THE PROBLEM OF OTHER MINDS IN THE BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION

MASAHIRO INAMI

1. INTRODUCTION

Dominds other thanone’s own exist? This is a serious problem especially for the Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins, Buddhist idealist, for they deny the existence of the external objects. If other minds were admitted, their theory would be inconsistent. If other minds were denied, it would be meaningless to preach to others. Dharmak¯ıti, in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi, the first independent treatise on this problem, explains that the existence of other minds can be inferred even from the viewpoint of the Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins. According to him, the existence of other minds is inferred from the appearance of other persons’ speeches and actions. However, Ratnak¯ırti, in Sant¯ an¯antarad¯ us .an .a, another independent treatise on this problem, from the viewpoint of the Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins, explains in detail that other minds cannot be inferred at all and denies their existence. His view seemingly contradicts Dharmak¯ırti’s view. The purpose of this paper is to analyze their views and to consider how the problem of other minds is dealt with in the Buddhist epistemological tradition.1

2. DHARMAK¯ IRTI’S SANT¯ AN¯ANTARASIDDHI

2.1. Dharmak¯ırti, when he takes the Sautr¯antika standpoint, of course admits the existence of other minds. As is well known, in the Pram¯ an .av¯arttika, he argues against the C¯arv¯akas that inference is a means of valid cognition by pointing out that we can know other minds only through inference. For the Sautr¯antikas, the existence of other minds as well as of external objects is known by inference.2

2.2. In the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi, on the other hand, Dharmak¯ırti consistently adopts the Vij˜ n¯anav¯ada standpoint. Dharmak¯ırti as a Vij˜ n¯anav¯adin discusses the problem of other minds with the Sautr¯antikas there.

First of all, Dharmak¯ırti states the view of the Sautr¯antikas as follows: Observing in our own bodies that [our bodily and verbal] actions are preceded by [our] mental [[[actions]]], we infer [the existence of other] minds from the fact that the [[[bodily]] and verbal actions] are grasped in other [[[bodies]] as well].3

After that, Dharmakirti maintains that the existence of other minds can be inferred even from the viewpoint of the Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins in the same manner. But the Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins do not admit that actions exist outside of minds. For them, therefore, the existence of other minds is inferred from the appearance of other persons’ actions. The Vij˜ n¯anav¯adin’s process of inference can be stated as follows: Observing that the appearance of our bodily and verbal actions is preceded by our minds, we infer the existence of other minds from the appearance of other persons’ bodily and verbal actions.4 This can be regarded as the inference based on the probans as effect (k¯aryahetu). By observing our own minds and the appearance of our actions, we establish the causal relation between mind and appearance of action. Then, we infer the existence of other minds from the appearance of other persons’ actions which are the effect of other minds.5

2.3. A question now arises. Other minds can never be perceived. Then, how can we infer them? We can observe only that our own actions are preceded by our minds. Since other minds are imperceptible (adr .´ sya), we cannot apply the relation between our own minds and actions to them.6 On this problem, the Sautr¯antikas explain that we can infer other minds from other persons’ actions because our own minds are not fit to be a cause of other persons’ actions. According to the Sautr¯antikas, the unfitness is for the following three reasons:7 1) We do not experience that our own minds produce other persons’ actions. 2) The actions based on our minds are observed in our own bodies, not in the body of another person. 3) If other persons’ actions were based on our minds, other persons’ actions would be experienced just like our own actions. In principle, Dharmak¯ırti agrees with the Sautr¯antikas. The cognitions in which our own actions appear are caused by our own minds, and then the actions appear as internal. Therefore, the cognitions, in which other persons’ actions appear as external, should be produced by causes other than our minds.

The difference between the appearance of one’s own actions and that of other persons’ actions is taken into consideration here. According to Dharmak¯ırti, our own actions appear as things which are not separated from our body. But other persons’ actions appear as things separated from our own body.8 However, Dharmak¯ırti notes that such a difference is not fundamental. There can be some exceptions. For example, although the movement of the stone cast by us and the movement of another person shaken by us appear as separated from our own body, they are caused by our own intentions. Therefore, Dharmak¯ırti concludes that whether the actions are separated from our own body or not is not a crucial factor in inferring other minds.9

2.4. Let us turn to the next problem. What is known through such an inference? Are other minds themselves known through it? If other minds themselves are known, the existence of an object other than one’s own mind would be accepted. If not, other minds would not be known through the inference.10 On the problem, Dharmak¯ırti insists that another person’s mind not in particular but in general is known through the inference. If mind in particular were known through the inference, the specific forms of another person’s mind would be known through it just as those of one’s own mind are known through perception.11 In Dharmak¯ırti’s epistemology, inference cannot reveal the unique characteristics of objects. It is concerned only with the universal. He reaffirms this in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi. He points out there that if inference could reveal the unique characteristics of objects, the following unacceptable results would occur:

1) There would be no difference between perception and inference. 2) Inference could be concerned neither with the things in the future and the past nor with unreal things. 3) The object of inference would have causal efficiency (arthakriy¯ a´ sakti).12 Moreover, Dharmak¯ırti explains that inference is a means of valid cognition not because it reveals an object itself, but because our behaviors based on it do not fail us. The correspondence (avisam . v¯ada) is regarded as a basis of its validity.13 The inference of other minds is concerned only with the universal. Although it cannot reveal other minds themselves, it is valid because our behaviors based on it do not fail us.14

2.5. As is well known, in the Buddhist tradition it is admitted that Yogins and Buddha can directly know other minds. Dharmak¯ırti, in the final portion of the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi, takes up their knowledge of other minds. Firstly, Dharmak¯ırti points out that Yogin’s knowledge of other minds does not reveal other minds themselves. They are considered to know other minds not because they know other minds themselves but because those which have great resemblance to other minds clearly appear in their knowledge. They do not truly know other minds. According to Dharmak¯ırti, Yogins are not free of the distinction between the gr¯ahya ‘object apprehended’ and the gr¯ahaka ‘subject apprehending’, because they have not attained enlightenment yet. Yogin’s knowledge of other minds is regarded as valid just because their behaviors based on it do not fail them.15 To the problem whether Buddha knows other minds themselves or not, Dharmak¯ırti comments only that Buddha’s omniscience is beyond our understanding because Buddha’s knowledge is beyond our knowledge and words.16

2.6. The inference of other minds stated in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi can be summarized as follows: Observing in our own bodies that the appearance of our bodily and verbal actions is preceded by the activity of our minds, we establish the causal relation between the mind and the appearance of action. Then we infer other minds from the appearance of actions which are not caused by us and which appear as separated from our body in most cases. Other minds in general are known through the inference. It is regarded as valid because of its correspondence.17

3.1. Let us turn now to Ratnak¯ırti’s Sant¯ an¯antarad¯ us .an .a. There, Ratnak¯ırti explains in detail that other minds cannot be inferred at all and denies their existence. First of all, he states opponent’s view as follows:

Some people explain as follows: There exist other minds, which are known through inference. Observing that our verbal and bodily actions appear immediately after our intentions (icch¯acitta) and that they do not appear in the absence of [our intentions], we first determine the causal relation between intention and appearance of verbal [and bodily] action. Causal relation is then established by perception and non-perception and consists of positive and negative concomitance. And then, observing that verbal and bodily actions separated [from our own body] appear even when any intentions

are not perceived, we infer [other] intentions to be the cause of the [[[appearance]] of the actions]. Thus, other minds are established.18 Here, we notice, this argument is quite similar to Dharmak¯ırti’s. In the Sant¯ an¯antarad¯ us .an .a, Ratnak ¯ ırti refutes the Vij˜ n¯anav¯adin’s argument for the existence of other minds as it is stated by Dharmak¯ırti in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi.

