Objections from the Point of View of Causation explained

Śāntarakṣita has quoted the view of an author, whom Kamalaśīla describes as Bhadanta Yogasena, apparently a Buddhist of the Hīnayāna school, who attacks the theory of flux on the ground of its failure to explain causation. The gravamen of his attack lies in the charge that even the momentary entity cannot produce the expected effect either in succession or in non-succession exactly like the non-momentary, as in either case the function of the subsidiaries remains unintelligible. The theory of flux holds that all existents are momentary, existing only for the moment and disappearing in the next moment, in which an exact facsimile of the previous entity crops up. This process of duplication and re-duplication goes on for any length of time and this is the reason why entities are prima facie looked upon, as continuous. In reality, however, there have been many entities, one similar to the other, and this similarity in appearance is mistaken for their unchanged identity. This is so far an intelligible position. The real difficulty, however, crops up when a dissimilar entity emerges, as, for instance, when the seed-series disappears and a different series in the shape of the sprout springs into being. Now, it is held that the cause of the sprout is not the same or similar seed-series, that was lying inactive in the granary, but a different entity, endued with a distinct causal efficiency (kurvadrūpa), that leaps into being when the full complement of subsidiaries, to wit, soil, water, air and the rest, are associated with the basic cause, viz., the seed. Plainly, it is unquestionable that the seed develops its peculiar causal efficiency for the sprout not in its independent capacity, but only when it is acted upon by the subsidiary conditions. And these subsidiaries can be required only if they can assist the basal cause, for assistance means the production of a supplementation on the basal cause, viz., the seed. But the basal cause and the subsidiaries, being alike momentary, can only exist side by side like the two horns on a cow’s head, and mutual assistance between them is impossible. Besides, each entity is independent of the other, being produced by its own proper cause, and cannot and does not stand in need of the assistance that may be afforded by foreign auxiliaries in order to come into being. So the peculiar sprout-producing entity will be produced by the power of its own cause and the subsidiaries will be totally useless. But, then, the question arises, if the momentary subsidiaries are powerless to produce any effect on the causal entity, which is equally a momentary and indivisible unit, and if the main cause be credited with a spontaneous, innate efficiency for the sprout, why does not the seed produce the sprout always? There can be no necessity for the subsidiaries, which are as powerless and ineffectual with regard to the momentary entity as they have been proved by the upholder of flux in respect of the permanent cause. So the. momentary also cannot exercise its causal efficiency, either in succession or in simultaneity, and there being no conceivable occasion for diversity, we shall have the same seed-series and not the dissimilar sprout.[1]

So far with regard to causation. The flux theory equally fails to account for destructive opposition. Destruction is regarded to be spontaneous, as an entity being perishable by its natural constitution cannot stand in need of a foreign destructive agent. But spontaneous destruction is equally unintelligible as spontaneous production. Now, take the example of the jug, which, as the fiux-theorist holds, perishes spontaneously in the second moment of its birth. But we ask, why should the jug produce its facsimiles and not potsherds which are also regarded to be the effect of it? Why is it that the club is required to occasion a different entitative series (visadṛśasantāna)? Certainly, the club cannot produce any effect, adverse or otherwise, on the indivisible, momentary jug. The same difficulty is confronted with regard to darkness. If darkness be a positive entity and goes on producing distinct replicas of itself every moment, why should it cease to exist when the light comes in? Certainly, light cannot be regarded to cause the destruction of darkness, as destruction is spontaneous and is uncaused so far as a foreign agent is concerned. And if you hold that it is the nature of darkness, as of other things, to come to a dead extinction, why does it not do so always, but does so only when light comes in? Perhaps, it will be said, ‘Well, darkness perishes every second moment, it is the series of duplicates that continues, which, in its turn, becomes defunct when another distinct series comes to take its place.’ But this is nothing but prevarication. The point at issue is, why is it that the same or similar series does not continue, if it be the nature of an entity to produce its duplicates? Or, if it be its nature to cease to exist, why does it not do so always? Why should it go on producing duplicates in some cases and should cease to do so in other cases? Why should there be in your terminology santānabheda (diversity of series) at all? Certainly, the nature of things cannot be freakish, and if causation and destruction be freaks of chance, which the theory of spontaneous production and spontaneous destruction, the two corollaries of the doctrine of flux, make them out to be, then the whole phenomenal order will be condemned to confusion. The doctrine of flux, therefore, only leads to negation of all philosophy.[2]

