Aaa
Sukumar Butt Buddhism in Bast Asia. New Delhi 1966, pp.103-11.
Sir Charles Eliot Hinduism and Buddhism III. London 1921, repr.1971, pp.340-4.
D.G.E.iiall A History of South-East Asia. London 1955* 3rd ed.,1968, pp.l<j>5- 205. 415-35 and 644-65-
Nguyen Khnc-Kham Introduction to Vietnamese Culture. Directorate of Cultural Affairs, Saigon N.D., 17-22.
Thien-An Buddhism and Zen in Vietnam. Rutland, Vermont 1975-
Mai Tho-Truycn Le Bouddhisn^au Vietnam /Buddhism in Vietnam /Phat-Giao'Viet- Nam . Pagode Xa-Lol, Saigon 1962. P.64 quoted above **. i
TWO SUTRAS--ON-DEPENDENT ORIGINATION
Translated by John M.Cooper
Two sutrac on Dependent Origination (pratltyasamutpada) edited by N.Aiyasvami
Sastri are here translated from the Sanskrit for the first time with the kind
permission of the publishers The first sutra is from a Sanskrit original,
but the second had been rendered by Sastri into Sanskrit from its Tibetan translation.
The first sutra belongs to the Hlnnyunu tradition according to Nan,Ho's Catalogue of the Chinese Trip!taka. It gives an explanation of the factors of the Dependent Origination formula.
The second sutra's connection with this formula lies mainly in the fact that it contains a verse called Pratityasamutp^dagatha. The mention of Nara- yana together with Mahabrahma^und Muhcsvara seems reminiscent of the triad, Braluna, Visnu and Giva, of Hinduism. ,
I am grateful to Dr M.N.Kundu who went over the translation and made a
number of useful suggestions.
Salutation to the Triple Gem.
Thus have I heard. At one time the Blessed One was living at SravastI, at the Jeta grove, in the monastery of Anathapindada, with a great community of monks, 1,250 monks. On that occasion the Blessed One addressed them: ’’To you, monks,
I shall teach to you the starting-point of dependent origination and its explan* ation. Therefore, listen well and duly ponder on it. I shall speak (as follows).
"What.is the starting-point of dependent origination? That is to say (i) This being, that becomes; from the arising of this, that arises, (ii) Condition -ed by ignorance are volitional activities, conditioned by volitional activit¬ ies is consciousness, conditioned by consciousness is mentality-materiality,. conditioned uy mentality-materiality are the six senses, conditioned by the s^x sense senses is contact, conditioned by contact is feeling, conditioned by feeling is craving, conditioned by craving is clinging, conditioned by clinging is becoming, conditioned by becoming is birth, conditioned by birth old age and death, grief, lamentation, misery, dejection and perturbation arise - thus is the arising of this whole mass or misery. This is called the starting-point 6f dependent origination.
"What is its explanation? In 'conditioned by ignorance are volitional
Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
Use your endeavour! No heedlessness 1 Practise the Doccrlftt.S^
of good practice! Whoever practises the Doctrine dwells^happilfnji.
in this world and the other.
NIBBflNA AND ABHIDHAMMA
L.S.Cousins
36. Delight in heedfulness. D monks! Be of good conduct, 0 loilllfc nature o£ nibb5na ln the teaching of the Buddha was already
With your thoughts well recollected, watch your minds! 'K subject of discussion in ancient times. More recently it has
37. Begin now! Come out! Harness yourself to the Doctrine of thtlfrttn much debated both in modern Western scholarship and also
Buddha! Rout the army of death £s an elephant lajys waste more traditional Buddhist circles.^ One issue which has recent-
to a hut made of branches!
38. Whoever is free from heedlessness in this Discipline and Doctrine, by rejecting the round of rebirths will reach the end of suffering.
(Translated by Sara Boln Webb from the French of Sylvain L6vi as it appeared in the Journal Asiatiquo , Sept.- Oct. 1912, and published with the kind per¬ mission of the editors.)
I been a focus for discussion is the ontological status of nibbana.
it some kina of metaphysical absolute? Or is it better seen
the mere cessation of suffering or cVen as a. total ending of
usience?
i the niKa yas
definitive answer to this question cannot easily* be found on it basis of the niklnpt material. Some passages would seem to sug- est that nibbana refers^ initially to the destruction of defile- tnts at the attainment of enlightenment but ultimately more part- cularly to the consequent extinction of. the aggregates making p the mind and body complex at the time of death. Other passages .an be used in support of the belief that nibbana is some kind 4 jjf absolute reality. Nevertheless it is evident that most relevant ^contexts In* the Sutta-pitaka are so worded as to avoid any commlt- fsent on this issue. This is clearly Intentional.
i Such a manner of proceeding has many parallels in early Budd- fklst thoupht. The most well-known example is probably the ten
Unanswered questions of HalurikyapJtta, but some other questions
- are treated In the same way in the suttas. The accompanying pass¬
ages make It quite clear that the main reason Cor not answering mhese kinds of question is because they 'are not connected with phe spirit, not connected with the letter, not belonging to bogin-
- ^tlng the holy life, (they) conduce neither to turning away, nor
f *to passionlessness, nor to cessation nor to peace nor to higher ^knowledge nor to full awakening nor to nibbana'. This of course . ‘is illustrated with the parable of the arrow which strongly suggests t'lhat answering such questions would only give rise to endless ‘further questions. The attempt to answer them would take up too
- *uch time and distract from the urgent need to follow the path
towards the goal.
\ Some scholars, notably K.N.Jayatilleke, have suggested that this was partly because no meaningful answer was possible. There
Jtj Uuddhist Studies Review l ,2 (1983-4)
may be something in this, but the texts do not seem to
Nibbana and Abhidhamma
ovided that is that the immense strength of these two typos
may besomething in this, but the texts do not seem to go quii* noviaca tnat Ao A --”
so far. More emphasis is laid on the need to avoid one-sided viewS®* viewpoint and their associated craving is recognised. For th rhov arc understood as pervading und distorting In ono
particularly eternalism and annihi la t ion i sm. Acceptance of tvi
ways of seeing things would become fertile soil for various klu
of craving which would themselves lead to further or more fix*
ddhlst they are understood as pervading und distorting in ono
direction or the other all our normal modes of thought. Provided
Ijjjo that the path set forth by the Buddha Is seen not so much
Views, thus creating or rather furthering the vicious circle tl[ al an alternative way of salvation comparable to others but more
unhealthy mentality. Clearly this would defeat the very purpojf” 4 deliberate attempt to reduce the spiritual life to its bare
of the Buddha's teaching. The Buddhist tradition is very emphstJ* ssentlals and t0 tria away ever y thin * redundant. The Buddha there-
1 hat Buddhas only teach what is conducive to the goal. "Mlore teaches only what is necessary without making any attempt
l0 satisfy intellectual curiosity where this would not be pfofit-
n,1U lE Perha ? s worth celling out in a little more detail,! ^ u u emphasl2ed that the Tathagata does not teach things
o y an soul (j,vo) are one and the same thing, then physical are trut but serve n0 use ful purpose or may even create.
cnlall}i annihilation of the individual. If however tbn l*
obstacles for the hearer.
1 rc distinct (and unrelated?), then death does not necessarllj *
entail Individual extinction and personal immortality might U • The account of nibbanh given in the nikirjas is clear and cogent.
Inferred. These views are not necessarily wrong. They are hw- • a,ch can be 6ald in prai8C o£ nibba,,a enc°“* a 8e the seeker.
over partial and misleading! exclusive adherence to them wil}l a ‘?* elall >' u 11 18 ln the form of 8l “ ile or met,phor * Such we
load to •trouble. The Buddha's simile of the blind men and frequently., But there must be nothing so concrete as to en-
o lephant (Sn - a 529 ) Illustrates this perfectly. Each blind s«S t#ttta 8 e attachment or dogmatic convictions. Beyond this the Buddha correctly recounted his experience of some part of the elephaot. bid not wlsh t0 B °‘ Thc ni * J! ' as never depart wholly from this posit*
Uniortunately each one wrongly •'generalised his experience ltd ! t#n> Paseages which can be used to support a 'metaphysical' lnter-
i:;i stod on Its unique validity. In the end they ceme to blow! * rat8tlon do not d0 80 una » bi 8uously. Nor Is nibbana ever unequl-
In fact the elephant was much more than partial experience ltf T#call y depleted no total annihilation. What wo find aro hints
oath blind man to supposu, * •*, ' tod suggoat ions, but never enough to undermine the fundamental
until blind man to suppose, •*. ' tod suggostions, but never enough to unueriaiue me iuhuubuuui
Similarly in the BrahmajSlasutta the majority of wrong vie*, * i “* ^ apparent aoblgulty ls not carelessness or inconsistency.
are based upon genuine meditation experience, and knowledge. ta t |{ lg npt that . th , anclent Buddhist lradlt ion was not clear on
chr, has been Incorrectly Interpreted and ‘dogmatically ^ WtviM ..J Rather u „ as q ulte clear that It did
in it, is truth, all else le foolishness'.'Only a mi nor i tv of view : * , . ,, - . . ,
unxy a minority ot view ; wlsh u£} tQ b(J too cIear , Nor is U that 'Nirvana had several
are the products of reasoning. Without a basis in experience thii l . . , ,, 4 Qll „ h _ ririA _
, no r , n . . . V ^aeanlngs, and...was variously interpreted . Such a view docs
too cun only lead ,to obsession. If the existence or non-existenct^L , , . ,
not see the interconnectedness and internal consistency of the of me Tathagata after death is not specified, this is sureli ^ i fftB h ra nv
Buddhist dhamraa. The apparent ambivalence here arises centrally to avoid the two alternatives of eternalism and annihilationU*. • »
if n, ft T _. - . . , by the force of the dialectic of early Buddhism. If that dialectic
it the Tathagata were declared to exist after death, then the , r ..
i$ understood, the ambiguities and silences appear profoundly Budolust goal is some kind of immortality.. Such a view would leaf , f , ,
to ** .nn f 4 C integral to the Buddha s message of salvation.
