Models of Embodiment in Buddhism
by Michelle Janet Sorensen
Tibetan Buddhist traditions such as Chod inherited much from Indian Buddhist theoretical paradigms, including various schemas for analyzing and describing human existence and the interrelation between body and mind. Before looking at particular issues of the body in Chod, it is thus important to consider the place of the body in various Buddhist discussions. These models of embodiment, it is important to note, are not necessarily competing frameworks for comprehending the body, but rather are contingent tools for the analysis of the body-mind modality.
AGGREGATES
The body—given its immediacy to us as a foundation for meditation and analysis—is frequently discussed in Pali literature. A key model is the well-known dissection of the self into five body-mind aggregates: these consist of form, sensation, perception, mental formatives and consciousness. Buddhist discussions of the aggregates aim to illustrate two beliefs. Sentient beings can be analyzed into aggregates, which are themselves conditioned by impermanence and interdependence, and thus there is no abiding and independent “self.” In addition, to be a sentient being is to be an embodied
consciousness. Sue Hamilton-Blyth emphasizes that the paradigm of the body-mind aggregates is supposed to represent a dynamic sentient being: “[t]he khandhas [[[aggregates]]] are not a comprehensive analysis of what a human being is comprised of. . . . rather, they are factors of human experience (or, better, the experiencing factors) that one needs to understand in order to achieve the goal of Buddhist teachings. . . . they are about how the human being operates” (2000, 29). Apart from the form aggregate, the other aggregates are “mental” components; however, the five aggregates are often metonymically
referred to as “the body,” signifying “embodied consciousness” rather than mere form. Winston King refers to the five aggregates as “an organizing principle for progression from body to feeling and thought” (1980, 67). One early canonical source for discussions of the five aggregates is the Mahasatipaddhana sutta (The Greater Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness; DN 22). The Mahasatipaddhana sutta reflects a traditional Abhidharma
foundation and provides a template for vipassana meditation on the body, feelings, concepts and phenomena (dharma). A refrain in this teaching emphasizes the interconnectedness of the “internal” and “external” body, along with the awareness of impermanent phenomena.
The Buddhist paradigm of the body-mind aggregates is not to be understood as a definitive characterization of being human, but as a heuristic construct to support a deeper understanding of the principle of paticcasamuppada,32' or interdependent co-arising. Another early text that offers a sustained discourse on the body-mind aggregates is the Khandha Samyutta (Related Discourses on the Aggregates, SN 22). While this collection of teachings addresses the topic of the body-mind aggregates from a variety of perspectives, the underlying theme is the absence of a coherent self, not the “existence” of the aggregates. According to the principle of interdependent co-arising, because all phenomena are interdependent with all other phenomena through time and space, there is no singular phenomenon that “exists” independently.
While not part of the Tipitaka, another Pali source of canonical stature is Buddhaghosa's fifth century Visuddhimagga (The Path of Purification), which contains detailed discussions of the five aggregates along with a discussion of how one develops understanding of these aggregates through meditative awareness. In addition, the Visuddhimagga provides descriptions of the twelve bases and the eighteen elements. These Abhidharma bases and elements provide
an alternate analysis of the experience of being a self. Several chapters of Part Three of the Visuddhimagga are devoted to these bases and elements from various perspectives: the supranormal powers and elements (chapters XII and XIII), the common aggregates, bases, elements and faculties (chapters XIV, XV and XVI), and the purification of the common elements, bases and aggregates (chapter XVIII). Such classifications demonstrate a Buddhist appreciation of
the essential interdependency of processes that constitute the body-mind. More importantly, they illustrate the interconnection of embodied impulses, perceptions, and sensory experiences, not merely within the body-mind, but also in correspondence with the environment. It is the interdependency of the functioning of these elements that renders each element fundamentally empty when taken alone. When taken together, they provide a sense of unified
consciousness in interaction with conceptual objects and perceptual awareness. According to Buddhist classifications, these elements are further discriminated into 84 dharmas or aspects that provide a more particular analysis of the processual modality conventionally labeled a “self.” In Buddhist Chod, the five body-mind aggregates are often the object for meditation; however, “form”— derived from the Sanskrit term “rupa,”—is often taken as signifying the entire group. In his discussion of the rich meaning of “rupa,” Rupert Gethin argues against the common translation of this term by the
English word “matter,” which, as he says, misleadingly implies inertness. Based on his readings of the nikaya literature and the Dhammasangani, Gethin posits that “the early Buddhist account of rupa focuses on the physical world as experienced by a sentient being—the terms of reference are decidedly body-endowed-with- consciousness (savmhanaka kaya)n (1986, 36). As Gethin emphasizes, the notion of form is not to be taken as merely representing the material body. Analogously, in Chod discussions of practice, it is crucial to remember that “form” and “body” connote the experiencing being, the living organism determined by interdependent co-arising.