Further, causal efficiency has been proved to be incompatible with a permanent entity. But it is no more compatible with a momentary entity either, as dependence or independence, unity or multiplicity, which are the characteristics of all existents and the necessary conditions of exercise of causal efficiency, cannot be predicated of it (a momentary entity). Now, a particular seed, when planted in a well-irrigated soil, nourished by a supply of free air and other conditions, is said to develop sprout-producing efficiency by its independent natural constitution. But why is it that some particular seed should come to have this differentiating factor, viz., sprout-producing efficiency, and not others, though they are to all intents and purposes absolutely similar in nature, being produced in.the same field and harvested and garnered in precisely the same fashion?[3] And this supplementation is certainly not in evidence in any of the seed-entities before its association with the subsidiaries and comes into play when that particular association takes place. But this adventitious supplementation cannot be attributed to the influence of the subsidiaries, as the Buddhist insists that causal efficiency is innate and inherent in an entity. It may be observed that the seed develops this peculiar efficiency of its own initiative, subject, however, to the co-presence of subsidiaries. But, in whatever way it may be explained, it is undeniable that causal efficiency, though inherent in its constitution, is not in evidence when the subsidiaries are absent. The conclusion is, therefore, irresistible that the seed and the subsidiaries, being ineffective in isolation and effective when combined, are dependent on each other for the production of the sprout or for the sprout-producing efficiency. So it cannot be maintained that a momentary entity is the sole cause of production independently of the subsidiaries. But dependence also is not any more intelligible in the case of. momentary entities, as there can be no reciprocity of services between two simultaneous point-events. So the first condition of causal efficiency, viz, dependence or independence, is not predicable of the momentary.

Let us examine the second condition of causal efficiency, which is another name for existence, viz., unity or multiplicity. The final seed-entity, which independently produces sprout, is believed also to produce the other factors associated with it, viz., the changed soil, the fermented water and the like. Now, if the causal efficiency with regard to the supplementary coproducts is identical with the efficiency for the sprout, the sprout and the supplementaries, soil, water and the like, will be identical in nature, being the co-products of the self-same cause. It may be urged that the causal nature is different in different cases. Thus, the seed is the material cause of the sprout but ancillary cause in respect of soil and the like. But the question is whether the material and the ancillary cause are a singular entity or multiple entities. If they are singular, the causal nature in question cannot be different. If they are multiple, the question is whether they are identical with or distinct from the basic cause, the seed. If they are distinct, the seed cannot be the cause; if identical, the seed cannot but be multiple. And if, to avoid this dilemma, you say that the material cause of the soil is the previous soil-entity and the latter is but another aspect of the seed’s causal efficiency, then you must admit that the seed produces the soil not independently of the soil-entity, which is conceded to be the material cause of the latter. If, however, the seed were the independent cause of the soil, the latter would not be different from the sprout. So the seed and soil are interdependent. But this interdependence is intelligible if they are serviceable to each other, as it is propounded by the Buddhist that only things which are serviceable are required. But no benefit can accrue from or to a momentary entity, which is an indivisible unit and independent in its origin.

