A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga
A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga
(By Kei Kataoka)
Full title: How Does One Cognize a Cow? A Dialogue between Mādhava and Dignāga by Kei Kataoka
1. An unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika
In Pramāṇasamuccaya 5.39–44 Dignāga defends his theory of apoha in reply to a Sāṃkhya theorist. Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti ad 5.39 begins with the words yas tv āha; the commentator Jinendrabuddhi identifies this theorist as Vaināśika, i.e. “the destroyer.” As Pind (2015: II Appendix 13) comments, this theorist must be the famous Sāṃkhya theorist Mādhava, who is elsewhere often called Sāṃkhyanāśaka, the destroyer of the Sāṃkhya system, because his unique views often deviate from orthodox Sāṃkhya tenets.[1] As Pind observes, it seems that Mādhava criticizes the theory of apoha by quoting from a lost work of Dignāga, probably either the Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā or the Sāmānyaparīkṣāvyāsa.
The main scenario of PS 5.39 can be depicted as follows:
1. Dignāga has criticized Sāṃkhya views in an earlier work.
2. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s theory of apoha.
3. Dignāga replies to Mādhava’s criticism in the Pramāṇasamuccaya.
PS 5.41ab refers to a certain view, namely, that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of a dewlap, and so on (sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ). Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) ascribes this view to “an unknown Jain ‘distinctionist,’ a Vaibhāgika,” on the basis of Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam.[2] Further, he ascribes the view presented in PS 5.41d (bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ) to Mādhava.[3] In the following the present author reexamines the relevant material, i.e. PS(V) and PSṬ, and shows that the first view should not be ascribed to a Jain Vaibhāgika but to Mādhava, and the second view not to Mādhava but to Dignāga.
Pind Kataoka
PS 5.41ab: sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ Jain Vaibhāgika Mādhava
PS 5.41d: bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ Mādhava Dignāga
2. Vaibhāgika and Vaināśika
It seems that the sole evidence on which Pind ascribes the first view to a Jain Vaibhāgika is Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary.
The edited text in Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516) reads as follows:
PSṬ Ms. B 233a7–233b2: tatra hi vaibhāgikenoktam. yasya darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati, tadyathā sāsnādidarśanād go-pratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gaur. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti.[4]
Here the passage vaibhāgikenoktam indicates that the subsequent paragraph quoted with iti in the end is a quote from a Vaibhāgika.
But the corresponding Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading was not vaibhāgika but vaināśika.[5]
Hattori 1982: 210, 11–12: de la’jig pa smar ba pa yis brjod pa
The Tibetan translation suggests that the original reading is tatra hi vaināśikenoktam.
This vaināśika is also mentioned previously in PSṬ ad 5.39, where the Sanskrit text reads as follows (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13):
PSṬ Ms. 232a2: anvayavītoktisamanantaraṃ vaināśikenoktaḥ6
The same opponent is also called Sāṃkhya in the following explanation of PSṬ (Pind 2015: II 150, n. 508, B232a6). Regarding the paragraph of PSV ad 5.39 beginning with yas tv āha, Pind observes as follows:
This paragraph introduces a lengthy discussion, covering § 56 through § 60, with the Sāṅkhyavaināśika Mādhava, who, as it appears, addresses Dignāga’s criticism of his proof of the existence of pradhāna, in connection with his own rebuttal of the apoha theory. Dignāga now answers his criticism. According to Jinendrabuddhi, Mādhava addresses Dignāga’s objection immediately after dealing with the direct proofs of the continuous connection of the particulars with primordial materiality (Pind 2015: II Appendix 13).
As Pind remarks here, Jinendrabuddhi’s expression anvayavītoktisamanantaram indicates the location of the text quoted by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.39. It is a quote from Mādhava’s work, in which the precise location is “immediately after the statement of anvayavīta.” This suggests that tatra in tatra hi vaināśikenoktam]] in PSṬ ad 5.41 also indicates the same context in the same text: “For in the same context it is stated by Mādhava.”
Thus, we can conclude that the quotation Pind ascribes to an unknown Jain Vaibhāgika should be ascribed to Mādhava by correcting the reading vaibhāgikenoktam to vaināśike-noktam on the basis of the Tibetan translation.[6] The main scenario of PS(V) 5.41 is the same as that of PS(V) 5.39. The argument is between Dignāga and Mādhava in both cases.
