Kamalasila's Theory of the Yogacãra

Kamalasila's Theory of the Yogacãra

Jitsudõ Nagasawa

šãntaraksita (710—792—) united the Madhyamaka doctrine and the Yogäcãra in his Madhyamakälamkãra-kärikã & vrtti, 91•92. Kamalaéïla (730 —794—) explained Yogãcära-theory and commented on the three gäthäs of the Lañkävatära quoted in the Vrtti in his Pañjikä. If we collate these commentaries with the explanations of the same three gäthäs in his Bhävanäkrama, we can understand Kamalaéïla's theology more clearly. Then, what a situation holds Kamalaéïla, being heir to Sãntaraksita, in Indian Buddhism of the 8th century .

ABBREVIATIONS : BhK Kamalaéïla, "Bhävanäkrama", Minor Buddhist Texts, Il. ed. G. Tucci, Roma, 1958. Lañk The Lañkävatära Sütra, ed. B. Nanjio, 1923. MAK Madhyamakälamkära-kãrikã, The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition Reprinted ( = PER) Tokyo-Kyoto, Vol. 101, No. 5284. MAV Madhyamakälamkära-vçtti, PER, Vol. 101, No. 5285. MAP Kamalaéïla, Madhyamakälamkära-pañjikä, PER, Vol. 101, No. 5286. MVT Sthiramati, Madhyäntavibhäga-tïkã, ed. S. Yamaguchi, 1934. SDV Jñänagarbha, Satyadvayavibhäga-vvtti, Tohoku., No. 3882. SN Samdhinirmocana-sütra I. from MAV, 91——Cittamãtra as the law of cause-effect (mutual immanent attribute of cause-effect) in the world. Although the law of causeeffect as the origination of the world is mere citta-caitta substantially, but there are two theories : (1) one attaching weight to caitta, and (2) one giving priority to citta (called " the two Madhyamaka doctrines " in MAP). (1) is one who contend " that which is preached cittamätra is for the sake of setting apart a kart? and a bhoktç " in the éãstra (MAP appoints Madhyamakahrdaya of Äcärya Bhavya). ŠäntaralÇita, in Bhävaviveka's Madhyamakahrdaya understood that the word (cittamätra)) in the Daéabhümika was not used for the purpose of denying caitta. (2) Others think that citta (—jñäna) is reasonable : Causality and effectiveness are the very sole cognition, that which is self-evolved (svasiddha) is attributed to cognition. (MAK, 91) According to SãntarakSta, the thought of " others " who explained the Madhyamaka doctrine is following : the essence of cognition lies in a constructure in mind, the self-evolved without any object, such as dreams and mãyä etc., nothing else fictitious assuming (kalpanã). If one thinks any experienced thing really exists in the outer world, recognizance (samvedana) is not reasonable because it has no intimate-cause (rab-tu ñe-bahi rgyu) .

is to perceive a form of blue and the like of no particularity. hetu because (recognizance) is substant of perception. drstänta •••such as dreams and mãyã etc. comments : if (" others ") would insist that sole cognition exists apart from effect (an object in mind), because it is utpäda in another meaning, so cognition alone appearing without effect is anumäl)a, but not (2) pratyalÇa. (Cognition) consisting of anumãna is non existing. Cittamätra means that " citta " contains samanantara-pratyaya which is objectivity itself, and the word of " mätra " put the outer aside as being no objective such as paramänu, the ultimate substance in the outer world (MAP : according to SN, Vijñänavädins explained so.). This thought of mine is accordanced with the traditions of Ghanavyüha and SN. (I think " others " so mentioned by Šãntaraksita, were Sthiramati.) . Quoting Lañk as a conclusion, he says : The outer form is not existing ; but svacitta manifests itself in the outer world. (X, 489) Because cittamätra has no essential element in the first principle, it is not a substance in truth (satyato 'sti). Having criticized both Bhävaviveka, the founder of Mãdhyamika-Svãtantrika and a Madhyamaka theologist (Sthiramati) who asserted jñãnäkära existing alone, SäntaralÇita traced

along to the cittamãtra-theory most classical and orthodox as to the origination of experience. To add to, Kamalaéïla gave historical lights upon him. 11. from MAV, 92 the theoretical union of Madhyamaka and Vijñaptimãtra (Yogãcära-Mädhyamika as Citta-paramärtha-vãda). summerized the three gäthäs of Lañk into one concise kãrikä. On the one hand, Kamalaéïla commented the three gãthãs directly. MAV, 92 Lañk, x Refuging on cittamãtra, (a) cittamätram samähya one should be cognizant of non-bähyam artham na kalpayet/ tathatãlambane sthitvã cittamätram ati- existence of the outer world.