So a momentary entity cannot be either singular or multiple, and thus the second necessary condition of existence is Jacking. It may be put forward that though the ancillary conditions do not assist the main cause, they are still necessary as they are seen to function together and the effect is found to follow them both in concomitance and non-concomitance. So the dialectic of dependence or independence does not arise. But this can be said with equal force with regard to the permanent cause, which may stand in need of subsidiaries, though they are absolutely ineffective, and thus the permanent will execute its functions in succession subject to the association of successive subsidiaries. So the middle term in the syllogism, viz., ‘existence,’ proving the fluxional nature of all entities, is inconclusive as its absence in the contradictory is doubtful, the absence of succession and non-succession from the non-momentary being an unpreved assumption.[4]

Now, in reply to the objection that interdependence is not intelligible in respect of a momentary entity, Ratnakīrti observes that inter-dependence is intelligible in three possible ways. Firstly, it may mean that a supplementation is produced on the main cause by the action of the subsidiaries and vice versa. Secondly, it may denote that the cause enters unaltered as a catalytic agent into combination with the subsidiaries and produces the effect. Thirdly, that the cause and the subsidiaries together produce the effect in their independent, unaided capacities without reciprocal help. The first and second alternatives are out of the question, as a momentary entity is an indivisible unit and as such impervious to any influence, friendly or hostile; and catalysis is inconceivable when all existents are constitutionally momentary and so cannot remain the same even for two consecutive moments. So interdependence is! intelligible only in the third sense that the subsidiaries find the main cause combine to produce a self-same 6et of efficient factors without mutual assistance or benefit, as assistance is not conceivable between two simultaneous facts existing side by side like the two horns on a cow’s head.[5] But it may be urged that if the seed develops its particular generative power in its independent unaided capacity irrespective of the service of the subsidiaries, then, why is it that it does not produce the sprout when the subsidiaries are absent? The answer is, that the particularly efficient seed-moment was not in existence at the time when the subsidiaries were absent. If it had been in existence, it could not have failed to produce the particular effect in question. The opponent may urge, ‘Well, it is an unwarranted assumption that a particular seed develops a particular causal efficiency in its independent capacity and not others, when they are all alike to all intents and purposes.’ But this objection is wide of the mark. Though to all outward appearance, so far as form and colour may go, they may be looked upon as absolutely similar, there is no possible means of divining that their invisible inner constitution persists to be the same or similar. It is quite supposable that things may have a quite similar structure and appearance and yet they may differ in their inner powers. In every act of production, it is admitted on all hands that two sets of causal factors are in operation, viz., the seen and the unseen. Certainly, the entire collocation of all these seen and unseen powers is not cognisable by one short of omniscience.[6] And even in the theory of permanent cause, the development of the particular effect-producing efficiency is not any more explicable. You will have to infer its existence from the effect produced by it. So the momentary real is supposed to develop a particular causal efficiency on the evidence of the effect produced. And for the emergence of this efficiency the service of the subsidiaries is useless. If causal efficiency is not developed of its own inherent constitutional force, an external agent cannot induce this supplementation, as the natural constitution of things cannot be changed. And the supplementation will fall apart, if it does not enter into the inner constitution of the thing itself. Nor can it be supposed to enter into the essence of a thing, as the dialectic of distinction and identity will prove the hollowness of such supposition. So inter-dependence in the sense of interaction is an unfounded myth; but if combination without interaction be meant by it, it is possible.

The second objection that singularity or multiplicity cannot be predicated of a momentary cause is equally untenable. The cause is one indivisible entity and produces its effect by one identical causal energy. It is regarded as a material and a subsidiary cause only in its different relations and those relations are conceptual fictions and do not pertain to the order of objective realities. So you cannot attribute a plurality of natures to a cause. It is one singular entity, the difference is due to relations which are ideal fictions. And the objection that an identical cause will produce an identical effect is not sanctioned by experience, as we see very often that one particular cause produces a plurality of effects. When it is affirmed that identity of cause entails identity of effect, the word ‘cause’ stands for the entire collocation of causes—certainly, the effect cannot vary when the collocation of causes is identical.

