Mipam's Middle Way Through Yogacara and Prasangika

Mipam's Middle Way Through Yogacara and Prasangika

D. S. Duckworth

Abstract;

In Tibet, the negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified with Candrakirti's interpretation of Nagarjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakirti. These two figures are also held to be authoritative commentators on a univocal doctrine of Buddhism. Despite Chandrakirti's explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapada, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated the theories of Candrakirti and

Dharmakirti in unique ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and ‘‘deconstructive negative dialectics on the other. The integration of an epistemological system within Madhyamaka is an important part of Mipam's ('ju mi pham rgya mtsho,

1846-1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the place of Yogaicaira in his tradition. This paper explores the way that Mipam preserves a meaningful Svatantrika-Prasangika distinction while claiming both Yogaicaira and Praisan_gika as legitimate expressions of Madhyamaka.

Mipam represents Praisan_gika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Praisan_gika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the ‘‘content of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Praisan_gika, as the representative discourse of

meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogaicaira as a discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Praisan_gika), the discourse of

Yogaicaira represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Praisan_gika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.

Keywords; Madhyamaka , Yogacara , Prasangika , Mipham , Buddhism

Introduction

The negative dialectics of Madhyamaka are typically identified in Tibet with Chandrakirti's interpretation of Nagarjuna, and systematic epistemology is associated with Dharmakirti. Despite Chandrakirti's explicit criticism of Buddhist epistemologists in his Prasannapada, Buddhists in Tibet have integrated

the theories of Candrakirti and Dharmakirti in distinct ways. Within this integration, there is a tension between the epistemological system-building on the one hand, and ‘‘deconstructive negative dialectics on the other. This integration is also a fundamental part of Mipam's ('ju mi pham rgya mtsho, 1846-1912) philosophical edifice, and is an important part of understanding the relationship between Yogaicaira and Praisan_gika in his tradition. This

paper explores Mipam's representation of Madhyamaka, and the way that he integrates the negative and deconstructive dialectics of Praisan_gika with the systematic and constructive discourses of Yogaicaira.1

Yogacara is an important part of Mipham's systematic presentation of Buddhism. The synthetic approach of Yogacara-Madhyamaka is instrumental to the way that he incorporates various systems of Buddhist thought in Tibet. Prai san_ gika-Madhyamaka also has an important place in his works. Not only is

Praisan_gika commonly held in Tibet as the culmination of philosophies in the dialectical vehicles (the non-Mantra views), but Mipam also associates Praisan_gika with the manner of understanding primordial purity (ka dag) in the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen), which is the penultimate view in his Nyingma (rnying ma) tradition. In this paper, I will show how Mipam portrays Madhyamaka through both the discourses of Yogaicaira and Praisan_ gika.

Ultimate Truth and Prasangika

We will begin by looking at how Mipam positions Praisan_gika. The main way he delineates Praisan_gika is through a division of two types of ultimate truth: the categorized ultimate (rnam grangs pa'i don dam) and the uncategorized ultimate (rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam).2 The ‘‘categorized ultimate refers

to mere absence as a negative representation of the ultimate. In contrast to this concept of nonexistence, the ‘‘uncategorized ultimate is nonconceptual. He describes this difference as follows:

1 This paper is derived from my Mipam on Buddha-Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), and develops an idea I raised therein. The reader can consult this source for a more detailed examination of this topic.

2 I use the terms ‘‘categorized and ‘‘uncategorized, following Thomas Doctor, to reflect the distinctive way that Mipam glosses the etymology of the term rnam grangs. Mipam states: ‘‘The categorized ultimate is ‘categorized' because it is counted as one in a pair, the binary counterpart of relative

existence, or, because it is included in the category of the ultimate. It is what is categorized as the binary counterpart of the relative when speaking of ‘two truths. Mipam (1990b), published in Doctor (2004, p. 62): rnam grangs pa'i don dam ni/ kun rdzob yod pa'i zla la sbyar ba'i cig shos kyi zlas drangs pa'i phyir ram/ don dam pa'i grangs su gtogs pas na rnam grangs te/ bden pa gnyis zhes pa'i kun rdzob kyi zlar bgrang rgyu de yin.

