crucially, however, and unlike Husserlian epistemology, on the Indian Buddhist account cognitions are not necessarily intentional. On the

contrary, subject-object duality is nothing more than a type of perceptual distortion, akin to an optical illusion; intentionality, in other words, is an accidental, and not an essential, feature of consciousness. Furthermore, and relatedly, on this account intentional duality does not, in fact, describe the apprehension of a perceptual object by some agentive, perceiving subject, but instead refers only to the structure of ordinary beings’ cognitions. Since this dualistic structure is a form of distortion, and any kind of phenomenal content is therefore epistemically unreliable, nondual— which is to say, non-intentional and contentless—reflexive awareness ultimately supplants sensory perception as the only true “direct” (pratyakṣa) pramāṇa. But in order to explain these points, it is first necessary to say a few words about Dharmakīrti’s account of the perceptual process. 2 Cf., for example, Arnold (2013), 106-108.

Intentionality and Perception in Buddhist Pramāṇa Theory

On the Buddhist account, sensation becomes knowledge in three distinct phases. First, there is an indeterminate, nonconceptual perceptual cognition that arises more or less automatically from contact with particulars, and is always already bifurcated into the twin “aspects” (ākāra) of subjective (grāhakākāra) and objective (grāhyākāra) “phenomenal forms” or “cognitive images.” The subject-image refers to the implicit feeling of first-person subjectivity or minimal self-representation, which I have elsewhere3 compared to what the cognitive scientist Antonio Damasio terms the “protoself.”4 The object-image is a mental representation with features that depend upon the causal properties of whatever is taken to be the object of perceptual cognition (i.e. infinitesimal particles on the basic, External Realist account). These two always arise simultaneously, a point of Dharmakīrti’s theory known as the “Rule of Appearing Together” (sahopalambhaniyama), which I will return to shortly. Subsequent to the initial moment of perceptual contact,

specific features of the objective image, which are considered relevant for the purposes of obtaining some particular goal or result, are picked out through the process of “other-exclusion” (anyāpoha) or concept formation.5 Precisely which properties get picked out, though, depends entirely upon the cognizer’s global situation—her karmic conditioning, her hopes and desires, the acuity of her sensory faculties, and so on. Finally, if the features picked out by the concept-formation process correspond with the actual causal properties of the particulars being perceived, there is a determinate perceptual judgment (niścaya). Consider, for example, the visual cognition of a blue circle. In the first phase, partless particles operate together to produce an objective cognitive image (as well as a subject-image) in 3 Yiannopoulos (2012). 4 Damasio (1999), 89. 5 NB this refers to the Buddhist view of concepts, i.e. sāmānya, which may or may not correspond well to Western epistemologists’ use of the term.

the consciousness of the cognizer. But this object-image tracks all the features of all the particles available to the visual faculty as they operate together—rather than any individual particle6—and is therefore no more a cognition of a ‘blue circle’ than of anything else in the visual field: say, for example, the screen upon which the blue circle has been projected, or the space surrounding it. In this sense, the objective image is undifferentiated, and therefore does not in and of itself constitute determinate propositional knowledge of the form, for example, of “This is a blue circle.” In the second phase, the capacity of the particles being perceived to produce the judgment ‘blue circle’ is isolated from all of their other causal properties, such as their brightness or hardness or causal history of having been made in a Chinese factory. Finally, on the

basis of this conceptual isolation, there is the definite perceptual judgment: “That is a blue circle.” However, it is extremely important to understand that, in principle, all the causal properties excluded through the process of concept formation are available to the cognizer— whether or not the cognizer ever forms a perceptual judgment about those properties. Irrespective of which particular features of the object image are (or are not) determined in a subsequent perceptual judgment, that is, the cognizer is minimally and reflexively aware of all its features, just insofar as the object-image is presented in consciousness. This is because the presentation of an object-image in consciousness just is the reflexive awareness of that object-image, or as Dharmakīrti writes, “reflexive awareness is the awareness of that object” (PV3.348a). Dharmakīrti explains (PV3.349cd-350, trans. Dunne):

Since the cognition (sthiti) of the object has the nature of [[[reflexive awareness]]], reflexive awareness is also considered to be awareness of the object.

Therefore, the awareness of the object and reflexive awareness do not actually have different objects. When one examines the nature [of a cognition], the result is said to be reflexive awareness, because the awareness of the object is of the nature [of reflexive awareness].

