Nāgārjuna’s Emptiness and Pyrrho’s Skepticism, by Anthony Peter Iannini
In this brief essay, I shall attempt to illuminate interesting parallels between the Madhyamaka Buddhist concept of emptiness and the ancient Greek Pyrrhonist concept of skepticism. I engage in this comparison for two reasons. Firstly, I will argue that common strands of thought exist in Madhyamaka Buddhist and Pyrrhonist philosophy─ two schools which were founded far apart in both space and time.
Secondly, and most importantly, I will examine and clarify the concept of emptiness by pointing out subtle differences between it and the concept of skepticism. I shall begin with a discussion of the development of emptiness in Buddhism.
The Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism was founded in the second century A.D. by Nāgārjuna (and his principle disciple Aryadeva1), as a reaction against the realism of the Hinayana and Brahmanical systems.2 Buddhist scholar Paul Williams writes that the Madhyamaka or 'Middling' school was, ". . .an attempt systematically to set forth, demonstrate, and defend an understanding of the way things really are".3
This attempt at understanding of 'the way things really are' was primarily based upon Nāgārjuna's interpretation of the Buddha's teachings concerning the nature and existence of dharma. Here an attempt must be made to clarify what is meant by dharma. Consider the following interpretation of dharma by historian Karl Jaspers:
All existence is dharma. Dharma is a thing, attribute, state; it is content and consciousness of content; it is subject and object, order, creation, law, and doctrine...Dharma has as many meanings as our Occidental 'Being'. The word cannot be translated because its meanings are all-embracing.4
It is clear from the preceding text that dharma is a word that refers to everything. But it is highly important to examine precisely how Nāgārjuna interpreted what the Buddha taught concerning the nature of dharma. Nāgārjuna's position is evident from his writing:
1. I offer salutation to the best of preachers, the Buddha, who has taught that dependent co-arising has no ceasing, no arising, no nullification, no eternity, no unity, no plurality, no arriving, and no departing, that it is quiescent of all fictions, that it is blissful.5
In the preceding passage, Nāgārjuna attributes the Buddha with the view that neither side of dualistic positions about existence actually are. Rather, there is only a non-duality to all things. And, all things are, according to Nāgārjuna, 'dependent' and 'co-arising'. In another passage, Nāgārjuna writes that, "8. No dharma occurs that is not dependently co-arisen; hence no non-empty dharma occurs"6. All existence is, on this view, empty, where emptiness signifies dependence and co-arising. Nothing exists that is non-empty or, in other words, nothing exists in itself or independently of all else.
In his writings, Nagarjuna dialectically objected to the non-empty, dualistic thinking of others who have founded schools upon their interpretations of the teachings of the Buddha. Abstracting from the teachings of the Buddha with respect to the nature of things as neither being or not being some way, Nāgārjuna adopted a logical technique of refutation against those who would assert otherwise. Jaspers has written of this process of refutation:
(Nāgārjuna's) method crystallized into a typical formula, which consisted in considering four possibilities one at a time and in rejecting them all: 1. Something is. 2. It is not. 3. It both is and is not. 4. It neither is nor is not. Thus every possibility of a final valid statement is excluded.7
Nāgārjuna, through this method, sought to refute the views of various schools of Buddhism that made positive assertions about the inherent existence or non-existence of things. This process of refutation of views that take things to be one way or another is exemplary of emptiness. Emptiness, then, can be seen as a method of navigating between the absolutes of something-ness and nothing-ness.
According to Chinese Buddhist scholar Hsueh-li Cheng, "The middle way is essentially a way of emptiness; it is a path demonstrating that speculative reasoning is unintelligible and that one should not be attached to a view".8 Hence, Madhyamaka, the school that Nāgārjuna founded, is often translated as the 'Middling' school or 'the middle way'.