(b)256kramet//

Resting on this principle, here incittamätram atikramya niräbhäsam atikramet/ niräbhäse sthito yogi mahäyänalll sa paéyati// 257 one should acknowledge nirät- (anãbhogagatih éäntä viéodhitä/) maka really. (d)nirätmakam niräbhäjñänam sena paéyati

(a) may be omitted,

(b) : ätma-ätmya and grãhya-grãhaka apart from citta attending with samprayukta (=caitta) which are pursued into the outer world are nihsvabhãvas, (c) : because the principle of cittamãtra is not svayambhü, cittamätra is nihsvabhäva (paratantra and nihsvabhäva i. e. sarvadharma-nihsvabhävatã, in the MAP), (d) : cittamätra is the Middle Way, nihsvabhäva beyond any monism and pluralism and avoids all the extremes (MAP : this concentration is reasonable because it accords with tattvapraveéa). Reffering to this phrase (d), Kamalaéïla scribes in his BhK (xviii, p. 217) : cittamãtra is vijñaptimãtra tattva) and nirvikalpa-jñãna is vijñaptimätratä (—tattva) to a Vijñänavãdin, while his own standpoint is

Ill. from Kamalaéïla's interpretations on the three gäthäs in the Lañk, x—Abandonment of cittamätra and Cittamãtra-paramärtha-väda. Kamalaéïla interpretates the 256th gäthã and preaches to abandon the idea of cittamätra (MAP & BhK). In the 257th, to "be beyond cittamätra" is to abandon cittamãtra, grähakäkära (MAP), to rest on jñäna of no dual of grähya-grä• haka and is to deny adhyäropa (a rule increasing wrongly). To " be beyond niräbhäsa " is to be beyond adhe sion to non-existence of the duality of grähya and grähaka (MAP), to be beyond jñãna in nirãbhãsa of the duality (BhK) and is to deny apaväda (a rule denying wrongly). He did not adopt the creed of paratantra-svabhäva admitting non-nothingness but asserted cittamãtra-nihsvabhäva i. e. cittamätra-madhyamamãrga (see

MAV, 92, d). To " dwell in niräbhäsa " means niräbhäsa, not to adhere to the non-duality of grähya-grähaka, nihsvabhãva delivered from the idea of monism and pluralism (MAP), and nirvikalpasamãdhi implying pratipatti of sarvadharmanihsvabhãvatã (BhK). He adopted here paratantra-nihsvabhävatã (see MAP of MAV, 92, c). A yogin resting in such a degree "perceives the mahäyäna" ; he does look at nothing in the first principle but experiences ïdréa (or tädré, such in ordinary) in the world (nihsvabhãva and yet " ïdréa " as a yogin's sphere of in MAP). This is paramatattva-daréana (BhK). Regarding this, he preaches the necessity of

éamathavipaéyanävãhïmarga to enter to paramatattvadaréana (BhK, xvii, P. 213). But also to him, it is one of the work-degrees, nirvedhabhägïya (BhK). Further, he gave an important description as to the word of " svasamvid " and the Two Truths : having experienced non-existence of the duality or niräbhäsa by svasamvid (rañ rig-pa), establishing it upon prsthalabha-jñäna, the world is nihsvabhava and yet ïdréa to a yogin. It is not reasonable that svasamvid is censure because it (svasamvid-bhãga) is additioned upon a keeper of cattle (gnag rdsi. MAP, P. 36, 1- 4). As for Kamalaéïla, to self-cognize non-existence of the duality or

nirãbhäsa is to be beyond cittamãtra (Lañk, 257), and therefore " svasamvid " implies abhisamaya. This differs from svasamvid-bhãga, the theory of Dignãga, in the sense of the synthesis of grähya and grãhaka. Next, " this world is nihsvabhãva and yet ïdléa " means paramärtha-sämv\ta. He says in the explanation of the last 258th ; " gati " signifing ïdréa as the character of the degree of Yogins is "anãbhoga", activities originating yogin's inner postulate beyond his will, because there is no other visibility (dr½-

tavya) than it (ïdréa) (MAP). A sentence entirely accordant with this can be found in the BhK (xvii, p. 214).