3. The cognition of a cow due to the observation of a dewlap, etc.
It is now clear that the quote in PSṬ following vaināśikenoktam is a quote from Mādhava’s text. In order to clarify its content, let me quote the entire PSṬ ad 5.41ab, which reads as follows:[7]
A. tatra hi *vaināśikenoktam.
B. yasya *khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ. ātmā-ntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmā-ntarāṇīti.
C. etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ. ātmāntarābhāva-darśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti kāryam āha.
D. atra sāṃkhyena pratividhānam uktam.
E. yadi sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati(1), evaṃ sati yad uktam ātmā-ntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti(2), tad ayuktam iti.
F. ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarvapratyayābhyupagame kathaṃ sāsnādinimitta-tvaṃ gopratyayasyeti yāvat.
G. ātmanābhyupetahānir uktā, dṛṣṭānte svapakṣatyāgāt.
- vaināśikenoktam] Corr.; vaibhāgikenoktam Pind; vaibhāśikenokta Ms. *khalv api] Corr.; omitted by Pind; khasvavi Ms.
Paragraph A (vaināśikenoktam) indicates that the subsequent paragraph B is a quote from Mādhava’s text. Paragraph B constitutes a syllogism: udāharaṇa (vyāpti + dṛṣṭānta), upanaya, nigamana. Paragraph C, in which the nigamana part is missing, is almost identical to B. By adding the words etena … iti kāryam āha
Jinendrabuddhi seems to classify the reason (hetu) in the syllogism B as kāryahetu.[8] Paragraph D (atra sāṃkhyena pratividhānam uktam) indicates that the subsequent paragraph E is the Sāṃkhya’s rebuttal (pratividhāna) to the view given in B. This Sāṃkhya theorist seems to be Mādhava, because there is no other candidate in this context. Paragraph F restates the main point of E with the expression iti yāvat.
In order to clarify Mādhava’s intention in these paragraphs, let me start by examining the easier paragraph F.
F. ātmāntarābhāvanimittasarvapratyayābhyupagame kathaṃ sāsnādinimitta-tvaṃ gopratyayasyeti yāvat.
It means:
If it is accepted that all cognitions are caused by the non-existence of non-X, how then could the cognition of a cow be caused by a dewlap, etc.?[9]
Here Jinendrabuddhi explains Mādhava’s intention. Mādhava is criticizing someone as being inconsistent because he has stated something that goes against his own view. The main view that this someone accepts is that all cognitions of X (sarvapratyaya) are caused by the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāvanimitta). This is exactly what Dignāga insists on as his theory of apoha. A cow is cognized by means of the exclusion of the non-cow. This view is formulated in E2 as follows:
E2: ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.
The cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.[10]
This view is incompatible with the view that the cognition of a cow is caused by observing the dewlap, etc. This view is formulated in E1 as follows:
E1: sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.
The cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, and so on.[11]
In paragraph E (yad uktam … tad ayuktam), as restated by Jinendrabuddhi in F (katham), Mādhava criticizes Dignāga for stating the incompatible views E1 and E2.
Mādhava’s intention is summed up by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph G as follows:
G. ātmanābhyupetahānir uktā, dṛṣṭānte svapakṣatyāgāt.
You yourself have formulated the abandonment of what you have accepted, because you give up your own thesis in the example.[12]
Dignāga’s own view (svapakṣa) is E2, i.e. the view that the cognition of X is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X. This is what he has accepted (abhyupeta).
But Dignāga, according to Mādhava, abandons this when he states E1 as an example.
svapakṣa/abhyupeta (E2): ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.
dṛṣṭānta (E1): sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati.
These analyses confirm the main scenario. Dignāga first refers to E1 as an example adduced in another work of his that is now lost. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga as being inconsistent, because this E1 is incompatible with Dignāga’s theory of apoha, which can be summarized as E2.
But where does Dignāga state E1? A candidate is easily found in paragraph C.
C. etena yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati(1). tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ(2). ātmāntarābhā-vadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavatīti(3) kāryam āha.
With this [paragraph B] he speaks of an effect [as a reason]: If the cognition of X arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X arises due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X.[13]
The passage in C “yaddarśanād … bhavati,” i.e. C1, C2 and C3, seems to be a reformu-lation of B’s syllogism by Jinendrabuddhi in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style: udāharaṇa (vyāpti + dṛṣṭānta) and upanaya (i.e. hetu, which shows pakṣadharmatā).
