Critiquing Winternitz’s Approach to the Darshanas
Critiquing Winternitz’s Approach to the Darśanas
Pavlov Institute, Kolkata
Short CV of Ramkrishna BHATTACHARYA
Born in Kolkata, 10 December 1947. Educated at the Scottish Church Collegiate School, Vidyasagar College and the University of Calcutta, Kolkata. Graduated with Honours in English (1966); M.A. (1968) and Ph.D. (1986). Retired on 31. 12. 2007 as Reader, Department of English, Anandamohan College, Kolkata 700 009 and Guest Lecturer, Post-graduate Faculty of English, University of Calcutta.
Emeritus Fellow in English, University Grants Commission, New Delhi, 2009-11.
Visiting Professor, Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 2009-10.
Fellow, Pavlov Institute, 98, Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata 700 007.
Author of 28 books and more than 175 research papers. Writes articles and reviews in both scholarly journals and other periodicals on literature (Indian and European), text-criticism (Bangla and Sanskrit), the history of ideas, the history of science in India, the history of modern India, and philosophy (specially the Carvaka/Lokayata system, materialism and rationalism). Regularly participates in national seminars and international conferences, workshops and across-the-board discussions. Lectures and acts as resource person in refresher courses on various disciplines (Bangla, English, Sanskrit, Philosophy, Political Science, etc.) organized by several universities in India.
Recent Works:
Bangla Marxiya Nandantattva, Kolkata: Ababhas, 2015.
Prabandhasangraha. Kolkata: Ebong Mushayera, 2015.
Bankimer Mananjagat. Kolkata: Korak, 2016.
Marksbad Jijnasa. Kolkata: Ababhash, 2016.
Takkatakki Karte Hale O Darsaner Barnaparichay. Pratham Bhag. Kolkata: Thik Thikana, 2016.
Bangabhanga: Swadeshi: Biplabbaad. Kolkata: K. P. Bagchi, 2016.
English
Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Florence: Societa Editrice Fiorentina, 2009; London: Anthem Press, 2011.
Indian reprint: New Delhi: Anthem Press India, 2012.
Emergence of Materialism in India (Centre for Scientific Socialism, Occasional Lecture Series-9). Nagarjuna Nagar (Gutur, Aandhra Pradesh 522510): K. R. R. Mohan Rao Centre for Scientific Socialism, Acharya Nagarjuna University, 2013.
Present (residential) address: 3 Mohanlal Street, Kolkata 700 004 West Bengal India
Institutional address: Pavlov Institute, 98 Mahatma Gandhi Road, Kolkata 700007 India Phone: 0091-33-2555-1288
e-mail;: < ramkrishna.bhattacharya@gmail.com> <purandara12@rediffmail.com>
Critiquing Winternitz’s Approach to the Darśanas
Abstract Besides the āstika/nāstika division of the philosophical systems in India, there was a parallel division of Ṣaṭ-tarkī which unlike the former division was secular not religious. Speaking of the so-called ṣa&-darśanāni (six āstika systems of philosophy), Maurice Winternitz argued that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika were basically secular systems having nothing to do with the Veda. In this respect he anticipated the views of M. Hiriyanna, Erich Frauwallner and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
Keywords āstika/nāstika, Nyāya, ṣaṭ-tarkī, secular, Vaiśeṣika.
Background
Louis Renou glossed darśana as a ‘philosophico-religious system’ (système philosophiquo-religieux), and more elaborately as ‘a generic name of the great domains of the philosophic or religious speculation of ancient India’ (nom générique des grands domaines de la spéculation philosophique ou religieuse de l’Inde ancienne) (qtd. Gerschheimer 2000-2001 p.173). Such a description indeed applies to all known Indian systems of philosophy excepting materialism, variously known at different times as Bhūtavāda, Cārvāka, Lokāyata, etc. (See R. Bhattacharya 2013a). Despite some differences among themselves, the materialist systems all represent a secular approach to philosophy, as opposed to the others, that admitted liberation or freedom (mokṣa, mukti, nirvāṇa, etc.) as the aim of studying darśana. It is, however, to be noted that no two schools agreed on the significance and features of this much expected liberation or deliverance. Thus the systems were ultimately allied to one religion or the other, be it Hinduism (brahmanism), Jainism or Buddhism.
