Śūnyatā from Madhyamaka to Early Yogācāra Philosophy

Śūnyatā from Madhyamaka to Early Yogācāra Philosophy

by

Huynh Thi Ha Vy (Ven. Thich Nu An Hanh)

A thesis submitted to the graduate school in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts at the International Buddhist College, Thailand

Abstract

The variety of philosophical and psychological teaching in Mahāyāna Buddhism leads to a difficulty of finding out what it in fact declares, especially in its two great Schools, Early

Madhyamaka and Early Yogācāra in Indian Buddhism. Thereby, Mahāyāna Buddhist thought is sometimes even seen as contradictory in itself. It has been tended to view the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools as divergent and radically opposed movements. In order to avert the growing of this argument, this dissertation examines the system of thought of both these philosophies. It investigates closely the relation between them, focusing on the fundamental doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism – emptiness (śūnyatā, Pāli: suññatā). It paves the way for the both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophies, and functions as a vital link which connects the whole of Mahāyāna Buddhist doctrinal thought.

In thorough investigation of the doctrine of emptiness in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools, the latter does not reject the doctrine of the former. The two Schools even should be viewed as a complementary continuity rather than contradictory. The Madhyamaka philosophy focuses on the philosophy of absolute emptiness which is a natural outcome of the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), empty of self nature of all phenomena. This notion, however, was brought to completion by the Yogācāra with various positive theories such as the theory of consciousness-only (cittamātra), the three-nature theory (trisvabhāva), etc. In addressing the philosophy regarding the relation between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra the thesis focuses on two doctrines which are closely associated with the two schools respectively: the two truths and the three natures. The Yogācāra doctrine of three natures does not negate or correct the Madhyamaka notion of two truths, but be in accord with and complementary to the two truths. They only argue the same doctrine of emptiness through their own terminologies. The thesis finally indicates the importance of right understanding of emptiness in progressing insight meditation on emptiness for attaining the highest enlightenment, Buddhahood.

Acknowledgements

The successful completion of this thesis would not have been possible without the kind guidance, assistance and criticism of the following individuals and organizations. Firstly, I want to express my gratitude to the International Buddhist College. It gave me the opportunities not only to study the Dharma of the Buddha, but also to study intensively and relatively free of financial worries. I want to thank Prof. Kapila Abhayawansa for his excellent lectures on Buddhism in all aspects, and also for his guidance and feedback during the period of writing this thesis.

I want to thank Prof. Tilak Kariyawasam for recommending and providing valuable Buddhist literature. It helped me a lot to make my research work easier and to deepen my knowledge of Buddhism.

I want to thank Dr. Dhammanandi for providing me with documents relevant to my research; thanks to Dr. Krishna Ghosh Della Santina for her valuable suggestions regarding the contents and philosophical terminologies; thanks to Dr. Fa Qing for recommending all research formulations. Additionally, I would like to thank my friends, Bhikṣu Nhuan Thinh, Bhikṣu Hue Phat, Ms. Margot Jarrett and Mr. Ben Goldstein, for spending their time to read, correct and suggest good ideas on my thesis.

For the last two years I enjoyed working in the IBC library. Special thanks to the library staff for helping me out with books and providing me a place where I could work concentrated and quietly. Table of Contents

Abstract i Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents iiiii Abbreviations v Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Chapter 2 Śūnyatā Concept in Madhyamaka Philosophy 3

2.1 A Brief Introduction of Madhyamaka School 3

2.2 Śūnyatā as the Central Doctrine of Madhyamaka 5

2.3 Śūnyatā and Pratītyasamutpāda 9

2.4 Śūnyatā and Upādāya-prajñapti 13

2.5 Śūnyatā and Madhyamā-pratipad 16 Chapter 3 Śūnyatā Concept in Yogācāra Philosophy 24

3.1 A Brief Introduction to the Yogācāra School 24

3.2 Ālaya-vijñāna in Accordance with Pratītyasamutpāda 26

3.3 The Three Natures (Trisvabhāva) in Relation to Śūnyatā 30

3.4 The Middle Path as neither Void nor Non-void 36

3.5 Śūnyatā Concept of Yogācāra School in relation to Early Buddhism 38 Chapter 4 Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools in Relation 41

4.1 The Historical Relationship 41

4.2 The Philosophical Relationship 46

4.2.1 The Concept of Vijñāna in Madhyamaka 46

4.2.2 The Two Truths and the Three Natures 48

4.2.3 In Terms of the Notion of Śūnyatā 53 Chapter 5 Practice of Śūnyatā in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Insight Meditation 59

5.1 Right View of Śūnyatā 59

5.2 Meditation on Emptiness 61

5.2.1 Meditation on Non-self 61

5.2.2 Meditation on Mind 64

5.2.3 Meditation on Absolute Emptiness 66 Chapter 6 Conclusion 69 Glossary 71 Bibliography 82

Primary sources 82

Secondary sources 83

Abbreviations

A.D. Anno Domini
AN Aṅguttara-nikāya (figures: number of sutta)
BC Before Christ
BCAP Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā by Prajñākaramati
ca. circa
CE Common Era
Dhp Dhammapada (figures: number of verse)
DN Dīgha-nikāya (figures: number of sutta)
etc. et cetera
i.e. id est (that is)
ibid. Ibidem (the same)
MMK Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (“MMK VI. 8” means chapter 6, verse 8)
MN Majjhima-nikāya (figures: number of sutta)
MSg Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (“MSg I.17” means chapter 1, verse 17)
MV Madhyānta-vibhāga (“MV I.1” means chapter 1, verse 1)
Mvb Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya (“Mvb I. 10c” means chapter 1, verse 10c)
MVK Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā (“MVK I. 14” means chapter 1, verse 14)
MVKB Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā-bhāṣya (“MVKB I.3” means chapter 1, verse 3)
p. page number
pp. pages number
PP Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti prasannapadā
Skt Sanskrit

SN Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN 54:9 means saṃyuttas 54, sutta 9.)
ŚS Śūnyatāsaptati (figures: number of verse)
T Taishō Chinese Tripiṭaka (大正新修大藏經 figures: number of volume, for example, “T25, no.1509, 691b15” means the Taishō Tripiṭaka Vol 25, Number 1509, page 691, col. b, line 15).
TSN Trisvabhāva-Nirdeśa (figures: number of verse)
trans. translation
YṢ Yuktiṣaṣṭikā (figures: number of verse)
 

Chapter 1 Introduction

When observing the history of Buddhist Philosophies of early Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism, the twofold basis that became prominent is Madhyamaka founded by Nāgārjuna and Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda by Maitreya, Asaṅga and Vasubhandu. They progress during the first four centuries of the Common Era. The fundamental treatise of the Madhyamaka system emphasizes the important doctrine of the supreme reality as emptiness (śūnyatā). Śūnyatā is a specific system of philosophy of Buddhism during the developmental period of

Mahāyāna Buddhism. Meanwhile, Yogācāra is considered as the Mind-only School focusing principally on analysis of the system of consciousness. Finally, Yogācāra is firmly on the side of Mahāyāna, having absorbed the basic Mahāyāna teaching of śūnyatā. Thus, it seems difficult to define the relationship between both these Mahāyāna traditions exactly. So, a legitimate question as to whether that theory of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra is same or different could easily arise.

Some scholars such as Gadjin Nagao, Ian Charles Harris, Richard King, Elena Hanson, etc. argue regarding the close relationship between these two schools in terms of the notion śūnyatā and many others doctrines as well. Nagao states the Mādhyamika thought of śūnyatā was extended within the Yogācāra by their system of the three-nature theory that dependent upon the logic of convertibility. Therefore, this dissertation attempts to elaborate the role and functions of the śūnyatā teaching as the core doctrine in both philosophies as well as the relational nature between them. Through this thesis, a right understanding of the

śūnyatā doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism, in particular of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, is on the one hand comprehended. On the other, the view that the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra present two radically opposed sets of doctrines must probably be rejected. It is important to discover that the Mahāyāna Buddhist tradition as a unity supports the stance taken by both the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra. The terms ‘Madhyamaka’ and ‘Yogācāra’ throughout this thesis refer to the early Madhyamaka and the early Yogācāra in early Indian Buddhism.

This thesis will examine the doctrine of śūnyatā which paved the way for Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophies and functioned as a vital link between them. In order to investigate it, Chapter 1 shows, in brief, the Madhyamaka School secured by an explanation on the doctrine śūnyatā and its nature, place and function in Madhyamaka philosophy. Śūnyatā here is elaborated in relation to Dependent Origination

(pratītyasamupāda), concept depending upon (upādāyaprajñapti) and Middle Path (madhyamā-pratipad). All characteristics of self-nature (svabhāva), dharmatā, the two truths and Nāgārjuna’s dialectical method are therein expressed. Chapter 2 introduces, in short, the Yogācāra School coming along with concentration on how the doctrine of śūnyatā is underlined in Yogācāra philosophy. They emphasize the structure of consciousness, especially the storehouse consciousness

(ālayavijñāna). Therefore, ālayavijñāna in accordance with pratītyasamutpāda which is the central teaching of early Buddhism and also in Madhyamaka is stated. The three nature doctrine (trisvabhāva) in relation to the notion śūnyatā, and the Middle Path as neither void nor non-void will be discussed in this part. The chapter closes with an introduction to the emptiness concept of Yogācāra School relating to Early Buddhism. Chapter 3 emphasizes the śūnyatā doctrine as a vital connection between

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra philosophies. Their relationship from both historical and philosophical aspects is investigated. In the latter, it explains the concept of vijñāna which is also accepted by Nāgārjuna. The correspondence between the two truths and the three nature theory will be mentioned and finally the equivalent explanation of the śūnyatā doctrine is indicated in the typical works of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Chapter 4 mentions the practice of śūnyatā in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra insight meditation. Initially, the meditator must realize the right understanding of emptiness. He subsequently penetrates into the meditation stages, meditation on non-self, on mind and on absolute emptiness, for the sake of the highest enlightenment, Buddhahood. Chapter 2 Śūnyatā Concept in Madhyamaka Philosophy

2.1 A Brief Introduction of Madhyamaka School

The Madhyamaka as a systematic philosophy arose only in the second century C.E.

with the figure of the great scholar and saint Ācārya Nāgārjuna. It has had a continuous history of development from the time of its formulation to the total disappearance of Buddhism from India (the 11th century). It is possible to distinguish four main stages in the development of the school. The first is the stage of systematic formulation by Nāgārjuna and his disciple Āryadeva. In the second stage, Madhyamaka is divided into two schools – the

Prāsangika represented by Buddhapālita and Svātantrika by Bhāvaviveka. The third stage includes Candrakīrti and Śāntideva who bring Madhyamaka to its rigorous, orthodox form and also follow the Prāsangika. The last stage is a syncretism of the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka represented by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. Nāgārjuna is believed to have lived in South India during the later part of the second century and the early part of the third century (ca. 150-250 A.D.). He is sometimes referred as ‘the second Buddha’. His considerable corpus includes texts addressed to lay audiences, letters of advice to kings, and a set of

metaphysical and epistemological treatises that represent the skeptical and dialectical approach of Madhyamaka philosophy; most important and principal of these is his best work as the ‘Mūlamadhyamakakārikā’ (literally ‘Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way’). Madhyamaka philosophy of Nāgārjuna has sometimes been called the central philosophy of the Mahāyāna tradition, and even the central philosophy of Buddhism in general. T.R.V. Murti mentions the Madhyamaka does justice to the importance of the central philosophy of Buddhism because of representing the quintessence of the teaching of the Buddha. Thereby, Madhyamaka philosophy or the philosophy of the Middle Way came to its widespread influence not only in India but also in Tibet, China and Japan. The essentials of Madhyamaka are in complete agreement with the utterances of the

Buddha recorded in the Pāli Canon. For instance in the ‘Mahāli Sutta’ , in the ‘Poṭṭhapāda Sutta’ , in the ‘Mahānidāna Sutta’ , in the ‘Cūḷamāluṅkya Sutta’ , in the ‘Aggivacchagotta Sutta’ , in the ‘Vacchagotta Sutta’ , and in the ‘Avyākata Sutta’ the Buddha also speaks about ‘emptiness’ (śūnyatā)—the central topic of Madhyamaka—in the highest terms. Furthermore, the tetralemma (Catuṣkoṭi) which will be discussed later is so characteristic of Madhyamaka and is introduced within the Pāli Canon. The Majjhima Nikāya states “dependent on the oil and the wick” (the Buddha declared) “does light in the lamp burn; it is neither in the one nor in the other, nor anything in itself; phenomena are, likewise, nothing in themselves. All things are unreal; they are deceptions; Nibbāna is the only truth”.

Additionally, the direct precursors of the Madhyamaka philosophy were the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. The philosophical content of the Prajñāpāramitā literature is the doctrine of śūnyatā, which was systematically expounded by the Madhyamaka. The Madhyamaka is thereby known as the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā), functioning as a critique against the idea of the concept of self-nature (svabhāva), which has been developed by Abhidharma scholars from the Sarvāstivāda school, and which can be regarded as a notion of permanent existence. This doctrine of emptiness is not avoiding the two alternatives of existence and non-existence, but a philosophically critical attitude. Nāgārjuna has declared in Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (hereafter, MMK) XIII.8 that

“The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible”.

2.2 Śūnyatā as the Central Doctrine of Madhyamaka

Central to the Mahāyāna movement was a spirit of negation that broke through the dharma-theory according to which the term ‘emptiness’ (Skt: śūnyatā, Pāli: suññatā). The

Sanskrit ‘śūnya’ seems to derive from the root ‘śvi’ meaning ‘to swell’. Śūnya mean literally ‘relating to the swollen’ while the root śvi seems to have expressed the idea that something which looks ‘swollen’ from the outside is ‘hollow’ inside. Buddhist usage of the term expresses strong negation as well as positive connotation of ultimate reality, an affirmation that has passed through negation of relativity.

It was Nāgārjuna who consolidated ideas of śūnyatā found in sutras into a philosophical system. He linked the idea of śūnyatā to the idea of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) that had been the core of Buddhism. He indicated this standpoint of emptiness in MMK XXIV.18

“We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness. That is dependent upon convention. That itself is the middle path”. It can be seen, in this verse, that the four key terms śūnyatā (emptiness), pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), upādāya-prajñapti (designation or derived name) and madhyamā-pratipad (Middle Path) are expressly declared as synonyms.34

It is Dependent Origination that is the truth of the world realized by the Buddha in his enlightenment. The essential teaching of Prajñāpāramitā literature is that all entities which originate dependently are ultimately unoriginated, unextinguished and empty as expressed in Aṣṭasāhasrikā “the Bodhisattva who understands conditioned coproduction (pratītyasamutpāda) as non-production; and this wisdom as non-extinction as the rays of the sun freed from the covering of the clouds; so he has dispelled the covering of ignorance”. The Prajñāpāramitā puts it as, “all putative elements of existence are void, because they lack

self-existence”. T.R.V Murti states Dependent Origination is not the temporal sequence of entities but their essential dependence , characterized by emptiness, non-existence and negation. For this process, Candrakīrti as well as Buddhapālita and Bhāvaviveka also affirm, “because it is devoid of self-being (niḥsvabhāva) it is empty”. Nāgārjuna also writes, in the Śūnyatāsaptati, “It is because the inherent existence of all phenomena is not to be found in causes, conditions, aggregations or individualities. Thus all phenomena are devoid of inherent existence and are empty”. He, moreover, indeed rejects the reality of the aggregates (skandhas) in the fourth chapter of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. It is stated in

Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra “the Bodhisattva finds that all these dharmas are entirely empty... not course in form, in feeling, or perception, in will or consciousness, but wanders without home, remaining unaware of coursing firm in wisdom, His thoughts on nonproduction - then the best of all the calming trances cleaves to him.”