Here the syllogism can be analyzed into three parts as follows:
C1 (vyāpti): yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.
C2 (dṛṣṭānta): tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ.
C3 (upanaya): ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.
C1 states an invariable concomitance (vyāpti): If X is cognized by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. C2 gives an example (dṛṣṭānta): One cognizes a cow by observing the dewlap, etc. Therefore, a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. In other words, a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc.[14] C3 presents the application (upanaya) of this invariable concomitance to his theory of apoha: One cognizes X by observing the non-existence of non-X. The conclusion, which is not stated in C, is obvious: ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi (Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X).[15]
This missing part is explicitly stated in paragraph B, which reads as follows:
B. yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati(1). tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ(2). ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ(3). tasmād ātmānta-rābhāva evātmāntarāṇīti(4).
In this world, as is also well known, if the cognition “X” arises by observing Y, X is nothing but Y. For example, the cognition of a cow arises due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. A cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. And the cognition of X is due to the observation of the non-existence of non-X. Therefore, Xs are nothing but the non-existence of non-X.[16]
B1, B2 and B3 are almost identical with C1, C2 and C3.
B C
1. yasya khalv api darśanād yad iti loke pratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati 1. yaddarśanād yatpratyayo bhavati, tad eva tad bhavati.
2. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopra-tyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ. 2. tad yathā sāsnādidarśanād gopra-tyayo bhavati. sāsnādaya eva gauḥ.
3. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayaḥ. 3. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanāc cātmāntare pratyayo bhavati.
4. tasmād ātmāntarābhāva evātmānta-rāṇi.
The main difference lies in B4, which clarifies the unstated conclusion (nigamana).
In paragraph C Jinendrabuddhi reformulates the syllogism of B in accordance with the Dharmakīrtian style and classifies the reason as kāryahetu.
C. etena “C1, C2, C3 (;B1, B2, B3)” iti kāryam āha
With this [paragraph B quoted above] he speaks of an effect [as a reason, for which the entire syllogism is reformulated as] C1, C2, C3.
But who has composed this syllogism in paragraph B? As suggested in paragraphs E, F, G, the syllogism of B must have been originally formulated by Dignāga. Then it is quoted by Mādhava, either literally or not literally, as a pūrvapakṣa, as Jinendrabuddhi’s opening remark tatra hi vaināśikenoktam indicates. Thus, it is surmised that paragraph B (which Jinendrabuddhi explains as C) is Mādhava’s quote from a lost work of Dignāga and that Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s view in E (which Jinendrabuddhi explains in F and G). Recapitulating these analyses, the main scenario can be reconstructed as follows.
First a syllogism was stated by Dignāga in a work that is now lost. Mādhava quotes Dignāga’s statement as B, which Jinendrabuddhi reformulates with classification as C. In paragraph E, which follows D (atra sāṃkhyena pratividhānam uktam), Mādhava points out Dignāga’s inconsistency with the words yad
uktam … tad ayuktam. The is-sue at stake raised by Mādhava is that the example Dignāga mentions does not fit with the theory of apoha, because the cognition of a cow (gopratyaya), according to the theory of apoha, should be based on the exclusion of the non-cow (agovyavaccheda) and not on the
dewlap, etc. (sāsnādi). By referring to, and thereby admitting the example, Dignāga amounts to having abandoned his own tenet that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow).
4. Dignāga’s intention in referring to the example Although there are uncertainties here and there regarding the reconstruction of PSV ad 5.41, the main argument of the following part is more or less certain.[17]
PSV ad 5.41: yasya hy [agonivṛttagopratyayaḥ, tasya kathaṃ sāsnādidarśa-nanimittaḥ].[18]
PSṬ B 233b5: yasya hīty apohavādinaḥ.
As an apoha theorist (apohavādin), it is inappropriate for Dignāga to state that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc., because according to the theory of apoha it is based on the exclusion of the non-cow. Here Dignāga seems to accept Mādhava’s claim of inconsistency. The example sāsnādidarśanād gopratyayaḥ is indeed incompatible with the theory of apoha. PS 5.41ab amounts to saying, using the word katham: How could an apoha theorist accept the example? But then how can Dignāga defend his reference to the example?