3.2. Let us examine Ratnak¯ırti’s refutation. First of all, Ratnak¯ırti analyzes the intention which is regarded as a cause of the appearance of actions. Is it perceptible for one who infers, or does the inference use intention in general, which need not be qualified by perceptibility or imperceptibility?19 Firstly, if it is perceptible,its nonexistencewill be proved.While inferring, we do not perceive the intention and therefore we will establish its

absenceby the non-perception of a perceptible object (dr .´ sy¯anupalabdhi). If we do perceive it, there is no need to infer it.20 Secondly, if intention in general is regarded as a cause of the appearance of action, how is the causal relation established? We can determine only that our own intention, which is perceptible, is the cause of the appearance of our action. We can never determine that intention in general is the cause of the appearance of action. Even if a particular fire is remote in space or time, we can suppose that it should be perceivedif it were here. Accordingly, we can determine the causal relation between fire and smoke in general. However, we can never perceive the fire of digestion (jat .har¯agni), which is substantially different

(svabh¯avaviprakr .s .t .a) from the fire regarded as the cause of smoke. Therefore, we cannot determine that a fire common even to the fire of digestion is the cause of smoke. As for intention, we cannot suppose that intention common to other persons should be perceived if it were here. It is substantially different from the intention regarded as the cause of the appearance of action. Thus, we can never determine that intention in general is the cause of the appearance of action.21 Here, the following objection is raised: Intention in general can be regarded as perceptible in reference to self-consciousness

(svasam . vedana) because other persons’ intentions are perceived by their self-consciousness.22 Ratnak¯ırti answers this by pointing out that we should not take into consideration the person other than the one who infers. If we could regard something as perceptible on the basis of other persons’ experience, a goblin (pi´ s¯ aca) would be perceptible. A globlin can be perceived by some Yogins or another goblin. Since we can never perceive other persons’ minds, a mind common to other

persons’ should not be regarded as perceptible. Here, Ratnak¯ırti seems to point out that only by observing our own mind and the appearance of our action, we cannot establish a rule applicable to other minds.23 As we have seen, Dharmak¯ırti explains that it is a mind in general that is proved. Such a theory is refuted by Ratnak¯ırti here. Moreover, it is noted that Moks .¯ akaragupta, in the Tarkabh¯ as . ¯ a, regards other persons’ minds as perceptible on the grounds that they are perceived by other persons’ self-consciousness. He insists there that we can establish the inevitable relation between mind in general and action in general, and that we can infer the existence of other minds.24 But such a standpoint is rejected here. Thus, Ratnak¯ırti refutes the proof of other minds’ existence by pointing out that a mind neither in general nor in particular is fit to be proved.

3.3. Let us turn now to the next refutation. After Ratnak¯ırti finds faults with the argument for the existence of other minds, he presents an argument against it (b¯adhaka). He points out the non-appearance of the distinction between one’s own mind and another. If other minds were existent, one’s own mind should be distinct from them. But such a distinction never appears. Ratnak¯ırti quotes J˜ n¯ana´ sr¯ımitra’s words from the S¯ ak¯arasiddhi´ s¯ astra. If one’s own mind is distinct from another by nature, it should appear together with a limiting object (avadhi), [i.e., another mind]. [Therefore, one’s own mind should not be distinct from another.] Nor should it be apprehended that [one’s own mind] is identical with [another mind]. (RNA 147,17–18 = JNA 458,21–22. Cf. JNA 570,15–16). Even if one has a distinction, other things do not appear at all. Then, what is it distinct from? (RNA 147,19 = JNA 456,24. Cf. JNA 573,19.)

Our notion of distinction depends on the knowledge of two things. When we know only one of them, we can never distinguish one from another. The distinction between one’s own mind and another also depends on the knowledge of them. But we can only perceive our own minds. For example, while perceiving our own minds, we cannot perceive a rabbit’s horn. Therefore, we cannot make a distinction between our minds and a rabbit’s horn. Similarly, since we cannot perceive other minds, we cannot make a distinction between our own minds and other minds.25 Ratnak¯ırti refers to the following three difficulties in admitting the distinction between one’s own mind and another:

Firstly, if the distinction between one’s own mind and another is admitted, the distinction between one’s own mind and external objects should be admitted as well. The Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins, who deny the existence of external objects, cannot admit the existence of other minds. Ratnak¯ırti seems to point out that the acceptance of the existence of other minds is contradictory to the theory of vij˜naptim¯atrat¯ a.26 Secondly, if the distinction is admitted, causality should be admitted. The apprehension of causality presupposes that of distinction. However, since two things differing in time are not apprehended

together, the distinction between them cannot be apprehended. Therefore, in reality, causality can never be known. Ratnak¯ırti quotes Dharmak¯ırti’s Pram¯ an .av¯arttika III 4d: sam . vr .ty¯astu yath¯a tath¯ a. There, Dharmak¯ırti insists that causal efficiency was admitted only conventionally. The acceptance of the distinction conflicts with Dharmak¯ırti’s statement.27 Thirdly, the acceptance of the distinction is contradictory to the theory of citr¯advaita. The Vij ˜ n¯anav¯adins, who prove the nonduality of cognition, if they admitted the distinction between one’s own mind and the mind of another, could not reject the objection that the theory is refuted by perception grasping a distinction. Since cognition has nonduality, no distinction can be perceived. Ratnak¯ırti, here, pays attention to the inconsistency with the theory of citr¯advaita.28

3.4. Here, the next objection is raised. By which means is the nonexistence of other minds proved? The existence of other minds may be refuted in the above manner. But, is there any means of establishing the nonexistence of other minds? It cannot be established through perception, because perception leads us to affirmative judgement and not to negative judgement, nor through inference, because imperceptible objects cannot be proved to be nonexistent through inference. Since other minds are regarded as imperceptible, we can not prove them to be either existent or nonexistent.29 Answering this, Ratnak¯ırti presents the proof of the nonexistence of other minds as follows:

[Vy¯apti:] If something (X), being perceived, does not appear in some form (Y), then X cannot be dealt with as a thing existing in that form (Y). For example, a blue thing, which does not appear in the yellow form, cannot be dealt with as a thing existing in the yellow form. [Paks .adharmat¯a:] One’s own mind, being perceived, does not appear in a form distinct from other minds. This is, with regard to distinction, the non-perception of the object itself (svabh¯ av¯anupalabdhi), without any reference to the qualifier “perceptibility”. This is formulated when it is denied that another mind is identical with one’s own mind.30

Here, Ratnak¯ırti does not directly prove the nonexistence of other minds. Since they are imperceptible, their nonexistencecannot be proved by inference. Therefore, he denies the distinction between one’s own mind and other minds. He considers that the denial of the distinction implies the nonexistence of other minds. Ratnak¯ırti explains that the probans is not illegitimate (asiddhi). If the distinction appeared, the limiting object (avadhi), i.e., another mind, would appear. Since another mind is not perceived, the distinction between one’s own mind and another is not perceived.31 Thus, denying the distinction between one’s own mind and another, Ratnak¯ırti proves the nonexistence of another mind. According to him, other minds are unreal, just as a rabbit’s horn, the universal (s¯am¯anya) and so on.32

3.5. Finally, Ratnak¯ırti argues about Buddha’sknowledgeof other minds. If there exist other minds, how does Buddha know them? Ordinary people may suspect that there exist other minds, but Buddha, who is an omniscient being (sarvaj˜ na), does not have such a suspicion at all. If other minds are existent, he should indubitably know them. But, by which means does Buddha know them? First, he does not know them by inference, because the inference of other minds is not correct, as we have seen. If he knew them by inference, he would know them indirectly and therefore he would not be omniscient. Secondly,he cannot know them by perception. If Buddha knows other minds by perception, there would exist the gr¯ahya-gr¯ahaka relation between other minds and Buddha’s mind, and

consequently the theory of external object (bahirarthav¯ada) would be accepted.33 The last point is noteworthy. Ratnak¯ırti, here points out that the acceptance of the existence of other minds is contradictory to the theory that the gr¯ahyagr¯ahaka relations are denied in the ultimate sense. The Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins, who advocate the theory of vij˜naptim¯atrat¯ a, should not accept that a mind other than one’s own is grasped by perception.34 Thus, Ratnak¯ırti concludes that other minds do not exist at all. According to Ratnak¯ırti, therefore, even if Buddha does not know them, the fault that he would not be omniscient does not follow. Since other minds do not exist at all, Buddha never knows them.35 Here, Ratnak¯ırti clearly denied Buddha’s knowledge of other minds. Such a standpoint seems to contradict the traditional view that Buddha can know other minds. But Ratnak¯ırti does not offer any comments on this contradiction.36

3.6. Moreover, Ratnak¯ırti calls our attention to the point that the existence of other minds is denied not in the conventional sense but in the ultimate sense. He does not intend that other minds are suspected to be existent from any viewpoints. In our conventional world, there may be such a suspicion. Otherwise, we could not act with respect to other persons. Even if one who denies the existence of other minds says to others that other minds do not exist at all, there is no fault of self-contradiction. Although other minds are not ultimately existent, in the realm of convention, one can speak about it to others in order to enlighten them.37 Thus, Ratnak¯ırti introduces the theory of two truths, i.e., the conventional (sam . vr .ti) and the ultimate (param¯artha), to the problem of other minds. On the level of the ultimate truth, the distinction neither between gr¯ahya and gr¯ahaka nor between one’s own mind and another exists. Nonduality is admitted as ultimate.38 As I have examined in another paper,39 Praj˜ n¯akaragupta and J˜ n¯ana´ sr¯ımitra explain that both causality and validity are admitted only in the conventional sense because nonduality is ultimate. The notion of causality needs the

cognition of two things. But, since two things cannot be cognized in reality, causality is not truly known. Similarly, validity based on correspondence needs two cognitions. But, each of two cognitions reveals its own object only, and it does not reveal the correspondence between them. Therefore, validity based on correspondence is not truly known. Both causality and validity are objects of empirical knowledge which has not yet been analyzed. Our notion of them is only a mistaken belief. Therefore they are admitted only in the conventional sense.40 Ratnak¯ırti’s view on other minds is quite similar to these views on causality and validity. In the ultimate sense, other minds are denied because the distinction between one’s own mind and another is not known at all. But they are not denied in the conventional sense. We must remember here that Dharmak¯ırti, in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi, explains that the validity