Śūnyatā in this text is upādāya-prajñapti translated as a designation based upon some material. Candrakīrti states ‘pratītyasamutpāda....is given the name upādāya-prajñapti’. Nagao explains any names or designations are conventional and cannot represent the ultimate reality, which remains silent (tūṣṇīṃ-bhāva) and beyond all grasping (anupalabdhi, anabhilāpya). The doctrine of elements or dharmas can be without difficulty subordinated to the doctrine of emptiness,

the reverse is not possible. The Buddha compares “the dharmas to a raft, being for the purpose of crossing over, not for the purpose of grasping”. The Buddha speaks of emptiness and of the non-reality of all dharmas that cannot be understood in any other way than the ultimate teaching. Nāgārjuna states “the teaching of the dharma by the Buddhas is based upon two truths: worldly convention and ultimate fruit. Those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths do not understand the profound truth embodied in the Buddha's message”. Thus Madhyamaka suggests the division of the truth into the

conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) referring to upādāyaprajñapti for saṃvṛti and prajñapti as synonyms is intended by the Buddha himself and the ultimate truth (paramārtha satya) to śūnyatā. A similar distiction is suggested with respect to the canonical scriptures as of expedient import (neyārtha) and of direct import (nītārtha). Otherwise, this division into two truths is also suggested in the Prajñāpāramitā literature. The Aṣṭasāhasrikā states “as mere talk he (Bodhisattva) cognizes all these dharmas which the Buddha has demonstrated, practised and revealed. Though he may teach for many niyutas of kotis of aeons, yet the Dharma-element does not get exhausted nor does it increase”. Śūnyatā itself is the Middle Path which is dialectical, moving from affirmation to negation and again to affirmation; and not a point between two extremes nihilism

(ucchedadiṭṭhi), eternalism (sassastadiṭṭhi). The Middle Way passing beyond the two extremes of eternalism and nihilism taught by the Buddha has been expounded essentially by Nāgārjuna “the teacher has spoken of relinquishing both becoming and other-becoming. Therefore, it is proper to assume that freedom is neither existence nor non-existence.” Thereby, śūnyatā affirms ‘saṃsāra is identical to nirvāṇa’ that passing beyond negation of both affliction and liberation. This ‘identical’ process is exemplified by the Catuṣkoṭi of Nāgārjuna that consists of any four alternative propositions such as ‘existence’,

‘nonexistence’, both ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’, neither ‘existence’ nor ‘non-existence’. The dialectical analysis is evident in the presentation of the fourteen inexpressibles (avyākṛta) found in the Pāli canon as mentioned above. For instance, the Buddha rejected the views that “the world is not eternal; the world is finite; infinite; the soul and the body are the same; the soul is one thing and the body another; after death a Tathāgata exists; after death a Tathāgata does not exist; after death a Tathāgata both exists and does not exist; after death a

Tathāgata neither exists nor does not exist” that is also stated in MMK XXV.17-18. This non-differentiation and identity, in the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras, is also mentioned that form is not different from emptiness; emptiness is not different from form in the verse “the spaceelement in the eastern direction, and in the southern, and so in the western and northern directions is boundless; above and below, in the ten directions, as far as it goes; there is no multiplicity, and no difference is attained. Past Suchness, future Suchness, Present Suchness, the Suchness of the Arhats, the Suchness of all dharmas, the Suchness of the Jinas; all that is the Dharma-suchness, and no difference is attained.”63

The Buddha has regarded the doctrine of emptiness as the real essence of his teaching in the Pāli canon. In the Saṁyutta Nikāya, the Buddha spoke of the monks of the future period who “won't listen when discourses that are words of the Tathāgata — deep, deep in their meaning, transcendent, connected with emptiness (suññatā paṭisaṃyuttā)— are being recited”. Therefore, the doctrine of emptiness of Madhyamaka comes from the real heart of the teaching of Śākyamuni. The

direct precursor of the Madhyamaka philosophy as mentioned above was the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras. The Mādhiyamika system is the systematised form of śūnyatā doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā treatises. Candrakīrti says Nāgārjuna had deeply realized the Prajñāpāramitā literature “ācārya-Nāgārjunasya viditāviparītaprajñāpāramitā-nīteḥ”. The Prajñāpāramitā revolutionised Buddhism, in all aspects of its philosophy and religion, through the basic concept of śūnyatā of all empirical notions and speculative theories.65 The Prajñāpāramitā and the literature of Madhyamaka reiterated the one basic idea that the real is neither one, neither many, neither ātman nor anātman; it is as it is always, Murti proved.

2.3 Śūnyatā and Pratītyasamutpāda

Paṭiccasamuppāda ( Skt. Pratītyasamutpāda) is often translated as ‘dependent arising’ or ‘dependent origination’ referring to the nature of existence declared by the Buddha. The Paṭicca-samuppāda-vibhaṅga Sutta (SN 12.2) continues to define each of the twelve links of dependent origination systematically. Its law is described as “When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that 65. T.R.V. Murti, p. 83.

does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases”. This theory is formulated on the basis of the existence of ‘dependently arisen phenomena’ (paṭiccasamuppanna dhamma, Skt: Pratītyasamutpannatva dharma). The meaning of paṭiccasamuppāda is best eluciated by clarifying the implications of paṭiccasamuppanna. In other words, a thing can originate neither out of itself nor out of other nor out of both nor out of neither. An abstraction noun dhammatā (Skt: dharmatā) meaning the ‘nature of phenomena’ without svabhāva is applied to describe paṭiccasamuppāda.

Mādhyamika retained this primitive notion of paṭiccasamuppāda which is reclaimed as a doctrine of emptiness by Nāgārjuna. In Madhyamaka philosophy, paṭiccasamuppāda itself is referred to as idappaccayatā (Skt. idaṃ pratyayatā), ‘dependent on this’ or ‘conditionality’ , for example, the production of a sprout involves the coming together of an array of contributory factors such as soil, the correct degree of moisture and warmth, etc. While Paṭiccasamuppanna is referred to as a upādāya-prajñapti, ‘designation having recourse’. Throughout Nāgārjuna’s works , the basic philosophical position is that entities (bhāva)

are empty of self-nature (niḥsvabhāva). Entities exist, it is true, but they exist and arise only in dependence upon conditions. ‘Those who are wise in regard to entities see that entities are impermanent, deceptive factors, pithless, empty, insubstantial and wholy vacuous’ (Yuktiṣaṣṭikā 25). In the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) Nāgārjuna states all entities are empty without svabhāva. They are, in other words, dependently arisen (pratītyasamutpannatva):

“Because all things are empty of inherent existence (svabhāva) the Peerless Tathāgata has shown the emptiness of inherent existence of dependent arising as the reality of all things.”

Nāgārjuna also basing on the Buddha’s declaration “an oil-lamp burns in dependence on oil and wick; it is neither in the one nor in the other, nor anything in itself...all things are of a deceptive nature, unreal, but only Nibbāna which has an undeceptive nature is the supreme noble truth” says the Lord which means śūnyatā is the dependence of things which is deceptive and delusive. Candrakīrti comments on Nāgārjuna’s MMK XV. 285 and affrims that the true nature of all entities is śūnyatā which is the state of absence of svabhāva

(niḥsvabhāva or naiḥsvābhāvya) , “śūnyatā does neither arise nor die as all these things are devoid of their self-characters”. Śūnyatā then appears to mean both that entities are dependently arisen (pratītyasamutpannatva), and that they do not have foundational existence (dravyasat) but conceptually constructed existence (prajñaptisat). Here Nāgārjuna proclaims the absence of self-nature of beings and thereby declares all descriptions of dependent origination as empty of substance, too. In other words, the dependently arisen does not originate with svabhāva. Pratītyasamutpāda is thus equated with śūnyatā by Nāgārjuna

because of lacking a nature of its own (niḥsvabhāva).92 However, one must not lean to either side to elevate one or the other to a position of superiority. If one loses sight of emptiness and claims that the principle of Buddhism is dependent origination, one has departed from Mahāyāna. Likewise, if one overemphasizes emptiness, one will fall into dogmatism, i.e. to evade the conventionality of being in the world. Emptiness and dependent origination must thus be understood together as an identity of absolute contradictories. Being interdependent, they are empty. When all phenomena, the birth-death cycle itself is empty, there is nothing that exists permanently as its own essence, i.e. all functions of beings depend upon others; then dependent origination is emptiness and emptiness is dependent origination.

This identity is particularly clear in MMK XXIV. 18 mentioned above as well as at the very beginning verse of MMK in which Nāgārjuna gives his famous eight negation as pratītyasamutpāda’s characteristic declared by the Buddha. From the absolute standpoint there is non-extinction (anirodham), non-origination (anutpādam), non-destruction (anucchedam), non-permanence (aśāśvataṃ), non-identity (anekārtham), non-differentiation (anānārtham), non-coming into being (anāgamam) and non-going out of being (anirgamaṃ); withdrawal of all fabrication (prapañcopaśamaṃ) of dependent origination. The doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda without origination and without destruction thus is boldly expounded by

Nāgārjuna, i.e. never and nowhere can anything be produced. Dependent origination thereby manifests the nature of phenomena (dharmatā) which is non-origination and noncessation (anutpannāniruddhā); empty of svabhāva that all are seen to be synonymous with emptiness. T.R.V. Murti states partītyasamutpāda is not the principle of temporal sequence, but of the essential dependence of things on each other, i.e. the unreality of separate elements (naiḥsvābhāvya, dharma-nairātmya). The entire Mādhyamika system is a re-interpretation of Pratītyasamutpāda. Moreover, Kalupahana says this is the easy route

to the belief in the so-called ‘non-conceptual’ (nirvikalpa) ultimate reality (paramārtha).101 Nāgārjuna once again affirms that ‘a thing that is not dependently arisen is not evident; for that reason, a thing that is non-empty is indeed not evident’. Candrakīrti, moreover, quotes with approval the canonical statement to the effect that ‘the Buddhas who know the true nature (dharmatā, 法性) may either arise or not arise but the dharmatā remains’.

2.4 Śūnyatā and Upādāya-prajñapti

The world of convention is the network of concepts and conventional entities (Pāli:

paññatti, Skt. prajñapti, Chinese: 波羅攝提) with its original form prajñaptirupādāya105 or it is usually expressed upādāyaprajñapti (Pāli: upādāyapaññatti or upādāpaññatti) as ‘concept depending upon’.106 The Buddha reveals the true nature of all things by means of nāma and lakṣaṇa (以名字相) in order for all to understand the truth of things. The complex of the five aggregates, ‘man’ or ‘woman’ is the nāma (name, 名); the bodily features by means of which the person can be distinguished as man or woman constitute the lakṣaṇa (sign, 相). Lakṣaṇa then is the root and nāma is the branch. Here, nāma as the name or concept, lakṣaṇa as the content or self-characteristic, nirmāṇa (化) as creation, saṃvṛti as the veil of the truth of things, vyavahāra (世間) as empirical validity, prapañca (戲 論) as an elaboration through prajñapti are considered as synonyms with prajñapti. As mentioned above Kalupahana and Burton also took saṃvṛti, vyavahāra and prajñapti as synonyms, as was intended by the Buddha himself in DN iii.202. Nāgārjuna uses the terms saṃvṛti and vyavahāra which have the same meaning with prajñapti in MMK XVII.24 and MMK

XXIV.6, 8. They are equivalents not only in the verbal expression, the ‘name’ that stands for the thing, but also the concept that the word conveys. It is in this way that prajñapti is used in ‘upādāya-prajñapti’ which is not only the names but also the entities they designate and translated as ‘derived name’, 假名 in Chinese.113

There are three kinds of prajñapti as dharma-prajñapti (法波羅攝提), avavādaprajñapti (受波羅攝提) and nāmasaṅketa-prajñapti (名字波羅攝提). Dharma-prajñapti is the subtle elements like the five skandhas, the twelve āyatanas and the eighteen dhātus. Avavāda-prajñapti is the complex entity constituted of these subtle elements. When the subtle things such as ‘roots’, ‘branches’, ‘leaves’ and ‘flowers’ combine, there is ‘individual’ which is a derived name, a ‘tree’. It is then called avavāda-prajñapti because here ‘nāma rūpa’ are seized. Through these two prajñapti, the composite entity called the ego is constituted. At the end of many names, yet other names arise, e.g. at the end of the names

‘roots’, ‘branches’, ‘leaves’ and ‘flowers’, there arises yet another name, ‘tree’. This is nāmasaṅketa-prajñapti. Prajñaptirupādāya in MMK is avavāda-prajñapti in Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra which is explained in ‘The Mahā-prajñāpāramitā-śāstra of Nāgārjuna’ (大智度論). Nāgārjuna means that an entity is a prajñaptirupādāya which is a concept (prajñapti) depending on its parts (upādāya). The term prajñaptirupādāya is used to denote conceptually constructed existents (prajñaptisat) by Nāgārjuna. These are really accounts of conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) of being meant to be of help to one in giving up one’s

false imaginations about the true nature of things, i.e. the emptiness (śūnyatā) of all entities in the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya).117 Saṃvṛti satya (Pāli: sammuti sacca, Chinese: 世俗) is defined as (1) one covering up entirely the real nature of things and making them appear; (2) as the mutual dependence of things – their relativity; (3) as conventional nature (saṃvṛti saṃketa) depending as it does on what is usually accepted by the common folk (loka-vyavahāraḥ) according to Candrakīrti. Paramārtha satya (Pāli: paramattha sacca, Chinese: 勝義) in which its parama meaning ‘ultimate, 勝’ while artha ‘meaning, 義 ’

is the ultimate truth as the knowledge of the real without any distortion (akṛtrinam vasturūpam) ; without the function of saṁvṛti; beyond the scope of discursive thought, language and empirical activity; and as the unutterable, the unthinkable, the unteachable, etc. The Buddha’s teaching of the dharma is based upon two truths, saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya. He says “these are (teachings) merely names, expressions,

turns of speech, designations in common use in the world (saṃvṛti), which the Tathāgata uses without misapprehending them”. Paramārthasatya, Nāgārjuna says, is the ultimate truth about the various entities constituting the world. These entities are conceptual constructs or conventions (prajñapti), but the ultimate truth can only be taught in dependence upon conventions (prajñapti), i.e. the conventional truth. Nirvāṇa is achieved only when one comprehends the nature of all entities, i.e. prajñapti which is emptiness as stated above in their ultimate truth because of their dependently arising without svabhāva. Candrakīrti also argues ‘without assenting to ordinary conventions, it is simply not possible to teach the ultimate truth; and without realizing the ultimate truth, it is not possible to realize nirvāṇa’.

According to Nāgārjuna, “those who do not understand the distinction between these two truths do not understand the profound truth embodied in the Buddha’s message.”

In conclusion, the complex entities constructed out of the svabhāva endowed the ultimate truth have conceptually constructed (prajñapti) and are the conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya) which arise from causes and conditions and is dependent. Candrakīrti states “[those foolish people] do not see the truth of pratītyasamutpāda which is free from [the wrong views of] eternalism and nihilism; and being given the name upādāya-prajñapti.”

He even suggests that śūnyatā and upādāyaprajñapti are different names (viśeṣasaṁjñā) for pratītyasamutpāda. He takes the example of the chariot, that its prajñapti, which occurs depending on (upādāya) the parts of chariot such as wheels, axle, chassis, yoke, etc. is not produced with svabhāva. Non-production with svabhāva, Candrakīrti says, is emptiness (śūnyatā).129 Knowledge in the saṃvṛti could be different on two principle grounds as the difference of objects or of the cognizing agent. Since both these differences are absent in the paramārtha, however, it is of one uniform, undifferentiated nature. Therefore, all things are one and vice versa, i.e. śūnyatā, prajñapti, pratītyasamutpāda, dharmatā, tathatā, saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, etc. are the same in the paramārthasatya and empty (śūnya) of svabhāva. Thus,

Nāgārjuna asserts “The Victorious Ones have announced that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. Those who are possessed of the view of emptiness are said to be incorrigible”.

2.5 Śūnyatā and Madhyamā-pratipad

Madhyamā-pratipad in its early original Pāli form ‘Majjhimā paṭipadā’ can be justifiably rendered into English as ‘Middle Way’ or ‘Middle Path’ and ‘ for the Buddha himself used the term ‘magga’ as a synonym for the term ‘paṭipadā’. Majjhimā paṭipadā is identified with the last of the Four Noble Truths, Dukkhanorodhagāmina paṭipadā by the Buddha, i.e. identified with the Noble Eightfold Path (Ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo) in the Dhamma-cakkappavattana Sutta. This way leading to the cessation of suffering is said to be middle since it avoids the two religious extremes, self-indulgence (kāma-

sukhallikānuyoga) and self-mortification (attakilamathānuyoga). It should be kept in mind that the middle way of the Eightfold Path is not just a teaching but a practice for the cessation of suffering. It is the statement by the Buddha himself with the thought, “this is the noble truth of the way leading to the cessation of suffering, and this way has to be developed’, there arose in the Tathāgata, bhikkhus, vision, knowledge, insight, wisdom, light, concerning things unknown before”. On the other hand, paṭipadā is referred as to be practiced, trained such as the phrase ‘anupubba-paṭipadā’ (gradual practice)136 and ‘sekha-paṭipadā (practice for the trainer). Majjhimā paṭipadā as Noble Eightfold Path is emphasized as the practical aspect of Buddhism.

The Buddha presents, however, not only the practical aspect but also the doctrinal aspect in terms of majjhimāpaṭipadā to explain the reality of things. Nagara Sutta states that the Buddha discovered the ancient path which is nothing but the middle way of Eightfold Path. On the strength of this, the Buddha realizes both aspects of samudaya and nirodha which refer to micchā-paṭipadā, meaning the mode of emergence, and sammā-paṭipadā, meaning the mode of cessation, in the twelve linked formula of paṭiccasamuppāda. Paṭiccasamuppāda thereby has to be realized by practicing the middle path. The Buddha further presents

paṭiccasamuppāda as a teaching in the middle way and right view as well as rejecting two doctrinal extremes in Kaccāyana-gotta Sutta of Saṁyutta-nikāya. In this sutta, the Buddha teaches the dhamma is paṭiccasamuppāda without veering to the two extremist wrong views while he in Dhamma-cakkappavattana Sutta explains what he himself has awaken to without veering to the two extremes. They are eternalism (sassata diṭṭhi), meaning everything exists (sabbaṃ atthi), and nihilism (uccheda diṭṭhi), meaning everything does not exist (sabbaṃ natthi). Consequently, conditionality or Paṭiccasamuppāda, as the reality of the world, is a doctrine following the middle path realized by the Buddha. Therefore, the doctrine of paṭiccasamuppāda as the objective reality becomes the middle path (Majjhimā paṭipadā) as not the path (belonging to practical aspect) but right view of the reality of the world (belonging to doctrinal aspect, majjhimā desanā).

Nāgārjuna emphasizes his main attention to the doctrinal aspect of paṭiccasamuppāda as the ultimate reality that is quite evident even from the first stanza of his MMK:

“Anirodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāśvataṃ anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamaṃ yaḥ praṭītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivaṃ desyāmāsa saṃbuddhaḥ taṃ vande vadatāṃ varaṃ.”