In the Indian tradition the darśanas were classified under two heads: āstika and nāstika. The division at first indicated two broad groups, one believing in the existence of the Other World, the other, not (for details, see R. Bhattacharya
2009/2011 pp.227-231). This interpretation, current from at least the fourth century
BCE (see Paṇini, Aṣṭādhyāyī 4.4.60), was accepted in this sense by all brahmanical,
Buddhist and Jain schools of philosophy. So much so that Haribhadra declares the
Jain and Buddhist systems as āstikavādins (Ṣa&darśanasamuccaya verse 78d) along with Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Jaiminīya (Mīmāṃsa) matas. By nāstika they all meant the materialists and the materialists alone (for instance, Śāntarakṣita, Tattvasaṅgraha 22.1871: nāstikatā; Hemacandra, Anya-yoga-vyavecchedadvātriṃśikā verse 20: nāstika; Sāyaṇa-Mādhava, Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, chap.1:
nāstika-śiromaṇi, the crest jewel of the nāstikas).1
Afterwards, however, nāstika in the writings of brahmanical authors came to signify the systems that did not adhere to the Veda, i.e., who did not accept the status of the Veda as a means of cognition. Thus, along with the materialists, the Buddhists and the Jains too were branded as nāstikas. It should, however, be borne in mind that this second signification was confined to the brahamanical circles only.
The Jains and the Buddhists continued to employ the word nastika in the old sense. Thus there emerged two sets: one set of six as Veda-abiding (the ṣa&-darśanāni) and another set opposed to them. They include four schools of Buddhist philosophy, the Jain and materialist mentioned mostly as the Cārvāka or Lokāyata (See Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 1977 p. 3).
In whichever sense the word is taken, the division is basically religious, not philosophical. Even though Nyāya pays homage to the Veda, it may very well be regarded as ‘of the nature of ransom paid to the authorities for the purpose of saving ānvīkṣikī ’ (Chattopadhyaya 1982 p.lxxxix). The brahmanical law books condemn reasoners (tārkika, hetuka or haituka) in no uncertain terms (for instances, see Bhattacharya 2009a pp.49-56).
1 In his translation of the Tattvasaṅgraha, Ganganath Jha said:
This use of ‘nāstikatā’ [in TS 22.1871] is to be noted, as it affords another indication of the truth that ‘nāstika’ is not the same as ‘Atheist’; ‘nāstikatā’ , as we find here is the view that denies the other world. This is in agreement with the view of Vātsyāyana, who also sums up the ‘Nāstika’ view in the words ‘Nāsti ātmā nāsti paralokaḥ’ , ‘There is no Soul, there is no
other world’ (onTS II:893n). Where? Definitely not in his commentary on the Nyāyasūtra ! In his glosses on vipratipratti (NS 1.1.26), Vātsyāyana mentions the view, nāsti ātmā but not
nāsti paralokaḥ’.
See also Jha’s note on TS 7.348, I:224.
S. C. Vidyabhushana was of the opinion that Nyāya had to submit to the orthodox forces solely in order to avoid this censure:
It seems that the unfavourable criticism to which ānvīkṣikī (the science of Logic) had long been exposed, terminated practically in the first century
A.D. when, under the name of Nyāyaśāstra, it accepted the authority of the Vedas and propounded the doctrine of syllogistic reasoning, the validity of which was never challenged. (1920/1988 p.39)
Not all Western historians of Indian philosophy, however, have paid attention to the āstika/nāstika division. Wilhelm Halbfass, for example, does not even mention it in his discussion of darśana (1988 chap.15), although Max Müller noted it (1899 pp.98.279). More recently the division has been rubbished by Daya Krishna as a ’myth’ (1991 pp.3-15). Whether myth or reality, the fact remains that the traditional adherents/interpreters of the darśanas of India used to take this division seriously. In response to the criticism that Nyāya was not based on the Veda, such a prodigious scholar as MM. Phanibhushana Tarkavagisa (1875–1941), following the lead given by Udayana in the Nyāyakusumāñjali, cited a verse from the Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad (3.3). He then proved to his satisfaction that Nyāya indeed is a Vedic system of philosophy, since the word, patatra, in that verse stands for atom (1978
p.65)! The division of the philosophical systems into āstika and nāstika, although quite old, is not found formulated before the seventeenth century. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī speaks of six nāstika systems, namely, Śūnyavāda (Mādhyamika),
Kṣaṇikavāda (Yogācāra), Vāhyārthavāda (Sautrāntika) and Pratyakṣa-svalakṣaṇa (Vaibhāṣika), all belonging to the Saugata (Buddhist), Dehātmavāda (Cārvāka), and finally Deha-vyatirikta-deha-pariṇāmātma-vāda (Digambara Jain): evaṃ militvā
nāstikānām ṣaṭprasthānāni (p.3).
