Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis

by Piotr Balcerowicz, Warsaw

Helmut Krasser, Horst Lasic, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner (eds), Religion and Logic in Buddhist Philosophical Analysis. Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmakīrti Conference. Vienna, August 23–27, 2005. Wien 2011, pp. 1–31.

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda)

1. As it is well-known, in his PV/PVSV 3.181–184 Dharmakīrti briefly criticises the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda). In this paper I will attempt to identify possible sources of Dharmakīrti’s presentation in Jaina literature, to analyse his account of the Jaina theory as well as discuss the Jaina response to his criticism.

1.1. The whole passage of PV/PVSV4 3.183–187 (59,24–61,29) = PV/PVSV5 3.181–185 (89,22–93,5) = PV/PVSV9 3.181cd–185 (262,18–265,20) reads as follows: {181.1}1 etenaiva yad ahrīkāḥ kiṃ apy aślīlam ākulam / pralapanti pratikṣiptaṃ tad apy ekāntasambhavāt // 181 // By this [refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory, viz. by proving that all things are discrete,2] that primitive and confused [[[Wikipedia:theory|theory]]] the shameless [[[Jainas]]] nonsensically profess is also disproved, because singular character [of reality] (sc. absolutely discrete entities) is possible. {181.2} yad ayam ahrīkaḥ syād uṣṭro dadhi syān neti kim

apy aślīlam ayuktam aheyopādeyam apariniṣṭhānād ākulaṃ pralapanti. {181.3} tad apy anena nirastaṃ svabhāvenaikāntabhedāt. What the shameless [[[Jainas]]] nonsensically profess, namely: “a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, [and] is not, in a certain sense, [yoghurt],” [a theory] which is somewhat primitive, inconsistent, not relevant to what should be avoided and to what should be appropriated (sc. is useless) and insofar as it does not help establish [that which should be avoided and that should be appropriated], is confused, also that [[[Wikipedia:theory|theory]]] is refuted by this [refutation of the Sāṃkhya theory] because [things] in [their] essential nature are different in the absolute sense. {181.3} tadanvaye vā. {182.1} sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ / codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭraṃ nābhidhāvati // 182 //3 Or, if [one were to admit that] there is [some kind of] association [between entities (or: between a camel and yoghurt) that are discrete in their essential natures, then] Since – if everything [is supposed] to have a form of both4 – [any] distinction between these [entities (or:

1 Numbers in { } refer to my division of Dharmakīrt’s text. 2 PVSVṬ: etenaiveti sarvasyārthasya bhedasādhanena. 3 The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,27–28; NASV 35 § 30, p. 93,27; NKC 620,20–21; AJP I 23,2–3; AVP 7; AṣS 9, 92,22–93,1; NViV I 177,19–20; NViV 2.203 (233,11); SVR 837; SViṬ 124,27, 212,24, 615,19, SViṬ 749,11. 4 Viz. either (1) ‘of the universal and of the particular’ (sāmānyaviśeṣarūpa) or (2) ‘of itself and of the other’

between the camel and yoghurt)] would be revoked, then why does a person enjoined : “Eat yoghurt!”, not run towards the camel? {182.2} tathā hy uṣṭro ’pi syād dadhi nāpi sa evoṣṭraḥ yenānyo ’pi syād uṣṭraḥ. tathā dadhy api syād uṣṭraḥ nāpi5 tad eva dadhi yenānyad api syād dadhi. {182.3} tad6 anayor ekasyāpi kasyacit tadrūpābhāvasyābhāvāt svarūpasya vātadbhāvinaḥ7 svaniyatasyābhāvāt na kaścid viśeṣa iti. {182.4} dadhi khādeti codita uṣṭram api khādet. For it is as follows: a camel is, [as you say,] in a certain sense, yoghurt; it is not the case that [the camel] is only a camel, because likewise the camel is also, in a certain sense, something else [than merely a camel]. Similarly, also yoghurt is, in a certain sense, a camel; it is not the case that this [yoghurt]

is only yoghurt because yoghurt is also, in a certain sense, something else [than merely yoghurt]. Therefore, since any of these two (the camel and yoghurt) lacks the absence of the form of the other or [any of these two (e.g. the camel)] lacks the intrinsic nature which is not present in the other (e.g. in yoghurt) [and] which is confined [only] to itself (e.g. to the camel), there is no distinction whatsoever [between the camel and yoghurt]. [Accordingly], someone enjoined: “Eat yoghurt!” could eat camel as well. {183.1} athāsty atiśayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate / sa eva dadhi so ’nyatra nāstīty anubhayaṃ param // 183 //8 If [the Jaina says that] there is indeed some special quality by virtue of whose singular character [the person

enjoined as above] acts [with respect to the yoghurt, not with respect to the camel, then what follows is that the entity] does not have both [natures but] is [only] something different: precisely that [special quality] is yoghurt [and] that [special quality] is not present in any other [thing, e.g. in the camel].9 {183.2} athānayoḥ kaścid atiśayo ’sti yenāyaṃ tathā coditaḥ kṣīravikāra eva pravartate nānyatra. {183.3} sa10 evātiśayo ’rthakriyārthipravṛttiviṣayo dadhi. tatphalaviśeṣopādānabhāvalakṣitasvabhāvaṃ hi vastu dadhīti. {183.4} sa ca tādṛśaḥ svabhāvo ’nyatra nāstīti11.

pravṛttyabhāvād arthinaḥ. tasmāt tan nobhayarūpam12 ity ekāntavādaḥ. If [the Jaina says that] these two (sc. the camel and yoghurt) indeed have some special quality by virtue of which this [[[person]]] enjoined in such a manner [to eat yoghurt] proceeds only towards the modification of milk (sc. yoghurt),

and not towards anything else (e.g. the camel), then precisely this special quality alone is yoghurt [itself], which is the scope of the activity of [the person] aiming at efficient action. For yoghurt is [here] a real thing whose essential nature is characterised by the condition [that allows] the

appropriation of its particular result. And this essential nature of such kind does not exist in any other thing (e.g. in the camel), because [the person enjoined to eat curd and] aiming at [executing efficient action] does not undertake activity [with respect to the other thing]. Therefore, this [yoghurt] does not have both forms (viz. of itself and of the camel). Thus, [the proof of] the doctrine of absolutely singular character of reality (sc. the refutation of Jaina anekāntavāda) [is established].

(svapararūpa). For the discussion on the meaning of ubhayarūpa see § 1.3. 5 PVSV5: napi. 6 AJP I 23,8: tad evam. 7 Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVSV4: vā tadbhāvinaḥ. 8 The verse is quoted in: TBV 242,29–30; NViV I 177,21–22; NViV II 233,15–16; AJP I 24,5–6. 9 Cf. the paraphrase of the argument by Vādirājasūri in NViV II 2.203 (233,11–16): tad uktam “sarvasyobhayarūpatve” [PV 3.182] ityādi. vidyata eva dadhani kaścid viśeṣo yato na karabhatvaṃ tasyeti cet, tarhi sa eva dadhīti vaktavyaṃ tata eva tatphalasya tṛptyāder bhāvāt, sa ca na karabhādau astīti kathaṃ tadatatsvabhāvatvaṃ bhāvānāṃ yata

ekāntavāda eva praśasto na bhavet. idam apy abhihitam: athāsty atiśayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate / sa eva dadhi so ’nyatra nāstīty anubhayaṃ varama // [PV 3.183, a which has param] 10 AJP I 24,8: evaṃ tarhi sa. 11 AJP I 24,10: nāsti. 12 AJP I 24,11: tasmān nobhayarūpam.

{184.1} api ca. sarvātmatve ca sarveṣāṃ13 bhinnau syātāṃ na dhīdhvanī / bhedasaṃhāravādasya tadabhāvād asambhavaḥ // 184 // Moreover, If everything were of the nature of everything,14 cognitions (mental images) and linguistic units would not be different [from each other]. Since these [[[cognitions]] and linguistic units] are not [non-different], the doctrine of the intermixed character of individual entities is impossible.

13 AJP I 25,6: bhāvānāṃ. 14 The same idea, i.e. that things are essentially distinct, which is a criticism of Jaina anekāntavāda, is also expressed by Dharmakīrti in PVSV5 24.24–25: sarva eva hi bhāvāḥ svarūpasthitayaḥ. te na ātmānaṃ pareṇa miśrayanti. tasyāparatvaprasaṅgāt (“For all entities with no exception have their actuality in their intrinsic nature. They do not mix their natures with another [[[entity]]], because of the undesired consequence that such [a thing] would become the other.) as well as in PV 3.40–41 (quoted in TBV 243.18–20): sarve bhāvāḥa svabhāvena svasvabhāvavyavasthiteḥ / svabhāvaparabhāvābhyāṃ yasmād vyāvṛttibhāginaḥ // 40 // tasmād yato yato arthānāṃ vyāvṛttis tannibandhanāḥ / j ātibhedāḥ prakalpyante

tadviśeṣāvagāhinaḥ // 41 // [a TBV: sarvabhāvāḥ] “[40] All entities [being absolutely discrete] are established in their own essential natures, because they partake in the exclusion (sc. apoha) of [things that have] similar essential nature and [things that have] different nature. [41] Therefore, on the basis of that by virtue of which the exclusion (differentiation) of things [is accomplished] individual class notions are conceived that encompass (sc. refer to) particulars which share this [similar essential nature].” A possible response to Dharmakīrti’s objection above is ĀMī 11: sarvātmakaṃ tad ekaṃ syād anyāpohavyatikrame / anyatra samavāye na vyapadiśyeta sarvathā // This [real thing (AṣS: tattvaṃ)] is in a certain sense of the nature of everything, if we put aside [the Buddhist theory of] the exclusion of the other. If [the real thing] resided in something else [than itself (its own

nature)], it could not be designated in any respect [at all]. That ĀMī 11 is treated as a reply to Dharmakīrti is confirmed by PVSVṬ ad PVSV 40, p. 109 which quotes ĀMī 11ab: yo ’pi digambaro manyate “sarvātmakam ekaṃ syād anyāpohavyatikrame” tasmād bheda evānyathā na syād anyonyābhāvo bhāvānāṃ yadi na bhaved iti. In the background of the discussion regarding the charge ‘if everything were of the nature of everything,’ there is also the theory of sarvasarvātmakatva, viz. ‘the identity of everything with everything,’ which is mentioned side by side with, and clearly distinguished from the doctrine of satkāryavāda by Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa in DNC 173,1–2: evaṃ ca kalpyamānaṃ sarvasarvātmakatvasatkāryatvamūlarahasyānatiremeṇa kalpitam. On

sarvasarvātmakatva see Wezler 1981 and Wezler 1982. Whereas the well-known ‘doctrine of the pre-existence of effect [in its cause]’ (satkāryavāda) was to explain how phenomena occur, being only transformations of (from) an already existent substratum, the concept of sarvasarvātmakatva stated that the substratum (here: conscious substratum) continues to exist in all its transformations which all have the same nature, being the transformations of the same substratum, see DNCV 173,12–14: evaṃ hi “sarvaṃ sarvātmakaṃ sac ca kāryam” it mūlarahasyam etan nātikrāntaṃ bhavati puruṣātmakatvāt sarvasya

tadvikāramātratvāc ca bhedānāṃ tatraivāntarlayāvirbhāvāt sarvakāryāṇāṃ kṛkalāsavarṇaviśeṣāṇāṃ iva kṛkalāse. – “For in this way, [the doctrine of the conscious principle] does not violate the following principal esoteric doctrine that ‘everything has the essence of everything and the effect exists [in its cause],’ because everything has the essence of the conscious principle and because all individual things are merely modifications of this [[[conscious]] principle], insofar as all effects (sc. individual things) inhere in and have their manifestation in this [[[conscious]] principle], just like [all] particular colours of a chameleon [inhere in and are manifested in] the chameleon.”