(I salute him, the fully enlightened, the best of speakers, who preached the nonceasing and the non-arising, the non-annihilation and the non-permanence, the nonidentity and the non-difference, the non-appearance and the non-disappearance, the depending arising, the appeasement of obsessions and the auspicious)146 These eight negatives used to denote pratītyasamutpāda possess two implications. The first is the truth of the phenomena, which is not the path itself but should be realized through the successful completion of the path. The second is the right view about the truth.

Nāgārjuna, however, still identifies pratītyasamutpāda with madhyamā-pratipad (middle path), i.e. to identify those two different concepts, the doctrinal and the practical, knowledge and insight that is provided in MMK XXIV.18 ‘yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe, sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā’. Kenneth K. Inada supports this statement by connecting two religious extremes rejected in majjhimā paṭipadā, kāma-sukhallikānuyoga and attakilamathānuyoga, to two doctrinal extremes in paṭiccasamuppāda, sassata diṭṭhi and uccheda diṭṭhi respectively. The scholars T.R.V. Murti and Kalupahana also follow the identification of pratītyasamutpāda with madhyamā pratipad by Nāgārjuna.

Madhyamā pratipad can be analyzed by none of the four alternatives as implicitly pointed out by the Buddha and explicitly by Nāgārjuna ‘no existents whatsover are evident anywhere that are arisen from themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause’. The formulation of four extremes (catuskoṭis) may be noted that there are two or three ways as [i] existence (asti, bhāva, sat), non-existence (nāsti, abhāva, asat), both (sadasat, bhāvābhava), and neither-nor

(naivāsti, na ca nāsti); [ii] self (sva), other (para), both (ubhaya) and neither-nor (anubhaya); one (eka), many (nānā), both (ubhaya) and neither-nor (anubhaya); identical (tat), different (anyat), both (ubhaya) and neither-nor (anubhaya); [iii] self (sva), other (para), both (ubhaya), and chance or devoid of reason (ahetuka). 152 What catukoṭis deny and what their rejection reveals is the conditioned origination of things. Professor Murti remarks that the four sets of views are schema for classifying all systems of philosophy.

The first alternative affirms existence, permanence, identity, and substantiality, which constitutes the doctrine of eternalism (śaśvatavāda); in other words its implication of the identity of cause and effect (satkāryavāda) which is advocated by Sāṅkhya. It validates the theory of self-becoming, self-manifestation and self-duplication; i.e. things are produced out of themselves (svatautpannā bhāvāḥ).156 Nāgārjuna refutes this saying ‘how can this nonarisen

arising produce itself? If it is the arisen that produces, then being born, what is it that is produced again?’ ; ‘if there were to be identity of cause and effect, then there would be oneness of producer and the produce’. Also ‘if the effect exists in the harmony of cause and conditions, it should be grasped in the harmony. However, it is in fact not apprehended in the harmony’. Entities that exist in their own substantiality, Buddhapālita argues, do not require another origination and if even though they exist, they nonetheless originate. In that case never so long as they exist, will they fail to originate. Candrakīrti and Śāntideva rely upon the reductio ad adsurdum against the notion of pre-existent effect.

The second alternative, on the contrary, the doctrine of existence from other emphasizes the ultimate differences of cause and effect (asatkāryavāda) and even the dispersal of causes. It affirms difference and impermanence absolutely that presents the doctrine of nihilism (ucchedavāda), which is advocated by the Buddhist Realists. Professor

Della Santina indicates Nāgārjuna’s criticism proceeds along two factors. On the one hand, because all entities do not exist in reality by being empty of self-existence, they cannot function as the cause of other entities as well as originate from conditions, i.e. other existence or other entities also do not exist. Nāgārjuna says “the self-nature of existents is not evident in the conditions (pratyaya including hetu, ālambana, samanantara, adhipati), etc. in the absence of self-nature, other-nature too is not evident”. On the other hand, if the cause and effect are considered as disassociation, they cannot be related to each other as cause and effect since relationship presupposes some sort of co-presence. This is impossible, so

Nāgārjuna states, “The difference between cause and effect is indeed not appropriate” because “if there were to be difference between cause and effect, then the cause would be equal to a non-cause”.

The third is simply the conjunctive affirmation of the two above alternatives, i.e. both existence and non-existence or both identity and difference that is held by Jaina philosophy. Nārgārjuna claims “neither the arising of an existent nor the arising of a non-existent is proper. Even so is the arising of that which is both existent and non-existent”. Madhyamaka says existence and non-existence cannot exist together or co-present since existence and non-existence at one time and in one object are impossible. However, they are not disassociated from each other because disassociated from non-existence, existence is not obtained and vice versa; disassociated from existence, there is no non-existence. Thereby, how does both existence and non-existence originate? Thus, the conjunctive affirmation of both existence and non-existence, or self-origination and origination from other is unacceptable.

The Madhyamaka explicitly rejects the fourth alternative expressed as neither existence nor non-existence; that phenomena arise without cause. The Madhyamaka relies upon the distinction between the two truths, conventional and ultimate that the ordinary pragmatic interpretation of causality current in the world is from the conventional standpoints, i.e. dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Nāgārjuna affirms that ‘it is known by the way of the world (relating to the

conventional truth) that this arises in dependence on that; such statements are not refuted’. Candrakīrti and Buddhapālita elicit the undesirable consequence of the notion of origination without cause which results in a universe totally devoid of properties not be apprehended by consciousness in order to be against the fourth alternative. The Madhyamaka’s criticism means this alternative as a total denial of the possibility of all statements, all ascriptions, even of all relative description. There would then be no scope for any knowledge of anything, i.e. no definite and certain knowledge of anything that which is

unacceptable. It further amounts to mistaking the distinction between two truths. The Madhyamaka here intends to the apparent recognition of the distinction of appearance and reality or the conventional and ultimate truth. Clinging to śūnyatā as a total negation is error since this is to deny even the possibility of relative judgement and vice versa, clinging to the conventional one ends in eternalism; even not to divide each other. This is called the Middle Way (Madhyamā

pratipad) which is noncontentious precisely because it is non-clinging. It is not a denial of anything, to assert this but only a rejection of the dogmatic and exclusive views. It is also free from seizing duality meaning clinging to the divisions, i.e. non-clinging.171 The Middle Path is considered as the standpoint of śūnyatā which has no standpoint of its own. For śūnyatā means also the fundamental attitude of non-clinging, anupalambha (不可得or無所得), even anupalambhaśūnyatā (不可得空).173

The Middle Way is taught as the remedy to dogmatism that śūnyatā as criticism has sense; and śūnyatā as criticism is the Middle Way. The primary meaning of śūnyatā is voidness which is a direct reference to the truth of things, mundane and ultimate; but it refers also to the method of criticism that is brought to light, i.e. by rejecting the imagination of ultimacy and absoluteness in regard to what is only relative and non-ultimate. Śūnyatā as the conventional truth is conditioned becoming that is brought to light by rejecting the supposed ultimacy of conceptual systems. Śūnyatā as the ultimate truth is the unconditioned that is brought to light by rejecting through criticism the imagination of the ultimacy of the conditionedness of the conditioned and consequently, of the division between the conditioned and the unconditioned. In this sense, thus, Śūnyatā is a synonym of madhyamā pratipad which sees things as they are.

Chapter 3 Śūnyatā Concept in Yogācāra Philosophy

3.1 A Brief Introduction to the Yogācāra School

The Yogācāra School, whose name is taken from one of its foundational texts – the Yogācārabhūmi (Stages of Yoga Practice) , arose as an independent and identifiable philosophical tradition in the fourth century C.E. focusing on a critical and reflective understanding of mind, and was founded by the two brothers Asaṅga and Vasubandhu who were born in Northwest India in what is now Pakistan. They played a central role in its formulation and popularization. Yogācāra indicates originally a particular interest in the data of meditation experience (yoga) or perhaps Vijñānavāda (school affirming consciousness), Vijñaptimātra or Cittamātra (school affirming Mind Only). This is called the school of Mind-only.

Asaṅga and Vasubandhu contributed to a large number of works defining, categorizing and setting forth the Mind-only philosophy. Asaṅga is famous for his Bodhisattvabhūmi (Stages of the Bodhisattva Path), Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of the Abhidharma) – a work specifically establishing Yogācāra Abhidharma, and the Yogācārabhūmi sometimes is also attributed to Asaṅga. He himself wrote commentaries on a number of important texts of Yogācāra Mahāyāna attributed to the Buddha Maitreya. Those which are attributed to him include Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Ornament for the Realisations), Madhyāntavibhāga (the Discrimination of the Middle from the Extremes), Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (the Discrimination of dharmas and their True Nature),

Mahāyānasūtralaṃkāra (Ornament for the Mahāyāna Sūtras) and Ratnagotravibhāga. Vasubandhu is renowned for his Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (A Treatise on the Three Natures), Triṃśatikā (A Treatise in Thirty Satnzas) and Viṃśatikā (A Treatise in Twenty Satnzas) and other texts containing commentaries on some of the above works of Maitreya such as Madhyāntavibhāgakārikābhāṣya.

Almost all modern scholars have followed Dharmapāla’s ideas and considered Yogācāra as ‘idealism’ that strays from the original ideas of Vasubandhu. Janice Willis says assessments which claim to characterize the whole of Yogācāra thought as being uniformly "idealistic" take little notice of the fact that historically—and according to the texts themselves – there existed at least two varying streams of Yogācāra thought, viz., (1) what may be called an "original" thread propounded by Maitreya, Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati; and (2) a "later" thread, which found expression notably through such authors as Dharmapāla, and Hsuan-tsang. Both "streams" were introduced into China – the earlier by Paramārtha and the later by Hsuan-tsang – and later transmitted to Japan. Moreover, while there is clear evidence that the later stream of thought, as expounded by Dharmapāla and others is "idealistic" in character, the same cannot and should not be assumed for the earlier "thread," though, in fact, this has generally been the case.

The Yogācāra philosophy – cognition theory of mind – has its origin in the earliest tradition of Buddhism. For instance, the Buddha claims mind of both deluded and pure is the creator of all things. This is mentioned in many places of the Pāli canon such as in the first two verses of Yamaka Vagga of the Dhammapada “Mind is the forerunner of all states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they…” and in the Sampasādanīya Sutta (DN 28). The Laṅkāvatāra belonging to Mahāyāna sutras deals at some length with the central principles of the Mind Only philosophy. Nevertheless, Yogācāra attempted to ground insight into

emptiness in its philosophy – a critical understanding of the mind or cognition theory – in dependently co-arisen structure of understanding, in particular, and to sketch a path toward the realization of ‘the conversion of support’, that is, of consciousness from illusion to awakening. In addition, as foundation for the cognition theory, the three-nature theory founded by this school has carried on the tradition of the emptiness of thought of the earlier period. Thus, the Yogācāra School is a reflective spirituality, i.e. while affirming the conventional validity of dependently co-arisen insight and doctrinal formulation; it maintains the centrality of ultimately meaningful emptiness.

3.2 Ālaya-vijñāna in accordance with Pratītyasamutpāda

The Yogācāra analysis of the structure of consciousness centers on two themes: (i) the container consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) in its constant interplay with the active consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñānas) of thinking (manas) and perception; and (ii) the three natures (trisvabhāva) of its functioning. The ālaya-vijñāna is the place in which are contained the impressions (vāsanā) of any karma whatsoever, good, bad or indifferent. All dharmas ensue from it as its effects. It is called therefore sarvabījaka, being the cause of everything empirical. It is vipāka-vijñāna since any kind of karma done by the individual in any sphere of existence leaves its trace in the ālaya. Thus, the ālaya serves two functions in the cosmic process (i) it is the receptum of the impressions of past vijñānas, (ii) in its own turn it gives rise to further vijñānas by maturing those impressions.

Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (hereafter, MSg) claims that the ālaya-vijñāna is necessary to fully explain the dynamic, circular causality depicted in the series of dependent arising both diachronically and synchronically. The associated activities of the pravṛtti-vijñānas perpetuate the resultant ālaya-vijñāna, which will eventually be reborn again conditioned by karmic formations (saṃskārā) at the beginning of the formula of dependent origination. Yogācāra explicitly states that what we see is that the formula of dependent origination depicts a diachronically reciprocal relationship between two distinct forms of vijñāna. This relationship is in brief mentioned in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra as below:195

First step: Depending upon:
Appropriation of material sense faculties +
Appropriation of predispositions, etc. Second step: Depending upon:
Ālaya-vijñāna (with two appropriations) +
Sense object + attention Third step: Depending upon:
Manifest cognitive awareness 
Fourth step: Depending upon:
Ālaya-vijñāna with accumulated (seeds) and
Two appropriations + sense object + attention
Whole cycle: Depending upon:
Ālaya-vijñāna with seeds and two appropriations +Sense object  ālaya-vijñāna grows and increases
 
manifest cognitive awareness
(pravṛtti-vijñāna) arises
seeds heap up, accumulate in citta
(ālaya-vijñāna)
cognitive awareness (pravṛtti-
vijñāna) arises
cognitive awareness arises, which in turn

heaps up and accumulates (seeds) in the ālaya-vijñāna. Ālaya-vijñāna is reborn with all the seeds, two appropriations, and so on. In terms of pratītyasamutpāda, saṃskārā conditions (ālaya-) vijñāna that is a precondition for development of mind and body. Mind and body appropriated by ālayavijñāna gives rise to manifest cognitive processes or active consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñānas), which heaps up and accumulates in the ālaya-vijñāna. Ālaya-vijñāna with all the seeds is reborn.

The MSg I.17 expresses “just as the ālaya-vijñāna is the cause of the defiled dharmas, so the defiled dharmas are established as the causal-condition (hetu-pratyaya) of the ālayavijñāna”. This ‘first dependent arising’ indicates the simultaneous and reciprocal conditionality (sahabhāva-, anyonya-, pratyayatā-pravṛtti) between these two distinct forms of vijñāna. Since causes are represented by the concept of seeds or impression (vāsanā), discussion about causes and

causal conditions is couched in terms of planting seeds, infusing impression and their finally coming into fruition. In other words, discussing about the relationship between the ālaya-vijñāna and pravṛtti-vijñānas is a way of discussing karmic theory that how cause and effect might operate within and between various kinds of mental processes. The vāsanā is defined as ‘that which, based upon arising and ceasing simultaneously with a dharma, is the cause of its arising (utpāda-nimitta) [in the future]’. Here, playing off the etymology of the term vāsanā as ‘perfume’, the statement illustrates this first by the example

of a sesame seed in MSg I.15 “when a sesame seed is perfumed by a flower, while the flower arises and ceases simultaneously with the sesame seed, the sesame seed [later] arises as the cause of the arising of another odor of that flower. Also, while the predisposition of sensual desire, etc. (rāgādivāsanā) of those who are engaged in sensual desire, etc., mind [later] arises as the cause (nimitta) of that (desire)…The ālaya-vijñāna should be understood in the same way.” MSg I.14 further states that “the ālaya-vijñāna is the result of past karmic activity for its arising is based upon the impresssion since beginningless time of those very defiled dharmas (i.e. the processes associated with the pravṛtti-vijñānas); and the cause for the pravṛtti to arise (because the ālaya-vijñāna which has all the seeds sarvabījaka is present at all times)”. Similarly, the pravṛtti-vijñānas which result from the seeds of the ālaya-vijñāna are in turn conjoined with the very mental factors of enjoying, discerning, stimulating that are essential for causing new karmic activities.

These, in turn, perpetuate the future arising of the ālaya-vijñāna. The ālaya-vijñāna is then regarded as both the result and the cause of the pravṛtti-vijñānas; as even the synchronic, reciprocal relations exist between them. This process thus is a crucial distinction, which points to a notion of causality of synchronic dependent arising (pratῑtyasamutpāda) – when this is, that arises.200 The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states that Pratῑtyasamutpāda is the mark of reality.