As in other forms of Buddhism, in Chod the body-mind aggregates are a matrix onto which sentient beings impute an individual mind and self; however, in Chod, they are also foregrounded as the objects that are to be cut. This tenet is attributed to Machik in various Chod sources, including The Great Explanation. The use of the term “phung po” or “aggregates” in the title draws attention to the fact that, in Machik's system of Chod, the body-mind aggregates are the objects to be cut and subsequently offered; however, within the teachings themselves, there is a dearth of discussion of what is meant by the aggregates.
In what is considered the “outer” form of Chod, all of the five aggregates are metaphorically represented by, and sometimes considered synonymous with, one's physical embodiment. One's embodiment, in this aspect of Chod, stands in for all of the aggregates. The body is considered the primary ground for one's self-habit of ego-clinging, and so one visualizes cutting and offering the body, while the four mental aggregates are not explicitly mentioned. However, even in this “outer” form of Chod, one is ultimately to cut through the mental constituents of the self; the physical form of the body is presented as an abstract figure, the thing that is metaphorically cut.
ENLIGHTENED EMBODIMENTS
In contrast to such analyses of the body-mind from a standpoint in conventional reality, the enlightened or realized body-mind of a Buddha has been represented through various concepts of embodiment. These paradigms provide a foundation for Buddhist discussions of ontological dialectics. As John Makransky (1997, 4-5) has noted, in the contexts of both foundational and Mahayana Buddhism, the term “kaya” or “body” does not merely denote the “physical body” (sarira) of a Buddha, but also connotes “body” as a collection or corpus
(samcaya), as a substratum or basis (âsraya), and as embodiment. These aspects are reflected in an important paradigm of embodiment within Buddhism, namely, the two bodies of the Buddha manifested as dharmakâya, the “Dharma Body,” and rûpakâya, the “Form Body.” The “Dharma Body” refers to the undefiled embodiment of the Buddha or buddhas, including the mental states of a realized being, and the teachings about the true nature of things that emanate from such mental states. Complementarily, the “Form Body” denotes the actual physical being of the Buddha or buddhas; this form is a manifestation of the conditioned being, a composite of defiled aggregates. This dyad is found throughout Buddhist teachings, from the Abhidharma teachings represented in the Sarvâstivâda Mahâvibhâsasâstra through the Tantras and their commentaries.
In his study of “wonderworkers” as represented in the Gandhavyûhasûtra, Luis Gomez (1977) posits that Buddhas and bodhisattvas possess both the Dharma Body and the Form Body through their identity with the Dharmadhatu. These two Bodies are non-dual realizations of the Dharmadhatu, the “realm of dharmas,” which itself has the non-dual aspects of being undivided (asambhinnadharmadhatu) and being manifest (dharmadhatutalabheda). Gomez describes the Dharma Body as a “representation” of the total aggregate of all dharmas that is identical with “a non-essence which, to be consistent with its lack of determination,
acquiesces to all transformations, but it [also has a] role as undifferentiated, pure, foundation . . . as the basis or root for the virtues of Buddhas, and as the metaphysical foundation behind appearances” (1977, 234). He juxtaposes this definition with a description of the Form Body as the aggregate of not only all the perfected qualities of a buddha, but also of all the illusory transformations and manifestations of perceptible qualities and phenomena: “The Form Body represents the power of transformation (vikurvana) inherent in the (unchanging) Dharmadhatu, the power by which the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas train the world in the foundation of all dharmas” (loc. cit.). These two Bodies are exemplary of enlightened being as capable of acting within conventions of the mundane world while simultaneously being concomitant with undifferentiated actuality.