of Yogin’s knowledge of other minds is guaranteed only by its correspondence. He notes there that a Yogin is not free of the distinction between gr¯ahya and gr¯ahaka. (See 2.5.) Dharmak¯ırti seems to understand that if other minds were perceived, there would be the gr¯ahya-gr¯ahaka relation between one’s own mind and other minds. The acceptance of the existence of other minds, just as that of the existence of external objects, is contradictory to the theory of vij˜naptim¯atrat¯ a. In this respect, Dharmak¯ırti, in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi,

deals with other minds only in the conventional sense. Moreover, as we have seen, he often insists that the inference of other minds can be regarded as valid because of its correspondence. Such an inference is conventional and is denied on the level of the ultimate truth. But, he does not clearly mention that the existence of other minds is denied in the ultimate sense. He comments only that Buddha’s knowledge is beyond our argument.41 Here, we may recall J˜ n¯ana´ sr¯ımitra’s remarks on causality in the Ks .an .abha˙ng¯adhy¯aya. He explains there that although causality is admitted only in the conventional sense, it cannot be refuted on the level of the ultimate truth. In the ultimate sense, all distinctions disappear. The distinction neither between pram¯ an

.a and prameya nor between s¯ adhana and s¯adhya exists. Since our logical arguments, both proof and refutation, are based on the premise that such a distinction is existent, they are only conventional. In this sense, on the highest level, causality cannot be refuted.42 The same may be true of the existence of other minds. It is admitted only in the conventional sense, and is denied in the ultimate sense. But, it cannot be refuted on the level of the ultimate truth. Therefore, the existence of other minds should not be refuted. It does not matter whether the existence of other minds is known in the conventional sense or in the ultimate sense. The ultimate truth is beyond our argument.43 Ratnak¯ırti insists that his refutation is not absolute. We should cling neither to the acceptance of other minds nor to the denial of it.44

4. CONCLUSION

Dharmak¯ırti, in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi, argues for the existence of other minds from the standpoint of the Vij˜ n¯anav¯adins. Ratnak¯ırti, on the other hand, argues against it in the Sant¯ an¯antarad¯ us .an .a. Their views are seemingly contradictory to each other. Ratnak¯ırti, however, denies it in the ultimate sense, not in the conventional sense. According to him, on the level of the highest truth, the existence of other minds is denied as is causality. Nonduality is ultimately admitted. But, from this point of view, all distinctions disappear. In this sense, therefore, neither the argument for nor the argument against the existence of these things is absolute. The ultimate truth is beyond our argument.

NOTES

1 Dharmak¯ırti’s Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi was translated into modern languages in Stcherbatsky (1922), Kitagawa (1955), and Katsura (1983). Ratnak¯ırti’s Sant¯ an¯antarad¯ us .an .a

had been translated into English by Yuichi Kajiyama (Kajiyama, 1965), who recently published a Japanese translation of the same work. (Kajiyama 2000) The problem of other minds in the Buddhist epistemological tradition was treated with in Sharma (1985), Negi (1997), etc. 2 PV III 68: siddha˜n ca paracaitanyapratipatteh . pram¯ an .advayam / vy¯ ah¯ ar¯adau pravr .tte´s ca siddhas tadbh¯avani´scayah . // 3 SS 1,5–7: rang lus blo sngon du ’gro ba yi / bya ba mthong nas gzhan la’ang de / ’dzin phyir gal te blo shes ’gyur / ... (R¯amakan .t .ha’s Nare´svarapar¯ıks . ¯ avr .tti, Kashmir Series, p. 62. ... : buddhip¯urvam . kriy¯am . dr .s .t .v¯a svadehe ’nyatra tadgrahan . ¯ at / j˜ n¯ ayate yadi dh¯ ı´ s (cittam¯atre ‘py es .a nayah . samah . // See Kitagawa 409.) Cf. Siddhivini´scayat .¯ ık¯ a I 164–167, Ny¯ayavini´scayavivaran . a 303, Tattv¯arthar¯ajav¯arttika 26.); SS 4,18–5,2: gal te bdag nyid la bya ba dang brjod pa sems kyi g-yo ba sngon du ’gro ba can dag mthong nas / gzhan la de dag mthong bas g-yo ba rjes su dpog par byed na / ... C. PV III 475cd–476c: pratyaks .a˜n ca dhiyam . dr .s .t .v¯a tasy ¯ a´ s ces .t .¯ abhidh¯adikam // paracitt¯anum¯ana˜n ca na sy ¯ ad ¯atmany adar´san¯at / sambandhasya ... 4 SS 5,2–6,5: sems tsam du smra bas kyang gzhan gyi sems rjes su dpag par nus te // 1 // de yang shes pa gzhan gyi g-yo ba’i khyad par med par lus dang ngag gi rnam par rig byed du snang ba’i shes pa de lta bu dag yod par ni mi ’dod do // 2 // Cf. SS 29, 17–32, 17: re zhig bya ba de nyid kyis

kyang sems de ci ste rtogs par byed // 40 // sems kyi ’bras bu yin pa’i phyir ro // 41 // de’i ’bras bu yin pa ni sems gzhan la yang ’dra bas ci ste rtogs par mi byed // 42 // gzhan yang gal te bya ba de rang yod pa tsam gyis rang gi rgyud rtogs par byed na ni / mi dmigs pas kyang de lta bu rtogs par ’gyur ro // 43 // gal te rtags ni shes pa la ltos pa’i phyir mi ’gyur ro zhe na // 44 // de la de’i tshe gzhan gyi sems las ni bya ba’o / bya ba las ni shes pa’o / shes pa las ni de rtogs pa’o zhes bya ba brgyud pa ’dis ci zhig bya // 45 // bya bar snang ba gzhan gyi sems las rab tu skye ba’i chos can gyi shes pa kho na ’di* rtogs par byed pa yin par ’gyur te // 46 // de rtogs pa ni tha mar yang de la brten pa’i phyir ro // 47 // (*B: ’dis; D: ’di) 5 As Katsura (1983) pointed out, the inference stated by Dharmak¯ırti in the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi is similar in essence to the so-called ‘argument from analogy’ for other minds in Western philosophy. 6 SS 6,15–16: gal te gzhan gyi shes pa’i byed pa mi dmigs pa’i phyir gzhan gyi blo rjes su dpag par mi rung ngo zhe na / Cf. RNA (¯ISD) 45.13–14: nanu yadi dr .´ sy¯agnidh¯umas¯am¯anyayor iva dr .´ sy¯atmanor k¯aryak¯aran .as¯am¯anyayoh . pratyaks .¯ agnidh¯umas¯am¯anyayor iva dr

.´ sy¯atmanor eva k¯aryak¯aran .as¯am¯anyayoh . pratyaks .¯ anupalambhato vy¯aptis tad¯a paracitt¯anum¯anaks .atih . /; TBh 44,10–12: nanu yadi dr .´ sy¯agnidh¯umas¯ am¯anyayor iva dr .´ sy¯atmanor eva k¯aryak¯aran .as¯am¯anyayoh . pratyaks .¯ anupalambhato vy¯aptis, tad¯ a sam . t¯ an¯antar¯anum¯anam . na sy¯ at, parcittasy¯adr .´ sy¯atmakatay¯ a vy¯aptigrahan .ak¯ale ’nantarbh¯av¯ad iti cen ... (TBht D355b5–6: ’o na bltar rung ba’i me dang du ba spyi dag gi bzhin du bltar rung ba’i bdag nyid kho na’i ’bras bu dang rgyu spyi dag nyid kyi khyab pa mngon sum dang mi dmigs pa las yin na de’i tshe gzhan gyis sems rjes su dpag pa nyams te / gzhan gyi sems ni bltar mi rung ba nyid kyis khyab pa ’dzin pa’i dus na nan du ’dus pa ma yin pa’i phyir ro zhe na ... ) 7 SS 8,3–10,6: gal te bdag nyid kyi sems gzhan la yod pa dag gi rgyu mtshan nyid du mi rung ba’i phyir gzhan gyi sems shes par ’gyur ro zhe na / ci ltar mi rung // 5 //(1)rang gi kun nas slong ba’i sems so sor yang dag par myong ba med pa’i phyir dang // 6 // (2)bdag nyid gyi sems kyi rten can yang bdag nyid la mthong ba’i phyir te / 7 / (3)de dag kyang de lta bu yin na ni de dang ’dra bar dmigs par ’gyur ba zhig na* /8/de lta ma yin par mthong bas / rgyu mtshan gzhan grub pa yin no zhe na / 9 / (*B: dmigs par ’gyur; D: dmigs par ’gyur ba zhig na)

