Asanga's Understanding of Madhyamika: Notes on the Shung-chung-lun

by John P. Keenan

I. Introduction

Since Madhyamika and Yogacara are the two principal fdstra schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhism, the relationship between these two schools is of central importance in understanding the development of Mahayana thinking. Yet the main Yogacara thinkers of the classical period—Maitreya-natha, Asariga, and

Vasubandhu—do not, it would appear, refer to the Madhyamika masters Nagarjuna and Aryadeva nor outline their view of Madhyamika philosophy. Edward Conze writes that "these two schools were engaged in constant disputes and the works of one have no authority for the other."1 Yet upon a closer examination, it becomes clear that such disputes took place between later proponents of these schools and, as will be shortly evident, Madhyamika texts do indeed retain

their authority for Yogacara thinkers. In contrast to Conze's opinion, Nagao Gadjin argues that "Madhyamika philosophy, which began with Nagarjuna, is presently believed to have been wholly inherited by Maitreya-natha, Asariga, and other Yogacaras."2 According to his understanding, Yogacara differs in the way it interprets emptiness but in no wise rejects the main themes of Madhyamika. Nagao has presented this view by focusing on analogous passages from

Nagarjuna's Madhyamakahariha and Maitreya-natha's Madhyantavibhdga.* He convincingly shows the lines of doctrinal development from the Madhyamika notion of the middle path to the Yogacara interpretation of the same. Yet in these Yogacara texts no specific reference is made to Nagarjuna or Madhyamika. It almost seems that, although these lines of developing thought

did occur in cognizance of one another, the Yogacara thinkers intentionally refrained from mentioning Madhyamika and did not accept its authorative status, as Conze maintained. Yet this is not the case, for there does exist a commentary by Asariga which interprets the Mahdprajndpdramitdsutra through

Nagarjuna's Madhyamakakdrikd. This text is invaluable in delineating the development from Madhyamika to Yogacara. It is the intent of this paper to offer evidence in support of Nagao's thesis of the organic relationship between Yogacara and Madhyamika by examining this text and outlining Asariga's understanding of Madhyamika and the Madhyamika ideas that underlie his explanation of the central Yogacara theme of the three patterns of consciousness.

Asanga on Madhyamika

The text in question is the Shun-chung-lun-i ju tai-pan-jo-pomi-to-ching chu-hin-fa-men, "Introduction to the Doctrine of the Introductory Section of the Mahdprajndpdramitdsutra in accord with the Meaning of the Mddhyamikasdstra (i.e., Madhyamakakarika)" Ui Hakuju has restored the Sanskrit title as {{Mddhyamikasfetra-artha-anugata-MahdprajMpdramitd-sutra-Mipariva parydya-pravesa[[.4

Unfortunately no Sanskrit version is extant and apparently no Tibetan translation was made. The sole source for our consideration then is the Chinese translation made in 543 by Gautama Prajnaruci, a translation which was characterized by Ui Hakuju as "rude" or "immature."5 Indeed, it is because of the poor quality of this translation that the Shunchung-lun has received scant attention both in Japan and in the West, for the difficulties in interpretation are numerous and often not amenable to definitive solution. Unfortunately, its Asarigan authorship cannot be definitely established, since it is attested only by this Chinese text. There is, however, little reason

to reject this Chinese attribution. The text is clearly Indian, delving into the intricacies of formal logic and argumentation in a way few early Chinese attempted. The "rudeness" of the translation in part comes from the difficulty of finding Chinese terms for the Sanskrit terminology. Modern Japanese scholars accept Asanga as its author." Indeed, the only reason to reject

it is for the anachronistic reason that the text treats Madhyamika thought, not Yogacara. In this article, its Asangan authorship is accepted as probable and its thematic structure employed to ascertain Asariga's understanding of the basic Madhyamika teachings. Although composed by the Yogacara thinker Asariga, the Hsun-chung-lun presents no Yogacara philosophy. One might expect that Asariga would interpret Madhyamika in Yogacara fashion, through the

basic themes of the three patterns of consciousness. Indeed, that is what Sthiramati does in his commentary.7 In fact, the Hsun-chung-lun is a straightforward Madhyamika commentary. This leads Mochizuki Shinkyo to conclude that it represents an early work of Asariga and dates to a pre-Yogacara period when, as is recorded in Vasubandhu's biography, he was struggling with the notion of emptiness and before he adopted Yogacara.8 It does seem probable that this text represents an early stage in his developing understanding of emptiness as presented in the Prajnaparamita literature and explained

by Nagarjuna. Asariga's interpretation of Nagarjuna's stanzas should amply convince the scholar of later Tibetan and Chinese disputes between Madhyamika and Yogacara that Asariga himself, at this stage at least, fully accepted and affirmed the basic Madhyamika notions, and, inasmuch as he never is recorded to have repudiated Madhyamika in any later text, that he maintained his commitment to Madhyamika throughout his entire career. His intention in this text, it would seem, is to explicate Nagarjuna's basic teaching. The anonymous author of the brief introductory note explains:

Nagarjuna Bodhisattva was a master of the basic teaching and, relying on the Mahdprajnaparamita, composed the full text of the Madhyamika-sastra. But he did not exhaust its ramifications. The Mahayana sastra master Asariga understood points not yet clarified and composed this article in a discerning manner.1'

This note agrees with Nagao's appraisal of the role of Asariga in inheriting Madhyamika thought. It further specifies that Asariga identified his task as the explication of the ramifications of Madhyamika thought, not as the offering of an alternative philosophy to Madhyamika. The Bussho haisetsu daijiten explains:

As this text is an interpretation focused on the eight negations and prapanca in the dedicatory stanzas of the Madhyamakakdrika, it is not a complete commentary on the Madhyamakakdrikd. Nevertheless, in as much as it is an interpretation of Nagarjuna's Madhyamakakdrika by the Yogacara Asanga, one can surmise that at their origin these two schools were not in opposition.10

It would seem reasonable then to conclude that the Hsun-chunglun presents Asanga's early understanding of Madhyamika and, in comparison with Asanga's mature thought as expressed in the Mahayanasamgraha, can be used to highlight some aspects of the development from Madhyamika to Yogacara.

The Content of the Hsun-Chung-Lun

The Hsun-chung-lun focuses from beginning to end on the dedicatory stanzas of Nagarjuna's Madhyamakakdrika and their themes of prapanca and the eight negations. Asanga describes his effort clearly:

These (dedicatory) stanzas from the fdstra (i.e., Madhyamakakdrika) summarize its basic meaning and it is in their light that I now reinterpret its unexplicated significance. This is the meaning I treat, for it is this that severs the craven attachments of sentient beings. I compose this essay in accord with this [basic] meaning and do not present an ordered treatment [of Nagarjuna's entire text)."

The first chiian distinguishes counterfeit perfection of wisdom, engrossed in prapanca, from true perfection of wisdom, characterized by an absence of prapanca. Refutations are offered on a number of heretical views: Mahesvara, time, atoms, an original source, original matter, etc. In addition, as Mochizuki Shinko observes, this section would appear to be the first Chinese text to examine arguments through the three marks of logical reasoning: thesis, reason, and example.1'2 The second chiian treats the eight negations, developing the theme of emptiness and denying essence to all things, even the truth of ultimate meaning. The text begins by quoting the dedicatory stanzas of the Madhyamakakdrikd:

I bow before universal wisdom— "Not passing away and not arising, Not annihilated and not eternal, Not one and not many, Not coming and not going, Buddha taught dependent co-arising To sever all prapanca— Thus I bow my head in reverence Before the best of all Dharma teachers.""

Asanga understands these stanzas of Nagarjuna to describe universal wisdom (sarvajndna) and sees Nagarjuna's source as the Prajriaparamita teaching. Immediately after stating his intent to closely follow the structure of these two stanzas in the passage quoted above, a questioner asks: What intent do you understand [[[Nagarjuna]]] to have had in composing his sdstra? What doctrine did he rely upon?14

Asanga responds by citing the Mahaprajnaparamitdsutra in a passage that distinguishes the true perfection of wisdom from a counterfeit perfection of wisdom that issues from a preaching of the perfection of wisdom "in accord with one's own ideas and understanding,"15 and which consequently fails to understand its nature as skillful means (upaya) and treats wisdom as a goal to be attained."' By contrast, true perfection of wisdom relies on not the slightest

doctrine,17 since in the perfection of wisdom there is no true doctrine.18 Thus, even if one articulates the doctrine of emptiness that all things are impermanent and empty, that can still be a counterfeit perfection of wisdom, if it constitutes attachment.19 Quoting the appropriate passages from the Madhyamakakdrika, Asanga strongly argues against taking emptiness as yet another view, for "all views are transcended by emptiness."20 In support he quotes a passage from an unknown work of Rahulabhadra, the third master of the Madhyamika lineage after Nagarjuna and Aryadeva:

The counter against all views is Emptiness as taught by the Tathagata. Neither seek after nor be attached to emptiness; For, when one is attached to emptiness, emptiness becomes reified. Seek neither emptiness nor non-emptiness; Both are to be abandoned. Do not cast aside the Buddha's words, Spoken in so many places.21

All views are to be rejected because they arise from prapanca and, as Nagarjuna's stanzas teach, the Buddha taught dependent co-arising in order to sever prapanca. The term prapanca has caused some confusion among scholars.22 Asanga offers a definition:

The term prapanca means attachment to the duality between attaining as something real and the thing [[[attained]]] as something real and the inability truly to apprehend the equality of all characteristics. The term prapanca denotes a ludicrous dialogue [as occurs on stage].23 In a word, it is the apprehending of essences.24

The Buddha taught dependent co-arising in order to sever such ludicrous dialogue, and Asanga explains that "all that which is dependently co-arisen is prapanca"2* for any view, even about the doctrine of Prajfiaparamita, being conceptually and coherently expressed, functions within the duality of a subjective attaining and an object attained.

In the HInayana the Buddha introduced doctrinal meaning by arranging it in an ordered fashion in order to counter the doctrine of the heretics.26 Dependent co-arising is then explained as the presentation of the teaching on the twelvefold chain of conditioned arising from primal ignorance to old age

and death, seen by Asanga as a deconstructive strategy functioning within the realm of prapanca to refute the various views propounded by the heretics, which occupy the next eight columns of the text. When asked why then Nagarjuna composed the Madhyamakakarika, Asanga answers not just by referring to the views of the heretics, but by negating the genesis of all such dualistic views.

He employed reason to introduce the meaning of the Mahdprajnapdramitd to lead sentient beings to abandon prapanca. Having done so, through reasoning they will speedily enter the perfection of wisdom.27

Upon being asked just what this perfection of wisdom is, Asanga responds by quoting the first of the Nagarjuna's stanzas on the eight negations, which he describes as "reasoning upon the sutras, an ordered interpretation of the Agamas."2* He then proceeds to interpret the eight negations as signifying the

absence of any essence which might validate the genesis of views, insisting that nothing ever arises or passes away in an essentialist context. The questioner, thinking perhaps to hoist Asariga upon his own petard, raises the question of the truth of ultimate meaning. Does that not truly exist? If that were the case [and the truth of ultimate meaning were a real identifiable essence], then there would be two levels of truth, the worldly truth and

the truth of ultimate meaning. Only if these two truths were to exist [in that essentialist fashion] would your assertion hold.29

The questioner continues to press his point, arguing that apart from worldly truth, there is a truth of ultimate meaning, and that this validates his assertion. He quotes the Madhyamakak&xika to the effect that both of two truths are real (zz )& % f?| "& ), apparently a misquotation of chapter 24.9.

Asanga agrees that the Tathagata preached the doctrine of the two truths, but points out that in so doing in fact he was preaching the suchness of things and it is incorrect to understand the two truths as two disparate levels of truth:

[[[Nagarjuna]]] neither rejected [the truth of ultimate meaning] nor bifurcated [it from the truth of worldly convention]. If in the two truths one regarded ultimate meaning as disparate, then the suchness of beings would be separate from things true in the world.30

There are then no solid reasons for propounding a dualistic suchness of things. In fact the two truths do not refer to two separate levels of truth. Both truths have the same characteristic:

being without essential characteristic. It is precisely this absence of essence and original emptiness that constitutes truth as beyond deconstruction (jUC ^^flO-31 Asariga presents yet another stanza from the Madhyamakakdrikd:

These two truths are both non-existent And are not projected in ludicrous dialogue. They are neither imagined nor separated. This meaning characterizes truth.111'

This stanza shows, Asaiiga explains, that while all tathdgatas rely upon the two truths, they all in fact have no support. They do not rely on worldly truth and they do not rely on the truth of ultimate meaning, for their minds are unsupported. Being without essential characteristic, ultimate meaning cannot be mediated in thinking. It cannot be employed as a thesis to refute other theses.

Thus no thinking of any kind can identify the essence of the truth of ultimate meaning. Therefore it cannot refute arising, nor passing away. To conceive the truth of ultimate meaning as a subtle essence that can be brought to speech is itself an expression of selfhood.™

This inability of thought to identify ultimate meaning does not, however, imply the abandonment of reasoning. Rather it casts reason in a deconstructive role in negating the assertions of prapanca consciousness in its mistaken formulation of views and attachment to propositional claims. Indeed, the remainder of Asahga's text turns to an examination of reason in the context of emptiness and outlines norms of logical consistency that can apply to all questioning.

