From Virtue Theory to Virtue Ethics

Any philosophical reconstruction of a Buddhist ethic will have to account for the diversity of moral factors and forms of moral reasoning present in Buddhist texts. For instance, motivation and virtue are often given (even almost exclusive) pride of place in some discussions of morality. On the other hand, it is undeniable that appeal to consequences and deontic considerations of rules, precepts, and vows play a role in Buddhist moral discourse. Moreover, it is important to appreciate here the gradualist nature of the Buddhist path of moral development. Moral evaluation very often appeals to the agent’s stage of moral or spiritual development. For instance, a motivation to cultivate

virtue or act virtuously based on enlightened self-interest is not only permissible, but even laudable, at early stages on the path. However, the path itself is thought to transform the practitioner’s motives so that, eventually, a more fully altruistic motivation predominates. Further, while heroic impartial altruism and generosity may be incumbent on one who has taken the bodhisattva vow to save all beings, it is not incumbent upon a layperson who has not taken that vow. The layperson ought to be altruistic and generous, of course, but acting virtuously in that context will be far less demanding than for a dedicated bodhisattva.

As mentioned earlier, virtue ethics and consequentialism are two common ways to reconstruct Buddhist ethics in contemporary terms. This is understandable, given that appeal to the factors of motive and virtue and appeal to the twofold harms or benefits (i.e., for oneself and for others) play prominent roles in Buddhist ethics. We may think of a consequentialist reconstruction of Buddhist ethics as deploying an outside-in strategy: that is, one begins with the emphasis on the welfare of all sentient beings and the

evaluative salience of consequences, and then works inward to ground the value of motives and virtues in their tendency to produce good consequences. As Charles Goodman puts it, “when we turn to our attention to the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism … the focus on acting effectively to promote the welfare of all beings becomes so central that it is difficult to sustain any interpretation that does not somehow contain a consequentialist test.” Goodman’s own approach is to reconstruct Mahāyāna as a form of virtue consequentialism in which virtues are also included in an account of well-being.

Here I want to take up an inside-out strategy and sketch the form of a Buddhist virtue ethics. An inside-out approach begins with an account of the ideal state, awakening, and the virtues that partly constitute it, and then moves outward to a consideration of outcomes. In short, an awakened being is supremely wise and compassionate, and so she will be deeply concerned to “effectively … promote the welfare of all beings.” The result, in the case of Mahāyāna, is a virtue ethics of wise universal compassion, rather than a virtue consequentialism. Further, on my view, a virtue ethics need not try to reduce other normative notions to the virtues. Rather, a virtue ethics need only be

committed to the virtues (and related notions, such a motives) being non-derivative and of central or primary theoretical and practical importance for ethics. There are several reasons to understand Buddhist ethics as a virtue ethics in this sense. First, as emphasized throughout this chapter, training in the virtues is central to the path of awakening—Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra, for instance, is a manual for training in the six perfections. Second, the perfection of virtue is partly constitutive of awakening itself. An enlightened being has perfected wisdom and great compassion, and her very mode of being is the skillful expression of these virtues. Therefore, the perfections have their fundamental value in the constitutive role they play in awakening, rather than merely in the outcomes they happen to produce.

Third, cetanā (motivation or intention) and virtue are strongly emphasized in the evaluation of actions. Indeed, in the Aṅguttara Nikāya the Buddha says, “It is volition (cetanā), O monks, that I call kamma. Having willed, one acts through body, speech or mind!” The moral quality of the motive or intention makes a non-derivative contribution to the moral quality of the act. At this point, however, it could be objected that an appeal to consequences also plays a non-derivative role in moral evaluation. As quoted

earlier, we find in the Pāli Canon: “When you reflect, if you know: ‘This action that I wish to do with the body would lead to my own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both; it is an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences, with painful results,’ then you definitely should not do such an action with the body.” Moreover, one may again cite the strong emphasis on concern for the welfare of sentient beings expressed in Mahāyāna texts.