10 .mine form of craving fo^ renewed existence r the very thltj
tu be abandoned. If on the other hand the Tathagata were gfMtf r Mlbbana ln the Abhldhamma-pJ. taka
to be non-existent after death, then either craving for non-exlst- Whereas the sutta .material on the subject of nibbana is often
ence - yc t another obstacle - would arise or the motivation tt c i te d and has been the source of much controversy, it does not
follow the path would be eroded. , *ppear that abhidhamma material is so well-known. There may then
The Buddha's silence makes very good sense in this light./ be 80Bie value in drawing attention to certain aspects. The abhi-
liuddhis t Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
dhamma position is already clearly formulated in the Dhammasarfgani
(Ohs), the first and no doubt oldest work lr. the Abhldhanma-pitakaj
The term nibbana is not used in the main body of Dhs which prefer!
the expression asahkhata dhaeu. This is usually translated as ‘uncon¬
ditioned element*, i.e. that which is not produced by any cause
or condition. Presumably this would mean ‘that which is independent]
of relatedness*. i
Nibbana and Abhidhamraa
This interpretation of the term is supported by the Nikkhepa- kanda. In which the Matika couplet - .*». i/i himi..t/nnohkhoi. - icxplainei as equivalent to the previous couplet - sappaccaya/appaccaya, i.e. con* dit ioned/uncondit ioned . 6 The first term in each case is explained; as referring to the five aggregates. So for Dhs the unconditioned! element is different to the five aggregates. From this point of view something sahkhata exists in relation to other things as pact of a complex of mutually dependent phenomena.
The use of the term asahkhata dhaeu probably derives from the Bahudha tukasu t ta 7 , where It ione of a series of explanation* as to how a monk is dhatukusaia. uhatu usually translated by ‘element'J
Jla the AAguttara-nikaya (II 34) the Path is called the highest of
conditioned dhammas, but nibbana (plus synonyms) is declared
j^to be the highest when • conditioned and unconditioned things are
5uken together.
It Is, however, the verbal form corresponding to the much itore frequent sahkhara . A sahkhara is an activity which enables some¬ thing to come into existence or to maintain its existence - it | fashions »r forma things. So aomething which is saiikhata has been rfashioned or formed by such an activity, especially by volition. |The reference is of course to the second link in the chain of Conditioned Co-origination. The succeeding links refer to that ehich is sahkhata, i.c. fashioned by volitional activity (from this Ur a previous life). Since this amounts to the five aggregates, the whole mind-body complex, it is virtually equivalent to the 'leanings given above.
The Nikkhcpa-kamia (Dhs 1BO-234) gives a surprising amount »f information^ about nibbSna in its explanation of the Mattki. Aefore setting this out, it may be helpful to point out that
seems always to refer to a distinct sphere of experience: visible;/^ t tuo t le „ uhlch comroe nce the Matika embody a definite
object is experientially distinct from auditory object, fro. ori«| toir i The first flve el „ tly concern the process
f sight, from consciousness. of sight, etc.; earth is distinct
from water, etc.; pleasant bodily feeling from unpleasant bodily
feeling, etc.; sense-desire from aversion, etc.; sense-object*
from form or the formless. Likewise the unconditioned and the
conditioned are quite distinct as objects of experience. Usually
the analysis into dhaeu is intended to facilitate insight into
non-self. Presumably the purpose here is to distinguish conceptually
the unconditioned element of enlightened experience in order to
clarify retrospective understanding of the fruit attainment (phala-
sam.iuott i ) .
Asahkhata occurs occasionally on its owh in the nikayas. The most conspicuous occasion is in the Asarikhata-samyutta (S IV 359-68), where it is defined as the destruction of passion, hatred and delusion. In this context it is clearly applied to the Third Noble Truth. In the Ahguttara-nikaya (I 152) the three unconditioned characteristics of the unconditioned are that ’arising is not known, ceasing is riot known, alteration of what is present is not known’. These are opposed to the equivalent characteristic* of the conditioned. In the Culavedallasutta of the MajJhima-nikaya (I 300) the Noble Eightfold Path is declared to be conditioned.
of rebirth and the law of kamma. Then follow two connected with jha/ia, after which are nine triplets concerning the path (magga).
The final six seem to relate especially to nibbana. This is not accidental, The intention is certainly to indicate an ascending order. This is perhaps more clear if set out in full, but in the present context I will confine myself tabulating the informa* tion given concerning the unconditioned element only in the Nikk- i hepa-kanda expansion of the triplets, listed in numerical order.
Asahkhata dhatu and the abhldhamma t riplets
1. It is indeterminate i.e. not classifiable as skilful
or unskilful action. Here in is taken with purely resultant mental activity, with kiriya action particu¬ larly that of the arahat who does what the situation requires and with all matter.
2. is not classified as linked (sampayutta ) with feeling
i.e. not in the intimate connection with feeling which applies to mind. Here it is taken with feeling Itself and with matter.
100 Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
3. is neither resultant nor giving results
, Here it ic taken withkiriyu action and matter.
4. has not been taken possession of and is not susceptible of' being taken possession of
i.e. it is not due to upadana in the past nor cat it be the object of upadana in the present - the refer-' cnee is of course to Dependent Origination.- Here it is taken with the Paths and Fruits.
5. is not tormented and not connected with torment
i.e. not associated with sahkilesa nor able to lead to such association in the future. Here again it is taken with the Paths and Fruits.
6 . is not with vilakka and vicara
i.e. not in the close association with these activities which applies to mind. Here it is taken with matter, the mentality of the higher jhanas and pure sense consciousness.
7. is not classified as associated with joy, happiness or equipoise
i.e. not in the close connection with .one or other of these which applies to the mind of the jhanaa , j paths or fruits. Here it is taken with matter, bobs feeling, painful tactile consciousness land aversion consciousness.
8 . is not to be abandoned either by seeing or by practice
i.e. not eliminated by one of the four paths. Here It is taken with everything which is not unskilful .including matter.
9. is not connected with roots to be abandoned by ■ seeing or by practice
i.e. similar to the preceding triplet
10 . leads neither to accumulation nor dispersal
i.e. does not take part in any kind of kamma activity whether skilful or unskilful not even the dispersive activity of the four paths. Here it is taken with resultant mental activity,kiriya action and matter.
H. is neither under training nor trained
i.e. distinct from supermundane consciousness. Here it is taken with matter and all mentality In the three
Nibbana and Abhidhamma
levels.
52. is immeasurable i c. superior buch to the very limited
mind and matter oi the sense spheres and to the less restricted mind of the form and formless levels.
Here it is taken with supramundane consciousness.
H. is not classified as having a small object, one which has become great or one which is immeasurable
i.e. the unconditioned element does not require any k object (.udmnami ) in contrast to mentality which re¬
quires an object in order to come into being. Here it is taken with matter.
54 . is refined i.e. superior both to the inferior
mentality associated with unskilfulness and to the medium .quality qf the remaining aggregates in the three levels. Here 11 Is taken with supramundane consciousness.
15.is without fixed destiny i.e. does not involve a definite kamma result. Here it is taken with everything except the four paths and certain kinds of unskilfulness.
16. is not classified as having the path as object, as connected with path roots or as having the path as overlord
i.e, does not have an object. Here it is taken espe¬ cially with matter.
17. is not classified as arisen, not arisen, going to arise
i.e. classification in these terms is inappropriate for the unconditioned element which cannot be viewed in, such terms - it is non-spatial. Here it is classi¬ fied on its own.
18. is not classified as past, future or present i.e. it is non-temporal. Here again it is classified on its own.
19. i*r not classified as, having past, future or present objects i.e. it does not have an object. Here it is taken with matter.
20 . is not classified as within, without or both i.e. it is not. kamma-born. However the Atthakatha- kanda of the Dhs, which gives further comment on the Matika, traditionally attributed to SAriputta, adds
dhamma position is already clearly formulated in the DhammasarfgMil
(Ohs), the first and no doubt oldest work in the Abhidhamma-pitakJ
The terra nibbana is not used in the main body of Dhs which prefers
the expression asahWiata dhatu. This is usually translated as 'uncoa-l
ditioned clement*, i.e. that which is not produced by any cause
or condition. Presumably this would mean 'that which is independent
of relatedness * . *. ,
This interpretation of the term is supported by the Nikkhepa- kanda, in which the Matika couplet - sniikhata/asahkhoi.a - 1 b explained as equivalent to the previous couplet - sappaccat/a/appaccaya, i.e. COI ditioned/unconditioned . 6 The first term in each case is explained^ as referring to the five aggregates. Sc for Dhs the unconditioned element is different to the five aggregates. From this point of view something sahkhata exists' in relation to other things as.part i of a complex of mutually dependent phenomena.
Nibbana and Abhidhamma
In the AAguttara-nikaya (II 34) the Path is called the highest of {conditioned dhammas, but nibbana (plus synonyms) is declared to be the highest when conditioned and unconditioned things are taken together.
It is, however, the verbal form corresponding to the much Itore frequent sahWiara . A s*n*/iara is an activity which enables some- j:thing to come into existence or to maintain its existence - it ^fashions or forms things. So something which is sarkhata has been fashioned or formed by such an activity, especially by volition. Tht reference is of course to the second link, in the chain of Conditioned Co-origination. The succeeding links refer to that shlch is sahkhata, i.e. fashioned by volitional activity (from this a previous life). Since this amounts to the five aggregates, the whole mind-body complex, it is virtually equivalent to the leanings given above. -
The Nlkkhepa-kanda (Dha ISO-234) gives a surprfalng amount of informaticV about nibbana in its explanation of the Matika.
The use of the term asahkhata dhatu probably derives from the Bahudhatukasutta 1 , where it is one of a series of explanations^
as to how a monk is dhatuktsala. Dhatu usually translated bv 'element 4*1" , . _ . . _ ^
7 y ® ^Ihofore setting this out, it may be helpful to point out that
seems always to refer to a distinct sphere of experience: visibl«|| - -
object is experientially distinct from auditory object, from organ]
1 sight, from consciousness. of sight, etc.; earth is distinct
from water, etc.; pleasant bodily feeling from unpleasant bodily
feeling, etc.; sense-desire from aversion, etc.; sense-objeett
from form or the formless. Likewise the unconditioned and tht
conditioned are quite distinct as objects of experience. Usually
the analysis into dhatu is intended to facilitate Insight into non-self. Presumably the purpose here is to distinguish conceptual!)! the unconditioned element of enlightened experience in order to clarify retrospective understanding of the fruit attainment ( phala sam7,uotti ).
Asahkhata occurs occasionally on its own in the nikayas . The mostt| conspicuous occasion is in the Asahkhata-samyutta (S IV 359-68) > If i where it is defined as the destruction of passion, hatred and It delusion. In this context it is clearly applied to the Third Noble ™ Truth. In the Artguttara-nikaya (I 152) the three unconditioned characteristics of the unconditioned are that 'arisi'ag is not. known, ceasing is not known, alteration of what is present ll not known'. These are opposed to the equivalent characteristic! of the conditioned. In the Culavedallasutta of the Majjhima-nlkayi * (I--300) the Noble Eightfold Path is declared to be conditioned, j
the twenty two triplets which commence the Matika embody a definite
conceptual 'order. The first five clearly concern the process
of rebirth and the law of kamma. Then follow two connected with
joins, after which are nine triplets concerning the path (magga).
The final six seem to relate especially to nibbana. This is not accidental. The intention is certainly to indicate an ascending order. This is perhaps more clear if set out in full, but In
tabulating the informa-
the present context I will confine myself t*.