And in fact, although this is not a part of Dharmakīrti’s argument in this particular passage, the same holds true for the subject-image as well; just insofar as the subject-image is presented in consciousness, there is reflexive awareness of the subject-image, because a cognizer is always 6 PV3.194-196.

reflexively aware of the contents of cognition, i.e. the (simultaneously-arisen) subject- and object-images. This is not to say, however, that the mere reflexive awareness of the contents of cognition is sufficient to determine specific features of those contents in a perceptual judgment. Ordinarily, only certain features of the object-image are determined in this way, reflecting the cognizer’s circumstances: what she is interested in, paying attention to, habituated for, and so on. If we are only interested in an abstract discussion of color or shape or Buddhist epistemology, for example, we might never form the judgment “This projector screen is high quality.” Similarly, we may not be able to tell whether the causal history of the particles comprising a particular projector screen involved the screen’s manufacture in a Chinese as opposed to an American factory, but an expert in the properties of projector screens very well might.7 As an aside, one way of thinking about a Buddha’s omniscience is as the perfect, lossless

recovery of all this causal information—not just whether the screen-particles were assembled in China, for example, but their entire causal history throughout beginningless time. Another way of thinking about this point is that we are constantly inattention-blind to every property of the object-image, except for those few features that contribute to a niścaya. Even during an episode of inattention blindness, however, the fact that someone does not happen to form a determinate perceptual judgment of one or more features

presented in the object-image in no way implies that she is utterly unaware of them. For example, a viewer of the famous “Monkey Business” video is (at a bare minimum) reflexively aware of the man in the gorilla suit—insofar as the gorilla suit particles necessarily contribute to the production of the objectimage—whether or not the viewer ever forms the judgment “Hey, there is a man in a gorilla suit in the middle of the basketball court!”. For Dharmakīrti, in other words, inattention blindness is nothing more than the failure of a cognizer to form a perceptual judgment about some particular feature(s) of the object-image, not the absence of reflexive awareness during such episodes. As we have seen from the passage above, the presence of an object-image in consciousness just is the reflexive awareness of that object-image.

7 In other words, a properly-habituated cognizer (e.g. an expert in projector screens) is able to form an “immediately subsequent definitive determination” (pratyakṣapṛṣṭhalabdhaniścaya) following the initial perceptual cognition. Cf. Dunne (2004), 287-309. Reflexive Awareness in the Pratyakṣa Chapter of the Pramāṇavārttika

Having briefly described Dharmakīrti’s model of the perceptual process, I would now like to discuss in greater detail the relationship between reflexive awareness, subject-object duality, and phenomenal content. To begin with, though, it will be helpful to define some key terms: self-awareness, reflexive awareness, and reflective awareness. The contemporary philosopher Matthew Mackenzie has defined "Self-Awareness Theory" as the epistemological claim that "if a subject is aware of an object, then the subject is also aware of being aware of that object."8 According to Mackenzie, there are two primary forms of the Self-Awareness Theory: the "Reflection Thesis" and the "Reflexivity Thesis." The "Reflection Thesis" claims that "Self-awareness is the product of a second-order awareness taking a distinct, first-order awareness as its intentional object.”9 Its

counterpart, the "Reflexivity Thesis," claims that "Conscious states simultaneously disclose both the object of consciousness and (aspects of) the conscious state itself,”10 or, in other words, that consciousness is reflexively, immediately aware of itself and/or its contents. The key difference between these theories is that “reflective” self-awareness is necessarily intentional, insofar as it apprehends an intentional object—mental states—while “reflexive” self-awareness is non-intentional or non-dual; it does not

necessarily take an object as such. In contemporary phenomenological literature, this is sometimes referred to as a distinction between “transitive” and “intransitive” forms of selfawareness. Western interlocutors frequently adopt a transitive or "reflective" view of reflexive awareness. Dan Arnold (2010), for example, has characterized svasaṃvitti as "a distinctive kind of perceptual awareness—one distinguished by its particular object or content (viz., one's "self,” [sic]11 or one's own mental states), but otherwise evincing the same structure and character as ordinary perception. While first-order perceptions, then, are of the ordinary objects of experience, svasaṃvitti consists in the essentially second-order awareness of those first-order

8 Mackenzie, “The Illumination of Consciousness,” 40. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Contra Arnold, see Śākyabuddhi, below p. 11: “The expression "subject" does not express mere reflexive awareness, which is the essential nature of cognition itself.”