{184.2} so ’yam ahrīkaḥ15 kvacid apy ekam ākāraṃ pratiniyatam apaśyan vibhāgābhāvād bhāvānāṃ katham asaṃsṛṣṭānyākāravatyā buddhyādhimucyetārthān16 abhilaped vā. {184.3} tato bhedāgrahāt tatsaṃhāravādo na syāt syād uṣṭro dadhi syān neti. atha punar asaṃsṛṣṭāv ākārau pratipadya saṃharet17. {184.4} ekarūpasaṃsargiṇyāḥ buddheḥ kvacit pratiniyamāt tatpratibhāsabhedakṛta eva tayo18 rūpayoḥ svabhāvabhedo ’pi syāt, ekānekavyavasthiteḥ pratibhāsaviṣayatvāt. {184.5} tathā ca naikas tadubhayarūpaḥ19 syād iti mithyāvāda eṣaḥ. {184.6} sthitam etat na bhāvānāṃ kaścit svabhāvānvayo ’sti bhedalakṣaṇam eva tu

sāmānyam. {184.7} atha ca prakṛtyā kecid ekajñānādiphalāḥ kecin neti. This very shameless [[[Jaina]]] does not notice that one [particular] form is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. a camel or yoghurt); since there is [supposedly] no [[[essential]]] distinction between entities, how would he get actively involved in20 [things] with his cognitive awareness, in which various forms (images of things) are present as not intermixed, or talk about [[[Wikipedia:distinct|distinct]]]

things? For this reason, since he does not admit any [[[absolute]]] distinction [between things], there could not be any doctrine of the mixed character of these [[[Wikipedia:individual|individual]] entities] in the form: “[a camel] is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, [and] is not, in a certain sense, [yoghurt].” If, however, [a person]

intermixed two different unmixed forms [of the camel and yoghurt], having cognised [them as unmixed], then – since cognitive awareness, which intermixes [them] into one form, is invariably confined to a certain entity (e.g. either a camel or yoghurt, not to both) – there would still be distinction in

essential natures of these two forms, [a distinction] which would be based on the distinction of [[[mental]]] representations of these [two things (e.g. a camel or yoghurt)]. [It would be so], because the determination of many [[[forms]]] as one has [their corresponding] representations as its contents. And,

accordingly, it would not be the case that one [[[entity]] (e.g. either the camel or yoghurt)] could not have the form of both of them. Hence, this is a false doctrine. Indeed it has been established that there is no association of essential natures of entities at all, but [rather their] common property is

characterised by distinction (sc. discrete character). Furthermore, some [entities generate] their results [in the form] of one [common] cognition by virtue of their nature etc., whereas others do not. {184.8} bhavatu nāma bhāvānāṃ svabhāvabhedaḥ sāmānyam. yeṣāṃ tu nirupākhyānāṃ svabhāva eva nāsti tatra

kathaṃ svabhāvabhedaviṣayāḥ śabdāḥ. {184.9} teṣv avaśyaṃ śabdapravṛttyā bhāvyam, kathaṃcid avyavasthāpiteṣu vidhipratiṣedhāyogāt21. {184.10} tathā ca sarvatrāyam anvayavyatirekāśrayo vyavahāro na syāt uṣṇasvabhāvo ’gnir nānuṣṇa ity api. svabhāvāntarasyāsataḥ kathaṃcid avyavasthāpanāt. {184.11}

sarvathāpratipatter22 agnisvabhāvasyāpratipattir iti vyāmūḍhaṃ jagat syāt. [The Jaina opponent]: “Let the common property of entities consist in the distinction of essential natures [of entities], if you wish. But how can speech elements have as their contents a distinction in essential natures [of

entities] such as inexpressible [particulars] which do not have, [as you claim,] any essential nature at all? Of course speech elements refer necessarily to these [inexpressible particulars], because affirmation (‘x is P’) and negation (‘x is not P’) are not possible with regard to [entities] that are not determined one way or another (sc.

Interestingly, Dharmakīrti treats Jaina and Sāṃkhya doctrines together (PV/PVSV4 3.183a: etenaiva), in contradistinction to Mallavādin’s criticism of both Sāṃkhya and the theory of sarvasarvātmakatva. 15 AJP I 26,5: ’yam anekāntavādī. 16 AJP I 26,5–6: buddhyādhibuddhyetārthān. Cf. n. 20. 17 PVSV4 = PVSV9: saṃhared. 18 Reading confirmed also in AJP. PVSV4 = PVSV9: °kṛta etayo. 19 PVSV9: °rūpa. 20 Haribhadrasūri, while quoting the passage in AJP 26,5–6,

replaces adhimucyeta with adhibuddhyeta (n. 16), for apparently the strictly Buddhist meaning of the rare verb adhimuc is not known to him. However, the verb is very well attested in Buddhist literature in the sense of ‘intent upon; take interest in; be actively interested in.’ For a list of occurrences see BHSD II 13–15, entries: adhimukta / adhimucyate. 21 Cf. SvSt1 5.5 = SvSt2 25: vidhir niṣedhaś ca kathañcid iṣṭau vivakṣayā mukhyaguṇavyavasthā / iti praṇītiḥ sumates taveyaṃ matipravekaḥ stuvato ’stu nātha //. 22 PVSV9: sarvathā pratipatter.

either through cognition or speech, both entailing the idea of common properties). And, thus, this practical action which is based on positive concomitance (affirmation) and negative concomitance (negation) could not take place with respect to anything, that is: [the affirmation]: “fire is hot in its essential nature” and also [the implied negation]: “[[[fire]]] is not not-hot,” because one cannot determine in any way something non-existent that is different from the

essential nature [of an entity one wants to cognise]. Since there could be no comprehension [of, say, something not-hot] in every respect, there would be no comprehension of the essential nature of fire. Thus, the world would be stupefied.” {184.12} syād etat na tatra kasyacid asato niṣedhaḥ anuṣṇaṃ sad evārthāntaraṃ niṣidhyata iti. [Reply:] That would be the case; [however,] in this case [of, e.g., fire,] there is no negation of anything nonexistent: only something which is really existent and not hot, which is something different [from fire], is negated. {184.13} katham idānīṃ sad asan nāma. [[[Jaina]]

opponent:] How then something which you say is non-existent is something existent? {184.14} na brūmaḥ {184.15} sarvatrāsat. tatra nāstīti deśakāladharmaniṣedha eva sarvabhāveṣu23 kriyate na dharmiṇaḥ, tanniṣedhe tadviṣayaśabdapravṛttyabhāvāt, anirdiṣṭaviṣayasya naño ’prayogāt. [Reply:] We do not say that [something not-hot] is non-existent in all cases. Merely the negation of place, time and property with respect to all entities is expressed in the form: “[something not-hot] is not in this [[[fire]]],” but not [the negation] of the property-possessor (sc. fire), because when one negates the [property-

possessor], speech element the contents of which is this [property-possessor] cannot be applied, because the negation particle, the contents of which remain unexpressed, cannot be verbally employed. {184.16} so ’pi tarhi deśādipratiṣedhaḥ katham. [[[Jaina]] opponent:] Then how is this negation of place etc. [possible]? {184.17} yasmān na tatrāpi deśādīnāṃ24 pratiṣedho nāpy arthasya. [Reply:] [It is possible], because even in that case there is neither negation of place etc. nor of the object [as such]. {184.18} sambandho niṣedhyata iti cet. [[[Jaina]] opponent:] “[Here] the relation [between the property

(e.g. not-hot) and property-possessor (e.g. fire)] is negated.” {184.19} nanu tanniṣedhe ’pi tulyo doṣo ’niṣedhād25 asati śabdāpravṛttir ityādi. {184.20} asato vāsya niṣedhe tadvad dharmiṇo ’pi niṣedhaḥ. [Reply:] Also when this [[[relation]]] is negated, there is the same fault, because the negation is not [expressed], in view of the fact that speech elements cannot be applied with respect to something non-existent (sc. relation) etc. Or, if a negation of this [[[relation]]] which is non-existent [could be expressed, then] in the same manner the negation of the property-possessor as well [is possible]. {184.21}

na vai sambandhasya nāstīti niṣedhaḥ. kiṃ tarhi. neha ghaṭo nedānīṃ naivam ity uktau26 nānena sambandho ’sti naitaddharmā vā iti pratītiḥ. tathā ca sambandho niṣiddho bhavatīti27. [[[Jaina]] opponent:]28 [The words:] “[the relation] does not exist,” are not at all a negation of the relation. Rather, when one says: “There is no pot here,” [or] “[There is] no [pot] now,” [or] “[There is] no [pot] in this condi

tion,” the understanding [arises] that there is no relation [of the pot] with this [particular place] or that [this pot] does not possess such and such properties. And in this manner the relation is negated. {184.22} tathāpi kathaṃ niṣiddho yāvad asya sambandho dharmo vā nāstīti matir na bhavati. na cāsyāḥ kathaṃcid bhāve sambhavo ’bhāveṣu tathābhāvāt. tasmāt sambandhābhāvapratīter nāyam ihetyādyā pratītiḥ. sā tadabhāve29 na syāt. pratītau vā

tadabhāvasya. yathā pratītimatas tatprabhavāḥ śabdāḥ kena nivāryante. sa eva hi śabdānāṃ na viṣayo yo na vitarkāṇām. te cet pravṛttāḥ ko vacanasya niṣeddhā. na hy avācyam arthaṃ buddhayaḥ samīhante. sambandhasya tu svarūpeṇānabhidhānam uktam. abhidhāne sambandhitvena buddhāv upasthānāt. yathābhiprāyam apratītiḥ. tad ayaṃ pratīyamāno ’pi sambandhirūpa eveti svarūpeṇa nābhidhīyate. tasmān nābhāvavat sambandhe ’pi prasaṅgaḥ. api cāyam abhāvam abhidheyaṃ bruvāṇaṃ prati pratividadhann30 abruvāṇaḥ kathaṃ pratividadhyāt. vacane cāsya31 katham abhāvo ’nuktaḥ. athābhāvam eva necchet, tenāvacanam. tad evedānīṃ

katham abhāvo nāstīti. yat punar etad {uktam}32 arthaniṣedhe anarthakaśabdāprayogān nirviṣayasya naño ’prayoga ity atrottaraṃ vakṣyate. tasmāt santy abhāveṣu śabdāḥ. [Reply:]33 Nevertheless, how can [this relation] be negated as long as its relation or property does not exist? Hence there exists no cognition [of that]. And since the [[[cognition]] of the kind that the relation does not exist] somehow arises, [such relation] is not possible, because [the cognition] is not possible with respect to non-existent things. Due to the cognition that the relation is absent, there [arises] cognition the contents of

which is: “there is no relation here” etc. This [[[cognition]]] would not occur, if there were no [[[cognition]] of the absence of the relation], or if there were cognition of the absence of this [[[relation]]], just like for a person who has the cognition [of the absence of the relation], what prevents [him from using] the speech elements which have their origin in this [[[cognition]] that there is no relation] (sc. what would prevent one from expressing the absence of the relation directly)? For whatever is not [the contents] of conceptual cognitive acts is certainly not the contents of speech elements. If these [[[Wikipedia:conceptual|conceptual]]

cognitive acts] operate, what is the factor preventing [their] expression? For acts of cognitive awareness do not concern inexpressible thing. However, it has been said that the relation is not expressed, because when it is expressed it is presented in cognitive awareness as a relatum (term of a relation). There is no [such] cognition [of it] in accordance with the intention [to express it]. Therefore, this [[[relation]]], even when it is being cognised, [is cognised] as having the form a relatum; consequently, it is not expressed in its intrinsic nature. Thus, there is no undesired consequence also with

respect to the relation, just as [there is no undesired consequence] with respect to the absence of relation. Furthermore, how could possibly such a person who [wishes to] contradict someone maintaining that absence can be expressed, [and] who [himself] does not maintain [it, be able to] contradict [that if he cannot express it]? Further, how it is possible that absence is not expressed when this [[[word]] “absence”] is uttered? If one does not accept [that] absence [can be expressed], then it is inexpressible by virtue of the [[[non-existence]] of absence]. Now, how could this very [expression]: “there is no absence,” be

possible? As regards to what is being said [now], namely: when the referent is negated, insofar as one does not employ referentless speech elements, then the negation particle, having no contents, cannot be employed, [and] that [[[idea]]] will be explained later on [in PV 3.207]. Therefore, there are speech elements which refer to non-existent entities. {185.1} teṣu kathaṃ svabhāvabheda iti. [[[Jaina]] opponent:] How is [then] the distinction in essential natures among these [[[non-existent]] entities] possible? {185.2} tatrāpi. [Reply:] Also with respect to these [[[non-existent]] entities we say the following:]

28 PVSVṬ ad loc.: netyādi paraḥ. 29 PVSV4 = PVSV9: ihetyādyā pratītiḥ syāt tadabhāve. 30 PVSV4: pratividadhad(nn). PVSV5: pratividadhad. 31 PVSV5: vāsya. 32 PVSVṬ ad loc.: yat punar etad uktam. PVSV4 = PVSV5 = PVSV9 omit uktam: punar etad. 33 PVSVṬ ad loc.: tathāpītyācāryaḥ.