{ tlon’glven concerning the unconditioned element only in the Nlkk- bepa-kanda expansion of the triplets, listed in numerical order.
Aaaftkhat? dhgtu and the abhidhamma triplets
J. It is indeterminate i- e - not classifiable as skilful
or unskilful action. Here it is taken with purely resultant meptal activity, with kliiya action particu¬ larly that of the arahat who does what the situation requires snd with all matters
is not classified as linked (sampayutta) with feeling
I.e. not in the intimate connection with feeling which applies to mind. Here it is taken with feeling itself and with matter.
Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
Nibbana and Abhidhamma
is neither resultant nor giving results
Mere it is taken with/ciriya action and matter.
has not been taken possession of and is not susceptible of being taken possession of
i.e. it is not due to upadana in the past nor cat it be the object of upadana in the present - the refer once is of course to Dependent Origination. Hei it is taken with the Paths and Fruits.
is not tormented and.not connected with torment
i.e. not associated with sahkilesa nor able to lead
to such association in the future,
is taken with the Paths and Fruits.
levels.
is immeasurable i.e. superior both to the very limited
mind and matter of the sense spheres and to the less restricted mind of the form and formless levels. Here if is taken with supramundane consciousness.
U. is not classified as having o small object, one which has become great or one which is immeasurable
i.e. the unconditioned element does not require any object {aratumjiut ) in contrast to mentality which re¬ quires an object in order to come into being. Here
Here again i
it is taken with matter.
is not with vitakka and vicara j
i.e. not in the close association with these activities which applies to mind. Here it is taken with matter, the mentality of the higher jhanas and pure sense consciousness.
7. is not classified as associated with joy, happiness or equipoiit t i.e. not in the close connection with one or other] of these which applies to the mind 9 f the jhanaa ,1 paths or fruitr. Here it is taken with matteft, sore j feeling, painful tactile consciousness and aversion consciousness. .^
d. is not to be* abandoned either by seeing or \>y practice
I.e. not eliminated by one of the four paths. Here It is taken with everything which is not unskilful including matter.
9. is not. connected with roots to be abandoned by seeing or by practice
i.e. similar to the preceding triplet
in. leads neither to accumulation nor dispersal
i.e. <k>es not take part in any kind of kamma activity whether skilful or unskilful not even the dispersive activity of the four paths. Here it is taken with resultant mental activity, kiziya action and matter.
11. is neither under training nor trained
i.e. distinct from supermundane consciousness. Here it is taken with matter and all mentality in the three
U. if- refined
i .e . superior both to the inferior
mentality asf.oc i ated with unskilfulness and to the medium quality ol the remaining aggregates in the thre6 levels. * Here it is taken with supramundane consciousness.
15.is without fixed destiny i.e. does not involve a deiimte kamma result. Here it is taken with everything except the four paths and certain kinds of unskilfulness.
16. is not classified as having the path as object, as connected with path roots or as having the path as overlord
i.e. does not have an object. Here it is taken espe¬ cially with matter.
17. is not classified as arisen, not arisen, going to arise
i.e. classification in these terras is inappropriate for the unconditioned element which cannot be viewed in such terms - it is non-spatial. Here it is classi¬ fied on its own.
18. is not classified as past, future or present
i.e. it is non-temporal. Here again it is classified on its own.
19. is not classified as having past, future or present objects
i.e. it .(Joes not have an object. Here it is taken
’ with matter.
is not classified as within, without or both
i.e. it is not kamma-born. However the Atthakatha- kanda of the Dhs, which gives further comment—on the Matika, traditionally attributed to Sariputta, adds
definite
Buddhist Studies Review 1 , 2 ( 1983-4 )
Nibbana and Abhidhamma
here that nibbana and Inanimate matter (anindriya* element is unique in that it is not classifiable In terms of bjclclharupa ) are without whereas all other dhamaat, may be within or without or both. Probably it "a!
following Vibh 115 which classifies the Third Trutk|? n ggest some element of underlying idealism of the kind which
demerges later in the VijMnavSda
as without. The difference is perhaps due to an ambl- guity in the terminology. Without can be taken U two ways : a) without * the within of other people; b) without - everything which*'is not within. NibbSna cannot, be 'within* as it is not kamma-born.
21. is not classilied as having an object which is within or with out or both
arising or as past, present or future. Suggestively, however,
E[lt may be reckoned as nama rather than rupa. 8 This does seem to
la other Abhl Ihamma works
i.e. it docs not have an object,
with matter.
Here it is takes
22. cannot be pointed out and does not offer resistance
i.e. it is quite different to most matter and by impli¬ cation can only be known by mind. Here it is takes with mentality and some very subtle matter.
In general the Matika couplets do not add much to out
understanding of nibbana. One point however is worth noting*.
The first three couplets of the Mahantara-duka are merely a differ¬
ent arrangement of the four fundamentals of’the later abhidharama:
citta, cot.au l ka , riipa and nibbana. Taking this in conjunction with the
explanation of the triplets summarized above, we can say that
the DhammasaAgani makes very clear that the unconditioned element
is quite different to the five aggregates - at least as different
from the aggregates as their constituents are from one another.
The unconditioned is not matter, although like matter it is inactive from a kammic point of view and does not depend upon an object as a reference point. It sis not any kind cf mental event or activity nor is it the consciousness which is aware of mind and matter, although it can be compared in certain respects with the mentality of the paths and fruits. The DhammasaAgani often classifies paths, fruits and the unconditioned together as * the unincluded (apariyapanna)' t i.e. not included in the three levels. Later tradition refers to this as the nine supramundane dhammas. The unincluded consciousness, unincluded mental activities and unconditioned element are alike in that they are not able
The description given in the DhammasaAgani is followed very
closely In Later canonical abhidhamma texts. The Vibhanga, for
Sexample. gives the identical account in its treatment of the
{ truths, taking the third truth as equivalent to the unconditioned
element. 9 The Dhatukatha does likewise. 10 Some of this material
can also be found in the Patthana which sometimes deals with
albbana as an object condition. The Patisambhida-maggra. which
contains much abhidhammic material although not formally in the
Abhidhamma-pitaka,' also treats the third truth as unconditioned.
Iqually, however, 1* emphasises the unity of the truths: 'In
V*our ways the foux truths require one penetration: in the sense
fot being thu 3 ,( ta^Aatthena) , in the sense of being not self, in the
sense of being truth, in the sense of penetration. In these four ways Jthe four truths are grouped as one. What is grouped as one
unity is penetrated by one knowledge - in this
vay the four truths require one penetration'.
The four ways are each expanded. One example may suffice:
'How do the four truths require one penetration? What is Impermanent Is suffering. What is impermanent and suffering is not self. What is Impermanent and suffering and not self is thus. What is impermanent and suffering and not self and thus is truth. Vhat is impermanent and suffering and not self and thus and truth is grouped as one. What is grouped as one is a unity. A unity Is penetrated by one knowledge - in this way the four truths require one penetration.*
This cf course is the characteristic teaching of the Thcravada school that the penetration of the truths in the path moments occurs as a single breakthrough to knowledge (ekaWiisamaya) and not by separate intuitions of each truth in different aspects. We find this affirmed in the Xathavatthu l2 , but the fullest account
occurs in the ?etakopadesa 13 which gives similes to illustrate to associate with upadana or with any kind of torment (kilesa) . they j simultaneous knowledge of the four truths. One of these is the
are all 'immeasurable' and they are all 'refined'. The uncondition-
. simile-of the rising sun: *0r just as the sun when rising accomp-
Nibbana and Abhidhamma
10* Buddhist Studies Review 4,2 MVB3-'*) _
of the unconditioned and in their understanding of the nature
lishes lour tanks at one tine without (an ; ot them being) before knowledge of the four truths the Th.ravadin abhidhamma opts
or aJiv: - m dispels darkness, it makes iight appear, it makes for a £ ar inore unitive view than the Sarvast ivadin.
visible material objects and it overcomes cold, in exactly the ' Uinly due to what Bareau calls la tendance mystique des
same way calm and insight when occurring coupled together perfora pridin'. 16 We may say that the Theravadin abhidhammikas
four tasks at one time in one moment in one consciousness - thej ? * closer relationship to their original foundation of meditative
>r aJiv: - m dispel:; darkness, it makes iight appear, it makes 1- for a far more unitive visible material objects and it overcomes cold, in exactly them' Uinly due to what Bareau ca
break through to knowledge of suffering with a breakthrough by I? experience. comprehending (the aggregates), they break through to knowledge*' jnitary view of the truths has been interpreted in terms
of arising with a breakthrough by abandoning (the def llements), °f ’sudden enlightenment , but it has not often been noticed they break through to knowledge of cessation with a breakthrough V ibat it involves a rather different view of the relationship
by realizing (direct experience of nibbana), they break through 1
to knowledge of path with a breakthrough by developing.* ’<
At first sight this runs counter to the characteristic Thera¬ vadin emphasis on the distinctiveness and uniqueness of nibbana as the only asahkhata dhamma, This is most clear in the Kathavatthu although obviously present elswhere. 1 * Here a series of possiblt ; candidates for additional unconditioned dhammas are presented and rejected. What is interesting is the argument used, E6&entiall|\ the point Is made that this would infringe upon the unity of/ nibbana.The idea of a plurality of nlbbanac is then Ejected because it would involve either a distinction of quality between . them or some kind of boundary or' dividing * l^ine* between then, Andrd Bareau finds some difficulty in understanding this as it involves conceiving nibbana as a place and he rightly finds this surprising. 15 However, the argument is more subtle than he allows. What is being put forward is a reductio ad absurdum. The argument may be expressed as follows: the unconditioned is by definition not in any temporal or spatial relation to anything . Qualitatively it is superior to everything . If then two unconditloneds are \ posited, two refutations are possible. Firstly, either only one of them is superior to everything and the other inferior to that one or both are identical in quality. Obviously if one is superior then only that one is unconditioned. Secondly, for there to be two unconditioneds, there must be some dividing line or distin¬ guishing feature. If there is, then neither would be unconditioned since such a division or dividing line would automatically bring both into the relative realm of the conditioned. Of course if there is no distinguishing feature and they are identical in quality, it is ridiculous to talk of two unconditions.
One thing is clear. Both in their Interpretation of the nature
between nibbana and the world. This is significant. The view
of nibbana set forth in the Dhammasarigani appears to be in other
respects common to the ancient schools of abhidhamma. The Sar-
vastivadin Prakaranapada, for example, has much of the same mater¬
ial. 17 It seems clear \hat although lists of unconditioned
dharmas varied among the schools to some extent, they were all
agreed that there were unconditioned dharmas and that the uncondit¬
ioned dharraa(s) were not the mere absence of the conditioned.