The categorized ultimate, which is merely a negation—an absence of true establishment—is an object of mind and an object of language. The uncategorized is the unity of appearance and emptiness that does not fall to the side of either appearance or emptiness. It is signified by the words such as ‘unity of the two truths,' ‘freedom from constructs,' ‘the Middle Way,' but these are merely indicators, like the finger pointing to the moon; the meaning is far beyond the domain of language and mind.3

Thus he says that the ‘‘uncategorized is indicated by words such as the unity of the two truths, but it has no linguistic or conceptual referent. Its meaning defies affirmation and negation, and any other conceptual formulation.

Mipam describes the transcendent quality of the ultimate in the discourse emphasized by Prasangikas, in accord with a perspective in which no position is held, while maintaining an ultimate truth that can be conceptually discerned in the discourse emphasized by Svatantrikas. For Mipam, Svatantrika discourse

emphasizes the categorized ultimate, the ultimate truth known within a conceptual framework. While the categorized ultimate is known within the framework of discursive, conceptual analysis, there is no such framework demarcating the uncategorized ultimate. Thus there are no conceptual or linguistic boundaries to demarcate what is uncategorized.

Mipam defines Prasangika as a discourse that emphasizes this uncategorized ultimate.4 As such, he positions Prasangika as a discourse that accords with the way things are in meditative equipoise, free from duality, in contrast to Svatantrika, which he frames as addressing the way the ultimate is conceptually

discerned in postmeditation. Accordingly, for Mipam, Praasan_ gika and Svatantrika respectively emphasize the two contexts of: (1) the way things are seen by wisdom—as the undivided truth, and (2) the way things appear to consciousness—as distinguished into two truths. Praasan_ gika discourse emphasizes reality as it is experienced in meditative equipoise when the two truths are not separate.

3 Mipam (1990b, p. 366): don dam rnam grangs pa bden grub med par dgag pa tsam ni blo'i yul yin sgra'i yul yin/ rnam grangs min pa la ni snang stong re re'i phyogs su ma lhungs pa'i snang stong zung 'jug bden gnyis zung 'jug spros bral dbu ma sogs ming btags pa ni mtshon byed tsam ste mdzub mos zla ba bstan pa dang 'dra ba las don du sgra rtog gi yul las shin du 'das pa yin no.

4 A slippery word in Mipam's definition here is emphasize (rtsal du bton). If Praasan_ gikas were said to always present the uncategorized ultimate in their discourse, they would not be able to have a presentation of conventional reality, or the two truths, which is an extreme view that Mipam does not

follow. By using the word ‘‘emphasize, even though he preserves a context for Praasan_ gikas to present the conventional truth, the word also brings ambiguity to the definition. That is, when Praasan_ gikas are not emphasizing the uncategorized ultimate, is their discourse still Praasan_ gika? After

all, their discourse is not directly characterized by the definition when they are not presenting the uncategorized ultimate. Also, with this definition we can see that uncritically labeling an author a ‘‘Praasan_ gika, or generalizing an entire text, such as Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara, as a

‘‘Prasangika text is a problem. The definition leaves open significant questions such as: is part of the Madhyamakavatara Prasangika (e.g., Chap. VI that addresses the uncategorized ultimate), while other parts not (e.g., Chap. XI that presents the qualities of a Buddha)? Or is the entire text ‘‘Praasan_

gika because it deals more with, or emphasizes, the uncategorized ultimate? How much discourse must be devoted to the uncategorized ultimate to constitute emphasis on it? While recognizing the ambiguity of the word ‘‘emphasize in his definition, we can see the significant place that the uncategorized ultimate has in his characterization of Praasan_ gika. For the textual reference to Mipam's definition of Praasan_ gika, see the following note.

In other words, he represents Prasangika as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality—the reality as experienced in meditative equipoise. He depicts Svatantrika, on the other hand, as emphasizing the component of dialectical inquiry, a discourse at play within the conceptual structures of

thought. In this depiction of the Prasangika-Svatantrika distinction, we can see that Mipam juxtaposes consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes), the conceptual and the nonconceptual—which reflects the important consciousness-wisdom distinction (or sems and rig pa distinction) in his Nyingma tradition's Great Perfection.