IV. The Move to Yogacara

Yogacara attempts to develop a critical understanding of consciousness as the dependently co-arising support for both illusion and wisdom. It tries to explicate the ramifications of Madhyamika insight into emptiness and dependent co-arising

in terms of a reflective understanding of consciousness as a synergistic functioning between the latent habit-seeds in the container consciousness and the manifested activities of the active consciousnesses of sensation, perception, and thinking. The entire attempt is to critically ground insight into the genesis of illusion and into the nature of awakening within a reflective understanding of consciousness by identifying the basic structure and functioning

of the mind through critical analysis. The Hsun-chung-lun, although Madhyamika in its entire context, contains inchoate Yogacara themes. One can discern a clear parallelism between the above themes and Asariga's presentation of the three patterns of consciousness in the Mahdydnasaingraha. The theme of prapanca echoes Asahga's presentation of the imagined pattern (parikalpita), which is defined as:

The appearance of conscious constructs [as real], despite the fact that objective things are not real and are only conscious construction.*4 The appearance of what seems to be an object over against the knowing subject and the imagining of that object to be an essence constitutes the basic

illusion of primal ignorance and engenders attachment to such putative objects as if they themselves already contained meaning. Asvabhava comments:

In reality there is neither an object known (grdhya) nor a knowing subject grdhaka). There is simply a host of mental constructs within unreal imagining in virtue of which imagination takes on the appearance of an object."

This explanation is probably based upon the first stanza of the Madhydntavibh&ga, which affirms the existence of unreal imagining, but the non-existence of the apparent duality within that imagining. This is the basic text used by Nagao to outline the Yogacara development of the Madhyamika notion of the middle path.36 Asahga's Mahdydnasawgraha further describes the imagined pattern as thinking endowed with concepts and having as its seed the permeation of language.37 The Hsun-chung-lun in describing prapanca as "ludicrous dialogue" and the "duality

between attaining and the thing [[[attained]]]" is then an early attempt to understand this imagined pattern of consciousness, for it too treats the illusory nature of subject-object knowing and the influence of the ludicrous dialogue oiprapaOca in engendering that illusion. Similarly, the definition of the perfected pattern iparinispanna) in the Mahdydnasaifigraha is that it is:

The complete absence of all images as objective realities in that same other-dependent pattern.™

The Hsun-chung~lun treats true perfection of wisdom as the absence of prapanca and non-attachment to one's own ideas and understanding. In the Mahdydnasamgraha Asanga explains the Mahdprajndpdramitd as the counter-agent to all views, echoing once again the theme of the Hsun-chung-lun that true perfection of wisdom abandons all views.39 The crux of the matter, however, is the Yogacara understanding of the other-dependent pattern, for Asanga defines it as the basic nature of consciousness, becoming manifest either in the imagined pattern or in the perfected pattern. The other dependent pattern is defined as follows:

The other-dependent pattern consists in all the conscious constructs that have the container consciousness as their seed and that are comprised with in unreal imagining.40

These mental constructs are engendered chiefly through the permeations of language, for it is in imagining that words refer to objective essences over against the subjective knower that the other-dependent pattern functions in an imagined, illusory manner. The central insight in the teaching on the three patterns relates to this other-dependent pattern, for that is the fulcrum upon which the other two patterns turn.4' The Mahdydnasawgraha describes the other-dependent pattern in the following passage.

With what intent did the World-Honored One teach in the Abhidharmamahdyanasutra that "there are three factors: that which pertains to the pure aspect, that which pertains to the defiled aspect, and that which pertains to both?" That which pertains to the defiled aspect is the imagined pattern. That which pertains to the pure is the fully perfected pattern. The other-dependent pattern itself is that which has both these aspects. This was the intention of the World-Honored One/2