^ Only the Sautrantikas and allied groups disputed this last point, it seems clear that their position is a later development baaed upon a fresh look at the SCtra literature among groups which [’did not accord the status of authentic word of the Buddha to the abhidharma literature.
The Dhammasaftgani account is perhaps the earliest surviving abhldhammic description of nibbana. It is certainly represent¬ ative of the earlier stages of the abhidhamma phase of Buddhist literature. Of course some of the nikaya passages cited above appear to suggest a very similar position. Very likely some of these V were utilized in the composition of the Dhammasarigani, but- this
- is not certain. At all events both are the products of a single
direction of development giving rise to the abhidhamma. We may suggest that this represents a slightly more raonist conception of yiibbana as against the silence of most of the suttas. never¬ theless such a position was at least implicit from the beginning.
J.R.Carter has drawn attention to the frequent commentarial identification of the word dhamma as catusaccadhamma (dhamma of the four truth) and r.avavidha loJcuttara dhainma (ninefold supramundane dhamma). 18 Here again a close relationship between nibbana and J ’the five aggregates or between nibbana and supramundane mentality is Implicit. What emerges from this is a different kind of model
106 Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4) ^
to those often given in Western accounts of Buddhism which seea to suggest that one has to somehow leave samsora in order to come to nibbana. Such language is peculiar in relation to a reality which is neither spatial nor temporal. No place or time can be nearer to or further from the unconditioned. - I
It can perhaps be said that the supraraundane' mentality is
Nibbana and Abhidhamma
from the njkayas. It cannot even be shown with certainty that a sin¬
gle view was held. By the time of the early abhidhamma the situation
is much clearer. The whole Buddhist tradition is agreed that
nibbana is the unconditioned dhamma, neither temporal nor spatial,
| neither mind (in its usual form) nor matter, but certainly not I the mere absence or cessation of other dhammas. The uniformity
sonuhov more like nibbSna than anything els*. Compare, for exapple, 1 #f thl , tradulon ls certainly a strong argument for projecting
the simile of Sakka in the Maha-Govinda-suttanta: •Just as the I thl# posltion lnt o the nikayas and even for suggesting that it rep-
vatcr of the Ganges flows together and comes together with thel {<sent8 thc true underlying position of the suttas.
water of thc Yamuna, even so’because the path has been well laid
down for disciples by the Lord, it is a path which goes to nibbana,
both nibbana and path flow together.' 19 Nevertheless nibbina
is not somewhere else. It is 'to be known within by the wise*. ^
'In this fathom-Long sentient body is the world, its arising,
its ceasing and the way leading thereto.’ 21
Bareau has shown that the Theravadin abhidhamma retains an earlier usage of the term asahkhata as uniquely referring to nibbana. The other abhidhamma schools are in this respect more developed and multiply thc number of unconditioned dharraas. In¬ evitably this tended to devalue the term. So much so that the Mahayana tends to reject its application to the ultimate truth. Bareau ls surely right to suggest that there is a certain similar¬ ity between the original unconditioned and the emptiness of the Madhyamika. To a certain extent the Mahayana reaction is a return to the original position if not completely so.
In North India where the Sarvastivadln abhidharma eventually
established a commanding position, the term dharma came to be
Interpreted as a 'reality* and given some kind of ontological
status as part of a process of reification of Buddhist terms.
Nirvana then tends to become a metaphysical 'other', one among
a number of realities. In*the South, at least among the Thera-
vadins, dhamma retains* its older meaning of a less reified, more
experiential ki.nd.. It is a fact of experience as an aspect of
j the saving truthHaught by the Buddha, but not a separately exist-
I Ing reality 'somewhere else'.
S?j the four truths are dhamma. Broken up into many separate pieces they are still dhamma. As separate pieces they exist only as parts of a complex net of relations apart from which they cannot occur at all. This is samsara. Nibbana alone does not exist as part of a network. Not being of temporal or spatial nature It cannot be related to that which is temporal or spatial - not even by the relation of negation! Nevertheless it is not somewhere else. Samaara is much more like a house built on cards than a \ solid construction. Only Lgnorancc prevents thc collapse i»C Us
A similar situation occurs with the peculiarly Theravadin 1 even by the relation of negation! Nevertheless it is not somewhere
position of a single breakthrough to knowledge. 23 So far as I l else. Samaara is much more like a house built on cards than a
know, it has not been pointed out how much nearer this is to \ solid construction. Only Lgnorancc prevents thc collapse ot lls
thc position of the early Mahayana thatv to the Vaibhasika viewpoint, f appearance of solidity. With knowledge nibbana is^ as it were
The Theravada does not reify dhammas to anything like the extent
found in the Sarvastivadln abhidharma. Nor does it separate
xamsara and nibbana as dualistic opposites: knowledge of dukkha i.e.
samsara and knowledge of its cessation i.e. nibbana are one knowledgt
at the time of the breakthrough to knowing dhamma.
To summarize the kind of evolution suggested here: we may say that the main force of the nikayas is to discount speculation about nibbana. It is the summum bonum . To seek to know more is to manufacture obstacles . Beyond this only a few passages go. No certain account of the ontological status of nibbana can be derived
seen where before only an illusory reality could be seen.
1 1 am indebted to Ven.Ananda Maitreya for a fascinating verbal account of
some controversies on this topic in Ceylon. References in E.Laraotte Itistoicc du bouddhJsme indicn, Louvain 1958, p.43, n.57. A survey of some earlier Western scholarship in G.R.Welbon The Buddhist Nirvana and its Western Interpreters , Chicago 1968 (reviewed by J.W.dc Jong in Journal of Indian Philosophy l, Dord¬ recht 1972, pp.396-403).
For other views see: K.N. Jayat illekc Karl9 Buddhist Theory of Know* -dye.
Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
Nibbanu and Abhidhamma
'Xi2 Kv Chap. 11 9. Ill 3-4 .
33 l‘ai 134-3.
!*•; tl Kv Chap.VI 1*6, XIX 3-3.
"6 Ibid . , p. 253.
I- W Ibid., pp.4 7-6l.
Lon- on 1065, pp.673-6; D.J.Kalupahana Causality: The Central Philosophy of ftrffr Honolulu 1073. o.g. p. 17 3#; buddbist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis,
Honolulu 1076, pp.87lf.; A. D. P. Kalansur iya 'Two Modern Sinhalese views of nitb- ana', Religion IX, 1, London 1979; K.Werner Yoga and Indian Philosophy, Delhi
1977 , pp./7-bl; K.Lamotte The Teaching oC Vimalakirti , London 1076, pp ,LX-LXXK;t : to:*™* r./>.cU., p.3l.
D.S.Kucgg La t hCoric du tathagatagarbha et da gotra , Paris 1969 (for the deve- , loped Mahayana); J.W.de Jong 'The Absolute in Buddhist Thought', Essays in Phil¬ osophy presented to Dr T.M.P.Mahadevan, Madras 1962 (repr. in Buddhist Studies .
Selected Ilssoys of J.W.de Jong, Berkeley 1979); Andre Barcau L’Abnolu on phil- (jsophiv bnuddhiyue (Paris 1931) covers some of the same ground as this article in his earlier sections, but my interpretation differs somewhat.
2 The ten unanswered questions are put by Malunkyaputta at M l 426ff., by Uttiyo at A V 193ff. t by Potthapada at D 1 18 7 f f . and by Vacchagotta at
S IV 3951 i . Pour of them are discussed by Saripulta and by an unnamed bhikkhy at S II 222ff. and A IV 68 f£. A much larger list is treated in the same vaj al D III 1 35ff., while a whole section of the Samyutta-nikbya (IV 374-403) is devoted to these questions. Of course, this kind of expansion and variation Is exactly what is to be expected with the mnemonic formulae of an oral tradition The. issue is being looked at from various slightly different angles.
3 Louis de La Vallee Poussin The Wag to Nirvana, Cambridge 1917 (repr.Del hi 1982), j .134.
4 Kdwarc Washburn Hopkins, cited by Wclbon, op.ci t., p, 238 . Acadcr.i ic and Sinhalese Buddhist inter-
| it John Ross Carter Mamma. West \ juittuLionn. A study Of J rolujious concept. Tokyo 1970.
19 0 I! 22Z.
30 !> 11 9J; PTC gives twenty-four r.ikmjo rcfctences sv akalika.
21 C 1 62; A 11 48,50.
22 Op.cit. ' *
ly io1ated schools of the Vibhajyovudin group probably adopted the
same po
sit. ion, but it was completely rejected by the Pudgalavadin and SarvautlvSdin groups. The MahSsSmghtkos appear to have adopted a compromise liaicau l-cn noctcr, houdilh .(« Petit vfliicnlc, Saigon 19S5. p.62).
5 Hot only docs Dhs have a canonical commentary appended to it. It is also j quite evident that it is presupposed by the other works of the Abhidhamma-
pitaka (except Puggala-pannatti). Of course, the material which has been in¬ corporated into the Vibhahga may be older than Dhs, but in Us present foris It is younger.
6 Dhs 197-3.
7 N III 63 trom here it has been included in the lists of the Dasuttarasutta (D III 274J.
8 Harcau is wrong to suggest that the Vibhahga contradicts this, since the Vibhahga definition of nama is in the context of paticcasamuppada , which auto¬ matically excludes the unconditioned element.
9 e.g. Vibh 112-5; 404ff .
10 Dhatuk 9 and passim.
U Patis 11 105.
AN ATLAS OF ABHIDHAMMA DIAGRAMS 1
Bhikkhu NAnajlvako
Anatia, the teaching of no permanent •self* entity or soul, required for its explanation a theory of 'psychology without soul'. The essential task of abhidhamma literature was to work oat this basic theory. In modern Western science and philosophy the same problem arose in the 19th century with the task of establishing a basic science of physiological psychology. One of its best known American founders, William James, has done most in this field to elicit also the philosophical aspects and implications of this new science and its relevance for the general world-view of our age. Among his philosophical essays the most significant for our analogy was 'Does consciousness exist?' - challenging the classical theological tenet of the soul theory. James welcomed with the greatest enthusiasm the appearance of the basic works of the founder of a metaphysically much broader conceived vitalist philosophjy, his younger French contemporary, Henri Bergson: The* Creative tVoiui ion , based on the function of an dlan vitaJ, inter¬ preted as 'the creative surge of life', as the primeval moving force of the whole process of the universal 'flux' of existence, conceived as the 'stream of life', of 'consciousness', of 'thought': and Matter and Memory, explaining the relation of mind and matter as consisting of the pulsation of an apparently continuous flow of instantaneous flashes of memory (like pictures in a movie show). 'Memory, by its active registration and connecting function of instant-events* was thus discovered as the missing link connect¬ ing the ’hard and static* atomic 'elements' of both mind and matter postulated by the earlier hypothesis of scientific material¬ ism. Now, on the contrary, physics becomes 'simply psychics invert¬ ed and 'cosmology, so to speak, a reversed psychology'. Thus
vitalism meant the end of the 'classical' materialism in Euro¬ pean philosophy and science.