{185.3} rūpābhāvād34 abhāvasya śabdā rūpābhidhāyinaḥ / nāśaṅkyā eva siddhās te vyavacchedasya vācakāḥ35 //185// Since absence has no intrinsic nature36, speech elements are expressive of intrinsic nature [of existent things]. [Hence, speech elements] are by no means established to be liable to doubt. They convey the exclusion. {185.4} vastuvṛttīnāṃ śabdānāṃ kiṃ rūpam abhidheyam āhosvid bheda iti śaṅkā37 syāt. abhāvas tu vivekalakṣaṇa eva nimittīkartavyasya kasyacid rūpasyābhāvāt tadbhāve38 ’bhāvāyogāt, tadbhāvalakṣaṇatvād bhāvasya. tasmād ayam eva sa mukhyo vivekaḥ. tasya tathābhāvakhyāpinaḥ39 śabdāḥ kiṃ

vivekaviṣayā ity asthānam evaitad āśaṅkāyāḥ. tasmāt siddham etat sarve śabdā vivekaviṣayā vikalpāś ca40. ta ete41 ekavastupratiśaraṇā api yathāsvam avadhibhedopakalpitair bhedair bhinneṣv iva pratibhātsu buddhau vivekeṣūpalayanād42 bhinnaviṣayā eva. tena svabhāvasyaiva sādhyasādhanabhāve ’pi na sādhyasādhanasaṃsargaḥ. tan na pratijñārthaikadeśo hetur43 iti. sa cāyaṃ hetutvenāpadiśyamānaḥ. A doubt might be raised as follows: “Do speech elements

which refer to real things have as their designatum [a positive] form or difference (i.e. exclusion of everything else)?” Absence is, however, characterised by the exclusion [of the other]44 only, because there is no [positive] form at all which could be taken as the factor [causing cognition / verbal concept of absence (sc. as a point of reference)], insofar as if such [a positive form] existed, it would not be consistent to assume absence,

insofar as an [[[existent]]] entity is characterised by this [positive form]. Therefore, this very [[[existent]] entity] is what is [known as] the primary exclusion [of the other]. [Objection:] “Do speech elements [expressing] this [exclusion of the other] which conveys absence in such a manner have [this] exclusion [of the other] as [their] contents?” This is an improper way indeed [to express] doubt. Therefore, it has been established that all speech

elements as well as concepts have exclusion [of the other] as [their] contents. Even though they accommodate [only] one real thing, these very [[[Wikipedia:speech|speech]] elements and concepts] – because they refer to exclusions [[[Wikipedia:present|present]]] in cognitive awareness which are represented as if different by virtue of individual entities made up of differences in their individual applications – have in fact different contents. Consequently, even though the relationship between the

inferable property and the proving property relates to only [one and the same] essential nature, there is no intermixture of the inferable property and the proving property. Thus, the logical reason does not extend [only] to a part of the object of the thesis. And this [[[essential nature]]] itself is referred to as the logical reason.

1.2. Before I proceed to deal with the analysis of the passage, there are some additional relevant issues to be discussed first. A larger portion of the above passage of PV/PVSV 3.182–184 is quoted in AJP I 23,1–27,2, being introduced as follows: tathā pareṇāpy uktam – sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ…

34 PV2 = PVV7 (Rā): dravyābhāvād; cf. Tib.: ngo bo med pa’i phyir. 35 PV2 = PVV7 = PVV9: te ’to vyavaccheda-vācakāḥ; cf. Tib.: de dag nyid rnam gcod rjod par byed par. 36 PVSVṬ ad loc.: rūpābhāvād iti svarūpābhāvād abhāvasya. 37 PVSV4 = PVSV9: śaṅkāpi. 38 PVSV4 emends tadabhāve to tadbhāve. PVSV9: tad bhāve.

39 PVSV4 = PVSV9: tathākhyāpinaḥ. 40 PVSV4 emends vikalpālpāś ca to vikalpāt: vikalpāt(lpāś ca). PVSV9: vikalpālpāś ca. 41 PVSV4 = PVSV9 omit ta: ete. 42 PVSV4 = PVSV9: vivekeṣūpasthāpanād. PVSVṬ: vivekeṣu bhedeṣu vikalpānāṃ copasthāpanāt. 43 PVSV4 = PVSV9: °deśahetur. 44 Or, if we were to follow Karṇakagomin: “characterised by the lack of essential nature”, i.e. by the lack of any independent existence (PVSVṬ ad loc.: abhāvas tu vivekalakṣaṇa iti svabhāvavirahalakṣaṇaḥ).

8 Separate sections of the above-quoted passage of PV/PVSV are subsequently disproved by Haribhadrasūri in AJP:

section(s) of PV/PVSV quoted in AJP refuted in AJP {182.1} AJP I 23,4–5 AJP I 295,10ff. {182.2}–{183.1} AJP I 23,6–24,6 AJP I 297,13–14 {183.2}–{183.4} AJP I 24,6–11 AJP I 300,5–12 {183.***} AJP I 25,3–5 AJP I 300,5–302,6 {184.1} AJP I 25,6–26,3 AJP I 302,7–8 and 316,7 {184.2}–{184.5} AJP I 26,4–27,4 AJP I 317,4–10 and AJP II 124ff. The passage of PV/PVSV 3.182–184 is quoted by Haribhadrasūri AJP faithfully, and the variae lectionis (enumerated in nn. 6, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16) are negligible. The only major difference is the deliberate replacement of the offensive “so ’yam ahrīkaḥ” in with neutral expression “so ’yam anekāntavādī” in Section {181.2}. This could be easily be due to Haribhadra’s reluctance to repeat Dharmakīrti’s offensive statement. Generally, the authenticity – in terms of strictly internal analysis of AJP – of the quotation PV/PVSV 3.182–184 is additionally supported by two factors: the sections quoted are first commented upon by Haribhadrasūri in his commentary AJPSV and then refuted in succeeding portions of AJP/AJPSV. We do, however, come across an intriguing insertion in the AJP quote. Interestingly, AJP I 25,3–5 inserts – between {183.4} and {184.1} – a passage {183.***} which is absent from PV/PVSV but is subsequently refuted by Haribhadrasūri in AJP I 300,5–302,6: kiṃca sarvavastuśabalavādinaḥ kvacid

anyāsaṃsṛṣṭākārabuddhyasiddheḥ tathāvācakābhāvāt saṃhāravādānupapattiḥ, tatsiddhau vā tata eva tatsvabhāvabhedāt tadekarūpataiveti. Furthermore, since it is not established for the proponent of manifoldness of all things that there exists cognitive awareness [of a real thing, e.g. camel] which has the form [of the real thing] which is not intermixed with another [[[object]] (e.g. yoghurt), and] therefore there exists no referring term [denoting the real thing] in such a manner (as not intermixed with other things), the doctrine of the intermixed character [of individual entities] (sc. the object having its own form

and the form of the other) is inexplicable (sc. is not meaningful). Or, [even] if it were established that [there can be cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the form not intermixed with another object]45, this [[[doctrine]]] it were established, then [the result would be] that – because of the singular character of the essential nature of the [real thing] precisely due to this [fact that there is cognitive awareness of a real thing which has the

form not intermixed with another object] – this [real thing is represented in cognition as] having singular form (sc. of its own, not that of the other thing)46. The interpolated passage is later repeated in the refutation section of AJP I 300,3–5. This interpolation apparently bears all the marks of an authentic quotation from PVSV for the following reasons: 1 It is commented by Haribhadrasūri in AJPSV I 25,13–21 and treated by him as genuine. 2 The only element of the passage {183.***} that might suggest that it is Haribhadra’s own interpolation is the marker iti at the end of it (tadekarūpataiveti): the particle iti in AJPSV clearly marks the end of the commentary portion on verse 3.183. However, in the passage

45 Clearly, tat-siddhau referes to the other alternative (the first being anyāsaṃsṛṣṭākārabuddhyasiddheḥ), cf. AJPSV ad loc. I 25.17–18: tatsiddhau vā kvacit anyāsaṃsṛṣṭākārabuddhyādisiddhau vā). 46 Cf. AJPSV ad loc. I 25.19–21: tatsvabhāvabhedāt tasya vastuna uṣṭrāder svabhāvabhedāt. ... tadekarūpataiva tasya uṣṭrāder vastuna ekarūpataiva.

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 9 disucssed here, i.e. PV/PVSV 3.181–184, Dharmakīrti generally neither uses iti to mark the end of a thematic block, unless he cites an opponent, nor tags the end of his auto-commentary on a commented verse as long as he expresses his own opinions. Therefore, the use of iti in this case seems slightly untypical. However, Haribhadrasūri himself takes it to belong to the original text of PVSV, for he comments on it in AJPSV I 25,21: iti na saṃhāravādo vāstavaḥ – ‘Thus the doctrine of the intermixed character [of individual

entities] is not true,’ which is merely a paraphrase of PV 184.cd: bhedasaṃhāravādasya … asambhavaḥ (‘the doctrine of the intermixed character of individual entities is impossible’). 3 It is subsequently refuted in AJP I 300,5–302,6, after being repeated verbatim (AJP I 300,3– 5). 4 The refutation of the passage is introduced by Haribhadra with the standard formula: yac coktam – ‘sarvavastuśabalavādinaḥ … tadekarūpataiva’ ity etad apy

ayuktam, and this particular refutation forms the whole portion devoted to a criticism of the respective portion of PV/PVSV, i.e. it is immediately followed by the criticism against the verse of PV 184 (section {184.1}). 5 Additionally, Haribhadrasūri comments in AJPSV I 300,14 on the refuted quotation: yac coktam mūlapūrvapakṣe… demonstrating that this interpolated passage belongs to PV/PVSV as he had it in front of him. 6 Haribhadra sets off

to refute the verse of PV 184 with the words: etena “sarvātmatve ca bhāvāṇāṃ” ityādy api pratyuktam. In his AJPSV I 302,22, he comments on this portion as follows: etena anantaroditena vastunā sarvātmakatve ca… In his opinion the pronoun etena refers to ‘the real thing which has been mentioned immediately before’ (anantaroditena vastunā). Indeed, we do find the mention of ‘vastu’ three times in the interpolated passage: sarvavastuśabalavādinaḥ…,

tatsvabhāvabhedāt and tadekarūpatā. However, there is no mention of ‘vastu’ in the immediate vicinity of verse 184 in the preserved reading of PV/PVSV. The immediately preceding verse 183 does not even mention it. PVSV does mention ‘vastu’ immediately before in section {183.3} (vastu dadhi), however, the reference to it is made in passing, whereas the whole passage {183.2}–{183.4} discusses the issue of special quality (atiśaya). Furthermore, the mention of

‘vastu dadhi’ in section {183.3} is separated from the interpolated passage {183.***} with section {183.4}, which does not deal with real thing (vastu) directly. Accordingly, Haribhadrasūri’s remark etena anantaroditena vastunā sarvātmakatve ca cannot refer to any portion of PVSV other than the passage {183.***}. 7 In the interpolated passage, anekāntavādin is called śabalavādin (‘the proponent of the variegated’), and the unusual term śabala signifies

here the idea of anekānta (multiplexity of reality). This is indeed a highly uncommon term with respect to anekāntavāda, to a degree that I have personally never come across it in Jaina literature in this sense. Also for this reason it would be incorrect, in my opinion, to assume that the problematic passage, containing the atypical locution sarvavastuśabalavādinaḥ, was Haribhadrasūri’s, or any of the Jaina authors’ for that matter, own insertion. However, the

rare term śabala is used, at least once, by Dharmakīrti himself in PV 4.132ab in a related context, namely with reference to perception which has non-dual character: advayaṃ śabalābhāsasyādṛṣṭer buddhijanmanaḥ / (‘…for [we] do not see any production of cognitive awareness which has manifold representation.’). That is why it is not improbable that that the compound sarvavastuśabalavādinaḥ may have stemmed from Dharmakīrti himself.