In light of this objection, it is worth looking again at the structure of both motivation and virtue in this context. The concept of cetanā here is complex, and seems to straddle motivation, intention, volition, and choice. Indeed, as Keown argues, cetanā has both an affective-motivational component and a cognitive-intentional component. Thus, we can understand cetanā as encompassing both that for which one acts—the aim or intention— and that from which one acts—the motivation. A compassionate act is (at least) done from genuine concern and is aimed at alleviating the suffering of another. Likewise, note that the virtues such as loving-kindness and compassion are defined partly in terms of

their target (i.e., genuine concern for the happiness or suffering of others). The virtues here are target-oriented—that is, the virtue will be (at least partly) defined in terms of its aim. Thus whether and how well an action hits the target of the relevant virtue will be a centrally important evaluative factor. When it comes to other-regarding virtues, then, consequences matter, but that does not commit one to consequentialism. Indeed, recall Śāntideva’s insistence that the inner attitude is paramount. An ideal action, on this account, will proceed from a good motive, hit the target of the relevant virtue, be properly guided by wisdom, and constrained by the precepts. Thus, any of these dimensions are potentially salient evaluative factors.

The fourth reason to prefer a virtue ethical over a consequentialist reconstruction is that there appear to be ineliminable aretaic constraints on the promotion of welfare. A distinctive feature of Mahāyāna sources is the appeal to skillful means (upāya-kauśalya) to justify certain violations of the precepts. For example, Śāntideva writes, “one should always be striving for others’ well-being. Even what is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person who sees it will be of benefit.” So benefit to others can sometimes justify breaking a precept. In commenting on this verse, Prajñākaramati writes,

But the foregoing [exemption] does not apply to everyone: only to cases of the exercise of compassion to its highest degree by one who is of a compassionate nature, who is without selfish motive, solely concerned with the interests of others and totally dedicated to this [[[Wikipedia:ideal|ideal]]]. In this way there is no offence for one who is skilled in means (upāya-kusala) and who works for the interests of others with wisdom (prajñā) and compassion (karuna).

Note here that an appeal to consequences can justify breaking a precept only when the agent has pure motives and highly developed virtue. Consequences matter, but they do not matter independently of motives and virtues. So, on my reconstruction, the bodhisattva should “always strive for other’s well-being” not because she is a consequentialist, but because that is target of the perfection (virtue) of compassion. And her promotion of that good will always be an expression of, and therefore constrained by, her wisdom, moral virtue, and skillfulness.

Much more needs to be said, of course, to properly develop and defend the virtue ethical reconstruction sketched here. What I think can be said with confidence, however, is that the Buddhist tradition offers rich resources for thinking about the human predicament and the nature, structure, and development of the virtues. It also offers a complex and subtle moral psychology, embedded within a dynamic and anti-substantialist account of both human persons and the world. Cross-traditional and interdisciplinary dialogue with the Buddhist tradition on these topics is in its early stages, but it is ripe for further exploration.

Bibliography

Bodhi, B. The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha: A Complete Translation of the Aṅguttara Nikāya. Sommerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2012. Clayton, B. Moral Theory in Śāntideva’s Sikṣāsamuccaya: Cultivating the Fruits of Virtue. London: Routledge, 2006. Conze, E. The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and Its Verse Summary. Bolinas, CA: Four Seasons Foundation, 1973. (p. 167)

Crosby, K., and A. Skilton. The Bodhicaryāvatāra. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. Dambrun, M., and Ricard, M. “Self-Centeredness and Selflessness: A Theory of Self-Based Psychological Functioning and Its Consequences for Happiness.” Review of General Psychology 15(2) (2011): 138–157.

Edelglass, W. “Moral Pluralism, Skillful Means, and Environmental Ethics.” Environmental Philosophy 3(2) (2006): 8–16. Garfield, J. Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Goodman, C. Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009. Goodman, C. “Virtue in Buddhist Ethical Traditions.” In The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, edited by L. Besser-Jones and M. Slote, pp. 89–98. New York: Routledge, 2015. Goodman, C., and S. Thakchoe. “The Many Voices of Buddhist Ethics.” In Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness, edited by The Cowherds, pp. 7–20. New York: Oxford University Press, 2016.

Keown, D. The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992. Ñānamoli, B., and B. Bodhi, eds. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2005. Pettigrove, G. “Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?” The Journal of Ethics 15(3) (2011): 191– 207. Siderits, M. Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons. London: Ashgate, 2003.

Swanton, C. Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. Wright, D. The Six Perfections: Buddhism and the Cultivation of Character. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011. Notes: (1.) This work was supported in part by the endowment fund of the Colorado State University Department of Philosophy. (2.) The relationship between happiness (particularly worldly happiness) and awakening is complex and the tradition is not univocal on the matter. (p. 170)

(3.) B. Ñānamoli and B. Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2005), 524– 525. (4.) M. Dambrun and M. Ricard, “Self-Centeredness and Selflessness: A Theory of SelfBased Psychological Functioning and Its Consequences for Happiness,” Review of General Psychology 15(2) (2011): 138–157.