The subsequent passage clarifies his strategy.
PSV ad 5.41 (reconstructed by Pind 2015: I 52): abhyupagamyāyaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddhaḥ. śabdabhedād dhi gosāsnādiṣu bhinnam apohyam.[19]
PSṬ Ms. B233b5–B234a1: abhyupagamyetyādi. bhavato hi sāsnādisamūha eva gaur iti. atas tad abhyupagamyāyaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ svamataviruddho’py uktaḥ. etad uktaṃ bhavati. yathā tava sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayas tathā ma-māpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyaya iti. śabdabhedād dhītyādi. sāsnādiśabdasyāsāsnādy apohyaṃ sāsnādiṣu, gośabdasyāpy agaur gavi. yata evaṃ bhinnam apohyam, ataḥ sāsnādiṣv asāsnādyapohena sāsnādipratyayaḥ, gavy agovyavacchedena gopratyayaḥ. evaṃ cātrāpy ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād evātmāntare pratyayaḥ.[20]
It is not easy to reconstruct the original text of PSV, because the two Tibetan translations differ from each other.
Nonetheless the main argument can be summarized as follows: the example (dṛṣṭāntaḥ), although it is incompatible with the Buddhist view (svamataviruddho’pi), is presented by provisionally accepting (abhyupagamya) your view, i.e. the Sāṃkhya’s view.
Sāṃkhya: sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ (→sāsnādaya eva gauḥ)
Dignāga: ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ (→ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi)
It is clear from this that the view referred to by Dignāga as an example is a Sāṃkhya view. The Sāṃkhya holds the view that the cognition of a cow is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamūhadarśanād gopratyayaḥ), and that a cow is nothing but the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ). Dignāga refers to this view by accepting it only provisionally (abhyupagamya). Therefore, there is no inconsistency in Dignāga’s statements, because he
does not wholeheartedly accept the Sāṃkhya view. Dignāga consistently keeps his doctrine of apoha, i.e. the view that the cognition of X (e.g. a cow) is based on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (e.g. the non-existence of the non-cow), i.e. ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pratyayaḥ.
Therefore, X is nothing but the non-existence of non-X for Dignāga (ātmāntarābhāva eva ātmāntarāṇi). For him the cognition of a cow is caused by the non-existence of the non-cow and not by the dewlap, etc. The two things, i.e. a cow and a dewlap, etc., have a different scope of exclusion. It is obvious for Dignāga that the words “cow” and “dewlap, etc.” have different objects to be excluded (apohya). The expression “dewlap, etc.” (sāsnādi) communicates the
dewlap, etc. (sāsnādiṣu) by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. (asāsnādi). The word “cow” (gauḥ) communicates a cow (gavi) by excluding the non-cow (agauḥ). This is Dignāga’s own view. The fundamental view of apoha is consistent.
apohya pratyaya
“sāsnādi” asāsnādi sāsnādiṣu
“gauḥ” agauḥ gavi
The view that the two different words have different scopes of exclusion is explicitly expressed in PS 5.41d, which runs as follows.
Pind 2015: I 51: bhinnāpohyās tu te mithaḥ.[21]
PSṬ: asmanmatena tu bhinnāpohyās tu te mitho gosāsnādayaḥ, bhinnam apohyam eṣv iti kṛtvā.
Here Pind’s reconstruction of PS 5.41d is strongly supported by PSṬ. However the reconstruction and interpretation of PS 5.41abc are a bit problematic.[22]
PS 5.41abc, Pind 2015: I 51: sāsnādidarśanād <gopratyayo yo’yam udāhṛtaḥ / so> viruddho bhavanmatyā.
PSṬ: sāsnādidarśanād ityādi … viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāt. bhavanma-tyeti. bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam.