The Yogacaras employ this notion of the threefold other-dependent pattern of consciousness to explain the meaning of the apparent contradictions in the scriptures, especially the Prajnaparamita scriptures. Asanga explains that in the other-dependent pattern there is neither arising nor passing away, for the arising of essences is negated as imagined, yet the other-dependent pattern is recovered and affirmed as itself other-dependent, i.e., dependency co-

arisen. Nagao explains that it is in virtue of becoming perfected and thus eliminating the imagined world of illusion that "the other-dependent pattern is restored as otherdependent. To be fully perfected means that this restoration [of the basic other-dependent pattern] is realized. . . ."4S This developed

notion of the other-dependent pattern is not present in the Hsun-chung4un, for it implies the critical Yogacara understanding of the structure of consciousness as the interplay between the container and active consciousnesses. Thus the Makdydnasawgraha differs from the Hsun-chung-lun in that it moves

within a realm of conscious interiority where meaning is established through analysis of the internal functioning both of insight and understanding, and of ignorance and misunderstanding. Nevertheless, in its treatment of the two truths the Hsunchung lun presents basic themes that seem to have led Asanga to

develop such a critical understanding. The main point of that explanation was that the two truths are not to be conceived as two disparate levels of truth, one worldly and falsifiable and one true and beyond deconstruction, because that would attribute an essence, however subtle, to the truth of ultimate

meaning. Rather, Asanga thinks, both truths are characterized as empty and without essential characteristic. Being without essential characteristic, the truth of ultimate meaning is ineffable and unobtainable in words and concepts, while worldly truth, being enunciated and expressed, can make no claim to anything

beyond a provisional validity. From a Yogacara perspective, the question this elicits is how truth, both worldly and ultimate, is grounded within the structure and functioning of conscious understanding.42 If truth is not a double-layered essence out there to be encountered by the subjective mind, then

how does it occur? It is in response to such questions that the Yogacaras developed their critical understanding of consciousness and their account of the three patterns, for truth, just as ignorance, must be identified within its operational structure.

Central to the endeavor is their understanding of other-dependent consciousness. The fulcrum structure of other-dependent consciousness allows Asariga to offer a critical understanding of conversion (dsraya-parivrtti) and to outline the

realization of truth. Upon conversion, one abandons attachment to the putative realities of the imagined pattern and realizes non-discriminative wisdom and awakening. But in the Mahayana understanding this does not sever all [[mental

function]], for the task of carrying out bodhisattva action necessitates a wisdom and encompasses an awareness of all the myriad factors that constitute the world. Awakening includes not only

insight into silent emptiness, but also insight into the suchness of thinking as itself dependently co-arisen. Awakening does not abolish the structure of consciousness, but rather enables one to recover the heretofore obstructed and obfuscated pattern of other dependence itself. In this recovery one neither imagines things to be essences nor remains in silent awareness of uncharacterizable emptiness, but rather, in full awareness of the genesis of views from

language and of their ultimately "ludicrous" quality, brings to skillful speech and clear reason doctrines that flow from emptiness and leads others toward awakening. This mode of being fully conscious of the other-dependent functioning of consciousness is insight into the limited, but valid role of worldly truth. Here the distinction in the Hsun-chung-lun between counterfeit perfection of wisdom, caught in the web of prapanca, and true perfection of wisdom,

liberated therefrom, is expressed in terms of the Yogacara focus on conscious interiority. The theme of the restoration of the other-dependent structure of consciousness brought about by the realization of the pattern of full perfection represents a critical explication of the two truths, for

both are understood by the same consciousness to be essencefree and empty. Asaiiga has grounded both truths in the awakened mind functioning through insight into the ultimate meaning of emptiness in the recovery of its other-dependent structure.44 Both awareness of ultimate meaning and of worldly truth occur in the same consciousness. They are not disparate levels corresponding to separate realities, but differing modes expressing the identical awareness

of emptiness—the one in abeyance of all words and the other in an employment of all words. In ultimate meaning one realizes the emptiness of all things. In worldly truth one realizes the dependently co-arisen being of all that is empty, for dependent co-arising is the designation of emptiness within the world

of mediated and verbalized meaning" In these points one can, perhaps, discern the developmental lines of Asahga's thinking from the Hsun-chung-lun to the MahdyanasaTflgraha in his progressive focus on conscious interiority and in his attempt to critically ground the Madhyamika themes which he fully accepted and articulated within his understanding of conscious understanding.