A second paradigm that figures frequently in Buddhist traditions is the Three Bodies (sku gsum; trikaya). This triad includes the Dharma Body (chos sku; dharmakaya), the Enjoyment Body (longs sku; sambhogakaya), and the Manifestation Body (sprul sku; nirmanakaya). This model is most likely an elaboration of the dyad just discussed, with the latter two Bodies being subsets of the Form Body. One of the most interesting aspects of this archetype is that there are numerous readings of the significance of these bodies. Often, they are interpreted as various aspects of the Buddha or buddhas, yet they also designate
body, speech and mind in reference not only to buddhas, but also to the capacities of sentient beings. Another way of describing this model is with the Dharma Body connoting the absolute truth of emptiness (stong nyid; sunyata), while the other two bodies are the “form bodies” through which the Dharma Body is experienced and incarnated. Yet another characterization is that the Dharma Body figures the “cognitive pattern;” the Enjoyment Body signifies “the operational pattern in its division into being with others,” and the Manifestation Body refers to “being in the world” (Guenther 1972, 132); this latter reading explicitly situates the tri-fold body as a social modality.
A third paradigm is articulated in sources such as the Abhisamayalamkara, where we find the Dharma Body either having a synonymous epithet or a complementary aspect (depending on one's philosophical and ontological standpoints): namely, the “svabhavikakaya” or “Essence Body.” The introduction of the Essence Body became a locus for hermeneutical debate by Buddhist thinkers: this debate, as Makransky (1997) has argued, is not merely over the number of Buddha embodiments described, but over the “essence” of the Essence Body and its relations to Buddhist discourses of enlightenment and liberation.
Briefly, the subject of the discussion is whether or not the buddha embodiment as Essence Body is synonymous with or distinct from the Dharma body; at stake is whether or not a clear distinction is needed in order to provide a sufficient ontological basis for the conditioned activity of an enlightened being in the mundane world. For thinkers such as Haribhadra (8th c. CE), a distinction between these two modes of embodiment would describe an unconditioned embodiment that transcends conditioned existence (the “Essence Body”) and an embodiment that sublates this transcendent body, allowing for a conditioned aspect of enlightened being that works within the mundane world for the sake of all sentient beings (the “Dharma Body”).
The paradigm of the Three Bodies is discussed in early texts of the Chod tradition attributed to Machik, not in the context of body offerings, but in the context of ideal embodiments and doxographical disagreements. At times, Machik seems to write positively about the Three Bodies, while at other times, she seems to regard them as an example of distracting tenet disagreements. In The Distinctive Eightfold Supplementary Section, Machik writes that, “as for the teaching of the fruits of gaining experience, the circumstantial fruit is liberation from physical illness, having pacified the Obstructive Negative Forces, the Non¬obstructive Negative Forces, the Joyful Negative Forces and the Negative Forces that Create
Pride. Liberated from mental suffering, one will ultimately be a buddha with the self-nature of the Three Bodies” (161/607). Machik connects her theory of overcoming the Negative Forces, and thus liberating oneself from mental suffering, with one's realization of the enlightened nature of the Three Bodies. Yet, in The Great Speech Chapter, she also cautions against dwelling on such conceptual schema like the Three Bodies, as they are undergirded by intellectual systems and fundamentally grounded in hope, fear, and attachment:
as for the Negative Forces of results, they are like this. As desires for the definitive attainment of the Three Bodies are the results of the tenet systems of the vehicles of the Hearers, the Self-conquerors, and the others, because of the joy associated with [such] desires, there are Negative Forces. The Three Bodies are explained as the result of the threefold self-nature of body, speech and mental consciousness; [the Three Bodies] are not established from the side of the enlightened ones. Having turned away from oneself—because there will not be attainment through accomplishment even if one searches for many millions of eons—not found, not accomplished, one rests in one's own self-nature. Without hope, Chod practitioners are freed from the limits of hope and fear; having cut the ropes of grasping, definitely enlightened, where does one go? (10/459).
While Machik demonstrates her orthodoxy by endorsing the model of the Three Bodies as suggestive of embodied enlightenment, she also emphasizes her own understanding of such models as provisional tools at best. By reminding practitioners that the human mind is prone to reify such models, she cautions them against their own susceptibility and potential downfall.