Considering the meter, it would be better to change the word order of PS 5.41abc to the following:
Kataoka: sāsnādidarśanād yo’yaṃ gopratyaya udāhṛtaḥ / sa viruddho bha-vanmatyā
It is true that viruddho bhavanmatyā can be interpreted as Pind translates, “is in conflict with your own theory.” K’s translation supports Pind’s interpretation. But this interpretation does not fit the entire context. Here bhavat clearly refers to the Sāṃkhya, as Jinendrabuddhi clarifies by stating, “For
it is your view that a cow is nothing but the dewlap, etc. (bhavato hi sāsnādaya eva gaur iti matam).” As we have already confirmed, this view should be ascribed to the Sāṃkhya and not the Buddhist. Then viruddho bhavanmatyā would mean that the example is in conflict with the Sāṃkhya view. But what we expect here is the opposite: The example is in conflict with the Buddhist view. Taking into consideration V’s translation of bhavanmatyā as khyed kyi lugs la rten pa yin
(resorting to your view), it seems more appropriate to interpret bhavanmatyā as being separate from the preceding word viruddhaḥ. Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary also supports this interpretation, because he comments on viruddha separately from bhavanmatyā, and states viruddha iti siddhāntavirodhāt. Considering that the opponent bhavat is the Sāṃkhya in this context, the opposite siddhānta (i.e. svamata) must refer to the Buddhist view (cf. svamataviruddha in PSV ad 5.41).
Therefore, the main argument in PS 5.41abc can be reconstructed as follows:
The example (dṛṣṭāntaḥ) that the cognition of a cow (gopratyayaḥ) is based on the observation of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśanāt) is presented (udāhṛtaḥ) by me in my earlier work. This example is indeed incompatible with the Buddhist view (viruddhaḥ), as you, Mādhava, claim. But it is mentioned by me only by provisionally resorting to your Sāṃkhya view (bhavanmatyā). Therefore, there is no fault of abandoning my thesis.
5. Positive and negative methods of cognizing a cow
The conflict of opinion between Mādhava and Dignāga is clear. Mādhava holds the view that a cow is cognized positively, i.e. by observing the dewlap, etc., whereas Dignāga holds the view that a cow is cognized negatively, i.e. by excluding the non-cow. For Dignāga any X, inasmuch as it is cognized in a general form, is cognized by observing the non-existence of non-X. A dewlap, etc. are no exception. They, too, are cognized by excluding the non-dewlap, etc. This is explicitly stated in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:
Pind 2015: I 52: sāsnādiṣu hi <sāmānyarūpam> arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavatīti pūrvam evopapāditam.[23]
Mādhava holds that X (ātmāntara) is cognized positively, without dependence on the observation of the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāvadarśana). This view of Mādhava is criticized by Dignāga in PS 5.42ab as follows:[24]
PS 5.42ab, Pind 2015: I 52: so’napekṣa <ity etat tu> svavikalpavi<nirmitam> /
PSṬ ad 5.42: so’napekṣa ātmāntarapratyayaḥ. kasmāt. na hi naḥ pratyayo bhavaty ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare, kiṃ tarhi vidhirūpeṇaiva gaur iti.
According to Dignāga, Mādhava holds that the cognition of X is independent (so’napekṣaḥ), i.e. does not depend on the exclusion of the other. A cow is cognized as such in a positive way (vidhirūpeṇaiva). But Mādhava’s idea is a mere fancy, because a general form is never cognized without exclusion of the other, as Dignāga has implied in PSV ad 5.34:vyatirekamukhenaivānumānam. The individual form (svarūpa), i.e. the particular form (svalakṣaṇa), is beyond the scope of language and therefore inexpressible (anabhilāpya). Thus, the individual form is not the object of everyday communication (vyāvahārika).
This is stated by Dignāga in PSV ad 5.42 as follows:
PSV ad 5.42 (Pind 2015: I 52): svarūpaṃ tu ten<āvyāvahārikam> anabhilā-pyatvāt.[25]
According to the Sāṃkhya, the individual form is denotable. Therefore, the word “cow” refers to the aggregate of the dewlap, etc., in a positive way. For Dignāga, by contrast, the particular form is not denotable. It is the object of perception and not inference. Words communicate things in a general form only by excluding the other. Our cognition of a cow is not independent but always dependent upon the non-existence of the non-cow.
6. Conclusion
1. The crucial passage in PSṬ vaibhāgikenoktam should be corrected to vaināśikeno-ktam.
2. The argument in PS(V) 5.41 is not between a Jain Vaibhāgika and Mādhava but between Vaināśika Mādhava and Dignāga. The scenario is similar to that of PS(V) 5.39. The Jain ‘distinctionist’ that Pind postulates 1. does not exist.
3. The view that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. should be ascribed to the Sāṃkhya, not a Jain Vaibhāgika.
4. Dignāga refers to the Sāṃkhya view in an example in an earlier work that is now lost. Dignāga’s text quoted by Mādhava is quoted by Jinendrabuddhi in paragraph B and modified as in C.