On the other hand, the passage is not only absent from extant editions and manuscripts of PV/ PVSV but also is not referred to by Karṇakagomin in his PVSVṬ. Further, is does not survive in Tibetan translation, where we would expect it to be inserted between ...de bas na de la gnyi ga’i ngo bo med do zhes bya ba ni mtha’ gcig tu smra ba’o, gzhan yang ({183.4} tasmāt tan nobhayarūpam ity ekāntavādaḥ. api ca.) and thams cad kun bdag nyid yin na... ({184.1}

sarvātmatve ca sarveṣāṃ). Although there is nothing in the passage as such that would speak against Dharmakīrti as its author, we would need some independent additional confirmation in Buddhist sources to accept the passage {183.***} as genuine part of PVSV. Interestingly, the passage AJP I 23,1–27,2 seems to be the only Jaina text which quotes any larger portion of PV/PVSV 181–184. Apart from this singular occurrence, Jaina authors quote only two PV verses: 182 (see n. 3) and 183 (see n. 8); in addition, Vādirājasūri in NViV 2.203 (233,11–16) paraphrases the argument of verse 183 (see n. 9). One has

the impression that that the remaining verses of the PV passage on anekānta, and the whole commentary of PVSV, were either unknown to Jaina authors, with some notable exceptions, or did not stimulate them to any reaction or refutation. In view of the fact that only a restricted selection of verses from rival philosophical works are cited in Jaina works, at the same time their selection remains constant and always the same verses/passages are repeated (often

with the same variae lectionis), this may confirm the prevailing tendency among Indian authors in general, especially after 7th/8th centuries, that they relied on earlier quotations as they had been reproduced in earlier Jaina works (or, perhaps, might have relied on some anthologies that presented a selection of verses), which became the major source of information on rival schools, whereas direct, first-hand readership of original sources gradually became scarce.

1.3. A separate issue is the reliability of commentators of PV/PVSV. In the expositions of the verse PVSV 182 (the most often quoted verse of the whole passage) offered by commentators we encounter various interpretation of the expression ubhayarūpatve.

1.3.1. Dharmakīrti’s criticism directed against the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) follows his criticism of the Sāṃkhya and, therefore, verse 182 should be read in such context (verse 181 is merely an introduction which marks the change of the opponent, not the change of the topic: etenaiva … kiṃ apy … pratikṣiptaṃ). Accordingly, ubhayarūpatve should be taken to mean sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatve, especially in view of the following two passages, which directly precede PV/PVSV 181–184: 1 PV/PVSV5 3.179d–180c (58,23–59,2) = PV/PVSV5 3.177 (88,13–20) = PV/PVSV9 3.177d–178c (260,16–261,9): na hi kvacid asyaikāntiko bhedo ’bhedo vā vivekena vyavasthāpanāt – sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti. yenātmanā tayoḥ / bhedaḥ sāmānyam ity etad yadi bhedas tadātmanā // 177 // bheda eva [178a] yadi sāmānyaviśeṣayor yam ātmānam āśritya sāmānyaṃ viśeṣa iti sthitis tenātmanā bhedas tadā bheda eva. yasmāt tau hi tayoḥ svātmānau tau ced vyatirekiṇau47 vyatireka eva sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ svabhāvabhedāt.

47 PVSV9: vyatirekiṇī.

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 11 2 PVSV4 3.182 (59,18–19) = PVSV5 3.179 (89,13–14) = PVSV9 3.181ab (262,13–14): …gavādisamāveśāt tadātmabhūtānāṃ cānanvayena tatrānubhayarūpatvāt.48

1.3.2. Karṇakagomin, however, is inclined to interpret the expression ubhayarūpatve strictly in the context of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) as referring to an object ‘being both itself and being the other.’49 1.3.3. Also Manorathanandin, apparently following Karṇakagomin, takes ubhayarūpatve to mean ‘[every object having] its own form and the form of the other.’50

1.3.4. It is only the Jaina author Haribhadrasūri who properly understands the expression the way Dharmakīrti himself did, viz. sāmānyaviśeṣarūpa.51 For certain reasons that will be discussed below, both Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin – either having better knowledge of anekāntavāda than Dharmakīrti or being more faithful to the unbiased presentation of the Jaina doctrine – felt obliged to introduce their own interpretation of the phrase, thus bringing it in line with the typical expositions of anekāntavāda, in accordance with which the double nature of any object that is both itself (svarūpa) and shares in the nature of another thing (pararūpa) is vital, whereas the double nature of a thing based on its universal-cum-particular character (sāmānyaviśeṣarūpa) is secondary. That was not Dharmakīrti’s concern: he either distorted the picture of the Jaina theory deliberately or was not sufficiently well informed.

2.1. The passage PV/PVSV 181–184 mentions some elements that are vital for the reconstruction the doctrine of multiplexity of reality in the form as it may have been known to Dharmakīrti. These expressions appear in bold in § 1.1. Beside the allusion to the doctrine of multiplex reality (anekāntavāda) by name (ekānta° in {181.1}, {181.3}, {183.4}), there is also an explicit reference to be found in the PV/PVSV passage – with the words: syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na in sections {181.2} and {184.3}, where the modal operator syāt (= kathaṃcit)52 occurs – which concerns a particular element of the doctrine, namely to the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description, known under the names saptabhaṅgī and syādvāda. It is merely one of three complementary cognitive-linguistic procedures within the scope of anekāntavāda, beside the doctrine of viewpoints (nayavāda) and the method of the four standpoints (nikṣepavāda, nyāsavāda). The expressions are the following ones: {181.2} = {184.3} syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na

48 The expression anubhayarūpa occurring in the passage clearly means asāmānyaviśeṣarūpa, as it is correctly explained in PVSVṬ: anubhayarūpatvād asāmānyaviśeṣarūpatvād eveti yāvat. And that is how, analogously, ubhayarūpa should be understood in PV 3.182a. 49 PVSVṬ ad loc.: sarvasyobhayarūpatvaṃ. ubhayagrahaṇam anekatvopalakṣaṇārthaṃ tasmin sati tadviśeṣasya uṣṭra uṣṭra eva na dadhi. dadhi dadhy eva noṣṭra ity evaṃ lakṣaṇasya nirākṛteḥ. 50 PVV ad loc.: sarvasya vastuna ubhayarūpatve svapararūpatve sati… 51 AJPSV ad loc., 23,11: ubhayarūpatve sāmānyaviśeṣarūpatve. ubhayagrahaṇam anekatvopalakṣaṇam. 52 On syāt see below § 3.2, p. 16ff.

{183.1} asty atiśayaḥ kaścid yena bhedena vartate {184.9} kathaṃcid avyavasthāpiteṣu vidhipratiṣedhāyogāt The exact sources for Dharmakīrti cannot be identified. Furthermore, it seems that none of these passages is a genuine quotation, albeit they do have authentic Jaina sources in the background.

2.2. The first and most conspicuous reference to the anekāntavāda is the phrase syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na ({181.2} = {184.3}). This is clearly an echo of, or what should look like a quotation from a Jaina source instantiating the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description (syādvāda), the characteristic trait of which is the use of the modal operator syāt. I shall first attempt to reconstruct the picture of syādvāda as it emerges from Dharmakīrti’s exposition and criticism of it, including the commentaries thereon.

2.2.1. In none of the two occurrences of the phrase in question does Dharmakīrti offer the logical reason why a camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, and is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt. In not supplying the logical reason for the syāt thesis Dharmakīrti is in agreement with Jaina practice, insofar as no Jaina text consulted by me mentions logical reason in such a context either. Only Karṇakagomin and Manorathanandin supply the justification for the Jaina thesis: ‘A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [these two] are identical as consisting in a substance etc. [A camel] is not, in a certain sense,

yoghurt, because the state of being yoghurt is different from the state of being a camel;’53 and ‘A camel is, in a certain sense, yoghurt, because [both] are real things. On the other hand, [a camel] is not, in a certain sense, yoghurt inasmuch as it has [its own] particular form.’54 The logical reasons adduced by them (dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt and °avasthāyā bhinnatvāt, vastutvāt and viśeṣarūpatayā, respectively) are clear references to the substance-expressive (dravyārthika) and the mode-expressive (paryāyārthika) viewpoints, already amply attested in the Jaina literature prior to Dharmakīrti, e.g. in Kundakunda’s Pavayaṇasāra55, in Siddhasena

53 See PVSVṬ 183 (339,23–24): syād uṣṭro dadhi, dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt. syān na dadhi uṣṭrāvasthāto dadhyavasthāyā bhinnatvāt. 54 PVV2 3.180 (352,8–9) = PVV7 3.181 (212,15–16) = PVV9 3.181 (262,21–22): syād uṣṭro dadhi vastutvāt. na vā syād uṣṭro viśeṣarūpatayā. 55 PSā 2.22–23 (p. 144–146): davvaṭṭhieṇa savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭhieṇa puṇo / havadi ya aṇṇam aṇaṇṇaṃ takkāle tammayattādo // atthi tti ya ṇatthi tti ya havadi avattavvam idi puṇo davvam

payyāyeṇa du keṇa vi tad ubhayam ādiṭṭham aṇṇaṃ vā // [22] From a substance-expressive viewpoint every substance is the same. However, from a mode-expressive viewpoint, [every substance] becomes also different. [Every substance] is non-different, [i.e. identical with other substances], because it consists in it (sc. substance) at its own time, [viz. when it is taken into consideration]. [23] Further, the substance can be said (1) to exist, (2) not

to exist and (3) to be inexpressible. However, taking a particular mode [into consideration] it is explained to (4) be both (sc. it both exists and does not exist) or otherwise. Three remaining permutations of the three principal options (sc. asti, nāsti, avaktavyam) are implied by aṇṇaṃ vā (‘otherwise’): (5) the substance both exists and is inexpressible, (6) the substance both does not exist and is inexpressible, (7) the substance simultaneously exists, does not exist and is inexpressible.

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 13 Divākara’s Saṃmatitarkaprakaraṇa (ca. 450–50056)57 in Mallavādin’s Dvādaśāranayacakra (ca. 550–600)58, in Pūjyapāda Devanandin’s Sarvārthasiddhi59 etc. What Manorathanandin refers to by vastu corresponds to what the Jainas usually call dravya, a substance60, and avasthā parallels what the Jainas call paryāya, a mode. The latter served as a kind of parameters

that qualified an angle under which a thing was predicated of. Neither these two viewpoints nor any other kind of parameterisation should not be confused with what Dharmakīrti called atiśaya (vide supra § 3.5.) inasmuch they were not a special quality of the thing as such. Dharmakīrti must therefore have known these two viewpoints, or any other parameters for that matter, and their absence in PV was in all probability not dictated by his poor knowledge of Jaina arguments but rather by the fact that he considered a detailed account of Jaina line of reasoning unnecessary.

2.2.1. How accurate and faithful was then his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality? To answer this, we should first identify central components of the anekānta theory as it emerges in Dharmakīrti’s exposition. Indeed, we can distinguish a number of important elements there that appear to underlie the Jaina doctrine at his times: (a) the assertion: ‘x is, in a certain sense, y,’ i.e.  (x is y), where the symbol  represents the modal operator syāt; (b) the assertion: ‘x is, in a certain sense, not-y,’ i.e.  (x is y); (c) the contention: ‘everything has a double form,’ viz. either it has the form of itself and of the other, i.e. x (x is x & x), or it has the form of the universal and of the particular;

56 For the dating see Balcerowicz 2003a. 57 These are referred to in STP 2.1: jaṃ sāmaṇṇaggahaṇaṃ daṃsaṇam eyaṃ visesiyaṃ ṇāṇaṃ / doṇho vi ṇayāṇa eso paḍekkaṃ atthapajjāo // Insight is the grasp of the general. Cognition is one, characterised by the particular. This modality of the object [viz. its general and particular aspect] is individually [the contents] for both viewpoints, [i.e. substance-expressive (dravyārthika) and the modal, or mode-expressive paryāyārthika). They are also taken for granted in the formulation of STP 3.10: do uṇa ṇayā bahavayā davvaṭṭhiyapajjavaṭṭiyā niyayā / etto ya guṇavisese gunaṭṭhiyaṇao vi jujjaṃto // See also STP 3.57: davvaṭṭhiyavattavvaṃ sāmaṇṇaṃ pajjavassa ya viseso / ee samovaṇīā vibhajjavāyaṃ viseseṃti //. 58 DNC 6,2–7,1: dravyārthaparyāyārthadvitvādyanantāntavikalpopakłptavidhibhedapadārthaikavākyavidhividhānād … DNC 876,1–2: teṣāṃ

dravyārthaparyāyārthanayau dvau mūlabhedau, tatprabhedāḥ saṅgrahādayaḥ. – “Among these [viewpoints], there are two main divisions, viz. the viewpoint the object of which is the substance and the viewpoint the object of which is the mode. Their subdivisions are the collective viewpoint etc.” 59 SSi 1.33 (100,8–10): sa dvedhā dravyārthikaḥ paryāyārthikaś ceti. dravyaṃ sāmānyam utsargaḥ anuvṛttir ity arthaḥ. tadviṣayo dravyāthikaḥ. paryāyo viśeṣo ’pavādo vyāvṛttir ity arthaḥ. tadviṣayaḥ pāryāyārthikaḥ. tayor bhedā naigamādayaḥ. 60 Compare e.g. the way Mallavādin describes the nature of (1) vastu and (2) dravya: (1) DNC 864,8–9: tathā ca sarvātmakam ekam evāsti vastv iti pratyakṣādipramāṇair upalabhāmahe; DNC 869,1–2: tadrūpaśaktivivartamātraṃ tv etat sarvaṃ bhāvaikyāt. ato nāniṣṭhitaṃ vastu, anārabdhārabdhatvāt śikyakādivat; (2) DNC 866,1– 2: ghaṭo mṛt, mṛdaḥ pṛthivītvam, pṛthivyā dravyatvaṃ druvikāratvāt, etc.