8 SS 10,12–11,5: ghzan la yang rang gi kun nas slong bar byed pa’i sems yang dag par myong ba med pas ’dra la / 10 / rnam par rig byed du snang ba’i shes pa rang gi sems kyi g-yo ba’i rgyu mtshan can dag kyang kha nang du bltas pa’i snang ba yin par rtogs pa’i phyir / kha phyir bltas pa’i ba dag rgyu mtshan gzhan las skye bar ’gyur ro // 11 //; SS 13,9–10: rnam par chad pa dang rnam par ma chad par snang bas byas pa’i khyad par ni... 9 SS 15,1-17,15: ‘o na ci zhe na / rnam par chad pa la yang bya ba’i khyad par du snang ba kho na yin no // 17 // mda’ dang rdo ’phang ba dang / rgyogs dang sprul ba dang gzhan gyis rab tu bskyod pa la sogs pa’i bya ba’i khyad par du snang ba can rnams yul chad par snang ba yang g-yo ba sngon du ’gro ba can yin pa’i phyir la / 18 / gzhan gyis byas pa’i g-yo ba la sogs pa rnam par ma chad pa yin yang de sngon du ’gro ba can ma yin pa’i phyir ro // 19 // de lta bas na ’dir bya ba’i khyad par tsam gyis g-yo ba rtogs pa yin par rigs so // 20 //; SS 34, 5–6: khyad par ’di ni phal che ba’i dbang du byas pa yin no // 10 SS 51,2–8: ci ste bya ba la sogs par snang ba’i rnam par shes pa ’bras bu’i rtags las skyes pa gzhan gyi sems shes pa de* gzhan gyi sems yul du byed dam / ’on te ma yin te / yul du byed na ni don gzhan yin par ’gyur ro // yul du mi byed na ni shes pas pha rol gyi sems yod pa ci ltar shes te / de’i ngo bo nyid ma shes par de ’grub pa mi srid pa’i phyir ro zhe na // 66 // (*B: de dag; P: de) 11 SS 52,10–55,8: ‘di yang thal bar ’gyur ba mtshungs te // 67 // bya ba dang tshig dag gis gzhan gyi sems rtogs pa ltar na yang de’i ngo bo’nyid yul du byed na ni / de’i tshe rang gi sems shes pa bzhin du de’i rnam pa yang shes par thal bar ’gyur ro // de mi shes na ni des de’i ngo bo nyid ci ltar ’dzin // 68 // gal te rtags kyis ni spyi rtogs pa’i phyir rnam pa rtogs pa ma yin no zhe na // 69 // spi de ci gzhan gyi sems nyid yin nam / ’on te gzhan zhig gam / ’on te brjod du mi rung zhig yin // 70 // gzhan nyid dang brjod du mi rung ba nyid dag gcig yin na ni ’dis spyi de kho na gzung gi / gzhan gyi sems mi ma yin na / ci ltar ’dis de rtogs par ’gyur // 71 // spyi gzhan gyi sems nyid kyang ma yin te / de yod na de’i rnam pa yang shes par thal bar ’gyur ro zhes bshad zin te // 72 // ’di ni rjes su dpag pa’i tshul yang ma yin no // 73 // Cf. SS 19,2–3: de lta bas na bya ba’i khyad par gyi spyi ni g-yo ba’i khyad par spyi rtogs par byed pa yin no // 22 //; SS 33,7–9: g-yo ba tsam gyi spyi ni bya ba dang brjod pa’i shes pa spyi’i rgyu yin pas ’bras bus rgyu rtogs pa yin no // 12 SS 55, 12–15: rjes su dpag pa ni don gyi rang gi ngo bo ’dzin par byed pa ma yin te / mngon sum dang ’dra bar snang ba khyad par med pa la sogs par thal bar ’gyur ba’i phyir ro // 74 //; SS 57, 14–58,2: du ba la sogs pa’i rtags las skyes pa yang me la sogs pa’i rang gi ngo bo’i yul can ma yin te / (1)mthong ba dang khyad par med par thal bar ’gyur ba’i* phyir ro // (2)rjes su dpag pa ’das pa la sogs pa dang / ngo bo nyid med pa dag la yang ’jug par mi ’gyur ba’i phyir dang / (3)don byed par thal bar ’gyur ba’i yang phyir ro // 77 // (*B: pa’i; D:ba’i) Cf. NB I 16–17: anyat s¯am¯anyalaks .an .am // 16 // so ’num¯anasya vis .ayah . // 17 // 13 SS 56,10–18: de’i phyir ’di ni tshad ma nyid ma yin no // 75 // de’i rang gi ngo bo mi ’dzin kyang mngon par ’dod pa’i don la mi slu bas tshad ma nyid yin pa’i phyir ro // 76 // Cf. PV II 1a–b: pram¯an .am avisam . v¯adi j˜ n¯anam; PV III 56: abhipr¯ay¯avisam . v¯ad¯ad api bhr¯anteh . pram¯an .at¯a / gatir apy anyath¯a dr .s .t .¯ a paks .a´sc ¯ ayam . kr .tottarah . // 14 SS 58, 15–19,5: gzhang gyi sems rjes su dpag pa la yang mngon pa ’dod pa’i don la mi slu ba yod pa kho na ste // 78 // ’jug par byed pa de’i sgo nas srog chags gzhan yod par rtogs nas yang nas yang du tha snyad dag la ’jug na / de’i dbang gis ’byung ba’i don thob pa’i phyir ro // 79 // 15 SS 68,9–71,7: gnas ma gyur pa’i phyir rnal ’byor pa gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa rnams kyis gzhan gyi sems shes pa yang / tha snyad la mi slu ba nyid kyis gzugs la sogs pa mthong ba bzhin du tshad ma nyid yin no