IV. Cittamätra-paramãrtha-väda and " Cittamätra-samvrti-väda " a) Kamalaéïla comments the following two gäthäs of Lañk quoted in the MA V, 92.

To turn away hetu and pratyaya, to deny kärana/ to rest upon cittamätra, I call it anutpäda// (x, 592, p. 338) He says : the theory of Sãntaralsita of turning away " hetu and pratyatya "'

i. e. five kinds of hetu and adhipati-hetu (" kärana ") , and to " rest upon cittamätra " this is an interpretation of anutpãda so called in the thought of the Mädhyamika and also in the principle of vijñaptimätratä. From above to him, cittamätra=vijñaptimãtratã (Vijñãnaväda) —anutpãda (Mãdhyamika).

There is no existence in the outer phenomena, and nothing caught in mind. It is characteristic of anutpäda to give up all visions. (x. 595, p. 339) He comments : it is anutpäda of phenomena that give up all visions to be nihsvabhäva either in the outer world or mind itself. He interprets the significance of " anutpäda " in the first chapter of the Mülamadhyamakakãrikã based upon Cittamätra-paramãrtha. If we apply the method of the (8) classification of the Two Truths of his contemporaneous preceeding scholars, .the former verse is paryäya-paramãrtha and the latter is aparyäya-paramãrtha. b) Further he comments the two verses quoted in the MAV, 92 :

(in the meaning of Truth) here (anything) does never rise or disappear, (in the meaning of the world) that whith rises and disappears is, to say, absolute cognition. He says : this is the Cittamätra-samvrti-vãda. jñãnakevala (absolute cognition) is original knowledge " yoni-jñäna i. e. vijñäna In correspondence with the terms of " Cittamätra-samvrti-vãda ", we may presume that his own doctrine was the Cittamãtra-paramärtha-väda. This means cittamätramadhyamamãrga, cittamätra-nihsvabhãva, and this view was supported most earnestly by him. (11) The mahäbhütas and the like preached (by Bhagavan) come together into vijñãna.

If it (jñãna) is apart from jñäna is it not false image ?

Kamalaéïla comments : this second verse was expressed by Ärya Nägärjuna. All the things, the four mahäbhütas and the like (containing bhautikas) preached by Bhagavan come together into vijñãna, for the four mahãbhûtas etc. are situated upon ãbhãsa of vijñãnas each of each. If so, it is reasonable that (the mahãbhütas etc.) exist either on vijñäna itself (=grähaka) or in the exterior-within-mind itself (=grãhya). If one thinks the mahãbhütas to be the outer existence in Truth, the worldly cognition (=vijñäna) regarding the outer world to be the actual existence in Truth is false-image, because there is no äbhäsa of it in Applying the words of his preceeding scholars, the first verse refars to bhüta-samvrti (the real world) and the second is cencerning mithyã (or abhüta) -samvrti (the false-world).

CONCLUSIONS : So as Säntaraksita, Kamalaéïla was a Mädhyamika scholar, but he developed his worldly theory on the classical and orthodox Vijñäna-väda. For this purpose, he criticized Bhãvaviveka and Sthiramati. standing against the Jñeya-adhyätma-vãda of Dignäga (Älam in his Pañjikä of SDV, 38, Kamalaéïla justificated the meaning of " svasamvid " from Dignäga's doctrine of These two scholars constructed Yogäcãra-Mädhyamika upon the idea of cittamätramadhyamamärga or cittamätra-nihsvabhäva, namely Cittamätra-paramärthaväda which united the highest ideals of Madhyamaka and Yogãcära. Although Jñãnagarbha, a Yogäcära-Mädhyamika who had influenced on them preached the vijñaptimätra-doctrine upon bhüta-samvçti in his SD V (5. 8. 22. etc.), they sublimated the thought of Yogãcãra-Mãdhyamika upto paryãya-paramärtha. Bu-ston says that the Mãdhyamika branched into three lineages after the argument between Kamalaéïla and a Chinese Hva-šañ (794. A. D.) at Bsam-yas (Sato, Historical Study of Ancient Tibet, Il. Kyoto, 1959, p. 862), and Kamalaéïla was a great scholar who established the third way, i. e. Yogãcära-Mädhyamika against the two lineages of Bhävaviveka and Candrakïrti, the founder of Mãdhyamika-Präsañgika. Yogäcära (J.

