An Introduction to the Tibetan Dzogchen (Great Perfection) Philosophy of Mind

This article is an introduction to the philosophy of mind that developed within the syncretistic rDzogs chen (Great Perfection) tradition of Tibetan Buddhism between the 8th and 14th centuries CE. Despite the growing interest in this tradition in recent decades, there has so far been no systematic appraisal of its views on mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with antecedent Buddhist philosophies of mind. These views merit attention not only because of their intrinsic interest and relevance to contemporary consciousness studies but also because they provide an essential key to understanding the tradition’s

leading ideas and practices. From a traditional standpoint, discerning the nature and structure of human consciousness in accordance with the crucial distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes) is deemed indispensable to understanding rDzogs chen view and meditation. To this end, the present article focuses on how this distinction allowed rDzogs chen adepts to precisely describe, on the basis of careful first-personal observation, what occurs when a human being becomes a buddha, and to articulate a disclosive model of goal-realization commensurate with their findings. It traces the development of the distinction within its historical and doctrinal contexts and then examines its subsequent clarifications and refinements as a soteriological model. It finally summarizes the tradition’s distinctive (re)intepretations of ‘mind’ and ‘primordial knowing’, and concludes with a brief assessment of the contemporary relevance of the distinction.

Introduction

Despite the growing volume of academic and popular literature on the syncretistic Tibetan tradition known as rDzogs chen (‘‘Great Perfection’’)1 over the past few decades, its philosophical foundations remain largely unknown to those unacquainted with its primary sources. The bulk of recent academic literature has been devoted to the important and difficult task of historical reconstruction of rDzogs chen traditions based on relative chronologies of the texts and their doxographical classes and revisionist accounts of historical events and leading figures. There have also been numerous studies devoted to specific religious and sociocultural aspects of the tradition. Comparatively little attention has been devoted to elucidating its principal doctrinal developments during the formative 8th to 14th centuries or the soteriological problems and interests that guided them. A noteworthy case in point is the absence of any systematic appraisal of rNying ma views on the nature of mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with other Indian Buddhist philosophies of mind such as Cittamatra, Madhyamaka, Pramanavada, and Vajrayana. The rNying ma views merit attention not only because of their intrinsic interest˙ and relevance to contemporary philosophies of mind but also because they provide an invaluable key to understanding the tradition’s distinctive doctrines and practices. To this end, the present article looks at the rDzogs chen philosophy of mind, with a particular focus on the distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes) that the tradition deems indispensable to understanding its systems of philosophy and meditation. From its inception as an esoteric instruction (man ngag) transmitted by early, mostly Indian masters of the Royal Dynastic Period (610–910)2, through its articulations and justifications within wider contexts of Buddhist doctrine and soteriology by scholaradepts of the Period of Monastic Hegemony (1249–1705), the mind/primordial knowing distinction emerges as a formative element of the rDzogs chen system.

A Short History of the Distinction Between Mind and Primordial Knowing

Between the 8th and 14th centuries, a succession of rNying ma scholar-practitioners presented and defended certain phenomenological distinctions that were considered indispensable for understanding Great Perfection (rdzogs chen) view and practice. Foremost among these was the distinction between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial knowing (ye shes)3 that is first systematically presented in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras (rgyud bcu bdun) that make up the Heart Essence (snying thig) subclass of the Esoteric Guidance Class (man ngag sde) of rDzogs chen teachings (these traditions are discussed in Dudjom Rinpoche 1991 and Germano 2005a, b). These teachings often take the form of personal instructions advising the practitioner to discern within the flux of adventitious thoughts and sensations that characteristize dualistic mind (sems) an invariant prerepresentational structure of awareness known as primordial knowing, open awareness or the nature of Mind (sems nyid) from which this turmoil arises. The idea is to directly recognize (rang ngo shes) and become increasingly familiar with this abiding condition without confusing it with any of its derivative and distortive aspects.