The key distinction between Mipam's two contexts of (nonconceptual) meditative wisdom and (conceptual) postmeditative consciousness is precisely how he distinguishes key themes related to the Praasan_ gika-Svatantrika distinction such as: (1) whether or not there are assertions,5 (2) whether or not the

qualifier ‘‘ultimately is needed to modify what is negated, (3) whether or not commonly appearing objects are accepted,6 (4) whether or not autonomous arguments (rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba, sva-tantraprayoga) are appropriate in the ascertainment of the ultimate,7 and (5) whether or not apprehension ('dzin stangs) is present in the ascertainment of the ultimate.8

5 Mipam states: ‘‘The defining character (mtshan nyid) of Svatantrika is explanation that emphasizes the categorized ultimate together with assertions. The defining character of Prasangika is explanation that emphasizes the uncategorized ultimate free from all assertions. In the context of

positing the defining characters for these two, positing a distinction such as whether or not [[[phenomena]]] are established by their own character conventionally, and the manners of forming evidence, etc. are merely ancillary divisions subsumed within the defining characters above. Also, due to this

[[[Wikipedia:emphasis|emphasis]] on the categorized or uncategorized] itself, which was just explained, is also the key point of: whether or not there are assertions, whether or not there is acceptance of establishment by own character conventionally, the manner of forming evidence establishing the lack of intrinsic nature as a

consequence or an autonomous argument, and whether or not the qualifier ‘ultimately' is applied to the object of negation. Mipam (1990b, p. 99): rnam grangs pa'i don dam khas len dang bcas pa de rtsal du bton nas 'chad pa rang rgyud pa'i mtshan nyid yin la/ rnam grangs ma yin pa'i don dam khas len kun

bral rtsal du bton nas 'chad pa thal 'gyur ba yin pa shes par bya'o// 'di gnyis kyi mtshan nyid 'jog pa'i skabs su tha snyad du rang mtshan gyis grub pa 'dod mi 'dod dang gtan tshigs 'god tshul sogs kyi khyad par phyes te 'jog pa ni yan lag gi dbye ba tsam ste gong gi mtshan nyid 'dir 'du ba yin te/ khas len yod med/ tha snyad du rang mtshan gyis grub pa zhal gyis bzhes mi bzhes/ rang bzhin med sgrub kyi gtan tshigs thal rang du 'god tshul/ dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyar mi sbyar gyi gnad kyang bshad ma thag pa'i tshul de nyid kyi dbang gis yin no.

6 For instance, Mipam states: ‘‘In the perspective of authentic vision—a perspective like the sight of the absence of floating hairs for which nothing at all is found—there are no commonly appearing objects; and due to that essential point, a qualifier [e.g., ‘ultimately'] does not need to be applied to the object of negation. Mipam (1990a, p. 503): yang dag pa'i gzigs ngor ci yang ma rnyed pa skra shad med pa'i mthong ba lta bu'i ngor chos can mthun snang med pa dang/ gnad de las dgag bya la khyad par sbyar mi dgos pa. See also Mipam (1990a, p. 502).

8 For instance, Mipam states: ‘‘The uncategorized ultimate free from all assertions appears as the object of meditative equipoise of a Sublime One, and the categorized ultimate appears in postmeditation certainty; the former is the domain of wisdom and the latter is the domain of consciousness...In

this way, there is a great essential point here that applies to the [difference between] the nominal and genuine ultimates, and postmeditation and meditative equipoise. If this is understood, one can also understand the essential point of whether or not apprehension has deconstructed (zhig). Mipam

(1993b, p. 473): rnam grangs min pa khas len thams cad dang bral ba'i don dam 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag gi yul du snang zhing/ rnam grangs pa'i don dam rjes kyi nges pa la snang la snga ma ye shes dang phyi ma rnam shes kyi spyod yul yin...de ltar don dam btags pa ba dang mtshan nyid pa gnyis po dang mnyam rjes sbyar rgyu 'dir go ba'i gnad chen po yod cing 'di go na lta ba'i 'dzin stangs zhig ma zhig gi gnad kyang go nus.

Within the realm of consciousness, the domain of thought and language: there are assertions, the qualifier ‘‘ultimately is applied when negating (conventionally existent) phenomena, there are commonly appearing objects, autonomous arguments can be used to ascertain the (categorized) ultimate, and apprehension is present. It is just the opposite in the context of wisdom and the discourse of Prasangika that accords with it.