This functions between the various moments of the system of consciousness themselves. This might best be illustrated by the imagery of waves in a stream. The stream is not independent of the arising of the wave, but their arising simultaneously, for the wave is part and parcel of the stream itself. Consequently, whatever affects the waves affects the stream at the same time, so it is not a separate process. Similarly, sensual desire is part of the stream of mind itself. One thereby cannot occur without the other being simultaneously affected, since these are ultimately not separate entities, nor are their arising ultimately separate processes.202

3.3 The Three Natures (Trisvabhāva) in Relation to Śūnyatā

For Asaṅga the three-nature doctrine derives its scriptural authority through the Vaipulyasūtra, the Abhidharmasūtra and the Ghanavyūha. It receives more thorough treatment however in the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, and the Madhyāntavibhaṅga by Asaṅga, and the Trisvabhāvanirdeśa and the Triṃśikā, both ascribed to Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu describes the three natures in the first stanza of his

Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (TSN) as “the imagined (parikalpita-svabhāva), the other-dependent (paratantra-svabhāva), and the absolutely accomplished (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva): These are the three natures, which should be thoroughly known by the wise.” He argues the world of subjectivity and objectivity is characterized as only the imagined nature for its reality is depending on others in ‘that which appears is the other-dependent, for it depends on causal conditions; the form in which it appears is the imagined, for it is merely an imagination’. The absolutely accomplished nature is the absence of the imagination of unreal forms

(abhūta-parikalpa) as well as the very non-duality of subjectivity and objectivity that is mentioned in the stanzas (3) “the perceptual absence of the form in which the otherdependent appears, is to be understood as the absolutely accomplished nature, for it is never otherwise” ; and (4) “what is it that appears? It is the imagination of the non-existent. How does it appear? In the form of duality. What will result from its non-existence? There will be the state of non-duality”. The other-dependent (paratantra) nature represents a dependently origination of things and is identified with the citta by Vasubandhu in the stanza

(5) “what is meant by the imagination of the non-existent? It is thought, for by it (the subjectobject duality) is imagined. The form in which it imagines a thing, never at all exists as such.” This other-dependent signifies none other than the world of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpada) taught by the Buddha. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha gives nine essential meanings of paratantra-svabhāva as (i) the base for the appearance of entities

(sarvadharmapratibhāṣāśraya), (ii) dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), (iii) representation only (vijñaptimātratā), (iv) neither different nor non-different (from the other two svabhāvas) (na bhinno nāpy abhinnaḥ), (v) like magical illusion, etc. (māyādivat), (vi) pertaining to suffering and cleansing (samkleśāṃśikovyavadānāṃśikaś ca), (vii) the object apprendended by the knowledge realised in succession (to the wisdom) (ālambanaṃ pṛṣṭhaladhyajñānasya), (viii) Nirvāṇa without any fixed abode (apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇa), (ix) the Buddha's body constituting entities (dharmakāya).210 The Vijñaptimātratāsidhi says it is

called paratantra because it is caused by causes and conditions. Causality operates on the subjective side. An idea is not produced by any external cause but by a previous idea. It is pratītyasamutpāda which functions between the very moments of consciousness themselves. One idea generates another idea due to its own dynamism. The moments of consciousness thereby are causally efficient and so become real (pratīyasamutpannatvād vastusat). Thus, paratantra is not an uncaused freak but is the dependence on condition (pratyayādhīna). It contains the whole of phenomenal reality (cittacaittās traidhātukāḥ) and denotes all

eight vijñānas – ālaya, manas and six pravṛttivijñānas. It is a real diversification (pariṇāma) of the willing consciousness, while also called abhūta-parikalpa (the imagination of the unreal) as the seat of the creative imagination projecting the unreal object. Abhūta-parikalpa is simply the human mind as the faculty of imagination (parikalpa) that is the “real creator of the unreal”, i.e. of all phenomena. However, consciousness itself as the basis of that imagination is real from the conventional view, and this is paratantra. The constructive imagination is finally only the transcendental category of objectification that stirs consciousness into disruption.

This paratantra nature is pivotal of the three, even in the Mind Only philosophy, insofar as it is the basis for the arising of all pair concepts such as liberation and bondage, purity and defilement, self and non-self, nirvāṇa and saṃsāra, paramārtha and saṃvṛti, etc. It has, on the one hand, the potential to produce the illusory prison of saṃsāra and, on the other, the potential for the liberation of nirvāṇa. If played upon by discrimination and false imagination,

coming into the imagined nature it becomes illusion, saṃsāra; if played upon by the knowledge of abandonment of duality, coming into the absolutely accomplished it becomes nirvāṇa. Thus, the other-dependent nature supplies the potential for the emanation of all phenomenalizing activity of the enlightened beings. Asaṅga puts these notions in MSg “the dependent (paratantra) is on occasion the dependent, on occasion the same is the imagined; and on occasion the same as the accomplished”.215 This nature, in this manner, meditates between the illusion of subject-object duality and the awakened state of subjectobject

non-duality. It is the place in which the meaning of identical parikalpita-svabhāva or saṃsāra with pariniṣpanna-svabhāva or nirvāṇa can be established which is mentioned in TSN 15 “the other-dependent nature is said to be dual as well as unitary, for, it appears in dual form, while it has an illusory unity as well”.

Likewise, Vasubandhu’s commentary is suggested on “there exists the imagination of the unreal (abhūta-parikalpa), namely the discrimination (vikalpa) between the graspable or object (grāhya) and the grasper or subject (grāhaka). However, there is no pair (dvaya), such as the graspable and the grasper. There is instead emptiness (śūnyatā), which means that state of imagination of the unreal, which is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper. Even in such

emptiness there exists the imagination of the unreal. Thus, when something is absent in a container, the latter is then perceived as such; also, what is left over there, namely the container, is then recognized as such, namely, as uncontradictably existing there: this indeed is the defining characteristic of emptiness”. Here, Vasubandhu argues a thing in its absolute state of existence is devoid (śūnya) of subject-object duality, at the same time interprets

śūnyatā with reference to abhūta-parikalpa ‘which is lacking in the form of being graspable or grasper’. Śūnyatā thereby ultimately means the state of existence that is empty of the imagination of unreal and of the consequent subject-object distinction. Therefore, with reference to abhūta-parikalpa or paratantra-svabhāva the śūnyatā is expressed as ‘neither [total] assertion (because of existing the negation of the pair of subject and object) nor [total]

negation’ (because of having the assertion of the negation of that pair); ‘neither different (from the abhūta-parikalpa) nor identical (with abhūta-parikalpa)’ in MVK I.14. Śūnyatā then stands to abhūta-parikalpa just as dharmatā stands to dharma, or anityatā and anityadharma. They are not quite different (na-pṛthak) nor identical (na-eka), but just two different modes of existence of the same individual. Śūnyatā refers to one’s mode of existence in the state of nirvāṇa, while abhūta-parikalpa refers to one’s mode of existence in the state of saṃsāra. This is the true sense of emptiness (śūnyatā) in the Yogācāra system. The overall context of three natures is found in the Madhyāntavibhāgabhāṣya is rather plain as

Mvb I.1 Mvb I.5

The imagined nature objects Duality

The dependent nature imagination imagination

The consummated nature absence of duality emptiness

Furthermore, Asaṅga in his Compendium of Ascertainment says the adherence to other-dependent nature and absolutely accomplished nature as imagined nature is an ‘extreme of superimposition’; and ‘the extreme of deprecation’ is deprecation of own character [by holding] that other-dependent nature and absolutely accomplished nature do not exist [by way of their own character], whereas they [actually] do. One should understand thoroughly the mode of the meaning of

suchness in the manner of abandoning those two extremes, i.e. emptiness is manifested by the defection of them. The Laṅkāvatāra sūtra III. 48 says for ultimately svabhāvas as “there is no self-nature, no thought construction, no reality, no ālaya; these indeed are so many discriminations cherished by the ignorant who like a corpse are bad logicians”. Kambala as well as Lindtner thereby argue that the knowledge of the three natures leads to the realization of vijñaptimātra. This is nothing than the realization of emptiness. “It is the limit of the real, it is thusness, it is emptiness, it is sameness, it is liberation, it is the state of representation only”.

The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Chinese: 解深密經, English: “Unfurling the Real

Meaning,” or “Unraveling the Bonds”) is one of the most important Mahāyāna sūtras, especially for the Yogācāra school explains the first nature as “determination by means of names and conventional terms (nāma saṃketavyavasthāpanam) of self-nature (svabhāva) and specifications (viśeṣa) in the sign of something conditioned (saṃskāranimitta) in speaking of form (rūpa), etc. For this sūtra the dependent (paratantra) appears to be the dharmic world itself,

although this world is not comprised of individual dharmas possessing self-nature (svabhāva) as believed by the ignorant, but a plenum of mutually conditioned things in a constant state of flux.227 The pariniṣpanna is simply stated as the middle aspect (i.e. paratantra) eternally devoid of the first aspect (i.e. parikalpita) which is itself devoid of selfnature (niḥsvabhāva) and consequently without correspondence to anything absolute (apariniṣpanna). This sūtra in chapter VII verses 3-6, in particular expresses the doctrine of emptiness of all phenomena in reference to the three

emptinesses (niḥsvabhāvatā) relevant to these three natures. (3) All phenomena are declared empty (niḥsvabhāva) by reference to the threefold emptiness (niḥsvabhāvatā) which is emptiness regarding identity (lakṣaṇa), arising (utpatti) and the ultimate (paramārtha). (4) The emptiness regarding identity (lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā) is the imagined nature, since it is established by names (nāma) and conventional symbols (saṃketa) and not by itself. (5) The emptiness regarding arising (utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā) is the dependent nature, since it arises from the force of other conditions (parapratyaya) and not by itself (na

svatas). (6) The emptiness regarding the ultimate (paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā) is the dependently originated phenomena (dharmāḥ pratītyasamutpannāḥ), which are empty by virtue of the emptiness regarding arising and also by virtue of the emptiness regarding the ultimate. The pure object (viśuddhālambana) in phenomena is the ultimate and since it is not the dependent nature it is called the emptiness regarding the ultimate. The consummated nature is also called emptiness regarding the ultimate, because of the selflessness (dharmanairātmya) of phenomena. Since the ultimate is manifested by the emptiness of all phenomena, it is

called emptiness regarding the ultimate. As a result, all phenomena (dharma) are empty (śūnya) of own being (svabhāva) since they depend on other phenomena for their being and hence they do not exist by virtue of themselves. For emptiness regarding the ultimate is manifested by the selflessness of phenomena, they are unborn, undestroyed, originally calm and essentially extinguished. It is always (nityakāla) and eternally (śāśvatakāla) persistent. To the extent that it is the essence of phenomena (dharmadharmatā), which is unconditionend (asaṃskṛta) and exempt from defilements (vigatakleśa), i.e. empty in its origination.230

3.4 The Middle Path as neither Void nor Non-void

All things that can be said with reference to any individual in the state of saṃsāra can be reduced to two extremes as (i) an assertion of the imagination of the unreal and of the absolute state of emptiness, (ii) a negation of subjectivity and objectivity. To understand any individual these two statements, one affirmation and the other negation have to be put together. Nothing is exclusively void nor exclusively non-void is stated in MVKB I.3 ‘sarvam na ekāntena śūnyam na ekāntena aśūnyam’. It is in avoiding these two extremes that Yogācārins claim to be holding the middle way as mentioned in MVK I.3 “neither void

(śūnya) nor non-void (aśūnya): so is everything described, that indeed is the middle path, for there is existence as well as non-existence, and again existence”. Śūnya evidently refers to the absence of subject-object duality, while aśūnya means that the same thing, although devoid of such

characterizations, still exists. The conditioned (saṃskṛta) exists as abhūtaparikalpa including everything that is called citta and caitta under the influence of which one finds oneself in the state of saṃsāra, and which cease to operate at the attainment of nirvāṇa. It is therefore those citta-caittas which are described as saṃskṛta-dhammas, as abhūtaparikalpa and finally as both śūnya as well as aśūnya. Thus, everything whether saṃskṛta under the aspect of abhūta-

parikalpa or asaṃskṛta under the aspect of śūnyatā is rightly described as ‘neither void nor non-void’ or the middle path.233 In particular, Vasubandhu states in MVKB I.3 “that indeed is the middle path, for, on the one hand, there is the existence of emptiness within the imagination of the unreal, and on the other, the existence of the imagination of the unreal within emptiness”. In other words, an individual undergoing the state of saṃsāra combines in himself abhūta-

parikalpa and śūnyatā, saṃskṛta and asaṃskṛta dharmas, saṅkleśa and vyavadāna, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. Yogācāra develops the thought of the Middle Path through three reasons ‘existence’, ‘non-existence’ and ‘again existence’. The first two are obviously paradoxical and on the same level represent affirmation and negation respectively. The third reason ‘again existence’ understood to transcend the former two is different from the first in spite of the same word. Its meaning is the existence both of śūnyatā and of abhūta-parikalpa.

Furthermore, Yogācāra considers through Madhyāntavibhāga (Discrimination of the Middle from the Extremes) the process of everyday consciousness (vijñāna) in its dependently co-arising character. The duality of subject and object always appearing within that process is then denied. The meaning of emptiness is finally expressed through this negation. The activity of consciousness nevertheless undeniably exists in the midst of that emptiness. This whole process, from

the affirmation of dependent arising to the negation of dichotomy as well as the recovering or reaffirmation of consciousness as reality, is called the ‘Middle Path’. Thereby, emptiness is expounded as “the absence (abhāva) of duality, which is the presence of an absence (abhāvasya bhāvaḥ)”. This assertion that emptiness is not merely ‘non-being’, but also the ‘being of non-being’ became the special feature of Yogācāra School that is related to the definition of emptiness in Cūḷasuññata Sutta.239

This idea is also found in chapter 6 of the Āryadeśanā-vikhyāpana (顯揚聖教論頌) only surviving in Chinese as “when [it is realized that] nothing exists here, and yet something of it remains – then the non-duality of emptiness is explained in accordance with twofold reasoning”. The twofold reasoning (yukti) is expressed as (i) the two kinds of selfhood (ātman) of person (pudgala-ātman) and of things (dharma-ātman) not existing; (ii) the two kinds of nonself (nairātmya) existing. Emptiness thus is suggested as neither eternally existing nor eternally non-existing that is completely identical with the notion of

‘non-being and being of non-being’. With its character, emptiness is the principle as ‘defilement is identical with Bodhi’, ‘saṃsāra is equal to nirvāṇa’.241 Nevertheless, Dignāga comments on how the two extremes mentioned above are abandoned in agreement with Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Summary of the Great Vehicle, 攝大乘 論) that all phenomena do not inherently exist – that is, do not exist by way of their own character – require interpretation in that they were made in consideration of imagined nature. Dharmakīrti also says in Commentary on Dignāga’s ‘Compilation of Prime Cognition’ ( Pramāṇa varttika) that the emptiness of

apprehended-object and apprehendingsubject as other substantial entities is the suchness of other-dependent nature. He argues the distinction of a thing’s production as being different is not a mere self-cognizing consciousness but just by a consciousness perceiving dualistically. All things through dualistic appearance is polluted and also false and imagined. In the aspects of apprehendedobject and of apprehending-subject there are no defining characters that are factually other, and furthermore defining characters that appear dualistically do not exist in accordance with how they appear. Therefore, it is explained that phenomena are without an inherent nature.

3.5 Śūnyatā Concept of Yogācāra School in relation to Early Buddhism

Gadjin M. Nagao states that a special significance in the treatises of Yogācāra School, i.e. emptiness of both being and non-being discussed above has been attracted by the Cūḷasuññata Sutta (the Lesser Discourse on Emptiness) of MN 121. The Buddha in this sutta says “Now, as well as before, ‘I remain fully in a dwelling of emptiness’. A monk is ‘not attending to the perception of village’, ‘not attending to the perception of human being’ — attends to the singleness

based on the perception of wilderness. His mind takes pleasure, finds satisfaction, settles, and indulges in its perception of wilderness. He discerns then that ‘whatever disturbances that would exist based on the perception of village are not present. Whatever disturbances that would exist based on the perception of human being are not present. There is only this modicum of disturbance: the singleness based on the perception of wilderness.’ He discerns that ‘this mode of perception is empty of the perception of village. This mode of perception is empty of the perception of human being. There is only this nonemptiness: the

singleness based on the perception of wilderness.’ Thus he regards it as empty of whatever is not there. Whatever remains, he discerns as present: ‘There is this.’ And so this, his entry into emptiness, accords with actuality, is undistorted in meaning, and pure”. By recourse to such meditation and negation, the monk travels through a number of stages.

Including the highest stage of trance in the ‘formless world’, to reach, finally, ‘the concentration of the mind that is signless’ (animittaṃ cetosamādhiṃ). In this final stage, he is freed from every canker of ‘outflowing impurities’ (āsava) and obtains Arhatship; and yet there remains the disturbance (daratha) of the six sensory fields that, conditioned by life, are grounded in this body itself. Thus, his corporeal being, which even the Arhat can never nullify, is his ultimate disturbance.

The statement “it is empty of whatever is not there. Whatever remains, he discerns as present: ‘There is this.’ And so this, his entry into emptiness, accords with actuality, is undistorted in meaning, and pure” repeated eight times emphasizes the doctrine of emptiness. Emptiness is non-being but undoubtedly in it something remains which, being reality, cannot be negated. Thus, emptiness is considered as including both being and non-being, both negation and affirmation.

Reality can be understood as emptiness in terms of existence and non-existence. It is empty, luminous, and pure. Reality is beyond existence because all existence is relative and dependent. It is beyond non-existence because, despite its emptiness and transience, reality does appear and is experienced. This statement is equivalently set forth in the assertion of

Heart Sutra (Prajñāpāramitāhṛdayasūtra, 般若波羅蜜多心經) of the Prajñāpāramitā literature that ‘emptiness is form, and form is emptiness (色卽是空, 空卽是色)’. Reality is not only empty: it is also form; it is also luminous, bright with the potential for appearance. This luminosity – this potential inherent in the real state of things – manifests itself to the impure, afflicted consciousness as saṃsāra. However, it manifests itself to the purified consciousness as the pure universe of the exalted Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, i.e. on the strength of this potential appearance of reality, the manifestation of the celestial Buddhas

and Bodhisattvas like Amitabha, Akshobhya, Avalokiteshvara, Manjushri, and the rest is achieved. They are luminous, pure, and the bright manifestation of reality – that reality which is simultaneously emptiness and luminosity, emptiness and purity. John P. Keenan states that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu as well as the semi-legendary Maitreya, who is reported to have been Asaṅga’s mentor, were deeply influenced by the Prajñāpāramitā scriptures and accepted their notion of emptiness – that all things are empty. Additionally, Tsong-kha-pa draws parallels between the three aspect doctrine of the Prajñāpāramitā and a similar notion

to be found in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Paramārtha records that Asaṅga first learned the doctrine of emptiness as taught by the Hīnayāna, but was not satisfied until he learned the Mahāyāna doctrine of emptiness. Thus, the early Yogācāra writers were present throughout the early Mahāyāna scriptures.

Chapter 4 Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools in Relation

Richard King says the comprehensive explication of the notion of ‘emptiness’ in the Madhyamaka’s philosophical śāstras provides a “doctrinal key” to unlock the abstruse meanings of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras; while Yogācāra developed as a response to the insights of those same sūtras. He continues “both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Schools still focus on the validity of the notions of pratītyasamutpāda, pudgala-nairātmya, dharmanairātmya, the four āryasatyas, the bodhisattva ideal, and śūnyatā, etc. With such a level of doctrinal unanimity, these two schools can hardly be said to be in great conflict with each other”.