Cimaṇabhaṭṭa too speaks of the same six in a different order: Cārvāka, Mādhyamika, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, Vaibhāṣika and Ārhata. His understanding of nāstika is that it is anti-Vedic (p.89).
The āstika//nāstika division, however, is in itself a confirmation of Renou’s view regarding darśana (see above). Both Erich Frauwallner (1956) and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1964) steer a middle course between the two approaches. Unlike the fourteenth-century Jain author, Guṇaratna (Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā, passim) they do not believe that all the philosophical systems had religious associations, but, at the same time, they do not deny that philosophical speculations have a distinct identity, not or no longer tied to religion. According to Frauwallner:
The Greek Philosophy is related to religion dialectically and develops itself out of contrast to it, in the form of that other religion of thought, purified through reason, formed in the form of the concept which has brought forth the philosophical God-idea, independent of religion in the idea of the good (Plato) and of the unmoved mover (Aristotle). Such is not the case with Indian thought. The Indian speculation has never departed from the soil or field of religion; it rather nourishes itself continually and directly out of the forces of this soil (of religion) from which it never uprooted itself (I:xiii).
Chattopadhyaya, too, compares and contrasts the Indian scenario to the Greek. He speaks of ‘the incomplete emancipation of our philosophical thought from all kinds of religious credulities, mythological imagination and even the belief in ritual practices’ (1964 p.6). He finds it surprising that all this could physically coexist ‘with the most remarkable logical subtleties and dialectical abilities, a peculiarity really difficult to understand for one acquainted only with the European tradition’ (ibid.).
A. K. Warder nevertheless tackles the issue of the overlap elaborately at the beginning of his Outlines of Indian Philosophy (1971). The distinction between religion and philosophy is made on the following basis: religion takes its stand on revelation and philosophy deals critically with the pursuit of knowledge and admits
no absolute authority (p.2). Warder is of the opinion that, in spite of the close connection between religion and philosophy in India, it is possible to deal with philosophy as an independent discipline.
A Parallel Scheme of Division
Besides this āstika/nāstika division, there was another classification of the philosophical systems that was not only philosophical but also secular. It is called Ṣaṭ-tarkī, Six Arguments (speculations in French. For a thorough discussion, see Gerschheimer 2007). Unlike the āstika/nāstika division, the concept of ṣaṭ-tarkī or ṣaṇmata, is found much later. (For details see Gerschheimer 2007). The first
reference to it occurs in Jayantabhaṭṭa’s Nyāyamañjarī (Ch.1 p.9). There too we have a distinction made – or at least implied – those systems adhering to the Veda (Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika) and those denying its authority (Jain, Buddhist, Cārvāka). Even then, long before Jayanta (ninth century) the distinction between the prevalent philosophical systems were current in south India. The Maṇimēkalai (±
550 CE) records six systems that accept logic, namely Lokāyata, Buddhist, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā (27.77-80). The notable absentees, as in many other accounts, are Vedānta, Yoga and Jain pluralism (Anekāntavāda). As Sīthalai Sāttanār, author of the work, was a devout Buddhist, we are not to expect any division in terms of pro-Vedic and anti-Vedic. The author does not even use the words, āstika and nāstika to signify belief and disbelief in the existence of the Other World or rebirth, not to mention the brahamanical division of Vedic and non-Vedic. The exponent of Lokāyata in this narrative, however, makes his position vis-à-vis rebirth quite clear as does Maṇimēkalai, the Buddhist princess (27.74-76). Apparently, the āstika /nāstika division can be traced to Naciketas’ statement in the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, 1.1.20:
’this constant doubt about a man departed – Some say he is, and others say he is not – this do I wish to know of thee (Yama). . .’ (Roby Datta’s trans. 1983 p.21) Interestingly enough, ṣaṭ-tarkī is mentioned in an inscription dated 1252 CE. Sarveśvara, a Kālāmukha priest of the Jagadīśvara temple in south India, is extolled vs one ‘who delighted in all the learning of the Ṛg-Veda, the Sāma-Veda, the Atharva-Veda, the Yajuḥ-Veda, the Vedānta, the six systems of philosophy [ṣaṭtarka], Grammar, Prosody, the collection and explanation of Vedic words and names, . . . ’ (Qtd. Lorenzen 1991 p. 152).