MIND-MADE EMBODIMENTS
The interrelation between liberation and being-in-the-world evident in the model of the Three Bodies is also evident in some of the earliest Pali teachings on the mind-made body (manomayakaya). The form of mind referred to as “manas” is that which synthesizes and conceptualizes phenomena into “objects.” The mind-made body is a form that is self-produced by the manas. It is described as an idealized embodiment attained through the practice of cultivated awareness: the form of a realized being upon enlightenment. This form can be realized by
an advanced practitioner and is an accomplishment that has parallels with other enlightened forms. In a section of the Mahasakuludayi Sutta (MN 77.30), the Buddha states that he has taught his disciples a way to create the mind-made body, which has form and lacks no faculty: “And thereby many disciples of mine abide having reached the consummation and perfection of direct knowledge” (Walshe 1995, 643). This statement can be read in two ways. First, the consummation and perfection of direct knowledge yields a mind-made body. Second, direct knowledge is perfected through abiding in a mind-made embodiment.
The production of the mind-made body is further described in the Samannaphala Sutta (DN 2.85-86): “And he, with mind concentrated, . . . [h]aving gained imperturbability, applies and directs his mind to the production of a mind-made body. And out of this body he produces another body, having a form, mind-made, complete in all its limbs and faculties” (Walshe 1995, 104). This embodiment is not distinct from the body generated biologically, but it is said to be like a reed pulled from a sheath or a snake that has shed its skin. Once a practitioner is able to concentrate his mind, he can then produce a mind-made body; that is, once one has an enlightened sense of self, one that is not misconceived as permanent and independent, one's embodiment has effectively been transformed.
The supernormal power of transformation in the production of a mind-made body is discussed in the section on “Subjects of Meditation” in the Vimuttimagga (Arahant Upatissa 1961, 213-14; 217-18). Here we find a description of the abilities of an advanced practitioner (entering into the fourth meditation, jhana) that is similar to training in manomayakaya. The body and mind of the Buddhist practitioner are necessarily interconnected and profound awareness of
this interconnection is to be cultivated as a supernormal ability. Upatissa writes, “[d]epending on the body, the mind changes; depending on the mind, the body changes. Depending on the body, the mind resolves; depending on the mind, the body resolves. The perception of bliss and lightness adheres to the body. In that state he accomplishes and abides” (Arahant Upatissa 1961, 213). This yogic experience is further discussed in terms that resonate with the
Buddhist practice of ‘pho ba, or the ejection of consciousness into space: “[r]ising therefrom, he knows space, and resolves through knowledge. Thus his body is able to rise up in space. Having resolved through knowledge, he can rise up in space” (Arahant Upatissa 1961, 213). The practitioner is cautioned to practice this ability gradually; otherwise, there might be such a degree of fear that one's meditative state would be compromised and the resulting benefits of serenity lost.
According to Upatissa, the practitioner can develop a further superior ability in relation to his form through meditative resolve. The practitioner builds on the supernormal power of resolve and strengthens his practice in order to change into any form he desires. Through this meditative practice, “he resolves through knowledge: ‘May I fulfil the form of a boy!'. Thus resolving, he can fulfil the form of a boy. In the same way in changing into the form
of a snake or of a garulq, a yakkha, an asura, or into the form of Sakka-Indra or Brahma, the ocean, a mountain, a forest, a lion, a tiger, a leopard, an elephant, a horse, infantry, groups of an army” (Arahant Upatissa 1961, 217). Again, this expresses the capacity to achieve and utilize a mind- made body through meditative technique. Upatissa describes methods by which the practitioner ultimately can identify with an enlightened being in order to facilitate her own liberation from the bonds of conventional reality.
The concept of a body transformed through mental preparation is also important in Mahayana sources such as the Siksasammucaya and the Ratnagotravibhaga. These sources illustrate a Mahayana shift in emphasizing the figure of the bodhisattva who has transformed his coarse form into an enlightened body of wisdom. In the Siksasammucaya, Santideva explains that the exemplary practitioner, through an increase in merit and wisdom, “realises that this body, although it is produced in the womb, full of old age, disease and death, and union and separation, is capable of being the cause of a body of wisdom
consisting in the resolution of a Buddha” (quoted from Bendall and Rouse 1922, 254; Santideva 277-278). A passage similar to this, but directly invoking the mind-made body, occurs in the Ratnagotravibhaga and its vyakhya commentary. In the context of a discussion on the pure and impure character of a bodhisattva, it is explained that the mind-made body enables the bodhisattva to be simultaneously immanent in and transcendent of the mundane world:
“Bodhisattvas who have attained the Body made of mind” are no longer conditioned by defilements (klesas; nyon mongs pa) such as ignorance, desire, aggression, and pride, yet they are able to continue acting in and affecting the mundane world of samsara. Through the conscious will of their mind-made bodies, bodhisattvas are able to remain in the world, to “attach themselves” to it in order to maintain their vow of helping all sentient beings attain enlightenment.