5. Mādhava criticizes Dignāga’s view as being inconsistent, because Dignāga abandons his thesis by admitting the Sāṃkhya example. Mādhava first quotes Dignāga’s earlier work (paragraph B) and then criticizes it (paragraph E).
6. Dignāga defends his earlier statement by insisting that his mentioning of the Sāṃkhya example that is incompatible with his thesis is not wholehearted acceptance, but only a provisional acceptance (abhyupagamya). For Dignāga the cognition of a cow is due to the exclusion of the non-cow (agovyavaccheda) and not due to the observation of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādidarśana). His main thesis of apoha that the cognition of X is based on the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāvadarśanād ātmāntare pra-tyayaḥ), is consistent. For him a cow is essentially the non-existence of the non-cow and not the aggregate of the dewlap, etc. (sāsnādaya eva gauḥ; sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ). X is essentially the non-existence of non-X (ātmāntarābhāva evātmāntarāṇi).
References and abbreviations
Corr. Correction by the present author.
Hattori 1982 M. Hattori, The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti of Dignāga with Jinendrabuddhi’s Commentary, Chapter Five: Anyāpoha-parīkṣā: Tibetan Text with Sanskrit Fragments. Memoirs of the Department of Literature, Kyoto University 21 (1982) 101–224.
K Kanakavarman’s translation of PS(V).
Kataoka 2011 K. Kataoka, Kumārila on Truth, Omniscience, and Killing. Vienna 2011.
Ms. Manuscript.
Pind 2009 O. H. Pind, Dignāga’s Philosophy of Language. Dignāga on anyāpoha. Pramā-ṇasamuccaya V . Texts, Translation, and Annotation. PhD diss., Universität Wien. Wien 2009. http://othes.univie.ac.at/8283/1/2009-12-03_0507516.pdf, last visited 15-03-2016.
Pind 2015 O. H. Pind, Dignāga’s Philosophy of Language. Dignāga. Pramāṇasamucca-yavṛtti V on anyāpoha. Part I: Text. Part II: Translation and Annotation, ed. E. Steinkellner. Vienna 2015.
PSṬ Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 1, Part I: Critical Edition, ed. Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, and Horst Lasic. Beijing/Vienna 2005. Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmala-vatī Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā. Chapter 2, Part I: Critical Edition, ed. Horst Lasic, Helmut Krasser, and Ernst Steinkellner. Beijing/Vienna 2012. For chapter 5, see Pind 2015.
PS(V) Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti). See Pind 2015.
V Vasudhararakṣita’s translation of PS(V).
FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES: [1]:
For Mādhava, see Pind 2015: Appendix 13; and Kataoka 2011: 497–498, n. 707.
[2]:
Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.
[3]:
Pind 2015: II 154, n. 518.
[4]:
The translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516): “For in this context the Vaibhāgika has stated: ‘In this world whatever cognition is due to the observation of whatever thing: this is such and such a thing only. For instance, the cognition ‘cow’ is due to the observation of dewlap, etc. A cow is only dewlap, etc. And the cognition of the nature of one thing is due to the observation of the non-existence of the nature of other things. Therefore the nature of some things are nothing but the non-existence of the nature of other things’.”
[5]:
The Tibetan translation ’jig pa, as also shown in the next example, means perishing (vināśa) and not dividing (vibhāga). If one wanted to support Pind’s reading vaibhāgika, one would have to explain how ’jig pa can mean vibhāga, which is usually translated as dbye ba.
[6]:
According to information provided by Horst Lasic, the relevant passage of the manuscript can be read as vaibhāśikeno° and surely not vaibhāgikeno°. The reading vaibhāgikeno° is probably a mistake arisen in two steps: vaināśikeno° → vaibhāśikeno° → vaibhāgikeno°. First the original nā was probably mistaken by an Indian scribe as
bhā. Then the modern transcriber who prepared the transcript that Pind uses mistakenly copied śi as gi. We can conclude that the reading vaibhāgikeno° is a modern invention. Furthermore, the immediately following passage which Pind reads as yasya darśanād has something in between in the manuscript. Probably the entire passage can be read as yasya khalv api darśanād, although the manuscript seems to read kha sva vi instead of kha lva pi.