// 90 // rnal ’byor gyi stobs kyis ni de dag la shes pa gzhan gyi sems kyi rnam pa’i bye brag gi rjes su byed pa gsal bar snang ba ’byung bar ’byur te / las dang lha la sogs pa’i byin gyis rlabs kyi stobs kyis rmi lam bden pa mthong ba bzhin no // 91 // de dag la yang gzhan gyi sems kyi yul can nyid kyi shes pa ’byung ba ni yin te / de dag kyang rang gi sems snang ba de dang rnam pa mtshungs pa kho na nyid shes pa las / gzhan gyi sems shes pa zhes bya ba nges par gzung bas tha snyad ’dogs so // 92 // mngon sum de ni de’i rnam pa’i rjes su byed pa gsal bar snang ba’i phyir dang / mi slu ba’i tshad ma zhes bya bar ’dod do // 93 // 16 SS 71,18–72,3: bcom ldan ’das kyis don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam gyis mi khyab ste / rnam pa thams cad du shes pa dang brjod pa’i yul las ’das pa’i phyir ro // 94 // Cf. Vim . ´satik¯a 22: vij˜naptim¯atrat¯asiddhih . sva´saktisadr .´ s¯ı may ¯ a/ kr .teyam sarvath¯as ¯ a tu na cinty¯a buddhagocarah . // 22 // 17 SS 33, 7–34,6: g-yo ba tsam gyi spyi ni bya ba dang brjod pa’i shes pa syi’i rgyu yin pas ‘bras bus rgyu pa yin no // 48 // de la bdag nyid kyi g-yo ba’i rgyu mtshan can ni kha nang du bltas par ’jug la / gzhan ni gzhan du yin te / khyad par ’di ni phal che ba’i dbang du byas pa yin no // 49 // 18 SD 145, 6–11: evam . hi kecid ¯ahuh . / asty eva sant¯antaram anum¯anaprat¯ıtam / tath¯ah ¯ ıcch¯acittasamanantaravy¯ah¯aravyavah¯ ar¯abh¯asasya dar´san¯ at tadabh¯ave c¯adar´san¯ad vy¯ah¯ ar¯ady¯abh¯asasya k¯aryak¯aran .abh¯avam ¯atmasant¯ane ‘vadh¯aryecch¯acittasy¯apratisam . vedanasamaye ’pi vicchinnavvy¯ah¯ ar¯ady¯abh¯asadar´san¯ at tatk¯aran .abh¯utam icch¯acittam anum¯ıyam¯anam . sant¯an¯antaram eva vyavatis .t .hata iti / 19 SD 145, 12–13: atredam ¯alocyate / tad icch¯acittam . vy¯ah¯ ar¯ady¯abh¯asasya k¯aran .atay¯ a vyavasth¯apyam¯anam anum¯atur (1)dar´sanayogyam atha (2)dr . ´ sy¯adr . ´ syavi´ses .an . ¯ anapeks .am icch¯am¯atram / 20 SD 145, 13–16: yadi t¯avad ¯adyo vikalpas tad¯anum¯atur dar´sanayogyatv¯ad icch¯acittasy¯anum¯anak¯ale ’nupalabdhir abh¯avam eva gamayat¯ıty anupalambh¯akhyapratyaks .ab¯adhitatv¯at kv¯anum¯an¯avak¯ a´sas tasya / yadi punar icch¯acittam anum¯anak¯ale ’py anubh¯uyeta, tad¯a kim asy ¯ anum¯anena / 21 SD 145,23–146,6: atha dvit¯ıyo vikalpah . / tath ¯ ah ¯ ıcch¯acittam¯atram . svaparasant¯anas¯adh¯aran .adr .´ sy¯adr .´ syavi´ses .an .¯ anapeks .am vy¯ah¯ ar¯ady¯abh¯asam . prati k¯aran .atay¯avadh¯aryate / tadavadh¯aran .am . kena pram¯an .ena / vy¯ah¯ ar¯ady¯abh¯asasya h¯ıcch¯am¯atr¯abh¯ave ’bh¯avam . prat¯ıtya tadutpattisiddhigaves .an .¯ a / na cecch¯am¯atrasya svaparasant¯anas¯adh¯aran .asya svasam . vedanen¯anyena v¯abh¯avah . ´saky¯avagamah . / yath¯a hi vahnim¯atrasya de´sak¯alavyavahitasy¯api dh¯umotp¯adade´sak¯alayor yadi sy¯ad upalabhyetaiva mayeti sam . bh¯avitasy¯anum¯atr .purus .endriyapratyaks .en .a dh ¯ umotp¯ad¯ at pr¯agabh¯avo ’vadh¯aryam¯an .as tadutpattisiddhim adhy¯asayat¯ıti vyavahitade´sak¯alasy¯api vahner dh¯umam¯atram . prati k¯aran .atv¯avadh¯aran .am, svabh¯avaviprakr .s .t .asya tu jat .harabhav¯adis¯adh¯aran .asya sarvath¯anum¯atr .purus .¯ a´saky¯abh¯avaprat¯itikasya vy¯aptibahirbh¯ava eva / tath¯atr¯ap¯ıcch¯acittam . parasant¯anas¯adh¯aran .am api y¯ avad yad¯ıha sy¯ad upalabhyetaiva mayeti yadi sam . bh¯avayitum . ´sakyeta tad¯ a tadvyatirekasiddhidv¯aren .ak ¯ aran .atay¯avadh¯aryate / kevalam . svabh¯avaviprakr .s .t .e cittam¯atre ’stamiteyam . katheti // 22 SD 146, 12–15: athecch¯acittam¯atram . svasam . vedanam¯atr¯apeks .ay¯a na svabh¯avaviprakr .s .t .am / na hy agnir apy eko yenaivendriyavij˜ n¯aena dr .´ syate tenaiv¯anyo ’pi dr .´ syah .* / tatra yath¯a caks .urvij˜ n¯anam¯atr¯apeks .ay¯a aginim¯atram . dr .´ syam iti vyavasth¯apyate tath¯atr¯api svasam . vedanam¯atr¯apeks .ay¯a icch ¯ acittam¯atram . svaparasant¯anas¯adh¯aran .am api dr . ´ syam eveti / (*RNA: dr .´ syam) 23 SD 146,16–25: atrocyate / kim atra m¯atra´sabden¯anum¯atr .purus .asam . bandh¯asam . bandh¯abhy¯am avi´ses .itam . yasya kasyacit purus .asyendriyaj˜ n¯anam . vastuvis .ay¯ıkurv¯an .am asya dr .´ syat¯asambhave ’pi n¯animittam abhimatam / yady evam . pi´ s¯ ac¯adir api dr .´ syah . sy¯at / so ’pi hi kasyacit pum . so yogy¯adeh . svaj¯ at¯ıyasya v¯a pi ´ s¯ ac¯antarasya bhavaty evendriyaj˜ n¯anagocara iti na ka´scit svabh¯avaviprakr .s .t .ah . sy¯at / tasm ¯ ad

anum¯atr .purus .asam . bandhitvam an¯apasya vij˜ n¯anasya svalaks .an .¯ adibhedanir¯asapara eva m¯atra´sabdo yuktah . / etad ev ¯ a´ sa˙nkya Dharmottaren .¯ abhihitam – “ekapratipattrapeks .am . cedam . pratyaks .alaks .an .am /” (NBT . 104,5–6.) ity¯adi / tenaivam . dr . ´ syat¯asam . bh¯avan¯ a yad¯ıha de´se k¯ale v¯a sy ¯ ad ghat . ¯ adir niyamenopalabhyeta, mad¯ıyasya caks .urvij˜ n¯ anam¯atrasya vis .ay¯ıbhaved iti / paracitte tu na ´sakyam evam / yad¯ıha paracittam . sy¯at niyamena mad¯ıyasya svasam . veda[na]m¯atrasya vis .ayi sy¯ad iti // 24 TBh 44,13–14: svasam . vedanam . hi tatra vy¯aptigr¯ahakam / svaparasam . t¯anagatasvasam . vedanam¯atr¯apeks .ay¯a paracittasy¯api dr .´ syatv¯at / (TBht D355b6–7: gang gi phyir rang rig pa ni der khyab pa ’dzin pa po ste / rang dang gzhan gyi rgyud du son ba’i rang rig pa tsam la blots pas na / gzhan gyi sems kyang bltar rung ba tsam nyid kyi phyir to //) Cf. RNA (¯ISD) 45,16ff. 25 SD 147, 6–25: evam . tarhi sant¯an¯antaras¯adhakasy¯abh¯av¯ad b¯adhakasy¯api kasyacid adar´san¯ad bhavatu tatra sandeha eveti kecit / tair idam . b¯adhakam abhidh¯ıyam¯anam avadh¯ıyat¯am / yadi hi sant¯ an¯antaram . sam . bhavet tad¯a tato bhedena svasant¯anasy¯ava´syam . bhavitavyam / anyath¯a svasant¯ an¯ad api prak¯ a´ sam¯ an¯ at tasya parasant¯ an¯abhimatasya bhedo na sy¯ at / na c¯abhedas tayor iti svasant¯ an¯ ad bhed¯abhed¯abhy¯am ab¯adhyasya parasant¯anasya s¯am¯anya´ sa´savis . ¯ an . ¯ adivad abh¯ava ev¯ ay¯ata iti katham . sandehah . / tasm ¯ at parasant¯an¯apeks .ay¯a svasant ¯ anasya bhedo ’py ava´syam bh¯avyah . / sa ca bhedah . sant¯anasya svabh¯avah . svasant¯ane pratibh¯asam¯ane niyamena pratibh¯aseta / katham aparath¯a pratibh¯an¯apratibh¯analaks .an .aviruddhadharm¯adh y¯ase ’pi svasant¯anasya prasant¯an¯ad bhedah . svabh¯avat¯am ¯ as¯adayet // na c¯asau bhedah . pratibh¯asate / bhedapratibh¯ase hi upagamyam¯ane tadavadhibh¯utasy¯api parasant¯anasya pratibh¯aso durapahnavah . sy¯at / asm¯ad bhinnam it¯ıdam . cet svar¯upam . svasya cetasah . / s¯ avadher asya bh¯asah . sy¯an na v¯a gr ¯ ahyam . tad¯atman¯ a // (Cf. JNA 458,21–22; 570, 15–16.) bhede ’nyale´sam api naiti kuto bhinnah . / (Cf. JNA 456,24; 573,19.) evam¯adikam a´ses .am iha pravacanaprad¯ıpa´ sr¯ ıs¯ak¯arasa˙ngrah¯adivacanam anusmaryat¯am / yath¯a hi svasant ¯ anam¯atre parisphurati ´ sa´savis .¯ an .¯ ad asphurato na bhedah . pratibh¯ati tath¯ a parasant¯an¯ad api sphuran .avirahin .o na bh ¯ aty eva bhedah . / na hi parasant¯an¯apeks .ay¯ a ka´scid vi´ses .ale´sah . svasant¯anasya pariphurati yo n¯asti ´ sa´savis .¯ an .¯ apeks .ay¯a / na ca ´ sa´savis .¯ an .aparasant¯an¯av apeks .ya sam¯ane svasant¯anapratibh¯ase ´ sa´savis .¯ an .¯ apeks .ay¯a na bhedo n¯apy abhedah . pratibh¯ati / parasant¯an¯apeks .ay¯a tu bheda eva bh¯ at¯ıty evam avasth¯apayitum . ´sakyam / Cf. PV III 212–213: paricchedo ’ntar anyo ’yam bh¯ago bahir iva sthith . /j ˜ n¯anasy¯abhedino bhedapratibh¯aso hy upaplavah . // 212 // tatraikasya apy abh¯avena dvayam apy avah¯ıyate / tasm¯at tad eva tasy¯api tattvam . y¯a dvaya ´ s¯ unyat¯ a // 213 //; PVA 293,21–24: advaite ’pi katham vr .ttir iti codyanir¯akr .tam . / yath ¯ a balis tath¯a yaks .a iti ki˙n kena sa ˙ ngatam // 410 // anenaitad api nir¯akr .tam . / “advaite katham paraprabodhan¯aya pravarttata” iti / svaparayor asy¯arthasy¯asiddheh . / ayam paro ’han na para iti svasamvedam evaitad udayam ¯ as¯adayati / n¯atra param¯arthato vibh¯agah . / aham pra´snayit¯a parah . kathayati dvayor api sv¯ak¯aroparaktapratyayasamvedanam evaitan na tu vibh¯agah . svapnapratyayavat / unmattapratyayapral¯apavac ca /; NBh¯u 140,16–19: tad evam . gr¯ahyagr¯ahakayor abhedav¯adin¯am . svasant¯ane [’pi] j˜ n¯an¯antaragrahan .am . n¯asti, kutah . sant¯an¯antarasiddhih .? tata ´ s ca paralokabuddh¯adiv¯art¯api d¯urots¯aritaivety asamam . jasam . sarvam eva saugatam . ´ s¯ astram iti / na hi bhed¯adyasiddhau s¯ adhanad¯ us .an .¯ adivyavah¯ara upapadyate / 26 SD 148,7–10: kim . ca m¯an ¯ ama bh¯asis .t .a bahirarthah . kasyacid api tath¯api katham . tadabh¯avasiddhir bhedapratibh¯ as¯abhyupagamav¯adina it¯ıyanm¯atram iha vivaks .itam / na c ¯ atra ka´scid dos .ah . / tasm ¯ ad bahirarthena s¯adh¯aran .am . sant¯an¯antaram iti katham . vij˜naptiv¯adin¯am api sam . matam . bhavis .yati / Cf. NBh ¯ u 152,2ff.: api ca svapnavat sarvapratyay¯a nir ¯ alamban¯a iti bruv¯an .asya katham . sant¯an¯antarasiddhih .? na hi svapnadr .s .t .¯ ant¯abhy¯am . gamanavacanapratibh¯ as¯abhy¯am . v¯astav¯ı purus .¯ antarasiddhir upapadyate ...