The image-making function of the manas is also an important topic in Vajrayana teachings: the mind as manas (yid) is responsible for the proliferation of percepts and concepts, and this function can be utilized within a contemplative context to reconstruct oneself in the image of an enlightened being. This meditative use of manas is employed in Tantric practices of the Creation stage (bskyed rim; utpattikrama), when the practitioner develops an enlightened perspective and skill through visualized mimesis of a bodhisattva or other liberated being.342 The Creation stage practice has parallels in different
dimensions of Chod praxis, particularly in the technique which requires one to project one's identity into the embodiment of an enlightened being in the act of offering one's own body, as is discussed extensively below. Chod draws upon this model to prepare the practitioner for the offering practice, while simultaneously incorporating earlier models of embodiment to complement this deconstruction and reconstruction of the embodied self.
The Body as Useless and Useful in Buddhist Meditation
These paradigms for mapping the body in Buddhist tradition imply different evaluations of that body, with corresponding implications for practice. By heuristically adopting these models of the body-mind in various teachings, Buddhist Chod situates itself within an Indic heritage. On the other hand, by emphasizing the provisionality of such models, Chod develops an innovative understanding of the body-mind. In particular, Chod provides a means through which the practitioner can transcend the problematic dichotomy of the body as useless/useful. Especially in the Chod praxis of offering the body, Chod uses earlier Buddhist paradigms to construct the body as both the source of suffering and the means of liberation from that suffering.
The “body,” in juxtaposition with the “mind” or “soul” or other non-corporeal element, is often considered problematic within the context of spiritual pursuits (as might be suspected when such pursuits emphasize the “spiritual” as distinct from the “material”). Within traditions that feature an eschatology of a life continuing after death, there is a question of what type of physical embodiment one will have in the “afterlife”: will it be
recognizable and capable of “doing” things with others? Will it be a healthy, perfect body or the body that was present at the end of one's life when one died “naturally” or “unnaturally”? Another problem is the association of the body with desires that are considered obstacles on many spiritual paths. A third problem common to many spiritual traditions is the transience of the body and its relation to suffering, in that leaving one's mortal embodiment is associated with a form of liberation. For these reasons, it is not uncommon for spiritual traditions to discount the body and to emphasize its “uselessness.”
In Buddhist teachings and practice, we find embodiment valued as both “useful” and “useless.” Ideas about mundane embodiments and realized embodiments often have correlations with ideas about useless and useful embodiments. A “mind-made body” is one that has been consciously generated by a practitioner on the path of enlightenment with the aim to engage in enlightened activity; thus, by definition, it is more useful than a mundane body. Similarly, the Dharma Body, in contrast with the Form Body, is the embodiment of the Dharma Teachings and the ultimate nature of actuality; although it is necessarily interrelated with the Form Body, the Dharma Body is the aspect of the enduring and unconditioned body of the Buddha. In fact, to a certain degree, one might see all of Buddhist praxis as engaged to varying degrees in negotiating the usefulness and the uselessness of embodiment for the religious practitioner. One area in which this negotiation most vividly comes into play is in Buddhist meditation and visualization practices.
As I discussed earlier, there are several paradigms for analyzing the body in Buddhist sources. Some of these paradigms are explicitly designed as foundations for meditation practice. There are two main categories of Buddhist meditation: calm-abiding meditation (zhi gnas; samatha) emphasizing the development of single-pointed mindfulness, and insight meditation (lhag mthong; vipasyana) emphasizing the development of a penetrating wisdom through meditative analytical reflection. In Buddhist teachings, there are numerous examples of using the body-mind modality as an object of meditation. Some teachings view the body-mind negatively—as “impure,” “contaminated,” “decaying”—and emphasize its “uselessness,” while others see the body-mind as more positive or “useful.”
In early Sutra sources, the body is represented as coarse and as a symbol of impermanence and decay. In the Samyutta Nikaya, for example, the mortal body is used as a figure for consciousness: “It would be better, monks, if the untutored masses saw this body, produced by the material elements, as the self
rather than seeing the mind as the self. Why? Because this material body persists for two years, or for three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty years. . . . But, monks, this that we call thought, or mind, or consciousness, it arises as one thing and perishes as another all day and all night long” (ii.94). Many such sources use the body as a synecdoche for the impermanence of the self and/or emphasize the decomposing nature of the body in order to illustrate the principle of impermanence.