( 1 ) Bhavya (650—700) is different from Bhävaviveka (490—470), see my "Jñãnagarbha no Bukkyö-gaku", Tokyo, 1960, p, 431 (35). (37). This phrase is of the Madhyamakahrdaya, V. 28, c, d. (Yamaguchi, ØÐüZ.ñè3 DY±Ë", the Tibetan text, p. 12). But it is in the V. 48, c, d that Bhävaviveka gives weight to caitta, and regards citta as an unity Of caittas as various psychological processes (Yamaguchi, do. p. 382).

( 2 ) The meaning of pratyaksa in Sãntaraksita is sarvajña, i. e. perfect knowledge intuiting essential substance in the real world in its originality. It is nyäya, i. e. knowledge in paryäya-paramärtha.

( 3 ) Sthiramati was not a Cittamätra-vädin who disregards caitta (his Mahäyänasüträlamkäratïkä, Yamaguchi, do. p. 367). Here is criticized his opinions on the substantiality of citta (=jñäna) and self-existence of jñänäkära, modification within cognition. He says : although there exists no ätman nor dharma in the outer world, atman and dharmas are adhered to vijñäna in itself (his Triméikävijñaptibhäya, p. 16), and, without grähya ("apart from effect"), the two

appearances as atman (klistamanas) and vijñapti (6 vijñänas) present themselves in grähakäkära ("jñänäkära"),therefore they are only false appearances ("sva-siddha") (MVT, p. 19; Yamaguchi's tr. p. 26), though (appearances) take the form of grähyagrähaka, it is not because they are coloured blue or in any other hue, as it were, by reflecting the colour of the cushion on which they lie as a crystal ball is coloured (see "Pratijñd') (MVT, p. 218 ; tr., p. 344).

Bhävaviveka argued against Sthiramati : 'Cit is true that crystal abandons transparency of its nature affected by the particularity of cushion (blue or any other hue), and transforms its nature to blue etc. (agaihst M VT) because jñänäkära can not be self-existing in jñãna apart from jñeyäkära (against Triméikävijñaptibhäya) (Yamaguchi, do. pp. 244—245). It means that Säntaraksita perhaps call Sthiramati in question through Bhävaviveka. otherwhere criticized his ontology of vijñäna ref-fering to "Sthiramati" in the Pañjikä of SD V, 23.

( 4) bahirdhä nasti vai rüpam / svacittarp dléyati bahih/ (Lañk, x, 489, a, b, p. 326) ( 5 ) hetupratyayavyävvttim käral)asya / cittamätravyavasthänam anutpädarp vadämy aham // (Lañk, x, 592, p. 338) ( 6 ) Lañk, ii (pp. 83—84) : Mahämati ! there are six hetus, bhavisyahetu, sambandha-h., vyañjana-h., and upelqsã-h. Among these, it is thought that sambandha-h. is correspond with "pratyaya", käral)a-h., with and the rest four, with "hetu". ( 7 ) na bähyabhävam bhävänärp na ca cittaparigraham/ (Lañk, x, 595, p. 339) ( 8 ) Bhavya, Madhyamakärthasarpgraha, 4. 5. Jñänagarbha, SD V, 4. 5. In the Yogäcãra(J. colophon of the former we see the terms : "written by Legs Idan hbyed (Bhävaviveka)", but according to my inquiry the name should be Bhavya (above, Note(l)). (9) na hy atrotpadyate kimcitpratyayair na nirudhyate / utpadyante nirudhyante pratyayä eva kalpitäh// (Lañk, Il, 140. p. 84) (10) I have not seen this word all through the volume of Lañk, but there is a phrase "cittam hi traidhãtuka-yonih" in X, 36 (p. 269). Citta-yoni seems to have been understood " yoni-jñäna " by Kamalaéïla. (11) Mr. D. Ueyama appointed the 34th verse in the Taisho. 1 575),

The Meaning and Significance of Spirituality in Europe and in India, Constantin Regamey 105 Sri Aurobindo and Greek Philosophy, Visbwanttb Prasad Varma 135 A Bibliograpby of Translations of Zen (ch'an) Works, Ruth Fuller Sasaki 149 Book Reviews 169 Book Recieved177 Current Periodicals 180 Index 189 University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu 14, Hawaii