The separate mention of Vedānta beside ṣa&-tarkī is significant. It proves that Vedānta was not accepted as a tarka, even though Mīmāṃsā was.
To the instances collected by Gerschheimer we may add a verse from an unpublished source, the Kapila-Gītā, a part of the Padma Purāṇa (Asiatic Society MS, folio 6b, qtd in Chatterjee 1967 p.204 n160), which, however, mentions Vedānta first:
vedānta-nyāya-mīmāṃsā-tarka-naiyāyikas tathā | cārvākādīni śāstrāni ṣa&-darśanam-api smṛtam ||
The exclusion of Sāṃkhya-yoga and three separate mentions of Nyāya, Tarka and Naiyāyikas is inexplicable.
Winternitz’s view
It will be rewarding in this context to consider the views of Maurice Winternitz (1863 –1937). He is known to Indian students chiefly as a historian of Indian literature (not just of Sanskrit literature). Although, this was his magnum opus published over many years (1908 –1922), he was a prolific writer both in German and English on several aspects of Indology and an authority in the field of Sanskrit textual criticism.
Let us look at his views about the darśanas of ancient India.
Speaking of the six āstika systems of philosophy Winternitz clearly distinguishes Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika from the rest of the four others, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedanta. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, he says, ‘are altogether independent of religious beliefs and they have the merit that entitles them to be designated as strict scientific systems of logic and theory of knowledge’ (3:557–558). He goes to the extent of declaring that Vaiśeṣika that tries to explain nature independently of religious belief, in its character does not appear to be widely separated from the Lokāyata system. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika constitute the secular philosophies of lay scholars, of nontheological paṇ&itas and of “heretics.” It is significant that in the development of these two systems both the Buddhists and the Jainas have had made abundant amount of contribution (3:558. Emphasis added.).
In a footnote, he adds,
Then there are those who depend on the Hetuśāstra and on the Tarkaśāstra, that is to say, those who are devoted to the study of the systems of logic and dialectics. They are not referred to in respectful terms in orthodox Brāhmaṇical literature (3:558 n3). He also refers to several instances in this connection (3:559 n3).
Similarly, in Winternitz’s opinion, ‘Whilst Sāṃkhya has had its origin, independent of ideas regarding religious belief, the system of Y o g a came into being directly through religious necessity’ (3:552–553. Emphasis added.). Pūrva Mīmāṃsa and Uttara Mīmāṃsa (Vedānta), he says, stand ‘[i]n closest relationship with Vedic religion. . . . These two darśanas constitute the real orthodox Brāhamaṇical philosophy for which the word of the Veda constitutes, as the “revelation”, the highest authority for all knowledge’ (3:509–510).
Winternitz points out further that the schools of Vedānta are affiliated to one religious cult or the other, either Viṣṇu or Śiva (3:537): ’[t]he followers of the philosophy of Śaṅkara form simultaneously a religious sect, so [many] other schools of Vedānta too represent many religious sects’ (3:531). M. Walleser was of the opinion that Rāmānuja’s Śrībhāṣya, a commentary on the Vedāntasūtra, was not only ‘one of the most important works of thought that India has produced’ (as R. Otto has said), but ‘it would at once be considered to be one of the most important productions of world-literature’ (qtd. Winternitz 3:532– 533). Winternitz, however, demurs:
As of Śaṅkara, so of Rāmānuja too, the main objective seems to be to make the texts of the Upaniṣads, the Bhagavadgītā, the Purāṇas, and the Mahābhārata, that are equally holy for him (sc. Rāmānuja), mean something that is in accord with his religion and philosophy (3:533).
Winternitz concludes with perfect candour: ‘It is a theological and not a scientific way of thinking an argumentation’ (3:533).