4.1 The Historical Relationship

D.T. Suzuki advises “most Buddhist scholars are often too ready to make a sharp distinction between the Mādhyamika and the Yogācāra schools, taking the one as exclusively advocating the theory of emptiness (śūnyatā) while the other is bent single-mindedly on an idealistic interpretation of the universe. They thus further assume that the idea of emptiness is not at all traceable in the Yogācāra and that idealism is absent in the Mādhyamika. This is not exact as a matter of historical fact”. Actually, the historical development of the two schools is difficult to be separated from each other. Madhyamaka is seen as the precursor to Yogācāra, or Yogācāra is presented as a fulfillment of Nāgārjuna's philosophy – a working out of what was left undone by Nāgārjuna and his Mādhyamika followers. However, some scholars argue that Yogācāra as a development occurred in response and opposition to the Madhyamaka. Richard King again concludes, “although the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu do show a marked development of ideas in the delineation and analysis of the yogic path when compared to their Mādhyamika predecessors. This should not necessarily be seen as characteristic of an antithetical attitude toward the earlier exposition of Mahāyāna philosophy”.254

The early Yogācāra's relation to the Madhyamaka from an historical perspective has been rarely mentioned. This relationship is examined after having determined Asaṅga and

Vasubandhu's relative position within the chronology of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra thought.

Then, the question of whether the early Yogācāra writers put themselves forward as a Buddhist philosophical school in opposition to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka has to be addressed. Therefore, investigation of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu's own writings can provide some indication of the historical relation between the early Yogācāra writings and those of Nāgārjuna. Three types of religious conflict can be found in all the biographical sources: (1) between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, (2) between factions of the Hīnayāna, and (3) between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna.

The conflict between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna is particularly evident in the accounts of Paramārtha and Hsuan-tsang – those which are chronologically closest to Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. The conflict is manifest in the brothers' own changing religious affiliations from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna. Additionally, a Chinese Buddhist monk – Fa-hsien (399-418 CE), who traveled to India during the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu affirms that at that time there was a clear differentiation between the

Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna as well as divisions within the Hīnayāna. However, both Fahsien and Paramārtha still state Mahāyāna does not appear to be fully emergent and widespread during the time of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. I-ching (635-713 CE) – a Chinese

Buddhist provides the earliest historical account of the division within the Mahāyāna as

“there are but two kinds of the so-called Mahāyāna. First, the Mādhyamika; second, the Yoga. The former professes that what is commonly called existence is in reality non-existence, and every object is but an empty show, like an illusion, whereas the latter affirms that there exists no outer things in reality, but only inward thoughts, and all things exist only in the mind (lit. all things are but our mind)”. Post-dating Asaṅga and Vasubandhu by at least one generation, and possibly up to two hundred years, however there was clearly the existence of a conflict between the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools. The Madhyamaka scholar, Bhāvaviveka (ca. 490-570 CE) is one of the primary scholars whose writings attest to such a conflict. Bhāvaviveka's counterpart Dharmapāla (ca. 530-561 CE) provided responses to Madhyamaka critiques of the Yogācāra, as well as counter-critiques of the Madhyamaka. It does not, however, imply that Asaṅga and Vasubandhu were involved in such a conflict as Fa-hsien, Paramārtha and Hsuan-tsang assert.

The question of whether the early Yogācāra writers put themselves forward as a Buddhist philosophical school in opposition to Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka has been examined directly through searching the early Yogācāra texts themselves for indications of classification regarding their own positioning of themselves within the history of Buddhist thought. Firstly, the early Yogācāra writers resemble Nāgārjuna both in their general defensive stance regarding the Mahāyāna and in particular issues of the Mahāyāna such as its novelty, its orthodoxy, and its teaching of emptiness. They present as one of vigorous opposition from the Hīnayāna. Jeffrey Samuels suggests Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna as two of the primary writers who propound the dichotomy of Hīnayāna as the vehicle of Śrāvakas and the Mahāyāna as the vehicle of Bodhisattvas. Both Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna agree the superiority of the Bodhisattva over the Śrāvaka is proof of the Mahāyāna's superiority.260

Asaṅga equates the Mahāyāna with the Bodhisattvayāna and even Nāgārjuna makes a similar association in his Ratnāvalī as

“Since all the aspirations, deeds and

Dedications of Bodhisattvas

Were not explained in the Hearers’ vehicle, how then

Could one become a Bodhisattva through its path?”

Moreover, although Asaṅga implicitly equates the Bodhisattvayāna with the one true vehicle (ekayāna) that leads to Buddhahood, the early Yogācāra writers never deny the legitimacy of Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna. Vasubandhu states that “having been a Śrāvaka, he becomes a Pratyekabuddha, and finally he becomes a Buddha”. Asaṅga explains ekayāna by asserting that all three vehicles are the same in terms of the reality dharmadhātu to which they refer, their teaching of selflessness, and the liberation to which they lead. This statement imitates a verse in a hymn by Nāgārjuna entitled Niraupamyastava. Nāgārjuna in this hymn asserts that the non-differentiation of the dharmadhātu attests to the non-differentiation of the vehicles, and thus establishes the one vehicle ekayāna. He still appeals to this doctrine in Ratnāvalī as part of his defense of the Mahāyāna.

“What the Tathāgata taught with a special Intention is not easy to understand.

Because he taught one as well as three vehicles

You should therefore protect yourself through indifference”.

Nāgārjuna and the early Yogācāra writers elaborate their hermeneutical stance in terms of a distinction between two levels of interpretation of the Buddha's word. The first level sticks to the literal meaning or the "letter" (vyañjana) of the text, while the second level uncovers the text's deeper meaning (artha).267 Asaṅga states “the Dharma has two aspects, and the meaning which should be known is not the literal one”. He also warns “when one construes the

meaning (of the Buddha's teaching) literally, self-conceited understanding leads to the ruin of intelligence. One rejects the well taught, suffers a loss, and is misled by resentment with regard to the Teachings”. For the inexpressible nature of reality, furthermore, Nāgārjuna and the early Yogācāra writers also argue that the Buddha's teachings were limited by the intellectual capacities of his audience. The Buddha applying his teachings to fit all abilities of beings is expressed in verse 394-396 of Ratnāvalī by Nāgārjuna.270

“Just as a grammarian [first] makes His students read the alphabet, So Buddha taught his trainees The doctrines which they could bear.

To some he taught doctrines

To discourage sinning.

To some, doctrines for achieving merit, To others, doctrines based on duality.

To some he taught doctrines based on non-duality, to some

He taught what is profound and frightening to the fearful, Having an essence of emptiness and compassion,

The means of achieving [the highest] enlightenment”.

The hierarchy between audiences of lesser and greater abilities; between the literal and deeper meaning of the Buddha's teachings, corresponds, in the view of Nāgārjuna and the early Yogācāra writers, to that between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna.272 Finally, both Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna appeal to the authority of the scriptures of the Hīnayāna for the sake of establishing the explicit orthodoxy of the Mahāyāna teachings. Paramārtha records that Asaṅga first learned the

doctrine of emptiness taught by the Hīnayāna, but was not satisfied until he discovered the doctrine of emptiness of Mahāyāna. Indeed, the early Yogācāra writings even appeal to the Hīnayāna scriptures to validate certain teachings, which are associated specifically with the Yogācāra. For instance, Asaṅga defends the authenticity of the concept of the ālayavijñāna by asserting that the Buddha presented this teaching in the Śrāvakayāna through synonyms (paryāya).

Asaṅga cites a number of passages from the Āgamas of schools such as the Mahāsāṃghikas and Mahīśāsakas where, he says, the ālayavijñāna is referred to through synonyms such as substrate consciousness (mūlavijñāna), or aggregate, which endures throughout saṃsāra (āsaṃsārikaskandha). In his Ratnāvalī, Nāgārjuna defends the authenticity of the Mahāyāna notion of the six perfections by asserting that

“The aims of benefiting oneself and others and the meaning

Of liberation as briefly taught [in the Hīnayāna] By Buddha are contained in the six perfections,

Therefore the Mahāyāna is the word of Buddha.”

In short, all the above concerns that defend the orthodoxy and the distinctiveness of the Mahāyāna place that the early Yogācāra writings are in close accord with the writings of Nāgārjuna. Elena France Hanson concludes, furthermore, the early Yogācāra writers not only shared this concern with Nāgārjuna but were closely connected with him in their method of addressing this concern, and in their textual grounding of their positions. In other words, the early Yogācāra authors were writing neither in opposition to Madhyamaka School nor with the intent to establish and systematize the Yogācāra as a separate Buddhist school. Rahula argues that the philosophics of Nāgārjuna and of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu are not contradictory, but complementary to each other. He claims the two systems known as

Madhyamaka and Yogācāra “... explain and expound, in different ways with different arguments, the very same doctrines of nairātmya, śūnyatā, tathatā, pratītyasamutpāda, but are not a philosophy of their own that can properly be called Nāgārjuna's or Asaṅga's or Vasubandhu's philosophy. We can only say that they are Nāgārjuna's or Asaṅga's or Vasubandhu's explanations, arguments and theories, postulated to prove and establish the

Canonical teaching of śūnyatā, cittamātra or nairātmya. If any differences of opinion exist between them, these are only with regard to their own arguments and theories, advanced to establish the old fundamental Canonical teaching, but not with regard to the teaching itself.”

4.2 The Philosophical Relationship

4.2.1 The Concept of Vijñāna in Madhyamaka

Nāgārjuna coming to a specific criticism of consciousness is his demonstration that vijñāna, as a member of the group of skandhas, is dependent and hence empty. However vijñāna in this treatment is always considered as a thing dependent on internal and external sense fields (āyatana) and cannot be equated with the notion of an abiding consciousness such as the bhavaṅga put forward in the Pāli texts and was subsequently elaborated by the

Yogācāra. The Vijñānavādins also adopt such a position that the six evolved consciousnesses (pravṛttivijñāna), since they arise in dependence, must from the ultimate point of view be considered to be empty (śūnya).278 This seems to be what Nāgārjuna means when he says:

“Dependent upon the inner and outer sense spheres (āyatana), consciousness (vijñāna) originates. Thus there is no consciousness. It is empty (śūnya), like mirages and illusions (marīcimāyāvat). Consciousness originates dependent upon an object of consciousness, therefore it is non-existent. Without cognition and an object of consciousness, there is consequently no subject of consciousness at all.”

Both consciousness and the external object then are dependent and consequently devoid of own-being (svabhāva). As Bodhicittavivaraṇa states “Mind (citta) is but a name (nāmamātra). It is nothing apart from (its) name. Consciousness must be regarded as but a name. The name has no own-being (svabhāva).281 Nāgārjuna implicitly accepts a distinction between the two consciousness states of the high level, the enlightened represented by prajñā; and of the mundane form, the unenlightened corresponding to vijñāna. When someone has developed the correct knowledge (samyagjñāna), then reality (tattva) is seen clearly and

ignorance (avidyā) is destroyed. In the twelve chains of dependent origination (dvādasāṅgika- pratītyasamutpāda), since avidyā is the first link as the cause of vijñāna (the third member in the series), which arises dependent on ignorance (avidyā). When avidyā is destroyed by jñāna then, so too, is vijñāna.282 Apart from being seen to be conditioned by the pratītyasamutpāda process, vijñāna is brought to a halt until Nāgārjuna brings to light “just as the birth of a son is said to be dependent upon the mother and the father, even so, the arising of (visual) consciousness is said to be dependent upon eye and material form”. The

concept of citta in the state of nirvāṇa, particularly expressing the overlap between early Buddhism and Nāgārjuna, is treated in the Majjhimanikāya. Citta is associated with emptiness. In a state of nirvāṇa, the mind (citta) is said to be free from the obsessions of sensuality (kāma), becoming (bhāva) and ignorance (avijjā), and the monk comes to understand that such a conscious state represents an emptiness of the obsessions (āsava). Nāgārjuna also asserts the same position of vijñāna, which is said to be uprooted once nirvāṇa is attained as “with the cessation of these, those other factors [of the twelvefold formula]

would not proceed. In this way, this entire mass of suffering ceases completely.” The Sutta Nipāta 734 says this emptiness is associated with a permanent state of mind, equivalent to nirvāṇa, and deriving from the cessation of vijñāna. For Nāgārjuna, emptiness (śūnyatā) then is a state of consciousness in which dichotomous thought (prapañca) no longer holds sway. It is a state of mind dehabituated from its ignorant tendency to distort. He states “on the waning of defilements of action (karmakleśa), there is release (mokṣa). Defilements of action belong to one who discriminates, and these in turn result from obsession

(prapañca). Obsession, in its turn, ceases within the context of emptiness.”

4.2.2 The Two Truths and the Three Natures

Nāgārjuna has explained the two truths (satyadvaya) initiated by the Buddhas as “the teaching of the doctrine by the Buddhas is based upon two truths: truth relating to worldly convention (saṃvṛtisatya) and truth in terms of ultimate fruit (paramārthasatya)”. He clearly indicates the ineffability of ultimate truth as “independently realized, peaceful, unobsessed by obsessions, without discriminations and a variety of meanings: such is the characteristic of truth”. It

is stated, “no existents whatsoever are evident anywhere that are arisen from themselves, from another, from both, or from a non-cause”. All things are actually conventional existence and provisional designations (prajñapti) only; even the teaching itself of the Buddha is made up of conventional words and concepts that are mentioned in Pāli canon. Nāgārjuna says in MMK XXIV. 10 that the conventional truth is the basis for the ultimate truth, that “without relying upon convention, the ultimate fruit is not taught”, and “without understanding the ultimate fruit, freedom is not attained”. These two truths follow

directly upon the establishment of the doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) since his critique, before indicating the doctrine of two truths, maintain “we say that you do not comprehend the purpose of emptiness. As such, you are tormented by emptiness and the meaning of emptiness.” He asserts the emptiness of dharmas from the ultimate point of view, but he cautions against reifying the notion of emptiness itself. To grasp onto emptiness as anything more than a conventional designation is just as much an error as to grasp onto the idea of ultimate existence.293

Elena France Hanson mentions that the early Yogācārins adhere to both the doctrine of two truths and that of three natures. In order to come to the conclusion that the three-nature doctrine is compatible with Nāgārjuna's teaching of two truths, it is necessary to prove the Yogācāra presentation of the two truths concurs with that of Nāgārjuna. The distinction between the conventional and ultimate truths is also stated throughout the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

Asaṅga says that it is through the Bodhisattva's great effort to seek the essence (dharmatā) of the conventional and ultimate truths that he becomes a support (pratiśaraṇa) for all creatures. The early Yogācāra writers along with Nāgārjuna apply the model of two truths predominantly in reference to the Buddha's teachings. It is emphasized for assessing the true reality of all statements as well as for communicating the limitation of languages. This idea is mentioned in Nāgārjuna’s MMK XXIV.8, 9 and Asaṅga’s MSg II.31. Yogācāra moreover agrees with Nāgārjuna’s conception of the ultimate truth as an ineffable thing from the

conventional point of view. Asaṅga states “neither being nor nonbeing, neither thus nor otherwise, it does not arise nor does it cease, it does not diminish nor does it increase, it is neither purified nor not purified. This is the characteristic of paramārtha.” He states that the pariniṣpanna is beyond the range of discursive thought, since it is free of verbalization (prapañca). For both Nāgārjuna and the early Yogācārins, the transcendence of the ultimate is analyzed by the problem of verbalization. Since the ultimate truth is utterly transcendent, all doctrines, all statements and all conceptualizations fall under

the category of conventional truth, i.e. the reference of all dharmas conceptualized through names and objects does not truly exist in the ultimate sense. Nāgārjuna asserts

“neither names nor objects exist, name does not imply existence for us, because we do not even say that name exists”. Asaṅga likewise denies the existence of both name and object as “the intrinsic nature (svabhāva) and specifications (viśeṣa) which are attributed to name or object, he says, are nothing but provisional designations (prajñapti); name and objects are merely mental talk (manojalpa)”.

The three nature doctrine of Yogācāra implicates the world as imagined (parikalpita), devoid of any self-nature (svabhāva) or substantiality. Pariniṣpanna must be an absence of parikalpita, which establishes the subject-object dichotomy. Pariniṣpanna is said to be devoid of this duality (dvayābhāva). This is consistent with the two truth doctrine of

Nāgārjuna. For Nāgārjuna the unenlightened world coincides with the conventional truth (saṃvṛtisatya), which is equated with saṃsāra. This is quite clearly the first or imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva). The enlightened world is the ultimate truth (paramārtha), a non-dual gnosis that equates perfectly with pariniṣpannasvabhāva. This is nirvāṇa. In his TSN, Vasubandhu defines the imagined nature as conventional truth itself and the ultimate truth is to be known as the one accomplished nature only. In the model of three natures, however, there is a middle element, the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhāva) as a bridge between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna; while the two truths have no intermediary as such.