rNying ma historical and biographical sources trace the distinction to the teachings of early rDzogs chen masters, in particular the oral transmissions of Vimalamitra (bi ma snyan brgyud), an identification that appears at first glance to be supported by the the many esoteric instructions (man ngag) on distinguishing mind and primordial knowing that are found scattered among rNying ma collections such as the Bi ma snying thig4, Bai ro rgyud ’bum, rNying ma rgyud ’bum and dGongs pa zang thal. A survey of these sources confirms that the detailed accounts of the mind/primordial knowing distinction presented in the seventeen tantras represent the culmination of a conspicuous gnoseological trend in early rDzogs chen exegesis of the Royal Dynastic Period (610–910) marked by a persistent and pervasive interest in articulating a primordial nondual mode of knowing and establishing it as the conditio sine qua non of Buddhist theory and praxis. This trend is reflected in the widespread employment of terminology specifying this mode of awareness that include (in varying combinations) primordial knowing (ye shes), open awareness (rig pa), selfawareness (rang rig), awakened mind (byang chub kyi sems), and Mind itself (sems nyid). The main lines of the rDzogs chen gnoseological trend can be traced to the Guhyagarbha tantra and other works belonging to the Mayajala cycle (sGyu ’phrul dra ba skor) and affiliated Mahayoga tantric corpus, and through a variety of texts assigned to the Mind and Space Classes (sems sde and klong sde) of Atiyoga that are ascribed to a group of early (8th-9th c.) figures that includes dGa’ rab rdo rje, Man˜jus´rı¯mitra, S´rı¯simha,Vimalamitra, and their Tibetan colleagues, Vairocana being the most important (On these figures see Germano˙ 2002 and Karmay 1988). This same circle of early masters are traditionally identified as the earliest human proponents of the rDzogs chen sNying thig (Great Perfection Heart Essence) system which (re)emerges as a relatively minor Central Tibetan religious tradition in the eleventh century but steadily eclipses other rDzogs chen traditions in the centuries to follow.

From the fourteenth century onward, the distinction between dualistic mind and primordial knowing is systematically elucidated, with a level of phenomenological rigor perhaps unparalleled in the history of Buddhist thought, by luminaries such as Klong chen rab ’byams pa, rTse le sna tshogs rang grol (b. 1608), ’Jigs med gling pa (1730–98), Yon tan rgya mtsho (19th century) and more recently by ’Jigs med bsTan pa’i nyi ma (1865– 1926) and Tshul khrims bzang po (1884–1957). Above all, it is Klong chen pa’s detailed exegesis of the distinction as a cornerstone of sNying thig doctrine and contemplation and his creative appropriation of it in formulating an inclusivist schematization of the Buddhist path in terms of the progressive disclosure of primordial knowing – a clearing process (sbyong byed) that seamlessly integrates elements of Mahayana, Vajrayana and rDzogs chen – that lays the doctrinal and hermeneutical foundation for all the subsequent rNying ma treatments. His soteriological standpoint is neatly epitomized in the definition of the path of awakening (bodhimarga) that he presents in the autocommentary to his famous path summary entitled Easing Weariness in Mind itself (Sems nyid ngal gso): When the turbulence of mind and its mental factors have come to rest, Mind itself – luminous primordial knowing – arises from within. We call the progressive familiarization with this [[[primordial]] knowing] the path of awakening (Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel vol. 1, 130).

An assessment of Klong chen pa’s extant corpus reveals that the distinction was a central and unifying theme in the author’s rDzogs chen writings that he would return to again and again during his lifetime and that he repeatedly characterized as ‘‘extremely important’’ (shin tu gal po che) but also as ‘‘very difficult to understand’’ (rab tu rtogs dka’).