cognitions."12 Similarly, Christian Coseru writes that “If self-awareness were not implicitly intentional”—in other words, as I understand this argument, if svasaṃvitti were not inherently object-oriented, reflectively directed toward internal mental states—“it could not be a necessary condition for genuine aboutness.”13 There are two main problems, however, with the reflective or intentional account of svasaṃvitti. First, such an account ignores Dharmakīrti’s commitment to asserting the ultimate unreality of any distributed entities: for Dharmakīrti, cognitions are ultimately real qua efficacious particular,14 and therefore cannot be bifurcated, since ultimately real particulars are ontologically singular, but a truly bifurcated cognition would be distributed over its two halves. Second, and more importantly for our purposes, the intentional account of svasaṃvitti is belied by Dharmakīrti’s theory of the internal error or antarupaplava, and his related commitment to the unreality of extramental objects. In PV 3.212-214, Dharmakīrti writes (trans. Dunne, emphasis mine):

This part of awareness—namely, the one that is established such that it seems external—is different from the internal determination. Awareness is not differentiated, but its appearance is differentiated into two. This being so, that dualistic appearance must be cognitive confusion.

The nonexistence of one of the two in awareness eliminates the existence of both. Therefore, the emptiness of duality is the suchness of the awareness.

The definition of things as different is based on the difference between [[[subject]] and object]. If the awareness is erroneous (upaplava), then their difference is also erroneous.15

Commenting upon this passage, Devendrabuddhi writes (trans. Dunne, emphasis original):

12 Arnold (2010), 324. It should be noted that in this passage Arnold is describing what he characterizes the "perceptual" sense of svasaṃvitti, as opposed to what he terms the "constitutive" sense, following Paul Williams' distinction between rang rig i) and rang rig ii). However, one of the primary aims of this essay is to demonstrate that this distinction is both hermeneutically suspect and philosophically incoherent. Arnold himself (2013, p. 162) acknowledges that, at the very least, from Dharmakīrti’s perspective this distinction begs the relevant question. 13 Coseru (2012), 264. 14 Dunne (2004), 90, 130-131. 15 Dunne (2004), 406-408.

The internal determination means the definitively determined experience of the subject-image which is internal and determined to be a single entity. This is the one from which the other aspect is different; that other aspect is the one that is established such that in the consideration of childish beings it seems external. Whether or not external objects exist, cognition has a dual nature, but it does not ultimately make sense for a single cognition to have two cognitive images because the cognition would no longer be singular.

To begin with, in other words, a cognition that was actually bifurcated into subjective and objective images would no longer be ontologically simple, and therefore could not be real. Furthermore, the apparent bifurcation between subject and object only holds “in the consideration of childish beings.” Glossing this phrase in his sub-commentary to Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi writes (trans. Dunne):

"[[[Devendrabuddhi]]] says childish beings because the duality of object and subject appears in that fashion only to those who are confused. The bodhisattvas who have realized that [[[phenomena]]] are selfless only know mere reflexive awareness which is devoid of duality… That being the case, in terms of just what appears, awareness is dualistic. However, dualistic awareness is not real; rather, it is established through cognitive error."

The particular type of “cognitive error” or upaplava that makes objects appear to be external, despite the fact that the subject/object duality in our perceptions is actually unreal,16 is the “internal distortion” or antarupaplava, identified by Dharmakīrti at PV3.362. In the verses leading up to his identification of the antarupaplava, Dharmakīrti explicitly maintains that the true nature of awareness is non-dual, and intentional duality nothing more than a form of distortion:

Even though the nature of awareness is undifferentiated, those with distorted experience (viparyāsitadarśana) characterize it as if it were differentiated into object, subject and awareness. [3.353]

For ordinary beings under ordinary circumstances, in other words, it is acceptable to speak of the object, subject, and resulting (pramāṇaphala) reflexive awareness of a cognition as different things. The reflexive awareness of an object may be, in a sense, conceptually distinguished from the appearance of the object-image in consciousness.17 However, this is not in keeping with the true nature of awareness. As noted above, the appearance of an object-image in consciousness just is the reflexive awareness of it; “there is no difference of object” (viṣayabhedo’pi na). Furthermore, because the object-image always arises together with the subject-image, the reflexive awareness of the object is not in fact different from the reflexive awareness of the subject. Although sometimes spoken of as a “result,” reflexive awareness in fact simultaneously discloses—or just is the simultaneous disclosure of—both subject and object.