(d) x is, in a certain sense, both x and not-x (nāpi sa evoṣṭraḥ yenānyo ’pi syād uṣṭraḥ; nāpi tad eva dadhi yenānyad api syād dadhi), i.e.  (x is (x & x)); (e) there is some special quality (atiśaya) by virtue of which an entity x can be treated as non-x; (f) everything is of the nature of everything (sarvātmatve ca sarveṣāṃ), i.e. x y (x = y); (g) there is no essential distinction between entities (vibhāgābhāvād bhāvānāṃ); in other words, absolute distinction between things is not a part of the empirical world (bhedāgrahāt); (h) the common property of entities may consist in the distinction of

essential natures of entities (bhāvānāṃ svabhāvabhedaḥ sāmānyam). In other words, the essence of a class of entities {A} instantiating a universal A may be defined in negative terms, and the universal A is not that which the entities of the class {A} have in common in positive terms, but rather the fact that the entities do not share their common property A with other entities of another class {A} that are not subsumed under that universal. On the basis of PVSV it is not possible to determine, however, how far the above idea is presented as a genuine constituent element of the doctrine of anekāntavāda (I consider it less likely) and how far the idea is a hypothetical reply to Dharmakīrti’s criticism, being in fact a concession to the Buddhist theory of apoha (I consider it more probable).

3. Before I proceed to assess the reliability of Dharmakīrti’s description, let us see what Jaina sources he might have used, how these sources outlined the doctrine of multiplexity of reality and what the crucial points it were. In the following, I am going neither to give a detailed exposition of the anekāntavāda nor to enlist a complete inventory of relevant passages from Canonical and non-Canonical literature etc., because any systematic account, including historical development, would turn into a large-size monograph. I will merely focus on some elements of the theory that are, in my opinion, relevant in our case.

3.1. One of the most conspicuous early components of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, one of the most hotly criticised by other schools of thought, but also one which is explicitly – at least in part – outlined by Dharmakīrti, are the three basic angles (bhaṅga), alongside the fourth angle, which is a permutation of the first two, or ways of analysing an object within a consistent conceptual framework: – syād asti (‘x is, in a certain sense, P’), i.e.  (x is P). – syān nāsti (‘x is, in a certain sense, not-P’), i.e.  (x is P), – syād avaktavyam (‘x is, in a certain sense,

inexpressible’),  (x is (P&P)), – syān asti nāsti (‘x is, in a certain sense, P and not-P’), 1 (x is P) & 2 (x is P). The third one among the angles is not mentioned by Dharmakīrti at all, whereas the fourth one seems to be implied in {184.5}. The first three are mentioned on a few occasions both in later Canonical strata (being absent from early portions of the Canon) and, especially, in non-Canonical literature. Some are enumerated, for instance, by Kāpadīā 1940–1947: cxi ff., Upadhye 1935: 81–84, discussed by Schubring 1962: 1163–165 and occasionally in Shah 2000; stray occurrences are listed also in JSK (entry ‘syādvāda,’ Vol. 4, pp. 496–502). I just list a couple of examples where the bhaṅgas are used as well as some occurrences of the modal

operator siya / siyā / syāt: (a) Viy 12.10 (p. 608–614): …siya atthi siya natthi…, esp.: 610,15ff.: rayaṇappabhā puṭhavī siya āyā, sya no āyā, siya avattavyaṃ – āyā ti ya, no ātā ti ya; and 611,20ff.: dupaesie khaṃdhe siya āyā, siya no āyā, siya avattavvaṃ – āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya, siya āyā ya no āyā ya, siya āyā ya avattavvaṃ – āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya, siya no āyā ya avattavvaṃ – āyā ti ya no āyā ti ya. (b) Viy 5.7.1 (210,20–21ff.): paramāṇupoggale ṇaṃ bhaṃte! eyati veyati jāva taṃ taṃ bhāvaṃ pariṇamati? goyamā! siyā eyati veyati jāva pariṇamati, siya ṇo eyati jāva ṇo pariṇamati. Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 15

(c) Paṇṇ 784 (195,21ff.): caupaesie ṇaṃ khaṃdhe siya carime no acarime siya avattavvae no carimāiṃ no acarimāiṃ no avattavvayāiṃ, … siya carimāiṃ ca acarime ya siya carimāiṃ ca acarimāiṃ ca siya carime ya avattavvae ya siya carime ya avattavvayāiṃ ca …, etc. (d) AṇD 415 (166,22ff.): tathā ṇaṃ je te baddhellayā te ṇaṃ siyā atthi siyā natthi, jai atthi jahaṇṇeṇaṃ ego vā do vā tiṇṇi vā… (e) AṇD 473 (p. 182): siyā dhammapadeso siyā adhammapadeso siyā āgāsapadeso siyā j īvapadeso siyā khaṃdhapadeso. Occasionally, similar three basic angles (bhaṅga) are mentioned, however, the modal operator syāt (siya,

siyā) is missing, which may reflect an earler historical layer: (f) Paṇṇ 781–788 (p. 194ff.), e.g. 194,25ff.: paramāṇupoggale ṇaṃ bhaṃte! kiṃ carime acarime avattavaye carimāiṃ acarimāiṃ avattavayāiṃ, udāhu carime ya acarime ya udāhu carime ya acarimāiṃ ca udāhu carimāiṃ ca acarime ya udāju carimāi ca acarimāiṃ ca…, etc. (g) Viy 8.2.29 (337,20ff.): jīvā ṇaṃ bhaṃte! kiṃ nāṇi annāṇī? goyamā jīvā nāṇī vi, annāṇī vi. These three basic angles (bhaṅga) are

subsequently permuted so that, in a full version of the doctrine of the modal description (syādvāda, saptabhaṅgī), the total of seven basic angles is reached. Perhaps the earliest non-Canonical occurrences of the basic angles (bhaṅga), some of them including the modal operator syāt, are to be found in works ascribed to Kundakunda (between 3th–6th centuries). (h) PSSā2 14 already offers what is later known as pramāṇasaptabhaṅgī61: In a certain sense,

[the substance] is…; [in a certain sense, the substance] is not …; [in a certain sense, the substance] is both; [in a certain sense, the substance] is inexpressible; and further, [in a certain sense, the substance] is the triplet of these (sc. is predicated of according to the permutations of the these). [In such a manner], the substance is, as one should realise, possible as seven-angled on account of the description.62 (i) Another example is found in PSā 2.22–23: [22] From the substance-expressive viewpoint everything is a substance. From the mode-expressive viewpoint, [any thing] becomes different. It is [nevertheless] non-different, because it consists in that [[[substance]]] in the time of its [[[existence]]].63 [23] The substance is said – on account of any particular mode – to be…, and not to be…, and again [the substance] becomes inexpressible; but further [the substance] is both, [viz. is…

61 See ṆC 254ab (p. 128): satteva huṃti bhaṅgā pamāṇaṇayaduṇayabhedajuttāvi / (‘There are as many as seven conditional perspectives with divisions with respect to cognitive criteria, viewpoints and defective viewpoints.’) and SBhT 1.7: iyaṃ eva pramāṇasaptabhaṅgī nayasaptabhaṅgīti ca kathyate. Cf. Balcerowicz 2003b: 37. 62 See PSSā2 14 (p. 30): siya atthi ṇatthi uhayaṃ avvattavvaṃ puṇo ya tattidayaṃ / davvaṃ khu sattabhaṃgaṃ ādesavaseṇa

saṃbhavadi //. 63 The verse is rather obscure. Another possibility to translate it as follows: “From the substance-expressive viewpoint and from the mode-expressive viewpoint, any substance is [both] different and non-different, because [the particular] consists in that [[[universal]]] in the time of its [[[existence]]],” where aṇṇam corresponds to viśeṣam and aṇaṇṇaṃ to sāmānyam. The difficulty with that translation is that the idea it renders is that

“everything is different from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and everything is the same from the mode-expressive viewpoint.” On the other hand dravyārthika relates to sāmānya, whereas paryāyārthika to viśeṣa (comp. p. 17, STP 3.57), which finally yields a contradiction. That is why the commentators Amṛtasena and Jayasena (p. 144–145) are at pains to relate dravyārthika–sāmānya–ananya and paryāyārthika–anya–viśeṣa.

and is not… at the same time] or is otherwise, [viz. any other permutation of the three basic angles (bhaṅga)].64 (j) Also Siddhasena Divākara in his STP 1.36–40 describes all the seven angles (bhaṅga). The picture presented there is already a mature concept, wherein Siddhasena supplies also additional parameters such as: atthaṃtarabhūehi ya ṇiyaehi ya (‘in view of the qualities of another thing and the substance’s own qualities,’ STP 1.36ab), sabbhāve … asabbhāvapajjave (‘with respect to the substance’s own existence … [and] with respect to the mode in which it does not exist,’ STP 1.37ab). He also regularly speaks of aspects (deso) from which the substance can be predicated of.

3.2. An essential and well-known element of the theory is the modal operator syāt (kathaṃcit): ‘in a certain sense, somehow.’ It is well described in many sources, and I will restrict myself just to mentioning two references dating to the times around Dharmakīrti. It is said to operate by means of affirmation (vidhi) and negation (niṣedha, pratiṣedha, niyama). These are extensively detailed and elaborated by Mallavādin, e.g. in DNC 6,2ff. (vidhibheda), and DNC

9,7–8: vidhiniyamabhaṅgavṛttivyatiriktatvād… All the permutations of vidhi and niyama are enumerated also in DNC 10,1–11,2. Also Samantabhadra refers to them in his Svayambhūstotra: Affirmation and negation are accepted [in the sense of] “somehow.” [Thereby] the distinction between primary and secondary [angle] is established according to the intention of the speaker. Such is the guideline of the wise (or: of the fifth tīrthaṃ-kara Sumati). That is your most excellent creed. Let the worshipper praise you, O Lord!’65 Thus, as we can see, by approximately the end of the fifth century we find a developed idea of the seven-fold modal description, which needed some centuries to take shape.

3.3. It is difficult to determine when the term saptabhaṅgī was used for the first time. Although is seems to be absent from the Cannon, it is, nevertheless, used by such pre-Diṅnāga authors as Siddhasena Divākara and Kundakunda. (a) Siddhasena Divākara speaks of ‘a verbal procedure that consists of seven options’ (saptavikalpaḥ vacanapanthaḥ), which he has just described before in STP 1.36–40: In this way, there emerges a verbal procedure that consists of seven options, taking into account the substantial modes. However, taking into account momentary manifestations, [the method of analysis] has either options [of description, viz. the object can be predicated of from various viewpoints,] or it has no options66.67

64 See PSā 2.22–23 (p. 146ff.): davvaṭṭhieṇa savvaṃ davvaṃ taṃ pajjayaṭṭhieṇa puṇo / havadi ya aṇṇam aṇaṇṇaṃ takkāle tammayattādo // 22 // atthi tti ya ṇatthi ya havadi avattavvam idi puṇo davvaṃ / pajjāyeṇa du keṇa vi tad ubhayam ādiṭṭham aṇṇaṃ vā // 23 // 65 See SvSt1 5.5 = SvSt2 25: vidhir niṣedhaś ca kathañcid iṣṭau vivakṣayā mukhyaguṇavyavasthā / iti praṇītiḥ sumates taveyaṃ matipravekaḥ stuvato ’stu nātha //. For later descriptions see e.g. RVār 2.8, p. 122,15ff., esp. RVār 1.6, p. 33,15ff. 66 I.e. it is not possible to predicate of an object because momentary manifestations, being transient and infinite, are beyond the scope of the language (sc. there are not enough words to describe each of them). The verse offers another possibility of interpretation, see TBV 448.15–29. 67 See STP 1.41: evaṃ sattaviyappo vayaṇapaho hoi atthapajjāe / vaṃjaṇapajjāe uṇa saviyappo ṇivviyapppo ya //.