Developments and Clarifications

The rDzogs chen philosophy of mind is inseparable from its distinctive soteriology. By investigating the complex and heterogenous structure of consciousness the adept seeks to determine how afflictive thoughts and emotions arise and how they can best be quelled to allow for the recovery of latent capacities for spontaneous, altruistic modes of thinking, feeling and acting. The treatments of the distinction between mind and primordial knowing in classical sources are perhaps best viewed as responses to a recurrent question that was already posed in the earliest stratum of rDzogs chen literature: How do people become enlightened? Stated otherwise, what are the conditions necessary for a human being to become what is known as an ‘awakened one’ (buddha : sangs rgyas), a being in whom cognitive and affective obscurations have cleared (sangs) so that inherent capacities for caring and knowing (mkhyen brtse nus ldan) are able to fully manifest (rgyas)? From this followed more specific questions: How are primordial knowing (ye shes) and dualistic mind (sems) co-present within the psychic and corporeal dimensions of lived experience? And, from a soteriological perspective, How can a practitioner reclaim unconditioned primordial knowing from the subjective appropriations and reifications of conceptually and emotionally distorted mind?

Such questions preoccupied rDzogs chen scholar-adepts from as early as the 8th century and led them increasingly to differentiate between conditioned and unconditioned modes of being and awareness. If adepts of the early Mind Class (sems sde) of rDzogs chen teachings (8th century onward) were inclined to emphasize the underlying unity of the ‘minds’ of buddhas (sangs rgyas kyi thugs) and sentient beings (sems can gyi sems), classical Heart Essence (snying thig) adepts increasingly underscored the need to establish clear priority relations between them. To better understand this shift in perspective, it may be useful to take a closer look at the attempts during this period to describe and explain the nature of consciousness and its role in spiritual awakening. On the earlier account, the abiding condition of Mind (sems kyi gnas lugs) is present equally in buddhas and sentient beings, but they differ according to whether or not they have recognized (rig/ma rig) and remained attuned to this condition. Already by the ninth century, however, the rDzogs chen master gNyag Jn˜anakumara had taken a more nuanced view of the matter. Strictly speaking, the minds of buddhas and sentient beings are neither the same nor different: if fundamentally the same, humans would already be fully realized buddhas without making any effort and errancy would be impossible; if fundamentally different, humans would live in perpetual self-bondage and enlightenment would be impossible. In a series of arguments, gNyag adduces a number of absurd consequences that follow from assuming that sentient beings and buddhas possess fundamentally identical or different kinds of minds.5 More than anything, gNyag’s arguments draw attention to the need to distinguish realized and non-realized persons based on a rigorous investigation of relevant phenomena rather than on an uncritical acceptance of traditional typologies. Useful phenomenological distinctions can all too easily congeal into rigid dichotomies when their grounding in living praxis is lost sight of. By reframing the constructs ‘buddha’ and ‘sentient being’ as available modes of being and awareness rather than as idealized, oppositional

categories, rDzogs chen scholars such as gNyag and, later, gNubs chen Sangs rgyas ye shes (9th–10th c. CE), were able to bring attention back to, and develop a language to describe, the unified experiential continuum or field which is the condition of possibility of buddhas and sentient beings. To be a buddha is to be directly acquainted with, and live out of, this abiding mode of being; to be a sentient being (sems can) is to be subject to (can) the vagaries of mentation (sems), viz., the nexus of self-reifications of this dimension that cause beings to overlook it.

Such developments paved the way for the increasingly nuanced distinctions between the modes of being and awareness specific to buddhas and sentient beings advanced by the sNying thig tradition that emerges from relative obscurity in the 12th century and steadily gains momentum in centuries to follow. On this account, although the nature of Mind, or buddha nature, is universally available to humans beings as a discernable invariant structure of lived experience, it not readily accessible, concealed as it is behind a morass of objectifying and nominalizing superimpositions of thought. In the words of the foremost classical rNying ma scholar-yogin, Klong chen pa,

When open awareness is free from dualistic mind, since it is also, by implication, free from mind’s distorted appearances, there is no ‘place to go’ apart from the unique state of buddhahood. This is because the very essence that is buddhahood becomes actualized through freedom from what obscures it. When open awareness is associated with mind, it is called ‘mind-governed being’ (sems can). When dissociated from mind, it is called buddha (Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel: 494 f).