NOTES

1. Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, 1934-1972, San Francisco: Wheelright Press, 1980, p. 52. 2. "From Madhyamika to Yogacara; An Analysis of MMK XXIV. 18 and MV 1.1-2," in The Journal of the international Association of Buddhist Studies 2.1 (1979), p. 29. 3. Ibid. Also see "Ku-i yori sanshosetsu e," [From the Meaning of Emptiness to the Theory of the Three Patterns], in Chukan to yuishiki, Tokyo: Iwanami, 1978, pp. 180-206. 4. Indo tetsugaku kenkyu, Tokyo: Sanseido, 1938, vol. 1, p. 400. 5. Ibid. 6. Besides the references to Ui in note 4 and to Mochizuki in note 8, see Kajiyama Yuichi, Chukan shiso, vol. 7 oilheKosa: Daijo bukkyo series. 1982, Tokyo: Shunjusha, p. 10.

7. In his Mulamadhyamakasaindhinirmocanavydkhyd, T. 30, #1567. This text also awaits further study. It is also influenced, so it would seem, by Bhavaviveka and is important in delineating the structure of MadhyamikaYpgacara synthesis. See Donald S. Lopez, A Study of Svdtantrika (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1987) for the best study in a Western language of these late developments in Indian Buddhist thinking. On Sthiramati's chronology, see Yuichi Kajiyama, "Bhavaviveka, Sthiramati, and Dharmapala," in Beilrdge zur Geistesgeschichte lndiens: Festschrift fur Erich Frauwallner (Wien, 1968), pp. 193-203.

8. Butten daijiten, 3.2526c. 9. T. 1656, p. 39c. 110-12. 10. Bussho kaisetsu daijiten, 5.242d. 11. T. 1565, pp. 39c.29-40a.3. 12. Bussho kaisetsu daijiten, 5.242d. 13. T. 1565, p. 39c.24—28. 14. T. 1565, p. 40a.4-5. 15. T. 1565, p. 40a.7. See Edward Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975, pp. 263-265. 16. T. 1565, p. 40a. 13-14. 17. T. 1565, p. 40a.21. See Conze, The Urge Sutra, p. 265. 18. T. 1565, p. 40a.22. 19. T. 1565, p. 40b.6. 20. T. 1565, p. 40b. 13-14. 21. T. 1565, p. 40b. 19-20. Compare Candrakirti's Prasannapadd: "Emptiness is taught in order to lay to rest all prapanca without exception. Thus the intent of emptiness is the laying to rest of prapanca in its entirety. But you, in [attributing] to emptiness the sense of non-being, hypostatize it." (Jacques May, Candraklrti Prasannapadd Madhyamakavjtti, Paris: AdrienMaisonneuve, 1959, p. 23, #491.)

22. Franklin Edgerion, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, pp. 380-81. 23. M. Monier-Williams, A Sanskrit English Dictionary, p. 681c, includes among the meanings of prapanca "ludicrous dialogue (as in drama)." This seems to be the sense of the Chinese "hsi-lung." 24. T. 1565, p. 41a. 1-3. 25. T. 1565, p. 41a.8. 26. T. 1565, p. 41a.9. 27. T. 1565, p. 44c.24-25. 28. T. 1565, p. 45a.6. 29. T. 1565, p. 45a. 14-16. 30. T. 1565, p. 45a.23-24. 31. T. 1565, p. 45b.2. 32. T. 1565, p. 45b.7-8; reference is the Madhyamakakdrikd 18.9, but Asaiiga relates the stanza to the two truths. 33. T. 1565, p. 45c.6-8. 34. Mahdydnasarftgraha 2.3; Etienne Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Vehicle d'Asanga, Louvain: Editions Peeters, 1973, p. 90; Nagao Gadjin, Shodaijoron: Wayaku to chukai, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1982, p. 281. 35. Lamotte, La Somme, p. 90, n. 3. 36. Nagao, "From Madhyamika to Yogacara," p. 36. 37. Mahdydnasamgraha 2.16; Lamotte, p. 108; Nagao, pp. 328-329. 38. Mahdydnasaingraha 2.4; Lamotte, pp. 90-91; Nagao, p. 283. 39. Mahdydnasarfigraha 2.22; Lamotte, pp. 115-118; Nagao,

pp. 349-351. 40. Mahaydnasarpgraha 2.2; Lamotte, pp. 87-88, Nagao, p. 275. 41. Nagao, Shodaijoron, p. 273. 42. Mahdydnsarrigraha 2.29; Lamotte, p. 125; Nagao, p. 376. 43. Keenan, John P., "The Intent and Structure of Yogacara Philosophy: Its Relevance for Modern Religious Thought," Otani daigaku shinshu sogo kenkyujo: Kenkyujoho," #15, 1987. 44. Mahayanasamgraha 2.26; Lamotte, p. 121; Nagao, p. 362. 45. Madhyamakakdrikd 24.18