Therefore, reflexive awareness cannot logically possess a subject-object intentional structure, because cognition itself does not actually possess this structure. As Dharmakīrti writes, cognitions are in fact undifferentiated, their seeming duality nothing more than a type of illusion:

For those confused (upapluta) by mantric spells and such, things such as clay shards appear otherwise [than they actually are], even though [those things] are devoid of the nature [that they appear to have] because they are not seen that way by those whose eyes are not confused. Or, to use another example, in the desert something that looks big from afar is seen to be small [by those nearby]. [3.354355] In accord with [confused] experience, object, subject and awareness are construed as the structure (sthiti) of a reliable cognition’s object, means and result, even though that structure does not [ultimately] exist. [3.356]18

A detailed treatment of this last verse is beyond the scope of the present essay, as it concerns pramāṇa theory’s debt to Sanskrit grammar, but for our purposes the most important point is that, in this passage, Dharmakīrti does not draw a distinction between the false cognitive appearance of seemingly extramental objects, and the differentiation of the object-image from the subject-image as such. Recall Devendrabuddhi’s comment from above: “Whether or not 17 This is, of course, the same point Diṅnāga makes in PSV ad PS1.10. 18 Devendrabuddhi (226b) remarks, “It is done in terms of the way [[[cognition]]] appears, but not in ultimate terms” (ji ltar snang ba bzhin du yin gyi don dam par ni ma yin no).

external objects exist, cognition has a dual nature, but it does not ultimately make sense for a single cognition to have two cognitive images because the cognition would no longer be singular.” In other words, every dualistic cognition is mistaken or distorted precisely to the extent that it feels like some object is being “apprehended” by a first-person or intentional subjectivity—even when that object is construed as a mental entity or a mental state, as in the reflective theory of self-awareness. I emphasize the phrase “feels like,” because in it lies the key to Coseru’s question as to how non-intentional reflexive awareness could ever serve as the basis for intentional experience. The answer is that cognition only ever feels like the apprehension of a subject by an object; as Śākyabuddhi (trans. Dunne, emphasis mine) writes,

Since an agent and its patient are constructed in dependence upon each other, these two [i.e. subject and object] are posited in dependence on each other. The expression "subject" does not express mere reflexive awareness, which is the essential nature of cognition itself. The essential nature of cognition is not construed in mutual dependence on something else because it arises as such from its own causes. The essential nature of cognition is established in mere reflexive awareness. Since it is devoid of the above-described subject and object, it is said to be non-dual.

Śākyabuddhi’s point here is similar to Nāgārjuna’s analysis of going: subjects, objects, and actions are only ever posited in dependence upon one another, and are therefore not ultimately real. In other words, cognition feels like a subject-image is apprehending an object-image, but in reality nothing of the sort is occurring. Precisely because the subject-image and object-image arise simultaneously, it is impossible for one to causally affect or interact with the other.19 On the contrary: the apparent bifurcation of cognition is nothing more than a type of perceptual distortion, structuring each and every moment of an ordinary or “childish” being’s consciousness. The “necessary condition” for intentional experience (or “genuine aboutness”), therefore, is not svasaṃvitti but ignorance.

19 See also Dunne (2004), 276n93: “That reflexive awareness is noncausal follows from its simultaneity with its object.”

It should not be surprising, then, that the Buddhist epistemological tradition ultimately abandons the idea that sensory consciousness—which, again, is always already structured into the dualistic appearance of subject and object—could ever be identified as the perceptual or “direct” epistemological warrant (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa). In Dharmakīrti’s system, pratyakṣapramāṇa has two necessary qualities: it must be both nonconceptual (kalpanāpoḍha) and undistorted (abhrānta).20 The concession, at the Epistemic Idealist level of analysis, that sensory cognitions (and all forms of intentional experience generally) are indelibly characterized by the “internal distortion,” necessitates that they fail to fulfill the latter criterion. It is my strong suspicion that this particularly difficult point has contributed greatly to the current hermeneutical impasse

surrounding reflexive awareness. If nonconceptual sensory experience cannot, in the final analysis, be considered “perception,” clearly we are dealing with a very different idea of what “perception” means than that which is familiar to Western epistemologists. Coseru, for example, has stated that he is "not at all convinced that Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, and their successors can be interpreted unambiguously to claim that perception lacks intentionality".21 And, in one sense, he is quite correct to point out that perception is intentional, if by “perception” we mean “sensory cognition” and by “intentional” we mean “dualistically-structured.” The problem is that, from an Epistemic Idealist perspective, only reflexive awareness ultimately qualifies as “perception” (i.e. pratyakṣa-pramāṇa), since only reflexive awareness is not intentional: every other form of cognition is erroneous, precisely insofar as it possesses a dualistic structure. Thus, in a very real sense, the only way we can ever truly know anything is by means of reflexive awareness. Yet, as John Dunne writes,