The aim of the distinction, then, is to illuminate how mind’s self-reifying activities lead the aspirant to overlook the simple taking place of presence itself in favour of the myriad perceptual and epistemic objects that claim our attention. Meditation is therefore viewed as a process of de-reification that restores an undistorted vision of how things present themselves and a mode of being and living commensurate with this vision. The distinction is widely adopted by classical exegetes as an interpretive scheme for articulating the conditions of nondual primordial experience. In this regard, Klong chen pa commends the distinction not only as a unique hermeneutical key for unlocking the implicit intention of Buddhist scripture but also, and more fundamentally, as a crucial point of entry into understanding the nature and structure of consciousness, one that best accounts for the range of phenomena involved in realizing the Buddhist goal of spiritual awakening.

By clarifying the mind/primordial knowing distinction, rDzogs chen sNying thig scholars were in effect articulating the preconditions for the kind of knowing said to be constitutive of being a buddha (sangs rgyas kyi ye shes: buddhajn˜ana) while at the same time delimiting the entire range of factors that are considered adventitious obscurations, or even obstacles, to illumination. Klong chen summarizes the distinction in this way: In brief, ‘‘mind and mental factors’’ refer to the arising of conceptualization and analysis of objects that is ostensibly causally produced by the subject-object [[[Wikipedia:dichotomy|dichotomy]]]. ‘‘Primordial knowing’’ refers to a [simple] object awareness in which the subject-object dichotomy has completely subsided. (Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel, 132.5.)

Needless to say, this dimensional account of consciousness, suggesting as it does an everelusive but nonetheless personally available prerepresentational stream of experiencing ‘beneath’ the concurrent flow of representational thought, had far-reaching doctrinal and soteriological implications. On this account, the Buddhist path is construed not as a developmental process of accumulating merits and knowledge that serve as causes and conditions leading to goal-realization (as in Mahayana gradualist paradigm), but as a disclosive process of directly recognizing and becoming increasingly familiar with primordial knowing as the mind’s objectifications and their obscuring effects subside.

It is important to note that the specifically rDzogs chen sNying thig treatments of the distinction combine two types of discourse that reflect the different doctrinal-soteriological contexts in which they developed: (A) an exoteric account that largely follows traditional Indian Buddhist philosophical views on the respective characteristics of mind and primordial knowing, and (B) an esoteric, specifically sNying thig account emphasizing embodied and embedded dimensions of mind and primordial knowing that draws on complex tantric physiological models presented in the seventeen tantras and supporting literature. The fifth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang Blo bzang rgya mtsho (1617–82) noted that this esoteric sNying thig treatment of the distinction which is based on ‘‘directly seeing mind and open awareness without confusing them’’ was a special quality (khyad chos) of rDzogs chen absent in the Middle Way traditions of Other Emptiness (gzhan stong) and Own Emptiness (rang stong), in the Mahamudra of the Abiding Condition (gnas lugs phyag chen)6 or in any other Tibetan systems. He does add, however, that these key points are not different from the implicit intent of the gSar ma (New or Reformist) Mantra system if one realizes its true import (Ngag dbang blo bzang gsung ’bum vol. 24, 94.1). Given the scope and intricacy of the esoteric accounts, which are perhaps best viewed as specialized applications of the basic distinction that draw upon a diverse repetoire of spiritual exercises, we have mainly confined this introductory discussion to a synoptic treatment of the exoteric account.

The rDzogs chen Analysis of Mind (sems)

In rDzogs chen doctrine, mind (sems) is identifed with a complex variety of phenomena that Buddhism has traditionally held to be causes of error, suffering and samsara itself. In the seventeen tantras and their commentaries, mind is associated inter alia with ignorance (˙ ma rig pa), actions (las) and their conditioning traces (bag chags), error (’khrul pa), subject/object dualism (gzung ’dzin), discursive elaborations (spros pa), adventitious mistaken concepts (glo bur ’khrul rtog), delusive perceptions, the Yogacara substratum consciousness (kun gzhi’i rnam par shes pa : alayavijn˜ana) with its eightfold ensemble of