In reply to the criticism of Yogasena, Śāntarakṣita first elucidates the Buddhist theory of causation and shows that the subsidiaries have a determinate, assignable place in the production of an effect and yet the objections of non-relation or infinite regression, which are unavoidable in the theory of a permanent cause, do not at all affect the Buddhist position.

Now, co-operation (sahakāritva) can be understood in two possible senses, viz., (1) combination of several independent factors to produce a self-same effect; (2) interaction or mutual assistance. Now, things being fluxional, there can be no co-operation in the second sense and so we have to fall back upon the first alternative. The several factors of production, as for instance, the seed, water, soil and the like, when associated together for the first time, can have no action upon one another, as they have all come into being under the influence of their proper causes and stand side by side independently of one another like the two horns on a cow’s head. But though devoid of interaction they are not, in spite of their structural or morphological similarity, the same or similar entities as before, but are altogether distinct entities vested with different causal efficiencies. So instead of producing their replicas, as they were doing before, they produce in the second moment -distinct entities, each endowed with sprout-producing efficiency, which in the third moment give rise to the grand effect, as, for instance, the sprout. So there is no interaction at any one of the stages. But if the seed-continuum is. looked upon as one identical entity, the idea of interaction becomes intelligible. In this case, the peculiar effect-producing entities, which appear in the second moment and which culminate in the production of the grand effect in the third moment, can be supposed to have been effected by interaction between the subsidiaries and the main cause, as it is undeniable that the second set of efficient factors do derive their peculiar efficiency from their immediate predecessors. But as the continuum (santāna) is only an ideal abstraction, the interaction cannot be regarded as real in any sense. But the makeshift of santāna does duty for the permanent entity of the Naiyāyika and is yet free from the difficulties of the dialectic of relations. The assistance of subsidiaries was requisitioned to account for the novel efficiency, which distinguishes the sprout-producing seed from its compeers. But in the Buddhist theory of causation the sprout-producing seed derives its peculiar causal efficiency not from any external auxiliaries, but from its own cause, which is responsible for its being. Such is exactly the case with the subsidiaries also. Each of them is endued with the same kind of efficiency as the seed and this efficiency they derive severally from their own causes. But though each is thus possessed of the causal efficiency requisite for the production of the ultimate effect, none of them can be supposed to be redundant, as every one of them has been generated by its own proper efficient cause. Nor can they be supposed to function in isolation, as there is no cause operating to rend them asunder at the time of their association and no such occasion arises in the succeeding moment also, as, being momentary, they will have disappeared in the next moment of their own initiative. It may be urged that this association of several co-efficient causal factors involves an unnecessary waste of energy when there is no plurality of self-same effects, and the result is only a single self-identical product, for which the service of any one of them would be enough. But the Buddhist replies that this charge could be brought forward if the causal factors were intelligent entities, possessed of the power of prevision and independent choice and action. If there is waste of energy the fault is entirely due to the blindness of Nature.[7] We may be permitted to observe in this connection that modern science has discovered numerous instances of blind waste of natural forces and scientists have complained of the prodigality of Nature. The Buddhist theory of causation, therefore, cannot be shaken on the ground of redundancy or waste of energy when the whole course of Nature is found to pay scant courtesy to considerations of economy and is not afraid of being prodigal.

It has been questioned that if the peculiar causal efficiency is inherent in the very constitution of things, why is it that it becomes evident only w'hen the subsidiaries are present and not otherwise? Certainly this is unaccountable unless the subsidiaries can produce an effect on the main cause, but this can be possible only if the causal entity is non-momentary.