Similarly, a taxonomy of the thirty-two elements that compose the body is outlined in the Kayagatasati Sutta (MN 119), including hair of the body, hair of the head, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinews, bones, bone marrow, kidneys, heart, liver, diaphragm, spleen, lungs, large intestines, small intestines, stomach, excrement, bile, phlegm, pus, blood, sweat, fat, tears, serum, saliva, mucus, synovic fluid, and urine. Buddhaghosa elaborates on how to develop a
mindfulness practice focused on these thirty-two elements in Chapter VIII of his Visuddhimagga. He also provides detailed instruction for various meditation techniques, including forty meditation subjects, ten of which are on “foulness”: “The ten kinds of foulness are these: the bloated, the livid, the festering, the cut-up, the gnawed, the scattered, the hacked and scattered, the bleeding, the worm-infested, and a skeleton” (1999, 110). Later in the
text, these ten subjects are given their own chapter, under the heading of “Foulness as a Meditation Subject”; in this chapter, each of the ten is described in sufficient detail to enable the practitioner to successfully cultivate a meditative practice. The chapter concludes with the instruction, “[s]o a capable bhikkhu should apprehend the sign wherever the aspect of foulness is manifest, whether in a living body or in a dead one and he should make
the meditation subject reach absorption” (1999, 190). Machik uses the same traditional taxonomy of the body in her teachings, but with different emphases. For example, in The Distinctive Eightfold Supplementary Section, she teaches that “when you have straightened your body, first, you should [[[mentally]]] let go of the mind-body as dissected parts, thinking ‘This body of mine is made out of thirty-two unclean substances, a sack of my own blood, a wound-up bundle of bones, a network of muscles.
Through attachment and clinging to such, I experience of the suffering of samsara. Now I must not have attachment and clinging!'” Unlike Buddhaghosa's accent on the repulsive aspects of the body with the aim of detachment, Machik stresses that attachment and clinging are the focus of the teaching. The taxonomy of the body is only useful to the practitioner up to a certain point, after which such discrimination perpetuates suffering.
The Vimuttimagga by Arahant Upatissa advocates meditation on one's own body as disgusting to cultivate an antidote for passion or lust: “When a man wishes to separate from passion, he causes the arising of the perception regarding the nature of his body. Because, if he has the perception of the nature of his body, he can quickly acquire the perception of its disagreeableness and cause the arising of the after-image” (1961, 140). As in the Visuddhimagga, the aim
of the practice is to generate awareness of the putrescence of the body in order to realize its impermanence. However, the perception of disagreeableness must be acquired appropriately in order to be used as an antidote for passion: “If the perception of putrescence is increased, the sign which he has grasped in his body will disappear. If he loses perception of his own body, he will not be able to acquire the thought of the disagreeableness quickly”
(Arahant Upatissa 1961, 140). One should not generate too much attachment to the object: one should not increase the perception of putrescence to the point that the visualized sign—the visualized body as signifier of one's embodiment as signified—disappears and thus is not useful for use as an after-image or for carrying into post-meditation experience. And it cannot be generated with too much detachment: if one is not adequately concerned with thought of one's own body putrefying, the perception of one's own body disappears along with the thought of its disagreeableness.