This was underscored and ’elicited most extensively by the third best known vitalist philosopher, A.N.Whitehead. Speaking of actual occasion*, of 'throbbing actualities' understood as 'pulsation of experience’ whose 'drops’ or 'puffs of existence' guided by an internal teleological aim in their 'concrescence* (analogous to the Buddhist sahkhara in karmic formations) Join the 'stream of existence' (bhavanga-soto), - Whitehead has taken over the
Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4) 111
terms under quotation marks from W,James and extended their inter¬ pretation in a 'theory of raomentariness' corresponding to the
Buddhist khanika-vado (of course essentially, without any direct
- 2
reference to the possibility of such analogies), ^
As a direct offshoot from vitalism there appeared in Europe, after the First World War, an authentic philosophy of dukkham whose representatives considered themselves to be the philosophers of existence, or 'existentialists*.
After the Second World War, when the correctness of these trends in European philosophy and their need for orientation were most obviously felt and confirmed, European philosophy with all its classical and historical precedents was forcibly suppressed by a militant Anglo-American anti-philosophical embargo imposed by the so-called 'logical positivists* and their reduction of philosophy to the exclusiveness of semanticist analyses and 'protocols' of allowable and unallowable word-meanings, a trend criticised tad rejected already by the Buddha under the designation ^ of ' logical, analysts (takkl-vlmamsl) believing only in empty words **
I ^nd 'meanings' arbitrarily attributed by 'the rules invented for a gamfe', as their modern successors formulated it.
Upajiva Ratijatunga applies in his presentation of tht abhidhamma modern criteria and terms implicitly analogous to the vitalist model. He translates, for example, cittam with 'tele-pulses' in phy¬ sical sense-organs in explaining their 'vital factors'. He des¬ cribes 'the occurring of a pulse of the vitality factor' and how it 'generates a momentary mental sub-personality*, 'the ex¬ perience of the life momentum* and the formation of the 'ego l complex’ led in its instantaneous transformations by the stream
- of 'cravings and desire for further physical experience'. The
basic 'vitalising factor* - jlvitindriyam - is translated as 'the pulsation'. In a 'living being's experience... objects and phenomena exist because they are reached directly'. And that Is the exclusive crlterium of their 'reality'.
The most significant and useful salient point in Ratnatunga’s model is, in my view, the essential restriction of the too wide extension of the range of abhidhamma conceptual numerology, con-
fuslngly unpracticable for our modern means and capacities of scientific computerizing. Remaining within the limits of the programmatic draft explicated in the Preface, it is encouraging
An Atlas of Abhidhamma Diagrams
Huddh i i'.t Studies Kevieu t,2 (1983-4)
to sec at the outset that the thematic range is restricted to ’a very small area of the Abhidhamma philosophy', of 'information gathered over the years' by the author in his specific quest 'that is connected with how a living being gathers information about the physical world around its body and then reacts to the perception'. Thus he 'realized that what was discussed in the philosophy was not the physical world, itself, but the living being's observed and inferred experience of matter and material phenomena in its body and in the physical world around it'.
No less Important than this restriction of the basic subject matter is the author's critical attitude and its cr^erium in j using Pali terms in their technical moaning and their contextual explanation. 'The subject matter of the Abhidhamma philosophy is very involved and the Pali terms used in describing the concepti were intended to be very precise. In consequence any error in Lhe. translation of Pali terms leads to confusion. Instead of translating Pali terms, the process of how the living being observe* o jeets and phenomena in the environment of the body and reacts tu the perception, has been described using a model that could | stimulate much of the living being's behaviour as described in the philosophy. ...The English terras used in this book, are those used for the same concepts in a more comprehensive book now under preparation in which I am covering a somewhat larger area.' b.Katnatunga .cannot conceal his 'hesitation to publish what I know', confessing that he 'tried to put the information together, in much the same way as an archeologist would do in attempting to reconstruct a shattered clay pot from the pieces found at an ancient site’. - 'The Abhidhamma texts appear to have been obscured by errors in memorising and errors in copying and also by mis¬ interpretations largely through failure to grasp the fundamentals that have been set out in this book.'
Toward the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century a revival of abhidhamma studies in the traditional ambience of the Theravada Buddhist world was noticed mainly in Burma from where it spread to neighbouring countries. The best known centres of this renewed trend in Buddhist studies were established by Led! Sayadaw between 1887 and 1923 . At that time (since 1900) also the first English translations of abhidhamma books, prepared in collaboration with Burmese scholars, were published by the Pali Text Society. At tho same time European students of Buddhist
started going Lo Burma for special abhidhamma studies. Most of
the early Western bhikkhus were ordained iher- and continued
their missionary work as abhidhamma scholars. The best known
anong them was the German NyHnatiloka Mahathera, ordained in
Surma in 1903. In 1911 he founded his Island Hermitage in Ceylon
(Dodanduva) whose head he remained until his death in 1957. His ^
nain contribution to abhidhamma studies was the Cuide through theAWu- thamma~i>iiaka first published in Colombo 1938, and later in the 3uddhi a i Publication Society's editions. His German disciple,
Jiyanaponi.ka Mahathera, published his Abhidhamma Studies first in 1949, in the Island Hermitage Publications. This book was later reprint¬ ed by the Buddhist Publication Society (Kanuy). In the series of the same editions there appeared in English translation some vorks of Ledi Sayadaw (not to be confused with the later meditation teacher, Mahasi Sayadaw) *and others on the 'Abhidhamma Philosophy , including recent editions of Narada's Manual of Abhidhamma, containing the English translation of the Abhidhamraattha-saAgaha. Short V summary presentations of 'Abhidhamma Philosophy' in diagrams ' were often preferred also by authors with intentions more popular and superficial than U.Ratnatunga's work. To him we should be grateful now if he continues with less 'hesitation to publish what he knows' in turn, adequated to our 20th century capacities and habits of understanding the anthropological and historical backgrounds of such investigation.
In the meantime there arises a question of critical importance for the reader: To whom and how will the present schematic atlas^ be useful and helpful for the actual study of abhidhamma? Certainly L not to the unprepared beginner, the assutava puthujjhano . Its value 3 will be much increased by the following more comprehensive book.
Yet there are already in the Buddhist world many students who have tried to study such intricate summaries as the Abhidhammattha- sahgaha, or even to learn by heart at least parts of it in pari- venas. Speaking of my own experiences with a few translations
- of this historically latest layer of dry bones survived archeo-
logically, or rather palaeontologically, 1 found out after many
years and attempts to approach it that there was the need of such a pedagogical talent as the Vajirarama Narada Mahathera,
i '- a disciple of the late Pelene VajiraftSna (who stirred up the ! interest of U.Ratnatunga in the abhidhamma philosophy in 1930),
- to help me correct at least a few terms heaped up in single statements
An Atlas of Abhidhamma Diagrams
1 U|»a vn Kam.ii.unKa Hind and Hat t. hm/i.i/./Wi/ ,nmi/.-ir.«; utahesino) . . .' .
This idea of a 'great self' is amplified at A l 240. Here
the Buddha explains that the same small (evil) deed may take
one sort of person to hell to experience its fruition (vipa*j), while another sort of person will experience its fruition in
the present life, and not beyond. The first sort of person Is described as follows:
'A certain person is of undeveloped body, undeveloped virtue, undeveloped mind, undeveloped wisdom, he is limited, he has an insignificant self, he dwells insignificantly and miserable (ab/ia- vitakayo hoti abhavitasJlo abhavita-citto abbavitapaflfio paritto appatume appu- dukkha-vibarl)'.
118 Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4) / K
The second sort is described thus: «
A certain person is of developed body, developed virtue, developed®!
Developing a Self without Boundaries xl<
(a) virtue, wisdom, the Path and the faculties (indriyas) are weil y 'developed (bhavita-)'.
mtnd, developed wisdom, he is not limited, he has a great self, || |b) 'body' (*; ya ) i s 'developed' and 'steadfast (thito)'.
he dwells immeasurable (aparitto mahatta appamana-vibarl)
This
situ
ar. ion is
illi
wil
l ma 1
ke a
cup of
wa tei
of
the
river
Canges.
As
si i
11 dr,
» a small evil
act
L ho
n he
tnu st
he some
one
of
deve
loped
virtue
and
in
hell,
he i
s probably a
who
ha s
t ran;
scended
bad
- gr
cat * ,
this
is no metap
won
Id ha
i ve be
e a ' i n s i
gnif
nol
yet
deve ic
>pcd his
- bod
ref
e i r u
t hes«:
i four qu
i a 1 i. t
What
transforms a
per j
strateo by saying that a grain of salt
undrinkable,^ but not the grea ; t mass
the person who has a ’great self' can
on, which brings some kammic fruition,
rfho is not yet an Arahant. 6 As he is
iocs not experience a kammic fruition
1(c) citta is ’developed’, 'steadfast', 'well-released (suvimuttam) *
£ and wituout ill-will,
S;(d) he is 'unlimited, great, deep, immeasurable, hard to fathom, k „tth much treasure, arisen (like the) ocean (aparitto mahanto gam- V bhjro iippameyyo dupp.ir/yoya Jim jKi/m-rataho aagar 'il/»flnn<>) ' (cf.M l 486-7), ? (e) in the face of the six sense-objects, he has equanimity and | is not confused; he sees only what is seen, hears only what
in heard . etc., and has no desire-and-attachment for such
hell, he is probably at least a St ream-enter er, however, one -!is heard, etc., and has no desire-and-a t tachment for such
rfho has transcended bad rebirths. As for the 'self' which is sense-objects,
'great*, this is no metaphysical self but the very 'self* which [(f) the six senses'are 'controlled (dantam)’ and 'guard'ed (rakkhitam) ,
jould have been ’insignificant* when the person in question had s (g) he is 1 se If-controlled (at tadanto) and with a well-controlled self (a it.m3 Sudan Lena) .
9. The above explanation of why someone - a Buddha or Arahant
_ ig 'one .of developed self' certainly shows that such a per son
has developed all the good aspects of their personality, but
to being great' can clearly be seen to be such practices
as the development of lovingkindness (metta) and mindfulness (sati). 1$ it also makes clear that such a person has two groups of qualities
The relevance of the first of these can be seen from A V 299
where an ariyan disciple whose citta, through met ta, ie grown great
(mubayyota) and immeasurable (appamana), knows that: 'Formerly this
"that might fce seen as in opposition to*each other:
> (a) he is self-controlled and has a citta that is not shaken by the
- input of the senses
- he is self-contained,.
citta of mine was limited (parittam), but now my citta is immeasurable, I <*>> he has a cltta which has no limit or measure: he has no boundar-
wel.l developed (appamanam subbavitara)* . The wording of this shows its I' les *
relevance to the A 1 249 passage. As for the relevance of sati, thli
can be seen from M I 270, which says that one who feels no attract- j
ion or repugnance for any of the six sense-objects, and who has
mindfulness of the body dwells ’with a mind that is immeasurable
(jppamanocccaso )•, in contrast to someone with the opposite qualities
who dwells ’with a mind that is limited ( parittacetaso )' (p.266).