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 17

(b) Another occurrence of the technical term sattabhaṃgaṃ is found in Kundakunda’s verse of PSSā2 14 (p. 30ff.), already cited above (p. 15). (c) Further, the same author refers to the saptabhaṅgī method as a capacity of the soul: The great soul is one (viz. either ‘self-same,’ or ‘one perceiving organ’ (akṣa) or ‘it is possessed of cognitive application (upayoga)’). It is [also] two (viz. ‘it is possessed of two-fold cognitive application:

cognition and perception’). It becomes of threefold characteristics, it is said to roam in four [types of existence]. And it is grounded in five primary qualities (viz. karmic states (bhāva)). It is endowed with the capability to move in six [[[directions]]]. It is cognitively apt as having the existence of (viz. as being to apply) the sevenfold modal description. It has eight substrata (viz. qualities). It has nine objects (sc. the nine categories (tattva)) [to cognise]. It has ten states. It is called the living element.68

3.3. The term saptabhaṅgī is occasionally juxtaposed with various ‘aberrations’ of the anekāntavāda. Some of these are listed by Siddhasena Divākara in STP

3.56–59, who displays an awareness that there is indeed certain, albeit superficial similarity between the Jaina anekāntavāda and the Buddhist theory vibhajyavāda (vibhajjavāyaṃ)69: The universal should be spoken of from the substance-expressive viewpoint, and the particular [relates] to the mode. When these two are brought together (sc. confused), they are defined as the doctrine of conditional analysis.70

3.4. The idea of syādvāda does not, however, have to necessarily involve the usage of the term ‘multiplexity’ (anekānta). And indeed, the term occurs only some time later, in the work of Pūjyapāda Devanandin (6th c.) for the first time.71 The sources of the term anekānta can be traced back to the following two passages: (1) The general and particular definition of these [seven viewpoints (naya) enumerated in TS 1.33] should be formulated. The general definition, to begin with, [states that] a viewpoint is a verbal procedure (formal pronouncement) that aims – with respect to a real thing, which is of

multiplex nature – at conveying, in conformity with essence [of the real thing], a particular [property of it] which one intends to establish, by laying emphasis on [a particular] reason without contradiction [by virtue of which that particular property is established].72 (2) On account of the purpose [which] a real thing, which is of multiplex nature, [is to serve], prominence is extended to, or is emphasised, i.e. [prominence] is given to a certain

property [of that thing] in accordance with the expressive intent [of the speaker]. [The property] which is contrary to that [emphasised property] is not-emphasised [property]. Since [such a not-emphasised property serves] no purpose [at a particular time], even though it exists, there is no expressive intent [to assert it]; hence it is called subordinate [property].

68 See PSSā2 71–72 (p. 123): eko ceva mahappā so duviyappo ttilakkhaṇo hodi / cadusaṃkamaṇo bhaṇido paṃcaggaguṇappadhāṇo ya // 71 // chakkāpakkamajutto uvautto sattabhaṅgasabbhāvo / aṭṭhāsao ṇavattho jīvo dasaṭṭhāṇago bhaṇido // 72 //. 69 For a brief comparison of vibhajyavāda and anekāntavāda, see Matilal 1981: 7–11. 70 See STP 3.57: davvaṭṭhiyavattavvaṃ sāmaṇṇaṃ pajjavassa ya viseso / ee samovaṇīā vibhajjavāyaṃ viseseṃti //. 71 See Soni 2003: 34: ‘As for the word anekānta itself, in the sense in which it can be associated with the theory of manifoldness unique to the Jainas, it seems that Pūjyapāda was the first person to explicitly use it.’ 72 See SSi 1.33, § 241, p. 100,7f.: eteṣāṃ sāmānyaviśeṣalakṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam. sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ tāvad vastuny anekāntātmany avirodhena hetvarpaṇāt [cf. TS 5.32] sādhyaviśeṣasya yāthātmyaprāpaṇapravaṇaḥ prayogo nayaḥ.

Since these two [kinds of properties] are establish, viz. “because emphasised [property] and not-emphasised [property] are established,” there is no contradiction.73

3.5. A brief reference to STP 1.36–40 above (p. 16) indicated a use of a series of certain parameters which determine the angle from which the thing under consideration is judged. And this is another important feature indispensable for the proper assessment of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality as the Jainas conceived of it. In the classical formulation of the theory we come across a set of four such parameters: substance (dravya) = S, place (kṣetra) = P, time (kāla) = T, condition (bhāva) = C; see e.g. TṬ 5.31 (409,29ff.), RVār 4.42 (254,14ff.), SVM 23.113 (143,12) or JTBh 1.22 § 63 (JTBh1, p. 19; JTBh2, p. 19), DNCV 3,6. Interestingly, the concept of the parameters to specify the angle (bhaṅga) from which an object is analysed developed over some centuries, and as early as in the sixth century we find elaborated attempts to list them. That is done by Siddhasena Divākara, who treats of 8 such

parameters: The proper method of exposition of entities [in accordance with syādvāda] is based on substance, place, time, condition as well as mode, aspect and relation, and also distinction.74 The list comprises more than four ‘classical’ parameters already mentioned. The parameters were an important device to show that method of the seven-fold modal description (syādvāda) was not trivial or beset with contradictions, but a rather complex analytical framework, which contained, alongside the seven angles (bhaṅga), a kind of second-level parametrisation. Historically speaking, the parameters evolved from the Canonical theory of descriptive standpoints (nikṣepa, nyāsa), the locus classicus of which is the enumeration found in the Tattvārthasūtra.75

3.6. Let us see how the angles of the seven-fold modal description were practically applied by Jaina authors prior to Dharmakīrti and what instances are used. Typical examples in genuine Jaina syāt-sentences are generally restricted to the terms: paṭa, ghaṭa and kumbha. An interesting reference is found in Jinabhadragaṇin’s Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya (6th/7th century): Being something the existence, non-existence and both [the existence and non-existence] of [a particular property of it] is emphasised through [the pitcher’s] own mode and through the mode of something else, this [pitcher] is differentiated as “a pitcher,” as “something else than a pitcher,” as “something inexpressible” and as “both [a pitcher and something else than a pitcher].”76

73 See SSi 5.32, § 588, p. 231,9ff.: anekāntātmakasya vastunaḥ prayojanavaśād yasya kasyacid dharmasya vivakṣayā prāpitaṃ pradhānyam arpitam upanītam iti yāvat. tadviparītam anarpitam. prayojanābhāvāt sato ’py avivakṣā bhavatīty upasarjanītam iti ucyate. tābhyāṃ siddher “arpitānarpitasiddher” [TS 5.32] nāsti

virodhaḥ. 74 See STP 3.60: davvyaṃ khittaṃ kālaṃ bhāvaṃ pajjāyadesasaṃjoge / bhedaṃ ca paḍucca samā bhāvāṇaṃ paṇṇavaṇapajjā //. 75 See TS 1.5: nāmasthāpanādravyabhāvatas tannyāsaḥ. Ample material on the nikṣepa is supplied in the monograph by Bhatt 1978. 76 See VĀBh 2232 (p. 910): sabbhāvāsabbhāvobhayappio saparapajjaobhayao / kuṃbhākuṃbhāvattavyobhayarūvāibheo so //. Hemacandra Maladhārin aptly elaborates on the verse in VĀVṛ 910,12 ff. See also VĀBh 911,9ff.: kumbhaḥ akumbhaḥ avaktavyaḥ … and p. 912 (on paṭa).

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 19 The idea indicated in the verse is that a particular entity a may – when certain parameters (typical of its own class) are emphasised, in other words when it is considered from a certain angle  – be predicated of as a member of a class of objects endowed with a fixed set of qualities:  (a  A); whereas when other set of parameters is taken into account, it can be predicated of as a member of another class:  (a  A). However, this style of predication can be reduced to the idea that a particular thing can, from a certain angle, be said to either possess a property P (which it shares with other members of its class A) or not to possess it, etc. In other other words:

(x is P),  (x is P) and  (x is (P&P)). In his Praśamaratiprakaraṇa, Umāsvāti likewise speaks of ghaṭa and mṛd77 as does Siddhasena-gaṇin78, giving an impression that these are the only entities used in the sources to exemplify the seven-fold modal description. There are some rare exceptions, such as the pair of viṣa and modaka (‘poison and sweetmeat’) in Haribhadrasūri’s Anekāntajayapatākā.79 In none of the literature, prior to Dharmakīrti, I have managed to consult, is there any mention of ‘camel’ (uṣṭra, karabha etc.) or any kind of ‘diary product’ (dadhi, kṣīra etc.) as the subject of the proposition.

This is an additional evidence that the ‘camel-yoghurt’ example Dharmakīrti adduces is not a genuine one, but construed by Dharmakīrti to mock the Jainas. The only mention of ‘yoghurt’ is found in the Āptamīmāṃsā: A person who has taken a vow [to eat only] milk does not partake of yoghurt; a person who has taken a vow [to eat only] yoghurt, does not partake of milk; a person who has taken a vow to refrain from all dairy products does not [partake of] both [milk and yoghurt]. Therefore, reality has triple nature (origination, cessation and continuation).80 Despite seemingly irrelevant character of this verse, its pertinence to the theory of anekānta is independently confirmed by Vidyānanda81 commenting on the verse and it is perhaps Samantabhadra who might have been a source of possible inspiration for Dharmakīrti. That suggestion seems to me exceedingly unlikely not only because of the exact contents of the verse but also

77 See PRP2 and PRPṬ 202–206 (p. 139–144), esp. PRPṬ 205–206 (p. 143): ghaṭārtho mṛtpiṇḍe nāsti nābhūd ityārthaḥ. 78 See TṬ 5.21 (407,26–27): yathā ghaṭaḥ paṭādir api bhavati syātkārasaṃlāñcchanaśabdābhidheyatāyām. 79 See AJP I 294,5–6: na viṣaṃ viṣam eva, modakādyabhinnasāmānyāvyatirekāt. Haribhadra notices that, despite the fact both poison and sweetmeat can be predicated of as the same from a certain angle, there is a fundamental practical difference between the two. After taking a sweetmeat, one does not die as it is the case with poison. Therefore, purely out of practical considerations, one should reject the idea of the identity between the poison and the sweetmeat, see AJP I 295,10–11: etena “viṣe bhakṣite modako ’pi bhakṣitaḥ syāt” ityādy api

pratikṣiptam avagantavyam, tulyayogakṣematvād iti. According to Haribhadra, these practical considerations, which reflect Jaina realism, are decisive to falsify Dharmakīrti’s misrepresentation, inasmuch people apply sweetmeat, instead of poison, albeit one could find an angle from which they could be described to share similar property, because they clearly see the difference between two different entities, see AJP I 295,5–9: ato yady api dvayam apy (= viṣamodakau) ubhayarūpam tathāpi viṣārthī viṣa eva pravartate, tadviśeṣapariṇāmasyaiva tatsamānapariṇāmāvinābhāvāt tadviśeṣapariṇāmasyeti, ataḥ

prayāsamātraphalā pravṛttiniyamocchedacodaneti. 80 See ĀMī 60: payovrato na dadhy atti na payo ’tti dadhivrataḥ / agorasavrato nobhe tasmāt tattvaṃ trayātmakam //. 81 See AṣS ad loc., 212,17–18: tataḥ sūktaṃ sarvaṃ vastu syān nityam eva, syād anityam eveti. evaṃ syād ubhayam eva, syād avaktavyam eva, syān nityāvaktavyam eva, syād anityāvaktavyam eva, syād ubhayāvaktavyam eveti api yojanīyam. Piotr Balcerowicz 20 because, despite an often repeated claim,82 Samantabhadra does not seem to have predated Dharmakīrti83 and should be, instead, considered a contemporary of Dharmakīrti and Kumārila.

4. The question now is how Jaina thinkers reacted to Dharmakīrti’s attacks and how his criticism relates to what the Jainas themselves understood under ‘anekānta.’

4.1. In most cases the reply of Jaina philosophers who flourished after Dharmakīrti is the same and can be summarised briefly as: ‘we have never professed the opinions which Dharmakīrti ascribes to us.’

4.1.1. One of very few Jaina philosophers who seriously responded to Dharmakīrti’s critical remarks on anekānta is Abhayadevasūri (c. 1050–1100).