(5.) Ibid., 139. (6.) K. Crosby and A. Skilton, The Bodhicaryāvatāra (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 99. (7.) D. Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992). (8.) B. Clayton, Moral Theory in Śāntideva’s Sikṣāsamuccaya: Cultivating the Fruits of Virtue; Goodman, Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics; Siderits, Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy: Empty Persons (London: Routledge, 2006).

(9.) W. Edelglass, “Moral Pluralism, Skillful Means, and Environmental Ethics,” Environmental Philosophy 3(2) (2006): 8–16. (10.) J. Garfield, Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). (11.) C. Goodman and S. Thakchoe, “The Many Voices of Buddhist Ethics,” in Moonpaths: Ethics and Emptiness, edited by The Cowherds (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7–20.

(12.) These presuppositions are widely, but not universally, shared in the current literature on Buddhist ethics. They are consistent with the views of Clayton, Garfield, Goodman, and Keown, for instance.

(13.) Crosby and Skilton, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, 7. (14.) Dambrun and Ricard, “Self-Centeredness and Selflessness.” (15.) Ibid., 146. (16.) Crosby and Skilton, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, 96. (17.) Ibid., 7. (18.) Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, 299. (19.) The “in order to” here should not be read merely instrumentally. One’s own awakening is a constitutive part of the goal.

(20.) Crosby and Skilton, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, 7. (21.) Ibid., 22. (22.) Ibid., 34. (23.) Ibid., 50.

(24.) Crosby and Skilton translate the term pratyaya here as “reasons” rather than the more standard “causes” or “conditions.” I agree with Goodman, Consequences of Compassion: An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009) that this is a misleading translation in the context.

(25.) Crosby and Skilton, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, 52–53. (26.) Ibid., 67. (27.) Ibid., 71. (28.) Ibid., 88. (29.) Ibid., 96. (30.) Ibid., 99. (31.) Ibid., 120. (32.) Ibid., 120.

(33.) Wright, The Six Perfections: Buddhism and the Cultivation of Character (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 218. (34.) Goodman, “Virtue in Buddhist Ethical Traditions,” in The Routledge Companion to Virtue Ethics, edited by L. Besser-Jones and M. Slote (New York: Routledge, 2015), 93. (35.) Garfield, Engaging Buddhism, 301.

(36.) Recall that “karma” here refers to the reliable connection between the moral quality of an act and its appropriate consequence for the agent. Hence, in declaring cetanā to be karma, the Buddha is effectively declaring motivation or intention to be the primary determinant of an act’s moral quality; B. Bodhi, The Numerical Discourses of the Buddha: A Complete Translation of the Aṅguttara Nikāya (Sommerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2012).

(37.) B. Ñānamoli and B. Bodhi, The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikāya (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, 2005), 524– 525. (38.) Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 218.

(39.) This should not be taken as an endorsement of Swanton’s full account of virtue and right action. The point here is simply that the Buddhist virtues have a target-facing aspect. On my interpretation of the Buddhist virtues, both motive and target play a role in determining the moral quality of an action. Here I think I am in agreement with Pettigrove, “Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?” In terms of Swanton’s approach, we might say that the primary Buddhist virtues have both an outer target and an inner target (the proper motive or attitude); Pettigrove, “Is Virtue Ethics Self-Effacing?” The Journal of Ethics 15(3) (2011): 191–207; Swanton, Virtue Ethics: A Pluralistic View (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

(40.) Crosby and Skilton, The Bodhicaryāvatāra, 41; it is interesting to note that in the previous verse, he writes, “Each of the perfections, beginning with generosity, is more excellent than its predecessor. One should not neglect a higher one for the sake of a lower one, unless because of a fixed rule of conduct” (41). (41.) Keown, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 84.

(42.) This is in contrast to a classical utilitarian view on which, if it turned out that acting from a motive other than universal compassion better promoted the good, then one should act from that other motive. Likewise, it seems that, for the character consequentialist, one ought to act viciously if, even taking into account the harm to one’s character, doing so better promoted the good overall. I find no compelling evidence in the tradition of these kinds of trade-offs at the level of virtue. Matthew MacKenzie Matthew MacKenzie is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Colorado State University. He specializes in Buddhist philosophy, Indian philosophy, and philosophy of mind. His research takes a cross-cultural, interdisciplinary approach to questions of consciousness, selfhood, and embodiment. He has published in Philosophy East & West, Journal of Consciousness Studies, Asian Philosophy, and Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, among other publications.