If we trust Śākyabuddhi's opinion, the ultimate pramāṇa would be the pure, non-dual, reflexive awareness of the mind itself. But while this ultimate instrumental cognition is the means to Dharmakīrti's final soteriological goal, it is not useful for practical action in the world (i.e., saṃsāra). If the ultimate instrument of knowledge is indeed some pure form of reflexive awareness, then there are no longer external objects—or 20 PV 3.1. According to Dharmakīrti perception must also fulfill a third requirement, arthakriyā-stithiḥ, but this stipulation is not relevant to the present goal. 21 Coseru (2012), 256.

even mental content—on which to act. Hence, it would seem that conventional perceptions and inferences are eventually left behind.

Dunne’s analysis is borne out by Dharmakīrti’s assertion that, in the absence of subject- or object-image, conventional appearances disappear altogether (PV3.215-218, trans. Dunne):

There is no definition of things outside of the definition of them as either objects or subjects. [Those definitions do not ultimately make sense;] therefore, since things are empty of any definition, it is explained that they are essenceless.

All distinctive definitions of things such as the aggregates are delimited by activity. That activity is not ultimate; therefore, those things are also devoid of [[[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]]] definition.

As is the case with persons who have cataracts, those who are by nature confused by ignorance have cognitions with false images (vijñaptirvitathākāra) that arise in dependence on their respective conditions.

The ultimate nature of the cognitive content [in perception] is not known by any [[[ordinary beings]]] whose vision is not supreme; they do not know that ultimate nature because it is impossible for them to experience that content without the error (viplava) for subject and object.

Because it is impossible to experience (intentional) content without (intentional) duality, in other words, the elimination of dualistic distortion entails the disappearance of differentiated sensory content. All that remains is the undifferentiated, non-dual “luminosity” (prakāśa or prabhāsvara) of reflexive awareness.

Conclusion

Of course, Dharmakīrti’s position here might well be thoroughly unsatisfying to a contemporary philosopher. In effect, this might be considered a form of argument from authority: a Buddha’s experience is non-dual, and contentless but for undifferentiated luminosity, so we have to work backwards from there. On the one hand, this rebuttal misses the point that there are important theoretical motivations behind Dharmakīrti’s stance. To begin with, the critique of distributed entities, and the commitment to the

idea that what is ultimately real is momentary and causally efficacious— both of which were inherited from Abhidharma-style analysis—necessitate a conception of cognitions as ontologically simple. There would, in other words, be serious problems with a dualistic account of consciousness, even without the specifically Yogācāra refutation of extramental entities. And even if, as Coseru has written, “Buddhist epistemologists rest their proof of selfawareness on the experience of states of pure luminosity that presumably transcend the subjectobject dichotomy,"22 it would be an overstatement to conclude (for example) that the experience of such states was therefore nothing more than a normative goal set by the tradition for its adherents, unrelated to the ordinary perceptual process. Nondual reflexive awareness is a feature of every cognition; for ordinary beings under ordinary circumstances, it just so happens to be a feature of distorted, dualistic, intentional cognitions. Furthermore, as David Tomlinson has pointed out, apart from the authority of the tradition, what motivates the theory of reflexive awareness is the need to account for how an ordinary being’s mind can become a Buddha’s mind; reflexive awareness is just what they have in common.23 On the other hand, however, the Buddhist theory of reflexive awareness does raise serious questions about the

relationship between philosophy and practice, as well as the thorny issue of experience in the study of religion. For what is a non-dual, pre-reflective form of awareness, if not precisely the type of “religious experience” laid out by Schleiermacher some two centuries ago, and roundly critiqued ever since? How could this kind of “pure consciousness” respond to the postmodern turn against any form of originary experience? One final note: the idea of non-dual cognitions might sound strange. And it may, as an account of the nature of the mind, be incorrect. Adjudicating whether or not Dharmakīrti’s epistemological theory is correct is beyond the scope of this essay, or perhaps any merely textual inquiry. But my primary goal has been to demonstrate that, whether or not Dharmakīrti is 22 Coseru (2012), 265. 23 Tomlinson (2014).

correct, he must undoubtedly and unambiguously be understood to maintain that reflexive awareness is a nondual form of cognition.

Thank you for your time.