Under the rubric of Svatantrika, Mipam depicts a progressive approach to truth, a truth determined by thought and language. He depicts the Svatantrika as based in a perspective of the two truths conceived separately. While Svatantrikas separate the two truths, the two truths are not separated in the

discourse that defines the Prasangikas.9 The Prasangikas—while emphasizing the way things are in meditative equipoise—have no claims and use consequences to negate wrong views. The difference between Svatantrika and Praasan_ gika, however, is not simply in logical form, but involves emphasis on a

distinctive perspective on truth. For this reason, we should recognize the fluidity of the categories of Praasan_ gika and Svatantrika in Mipham's interpretation, as the difference between them is a contextual one. Also, an important point of Mipam's presentation of Praasan_ gika is that it is not so

much a view but is a discourse in accord with a view. Consequently, one is allowed the flexibility to proclaim a Praasan_ gika discourse in the morning and a Svatantrika one in the afternoon, without being limited to one at the exclusion of the other.

While Praasan_ gikas emphasize the discourse of the uncategorized ultimate, ironically, they do so without making a distinction between the categorized and uncategorized ultimate.10 So oddly enough, we are confronted with the paradox that the defining character of Praasan_ gika, explanation with an emphasis on

the uncategorized ultimate, is based on the distinction of an uncategorized ultimate that the Praasan_ gikas themselves do not accept in such discourse! This aporia is a significant part of Mipam's representation of Praasan_ gika. I wish to argue that the systematic exposition of Praasan_ gika as Mipam

defines it necessarily entails this aporia, this contradiction without rational resolution, because distinctions become necessary when theorizing about Praasan_ gika, (but theorizing about Praasan_ gika is not Praa-san_ gika discourse!) for such distinctions fall within the discursive contexts of non meditative states, whereas there are no distinctions in the wisdom of meditative equipoise nor the discourse that accords with it.

9 Mipam states that the unique object of negation for Praasan_ gikas is holding onto the two truths as distinct: ‘‘One should know that the Praasan_ gika's unique object of negation is the aspect of apprehending the two truths as distinct because if the Svatantrika were free from this object of negation, which is conceiving the two truths as distinct, then other than that view, there would not be the slightest thing to develop for even the

Praasan_ gikas, etc. Mipam (1990b, p. 97): de ltar bden gnyis so sor zhen pa'i cha de thal 'gyur ba'i dgag bya thun mong ma yin pa yin te/ gal te rang rgyud pa dag bden gnyis so sor zhen pa'i dgag bya dang bral bar gyur na/ thal 'gyur ba sogs la'ang lta ba de las skyed cung zad kyang 'don rgyu med par shes par bya ste.

10 Mipam states as follows in his commentary on the Wisdom Chapter of the Bodhicaryavatara: ‘‘One should know that in this context of Praasan_ gika, since the emphasis is on the great Middle Way, which is a unity and free from constructs, there is no twofold distinction of the categorized and uncategorized ultimates in this tradition. Mipam (1993a, p. 9): thal 'gyur ba'i skabs 'dir zung 'jug spros pa dang bral ba'i dbu ma chen po nyid rtsal du 'don pas 'di'i lugs la rnam grangs dang rnam grangs min pa'i don dam gnyis su dbye ba med par shes par bya'o.

Consequently, this unresolved paradox is a necessary feature of Prasangika as Mipam has positioned it: if Prasangika represents the deconstruction of systematic thought, then a systematic exposition of Prasangika will always entail this contradiction. We can also see this as a reason why Yogacara plays

an important role in Mipam's representation of Madhyamaka: for in order to sustain a radically negative dialectic like Prasangika, the discourse must eventually implode—it must turn on itself; hence, it must defer to something else for its systematic configuration. Furthermore, we can see this as a reason why Mipam, unlike Tsongkhapa for instance, does not attempt to explicate Praasan_ gika as a complete and consistent system. In fact, Praasan_ gika is not a system at all—for it does not stand alone as a coherent structure in a conceptual scheme.

Unlike the systematizing function that Yogacara plays in Mipam's works, Praasan_ gika functions to deconstruct systematic representation; it is a discourse that accords with meditative equipoise in that it performatively enacts the nonconcep-tual—where all distinctions, including the distinction

between the conventional and ultimate truth, have collapsed. Yogacara, on the other hand, frames the noncon-ceptual; that is, it plays the all-important function for Mipam to situate the non-conceptual state of meditative equipoise within an overarching structure of a system that distinguishes the conceptual from the nonconceptual. By doing so, Yogacara is more suited to represent a comprehensive account of reality that accounts for both distorted (conceptual) experience and undistorted (nonconceptual) experience.