[7]:
This citation is based on Pind’s edited text with slight modifications of sandhi and punctuation, etc. See Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.
[8]:
Cf. PSṬ 1 10, 6–10: yo’nanyasattvaneyasyābhiratipūrvako hīnasthānaparigrahaḥ, sa ātmasnehavato duḥkhasukhatyāgāptivāñchāpūrvakaḥ. tad yathā makṣikāṇām abhiratipūrvako’śucisthānaparigrahaḥ. ananyasattvaneyasyābhiratipūrvakaś ca garbhādihīnasthānaparigrahaḥ prāṇina iti kāryam; PSṬ 1 11, 9–11: yo yadviparītasvabhāvaḥ, sa tasya
pratipakṣaḥ. tad yathā vāyuviparītasvabhāvaṃ tailaṃ vāyoḥ. ātmadarśanaviparītasvabhāvaṃ ca nairātmyadarśanam iti svabhāvaḥ; PSṬ 1 11, 12–13: yo yannidānaviruddhaḥ, sa tasya bādhakaḥ. yathā vātikasya vyādhes tannidānaviruddhaṃ tailam. ātmasne-hādinidānātmadarśanaviruddhaṃ ca nairātmyadarśanam iti svabhāvaḥ; PSṬ 1 57, 8–9: kalpanājñānam
api nāmeti. asyāyam arthaḥ–yat svasaṃvedyam, tat svādhigamaṃ prati pratyakṣam, rāgādijñānavat. tathā ca kalpanājñānam iti svabhāvaḥ; PSṬ 1 84, 3–4: asyāyam arthaḥ. yatra smṛtiḥ, tatrānubhavaḥ, rūpādivat. asti ca smṛtir iti kāryam; PSṬ 1 130, 12–131, 1: kuta etat–samudāyaviṣayaṃ tu na punar vastusadghaṭādidravyaviṣayam ity āha–
rūpādyagrahe tadbuddhyabhāvād iti. yo yadagrahe saty u-palabdhilakṣaṇaprāpto nopalabhyate, na sa tato vyatirikto’sti. tad yathā kāṣṭhādibhyaḥ ṣaṇṇagarī prāmādamālā vā. rūpādyagrahe nopalabhyate copalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ ghaṭādi dravyam iti svabhā-vānupalabdhim āha; PSṬ 2 41, 6–7: siddhatvād iti. yat siddhaṃ na tat sādhyam, uṣṇo’gnir iti
yathā. siddhau ca kevalau dharmadharmiṇāv iti svabhāvaviruddham āha; PSṬ 2 78, 15–16: saṃyogasya cetyādi. yaḥ saṃyogāśrayaḥ sa dvitīye pratiyogini pratītihetuḥ, tad yathā dhūmaḥ. tathā cāgnir iti svabhāvaṃ prasaṅgam āha; PSṬ 2 111, 1–4: na hītyādi. anena yat pūrvānubhūtaṃ tad evedam iti pratyavamṛśati, tat smṛtyātmakam. yathā
sa evāyaṃ dhūma iti jñānam. yathoktadharmakaṃ ca viśe-ṣadṛṣṭam iti svabhāvam āha; B 119a5: ekadeśatvād iti. tad anena yo yadekadeśaḥ sa tadvyapadeśam arhati. [[tad
yathā]] paṭe deśaḥ paṭavyapadeśam. pakṣaikadeśaś ca dharmīti svabhāvam āha. (I thank Horst Lasic for these references. Orthographical modifications are given by the present author.)
[9]:
My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).
[10]:
My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).
[11]:
My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).
[12]:
My translation; cf. the translation by Pind (2015: II 153–154, n. 516).
[13]:
My translation. This passage is quoted but not translated in Pind 2015: II 153–154, n. 516.
[14]:
Cf. PSṬ B 233b5: sāsnādisamūha eva gauḥ, quoted by Pind 2015: II 154, n. 520.
[15]:
With the plural form ātmāntarāṇi Dignāga intends, for example, cows in general. See, e.g. his usage in PSV ad 5.36d (Pind 2015: I 45): śabdo’rthāntaranivṛttiviśiṣṭān eva bhāvān āha; cf. also PSṬ Ms. B 238b5–6 quoted in Pind 2015: II 179, n. 604: yathā vṛkṣaśabdaḥ śiṃśapādīn viśeṣān abhedenābhida-dhat sāmānyavācī tathā…
[16]:
My translation.