cognitions, and the karmic energy currents (las kyi rlung : karmavayu) and their energetic pathways as these are detailed in rDzogs chen tantric physiology. In short, mind comprises all that is constructed and conditioned (’dus byas rkyen dbang) and constitutes the sum total of obscurations to be eliminated (spang bya’i sgrib pa), stopped (’gags bya) or cleared away (sbyangs bya), as all these were identified and codified in the various Indian Buddhist doctrinal systems. While a detailed consideration of these points in light of their historical-doctrinal contexts would far exceed my abilities and the scope of this article, it may be worthwhile to briefly summarize how rDzogs chen scholars characterized mind in terms of its subjectobject structure. According to Klong chen pa, ‘‘mind constitutes adventitious defilement. It functions as the fundamental cause of samsara. It depends on habitual tendencies of the three realms. As it creates the conditions of worldly life, it is that from which we should˙ be emancipated’’ (Zab don gnad kyi me long, in Zab mo yang tig vol. 2, 281.3.). These various

elements are then shown to be consequences of the complex dual structure that is held to be constitutive of mind. Dualistic mind is said to have two aspects: an apprehended object-oriented mind ([yul] gzung ba’i sems) that gives rise to the intended objects (yul) of the five sensory capacities, and an apprehending subject-oriented mind ([[[yul can]]] ’dzin pa’i sems) that, under the distorting influence of karma and various cognitive and affective factors as these are identified and classified in earlier Buddhist psychological literature, gives rise to the sense of an independently exiting ‘self’ as the possessor of these objects (yul can). In this way, ‘‘samsara which consists in grasping an object where there is no object and grasping a mind where there is no mind’’ is held ‘‘to appear before sentient˙ beings like a dream, having arisen from the manifesting of aspects of subject-oriented and object-oriented mind’’ (Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel, 495.3).

This portrayal draws on the Yogacara-Cittamatra view that mind (citta), under the influence of defiled ego-mind (klistamanas), has both intentional (object-intending) and reflexive (‘I-intending’) operations that structure experience in terms of an ‘I’ (subject)˙˙ and ‘mine’ (object). Mind’s activities in the three realms are shot through with dualism, the only difference being whether the reifications are coarse (as in the desires realm) or more subtle (as in the realms of forms and formlessness). Elsewhere, Klong chen pa characterizes mind as encompassing act, object and agent in a manner reminiscent of Nagarjuna’s analysis of mind in Madhyamakakarika 23.15.7 The author proceeds, however, to claim that the source of this tripartite intentional structure is the efflugence of primordial knowing (ye shes kyi gdangs) as it is explained in sNying thig tantric physiology. From the foregoing, it is clear that the rDzogs chen understanding of dualistic mind is syncretistic, combining analyses of its act-object structure that are known from traditional Cittamatra and Madhyamaka sources with accounts of the psychophysical genesis of this dual structure that are specific to sNying thig tantric physiology. The rDzogs chen Analysis of Primordial Knowing

If much of what one encounters in the sNying thig exposition of mind (sems) has been drawn from traditional Abhidharma and Cittamatra psychology, the descriptions and explanations of ye shes (Skt. jn˜ana) and related gnoseological terms reflect strongly indigenous interpretations in which antecedent Mahayana and tantric formulations are assimilated to the rDzogs chen disclosive paradigm. The term ye shes itself has presented something of an enigma to contemporary scholars of Tibetan Buddhism since the prefix ye (‘‘primordial’’) has no obvious equivalent in the Sanskrit jn˜ana which it renders. Traditionally, the Sanskrit term jn˜ana has been rendered into Tibetan as shes pa, mkhyen pa and ye shes according to context (See Tshig mdzod chen mo s.v. ye shes and discussion