4.1.1.1. According to Abhayadeva Dharmakīrti misrepresents the Jaina idea of the universal, which is his opinion underlies the alleged equation of the camel and the yoghurt and thus Dharmakīrti’s whole account of anekāntavāda is flawed: “For we do not accept that there exists one synchronic homogeneity,84 such as “being the real thing” etc., which [would be] established by virtue of the non-difference among individuals, because there appears no

representation [in mind] of something of such kind. However, we do accept such [[[homogeneity]]] which is different in each individual, which is the contents of awareness [that individual things] are similar; when the verbal designation of this [[[homogeneity]] is made] by a speech element, why would a person urged [by it] towards one thing (sc. yoghurt) run towards another thing (sc. camel) in order to eat, unless he were a madman?”85 The above comment by Abhayadevasūri, albeit being directed against Dharmakīrti, seems to have been prompted also by a passage from Manorathanandin’s Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: ‘In a

82 See, for instance, Pathak 1893, Pathak 1930, Pathak 1930–1931, Fujinaga 2000. Pathak’s erroneous conclusions are aptly summarised in his own words: ‘I have proved that Kumārila has attached the view of Samantabhadra and Akalaṅkadeva that Arhan alone is sarvajña’ (Pathak 1930–1931: 123). These analyses do not take into account other possible sources for Kumārila’s statements, e.g. Jinabhadragaṇin’s Viśeṣāvaśyakabhāṣya or Mallavādin Kṣamāśramaṇa’s

Dvādaśāranayacakra. 83 That issue is going to be dealt with in a separate paper ‘On the relative chronology of Dharmakīrti and Samantabhadra.’ 84 The notion of tiryaksāmānya is post-Akalaṅkian, cf. Balcerowicz 1999: 218–219: “the terms synchronic homogeneity (tiryaksāmānya) and diachronic homogeneity (ūrdhvatāsāmānya) must have been coined not earlier than in post-Akalaṅkian literature. As late as at the turn of the 9th/10th centuries we can observe certain laxity in use of the two terms. Beside ūrdhvatāsāmānya and tiryaksāmānya, we find such forms as ūrdhvasāmānya and tiraścīnasāmānya.” 85 TBV

242,31–243,2: na hy asmābhir dadhyuṣṭrayor ekaṃ tiryaksāmānyaṃ vastutvādikaṃ vyaktyabhedena vyavasthitaṃ tathābhūtapratibhāsābhāvād abhyupagamyate, yādṛgbhūtaṃ tu prativyaktibhinnaṃ “samānāḥ” iti pratyayaviṣayabhūtam abhyupagamyate. tathābhūtasya tasya śabdenābhidhāne kim ity anyatra prerito ’nyatra khādanāya dhāveta yady unmatto na syāt. This passage follows Abhayadevasūri’s criticism (TBV 242,19–26) against Dharmakīrti’s u

nderstanding of the universal, as it is found e.g. in PV4 3.109 = PV4 3.107, pada d of which being quoted in TBV 242,19: samānā iti tadgrahāt. Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 21 certain sense yoghurt is camel, because [both] are real things. Or, in a certain sense [yoghurt] is not camel, because of its particular nature.’86 While commenting on PVSV9 3.181 passage, Manorathanandin not only

elaborates on Dharmakīrti’s argument but converts Dharmakīrti’s wording, which appears seemingly incomplete to the commentator, of PVSV 181: syād uṣṭro dadhi syān na, into a full-fledged proof formula (prayoga), by supplying logical reasons for both theses (vastutvāt, viśeṣarūpatayā). These are clearly reflected in Abhayadeva’s response. The similarities between PVV and TBV in wording and contents are as follows: Manorathanandin Abhayadevasūri (1) vastutvāt na … asmābhir … ekaṃ tiryaksāmānyaṃ vastutvādikaṃ … abhyupagamyate (2) viśeṣarūpatayā na … asmābhir ekaṃ tiryaksāmānyaṃ vyaktyabhedena

vyavasthitaṃ … abhyupagamyate Abhayadevasūri’s reply is meant to invalidate Dharmakīrti’s criticism, seen through the prism of Manorathanandin’s statements, by rendering it into a flawed and inaccurate account of Jaina thesis. It is worth noting in passing that Abhayadevasūri’s reference to Manorathanandin’s account may help establish a relative chronology between Manorathanandin and Abhayadevasūri who both lived at more or less the same time: 2nd half of the 11th century. If my assessment is correct, Manorathanandin must have preceded Abhayadevasūri. Another possible inspiration for

Abhayadevasūri’s remark could be the statement of PVSVṬ 183 (339,23–24): syād uṣṭro dadhi, dravyādirūpatayaikatvāt. syān na dadhi uṣṭrāvasthāto dadhyavasthāyā bhinnatvāt. The ideas and formulations, however, are slightly different and thus Karṇakagomin is much less probable a source. 4.1.1.2. Abhayadevasūri rejects also what he takes for Dharmakīrti’s misrepresentation of Jaina idea of the particular: If this real thing, which is [supposedly] excluded from [all] things that belong to the same class and from things that belong to a different class [and] which is undiversified

(homogeneous), is represented in exactly such a manner in perception which has the efficacy to [represent] it, then, however, acts of conceptual cognition which take place in subsequent time [and] which [merely] represent something unreal, arise as conceptualising – with respect to the excluded real thing – various universals, which are based on the exclusion of everything else by virtue of the real thing to be excluded. It is not consistent [to assume] that the distinctive nature of the universals is established by virtue of this [real thing] because of too far-reaching consequence.87

4.1.2. Another Jaina thinker in whose work we come across a refutation of Dharmakīrti’s account of the universal is Vādirājasūri:

86 PVV2 3.180 (352,8–9) = PVV7 3.181 (212,15–16) = PVV9 3.181 (262,21–22): syād uṣṭro dadhi vastutvāt. na vā syād uṣṭro viśeṣarūpatayā. 87 See TBV 243,12ff.: atha sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttaṃ niraṃśaṃ vastu tatsāmarthyabhāvini ca pratyakṣe tat tathaiva pratibhāti, tad uttarakālabhāvinas tv avastusaṃsparśino vikalpāḥ vyāvartyavastuvaśavibhinnavyāvṛttinibandhanān sāmānyabhedān vyāvṛtte vastuny upakalpayantaḥ samupajāyante. na tadvaśāt tadvyavasthā yuktā, atiprasaṅgāt.

For it is as follows. This criticism, which one wishes to raise against [our doctrine of multiplexity of reality that states that] the real thing consists in positive aspect (P) and in negative aspect (non-P) cannot hold [true], to begin with, with respect to [such a real thing] that consists in a universal and in a particular, because there is no single universal which is concomitant with [both] yoghurt and [[[Wikipedia:camel|camel]],] etc. For the universal is the transformation pertaining to likeness, and it is indeed confined to yoghurt etc.; there is no other entity at all or anything else associated [with it, and

independent of it], just like the likeness between something blue and the cognition of it. Therefore, how can oneness between yoghurt and camel be possible, on the basis of which some activity were possible with respect to one thing [even though] the injunction concerning the other [thing were expressed]?88 The main line of his argumentation is, again, that Dharmakīrti misrepresents the Jaina concept of the universal and his criticism might hold valid only with respect to a theory which would understand the universal the way the Jainas do not.

4.1.3. Not only Abhayadeva and Vādirāja, but generally no Jaina text consulted by me refers to any kind of universal (sāmānya) in the sense of a special quality (atiśaya), over and above the thing itself, by virtue of which two entities could be associated or dissociated as it is done in the exposition above (vastutvāt, see p. 12). We come across clear statements that deny such an approach, see e.g. Akalaṅka’s Svarūpasambodhana: “Acknowledge that the essence of the real thing is [the thing] itself and the other by virtue of the nature of the real thing.”89 Clearly, atiśaya cannot be considered to correspond to parameters or stand for the dravyārthika and paryāyārthika viewpoints. Further, Akalaṅka’s riposte to Dharmakīrti (PV 3.182) in his

Nyāyaviniścaya points out the general misrepresentation of the main idea behind the doctrine of the seven-fold modal description. His strategy is to demonstrate that Dharmakīrti commits the fallacy of ‘pseudo-criticism’ (dūṣaṇābhāsa): [Your] false riposte with respect to the [inferable property of our thesis] is a counterfeit rejoinder [as a formal flaw in discourse to blame] on the enemies of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality, just like one

injunction [concerning both yoghurt and camel] due to the undesired consequence of non-difference of yoghurt and camel.90 He further ironically points out the consequences of Dharmakīrti’s understanding of anekānta: Also the Buddha was [once] born as a deer, and the deer is known as the [[[Wikipedia:future|future]]] Buddha. Nevertheless, just as [you] accept that the Buddha should be venerated, [whereas] the deer can be eaten, in the same manner, since the [[[relative]]] difference and non-difference [between things (e.g. the Buddha and the deer)] is established only by force of the real thing, why should the person enjoined: “Eat yoghurt!”, run towards the camel?’91

88 See NViV 2.203 (233,19ff.): tathā hi – tad api tadatadātmake vastuni dūṣaṇam uddhuṣyamāṇam na tāvat sāmānyaviśeṣātmake bhavitum arhati, dadhyādyanvayinaḥ s āmānyasyaikasyābhāvāt. sādṛśyapariṇāmo hi sāmānyam, tac ca dadhyādiparyavasitam eva na kiṃcid api sattvam anyad vā samanvitam asti nīlatajjñānayoḥ sārūpyavat. tat kathaṃ dadhyuṣṭrayor ekatvaṃ yata ekacodanāyām anyatrāpi pravṛttiḥ. 89 SSam 20ab: svaṃ paraṃ ceti vastutvaṃ vasturūpeṇa

bhāvaya / 90 See NVi1 371 (79,29–30) = NVi2 2.203 (vol. II 233,2,6): tatra mithyottaram jātiḥ yathānekāntavidviṣām / dadhyuṣṭrāder abhedatvaprasaṅgād ekacodanam // 91 See NVi1 373–4 (p. 80) = NVi2 2.204–5 (vol. II 234,1–4): sugato ’pi mṛgo jāto mṛgo ’pi sugataḥ smṛtaḥ / tathāpi sugato vandyo mṛgaḥ khyādyo yatheṣyate //

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 23 These two verses, especially the phrase sugato vandyo mṛgaḥ khyādyo yatheṣyate, parodies Dharmakīrti’s ridicule contained in PV 3.182 (codito dadhi khāda…).

4.2. The above comparison of the main features in Dharmakīrti’s account of anekānta (see § 2.2.) and the way the doctrine is explicated by the Jainas themselves (§ 3.) leads us to the conclusion that, in his account of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality, Dharmakīrti is off the mark as regards several points. Apart from the arguments formulated by the Jaina thinkers and summarised above that concern Dharmakīrti’s account of the Jaina understanding of the universal (§§ 4.1.1.1., 4.1.2.) and the particular (§ 4.1.1.2.), we can mention a few more in the following.

4.2.1. The qualified identity or difference, predicated of with the modal operator syāt, does not entail complete (ekānta) identity or difference of the predicated object.

4.2.2. No Jaina text consulted by me refers to some special quality (atiśaya), reported in PVSV {183.1}, or any kind of special character (viśeṣa) which would qualify things and by virtue of which we could predicate of things as being either identical or different. In Jaina works there seems to be no mention of things that are x-viśiṣṭa, where x would be such a special quality. On the contrary, some Jaina thinkers explicitly deny that there exists any such special quality (atiśaya). Haribhadra, while refuting Dharmakīrti’s account of anekāntavāda, states in his Anekāntajayapatākā: [9] Hence, there is

[indeed] some special quality in this [yoghurt] by virtue of whose singular character [the person enjoined] acts [accordingly by distinguishing]: ‘This is indeed yoghurt’, ‘That is not [yoghurt]’, inasmuch as [this special quality] is coexistent92 with [both of these, i.e. yoghurt and camel,] which are existing substances. [10] Therefore this special quality does exist [as the substance of yoghurt as such. However,] it does not exist in anything else, and there is nothing else at all except for these two (sc. the yoghurt and the camel). Accordingly, since the true nature [of yoghurt] is well established,

there is no fault [with the doctrine of multiplexity of reality].93 In other words, Haribhadra concedes that we might speak of some kind of special quality (atiśaya) but it is not an independent entity separate from either youghrt or camel. The special quality is merely a condition of the particular thing as something that retains its individuality94. But that concession is not tantamount to saying that such a special quality indeed exists.95 What Haribhadra wants to say is, therefore, not only that there exists such a quality, albeit not of the

tathā vastubalād eva bhedābhedavyavasthiteḥ / codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭram abhidhāvati // 92 Viz. the special quality is reducible to yoghurt or camel. On anuvedha (‘coexistence’ or ‘togetherness’) comp. Bossche (1995: 448–449). 93 Vol. I 297,13–14 (kā. 9–10): ato ’sty atiśayas tatra yena bhedena vartate / sa dadhy evety ado neti saddravyatvānuvedhataḥ // 9 // tataḥ so ’sti na cānyatra na cāpy anubhayam param / evaṃ tattvavyavasthāyām avadyaṃ nāsti kiṃcana // 10 // 94 Cf. AJPSV ad loc.: ato ’sty atiśayaḥ viśeṣapariṇāmaḥ. 95 AJPSV ad loc., I 298,12: na caivam api pareṣṭasiddhir iti.