[17]:
V (Hattori 1982: 142, 10–11): gaṅ la ba laṅ ma yin pa las log pa’i ba laṅ gi blo de ji ltar nog la sogs pa mthoṅ ba’i rgyu mtshan can du smra bar byed /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 11–12): gaṅ gi ba laṅ ma yin pa las ldog pa’s ba laṅ gi rogs par’gyur ba de’i ji ltar lkog śal la sogs pa mthoṅ ba rgyu mtshan du smra bar byed /; Pind 2015: II 154: “For how could someone, to whom the cognition of a cow (*gopratyayaḥ) as precluded from non-cows (*agonivṛttaḥ), assert that it is caused by the observation of dewlap, etc. (*sāsnādidarśananimittaḥ)?”
[18]:
Pind 2015: I 52 presents the reconstruction as “yasya hi […],” not filling in the blank. But the main words are more or less safely reconstructed on the basis of the two Tibetan translations; Pind provides the Sanskrit words in his translation.
[19]:
V (Hattori 1982: 142, 12–13): ba laṅ daṅ nog la sogs pa sgra tha dad pas tha dad du sel ba can yin yaṅ khyod kyi lugs khas blaṅs nas / ’gal bźin du yaṅ de ṅes par bstan to /; K: khas blaṅs kyaṅ khyod kyi’dod pas dpe’di’gal ba yaṅ yin no / ba laṅ gi lkog śal la sogs pa rnams la sgra’i khyad par gyis tha dad pa sel ba /; Pind 2015: II 154–155: “Having assumed [this], the example is in conflict even with your own theory (svamataviruddhaḥ). For the excluded [[[object]]] is different with regard to a cow and the dewlap because of verbal difference (śabdabhedāt).”
[20]:
For the text, see Pind 2015: I 52, n. 275, and Pind 2015: II 154–155, nn. 520, 521 and 522.
[21]:
V (Hattori 1982: 142, 6): phan tshun tha dad dag yod kyaṅ; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 0): tha dad sel la de log pa; Pind 2009: 110: “On the contrary, they have mutually different excluded referents.”
[22]:
V (Hattori 1982: 142, 7–9): nog la sogs pa mthoṅ ba las / de’i blo dper brjod’gal ba de / khyed kyi lugs la rten pa yin /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 7–9): lkog śal la sogs mthoṅ phyir gaṅ / ba laṅ rtogs pa’i dper byas pa / de ni khyod kyi’dod pas’gal /; Pind 2015: II 153–154: “The example [you have] adduced, namely that the cognition of a cow is due to the observation of dewlap, and so on, is in conflict with your own theory.”
[23]:
V (Hattori 1982: 142, 18–19): nog la sogs pa la spyi’i ṅo bo daṅ ldan pa gźan med par mi ltos pa ni mi srid do źes sṅar bśad zin to /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 9–20): lkog śal la sogs pa rnams la spyi’i ṅo bo bdag ñid gźan med pa la bltos pa med par srid pa ma yin no źes sṅar bstan pa yin no /; Pind 2015: II 156: “For it has previously been demonstrated that the general form in a dewlap, etc. (sāsnādiṣu), does not exist without dependence upon the non-existence of other referents (sāmānyarūpam arthāntarābhāvanirapekṣaṃ na bhavati).”
[24]:
V (Hattori 1982: 142, 14–15): de mi ltos śes pa’di ni / raṅ gi rnam rtog spros par zad /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 15–16): de ltos med phyir’di yaṅ ni / raṅ gi rnam par rtog pas sprul /; Pind 2015: II 155: “The idea, however, that this [namely the cognition of one thing (ātmāntara)] is not dependent [upon the observation of non-existence of other things], is created out of your own imagination.”
[25]:
V (Hattori 1982: 142, 19–20): raṅ gi ṅo bo ni brjod par bya ba ma yin pa’i phyir de’i sgo nas tha sñad du bya’o /; K (Hattori 1982: 143, 20–21): raṅ gi ṅo bo ci brjod par bya ba ma yin pa’i phyir de tha dad mi bya’o /; Pind 2015: II 156–157: “The individual form, however, (svarūpaṃ tu) is not denotable (*vyāvahārikam [sic]) in this (tena) [[[form]]] because it is inexpressible (anabhilāpyatvāt).”
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