However, this leaves open the question of how this emptiness or middle path is explained as the correct path without merely relying on the words of the Buddha. Cheng summarizes Nāgārjuna's explanation for emptiness as the correct way or path to take concerning the ultimate nature of things:
The claim that all things are empty means that all things neither absolutely exist nor absolutely do not exist. If things in the universe existed absolutely, they would have their own nature and would not be dependent upon causal conditions, but nothing in the world is seen to be independent of causal conditions. Thus the existence of things cannot be absolutely real. And if the existence of things were absolutely unreal or nothing, there would be no change or motion in the universe, yet myriad things are perceived to arise from causal conditions. So the absolutist and the nihilist notions of existence and non-existence are unacceptable.9
Through Nāgārjuna's methodological uncovering of the Buddha's truth concerning the nature and existence of dharma, he reached the conclusion that emptiness is the correct way in which to 'see' the world as it is without delusion.
However, there are two salient problems that arise once we consider the truth of Nāgārjuna's position. Firstly, in what sense does emptiness exist? Secondly, how can we reconcile emptiness with our everyday navigation and communication in the world? Of the first problem, scholar of emptiness, Frederick Streng, writes that:
..."emptiness" itself is empty in both an ontological and an epistemological sense: "it" is devoid of any self-sufficient being, and it is beyond the designations "empty" and "non-empty".10
It appears that emptiness, like everything else, is conditioned and dependent. Emptiness, while still a part of the 'empty' whole, is a tool or way to carve the middle path between the two extremes one could take concerning the nature of some object even emptiness 'itself' is within the reach of emptiness.11
In regards to the second objection, that emptiness results in a loss of our ability to learn, navigate, and communicate in the everyday or common world, Nāgārjuna appeals to the Buddha's pointing to the difference between lokasamvrtisatya (conventional truth) and paramārthasatya (ultimate truth). Again, between these two realms of truth, we must maintain our middle path of emptiness because, according to Nāgārjuna, "Without dependence on everyday practice the ultimate is not taught. Without resorting to the ultimate, nirvāna is not attained".12
In summary then, emptiness, as a method to find out the way things actually are and as the middle path between absolutism and nihilism, is (i) metaphysically agnostic, (ii) epistemically detached, and (iii) pragmatically a part of the path to nirvana. Given these characteristics and the aforementioned discussion of emptiness, I will move on to a examination of the concept of skepticism in Pyrrhonist philosophy.
Pyrrhonism was the ancient Greek school founded by Pyrrho of Elis sometime between 360 and 270 B.C.13 Most of what we know today about the Pyrrhonists comes from the writings of one of Pyrrho’s contemporary, Timon of Phlius and Sextus Empiricus, who lived and wrote Greek some time around 200 A.D.14 In order to gain an understanding of what Pyrrhonic skepticism is, consider the lines from Sextus Empiricus, who is credited with the most comprehensive works on the topic:
Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way at all, an ability by which, because of equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquility.15
One of the defining features of Pyrrhonic skepticism, when compared to the skepticism of Socrates, is that the Pyrrhonists denied that one could, as Socrates held, know that one knows nothing. Rather, the Pyrrhonists suspended judgment on even this basic skeptical position. Notice that in Sextus’ last line, he writes, “…we come first to suspension of judgement and afterwards to tranquility” (italics added for emphasis). The tranquility referred to in this passage is known as ataraxia in Greek. Consider the following lines about ataraxia by Greek scholar Charlotte Stough:
Those following the favored program will acquire a natural disposition to remain neutral in regard to unanswerable questions. This state of mind, in which one is averse to making any assertions positive or negative, is followed by ataraxia, the Pyrrhonic conception of well-being. The outcome of the Skeptic’s enlightenment, therefore, is an untroubled state of mental calm, marked by the absence of efforts to know the unknowable.16
The goal, then, of the metaphysical agnosticism of Pyrrhonism, was to achieve a certain state of well-being or peace of mind about things. The denial of our ability to achieve metaphysical insight had both true and pragmatic consequences. Consider also, the following illuminating passage from Aristocles:
Pyrrho’s pupil, Timon, says that anyone who is going to lead a happy life must take account of the following three things: first, what objects are like by nature; secondly, what our attitude to them should be; finally, what will result for those who take this attitude. Now he says that Pyrrho shows that objects are equally indifferent and unfathomable and undeterminable because neither our senses nor our judgements are true or false; so for that reason we should not trust in them but should be without judgements and without inclination and unmoved, saying about each thing that it no more is than is not or both is and is not or neither is nor is not. And Timon says that for those who take this attitude the result will be first non-assertion, then tranquility…17
If one recall’s the dialectical method of Nāgārjuna from the discussion of his four-fold method of asserting the emptiness of the dharma, one can see the striking similarities between what is said of Pyrrho’s methodology for achieving ‘tranquility’ or ataraxia. The logic of Nāgārjuna and Pyrrho seems to be derived from the same insights about the nature of reality. Pyrrho, we can rightly say, did not come across the Buddhist teachings of emptiness by Nāgārjuna, as there is a nearly five hundred year gap between the ancient school founded by Pyrrho and the Madhyamaka school of Mahāyāna Buddhism (Pyrrho circa 300 B.C., Nāgārjuna circa 200 A.D).