Ashok Chatterjee argues the Yogācāra hold a more positive view of conventional truth which consists of its two aspects as the imagined and dependent natures. He says “the whole of empirical experience is therefore not equally despicable. In phenomena themselves there are two aspects – the one utterly unreal, and the other real, though infected by the former. Saṃvṛti must be split into two, the subject and the object...There are thus three, and not merely two, Truths.”303

Anacker also indicates that Yogācāra maintains a more positive interpretation of the conventional truth as a small difference between the two truths and the three natures. He states that whereas Nāgārjuna wishes to demonstrate the inadequacy of all conventional statements (and all statements are, by necessity, conventional), Vasubandhu is interested in showing a path, conceived in conventional terms, which leads to the abandonment of all mental constructions…In emphasizing the existence of the construction of that which was not abhūtaparikalpa, Maitreyanātha and Vasubandhu affirm that there is a force in

interdependent events that gives rise to constructions and afflictions. Thus, there is a reality given to suffering which does not arise with Nāgārjuna's dialectical denials of any existent contrasts or causalities. Hanson comments that Ashok Kumar Chatterjee, Stefan Anacker and some scholars in analyzing the two models do not take into consideration the context in which these models are presented, or the scope to which they refer. It is actually dependent origination – the first item of Nāgārjuna's list of things that become possible through emptiness – which is the bridge between these two truths. It is equated with both the conventional realm of being and the ultimate realm of emptiness. Therefore, only through dependent origination we can see that both extremes are, in the end, the same.305 Anacker acknowledges that even for Vasubandhu, the path between the conventional and ultimate realms is ‘self-dissolving’, since for Vasubandhu, just as for Nāgārjuna, all constructions are, in the end, empty.

According to Yogācāra, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, parikalpita and pariniṣpanna are as two aspects of paratantrasvabhāva. Asaṅga remarks “saṃsāra is the paratantra-svabhāva in its aspect of defilement (i.e. the parikalpita svabhāva). Nirvāṇa is the same in its aspect of purity (i.e. the pariniṣpanna svabhāva). The basis (āśraya) is the dependent nature in that it partakes of both aspects at the same time (tadubhayabhāgapatita).” Thus, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa as well as parikalpita and pariniṣpanna are the same but they are identical with the dependent nature paratantra. The identity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is still proclaimed by

Nāgārjuna in MMK “the life-process (saṃsāra) has no thing that distinguishes it from freedom (nirvāṇa). Freedom has no thing that distinguishes it from the life-process. Whatever is the extremity of freedom and the extremity of the life-process, between them not even a subtle something is evident.” More precisely, Kalupahana commented it is the absolute distinction between saṃvṛti and paramārtha that is denied.

Nāgārjuna affirms as analyzed above that all things lacking of their own nature in fact exist in dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) which arise in the everyday world from the conventional point of view. He equates this doctrine with the notion emptiness (śūnyatā) form the ultimate point of view in MMK XXIV.18 at the same time. Besides, “convention

(saṃvṛti) arises from causes and conditions and is relative (paratantra). Thus, the relative has been spoken of. The ultimate meaning, however is absolute (akṛtrima).” Likewise, for

Yogācāra the dependent nature paratantra, which is identical with parikalpita on the one hand and pariniṣpanna on the other, is in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and Mahāyānasaṃgraha defined simply as the dependent origination of phenomena. As to the doctrine of pratītyasamutpāda, the early Yogācāra writers develop the notion paratantra in direct opposition to the notion of svatantra, which means self-dependent, or independent, and hence absolute.310 Whereas, the dependent nature corresponds to the doctrine of dependent origination, the perfected nature corresponds with the notion of emptiness. Consequently, the relation between the dependent and accomplished natures in early Yogācāra thought is close to that of dependent origination and emptiness in Madhyamaka. Additionally, Nāgārjuna asserts “the dependent nature of things is called emptiness, because the dependent nature is what it is to have no intrinsic nature.” The equation of

dependent origination and emptiness in Madhyamaka and of the dependent and accomplished natures in Yogācāra explain how the conventional realm can come into being, even though it does not exist in fact. These equations allow for the manifestation of the conventional realm out of the ultimate, and for a path out of the conventional and up to the ultimate.313 More importantly, in the model of three natures the Yogācāra systematized the Madhyamaka’s thought of the two truths into one coherent scheme. Furthermore, Nāgārjuna's use of the term relative (paratantra) for pratītyasamutpāda allows us to speculate that there may be a great deal more of a connection between his two-fold truth formulation and the three nature doctrine of the Yogācāra than is generally recognized. The below diagram will clarify the connection.315

Paratantra The ontologically

(Pratītyasamutpāda) indeterminate base

Parikalpita Pariniṣpanna The two orientations

Saṃvṛti Paramārtha

Defilement Purification

DIFFERENCE IDENTITY

4.2.3 In Terms of the Notion of Śūnyatā

Both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools emphasize the doctrine of śūnyatā, but their interpretation of the terminology has been different. MMK XXIV.18, the root verse elaborating the Madhyamaka, analyzes the notion of śūnyatā as pratītyasamutpāda, upādāyaprajñapti and also madhyamā-pratipad, as explained above. While the characteristics of the first two verses of Madhyāntavibhāga (hereafter, MV) which is a treatise of Yogācāra, are similar to those in verse MMK XXIV.18.

These two verses elucidate śūnyatā as abhūtaparikalpa and madhyamā-pratipad. This expresses the development of Buddhist philosophy as well as the continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra. Murti argues śūnyatā is accepted in the Vijñānavāda but with a modification. The formula is that which appears (i.e. vijñāna) is real while the form of its appearance (the duality of subject and object) is unreal. The two verses of MV I.1 and I.2 respectively read: “There exists unreal imagination; duality does not exist therein

Emptiness, however, exists in it, and also the former exists in the later.”

“Therefore it is stated that all entities are neither empty nor non-empty

Because of existence, because of non-existence, and again because of existence. And this is the Middle Path.”

The imagination (parikalpa) refers to cognitive function or consciousness (vijñāna) which is characterized by the Yogācāra as ‘dependent-on-other’ (paratantra), that is, pratītyasamutpāda. The world therefore is constituted by vijñāna. For Vasubandhu, when the mind is at work in an ordinary person a transformation takes place such that the distinction between being conscious of something (vijñāna) and that something of which one is conscious arises

(vijñeya). This process is called representation (vijñapti). Of course this does not mean that the vijñapti is caused by vijñāna. On the contrary, from the vijñapti proceeds the vijñāna/vijñeya combination which in turn produces the idea of subjects and objects (grāhya-grāhaka). This is the meaning of the Vijñānavādin doctrine that everything is representation only (vijñaptimātra). For Vasubandhu reality is observed through the subject and object dichotomy “the transformation of vijñāna (a false construct) is the distinction (between subject and object); what is thus distinguished does not exist. Therefore this is all

mere representation of consciousness (vijñaptimātra). The world is in fact the unreal imagination (abhūta-parikalpa) which exists neither in the grasped object nor in the grasping subject from the ultimate point of view. This negation of duality is called śūnyatā, i.e. abhūta-parikalpa equals to śūnyatā itself that is similar to the equation pratītyasamutpāda equals śūnyatā in the MMK. ‘The former (unreal imagination) exists in the later (emptiness)’ expresses the

important meaning as the revival of unreal imagination (or pratītyasamutpāda or vijñaptimātra) which corresponds to upādāya-prajñapti of the MMK. Yogācāra inherited and then continued to develop the ideas of emptiness from Madhyamaka which can be charted as follows322   MMK XXIV.18 MV I.1 MV I.2

a: pratīyasamutpāda I.1a: abhūta-parikalpa I.2c: sattvāt

(dependent (unreal imagination (because of

origination) exists) existence)

I.2a: na śūnyam

I.1b: dvayaṃ na I.2c: asattvāt

vidyate (duality (because of I.2b: sarvam

b: śūnyatā does not exist) non-existence) (all entities)

(emptiness) I.2a: na cāśūnyam

(nor non-empty)

I.1c: śūnyatā vidyate

(emptiness exists)

c: upādāya-prajñapti I.1d: tasyām api (because of existence)

(designation sa vidyate (unreal based upon) imagination exists)

d: madhyamā pratipad I.2d: madhyamā pratipad

    (

middle path) (middle path)

The doctrine of emptiness, abstractedly expressed by Madhyamaka, refers to the terms as citta, vijñāna, and abhūta-parikalpa, which are more concrete, practical and related to everyday life situations by Yogācāra. The Yogācārins stress that the range of ‘fictive’ perceptions that does occur, although not corresponding to an independently existing world of subjects and objects, nevertheless occur. This particular emphasis in the use of the notion of emptiness is a specific feature of the Yogācāra explanation of the term, since even in emptiness there is an ‘existent’, viz. the abhūta-parikalpa. In addition, since awareness of the contradiction of original śūnyatā, i.e. ‘existence of śūnyatā’ characterized by negation and non-being is itself a contradiction, Yogācāra dares to define śūnyatā as “non-existence of the duality and existence of (that) non-existence” (MV I.13), so śūnyatā is non-existence as well as existence.

In defining emptiness in this way, the Yogācārins are actually considered as ‘tidying up’ the earlier work of the Madhyamaka School which suggests śūnyatā as ‘a swollen head is an empty head’ (i.e. things in the phenomenal world appear to be real and substantial outside, but they are actually empty within). This view is supported throughout the long and varied Buddhist history, even by modern Western scholars like Janice Willis,

Stefan Anacker, Gadjin Nagao, Charles Harris.

T .R. V. Murti states that “the Idealism of the Yogācāra School has to be understood as a significant modification of the Mādhyamika śūnyatā on a constructive basis”.326 He says “the Vijñānavādin maintains two contentions: vijñāna is real, not apparent; vijñāna alone is real, not the object. The first is against the Mādhyamika, for whom both the knowing consciousness and the object known are relative to each other, and are nothing in themselves, i.e. unreal. The second is

against the realist (Ābhidharmika) who accepts the object as real on a par with vijñāna. The Vijñānavāda steers a middle position between these two.” Likewise, Stcherbatsky writes in his translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga “the whole chapter V of the first part of the treatise is devoted to the elucidation of the Yogācāra concept of this term (śūnyatā) as contrasted with the Mādhyamika view of it. There it is most clearly and emphatically stated that, for the Yogācāras, it means (1) grāhya-grāhaka-abhāva and (2) tasya ca svabhāva, i.e. (1) the (ultimate) non-reality of the relation of subject to object and (2) the

(ultimate) reality of their Absolute.” Thus, accepting the śūnyatā of the Prajñāpāramitā, the Yogācāra modifies the śūnyatā of the Mādhyamika as well as gives substance to the śūnya by identifying it with Pure Consciousness (vijñaptimātratā) that is devoid of duality (dvaya-śūnyatā). They adopt the middle of both Nihilism and Realism.  

Chapter 5 Practice of Śūnyatā in Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Insight Meditation

5.1 Right View of Śūnyatā

Right view (Skt: samyagdṛṣṭi, Pāli: sammādiṭṭhi) is placed at the very beginning of the Noble Eightfold Path (āryāṣṭāṅgamārga) by the Buddha. Elsewhere in the suttas the Buddha calls right view the forerunner of the path (pubbaṅgama), which gives direction and efficacy to the reality of all phenomena. In AN, right view is considered as the correct view of the three characteristics of conditioned phenomena which are arising, vanishing and its alteration while it persists.

In other words, it is an understanding of impermanence (anicca), suffering (dukkha) and non-self (anattā) as the Buddha says in the Dhammapada “though one should live a hundred years without comprehending how all things rise and pass away, yet better, indeed, is a single day’s life of one who comprehends how all things rise and pass away”. In particular, it is an understanding of dependent arising and the Four Noble Truths as mentioned in many places in Sutta Piṭaka. Once the Buddha said to the monks that, “Bhikkhus, this is the forerunner and precursor of the rising of the sun, that is, the dawn. So too, bhikkhus, for a bhikkhu this is the forerunner and precursor of the breakthrough to the Four Noble Truths as they really are, that is, right view. It is to be expected that a bhikkhu with right view will understand as it really is: ‘This is suffering.’… ‘This is the way leading to the cessation of suffering.” With comprehensive

knowledge of the Four Noble Truths one view is called Mundane right view (Skt. laukika samyagdṛṣṭi, Pāli. lokiya sammādiṭṭhi) and the other is called Supra-mundane or Transcendent right view (Skt: lokuttara samyagdṛṣṭi, Pāli: lokottara sammādiṭṭhi). This is the twofold right view explained in Mahācattārīsaka Sutta of MN 117. The nature of the former is the correct way for conventional life along with the natural order; so it enhances development of the path through

supporting the arising of its other factors. Although all such understanding is still accompanied by the taints (āsrava), it can also be a factor for the arising of the supramundane right view. The latter is considered as the ultimate understanding of the world as things really are. It is stated as “the wisdom, the faculty of wisdom, the power of wisdom, the investigation of states enlightenment factor, the path factor of right view in one whose mind is noble, whose

mind is taintless, who possesses the noble path and is developing the noble path: this is right view that is noble, taintless, supramundane, a factor of the path”. It is the right view which leads to the mind becoming totally empty of self-attachment, empty of the two extremes, thus attaining the highest peaceful state (nirvāṇa), completely empty of affliction. The Questions of Ārya-Rāṣṭapāla Sūtra (Ārya-Rāṣṭapālaparipṛcchā-sūtra) states that due to ignorance of

emptiness, peace, and the unborn, sentient beings wander in the cycle of existence. The phrase emphasizes emptiness, because all phenomena in the world are devoid of any inherent nature. In this context ‘peace’ refers to freedom from conceptual elaboration, which entails grasping onto true existence. ‘The unborn’ implies that in this sphere of freedom from conceptual elaboration, there is no arising, and since there is no arising, there is no cessation. This is the

ultimate mode of all phenomena – the mode of emptiness. The Saṃyutta Nikāya states “the emptiness concentration (suññata samādhi) is the path leading to the unconditioned path (asaṅkhatagāmi magga)”.

The prerequisite condition for meditating on emptiness is that one can attain a nonconceptual realization of emptiness or the ultimate enlightenment consciousness. It is ‘the Buddha mind’ – a state in which dualities no longer have any meaning. In order to attain this state, one has a conceptual realization of emptiness or the conventional enlightenment thought, in which one's experience of emptiness is mixed with a generic idea of emptiness. The conventional

enlightenment thought – the determination to achieve Buddhahood but still perceive the dualities of subject and object, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, etc. – entails the practice of the Six Perfections (Pāramitā) of generosity (dāna), morality (śīla), patience (kṣānti), energy (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna) and wisdom (prajñā). Wisdom is the crown of the six. It is right view of emptiness which is the perfection of wisdom transforming the practices of compassion, merit as

well as the other remaining five into perfections. This can be explained that when one lacks any right understanding of emptiness, then all of one's other virtues are said to be blind for themselves and others to be freed from suffering. It should be borne in mind that right view of emptiness is the sense of the nature of emptiness which is punching a hole in the bag of saṃsāra. As above analyzed the emptiness teaching firstly is comprehended in terms of the two truths, saṃvṛtisatya and paramārthasatya. In reference to saṃvṛti, the mundane nature of things is the relativity, conditionedness (pratītyasamutpāda), and is also conveyed by upādāya prajñapti, vijñapti. All things in reality are niḥsvabhāva and naiḥsvābhāvya. In reference to paramārthasatya, the ultimately true nature of things, śūnyatā means the non-conceptual, non-phenomenal, indeterminate nature of the absolute. Secondly, śūnyatā is understood through the Middle Way – the way that sees things as they are – which is not clinging to the determinate as ultimate in its determined nature and to the ultimate as anything specific. The last but most important nature of śūnyatā is the sense of the beyond of the thirst (eṣaṇā) for the real, the thirst for fulfillment. It describes the mind’s thirst for fulfillment which comes to a rest with the realization of reality.340

5.2 Meditation on Emptiness

5.2.1 Meditation on Non-self

Meditation on non-self is explained as the first step. At a conventional level, there is a self which has the innate nature of delusion, passes through the lives, accumulates karma and experiences the result. Nevertheless, this ‘self’ in fact does not exist at the absolute level, i.e. there is no truly existent self. Meditation on non-self is that one realizes the non-existence of that self. Refuting a truly existing self refers to a ‘completely imputed self’, a self

which is asserted as absolutely existing, and to a ‘spontaneously arisen self’, the reference object of our ego-clinging – the thoughts that think, ‘I’, ‘myself’, and so forth. In other words, it is contemplation on the non-existence of the five aggregates [[[skandha]]], the first which is form [[[rūpa]]] as the individual's body and the last four i.e. feeling [[[vedanā]]], perception [[[saṃjñā]]], formation [[[saṃskāra]]] and consciousness [[[vijñāna]]]) as the mind. Since the truly existent self is apprehended by ignorance with reference to the self which is apprehended with reference to the aggregates. Therefore, the meditator has to view all five skandhas as being naturally empty, i.e. just a name, a basis for imputation that does not exist by its own essence. The Heart of Wisdom Sūtra says “one should have a pure sincere view that all five skandhas are naturally empty as well.” This statement is followed by the

Svātantrika-madhyamaka tradition. In order to meditate, one firstly has to establish that no phenomenon whatsoever truly exists. Then, one refutes any true existence. There is no phenomenon which exists by its own essence. There is no consciousness, nor any aspect of clear light. There is absolute emptiness, blank like space. However, it is possible to easily develop a wrong understanding of emptiness that is criticized by great scholars such as Candrakīrti and Śāntideva.