But the objection, the Buddhist observes, is a specious one. You cannot cavil at the nature of things, as you cannot pretend to be aware of all the secrets of nature. Things have powers that cannot be fully gauged; and if some unwonted and unexpected energy is evinced by a thing in some particular circumstances, it does not lie in us to question its logical propriety. We have to record the evidence and shape our theories pursuant to such evidence. Besides, the hypothesis of the permanent cause is not in the least free from the objections levelled against the theory of flux. It is open to the question why should the seed develop its sprout-producing efficiency, even when acted upon by the subsidiaries? If you say, ‘because it is found to develop that particular efficiency and no other,’ well, the same answer is possible in the case of the fluxional entity also. Questioning is allowable only up to a certain limit, but it is out of place when the ultimate nature of things is involved. You. cannot question fire why it should burn and the sun why it should shine. So you cannot question why should the seed suddenly develop a causal energy for the sprout and not any other, or why should it not continue to produce its duplicates as it was doing previous to its combination with the subsidiaries, because such questions are unanswerable in any hypothesis.[8]

Now, as regards the objections raised in connexion with destruction and opposition, let us take up the question of destruction first. Destruction, in the sense of extinction of an entitative series, is certainly uncaused, as extinction of being is not an objective fact but an idea and, as such, cannot be said to be produced. But if destruction is understood to denote the emergence of a diverse entitative series, certainly we do not deny that it has a cause. The destruction of the jug caused by the stroke of a club does not connote that non-beiug of the jug takes place somewhere; it means that it is Succeeded by another entitative scries of an opposite character. And, certainly, destruction, in the latter sense, viz., the emergence of an opposite entitative series, has a definite, assignable cause in the shape of the club and other circumstances, produced in their turn by the inherent causal power of the previous entity.[9]

As regards opposition, it should be made explicit that there is no such thing as opposition as an objective fact. In reality, however, supersession of one entity by another is logically untenable, as the inherent nature of a thing is unalterable.[10]

From experience we have it that there are two sorts of entities, though momentary alike, of which one sort is found to induce diminution of energy in the other, with which it comes in contact, as, for instance, fire and cold. But we find no such antagonism in respect, of other entities, as between fire and smoke. The relation between the two sets of entities is however purely one of causality, which is mistaken for opposition or antagonism by those who cannot probe the inwardness of the situation. There can be no opposition, however, between two momentary units, which are indivisible and so impervious to any influence, friendly or hostile. But this opposition is manifested between two series of momentary reals, when one series is seen to be supplanted by another. Thus, when the moments of fire and the moments of cold are brought into relation, in the first moment fire is unable to remove the cold, but becomes itself incapacitated. The second moment of fire, however, renders the succeeding moment of cold inefficient, and in the third moment, fire supplants the cold-series, it. having disappeared owing to loss of efficiency it has undergone in the presence of fire. So if there is opposition, it is possible in the third moment, if the operation is the earliest and quickest possible. So opposition is nothing but the occasioning of diminution of causal energy in one series of entities by another series.[11]

That such is the essential character.of opposition has been enunciated by Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu in the following words: “Opposition is understood when one series of entities is found, in spite of the fact that the entire collocation of its causes is present intact, to disappear when another series of entities supervenes.”[12] Śāntarakṣita cautions us that opposition in the sense of one being sublated by another should not be confounded as a factual occurrence obtaining in the objective order of things. It is an ideal construction and is subjectively arrived at. And that this is the case is plainly deducible from the expression ‘opposition is understood.’ Thus, the so-called relation of opposition, being nothing but an aspect of causality, is predicable only of the series (santāna) and not of the individual moments. And as this series is only a mental construction[13] and has no existence outside the individual moments, which are in their turn absolutely unrelated and independent facts, the fact of opposition is only an idea and not an objective fact.[14]

Dharmottara in his Nyāyabinduṭīkā joins issue with those who bold that opposition is an unreal, ideal construction. It is probable that he meant Śāntarakṣita, who certainly preceded him in time, though he does not choose to mention his adversary by name. Dharmottara’s taciturnity in regard to names is notorious, as he docs not even mention Vinītadeva, Śāntabhadra and Kumārila, whose opinions he obviously criticises in hia commentary, as has been pointed out by the author of the sub-commentary. So his silence in this respect does not prove anything. Be that as it may, it is indisputable that he attacks that sort of view, which has been propounded by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Dharmottara argues that if opposition is regarded as unreal, then, one should, to be consistent, regard causation also as unreal. That opposition is not found as a fact but is only understood after an entity has disappeared is no argument for its ideality or unreality, inasmuch as causation also is not perceived as an objective fact but is only understood as an idea after an entity is seen to have been produced. And if causation is accounted to be real on the ground that the cause actually precedes the effect, the same logic holds good of opposition also, as the actual presence of fire causes privation of causal energy in the cold.[15]

FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES: [1]:

krameṇa yugapac ce’ti yatas te’rthakriyākṛtaḥ |
na bhavanti tatas teṣāṃ vyarthaḥ kṣaṇikatāśrayaḥ ||
sahakārikṛtaś cai’vaṃ yadā nā’tiśayaḥ kvacit |
sarvadā nirviśeṣai’va tadā santatir iṣyate ||
      T. S., Śl. 431-32.

[2]:

Vide Tattvasaṅgraha and the Pañjikā, verses 428-34. Almost similar objections have been recorded by Ratnakīrti in his ‘Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi;’ but it is a pity that the author does not quote the name or names of the adversaries whose opinion he criticises so elaborately. We, however, do not refrain from reproducing those arguments even at the risk of repetition of much that has been said above, because we feel that the logical cogency of Ratnakīrti’s writings will go a long way in placing the views of the opponent in a clear light. In fact, this is the most damaging objection that has been advanced against the theory of universal flux and we shall have to judge how far the Buddhist philosopher has been successful in rebutting it. To the credit of the latter it must he stated that he has neither shirked nor burked the discussion. He has boldly faced the opposition and has perhaps given the only possible answer. As Ratnakīrti observes in the closing part of the discussion, the opponent's arguments will only serve to prove that causation is an impossible and inexplicable phenomenon, as both the momentary and the non-momentary have been alternately shown by both the parties to be inconsistent with causation. In fact, causation is a phenomenon which is difficult to explain and Nāgārjuna and Śaṅkara have proved that causation is only an appearance, as it is not amenable to any logical explanation. But the theory of flux is wonderfully immune from many of the objections of the idealist and is thus the most approximate logical explanation of the reality of the phenomenal world. So no school of idealism can afford to leave out of account the doctrine of Universal Flux, because the limitations of this theory are the least of all, and idealism can be established on a secure foundation if the theory of flux be shown to be an impossible or unsatisfactory explanation of experience and reality.

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[3]:

nanv ekatra kṣetre niṣpattilavanādipūrvakam ānīya ekatra kuśūle kṣiptāni sarvāṇy eva bījāni sādhāraṇarūpāṇy eva pratīyante, tat kutastyo ‘yam ekabījasambhavī viśeṣo nā’nyeṣām iti.
      SBNT., pp. 49-50.

[4]:

yadi manyetā ’nupakārakā api bhavanti sabakāriṇo ’pekṣaṇīyāś ca, kāryeṇā ’nuvihitabhāvābhāvatvāt sahakaraṇāc ca, nanv anena krameṇā ’kṣaṇiko ’pi bhāvo ’nupakārakān api sahakāriṇaḥ kramavatkāryeṇā ’nukṛtānvayavyatirekān apekṣiṣyate, kariṣyate ca kramavatsahakārivaśaḥ krameṇa kāryāṇī ’ti vyāpakānupalabdher asiddbeḥ sandigdhavvatirekam anaikāntikaṃ sattvam kṣaṇikatvasiddbāv iti.
      SNBT., pp. 48-40.

The syllogism proving the momentariness of all existents is as follows: —

‘yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghaṭaḥ, santaś cā’mī vivādāspadībbūtāḥ padārthāḥ’—

‘whatever is existent is momentary, as, for instance, the jug; and the things under dispute are existent; (therefore they are momentary).’