by Almogi 2009, 160 f.). Of these, shes pa is a generic term for knowledge, while its honorific form mkhyen pa and the more technical abstract noun ye shes are both used with reference to the special knowledge of a realized being. The Tshig mdzod chen mo dictionary provides the following definition of ye shes: (A) primordially existing knowedge (ye nas gnas pa’i shes pa), i.e. an empty and luminous awareness that is naturally present in the mental continuum of all sentient beings, and (B) the knowledge possessed by Noble Ones.8 As for the particle ye, the dictionary lists the following connotations: (A) beginning, origin, root, (B) constant, perpetual, and (C) certain, definite.9 It is reasonable to view the addition of element ye in ye shes as an example of the Tibetan penchant for specifying technical uses of the more generic Indic originals (e.g. citta, jn˜ana, vidya), terms that had through semantic accretion taken on many diverse, and at times divergent, associations and connotations in the course of their long and complex conceptual histories. In this regard, it is interesting that the Karma bKa’ brgyud scholar gTsug lag ’phreng ba (1503/4–1566) observed that early Tibetan translators found it necessary to render jn˜ana as shes pa

(‘‘cognition’’) or rnam shes (‘‘consciousness’’) when describing the cognition of a sentient being, but as ye shes (‘‘primordial knowing’’) when describing the cognition of a buddha, there being no such difference explicit in the original term (Zab rgyas snying po, 764.4 f.). A survey of the ways ye shes has been variously employed in rDzogs chen sources leaves little doubt that the element ye in ye shes has had connotations of ‘primordial’ (ye nas) and ‘enduring’ (gtan) from the time of the tradition’s earliest available literature. Used adjectivally, the ye (‘primordial’) qualifies shes (‘knowing’ in a generic sense) in order to specify a mode of knowledge that is considered genuine, abiding and originary in contrast to normal cognition that is adventitious, transient and derivative. rDzogs chen scholars employed ‘primordial knowing’ and related gnoseological terms to characterize and affirm a mode of experiencing that is neither derivable from nor reducible to the (re)presentation of perceptual and epistemic objects. From a rDzogs chen perspective,

it is a mistake to arbitrarily limit the range of human experience to empirical and ideal objects. To do so is to assume that the experience of spiritual awakening that is said to occur with the dissolution of cognitive and affective obscurations along with the sense of self that anchors them consists merely in a change of knowledge, an altered state of cognition. To make experience coextensive with objects of cognition is to exclude vitally important affective and embodied dimensions of lived experience that play a decisive role in rDzogs chen soteriology.10 According to the seventeen tantras, primordial awareness pervades the lived body like oil in sesame seeds; it is therefore elicted not only through mental disciplines but physical ones as well. Its realization is often accompanied by powerful feelings of love and compassion, spontaneous expressions of the fundamental care structure (thugs rje) of primoridal knowing that are said to overwhelm and transcend subject-centered cognition. In these ways and others, ‘primordial knowing’ can be seen to circumscribe far more than what we normally associate with the term ‘consciousness.’

In this regard, rDzogs chen thinkers rejected the idea advanced by Indian Buddhist epistemologists such as Dharmakı¯rti that the spiritual realization attained by overcoming ignorance is a matter of exchanging incorrect representations of phenomena with correct ones. But they also rejected, or consider merely provisional, the Yogacara-tantric idea that awakening consists in the transformation (gnas ’gyur : as´rayaparavrtti) of consciousness (sems : citta) from one state to another. It makes little sense to say that afflictive states (e.g.˙ nyon mongs) are transformed into enlightened ones (e.g. ye shes), especially given the adventitious and obscuring character of the former and abiding, unfabricated character of the latter. It is more accurate to say that afflictive states must be eliminated in order for enlightened ones to manifest. Thus, the rDzogs chen affirmation of primordial awareness is perhaps best seen as an attempt to

go beyond a merely psychologistic account of what occurs when a human being becomes a buddha. We gain a sense of this in the recurring admonition to not confuse the prerepresentational path of primordial knowing (ye shes kyi lam) with the representational paths grounded in dualistic mind (sems kyi lam). Indeed, rDzogs chen testimonial accounts of the experience of primordial awareness suggest that the entire edifice of representational epistemology – the sense we have of being a knowing subject over against a totality of independently existing objects that we come to know through our representations of them – collapses with the disclosure of primordial knowing. In this way, the attempt to discover and articulate nondual primordial awareness led rNying ma scholars to abandon subject/object epistemologies, realist as well as anti-realist, in a manner comparable to attempts by Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein to overcome mediational epistemologies in Western philosophy (See Taylor 1995).