The Buddha instructs that a Bhikkhu is obliged to dwell contemplating arising and passing away of these aggregates which arise as the object of mental attachment. Since ‘self’ and ‘I’ awareness arises in the place where mental attachment develops with the five aggregates, the process of inward and outward

emptiness constitutes the path for freeing oneself from attachment, from ‘I’ consciousness, and hence from Bondage. The meditation on inward and outward emptiness is respectively instructed in Cūḷasuññata and Mahāsuññata suttas of MN 121, 122. The former introduces the preliminary steps for the process of

emptying objects of consciousness in which the real test of inner experience is expected to proceed from here. One then, the latter presents, is prompted to attend to an external emptiness and proceed through similar critical reflection as regards his state of concentration. He is further prompted to attend to an

inward and outward emptiness simultaneously. Finally, he attends to the perfected state of concentration whereby he realizes the state of Arhatship. The five aggregates are defined in the double way ‘mentality-materiality’ (nāma-rūpa) by Buddhaghosa. In order to meditate on non-self, to abandon

this worldly designation of ‘a being’ and ‘a person’ more thoroughly, to surmount confusion about beings and to establish the mind on the plane of non-confusion, he makes sure that the meaning of mere mentality-materiality of all things which is ‘no being’, ‘no person’ is realized. After observing the nature

of phenomena as empty of self, one should then come to meditate (samatha and vipassanā) leading to samādhi and prajñā. This way of practice variously called emptiness-mind-liberation (śūnyatā cetovimutti) is the essential path to the ultimate liberation, nirvāṇa.

The contemplation on the selfless nature of all phenomena is taught by the Buddha in terms of ‘the liberation of mind by emptiness’ (suññatā cetovimutti) in Godatta sutta of SN 41.7. “Here a bhikkhu, gone to the forest or to the foot of a tree or to an empty hut, reflects thus: ‘Empty is this of self or of what

belongs to self.’ This is called the liberation of mind by emptiness.” The practice of suññatā cetovimutti is considered as the concentration on emptiness (suññato samādhi). It is mentioned along with signless-concentration (animitto samādhi) and desireless-concentration (appaṇihito samādhi) in SN 43.4, DN 33 and

AN 3.163. The three samādhis are sometimes expressed as three ‘emancipations’ vimokkha (Skt: vimokṣas) or three ‘doors to emancipation’ vimokkhamukhas (Skt: vimokṣamukhas). Suññatā vimokkha (Skt: śūnyatā vimokṣa) is the state of mind freed from the three impurities explained in Dhammapada 93: “He whose corruptions are destroyed, he who is not attached to food, he who has Deliverance. Which is Void and Signless, as his object, - his path, like that of birds in the air, cannot be traced.”

Śūnyatā vimokṣamukha results from the contemplation on the non-soul-concept. The Vimuttimagga of Upatissa also makes clear how the void-emancipation is fulfilled through penetration into no-soul-thought. One dwelling on the no-soul-thought obtains śūnyatā vimokṣamukha, says the Paṭisambhidā. This specific

import of śūnyatā has also been much amplified by Nāgasena and Buddhaghosa. Nāgasena comments in Milindapañha book “the self-character of all the manifest elements, the supreme voidness, i.e. absence of any living being and intention the extreme voidness should be made right”. Likewise, Buddhaghosa remarks: just as a marionette is void, soulless and without curiosity (i.e. free of any living being and intention), and while it walks and stands merely through the

combination of strings and wood, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness, so too, this mentalitymateriality is void, soulless and without curiosity, and while it walks and stands merely through the combination of the two together, yet it seems as if it had curiosity and interestedness. Thus the Buddha especially teaches Mogharāja that

“Look on the world as empty, being always mindful.

Having removed wrong view of self, in this way one will cross beyond Death.”

5.2.2 Meditation on Mind

The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra which is the fundamental of Yogācāra Schools declares that all dharmas, except Consciousness or Mind, are unreal. Consciousness-only is the established truth preached by the Buddha. The Sūtra says that all the three worlds (kāma, rūpa and arūpa) are the result of discrimination or thought-

relations. No external object exists in reality. All that is, is Consciousness. In this sūtra, the Buddha teaches that the Bodhisattvas-Mahāsattvas will before long attain the understanding that Nirvāṇa and Saṃsāra are one. Their conduct will be in accordance with the effortless exhibition of a great loving heart that ingeniously contrives means of salvation, knowing that all beings have the nature of being like a vision or a reflection, and that there is one

thing which is not bound by causation, being beyond the distinction of subject and object ; and further seeing that there is nothing outside Mind, and in accordance with a position of unconditionality, they will by degrees pass through the various stages of Bodhisattvahood and will experience the various states of Samādhi, and will by virtue of their faith understand that the triple world is of Mind itself, and thus understanding will attain the Samādhi Māyopama. The

Bodhisattvas entering into the state of imagelessness where they see into the truth of Mind-only, arriving at the abode of the Pāramitās, and keeping themselves away from the thought of genesis, deed, and discipline, they will attain the Samādhi Vajravimbopama which is in compliance with the Tathāgatakāya and with the transformations of suchness (Dharmatā). After achieving revulsion in the abode of the Vijñānas, they will gradually realize the Tathāgatakāya,

which is endowed with the powers, the psychic faculties, self-control, love, compassion, and means; which can enter into all the Buddha-lands and into the sanctuaries of the philosophers; and which is beyond the realm of Citta-mano-manovijñāna. In order to attain liberation, therefore, these Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas should exercise themselves in compliance with the truth of Mind-only to desist from discriminating and reasoning erroneously on such notions as

skandhas, dhātus, āyatanas, thought, causation, deed, discipline, and rising, abiding, and destruction. The Yogins must recognize an external world whose self-nature is of Mind itself and of discriminations such as the grasping (subject) and the grasped (object). Only those are capable of obtaining an insight into the flowing of Mind itself in a world of discrimination, of being baptised by the Buddhas living in the lands without limits, and of realizing the self-

control, powers, psychic faculties, and samādhis.

Consequently, the meditator should abide in dharmatā which is empty of the duality of perceived (object) and perceiver (subject). There are four applications gained before resting within such dharmatā. These four applications are presented in Maitreya's Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being. “The introduction to practicing wisdom correctly Entails the following four specific aspects:

Practice involving something to focus on;

Practice involving nothing to focus on;

Practice involving no subject to focus on;

Practice whose focus is nothing to focus on.”

The first is to engage in practice involving something to focus on, namely, that all phenomena are mistaken appearances of mind only. With that as the basis, one then engages in practice involving nothing existing that could constitute a perceived object on which to focus. The perceived does not exist as an outer object. With the third, one engages in practice involving no subject to focus on, i.e., whatever appears as perceiver does not exist since what appears as perceived does not exist. It is the mind itself which appears as both, the perceived and the perceiver, but neither of these is really there. Finally, one engages in practice whose focus is the suchness, which is empty of perceived and perceiver on which to focus at all. One should contemplate on these four aspects in order to abide within dharmatā, emptiness of duality.

5.2.3 Meditation on Absolute Emptiness

Meditation on absolute emptiness is that one should rest within dharmatā, i.e. within emptiness which is free of all mental fabrications. That means there is no grasping anything in any way such as thinking ‘it is’ or ‘it is not’. Prāsaṅghika-madhyamaka and Yogācāramadhyamaka agree on the essential point of meditation of the absolute being merely freedom from mental fabrications. However, from the absence of self in the individual, they all differ on how they describe this mere freedom from fabrications.

Initially, the meditator gains a clear idea of what is, and what is not, being refuted.

The object of refutation is inherent existence or dharmatā, dhramadhātu. The meditator clarifies what intrinsic existence is, and how it differs from mere existence. He may review the faults in attempting to refute existence as such, the conventional realm as well, particularly if his problem is to over-negate. He subsequently checks that the reasons given for absence of intrinsic existence do indeed entail such an absence. For example, in meditating on the emptiness

of intrinsic existence of the self, he might consider that the self lacks intrinsic existence because of being neither the same as nor different from the psychophysical constituents (the skandhas). He realizes that therefore the subject of analysis lacks intrinsic existence. With experience the meditator is able then to place his mind on this absence alone, the vacuity which is a specific vacuity that is absence of intrinsic existence in the object being analyzed. His mind in this state has no actual conscious conception of subject and object, although subject and object do still appear. He is said to have attained a

conceptual realization of emptiness – conceptual because it is through the medium of a conceptualized image, it is still not a direct cognition of emptiness. Through repeated familiarization with such meditation the conviction that entities are empty of intrinsic existence becomes more and more firm and penetrates his awareness. Then, any speculating about existence, non-existence, appearance, emptiness, thing, non-thing, etc. which would involve such mental fabrications are freed. This is called the absolute freedom of any assertion of emptiness, because it is beyond all conventions and mental fabrications, i.e.

all are the same, inseparable, not to be conceptually grasped in the absolute, not ‘from itself, other, both or neither (causelessly)’. Jamgon Kongtrul in his Treasury of Knowledge still emphasizes

“[For a] prāsaṅgika the object to become accustomed to, the dharmadhātu, [and] what becomes accustomed to, the mind,

Are inseparable, like water being poured into water.”

The next stage of meditation on emptiness is to attain perfect meditative absorption. Practices for generating stabilization are self-settled, uncontrived, and calm abiding (śamatha). The meditator gains an ability to place his mind without effort and without wavering on the meditation object. On the one hand, the

meditator, instructed to ‘rest as a small child in your own way of being’ taught by the yogi Milarepa, does not need to reject appearances, label them or create any conceptual association; but just rest relaxedly in the true nature of mind. Encouraged to ‘rest as an ocean without waves’, on the other, he is not

to be distracted by wavering thoughts of the three times: past, present and future; but completely calm and still as an ocean without waves.362 With the calm, still, powerful mind thus developed, the meditator now returns to emptiness, alternating calming meditation with analytic meditation. Eventually a deep state of absorption, one-pointedness (but not yet pure calm-abiding), is attained through analytic meditation itself. When analytic meditation actually

generates the full state of calm-abiding, one is said to have attained insight (vipaśyanā). If this insight is generated with emptiness as the object, one enters what is called the ‘Path of Preparation’ (prayogamārga). Subsequently, the meditator removes the conceptual elements of this insight into emptiness. When a direct, non-conceptual insight into emptiness is attained in meditative absorption then one is said to enter the ‘Path of Insight’ (darśanamārga). This

is a direct, non-dual cognition of the ultimate, emptiness. He has now so to refine his perception that he eradicates completely even the afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaraṇa) and cognitive obstructions (jñeyāvaraṇa). He must attain omniscience, Buddhahood, in which he no longer even sees intrinsic existence but sees emptiness in the very same perceptual act as he sees objects. In the Yogācāra and Madhyamaka systems, the cognitive obstructions are

treated as subtler hindrances that serve as the origin of the afflictive obstructions, and result from fundamental misapprehensions about the nature of reality. According to Yogācāra, because of the attachment deriving ultimately from the reification of what are actually imaginary external phenomena, conceptualization and discrimination arise in the mind, which lead in turn to pride, ignorance, and wrong views. Based on these mistakes in cognition, then,

the individual engages in defiled actions, such as anger, envy, etc., which constitute the afflictive obstructions. The afflictive obstructions may be removed by followers of the Śrāvaka, Pratyekabuddha, and beginning Bodhisattva paths, by applying various antidotes or counteragents (pratipakṣa) to the afflictions (kleśa); overcoming these types of obstructions will lead to freedom from further rebirth. The cognitive obstructions, however, are more deeply ingrained and

can only be overcome by advanced Bodhisattvas who seek instead to achieve Buddhahood, by perfecting their understanding of emptiness (śūnyatā). Buddhas, therefore, are the only class of beings who have overcome both types of obstructions and thus are able simultaneously to cognize all objects of knowledge in the universe; this is one of the sources for their unparalleled skills as teachers of sentient beings. The jñeyāvaraṇa are therefore sometimes translated as

“obstructions to omniscience”.

  Chapter 6 Conclusion

Śūnyatā which is the main doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism was formulated and justified differently by two Indian schools of Buddhism, the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra. This doctrine was systematically expounded by the Madhyamaka in consideration of the philosophy of the Prajñāpāramitā literature. The Madhyamaka’s philosophy of emptiness proclaims that inasmuch as dharmas dependently co-arise, they are said to be empty of selfnature (niḥsvabhāva). Nāgārjuna insists that

one can account for enlightenment only if one can recognize that all phenomena lack self-existent reality, i.e. emptiness as dependent origination. Nāgārjuna equates emptiness with dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) which is the truth of all phenomena realized by the Buddha himself. Thus, the Madhyamaka philosophy represents a logical development out of the early Buddhist teachings.

Furthermore, Nāgārjuna in his dialectic develops the doctrine of śūnyatā not as a view at all, but as a philosophically critical attitude. That is a common argumentative procedure of the denial of four alternatives (catukoṭis). ‘It is empty’ is not to be said, nor ‘it is non-empty’, nor ‘it is both (empty and non-empty)’, nor ‘it is neither’. The religious significance of this critical dialectic is the ‘non-abiding’ or ‘non-clinging’ of the way things are. Thus,

Nāgārjuna emphasizes that the awareness of emptiness is the relinquishing of all views, even the negation of self-existence reality. Those who adhere to any idea of emptiness are incorrigible.

Likewise, the Yogācāra also affirms that all phenomena are empty. They state that emptiness is still seen as the result of causes and conditions and therefore characterized as dependently originated and empty of self-nature. All things, Asaṅga claims, in fact have the unreal imagination (abhūta-parikalpa) which

artificially divides the world into many dualities such as subject and object, being and non-being. The elimination of dualistic fabrication is true emptiness of the reality. The Yogācāra often refutes mistaken ideas about emptiness, in particular ‘wrongly-grasped emptiness’ (durgṛhīta-śūnyatā), at the same time put importance on a true understanding of emptiness, ‘well-grasped emptiness’ (sugṛhītaśūnyatā). Yogācāra thought puts central emphasis on the practice of yogic

meditation through the system of consciousness. It is consciousness that knows in an empty manner, that is the comprehensive reality, the Yogācāra reflects. Consciousness is constructed in pratītyasamutpāda, especially in three kinds of reality or three natures (trisvabhāva): the imagined (parikalpita-svabhāva), the other-dependent (paratantra-svabhāva), and the absolutely accomplished (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). It is these three natures which explain the functioning of

the interplay between the store consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) and the active consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñānas). It is realized that the illusory reality is non-existent and purifies the conditioned existence, which itself is not a real object but a modality of consciousness. The non-duality or emptiness of all phenomena then is manifested and exists from the ultimate point of view (paramārthasatya). Thus, whereas the notion of emptiness in

Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka system is not specifically “placed” but equated with the doctrine of dependent origination, it is in Yogācāra thought located in the system of consciousnesses.

Nevertheless, the Madhyamaka philosophy, which began with Nāgārjuna, is believed to be wholly inherited by Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga, and also Vasubandhu. The Prajñāpāramitā sūtras are equally revered as authentic by both Madhyamaka and Yogācāra schools.

Furthermore, the Yogācāra developed the doctrine of emptiness as an important position by inheriting the entire body of thought of their former masters, i.e. Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka. The Yogācāra emphasizing the insight on the Madhyamaka’s thought displays a spirit of underlying continuity and acceptance. All Buddhist Schools, either explicitly or implicitly, acknowledge the world to be dependent origination (pratītyasumutpāda) which is understood as truth (satya)

since it is the ground of being (sat). In the Madhyamaka, it is not referred to by name or accounted for by the explanation of phenomena, but relegated to the whole of empirical existence under one category saṃvṛti. The Yogācāra provides name for the provisional nature of such denotation. Saṃvṛti is constituted through a particular way by the dependent paratantra and the imagined parikalpita. Consciousness as non-conceptual is the paramārtha. The enlightened state is

the accomplished nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) by Yogācāra, while it is referred to as the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya) by Madhyamaka. Having stated the above, the doctrine of śūnyatā paves the way for both Madhyamaka and Early Yogācāra philosophies in early Mahāyāna Buddhism. While the Madhyamaka states that both the conditioned and unconditioned reality are empty, the Yogācāra emphasizes that the true reality is neither empty nor non-empty.

Glossary

abhāva 無, non-being, negation, absence. abhāvasya bhāvaḥ, being of non-being.

abhūta-parikalpa, literally, that where the construction of the non-existent (object) obtains; in the Yogācāra philosophy, a term for the ‘paratantra’ reality, the Constructive Ideation of Consciousness, the stream of ideas itself.

ācārya 阿闍梨,教授, teacher, master.

adhipati-pratyaya 僧上緣, literally, a presiding or dominant condition or cause, e.g., the organ of vision with regard to the occurrence of visual sensation; one of the four kinds of Causes. This has been differently interpreted by the Theravādins and

Sarvāstivādins. According to the latter, it is the influence that any entity exerts upon all other entities excepting itself and the unconditioned noumena. ālambana, ālambana-pratyaya 緣緣, the object viewed as a cause or condition for the occurrence of any knowledge.

ālaya, ālaya-vijñāna 阿賴耶識, in the Yogācāra philosophy, the ‘store-house’. Consciousness containing potentially all the ideas and other mental states; it is also the residual of all thoughts and deeds. anātman (Pāli: anattā) 無我, no self or non-self or more broadly “insubstantiality”; the third of the “three marks” (trilakṣaṇa) of existence, along with impermanence (anitya) and suffering (duḥkha). The basic Buddhist doctrine is that all things lack substance or permanent identical reality. animitta 無相, animittatā, refraining from marking things occasions for clinging, as one of

the gates to freedom or nirvāṇa. animitta-cetosamādhi 無相心定, meditation on refraining from marking things occasions for clinging. anitya, anityatā (Pāli: anicca) 無常, impermanent, changing, momentary. anupalambha 不可得, 無所得, the non-clinging, as a name for nirvāṇa, as a name for prajñāpāramitā anupalambha-śūnyatā 不可得空, non-clinging śūnyatā, a name for the ultimate truth. appaṇihito samādhi 無願三昧, concentration on freeing from desire.