' One of developed self (bha vi tatto) '
8. As the path towards Arahantship is building up a 'great self', and a personality that has 'become self-like', then it is no wonder that the Arahant is called 'one of developed self (bbavit- atto)', a title which differentiates him from a 'learner (sekho)'
(It.79-80, cf.It.57 and 69). A long explanation of this ter* is found at Nd II 218-9, commenting on its application to the Buddha at Sn 1049. Summing up the various strands of this explanat¬ ion, one can say that for one who is'bhavitatto* :
How can someone be self-contained, and yet have no boundarler?
Before answering this, we will outline further aspects of (a)
and (b), so as to provide a good background for an answer.
Th e Arahant as self-contained and 'dwelling alonej,
10. The Arahant's self-contained nature is shown in many ways.
For example, at A I 124 he is described as 'one with a mind like diamond <vajirupamacitto)' : his citta can 'cut* anything and is Itself uncuttable - it cannot be affected by anything. Thus, at S II 274, Sariputta says that he does not know anything from whose alteration he would be caused sorrow or dukkha , and at Thag 715-7 the ArAhant Adhimutta shows complete equanimity when his life is threatened: the Arahant is not dismayed by anything. Again, the Arahant is 'unsoiled* by anything. At S HI 140 it is said that a Tathigata. like a lotus which 'stands unsoiled by the water (that! anupalittam udaJccria)' dwells unsoiled by the world
Developing a
12 i
Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
Self without Boundaries
ut.n t; ) ' . 8 Similarly, at Thag 1180, Mahamoggaliana
says of himself, 'he Is not soiled (nopa/ipoati) by conditioned lhln{i < wiKhurux) 9 a s a lotus is not soiled by water*. Elsewhere, the image o! the lotus or leaf being unsoiled by water is used to illustrate various qualities: ’Thus the sage (muni), speaking of P 2 JCe, without greed, is unsoiled by sense-desire and the world lr.. t .-v >:j l :>kc arrjpal i tto) * (Sn 845); 'lament and envy do not soil him (ta.rr; T t, u : iucvam t n.chdr<tn .. . n« Zippati)* (Sn 811); 'Thus the muni is net s«;iJed (tnjpol jppjti) by what is seen, heard or sensed* (Sn 812,
•{, Sn '78); 'so you are not soiled (lippaii) by merit or evil or both' fan 547).
Similarly, there is reference to monks 'unsoiled by any materia? tiling a/mpay/tiS)* (M I 319), and to Arahants 'having put
evils outside, unsoiled (bahitva papani anupalitto)' (S 1 141). Such passages show that an Arahant is 'unsoiled' by the world or sahkh- in the sense that he does not react to them with greed, lament¬ ation Qt.c . , he has no attachment for them and is unaffected
by them.
11. One can see, in fact, that the Arahant is, in a sense, cut oft from the world of the six sense-objects. Thus, at v M 111 274-5, the Buddha outlines a simile: a butcher who cuts off the hide from a dead cow and then drapes it back^over the carcase would be wrong, to say that, ’This hide is conjoined with the cuw as before'. Here, the carcase stands for the six internal ayuLa/M:. (the senses), the hide stands for the six external ones (the sense-objects) and the tendons and ligaments which are cut
stand for 'delight and attachment (nandiratjaas*) ' . As attachment is only fully got rid of by an Arahant, the simile surely is meant to apply to him. He is thus portrayed as being such that his senses are in no way tied or bound to their objects. He passes through the world without sticking to it. He is thus one who
'dwells alone ( ckovihazi ci> *, even if he is in the miJst of a crowd, for he has destroyed 'delight* and 'attachment* with respect to the six desirable sense-objects (S IV 36-7), Similarly, at
S II 283-4, the Buddha tells a monk living alone that to perfect dwelling alone {cka-vi/iaro) * he should abandon the past, renounce the future and give up ’desire and attachment ( chandarago ) ' for what Is presently (his) personality (paccuppanncsu ca actabhavapatilabhosu )' , He then gives a verse:
Who overcomes all. knows all (.abbibl.iw.u- sabbavidum), very wise.
Unsol 1 cd by any dhammn ( soW^.mi dlwmmosi. anupalittam) .
Who, letting go of all. Is freed In the destruction of craving (sabbamjaham tanhakkhayc vimuttam) ,
That is the man of whom 1 say "he dwells alone (ekavibiriti)’" .
| The Arahant thus dwells totally 'alone' as he has let go of everjr-
, thing , is not 'soiled' by anything. By ending attachment, he has
i .'abandoned' the kbandhas (S Ill 27) and the 'home' which these con-
! stitute (S 111 9-10).
12. This 'aloneness' seems to apply not only to the Arahant, but also to Nibbana. '"Seclusion ( viveko) ' is a synonym for viriyj and i.i/odl.a (e.g.at S IV 305-8) and as these are themselves synonyms for Nibbana (e.g. It 88) Nibb’ana can be seen as such a 'seclusion'. .Thus Nd 1^26-7, commenting on this word at Sn 772. says that it can be of three kinds*.
I (a) of body (kaya-): physical seclusion in the form of forest-
( dwelling,
} (b) of mind (citto-): this refers to the c-itta of one in any of the eight jlumas , or in any of the tour ariyan persona - such cittas are ’secluded* from various unskilled states,
(c) from substrate (upadhi-): this refers to Nibbana, which is ’se¬ clusion' from 'substrate' in the form of defilements, khandhas
and kainma formations.
There is, indeed, considerable evidence (which cannot be
dealt with here l0 ) , that Nibbana is a Wflnana (consciousness) which
has transcended all objects and thus become objectless and uncon¬
ditioned. As such, it is ’secluded’ from all conditioning objects,
\ and is totally ’alone* .
The Arahant's boundaryless citta
13. Vie now move to examining further aspects under point (b), at Para,9, that of the Arahant’s citta lacking boundaries.
The Arahant is in ,several places described in such a way as to suggest that he has broken down all barriers between 'himself' and ‘others*. At M 1 139 (and A III 84) he is said to have:
(a) 'lifted the barrier (ukkhittapaliyho) ’ , i.e.got rid of avijja (ignorance),
| (b) 'filled the moat (sanJcinnaparikho) ' , i . e again-becoming and
/ faring on on birth (jatisamsaro) is got rid of',
Buddhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
hevclopJng a Self without Boundaries!
(c) 'pulled up the pillar (abuihesiAo)', i.e. got rid of craving,
(d) 'withdrawn the bolt (niragyalo)' , t. e . 'the five lower fetters binding him to the lower (shore) are got rid of',
(e) become 'a pure one, the flag laid low, the burden dropped, without fetters (ariyo pannaddhajo pannabharo visamyutto)' , i.e. he has got rid of the 'I am conceit (asminmano)' .
The Arahant can thus be seen as no fonger waving the if lag of 'I am* and so no longer has boundaries, as he no longer identi¬ fies with any particular group of phenomena such as his 'own* Ichancfhas. There is no longer ignorance to act as a barrier. Thus the Buddha refers to himself as having broken the 'egg-shell of ignorance ( avijjandakosam )' (A IV 176, cf.M I 357). In A similar, but more striking way, the Avadana-tfataka says of the Arahant: 'he lost all attachment to the three worlds; geld and a clod of earth were the same to him; the sky and the palm of his hand were the same to his mind;...; he had torn the egg-shell (of ignorance) by his knowledge...; he obtained the knowledges, the abhijfias... 1 . 11 Again, A II 166 compares the 'break-up (-pafchedo)' of ignorance to the 'breach of a dyke {alippabhedo)* which will occur in 'a village ‘ pond that has stood for countless years (anekavassayaniJta) 1 when all the inlets are opened, the outlets blocked and it rains down stead¬ ily. Thus ignorance Is like a 'barrier' to be lifted, an 'egg¬
shell' to be broken and the 'dyke* of an ancient pond, to be burst* The Arahant is one who has destroyed such an enclosing boundary*
14. The lack of boundaries to the Arahant's mind is perhaps well illustrated at M I 206-7 (cf.M III 156). Here, the Buddha
approaches the monks Anuruddha, Nandlya and Kirabila, greeting
them simply as 'Anuruddhas;*. He then asks them:
'And how is it that you, Anuruddhas, are living all together on
friendly terms and harmonious, as milk and water blend, regarding one another with the eye of affection?'
Anuruddha then replies that this is because he has developed motto, with respect to acts of body, speech and mind, for his com¬ panions and thus had gone on to become such that:
'!» Lord, having surrendered my own mind (saka/n cittam niXJchipitva), am living only according to the mind of these venerable ones (ayasmantanam cittassa vasena vattami). Lord, we have diverse bodies (nana...Jcaya) but assuredly only one mind (ekafi ca.. .cittan-ti ) ' .
Anuruddha then explains that they help each other with various
chores and, at p.210, that he knows that his companions have attain¬ ed all eight jhanas and nirodha-samapatti and destroyed the cankers (I-savas) as he has read their minds. In this passage, one thus finds three Arahants being regarded as having one citta and being all called 'Anuruddha', even though this ^is the actual name of only one of them. This merging of cittas is motivated by mcttS, a quality which when fully developed means that a person no longer has the barriers that make him prefer his own happiness over that of others 12 , and, one must assume, such merging is enabled by the three monks being Arahants, whose cittas are no longer enclosed in an 'egg-shell' of ignorance and who no longer wave the flag of *1 am'.
15. The reason why the Arahant's citta has no boundaries, why he 'dwells with a citta made to be without boundaries (vimariyadi- katena colas* viharati)' is explained in a number of places. It is be¬ cause he is 'escaped from, unfettered by, released from (nissato visamyutto vippamutto)* the Wiandhas, being like a lotus standing above the water, urfsoiled by it (A V 152), because he feels no attraction or repugnance for the objects of the six senses and so Is 'independ¬ ent Twnissito)' , 'released, unfettered 1 (M III 30), and because he has fully understood the satisfaction of, misery of and 'leaving behind (nissaranam)' (i.e. Nibbana, from Ud BO-l) of the khandhas . so as to be 'escaped, unfettered, released' (S III 31).
The Arahant 1 s anatta , bounda ry less , self-cont ained ' sej Jfj.