27 SD 148,10–17: kim . ca k¯aryak¯aran .abh¯avo ’pi vij˜ n¯anadvayasya bhedapratibh¯asav¯adin¯ a b¯adhitum a´sakyah . /p ¯ urvabh¯avin¯ı hi sam . vittih . parasam . vittyapeks .ay¯a bhedam . p¯urvatvam . c¯atmano gr .hn .¯ aty ev¯avadhipratibh¯asavigame ’pi // parabh¯aviny api sam . vittih . p¯urvasam . vittyapeks .ay¯a bhedam . paratvam . c¯atmano ’dhigacchaty eva sant¯an¯antaravad iti niyatap¯urv¯aparabh¯avalaks .an .ek ¯ aryak¯aran .abh¯ave ’vabh¯asam¯ane ’vas¯ıyam¯ane ca n¯ ıl¯adicitr¯ak¯aravat katham sam . vr .tty¯astu yath¯a tath ¯ a (PV III 4d) iti bhagavato v¯arttikak¯arasya vacanena phalitam atra mate / Cf. PVA 606,29: asm¯akam . tu advaitav¯adin¯am . na param¯arthatah . k¯aryak¯aran .abh¯avo n¯ama /; JNA 417,22–418,2: tath¯ a ca s¯utram, “hetupratyayavy¯avr .ttim . k¯aran .asya nis .edhanam / cittam¯atravyavasth¯anam anutp¯adam . vad¯amy aham //” (La˙nk¯avat¯aras¯utra X 592) anutp¯adam iti phalanis .edhah . / cittam¯atrasthitir eva hetuphalanis .edho vyaktah . / See Inami (2000). 28 SD 148,17–20: api ca citr¯ak¯aracakre dharmin .y advaitas¯adhan¯artham upanyastasya prak¯ a´sam¯anatv¯adihetor bhedagr¯ahakapratyaks .¯ apahr .tavis .ayatvam udbh¯avayatah . prativ¯adino bhedagrahan .am anumanyam¯anena sant¯an¯antarasandeham . ca vin¯a katham uttaritavyam . bhavat¯a / Cf. NBh¯u 140,16–17: tad evam . gr¯ahyagr¯ahakayor abhedav¯adin¯am . svasant¯ane [’pi] j˜ n¯an¯antaragrahan .am . n¯asti, kutah . sant¯an¯antarasiddhih .? 29 SD 148,21–23: nanv evam api sant¯an¯antar¯abh¯avah . kena pram¯an .ena siddhah . / na t¯ avat pratyaks .en .a tasya vidhivis .ayasya pratis .edhas¯adhan¯anadhik¯ ar¯at / n ¯ apy anum¯anena, tasya dr .´ sy¯abh¯avas¯adhananiyatasy¯ at¯ındriyaparacitt¯abh¯avas¯adhane ’navat¯ ar¯ad iti cet / 30 SD 148,23–28: atra br¯umah . / sant ¯ an¯antarasam . bhave niyatabh¯avah . tato bhedah . svacittasya / abhede svasant¯an¯at parasant¯ana eva sy¯at / yath¯a ca yad upalabhyam¯anam . yena r¯upen .a na bh ¯ asate na tat tena r ¯ upen .a sadvyavah¯arayogyam . yath¯an ¯ ılam . p¯ıtar¯upen .a/ nopalabhyate ca svacittam upalabhyam¯anam . parasant¯an¯ad bhinne[na] rupen .eti bhedasya svacittat¯ad¯atmyanis .edhe dr .´ syavi´ses .an .aprayog¯anapeks .¯ a svabh ¯ av¯anupalabdhir iyam // 31 SD 148,29–30: n¯apy asiddhih . bhedapratibh¯ase tadavadher api pratibh¯asapr¯apteh . / avadhyapratibh¯ase tu bhedapratibh¯ as¯abh¯avah . ´ sa´savis .¯ an .abhedapratibh¯ as¯abh¯avavat siddha eva / Cf. SD 147,15–20: bhedapratibh¯ase hi upagamyam¯ane tadavadhibh¯utasy¯api parasant¯anasya pratibh¯aso durapahnavah . sy¯at / “asm¯ad bhinnam it¯ıdam . cet svar¯upam . svasya cetasah . /s ¯ avadher asya bh¯asah . ay¯an na v¯a gr ¯ ahyam . tad¯atman¯a // (= JNA 458,21– 22; 570,15–16.) bhede ’nyale´sam api naiti kuto bhinnah . / (= JNA 456,24; 573,19.)” evam¯adikam a´ses .am iha pravacanaprad¯ıpa´ sr¯ ıs¯ak¯arasa˙ngrah¯adivacanam anusmaryat¯am /; PVA 240.10–11: saj¯ at¯ıyavij¯ at¯ıyavy¯avy¯avr .ttibh¯ajo hi jagati janmabh¯utah . / te yato yato vy¯avarttante tatas tato bhedam avadhibhedopakalpitam . tam . tam up¯ad¯anam ¯ad¯aya n¯an¯adharm¯an .ah . prat¯ıyante /; JNA 459.1–2: tasm¯ad avadher abodhe ’vadhimato matir iti vimatir eveti kuta´scid bhedagr¯ahi pratyaks .am apratibh¯asinah . /; JNA 458,24: avadhir api hi sambandhivi´ses .a eva / 32 The denial of the existence of other minds has been understood as a kind of solipsism (see Kajiyama, 1965, etc.) According to Ratnak¯ırti, however, the denial of other minds does not mean the affirmation of the sole existence of one’s own mind. Ratnak¯ırti, who refuses the distinction between one’s own mind and others, must deny not only the existence of other minds but also the existence of one’s own mind. For the notion of “one’s own mind” also depends on the same distinction. When the distinction disappears, even one’s own mind cannot survive at all. Moreover, if the notion of “one’s own” or “self” were admitted, the ¯atmav¯ada would be accepted. We should remember Dharmak¯ırti’s words: “When self exists, the notion of “other” occurs. From the distinction between self and others, the attachment [to self] and the hatred [for others] arise. Connected to these two [i.e., the attachment to self and the hatred for others], all vices arise.” (PV II 219 (Miyasaka ed. PV I 219cd–220ab): ¯ atmani sati parasam . j˜ n¯a svaparavibh¯ag¯at parigrahadves .au / anayoh . sam . pratibaddh¯ah . sarve dos .¯ ah . praj¯ayante //

