Excerpt from 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's dBu ma chen mo
by Guy Newland
The following brief excerpt from 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's Mādhyamika debate manual illustrates how instruction, polemic, and exegesis can be finely woven on the framework of the debate format. We find the author citing Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā and Madhyamakāvatāra in order to rebut attacks by Tsong kha pa's Sa skya pa critic, sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405). 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa attempts to show that sTag tshang, in his critique of the dGe lugs presentation of valid cognition (tshad ma, pramāṇa) of conventional phenomena, adopts a position that Candrakīrti specifically refutes. At the same time, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa implicitly offers a solution to an exegetical problem in the Prasannapadā.
In his discussion of the term lokasaṃvṛti ('jig rten gyi kun rdzob; worldly conventionality" or "worldly concealer"), Candrakīrti (PP: 493) first seems to say that the word loka ("world") does not imply a contrasting aloka ("non-world"). Yet Candrakīrti then appears to reverse himself, writing (PP: 493), "Yet, in one way there is such a non-world. Those who have erroneous vision because their senses have been impaired by opthalmia, blue eye-film, jaundice, etc. are not worlds." Many scholars ignore or gloss over Candrakīrti's initial denial. 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa thinks he can explain the intent of the initial denial, but he embeds his answer in a refutation of sTag tshang. A key feature of sTag tshang's presentation of conventionalities (saṃvṛti, kun rdzob) is the distinction between worldly conventionalities and yogic conventionalities (GTKN: 266). By citing Candrakīrti's denial of non-worldly conventionalities in refutation of sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa suggests that Candrakīrti's initial denial is intended to rule out a special category [page 210] of non-worldly, yogic conventionalities.
'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa then uses a hypothetical objection as an opportunity to reconcile his reading of the Prasannapadā with earlier comments on the Madhyamakāvatāra. Confident that in a few brief strokes he has unravelled a passage in the Prasannapadā, aligned it with the Madhyamakāvatāra, and refuted sTag tshang, 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa cannot resist concluding on a self-congratulatory note. He writes (BMC: 541-542):
Incorrect Position held by sTag tshang the Translator: [[[Candrakīrti's]]] use of the word loka ["world"] in the phrase lokasaṃvṛti ('jig rten gyi kun rdzob) precludes Superiors having in their continuums conventional valid cognitions (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma) that perceive conventional truths (saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa).8
Correct Response: It follows that this is incorrect because [[[Candrakirti's]]] statement of loka [in "lokasaṃvṛti"] is descriptive; it is not [made] for the sake of applying analyses such as [yours]. This is because Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (493) says:
Is there also a saṃvṛti that is not worldly from which a worldly saṃvṛti could be thus distinguished? This [[[word]] "worldly"] describes how things are. That analysis [which assumes that since saṃvṛti is sometimes modified by "worldly," there must also be an unworldly saṃvṛti] does not apply here.
Incorrect Position with regard to this: It [absurdly] follows that worldly conventionalities (lokasaṃvṛti, 'jig rten gyi kun rdzob) are not divided into conventionalities that are real for the world ('jig rten gyi yang dag pa'i kun rdzob) and conventionalities that are unreal for the world ('jig rten gyi log pa'i kun rdzob) because [according to you] "world" (loka, 'jig rten) is stated [merely] for descriptive purposes [and not in order to differentiate two types of conventionalities].9 If you accept the consequence, it follows that your explanation that in Candrakīrti's Madhyamakāvatāra (104) worldly conventionalities are of two types—those that are real from a worldly perspective and those that are unreal from a worldly perspective—is incorrect.
Correct Response: The original reason [—that "world" is stated for descriptive purposes in the Prasannapadā—] certainly does not entail the consequence [—that worldly conventionalities are not divided into conventionalities that are real for the world and conventionalities that are unreal for the world—] because, since the erroneous—i.e., false—consciousnesses of one whose sense powers have been impaired by jaundice, etc., are not the world in relation to whose perspective something is posited as [page 211] real, Candrakīrti says "worldly conventional truth" (lokasaṃvṛtisatya) in order to make that point understood.10 This is because Candrakīrti's Prasannapadā (493.2-4) says:
Yet in one way there is [such a non-world]. Those who have erroneous vision because their senses have been impaired by opthalmia, blue eye-film,11 jaundice, etc. are not worlds. That which is a conventionality for them is not a worldly conventional truth (lokasaṃvṛtisatya).12 Therefore, a worldly conventional truth is distinguished from that.
Since it seems that even many former scholars did not explain13 this, I have written a little clearly.
Notes
[8] The Sa skya scholar sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen criticizes the dGe lugs position on conventional valid cognition (tha snyad pa'i tshad ma). He writes (GTKN: 269):
[T]he presentation of valid cognition that is well known in the world ... [may be] asserted in a way that indulges the perspective of the world. However, a so-called "valid cognizer comprehending conventionalities" is completely non-existent [not only in terms of the thorough analysis into emptiness but even] in terms of the normal analysis of our own system.
Thus, even Superiors in states subsequent to meditative equipoise (prṣṭhalabdhajñāna) cannot have valid knowledge of conventional phenomena. Nevertheless, their "yogic" mode of apprehension is distinct from the non-analytical perspective of the world. sTag tshang (GTKN: 266) uses this distinction to make a twofold division of conventionalities:
In general, it is said that there are two types of conventionalities: worldly conventionalities and yogic conventionalities.…With regard to illustrations, coarse phenomena of a mistaken perspective that does not investigate or analyze are worldly conventionalities. Subtle impermanence—an object found by a conventional awareness with normal analysis—and the appearances in states subsequent to meditative equipoise of Superiors…are yogic conventionalities.
[9] This incorrect position challenges a shift in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa's manner of reading the word "world." When the phrase "of the world" ('jig rten gyi) is added to the phrase "real conventionality" (yang dag pa'i kun rdzob) or "unreal conventionality" (log pa'i kun rdzob), 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa understands [page 213] this to mean conventionalities that are real or unreal for the worldly perspective. (If the qualification "for the worldly perspective" were not added, then one would have to say that all conventionalities are unreal.) However, when the phrase "of the world" ('jig rten gyi) is added to "conventionality" (kun rdzob), 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa does not take this to mean "conventionality in the perspective of the world." Such a reading might suggest a contrasting "conventionality in the perspective of yogis" as advocated by sTag tshang. Or else, it might suggest that worldly conventionalities are phenomena that worldly beings can recognize as conventionalities.
[10] Conventional truths (saṃvṛtisatya), literally, are "truths-for-a-concealing ignorance," phenomena that are misapprehended as truths by the subtlest ignorance—a conception of inherent existence—of even ordinary, healthy persons. A person with jaundice who sees a white piece of paper as yellow may have a coarse ignorant consciousness that believes that the paper is actually yellow, just as it appears. That misconception conceals the white color of the paper. However, such a misconception is not the concealing ignorance in terms of which that paper is a concealer-truth because it is not a conception of inherent existence.
[11] "Blue eye-film" (ling thog sngon po) does not appear in the Sanskrit. [12] Jacques May's Tibetan (432) reads: 'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa ma yin pas. La Vallée Poussin's Sanskrit (493) reads alokasaṃvṛti. [13] At 542, reading bshad for shod in accordance with the sGo mang edition, 300a.