16. The above, then, enables us to resolve the apparent tension outlined at Para.9. It is because an Arahant is so self- contained, having abandoned everything, being 'unsolled' oy anything, without attachment or repugnance for sense-objects, Independent, 'dwelling alone', and having experienced Nibbana, 'seclusion', that his citta has no boundaries, citta, being completely 'alone* has no barriers or boundaries. When a person lets go of everything, auch that *his' identity shrinks to zero, then citta expands to in¬ finity. -Whatever one grasps at and identifies with as 'l am* limits one. As can be seen at Sn 1103 and S I 12, it allows Mara to 'fol¬ low* a person and devas and men to 'search' him out. The Arahant, however, does not invest anything with selfhood and so cannot be 'found' anywhere. Though he is completely 'alone', he 'is* no-one, he is a 'man of nothing (akincano)'. He has broken through the binding-energy of I-eentred existence. Thus Sn 501 says of
Bucdhist Studies Review 1,2 (1983-4)
Developing 3 Self without Boundaries
“-’ho fare in the world with self as an island (attadlpa ),
Entirely released, men of nothing (akiflcanS sabbadhi vippam ucta),./
17. The Arahant dwells with 'self 1 (citta ) as an island, but he knows that 'himself', ’others' and the world are all, equally, anatta, and that there is no real 'I am' anywhere: he has nothing on the island, so to speak. Thus Adhimutta was not afraid when his life was threatened as there was no 'I' there to feel threaten¬ ed and afraid, only dukkha dhammae (Thag 715-7). Again, the Arahant's senses are 'cut off' from their objects (Para.11) Aot because he invests identity in his sentient body and shuns all else, but because he sees both , the inner and the outer, as equally anatta.
He is undisturbed by the world not because he Is protected from it by a barrier, but because he realizes that no such barrier exists, separating a ’self', an from 'others'. All is equally
anatta, $ 0 there are no grounds for 1-grasplng to arise and give his citta limiting boundaries. Paradoxically, by realizing that all > he had taken as acta and 'I' is really anatta and insusceptible to control (S III 66-7), the Arahant is no longer controlled' 4 *by such things - they have no hold over him - and he is more able to control them - he has mastery over his mental processes^ As Edward Conze says, one awarq of things as anatta will see that 'possessions pos¬ sess you, see their coercive power and that "1 am theirs" is as true as "they are mine’". 13 Nyanaponlka expresses a similar thought when he says, ’Detachment gives, with regard to its objects, mastery as well as freedom. 14
like citta, unperturbed and ’unsoiled' by anything (Para.10), with
his senses not tied to their objects, one who has perfected ’dwell¬
ing alone' by letting go of everything (Para. 11) such as the *hand-
has, with no attachment or repugnance, independent (Para.15). He
haJ experienced Nibbina. the ultimate 'seclusion’ (Para.12), the
’leaving behind’ of the conditioned world (Para.15). It is because
of these self-contained qualities that the Arahant is one who
has made his citta to be without boundaries (Para. 16) and has broken
the ’egg-shell', hurst the ancient *pond‘, of ignorance (Para*V3)
and is such that his citta can merge with that of other Arahants
(Para. 14). He is an independent 'man of nothing' who does not
identify with anything as but who surveys everything, internal
and external, as anatta, such that he (a) is completely 'alone' with* ‘self as an island:* he does not identify with anything, does not ‘lean’ on anything, is not influenced by anything, as nothing can excite attachment, repugnance or fear in him and (b) he has a boundaryless citta, not limited by attachment or I-dentif ication, and immeasurable with such qualities as lovingkindness (Paras 16-17). He has, then, a developed, boundless 'self', this being, paradoxically, because he is completely devoid of any tendency to the conceit of *1 am', having realized that no metaphysical self can be found - thaL the thought of '1 am’ can only arise with respect to factors (the Mundhas) which cannot possibly give it genuine validity. As seen at Sn 19, he is one whose hut , i,e. citta, is open and whose 'fire', i.e. attachment, hatred and delusion, which are centred on the '1 am' conceit, is out. ,
18. Summarising the findings of this article, we can thus say
the following. The ariyan eightfold Path, when properly
integrated into someone's personality, is regarded as 'become
self-like' (Para.5) ano those on the Path are such as to live
with ’self' - citta - as an 'island', by means of the Foundations of Mindfulness (Paras 3-4). By such factors as mindfulness and
lovingkindness (Para. 7) the Path can be seen as developing the
good qualities and strength of a person's personality such that
Stream-enterers etc. are referred to as 'those with great selves'
(Para.6). At the culmination of the Path stands the Arahant, 'one of developed self', who has carried the process of personal develop¬
ment and self-reliance to its perfection (Para%8), He is thus
very self-contained and self-controlled (Para.9), with a 'diamond-
Notcs
1 This article is substantially the same as Chapter 13 of the author s Ph.D. dissertation, ’The Concept of the Person in Pali Buddhist Literature (University of Lancaster 1981).
2 This is the formula for the four Foundations of Mindfulness, c.g. at M I
3 'Dhamma' is here used in the sense of ’teaching' (and its practice), rather -than in the sense of 'Nibbana'. It is only in this former sense that there
can be an ’other Dhamma’: from the Buddhist point of view, the 'Dhamma* In the sense of ’Nibbana' is unique, but there can be different 'Dhammas' in the sense of ’teachings'. Thus, at H 1 168, in persuading the Buddha to teach, Btahma says, 'There has appeared In Magadha before you an unclean Dhamma...', i.e. a perverse teaching. Again, at A I 218, a layman praises Xnanda's modesty
Buddhist Studies Revlev 1,2 (1983-4)
In teaching by saying, 'here there is no trumpeting of his own Dhamroa (sadhammu- Xicamsana), no depreciating of another*s Dhasuaa {paradhammSpas&danS) but Just teaching Dhamma (dhammadesana) in its proper sphere'.
4 This can be seen from various parallel passages on atta and on citta . For example, Dhp 160 says, 'For with a well-controlled self (attana* va sudanterto),
one gains a protector hard to gain*, while Dhp 35 says, ’a controlled (dantaai) citta is conducive to happiness*. Again, A II 32 talks of ’perfect applicatioa of self ( atta-sairjnS-panidhi ) as one of the four things which lead to prosperity, while Dhp 43 secs *a perfectly applied isamma-panihitam) • citta as doing tor one what no relative can do. That citta is not an atta in a metaphysical sense (i.c. it is anattS) can be seen from the fact that S V 184 sees it as dependent 'on n&ma-rQpa , raind-and-body. A metaphysical atta , on the other hand, would be an independent, unconditioned entity.
5 Aturoo is the archaic word for atta. Thus Nd 1 69 says atuma vuccati atta.
6 Although MA II 361 secs him as an Arahant, being without attachment, hatred and delusion, which are 'productive of the measurable', as seen at M I 298.
M I 298, however, does not limit 'immeasurable* states to that of the Arahant'» 'unshakcable cetovimutti* but says only that thjs Is the ’chief’ of these. Others it mentions arc the four Brahraaviharas, and the Corny, MA II 354 . adds the four maggas and the four phalas to the list.
7 or ’body’ here, may refer to the nSma-kaya, i.e. to the components of ndma, or to nSma-rOpa as a whole. A 'developed Jc3ya * must be a person's
body of mental states or their 'sentient body' when developed by Buddhist practice.
8 Cf. A II 30-9.
9 Cf Ps II 220 on five kinds of viveka , the last, again, being Nibbana. Simi¬ larly, Nd II 251 explains the v ivekadhatmam of Sn 1065 as Nibbana.
10 See Chapters 10 and 11 of author's dissertation (see Note 1).
11 As quoted and translated by Har Dayal in his The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (London 1932; repr.Delhi 1978), p.15-16. On
the abhifllias as overcoming various barriers, sec A III 27-8.
12 See Vism 307-8 and Sn 368 and 705.
13 Buddhist Thought in India (London .1962), p.37.
14 The Heart of Buddhist Meditation (London 1969), p.68.
A V A N T - P K O P O 5 (1)
PRESENTATION DU RECUEIL D'EKOTTARAGAMA (2)
Par le ^ramana (3) Che Tao Ngan ( \
Dynaslie des Tsm )
Traduil du Chinois par THfcH HUYEN-Vl
U exisie qualre recueils d’Agama (4). La definition de I'appellation "Agoma" a exposde dans le dcuxifcmc recueil, le MadhyomSgoma cl il nous paratl inutile dc la rappeler ici.
Prdcisons seulemenl la definition du lerme "Ekotlara". Littdralement il signifie WW augments do un". Que veul dire "augments de un"? "Dix" repr4sente I'inumdration complete des sujels trails, complite^dans leur nombre et dans leur classification par categories, cl la dizainc augments* dc I'uniti symbolise la progression susceptible de s'dlendre vers I'infiri. Ainsi cheque rfegle 4dicl4e par I'enseignement progresse cheque jour, lend ant vers la perfection. Pour cette raison, le prdsent Recueil des Rfegles de lo Doctrine el des Rites'servira pour toujours comme des mesures et des modules en or el en jade pour le salut des Sires vivanls.
A I'exUSncur du continent indien, les qualre Recueils d'Agamo ont 6tS accueillis avee respect par tes habitants des agglomerations citodines einsi que par les religieux retires dans les bois et les monlagnes.
'.e vSnSrable Sramaija Dharmanandin (5), originate de Taksaflla (6), Stall entrS asset tard on religion. II o consacrd le reslo de so vie 4 dludicr Ids Agoma ct il cn possddait parfaitemenl la lettre et I’espril. Parloul 4 I’Slranger ses conferences Staicnt suivies avec enlhousiosme.
En I'on 20 de l*4re KicnYuan ( ) des Te'm (.4-), il arriva 4 la capitate Tch’ang
I Ngan et lous les habitants, aussi bien les nalits du pays que les rdsidenls (Strangers Ic
\ lou&renl pour ses explications des texles des Agama. Le gouverneur mililaire Tchao
> Wen Ye ( M jC.-^ ) le pria de rendre la connaissance des Agama accessible au people.
A I'enlrrprisc gigantesque de transcription (en langue chinoise) participaient le vSndrable Buddhasmrti comme traducteur et le Sramana Dharmanandin comme correcteur. Clle commenga d4s la retraile d'dtd de l'annde Kia Chen ( f Jp ) pour se terminer 4 la flo du printemps de I'annde suivanle. Le recueil[d'EkoUaragama]a M nfparti en quarante-et -un fascicules formant de'ux tomes. Le premier tome comptant vingl-six fascicules est complet par rapport aux texles originaux. Le deuxidme tome de quinze fascicules est incomplet : il y manque les gatha (courts podmes rdsumant le contenu de cheque
_sutra) (7).