Even if one does not accept Winternitz’s way of viewing the secular and the religious origins of the philosophical systems in India, it cannot be denied that some of the so-called secular systems, too, were forced to pay at least lip service to the Vedas, and that is how the distinction between the āstika and the nāstika systems came into being. It is not possible to locate the first occurrence of this division based on acceptance or rejection of the Veda. However, it can be safely asserted that such a division was already current by the eighth century CE, from when the philosophical battle between the Vedists and the non-Vedists (not only the materialist but also the Jains and the Buddhists) was in full swing.
What Winternitz said about Nyāya is indeed borne out by Vātsyāyana’s remark on the nature of Nyāya. He defends the scope of Nyāya by distinguishing it from adhyātma-vidyā (spiritual science). Replying to the question why ‘doubt’
(saṃśaya) is separately mentioned among the categories in the base text of Nyāya,
Vātsyāyana asserts: each of the four vidyās has its unique subject-matter and
without the separate mention of these (sc. doubt, etc.) it (Logic) would have
been mere ‘study of the self’ (adhyātma-vidyā), like Upaniṣad. Therefore, by mentioning the categories like saṃśaya, etc., it is shown to have its unique subject-matter (comments on Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1. trans. M.K. Gangopadhyaya 1982 p.3. Emphasis added.).
Hiriyanna’s following observation too is worth noting: ‘The position [of Nyāya concerning the theory of soul and consciousness] is scarcely distinguishable from that of the Cārvākas’ (1956 p.260n).
Winternitz’s subdivision of the so-called āstika systems further into religious and secular (3:558) has been endorsed by later scholars. Frauwallner expresses his view on the nature of Vaiśeṣika as follows:
The doctrine of deliverance . . . was introduced into the Vaiśeṣika system externally, without any inner connection with the rest of system. As a matter of fact, it shows itself to be a later supplement which had originally nothing to do with the system. It was on the contrary, a purely Nature-philosophy. With the Vaiśeṣika we stand before a philosophical system–a phenomenon rare in India–which sets before it as its final goal, not deliverance, but the attempt to understand and explain the phenomenal world. (2:13. Emphasis added.)
There is a floating verse which says: describing the six categories, after having proposed to describe the nature of dharma is comparable to a person, intending to go to the Himālaya, going to the sea.
dharmaṃ vyākhyātukāmasya ṣaṭpadārthopavarṇanam | himavad gantukāmasya sāgaragamanopamam ||5 (Qtd. Dasgupta 1:.282)
The reading of the base text of Vaiśeṣika has been subjected to scrutiny. The word dharma in the first two sūtras (1.1.1-2) is dubious and 1.1.4 might very well be a later addition (Gangopadhyaya 2003 p. 24).
5 There is variant reading in the last line of the verse:
dharmaṃ vyākhyātukāmasya ṣaṭpadārthopavarṇanam |
sāgaraṃ gantukāmasya himavadgamanapamam || (Qtd. Sukhamay Bhattacharyya
1360BS p.6)
Summing Up
The upshot of the above discussion then is that the āstika/nāstika division was originally meant to isolate the materialists alone, who did not admit the existence of the Other World. Not only the brahmanical writers but also the Buddhists and the
Jains accepted this division and continued to brand the materialists only as nāstika. But, over time, under the pressure of Dharmaśāstra, particularly of the Manu, the scope of nāstikavāda was extended to include Jain and Buddhist philosophical systems as well, since they too did not adhere to the Vedic ritual theory and practice. Thus, instead of the earlier, secular division based on ontology, the new division based on religion – Vedic or non-Vedic – became thoroughly religious. Dharmaśāstra came to rule over Mokṣaśāstra. The inclusion of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika was made possible by grafting the aim of freedom to these otherwise secular systems. Ṣaṭ-tarkī, a secular concept, was ultimately marginalized; the āstika/
nāstika division alone prevailed. The views of Frauwallner, Hiriyanna and Chattopadhyaya thus were anticipated by Winternitz.
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Winternitz, Maurice. 1985. A History of Indian Literature. Vol. III. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (reprint).
Acknowledgements Amitava Bhattacharyya, Chayan Samaddar and Siddhartha Dutta. The usual disclaimers apply.