As existence is identical with causal efficiency and as succession and nonsuccession, the necessary conditions of causal efficiency being exercised, have been proved to be incompatible with a non-momentary entity, the momentary is alone proved to be really existent. But the opponent shows that succession and non-succession are not necessarily incompatible with the non-momentary. So the middle term ‘existence’ is inconclusive, its non-concomitance with the non-momentary (the contradictory of the momentary) being doubtful.

[5]:

samasamayakṣaṇayoḥ savyetaragoviṣāṇayor ivo’pakāryopakārakabbāvāyogāt.
      SBNT., p. 47.

[6]:

kāraṇam khalu sarvatra kārye dvividham, dṛṣṭam adṛṣṭaṃ ca sarvāstikaprasiddham etat. tataḥ pratyakṣaparokṣasahakāripratyayasākalyam asarvavidā pratyakṣato na śakyaṃ pratipattum.
      Op. cit., p. 50.

[7]:

pratyekaṃ samarthā hetavaḥ pratyekaṃ kāryaṃ janajeyuḥ, kimity ekam aneke kurvanti? atrā’py amīṣāṃ kāraṇāni praṣṭavyāni...... vayaṃ tu yathādṛṣṭasya vastusvabhāvasya vaktāro na paryanuyogam arhāmaḥ........ yatrai’kam eva samarthaṃ tatrā’pareṣāṃ ka upayoga iti cet, satyam, na te prekṣāpūrvakāriṇo yad evaṃ vimṛṣyo’dāsate ekaṃ kāryam aparasmād utpadyata iti.
      N. K., p. 74.

[8]:

niyatācintyaśaktīni vastūnī’ha pratikṣaṇam |
bhavanti nā’nuyojyāni dahane dāhaśaktivat ||
    T. S., Śl. 438.

[9]:

santānocchedarūpas tu vināśo yo na hetumān |
tasyā’nte’pi na bhāvo’sti taihā janma tu vūryate ||
vilakṣaṇakalāpāder utpādas tu sahetukaḥ |
so’ py ādau jāyate nai’va tadā hetor asambhavāt ||
    T. S., Śls. 440-41.

[10]:

na tu vastūnām paramārthataḥ kaścid bādhyabādhakabhāvo’sti, sataḥ sarvātmanā niṣpatteḥ. svabhāvānyathātvasya kartum aśakyatvāt.
     T. S. P., p. 157.

[11]:

tasmād yo yasya nivartakaḥ sa taṃ yadi paraṃ tṛtīye kṣaṇe nivartayati, prathame kṣaṇe sannipatan asamarthāvasthānayogyo bhavati; dvitīye viruddbam asamarthaṃ karoti; tṛtīye tv asamarthe nivṛtte taddeśam ākrāmati.......... tato’yam paramārthato na kṣaṇayor virodhaḥ, api tu bahūnāṃ kṣaṇānām.
      N. B. T., pp. 72-78.

[12]:

Avikalakāraṇasya bhavato’nyabhāve’bhāvād virodhagaṭiḥ.
      N. B., p. 113 (B.I.).

[13]:

Cf. “Classes or series of particulars, collected together on account of some property which makes it convenient to be able to speak of them as wholes, are what I call logical constructions or symbolic fictions. The particulars are to be conceived, not on the analogy of bricks in a building, but rather on the analogy of notes in a symphony. The ultimate constituents of a symphony (apart from relations) are the notes, each of which lasts only for a very short time. We may collect together all the notes played by one instrument: these may be regarded as the analogues of the successive particulars which commonsense would regard as successive states of one ‘thing’ But the ‘thing’ ought to be regarded as no more ‘real’ or ‘substantial’ than, for example, the role of the trombone.”

Vide Mysticism and Logic, Constituents of Matter, pp. 129-180. (The italics are mine.)

[14]:

bādhyabādhakabhāvas tu vastuno nai’va tāttvikaḥ |
vidyate tata evo’ktaṃ virodhagatir ity api ||
      T. S., Śl. 443.

[15]:

Vide N. B. T., pp. 73-74.

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Source

[1]