Arhat 阿羅漢, the perfect Saint who has eliminated all passions and suffering. This is the highest stage of attainment according to the Hīnayāna. The Mahāyāna sharply contrasts this with the Bodhisattva ideal of attaining complete Buddhahood and of non-egoistic striving for the salvation of all beings. arūpya-dhātu (arūpa-dhātu) 無色界, the immaterial world, other realm of formlessness. ārya-satya 聖諦, the Holy Truths, the four Buddhist Truths of Suffering, its Cause, its Cessation, and the Path leading to Cessation. asaṃskṛta 無爲, asaṃskṛta-dharma 無爲法, the Unconditioned entities. According to the

Sarvāstivādins there are three such entities: Space (ākāśa), Nirvāṇa, and the Cessation of Elements due to the lack of favorable conditions.

Asaṅga  無著,  (ca.  320–c.  390 CE). Ārya Asaṅga,  Indian scholar  who  is  considered  to  be  a  founder  of  the Yogācāra school   of Mahāyāna Buddhism. 

āsrava (Pāli. āsava) 漏, the impure tendencies, passions (kleśas), that infect and defile the mind, causing bondage and suffering. ātman 我, Self, Soul, Substance. ātman is equated with dravya (substance), with the nitya

(permanent, eternal), with svabhāva (nature or self-being), with sāra (essence) and vastu (real). avavāda-prajñapti 受波羅攝提, convention in regard to the complex entities in distinction from their subtle constituents. avyākṛta 無記, avyākṛta-vastūni, the Undeclared, the Inexpressible, the fourteen questions regarding the ultimate nature of the World, the Perfect Being (Tathāgata), and the Soul (jīva) which Buddha declared as not capable of definition either existent or nonexistent or both or neither. āyatana 處, literally ‘bases’. In Buddhist psychology, the twelve āyatanas are the six senses or modes of perception and the six kinds of object they correspond to, namely: (1) sight and colour/form (rūpa-āyatana); (2) hearing and sound (śabda-āyatana); (3) smell and scent (gandha-āyatana); (4) taste and flavours (rasa-āyatana); (5) touch and tangible objects (sparśa-āyatana); and (devil) the mind and ideas (manoāyatana). Each āyatana is thus the sphere or domain of a particular sense, and encompasses everything that can be experienced through that particular ‘sense-door’. bhāva 有, being, existence, affirmation.

Bhāvaviveka 清辯 (ca.490-570), A noted Indian Madhyamaka philosopher, also known as Bhavya, who wrote a number of important works, including the Tarka-jvālā, refuting other contemporary Buddhist and non-Buddhist doctrines. His method of argumentation is characterized by the use of standard syllogisms (svatantra) derived from the Buddhist school of logic in contrast to the reductio ad absurdum (prasaṇga) method of argument favoured by the later philosopher Candrakīrti.

Bodhisattva 菩薩, the Aspirant for Enlightenment. caitta, mental states. citta 心, mind, Pure Consciousness. In Buddhism, this is conceived as a stream or a series of momentary mental states without any abiding stratum. Cittamātra 唯心宗, a term derived from the Laṇkāvatāra Sūtra used in a loose and somewhat misleading manner in Tibetan Buddhist doxology to denote the Yogācāra school of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

darśana 知見, Immediate Knowledge, Transcendental Insight, Intuition. darśanamārga 見道, the path of Insight or Illumination. dharma 法, Law, especially Moral Law; virtue or merit; Essence or Nature of a thing; element or ultimate constituent of existence. dharma-dhātu, dharmatā 法性, the Reality of Dharmas; the Noumenal Ground of phenomena; synonymous with Dharma-kāya, Śūnyatā and Tathatā. dharmakāya 法身, the Cosmic Body of the Buddha: the essence of all beings.

dharma-nairātmya 法無我, the unreality of elements as separate ultimate existences; this contention of the Mādhyamika is directed against the dogmatic acceptance of the reality of elements by the Hīnayāna Schools (Ābhidharmika and Sautrāntika).

Dharmapāla 護法, one of the leading exponents of the Yogācāra school in India, a contemporary of Bhāvaviveka, active during the early decades of the 7th century CE and dying young at the age of 32. Eventually based at Nālandā, he initially travelled widely and studied both Hīnayāna andMahāyāna throughout India, with Dignāga numbered among his teachers. Unlike classical Yogācāra, his interpretation tends towards idealism and it was through the connections his student Śīlabhadra had with Hsüan-tsang that this understanding of Yogācāra was eventually transmitted to China.

dharma-prajñapti 法假, conventional designation of the subtle constituent elements. dhātu 界, the literal meaning is ‘root’ or ultimate element. In Buddhist thought, this term is used in three senses: (i) the three planes of existence (trai-dhātuka), viz., the Kāmadhātu (the sphere of gross desires or bodies), Rūpadhātu (the sphere of subtle bodies) and Arūpadhātu (the sphere of immaterial bodies); (ii) for the six ultimate elements of existence (the four general elements of matter, viz., air, fire, water and earth), ākaśa (space) and vijñāna (pure awareness); (iii) for the eighteen elements of existence (aṣṭādaśadhātavaḥ), viz., the six sense-data, the six sense-organs of cognition and the six resultant cognition or sensations.

dravyasat (vastusat) 實有, literally being a real, an immutable substance. duḥkha (dukkha) 苦, suffering, unpleasant, painful; unsatisfactory, pain. ekayāna 一乘, the One Way or Vehicle; a concept found in certain Mahāyāna texts such as the Lotus Sūtra which teaches that the three Ways (triyāna)—the Śrāvakayāna, the Pratyekabuddhayāna, and the Bodhisattvayāna—taught by the Buddha all converge in the single Buddhayāna. eṣaṇā 求, seeking, longing, thirst for the real.

Fa-hsien 法顯, Chinese scholar and pilgrim-monk, born in Shansi and trained at Ch'ang-an in the west of China, which he left in 399 CE to visit India and elsewhere in search of the complete canon of Buddhist scripture. After extensive travels he returned home in 414 and began a translation of the Buddhist Scriptures. His works include an account of his travels, translated into English by various persons including a translation by H. A. Giles, The Travels of Fa Hsien (1923).

grāhaka 能取, grasper (subject). grāhya 所取, the graspable, the grasped (the object). grāhya-grāhaka-abhāva 無能取所取, the absence of the subject and the object.

hetu, hetu-pratyaya 因缘, cause; also used more specifically to mean the ‘producing cause’ (nirvarttako hetuḥ). Hīnayāna, 小乘 also called Small Vehicle or Liberated Vehicle, which refers to Śrāvaka and Pratyeka-Buddha. It is a school of Buddhism, popular in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, hence also known as Southern Buddhism, in contrast with Northern Buddhism or Mahāyāna, the form mainly prevalent from Nepal to Japan. Hīnayāna is sometimes described as self-benefiting, and Mahāyāna as self-benefiting for the benefit of others. Another difference is that Pali is the general literary language in Hīnayāna while Sanskrit of Mahāyāna. Hīnayāna is nearer to the original teaching of the Buddha.

Hsuan-tsang 玄奘 (596-664), Chinese philosopher. After long search for truth in his homeland he went to India in his early thirties and remained there for sixteen years, eventually returning home to set up a school for the translation of hundreds of works that he had collected in India. His own findings expressed in his Treatise on the Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only focus on the contention that neither the self nor external objects exist, but only the inner, psychic awareness. This is not and probably cannot be fully realized except by the Arhat.

jñeyāvaraṇa 所知障, the veil or obscuration of ignorance with regard to the true nature of the real. In the Yogācāra system, this stands for the obscuration engendered by the wrong belief in the reality of object. Only a Buddha can overcome this, in addition to overcoming the defilement-hindrance (kleśāvaraṇa). When it is overcome, a Buddha

is perfectly omniscient, capable of knowing both the intrinsic (svalakṣaṇa) and common characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa) of all things. kāma 欲, pleasure; lust; enjoyment; an object of sexual enjoyment. karma 業, ‘action'. In the specifically Buddhist sense, it primarily mea ns a morally skillful or unskillful action which determines specifically the manner of future existence of the doer. It is divisible as mano-karma, kāya-karma and vāk-karma. The latter two can induce avijñapti-karma. Karma can also be distinguished as individual and collective karma-s, of which the fruits of the latter are not regarded as vipāka, but adhipatiphalas.

kleśa 煩惱, afflictions as arising from and headed by ignorance and perversions. kleśāvaraṇa 煩惱障, afflictive obstructions; obstructions to liberation; the veiling caused by passions. lakṣaṇa 相, sign, mark in distinction from dhātu (nature); essential nature as synonym of prakṛti, svabhāva. laukika samyagdṛṣṭi (Pāli. lokiya sammādiṭṭhi) 正見出世間, the right view of the mundane or worldly truth.

Madhyamaka 中論, the Middle Position or Philosophy (of Nāgārjuna). madhyamā-pratipad 中道, the Middle Path; the avoidance of extremes. Mādhyamika, a follower of the Middle Position or Madhyamaka Philosophy. Mahāyāna 大乘, 'Great Vehicle'. A name used by the Mahāyānists to stress that they aim at the perfect Buddha-hood of all beings, and their ideal is thus superior to that of the Hīnayāna.

Mahīśāsakas, One of the major Eighteen Schools of Early Buddhism, thought to have been a 2nd century BCE offshoot of the Vibhajyavādins. Based on present knowledge of its Abhidharma doctrines, it is sometimes considered to be a mainland Indian parent school linked to Sri Lankan Theravāda.

Maitreyanātha (270-350 CE) 彌勒, One of the three founders of Yogācāra, along with Asaṇga and Vasubandhu. His dates are uncertain, and scholars are divided as to whether the name denotes a historical human teacher or the Bodhisattva Maitreya, used pseudo-epigraphically. The number of works attributed to him in the Tibetan and Chinese traditions but variously include the Yogācārabhūmi Śāstra, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, the Dharma-dharmatā-vibhāga, the Madhyānta-vibhāga-kārikā, the Abhisamaya-alaṃkāra, and the Ratna-gotra-vibhāga.

mokṣa 解脫, become released; liberation; emancipation. naiḥsvābhāvya, niḥsvabhāva 無自性, 自性空, devoid of self-being, non-substantiality nairātmya 無我, soullessness, substancelessness, unreality. nairātmya-vāda, the theory that there is no substance or soul. nāma 名, names, concepts as conventionally established; mental elements in distinction from rūpa. nāmasaṅketa-prajñapti 名字一, convention of names and signs.

neyārtha 不了義, teaching of the indirect or circumstantial import, having phenomenal validity only. nimitta 相, the determinate entities as mark, sign; image; target, object; cause, condition. These meanings are used in, and adapted to, many contexts of which only the doctrinal ones are mentioned here. nirmāṇa 化, creation, a name for the world of convention.

nirodha 滅, cessation, extinction or suppression, referring especially to the extinction of a specific affliction (kleśa) or group of afflictions. nirvāṇa (Pāli. nibbāna) 涅槃, the extinction of the root of suffering, of clinging; the ultimate goal of all beings; the ultimate nature of all things. nirvikalpa 了無餘, non-conceptual; free from conceptual construction; indeterminate.

nītārtha 了義, teaching of the direct or ultimate way, versus neyārtha. paramārtha 第一義, paramārtha-satya 真諦, the ultimate or noumenal reality, Absolute. pāramitā 波羅蜜多, literally, that which has gone beyond all limits; Infinite Excellence, Perfection. paratantra 依他起, the dependent reality. In the Yogācāra system, it stands for the mind and the mental states on which there occurs the imputation of subject-object distinction; same as abhūta-parikalpa.

parikalpita 妄想, 遍計所執, the imagined or illusory aspect of appearance; in the Yogācāra, the entire world of objects is imputed on consciousness, and is therefore essentially unreal.

pariṇāma 轉變, modification, change. pariniṣpanna 圓滿, the absolute reality; the specific term for the Yogācāra absolute. prajñāpāramitā 般若波羅蜜, Perfection of Wisdom; the Highest Reality identified with the Buddha. prajñapti 波羅攝提, name, concept, as well as the entity that the name designates; also convention.

prajñapti-sat, literally, real in thought (only); subjective; unreal. prapañca 戲論, elaboration as the clinging to words or concepts and as the root of all contentions. pratipakṣa, counter-thesis. pratiśaraṇa 依, reliance, refuge.

pratītyasamutpāda 緣起, Dependent Origination, this is equated, in the Madhyamaka, with śūnyatā, the Reality of things. pratyaya 緣, conditions; referring generally to the subsidiary factors whose concomitance results in the production of an effect from a cause, especially in the compound hetupratyaya (“causes and conditions”).

Pratyekabuddha-yāna 緣覺乘, the path, way, or ‘vehicle’ of the solitary Buddha. pravṛtti-vijñānas 轉識, the cognitive awareness; the active consciousness. pudgala (Pāli. puggala) 人, the empirical individual, ego.

pudgala-ātman 人我, pudgala-ātman-vāda, the theory held by the Vātsīputrīyas or Sāmmitīyas, of a quasi-permanent entity, neither completely identical with the mental states, nor totally different from them. samanantara, samanantara-pratyaya 次第緣, the immediately preceding cessation of an entity conceived as a condition in the occurrence of an effect, especially of a mental state.

saṃsāra 輪迴, literally incessantly in motion, flux; the world of phenomena. samudaya 集, origination or arising. saṃvṛti 世間, as a name for the world of convention, the covering activity. saṃvṛti-satya 俗諦, conventional, superficial or apparent truth, phenomena reality. śaśvata-dṛṣṭi (Pāli. Sassasta-diṭṭhi) 常見, eternalism; one of the two extreme views (antagrāhadṛṣṭi), along with nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭi). Satkāryavāda 因中有果論, the (Sāṅkhya) theory that the effect is pre-existent in or identical with the cause; versus with asatkāryavāda. skandhas 陰, the (five) groups of elements (dharmas) into which all existences are classified in Early Buddhism. The five are: rūpa (matter), vedanā (feeling), saṁjñā (ideation), saṁskāra (forces), vijñāna (consciousness).

śūnya, śūnyatā 空, empty, void, emptiness. The terms are used in two allied meanings: (i) the phenomena are śūnya, as they are relative and lack substantiality or independent reality; they are conditioned (pratītyasamutpanna), and hence are unreal; (ii) the Absolute is śūnya or śūnyatā itself, as it is devoid of empirical forms; no thoughtcategory or predicate (‘is’, ‘not is’, ‘is and not-is’, ‘neither is nor not-is’) can legitimately be applied to it; it is Transcendent to thought (śūnya).

svabhāva 自性,自有, literally, self-nature or self-being, essential nature. Tathāgata 如來, appellation of Buddha; one who has realized and known things as they are in reality; Perfect Being. tathāta 如, Suchness, Thatness; the Real that stays unmodified; Absolute.

uccheda-dṛṣṭi (Pāli. Uccheda-diṭṭhi) 斷見, nihilism, materialism; one of the two extreme views(antagrāhadṛṣṭi) together with śāśvatadṛṣṭi. upādāya-prajñapti 假名, derived name, as a synonym of conditioned origination and of śūnyatā.

Vasubandhu 世親 (ca. fourth or fifth centuries CE), One of the most influential authors in the history of Buddhism, and the only major figure to make significant contributions to both the mainstream Buddhist Schools and Mahāyāna.

vigata-kleśa 無垢, vigata is the past participle of vigacchati. It means gone away, ceased, deprived of, and being without. Kleśa is defilement. Vigatakleśa is ‘gone away defilement’, or ‘ceased defilement’. vijñāna 識, Consciousness

Vijñānavāda 唯識學派, ‘The Way of Consciousness’, an alternative name for the Yogācāra school. The title Vijñānavāda emphasizes the interest of that school in the workings of consciousness (vijñāna) and its role in creating the experience of saṃsāra.

vijñapti 了别, representation, a Yogācāra term which denotes the mentally generated projections of subject and object that are falsely believed to exist. In reality, according to Yogācāra teachings, they are merely superimposed by unenlightened beings upon actuality. The aim of Yogācāra practice is to realize the false and illusory nature of these projections and attain non-dual awareness (nirvikalpa-jñāna).

vijñaptimātra, the sole reality of Consciousness; the Yogācāra doctrine of the Absolute.

vikalpa 分別, (1) ‘Imagining’, an intellectual process which leads to the formation of concepts, judgements, views, and opinions. In Buddhist thought, the term usually signifies deluded or erroneous thinking which is tainted with emotions and desires and fails to grasp the true nature of things as they are. In this sense it is synonymous with the term prapañca, meaning ‘mental proliferation’, an activity of the deluded and unenlightened mind. (2) The process, according to Yogācāra, which sets up a false dualistic split that is imposed upon reality, and involves belief in the existence of a perceiving subject and perceived objects. Some sources consider both ‘subjectivity’ (grāhaka) and ‘objectivity’ (grāhya) to be the result of vikalpa .

vimokṣa (Pāli: vimokkha) 解脱, deliverance, release, emancipation, The three liberations are: 1. the conditionless (or signless) liberation (animitta -v.), 2. the desireless liberation (apanihita-v.),3. the emptiness (or void) liberation (suññatā-v. ). They are also called 'the triple gateway to liberation' (vimokkha-mukha), as they are three different approaches to the paths of holiness.

viśuddhālambana 所縁清淨, object of observation of purification.

vyavadāna 淸淨, purification, opposite to saṃkleśa (pollution, the process of defiling).

vyavahāra 世間,世界, the world of convention, mundane life, mundane truth.

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