There is a dialectical relationship between usefulness and uselessness in foulness mediations: the body is rendered useful through the sublation of its uselessness as a decaying corporeal entity. Its significance as a sign for the meditation practitioner contributes to a revaluation of the body as a support for enlightenment. However, it is necessary to recall that the body and the mind are considered interdependent in Buddhist teachings. The
Vimuttimagga thus describes the practitioner: “His mind, being wieldy, responds to the body, and his body responds to the mind. Thus that yogin sometimes controls the body with his mind, and sometimes the mind with his body. Depending on the body, the mind changes; depending on the mind, the body changes. Depending on the body, the mind resolves; depending on the mind, the body resolves” (Arahant Upatissa 1961, 213). Attention to the mutual relation between
mind and body is vital to the yogin's practice and his pursuit of liberation. A similar instruction of interdependence becomes a motif in the Chod teachings of Machik Labdron. For example, in The Distinctive Eightfold Supplementary Section we read: “As for what has been concentrated by tightening, relax by loosening. The pith of meditative cultivation is like that.” Machik suggests that awareness of the intersection between body and mind in the
movements between flexibility and control, between relaxation and concentration, is vital to meditative practice. In a subtle contrast with meditative practices that aim to develop single-pointed focus and a stable conscious state grounded in peace, techniques of meditation which employ the coarse body as a base for developing realization aim at developing a stable conscious state grounded in discomfort. Such practices foreground the body as a cause of suffering, and they enable one to abide in this realization. Winston King makes the following observation about
body-part and body-foulness meditative practices: “a substantial part of the content and flavor of the Buddhist subjects of meditation is not ‘peaceful'; it is a deliberate and intensive direction of the attention to the insubstantial and impersonal, as well as repulsive, aspects of being human. Such is the thrust of body-part and body-foulness subjects” (1980, 55). In such meditations, the body is valued negatively: it is a paradigmatic object of attachment, representing attachment to one's own self. But, as in the teachings on the mind-made body and in the praxis of Chod, the physical body can be used as a tool to attain realization: the body-mind can be “purified” and transformed through practice.
Mahayana Buddhism emphasizes that through the precious opportunity of having a human embodiment, one is able to accumulate the merit and wisdom enabling one to practice bodhicitta, the spirit of awakening. In Mahayana, the body can be valued positively as worthy of offering as a gift, as a precious human vehicle for enlightenment, and as a matrix for the two, three or four buddha bodies. In Vajrayana, this revaluation is taken a step further, with many of
the techniques for enlightenment requiring the technologies of the body. As Khenpo Kalu (1999, 123) emphasizes, regarding the “skandhas or aggregates of our psycho-physical makeup” as “impure and base” is considered to be a “root downfall” in Vajrayana Buddhism. Because “[a]ll appearance is a form of divinity, all sound is the sound of mantra, and all thought and awareness is the divine play of transcending awareness,” the skandhas are the basis for enlightenment: “Acknowledging psycho-physical aggregates of an individual as the potential of the Buddhas of the five families, or the five elements, or
the five feminine aspects, and so forth, is to recognize that, in tantra, the potential for that transformation exists within our present situation. To disparage that potential as something useless or impure or unwholesome is a root downfall, a basic contradiction, from the point of view of tantric practice” (1999, 123). Rather than focusing on the decaying body as a sign of impermanence, Vajrayana teachings emphasize the potential for transforming mundane embodiment into enlightened embodiment.
Chod teachings share this Vajrayana emphasis on the transformation of the body, but they also revalue the “uselessness” of the mundane body in an innovative way. In Chod praxis, one conceives of one's body not as abstractly disgusting, but as disgusting or pleasing dependent on context. Machik frequently explains that what is disgusting to one being, such as flesh and blood, can be pleasing and desirable to another being. By grasping onto the foulness of one's embodiment, or by ignoring the material aspects of one's body, according to Chod teachings, one perpetuates a hypostasized conventional discrimination rather than challenging and undermining that mental process as a means to liberation.
See Takasaki 1966, 243-4; Ratnagotravibhaga 1.67-68.
Bodhisattvas attach themselves to the mundane world by means of consciously accepting “defilements endowed with virtuous roots” (Takasaki 1966, 245). On the topic of compassion as a “defilement,” Nagao observes, “[a] bodhisattva, however, does not eliminate klesas for the purpose of remaining in samsara, that is, not entering into nirvana (apratisthita-nirvana), and his compassion is nothing but a sort of a klesa retained by him” (1991, 88). Makransky also discusses the activity of an enlightened being who remains “connected to the world through the force of their roots of virtue, which are likened to klesas (defilements) and referred to metaphorically as such: kusalamula-samprayukta klesah (defilements associated with the roots of virtue)” (1997, 341). However, according to Makransky, it is important to note that these klesa-like roots of virtue are actually not defilements, but appear similar due to their roots being in the world that is produced through the conditioned defilements of non-enlightened beings. Makransky observes, “[t]his seems both to invoke and to explain away a model of bodhisattvas' ‘retaining defilement' like that expressed in the Tarkajvala just above, and may represent a refinement of some such model in the direction of the classical nonabiding-nirvana doctrine that dominated late Indian Mahayana” (1997, 342).