Thus, we can see how Mipam configures Praasan_ gika and Yogacara such that they can relate in a symbiotic way.11 Praasan_ gika's deconstruction of systematic thought depends on the architecture of systematic thought, or in other words, we might say that the antistructure of Prasan_gika presumes the

structure of Buddhist thought. In any case, the integral relationship between the negative and destabilizing discourse of Praasan_ gika and the comprehensive and constructive system of Yogacara is a significant part of Mipham's formulation of Madhyamaka. Conventional Truth and Yogacara

In contrast to Praasan_ gika's emphasis on the (uncategorized) ultimate, the domain of Yogacara plays an important role in Mipam's formulation of conventional reality, where phenomena are known and discussed as if they were separate from emptiness. Mipam presents Yogacara-Madhyamaka as a system that makes a distinction between the conventional mode of appearance (tha snyad snang tshul) and the conventional

11 Mipam does not claim that all Prasangikas must necessarily go along with Yogacara (Mind-Only), in fact, he explicitly denies this. He states: ‘‘In general, it is sufficient for Middle Way proponents to determine that all phenomena that arise in dependent relation are non-arising; it is not required

for them to accept a Mind-Only philosophy... Mipam, A Feast on the Nectar of the Supreme Vehicle: Commentary on the Mahayana sutra larnkara (theg pa chen po mdo sde'i rgyan gyi dgongs don rnam par bshad pa theg mchog bdud rtsi'i dga' ston), Mipham's Collected Works, vol. 2 (a), 98.5-98.6: spyir dbu ma pas rten cing 'brel 'byung gi chos rnams skye ba med par gtan la phab pas chog gi /sems tsam gyi grub mtha' khas ma blangs thabs med pa ma yin.

mode of reality,12 through which one can take account for the fact that although things appear to be external, they are not because their conventional mode of reality is Mind-Only. It is not only the presentation of conventional truth that distinguishes Yogacara, for Mipam uses Yogacara discourse to offer a systematic representation of both conventional and ultimate truth. The systematic quality of Yogacara contrasts with Prasangika, which he defines with reference to only the ultimate truth.

While Mipam's defines Prasangika with reference to the (uncategorized) ultimate, his characterization not only reflects an approach to the ultimate truth, but also implicates a different way that the conventional truth is represented. Botrul (bod sprul mdo sngags bstan pa'i nyi ma, 1898-1959), an influential

commentator on Mipham's works, elaborates Mipam's Prasangika distinction not only in terms of ultimate emptiness, but also in terms of relative appearance. He makes a distinction between the way the relative truth is respectively asserted in the three traditions of (1) Mind-Only, (2) Yogacara-Madhyamaka

(Santaraksita), and (3) Prasangika-Madhyamaka. He says that appearances are held to be mind in the Mind-Only tradition, and that the mind is conceived as truly established. In Yogacara-Madhyamaka, however, while the conventional mode of reality (tha snyad gnas tshul)is mind, that mind is not held to be ultimately real. Finally, in the Praasan_ gika, the appearances of relative truth are ‘‘merely self-appearance (rang snang tsam).13

In contrast to the accounts of conventional reality in the Mind-Only and Yogacara-Madhyamaka systems, ‘‘merely self-appearance seems to be the concise and comprehensive delineation of conventional truth in the context of what is a uniquely Praasan_ gika account of conventional reality. We are not given an elaborate discussion of conventional truth beyond ‘‘self-appearance—perhaps necessarily so— because when we engage in discourses that theorize about

conventional reality, we are no longer in the domain of Praasan_ gika as it is defined: namely, a domain of discourse that emphasizes the uncategorized ultimate—the ‘‘content of non conceptual meditative equipoise.

Unlike Yogacara, a uniquely Prasangika discourse does not make an appearance reality distinction between a conventional mode of appearance and a conventional mode of reality. Also unlike Yogacara, a uniquely Praasan_ gika discourse does not offer the mind as the ontological ground for appearances

even conventionally. Thus, there is no reality behind conventional appearances to ground reality in the Praasan_ gika tradition; Praasan_ gika is ground-less and anti-realist through and through. Nevertheless, Mipam shows how conventional reality as it is laid out in terms of Yogacara can be compatible with Praasan_ gika. He states:

In general in the Praasan_ gika tradition, the collection of six consciousnesses is accepted, and there is no presentation of reflexive awareness and so forth, as it is clear from their texts. Yet how is it that just because there is no assertion conventionally in that [[[tradition]]] that one must necessarily understand that [these] definitely do not exist conventionally? For example, like the fact that

12 See Mipam (1990a, p. 528).

13 Botrul (1996, pp. 185-186). For an in-depth presentation of Botriil's interpretation of Mipham's Madhyamaka, see my forthcoming English translation of his Distinguishing the Views and Philosophies (Albany: SUNY Press, 2011).

although there is no point in using conventions such as innate mind and great bliss in the Praisan_gika tradition, it is not that these are conventionally unreasonable.14

There is no point to theorizing about conventional existence in Praisan_gika discourse—a discourse in accord with the nonconceptual. Yet in terms of conventional truth, such conventions as reflexive awareness (rang rig), innate mind (gnyug sems), and great bliss (bde ba chen po) are not necessarily

incompatible with the Prai san_ gika tradition either. Similar to his distinction between Praisan_gika and Svatantrika, Mipam uses a perspectival system to integrate Prai san_ gika with Yogaicaira, as well as tantra. Such a perspectival system can be seen as an extension of Santaraksita integration of Dharmakirti and Nagarjuna. In Mipam's case, however, it extends to become an integration of Candrakirti and Padmasambhava.

So the question remains: how do we understand Mipam, as a proponent of Praisan_gika or Yogaicaira? We might think that the fact that he does not develop a uniquely Praisan_ gika position on conventional reality reflects his commitment to Yogaicaira. However, rather than this fact being necessarily due to a

preference for Yogaicaira over Praisan_gika, his representation of Praisan_gika apparently necessitates this. As such, he does not develop a systematic theory of conventional reality that is unique to Praisan_ gika precisely because such theories necessarily involve founda-tionalist presuppositions. Instead, he positions Praisan_gika as antithetical to the foundationalist and discursive presumptions that system-building discourses such as Yogaicaira involve.

When we carefully consider this question of whether Mipam is a proponent of Prai san_ gika-Madhyamaka or Yogacara-Madhyamaka, we can see how the answer to the question of where he stands might be best answered with a ‘‘both/and. As we see in his Svatantrika-Praisan_gika distinction, his presentations of

Yogaicaira and Praisan_ gika reflect a distinction based on different perspectival contexts rather than necessarily entailing incompatible ontological commitments. The question of whether he is a proponent of either Praisan_gika or Yogaicaira is poorly formulated because neither necessarily precludes the other, and both discourses can be employed to demonstrate the authentic view of Madhyamaka.

Conclusion

Mipam represents Praisan_gika-Madhyamaka as a discourse that emphasizes what transcends conceptuality. As such, he portrays Praisan_gika as a radical discourse of denial. Since the mind cannot conceive the ‘‘content of nonconceptual meditative equipoise, Praisan_gika, as the representative discourse of meditative equipoise, negates any formulation of that state. In contrast, he positions Yogacara as a

14 Mipam (1993b, p. 561): spyir dbu ma thal 'gyur pa'i lugs la rnam shes tshogs drug tu bzhes pa dang/ rang rig gi rnam bzhag sogs ma mdzad pa ni rang gzhung na gsal mod/ der tha snyad du zhal bzhes med pa tsam zhig gis tha snyad du med nges su go dgos pa'i nges pa ga la yod de/ dper na thal 'gyur pa'i lugs la gnyug sems dang bde ba chen po sogs kyi tha snyad sbyar don med kyang de dag tha snyad du mi 'thad pa ma yin pa bzhin no.

discourse that situates the nonconceptual within a systematic (conceptual) structure. Rather than a discourse that re-presents the nonconceptual by enacting it (like Praisan_gika), the discourse of Yogai caira represents the nonconceptual within an overarching system, a system (unlike Praisan_gika) that distinguishes between the conceptual and the nonconceptual.

Mipam portrays Praisan_gika as a deconstructive and radically negative dialectic. Although he unequivocally denies discursive practices as such in the discourse that defines Praisan_ gika, we must situate the negative dialectics within the context of his larger hermeneutic project. His larger project incorporates Yogaicaira and the systematic portrayal of two truths, as well as tantra, which has historically been the main emphasis, and defining character, of his Nyingma tradition.

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1 This paper is derived from my Mipam on Buddha-Nature (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), and develops an idea I raised therein. The reader can consult this source for a more detailed examination of this topic.