Piotr Balcerowicz 24 same kind assumed by Dharmakīrti, but that such a special quality is reducible to either of (or both) the two particulars (youghrt and camel): there is nothing over and above the two things (na cāpy anubhayam param). Another example of a philosopher who rejects Dharmakīrti’s criticism is Prabhācandrasūri96. The existence of any kind of special quality is thus denied, and indeed it is hard to find a trace of it also in earlier Jaina sources. 4.2.3. In opposition to what Dharmakīrti claims (vide supra § 2.2.1.f.), no Jaina text consulted by me speaks of the identity of two unrelated things x = y. Instead, the formulation of the syāt proposition is one of the following: (a) an incomplete sentence of the sort:  (x is …),  (x is not …), etc.,

in which no explicit predicate is mentioned; (b) a modal statement in which the subject is predicated of in terms of a predicate:  (x is P), where P is a property,  (x is non-P), etc.; (c) a modal statement – e.g. syāt ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ, syāt ghaṭo ’ghaṭaḥ etc. (see § 3.6.) – that links a member of a class to the class of the kind  (a  A),  (a  A), etc. by virtue of a property P all the members of the class possess; therefore, this kind of statements can be reduced to the pattern of § 4.2.3.(b):  (x is P),  (x is nonP), etc.; (d) rather rare type:  (x is x-related),  (x is non-x-related) etc.,

where the relation is strictly causal, based on the idea of the triad: origination (utpāda), cessation (vyaya) and permanence (dhrauvya), e.g. ‘a pot is, in a certain sense, a lump of clay’ (syād ghaṭo mṛdpiṇḍaḥ97;  (x is x-related)), ‘a pot is not, in a certain sense, a lump of clay’ (syād ghaṭo mṛdpiṇḍo nāsti;  (x is non-x-related)); what Haribhadrasūri formulates is already implied by the two verses of Praśamaratiprakaraṇa: “[204] Whatever is

characterised by origination, destruction and permanence, all that with no exception exists. It is [predicated of as] something existent, something non-existent or otherwise (sc. inexpressible as well as the remaining permutations) on account of whether a particular [property] is emphasised or not emphasised. [205] The production, [[[caused]]] by [the substratum] y, is of such an object x which was not there in [the substratum] y, and is seen presently there in [the substratum] y. The opposite of this is the destruction of [the object] x.”98

4.2.4. In Dharmakīrti’s account we see absolute absence of the four parameters dravyakṣetrakālabhāva (vide supra § 3.5.) which, at a point, become essential in Jaina exposition of syādvāda.

4.2.5. Dharmakīrti does not seem to notice an important distinction between the substantial aspect of dravya and the modal, transient aspect of paryāya that are at the basis of such propositions as syād asti and syān nāsti, respectively, etc. That oversight is unhesitatingly pointed out

96 NKC, Vol. 2 463,5–6: …kiṃcit sat samastasad iti, evam asad api. sampūrṇaniratiśayasvātmana eva tu vastutvād nirūpyam – katamat tat kva vā kiṃcitsattvam asattvaṃ vā? etarhi nirūpyate – nanv idam eva tad ekasattāsad asad api asamarthagavavat. 97 Comp. Haribhadrasūri’s account in PRPṬ. 98 PRP 204–205: utpādavigamanityatvalakṣaṇam yat tad asti sarvam api / sad asad vā bhavatīty anyathārpitānarpitaviśeṣāt // 204 // yo ’rtho yasmin nābhūt sāmpratakāle ca dṛśyate tatra / tenotpādas tasya vigamas tu tasmād viparyāsaḥ // 205 //

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 25 by Śāntisūri in the Nyāyāvatārasūtravārttika, while directly referring to Dharmakīrti’s verse: ‘One should not claim the following: … [PV 3.182], because also the aspect of the mode is admitted [by us]. It is only in that way that the seven-fold modal description is established. For it is as follows: When one wants to express the primary character of the substance, then one asserts: “x is, in a certain sense, [P].” When [one wants to express the primary character] of the mode, one [asserts]: “x is, in a certain sense, not-[P].” When one wishes to express the contention that both are primary at the same time, then [one asserts]: “x is, in a certain sense, inexpressible.”

These [three] are the cases of the complete (sc. basic) account. The combinations of precisely these [three] yield another four angles. And these [remaining four] are the cases of the incomplete account insofar as they are based on the [combination of] the elements of these [three]. [The

permutations] are as follows: “x is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is not-[P]”; “x is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is inexpressible”; “x is, [in a certain sense,] [P] and is not-[P], and is inexpressible.” Thus, no other angle is possible.’99 What is important, the parameterisation of the modal propositions within the framework of the seven-fold modal description had already become a standard procedure among the Jainas before Dharmakīrti, for examples see §§ 3.1.j., 3.5., 3.6, so Dharmakīrti must, at least should, have been acquainted with it.

4.2.6. We come across similar criticism against a charge of the identity of two unrelated things x = y (vide supra § 2.2.1.f. and 4.2.3.), expressed by Samantabhadra. He explains that any two things can be regarded as equal and unequal the way a substance and its modes can be interpreted as identical and different: [70] Because of the contradiction, there cannot be selfsameness of nature of both [[[phenomena]] that are opposed in nature, which is incriminated] by the enemies of the method of the seven-fold modal description. Also when [a charge is expressly formulated by the opponents] that if [a thing is] indescribable100 it is [[[indescribable]]] in the absolute sense, then [such a charge] is not logically tenable because, [that being the case,] it is [seen to be] expressible.101 [71] The substance and the mode are one, insofar as there is no disassociation of these two (sc. they are invariably related) and insofar as [these two always] undergo [their respective] particular kind of transformation due to the relationship [that holds between these two] of the potentiality bearer (sc. substance) and the potentialities (sc. modes).

99 NASV 35 § 30, p. 93,26–94,4: na caitad vācyam – sarvasyobhayarūpatve tadviśeṣanirākṛteḥ / codito dadhi khādeti kim uṣṭraṃ nābhidhāvati // PV 3.182 // paryāyanayasyāpy abhyupagamāt. ata eva saptabhaṅgī siddhyati. tathā hi – yadā dravyasya prādhāṇyam vivakṣate tadā “syād asti” iti kathyate. yadā paryāyāṇāṃ tadā “syān nāsti” iti. yadā yugapad ubhayaprādhānyapratipādanaṃ vivakṣyate tadā “avaktavyam.” ete sakalādeśāḥ. tatsaṃyoga evāpare catvāro bhaṅgā bhavanti. te ca svāvayavāpekṣayā vikalādeśāḥ. tad yathā – asti ca nāsti ca. asti cāvaktavyaṃ ca. nāsti cāvaktavyaṃ ca. asti ca nāsti cāvaktavyaṃ ca iti

nāparabhaṅgasambhavaḥ. 100 Here: avācya=avaktavya, in the sense of the third (or fourth) modal proposition (syād avaktavyam). 101 ĀMī 70cd is apparently a reply to PVSV {184.22}: na hy avācyam arthaṃ buddhayaḥ samīhante. The verse of ĀMī 70 (kārya–kāraṇa) is a repetition of ĀMī 13 (abhāva–bhāva), and it recurs again and again in Samantabhadra’s work: 32 (sāmānya–viśeṣa), 55 (nitya–anitya), 74 (apekṣika–anapekṣika), 77 (pratyakṣa–āgama), 82 (antarjñeya–bahirjñeya), 90 (daiva–adaiva), 94 (puṇya–pāpa), 97 (ajñāna–jñāna). In each case ubhaya (in ubhayaikātmyaṃ) changes its meaning, here supplied by me in brackets.

[72] On the other hand, since [these two] have their particular designations and their particular numerical character (sc. substance is one, modes are many), since they have their unique natures and since there is a distinction between them in terms of their purpose etc., [therefore] there is difference between them. However, [the difference] is not in the absolute sense.’102 The implication of Samantabhadra’s exposition, which I believe is directly prompted by Dharmakīrti, is that any two entities can be considered both as identical and different in accordance with the substance-expressive

(dravyārthikanaya) and the mode-expressive (paryāyārthikanaya) viewpoints (see pp. 12, 15, 17), where the two viewpoints serve as parameters.

5. To conclude, we easily see some points in Dharmakīrti’s account of the anekāntavāda that significantly diverge from the genuine doctrine as it is represented by Jaina philosophers themselves. It is no wonder that the Jainas are keen to demonstrate how greatly Dharmakīrti misrepresents it. It is particularly Akalaṅka who ridicules Dharmakīrti on that basis: You who prove the manifold continuum of impermanent cognitions [which are] false represantations of things [and] who criticise, indeed, the statements (sc. saptabhaṅgī) of cognition of truth, are a jester.103 Vādirājasūri follows the suit: “Therefore, [when Dharmakīrti] has not understood the opinion of the propounders of modal description, and [still] formulates this [objection]

against them, [the objection] reveals Dharmakīrti’s nature of jester: ‘Someone who has not understood the position of [his] opponents and yet criticises [it] is a jester’.”104 the last line being a pun (avijñāya DŪṢAKO ’pi viDŪṢAKAḥ). In these acts of derision they reciprocate Dharmakīrti’s own tactics, who calls his opponents ‘shameless’ (ahrīkāḥ) and their theory ‘primitive and confused’ (aślīlam ākulam) in PV 3.181. Both approaches obviously seem to be compatible neither with the Jaina and Buddhist principles of ahiṃsā or karuṇā nor with a general principle of mutual respect. The question arises whether the points Dharmakīrti ‘missed’ can be justified historically with his poor acquaintance with the Jaina doctrine? That supposition seems highly unlikely to

02 See ĀMī 70–72: virodhān nobhayaikātmyaṃ syādvādanyāyavidviṣām / avācyataikānte ’py uktir nāvācyam iti yujyate // 70 // dravyaparyāyor aikyaṃ tayor avyatirekataḥ / pariṇāmaviśeṣāc ca śaktimacchaktibhāvataḥ // 71 // saṃjñāsaṅkhyāviśeṣāc ca svalakṣaṇaviśeṣataḥ / prayojanādibhedāc ca tannānātvaṃ na sarvathā // 72 // 103 See SVi 3.26 (412): mithyārthābhāsthirajñānacitrasantānasādhakaḥ / tattvajñānagirām aṅgadūṣakas tvaṃ vidūṣakaḥ // See also SViV 6.37 (437,22–25): dadhyādau na pravarteta bauddhaḥ tadbhuktaye janaḥ / adṛśyāṃ saugatīṃ tatra tanūṃ saṃśaṅkamānakaḥ // dadhyādike tathā bhukte na bhuktaṃ kāñcikādikam / ity asau vettu no vetti na bhuktā saugatī tanuḥ // 104 See NViV 2.203 (233,26–27): tataḥ syādvādimatam anavabuddhya tatredam ucyamānaṃ dharmakīrter viduṣakatvaṃ āvedayati “pūrvapakṣam avijñāya dūṣako ’pi vidūṣakaḥ” [NVi] iti prasiddheḥ.

Dharmakīrti’s criticism of the Jaina doctrine of multiplexity of reality (anekāntavāda) 27 me, although one cannot exclude the possibility that what Dharmakīrti depicts are some early developments of the theory. Rather Dharmakīrti deliberately invents the example of the camel and the yoghurt in order to graphically emphasise the paradoxes he believed Jaina theory contained by drawing a sarcastic caricature of it. His approach is reductionist in the sense that he simplifies essential elements of the doctrine of multiplexity of reality for his objective is not a doxographic report but rhetorically successful tactics.

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