In his study of the Maha-Vairocana-Abhisambodhi Tantra (MVT) and Buddhaguhya's commentary on this text, Stephen Hodge examines the mind in the form of manas, along with its functions. Hodge discusses how the mind as manas can be employed in the service of enlightenment: ‘This view that the manas can play a valuable role in reshaping one's spiritual life had a long history in India. For example, we can find echoes or even the origins of many ‘tantric' ideas and practices in the Vedas. There, such a term as manas and other related words derived from V man are used with great frequency to
indicate the process by which the Vedic seers achieved illumination. . . . In the MVT it is clearly stated that the manas is located in the heart. Here the term ‘heart' should probably be understood as the core of man's inner dimension. Of course this idea is not unique to the MVT even in Buddhism, for the Theravadin school posited a ‘heart-base' (hrdaya-vatthu) as the location of the manas. While the great commentator Buddhaghosa in his Path of Purity (Visuddhi-magga) understands this quite literally as the physical heart, other Theravadins understood it as the interior core of the person” (2003, 39-40).
In my discussion here, I am primarily referring to techniques of insight meditation; however, the body is also
employed in techniques of calm-abiding meditation, for instance in meditations where the practitioner pays attention to the inflow and outflow of breath.
345 “Presumably the foulness sign as it is developed—though it is not clearly so stated—changes like the kasina [a visual object that functions as a signifier for an object of meditation and which “supports” one's meditative concentration] and becomes more generalized. We are told that in the case of a scattered body or skeleton, the counterpart sign brings the parts together into a perceptual whole, thus differing slightly from the original visual image. But even though the process begins with a dead body, and its sign becomes generalized by its meditative development, the goal is not to abstract it from life. One begins with a dead body only because therein the decay inherent in every living body is radically manifested. And that concrete beginning datum is generalized and etherealized solely for the purpose of making it flexible enough to apply to living bodies — which otherwise hide this, their true nature, from our awareness. Thus it is that the meditator is given illustrations of modes of applying the developed cemetery sign to other bodies” (King 1980, 70)
Asubha-kammatthana-niddesa, Chapter VI.
In Charming Cadavers (1996), Liz Wilson provides an extensive study of “foulness meditations” which focus on impermanence and decay in relation to embodiment. Wilson pays special attention to texts that describe female embodiment as the object for meditative focus. Wilson's presentation, while bringing issues of gender, ethics and politics into discussion, unfortunately risks obscuring the nuances of these practices, including their cultural and historical specificity. Many of the texts in the Pali canon discuss bhikkhus focusing on their own—male—bodies. For example, in the two versions of the Satipatthana sutta, the subject of bodies is non-gender specific. This is also the case in Buddhaghosa's discussions, such as the ones just mentioned. These meditations are intended not only as an antidote for male lust, but also for personal vanity.
In The Distinctive Eightfold Supplementary Section attributed to Machik, we read the following: “lus drang por bsrang la / dang po phung po la gzhig ‘grel btang ste / bdag gi lus ‘di mi gtsang ba'i rdzas sum cu rtsa gnyis las grub pa / rang khrag gi rkyal pa / rus pa'i dum bu ‘thud pa / chu rgyus kyi drva ba / ‘di lta bu la chags shing zhen par gyur pas ‘khor ba'i sdug bsngal nyams su myong ba yin te / da ni ma chags ma zhen par bya dgos snyams du bsams la” (158-9/604-5).
“grims gyis bsgrim la lhod kyis glod / bsgom pa'i gnad cig de na gda'” (606/160). The complete Tibetan text and my English translation are provided in an appendix to this study.
David Germano, in an account of Longchenpa's description of meditation from the Tshig don mdzod (The Treasury of Words and Meanings), points out how “the emphasis on posture, gaze and breath indicates a body-based knowing, that is, that the ways of knowing advocated in these texts must of their very nature involve bodily activities and processes” (1997a, 295).
Khenpo Kalu Rinpoche (1905-1989) was an esteemed meditation master who transmitted a Kagyü lineage of Chod.
Embodiment in Vajrayana is understood according to various anatomical schemas that include inner and outer, subtle and coarse, and microcosmic and macrocosmic mappings. However, such microcosmic/macrocosmic mappings are not necessarily indicative of Tantra praxis; as André Padoux observes, the Upanisads also employ such correspondences (2002, 19).