33 SD 149,3–8: api ca sant¯an¯antare t¯avad arv¯agdr .´ s¯ am . sandeho bhavadbhir anumanyate / bhagavatas tu kim avasth¯apyat¯am / sam . deh¯avasth¯apane katham . sarvaj˜nat¯ a / vidyam¯anam eva kad¯acit sant¯an¯antaram . bhagavat¯an ¯ avadh¯aryate tath¯apy asau sarvaj˜na iti katham etat / anum¯anam . ca sant¯an¯antaravis .ayam . pr¯ag eva cintitam / na c¯ anum¯anena prat¯ ıt¯av api sarvaj˜nat¯a bhavitum arhati / pratyaks .en .a paracittaprat¯ıtau gr¯ahyagr¯ahakabh¯avo ’pi paracittasya bhagavaccittena sah¯ ay¯ata iti bahirarthav¯ada eva mukh¯antaren .opagatah . sy¯at, katham ayam . va˜ncayati v¯adah . // 34 Cf. Prameyakamalam¯art¯an .d .a 80,3–9: tath¯a sarvaj ˜ naj˜ n¯anasya tajj˜neyasya cetarajanacittasya sahopalambhaniyame ‘pi bhed¯abhyupagam¯ad anek¯antah . / nanu sarvaj˜nah . sant¯an¯antaram . v¯a nes .yate tat katham ayam . dos .ah .? ity asat; sakalalokas¯aks .ikasya sant¯an¯antarasy¯abhyupagamam¯atren .¯ abh¯av¯asiddheh . / sugata´s ca sarvaj ˜ no yadi param¯arthato nesyate tarhi kimartham . “pram¯an .abh¯ ut¯aya” ity¯adin¯asau smarthitah . stuta´sc ¯ advait¯adiprakaran .¯ an¯am ¯adau dign¯ag¯adibhih . siddhih . / 35 SD 149,9–10: asmad¯ıyamatena tu paracittam . n¯asty eveti tadavadh¯aran .akr .to na* bhagavatah . sarvaj˜nat¯aks .atidos .ah . / (*RNA: [na]) Cf. TSP 693,6–10: na ca buddhasya bhagavata´s cittena parasant¯anavarttina´s cittaks .an .¯ a avas ¯ ıyante; tasya bhagavatah . sarv¯avaran .avigamena gr¯ahyagr¯ahakakala˙nkarahitatv¯at / yatoktam – “gr¯ahyam . na tasya grahan .am . na tena j˜ n¯an¯antaragr¯ahyatay¯api ´ s¯ unyam” iti / 36 Commenting to the last portion of the Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi, Vin ¯ ıtadeva refers to the four kinds of Buddha’s knowledge, i.e., 1) ¯adar´saj˜ n¯ ana, 2)pratyaveks .an .aj˜ n¯ ana, 3) samat¯ aj˜ n¯ ana, and 4) kr .ty¯anus .t .h¯anaj˜ n¯ ana. According to him, only the first one is beyond the conventional world, and is the all-knowing knowledge in the ultimate sense. The others, which are obtained after the enlightenment, are conventional. Vin¯ıtadeva, who calls our attention to the variations of Buddha’s knowledge, may suggest that Buddha knows other minds not by his ultimate knowledge, but by the conventional knowledge obtained after the enlightenment. SST . 72,l16–73,20: yang de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi don thams cad mkhyen pa ni rnam pa gnyis te / me long lta bu’i ye shes kyis chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid de bzhin nyid mkhyen pa dang / so sor rtogs pa’i ye shes kyis dngos po thams cad du mkhyen pa’o // de la me long lta bu’i ye shes gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa dang yang dag par bral ba chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nvid de bzhin nyid rig pas / don thams cad mkhyen pa don dam par thams cad mkhyen pa ni yin te/ ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes kyi ngo bo yin pa’i phyir ro // so sor rtog pa’i ye shes ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes kyi rjes las thob pa gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa dang ldam pas / dngos po phra ba dang / sgrib pa dang / bskal pa thams cad rnam pa thams cad du mkhyen pa pa ni ’jig rten pa’i rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa yin te / ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes kyi rjes la thob pa ’jig rten pa’i ye shes kyi ngo bo yin pa’i phyir ro // de’i phyir so sor rtog pa’i ye shes la don thams cad mkhyen pa’i tshul mi ’gal lo // de la gzung ba dang ’dzin par rnam par rtog pa yod par khas blangs pas phyin ci log pa yang ma yin te / de phyin ci ma log pa nyid du gzigs pa’i phyir ro // mnyam pa nyid kyi ye shes ni rten cing ’brel par ’byung ba’i dngos pa tsam gyi yul can yin pa’i phyir / me long lta bu’i ye shes la dmigs pa yin no // bya ba sgrub pa’i shes ni rang dang spyi’i mtshan nyid kyi yul can yin no // de ltar na de bzhin gshegs pa ni ye shes bzhi’i rang bzhin yin la / de la me long lta bu’i ye shes ni ’jig rten las ’das pa yin no // de’i rjes las thob pa gzhan dag ni ’jig rten pa yin no // des bas na bcom ldan ’das kyi don thams cad mkhyen pa ni ye shes bzhi po ’di dag la ci rigs par sbyar bar bya’o // 37 SD 149,10–11: y¯avac ca bhedagrahan . ¯ abhim¯anar¯ up¯a sam . vr .itis t¯avat sant¯an¯antare sandeh¯at tadavabodhan¯artham . vacan¯adir api pravartata iti svavacanavirodho ’pi na sam . bhavaty eva / 38 SD 149,11–13: na khalu sant¯an¯antaravis .ayah . sarvath¯a sandeho n¯asty evety abhimatam asm¯akam, api tu param¯arthagatir iyam upadar´ sit¯ a /

39 Inami (1998). 40 PVA 183,16–17: anvayavyatirek¯abhy¯ a˙nk ¯ aryak¯aran .at¯agatih .* / pram ¯ an .a˜ n ca** na tatr¯asti pratyaks .am anum¯a tath ¯ a // 146 // pratyaks .¯ anupalambh¯abhy¯am anvayavyatirekayoh . / gatir yady anum¯an¯at sy¯ad itaretarasam . ´srayah . // 147 // (*PVA: k¯aryak¯aran .at¯am . gatih .; **PVA: pram¯an .a˜n ja); PVA 184,21: tad eva punar ¯ay¯atam . samvr .ty¯ a ´saktat¯agatih .* / anir ¯ upitatattv¯a hi prat ¯ ıtis samvr .tir mat¯a // 152 // (*PVA: ´saktat¯ a gatih .); PVA 4,8: dvis .t .hasambandhasamvittir naikar¯upapravedan¯at / dvayasvar¯upagrahan .e sati sambandhavedanam // 3 //; PVA 25,19–20: s¯am . vyavah¯arikam etad iti pratip¯aditam . / sam . vyavah¯ara´s ca vic ¯ aryam¯an .o vi ´ s¯ıryata eva /; PVA 25,24–25: s¯am . vyavah¯arikam . pr¯am¯an .yam . pratip¯adayat¯a param¯arthata ekam eva svasam . vedanam . pratyaks .am ity uktam . bhavati /; PVA 292,19–23: na khalu pratyaks .atah . p¯urv¯aparavastudvayagrahan .am /k ¯ ary¯abhimatagraphan .ak¯ale smaran .am eva k¯aran .¯ abhimate / yad¯a sa gr .hyate tad¯ a svar¯upen .aiva grahan .an na k¯aran .atvena / k¯ary¯asy¯agrahan .¯ at / k ¯ aryagrahan .ak¯ale ca tadat¯ıtam . smaranagocara eva / na ca smaran .am ananubh¯ute na ca k ¯ aran .atvasy¯anubhavah . katham . smaran .am . / atha k ¯ aryak¯ale ’pi tad anubh¯uyata iti matih . / tath ¯ a sati p¯urvar¯upat¯anubhav¯abh¯av¯at sam¯anak¯alatay¯ a´sakyavivecanatv¯ad abheda eva kutah . k¯aryak¯aran .abh¯avah . /; PVA 295;13: anvayavyatirek¯abhy¯am bhedasy¯asya prakalpan¯a/ an¯adiv¯asan¯asa˙ng¯ad anvayavyatirekavit // 428 //; PVA 295,16: na c¯anvayavyatirekayoh . param¯arthatah . samvedanam iti pratip¯aditam . /; PVA 295,23–24: na ca param¯arthato ’nvayavyatirekapratipattir anyatr¯abhim¯an¯at / abhim¯anam¯atram eva skalam iti /; PVA 295,31–32: param¯arthatas tu svasamvedanam ekam eva / n¯anyen¯anyasya grahan .asambhavah . /; PVA 606,29: asm¯akam . tv advaitav¯adin¯am . na param¯arthatah . k¯aryak¯aran .abh¯avo n¯ama /; JNA 416,18–20: sam . v¯ad¯ac ca pr¯am¯an .yam, na ca kvacid bhinne vastuni samv¯adah . / tasm ¯ at svavedan¯atiriktasya pr¯am¯an .yam s¯am . vr .tam eva, tath¯a hetuphalavyavah¯aro ’pi s¯am . vr .ta eva, ekaprat¯ıtikatv¯ad ubhayoh . / 41 SS 69,2–4: gal te gzhan gyi sems kyi rang gi ngo bo mngon sum du shes par gyur na ni de’i gzung ba don bzhan yin par ’gyur ro //; SS 68,9–13: gnas ma gyur pa’i phyir rnal ’byor pa gzung ba dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par rtog pa ma spangs pa rnams kyis gzhan gyi sems shes pa yang / tha snyad la mi slu ba nyid kyis gzugs la sogs pa mthong ba bzhin du tshad ma nyid yin no // 90 // Cf. Vim . ´sV ad Vim . ´ s 21: yath¯a tannirabhil¯apyen¯atman¯a buddh¯an¯am . gocarah . / tath ¯ a tadaj˜ n¯an¯at tadubhayam . na yath¯artham . vitath¯apratibh¯asatay¯a gr ¯ ahyagr¯ahakavikalpasy¯aprah¯ın .atv¯at /; Vim . ´sT . D194a6–7: gal te gzhan gyi sems shes na de’i tshe gzung dang ’dzin pa’i rnam par khas blangs pas rnam par rig pa nyid nyams ’gyur ro // 42 JNA 10,19–21: na ca tasya d¯ us .an .ena ks .an .abha˙ngav¯adinah . ki˜ncit / hetuphal¯apal¯apino ’pi yadi tadapal¯ap¯aya ny¯ayasam . bhava, tad¯a tad api na d¯uram iti kim atra nirbandheneti / Cf. PV I 85–86: dharmadharmivyavasth¯anam . bhedo ’bheda´s ca y¯adr .´ sah . / asam ¯ ıks .itatattv¯artho yath¯a loke prat ¯ ıyate // 85 // tam . tath¯a ca y ¯ adr .´ sah . / asam ¯ ıks .itatattv¯artho yath¯a loke prat ¯ ıyate // 85 // tam . tath¯a eva sam ¯ a´sritya s¯ adhyas¯adhanasam . sthitih . / param¯arth¯avat¯ ar¯aya vidvadbhir avakalpyate // 86 //; NBh¯ u 140,18–19: na hi bhed¯adyasiddhau s¯adhanad¯ us .an .¯ adivyavah¯ara upapadyate / 43 JNA 452,6–8: sant¯an¯antarabh¯avo ’yam . na siddha´s cet phal¯ a˙ngavat / sant¯an¯antarasiddhih . kim . sam . vr .ty¯astu* yath¯a tath ¯ a // v ¯ astu kim atra nirbandhena? (*JNA: sam . vr .tty¯a tu) Cf. JNA 4,24–25: s¯a mat ¯ a cet sam . vr .ty¯a*, na param¯arthena / astu yath¯a tath ¯ a sam . vr .ty¯a** param¯arthena v¯a, kim atra nirbandhena? (*JNA: s¯abh¯ as¯ a cet sam . vr .tty¯a; **JNA: sam . vr .tty¯ a) 44 SD 149,13–14: idam . hi sant¯an¯antar¯abh¯avas¯adhanam advayas¯adhanena s¯adh¯aran .am iti naikaniyatah . svavacan¯adivirodhas tatparih¯aro v¯a/