Although the resultant projects of skepticism and emptiness appear quite parallel, the ways in which each are reached are highly disparate. Pyrrho originally bases his views on a number of ‘methods’ and ‘modes’ of deducing that the world is not the way in which anyone in particular takes it to be. These analytic arguments rest on empirical observations of how people argue, how views come to be held, and how subjectivity creeps into all attempts at understanding the true nature of reality.18
This is in rather stark contrast to the Buddha’s teachings, which came from his enlightenment and his realization of the truth of non-duality and, hence, of emptiness─ as later formulated by Nāgārjuna. It would be safe to say that the Pyrrhonists would not consider there to be some state of ultimate enlightenment like that of nirvāna nor would they accept the notion of conventional and ultimate truth as being realities to be navigated between.
However, there are some interesting parallels between the Pyrrhonist’s attainment of ataraxia and the Buddhist’s attainment of nirvāna. Consider that Pyrrhonic skepticism’s end result, as a method, is (i) metaphysically agnostic, (ii) epistemically detached, and (iii) pragmatically a main part of the path to ataraxia. Many Buddhist schools hold that there are thousands of ways in which to reach enlightenment. Perhaps an ancient Greek school of skeptical philosophers had stumbled across one such way.
1 Williams, Paul. Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations. (London: Routledge, 1989). p. 55.
2 Cheng, Hsueh-li. Empty Logic: Madhyamika Buddhism from Chinese Sources. (New York: Philosophical Library, 1984). p. 21.
3 Williams, P. p. 55. (see footnote 1 for ref).
4 Jaspers, Karl. The Great Philosophers: The Original Thinkers. (English trans, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966) p. 416-417.
5 Nāgārjuna is quoted in Robinson, Richard. Early Madhyamika in India and China. (Madison: University of Wisconsin UP, 1967). p. 40. Quote originally from La Vallee Poussin, Louis de. Mulamadhyamakakarikas de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā de Candrakirti (Bibliotheca Buddhica, vol. IV) (St. Petersberg: Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1913). Citation from original source: (1.1-2, cf. 18.11) (Prasannapadā, p. 11)
6 Ibid. Citation from original source: (24.19) (Prasannapadā, p. 505)
7 Jaspers, K. p. 419. (see footnote 3 for ref).
8 Cheng, H. p. 33. (see footnote 2 for ref).
9 Cheng, H. p. 39. (see footnote 2 for ref).
10 Streng, Frederick J. Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967). p. 80
11 Williams mentions that this emptiness as subject of emptiness can potentially lead to an infinite regress, but, he writes, “This (emptiness of emptiness) is a potentially infinite series, depending on what it is that the opponent is grasping at, for the function of understanding emptiness is simply to cut grasping” p. 63. (see footnote 1 for ref).
12 Williams, P. p. 69. (see footnote 1 for ref). Citation from original source: (Mulamadhyamakakarikah, ed. J.W. de Jong (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1977) (24:8-10/14).
13 Annas, Julia and Barnes, Jonathan. The Modes of Scepticism: Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1985). p. 10.
14 Ibid. p. 10.
15 Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Scepticism. Trans. by Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994). p. 4.
16 Strough, Charlotte. Greek Skepticism. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). p. 28-29.
17 From Arisocles, in Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV xviii 2-4. Quoted in Ibid. p. 29.
18 Sextus Empiricus, p. 4-16. (see footnote 15 for ref).