Moi, Dharmanandin, j'ai participd 4 la correction avec d'autres religieux. Les vdndrablcs Seng Uo ( ft > et Seng Meou ( ft ft. > ont pu reconstituer et tredu.re le* partie. Trailokyavijayamatujalopayika: Anandagarbha's SrUrailokyamandalopayika arya- laUvasanigrahatantroddhftd (dpal khams gsum mam par rgyal ba'i dkyil *khor gyi cho ga ‘phags pa dc kho na nid bsdus pa 7 rgyud las btus pa ), Tibetan translation, Peking edition, vol.74 (no. 3342), pp. 32c8-52b8.
Vajrasekharatantra : Vajra.sikharatantra (sic), Tibetan Translation, Peking edition, vol.5 (no. 113), pp.lal-56d7.
Vajrasekharatantra , Tibetan Translation, Taipei edition, vol. 17 (no. 480), pp.223d 1 -261 a5.
Yainada 1981 lsshi Yamada (cd,), Sarva-Tathagala-Tattva-Samgraha-Ndma-Muhd - ydna-SCitra , A crit. cd. based on a Sanskrit manuscript & Chinese & Tibetan transl. (Sata-Pitaka Series 262), New Delhi 1981.
TILMANN VETTER
Explanations of dukkka
The present contribution presents some philological observation:, and a historical assumption concerning the First Noble Truth.
It is well-known to most buddhologists and many Buddhists that the explanations of the First Noble Truth in the First Sermon as found in the Mahavagga of the Vinayapitaka and in some other places conclude with a remark on the five upadanakkhandha, literally: 'branches of appro¬ priation*. This remark is commonly understood as a summary.
Practically unknown is the fact that in Hermann OLDENBERG’s edition of the Mahavagga' (= Via 1) this concluding remark contains the parti¬ cle pi, like most of the preceding explanations of dukklta. The preceding explanations are: jdti pi dukkha, jara pi dukkha, vyadhi pi dukkhS, maranam pi dukkham, appiyehi sampayogo dukkha, piychi vippayogo dukkho, yam'p ’ iccham na labhati lam 2 pi dukkham (Vin I 10.26). Wherever pi here appears it obviously has the function of coordinating examples of events or processes that cause pain (not: are pain 3 ): birth is causing pain, as well as decay, etc. 4
1. The Vinaya Pilukam. Vol. 1, The Mahuvuggu. Lonilon-Edinburgli 1879.
2. OLDENBERG’s edition seems to reflect inconsistency of the manuscripts in some¬ times considering combinations of -m with the particle pi as a real sandhi and writing -m pi.
3. dukkha - is an adjective here; it follows the gender of the preceding (pro)noun. Not so in the MOlasarvastivada version in The Gilgit Manuscript of the Satigha• bhedavastu, cd. by R. Gnoli andT. Vcnkatacharya, Part 1, Roma 1977, 137: jSlir dukkham, jara duhkluuiu vyadliir duhkluup, maranani duhkhain, priyaviprayogo duhkliam, apriyasamprayogo duhkhain. yad apTcchan paryesamdno na labhatc tad api duhkhain, saAksepatah panca upadanaskandha duhkhain. Here only yad aptcchan paryesamdno na labhate tad api dultkhain contains api.
4. In translating the noun dukkha as ‘pain’ (and correspondingly the adjective as
‘causing pain’ or ‘painful’) I follow K. R. NORMAN “The Four Noble Truths”, in: tndogical and Huddhist Studies (Festschrift J.W. dc Jong) cd. A.L. Hcrcus ct. al. Canberra 1982: 377-391, n.3 “without implying that this is necessarily the best translation”. ..
Journal of the International Association of lltuUlhisi Studies Volume 21 • Number 2 • IV9X
At Vin I 10.29, the concluding remark runs as follows: samkhittena pane' upddunakkhandhd pi* dukkhd. No note on this pi is found in OLDENBERG’s generally trustworthy apparatus criticus. So we may infer that the manuscripts consulted by OLDENBERG all contained this pi.
In the Dhammakdya CD-ROM [1.0, 1996], which, with some errors, represents the PTS editions, this pi is also found in other places where the concluding remark on dukkha appears, namely, DN II 305.5; 307. 17-20; SN V 421.23; Pads I 37.28; II 147.26; Vibh 99.10; 101.15. 20. However in the Nalanda-Devanagan-Pali-Series (=NDP) [1958, etc.] it is missing in all these places (including Vin I 10.29), while it is found in AN 1 177.2, where it is lacking in the Dhammakdya CD-ROM. In MN I 48.34 and 185.6 it is found neither in the PTS edition [ed. V. Trenckner, 1888] nor in NDP 6 . But TRENCKNER remarks on p.532 with regard to 48.34: “-kkhandha pi M and all the Burmese authorities known to me, also Vin. l.c. [=Vin I 10.29].” The CD-ROMs BudsirlV of Mahidol University [1994] and Chattha SartgUyana from Dhammagiri [1.1, 1997] consistently omit pi in these places.
We can therefore state: 1) TRENCKNER, whose edition of MN I nor¬ mally cxcells the average PTS editions, has chosen a reading against all Burmese manuscripts; 2) NDP and the CD-ROMs mentioned above, all v depending on the Sixth Council, do not accept this pp\ 3) other editions show there was a manuscript tradition of employing pi in thfe concluding remark in the Mahdvagga as well as in Sutta and Abhidhamma texts.
How should we deal with these observations from a historical point of view? That TRENCKNER has made his choice against nearly all his witnesses is easily explained. On the third page of the Preface of his MN l edition lie says: “Buddhaghosa’s commentary has been of very great service. Whenever his readings, from his comments upon them, are unmistakable, they must, in my opinion, be adopted in spite of other authorities. His MSS. were at least fifteen centuries older than ours, and in a first edition we certairly cannot aim at anything higher than repro¬ ducing hi; text as far as possible (here he adds a footnote: ‘Even if his readings may seem questionable, as [...]’)”.
5. OLDENBERG writes: updddiwkkltandhdpi
6. Note that at MN I 48.34 in TRENCKNER’s edition the passage appiyehi sampa- yogo dukkho, piyelii vippayogo dukkha of Vin 1 10.29 is replaced by sokapari- devadukkhadomanassupdydsd pi, while in NDP it is preceded by this long compound, and pi also appears after sampayago and vippayogo.
7. The pi at NDP AN I 177.2 seems to have escaped attention.
What does the commentary to MN I 48.34 say? It refers to the discus¬ sion of the four noble truths in [[[chapter]] XVI] of the Visuddhimagga.
There (§ 57-60 ed. H.C. Warren and Dh. Kosambi, Cambridge Mass!,
1950) we read sahkhittena paheupaddnakkhandha dukkhd, without pi. f The Sixth Council (perhaps influenced by. TRENCKNER’s view) may have had a similar motive for leaving out pi at all places where the con- C eluding remark on dukkha appears, but I have no information about this and can therefore only deal with TRECKNER’s statement.
In the main, I am in favour of considering the oldest commentaries as .... very likely preserving old readings. But such a reading, especially when the commentator himself lives centuries after the composition of a text, cannot be preferred to another, if he employs ideas that cannot be found in the old texts, whereas the other reading can be defended by referring to their 0011101118411118 is precisely the case in Buddhaghosa’s explanation of the reading without pi. £
At Visuddhimagga XVI § 57-60 we get the impression that Buddha- ghosa (or a predecessor) had a text without pi before him (readings are not discussed) and made the best of it by explaining sahkhittena as indi- •caling a summary of the preceding statements 8 aid declaring that the remark on the live 'branches’ of appropriation implies all other state¬ ments about pain, because actual pain does not occur without them. 9
But to my knowledge, there is no single place in the Pali Vinaya- and Suttapitaka where the often occurring statement that the five updddna- kkhandha are dukkha is understood in this way, while there are many places where their being dukkha is understood as derived from their impermanence, which implies that in this context dukkha does not mean ‘causing actual pain’, but ‘eventually disappointing’ or ‘unsatisfactory’. Moreover, there is, as far as 1 know, at best one place in the Vinaya - and Suttapitaka where sahkhittena seems to summarize what precedes: at the ? end of MN no. 38 (1 270.37); and this place is doubtful, because it could be an inadequate copy of what happens in MN no. 37, where sahkhittena
8. l ie depends on a text that included sokaparidevadukkhadomassupdydsd and
appiyehi sampayago dukkho piyelii vippayogo dukkho. not on the Mahdvagga
passage.
9. The essence of the commentary is given in these verses:
Jdlippabhulikam dukkham yam vultam idha tadind avutiam yah ca lam sabbam vino ete. na vijjali Yasmd, tasma updddnakkhandhdsailkhepato ime dukkha ti vuttd dukkltanladesakena Mahesind.
wars at the start and at the end of the sutta. In all other cases I have
- cked, about 300, saAkliittena announces an item that afterwards is, or
>uld be, explained.
jiven this state of things it seems unlikely that pi in the last remark on delta is an error of uncontrolled repetition of the pi in the preceding itences, now fortunately removed by TRENCKNER and the Sixth uncil. It is much more probable that Buddhaghosa (or a predecessor) l a text where pi in the last remark had, accidentally or with some jntion, been lost, and that he made the best of it, a nice interpretation t succeeds fairly well in maintaining an unequivocal meaning of kkha, but is not important for the historian of early buddhism. For s historical purpose we have to accept the reading with pi, and to derstand the last remark as another example of the usage of the adjec- e dukkha, .though in a slightly different meaning, which points to an dition. Sankhittena means nothing than: this is a short remark that has be explained to the neophyte who does not know what the five >adanakkhandhas are and/or .vhy they are are called dukkha, though ey do not always actually cause pain. The translation then is: “Also the
ve branches of appropriation, briefly said ( sankhittena ), are causing
^et us, finally, return to OLDENBERG. In his famous Buddha, sein hen, seine Lehrc, seine Gemeinde 10 we find a translation of the con- iding remark on dukkha that also seems to depend on the Visuddlii- igga, not on the Muhdvagga, the source OLDENBERG mentions in this nnection: “kurz die funferlei Objektc des Ergreifens sind Leiden 11 ”, rhaps he was inspired by TRENCKNER. But then one would expect a >te referring to the reading established by himself in his edition of Vin I found no such note. Instead a note is attached to ‘Objektc des rgreifens’ that gives German translations of the names of these five jjects as they occur elsewhere, and moreover rejects, without any •guing, an assumption by KOEPPEN 12 said to be given without any
10. The (ourih edition (Stuitgart-Bcrlin 1903) was the earliest available to me; see p. 146 and 293.1 also checked the edition supervised by H. von GLASENAIM* (Stuttgart [1959?]) and saw that in this question nothing had changed; sec p. 137 and 224 and note p. 426.
11. dukkha is of course not ‘Leiden’, but 'Icidvoll’, if one depends on the Pali sources, as OLDENBERG says he docs.
12. Carl Friedrich KOEPPEN, Die Religion des Buddlia und ihre Entstehung. I, Berlin 1853.
VETTER 387