REFERENCES

Inami, Masahiro (1998). ‘On the Method of Determining Causality in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition: Can Causality be Truly Determined?’, Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu) XLVII(1): 150–156 (in Japanese). Inami, Masahiro (2000). ‘astu yath¯a tath ¯ a’, Indo no Bunka to Ronri, Festschrift for Dr. Hiromasa Tosaki’s Seventieth Birthday, ed. by A. Akamatsu. Fukuoka: 360–397 (in Japanese). Kajiyama, Yuichi (1965). ‘Buddhist Solipsism – A free translation of Ratnak¯ırti’s Sant¯an¯antarad¯ us .an .a –’,Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies XIII–1: 9–24. Reprinted in: Y. Kajiyama, Studies in Buddhist Philosophy, Selected papers, Kyoto 1989. Kajiyama, Yuichi (2000). ‘Do Other People’s Minds Exist? With a Japanese Translation of Ratnak¯ırti’s Sant¯ an¯antarad¯ us .an .a’, Annual Report of the International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology 3: 3–35 (in Japanese). Katsura, Shoryu (1983). ‘Dharmak¯ırti’s Sant¯an¯antarasiddhi – Japanese Translation and Synopsis –’, The Hiroshima University Studies Faculty of Letters 43: 102–120 (in Japanese). Kitagawa, Hidenori (1955). ‘A Refutation of Solipsism’, Journal of the Greater India Society XIV–1, 2. Reprinted in: H. Kitagawa, Indo Koten Ronrigaku no Kenky¯ u, Tokyo 1965. Negi. J. S. (1997). Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhih . of ¯ Ac¯arya Dharmak¯ırti and Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhih . T . ¯ ık¯a of¯ Ac¯arya Vin¯ıtadeva, Bibliotheca Indo Tibetica Series 37, Sarnath. Sharma, Ramesh Kumar (1985). ‘Dharmak¯ırti on the Existence of Other Minds’, Journal of Indian Philosophy 13: 55–71. Stcherbatsky, Th. (1922). ‘Establishment of the Existence of Other Mind’, translated into English from Russian by Harish C. Gupta. In: Papers of Stcherbatsky, Soviet Indology Series No. 2, Calcutta 1969.

ABBREVIATIONS

¯ ISD ¯ I´ svaras¯adhanad¯ us .an .a of Ratnak¯ırti: RNA 32–57. JNA J˜ n¯ ana´ sr¯ımitranibandh¯avalih ., ed. A. Thakur, 2nd edn. Patna 1987. KA Ks .an .abha˙ng¯adhy¯aya of J˜ n¯ana´ sr¯ımitra: JNA 1–159. NBh¯ u Ny¯ayabh¯ us .an .a of Bh¯asarvaj˜na. ´ Sr¯ımad-¯ ac¯arya-Bh¯asarvaj˜napran .¯ ıtasya Ny¯ayas¯arasya svopaj˜nam . vy¯akhy¯anam . Ny¯ayabh¯ us .an .am, ed. Sv ¯ am¯ı Yogindr¯anandah ..V ¯ aran .as¯ ı 1968. PV Pram¯ an .av¯arttika of Dharmak¯ırti. In: Y¯usho Miyasaka, ed. Pram¯an .av¯arttikak¯arik¯a (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2 (1971/72). [Chapters I (sv¯arth¯anum¯ana), II (pram¯ an .asiddhi), and III (pratyaks .a) correspond to III, I, and II in Miyasaka’s edition respectively.] PVA Pram¯ an .av¯arttik¯ala˙nk¯ara of Praj˜ n¯akaragupta. Pram¯ an .av¯artikabh¯ashyam or V¯artik¯ala˙nk¯arah . of Praj˜ n¯ akaragupta (Being a commentary on Dharmak¯ırti’s Pram¯ an .av¯artikam), ed. R¯ahula S¯ a˙nkr .ty¯ayana. Patna 1953.

RNA Ratnak¯ırtinibandh¯avalih ., ed. A. Thakur, 2nd edn. Patna 1975. SD Sant¯ an¯antarad¯ us .an .a of Ratnak¯ırti: RNA 145–149. SS Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhi of Dharmak¯ırti, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica XIX. Petrograd 1916. SS´ S S¯ ak¯arasiddhi´ s¯ astra of J˜ n¯ana´ sr¯ımitra: JNA 367–513. SST . Sant¯ an¯antarasiddhit .¯ ık¯ a of Vin¯ıtadeva, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky. Bibliotheca Buddhica XIX. Petrograd 1916. TBh Tarkabh¯ as . ¯ a of Moks .¯ akaragupta, ed. H. R. R. Iyengar. Mysore 1952. TBht Tibetan translation of Moks .¯ akaragupta’s Tarkabh¯ as . ¯ a. sDe dge edn., No. 4264. TSP Tattvasam . grahapa˜njik¯ a of Kamala´ s¯ıla. Tattvasa˙ngraha of ¯ Ac¯arya Sh¯antaraks .ita with the Commentary ‘Pa˜njik¯a’ of Shri Kamalash¯ıla, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981, 1982. Vim . ´ s Vim . ´satik¯a Vij ˜ naptim¯atrat¯asiddhi of Vasubandhu. In: Vij˜naptim¯atrat¯asiddhi, Deux Trait´es de Vasubandhu, Vim . ´satik¯ a (la Vingtaine) accompagn´ee d’une Explication en Prose et Trim . ´sik¯ a (la Trentaine) avec la commentaire de Sthiramati I, ed. Sylvain L´evi. Paris 1925. Vim . ´sV Vim . ´satik¯avr .tti of Vasubandhu. See Vim . ´ s. Vim . ´sT Vim . ´satik¯ at .¯ ık¯ a of Vin¯ıtadeva. sDe dge edn., No. 4065.

Tokyo Gakugei University Koganei, Tokyo 184-8501 Japan