Concluding Remarks

From the foregoing, it is evident that the rDzogs chen sNying thig analysis of consciousness reflects an innatist view of Buddhist soteriology that draws on Mahayana philosophical, Tathagatagarbha (buddha nature) and tantric currents of thought, but introduces much that is original as well. On this syncretistic account, the conditions for spiritual awakening and delusion, freedom and errancy, are located in the heterogenous structure of human experience. The meditator learns to discover the abiding nature of Mind, or buddha nature, which is simply the undifferentiated and invariant structure of the experiential continuum, and distinguish it from ‘mind’ which comprises the adventitious reflective and thematic differentiations that arise within this continuum. Buddhist soteriology is, from this standpoint, construed as a task of recovery or retrieval, a clearing process (sbyong byed) that brings to light what is already present though temporarily and adventitiously obscured.

This brings us to the question of what, in general terms, rDzogs chen views of mind can contribute to the contemporary study of consciousness? Today, there is a growing sensus communis among scholars in various disciplines that there is something irreducibly subjective about conscious experience and that explanations of consciousness that discredit or avoid first personal descriptions in the name of scientific neutrality and objectivity are therefore bound to be impoverished and self-defeating. This concern has arisen largely in reaction to the prevailing materialist-reductionist philosophies of mind that developed alongside the ‘‘cognitive revolution’’ over the past half-century with the shared goal of explaining mental processes in strictly evolutionary and

neurobiological terms. Their ambition has been to reduce talk of mental processes to talk of neurological processes, with more extreme advocates, eliminative materialists, recommending that we do away with the former entirely. Among a wide range of disciplines, some form of scientific naturalism has become the default metaphysical position (See Zahavi 2009). In this regard, it may be worth considering the critical role that a sophisticated prescientific phenomenology of consciousness, such as we find articulated in rDzogs chen, could play in restoring a measure of balance to an area of study that has increasingly taken its direction from the objective sciences. The rDzogs chen philosophy of mind does not merely reaffirm the primacy of first person experience in the task of understanding the nature, structure and plasticity of phenomenality, and therefore of consciousness itself. Its soteriological-ethical inquiry standpoint also reopens to investigation neglected areas of human experience – those prerepresentational modes of thinking, feeling and acting that are the focus of Buddhist path discourses – that may well lead us to rethink why we should be interested in investigating consciousness in the first place.

Short Biography

David Higgins is a Research Fellow in the Dept. of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna where he is exploring the synthesis of Mahamudra and gZhan stong traditions in bKa’ brgyud scholasticism during the 15th and 16th centuries. His research interests include Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophy and epistemology with a particular focus on bKa’ brgyud Mahamudra and rNying ma rDzogs chen doctrinal systems. He has authored papers on Mahamudra and rDzogs chen philosophies of mind for the Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies and has given guest lectures at the universities of Vienna, Lausanne and Victoria and at conferences in Taiwan, Vancouver, Atlanta, and Thimpu, Bhutan. His forthcoming PhD dissertation entitled Philosophical Foundations of Classical rDzogs chen in Tibet: Investigating the Distinction Between Dualistic Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes) offers a philosophical analysis of rNying ma views on the nature of mind that traces their evolution and complex relationships with Indian Cittamatra, Madhyamaka, Pramanavada, and Vajrayana views and explores their soteriological implications. ˙

Notes

• Correspondence address: David Higgins, Spitalgasse 2, Hof 2.7, Vienna 1090, Austria. E-mail: david. higgins@univie.ac.at

1 Teachings classified as rDzogs chen are common to Tibet’s two oldest religious systems, the rNying ma (Ancient Ones) school of Tibetan Buddhism (Rinpoche and Yeshe Dorje) and pre-Buddhist Bon tradition. While these traditions share many doctrines and practices, their lines of transmission and scholastic developments are quite different. This paper considers only the rNying ma rDzogs chen system philosophy, on which see Karmay 1988, Achard 1999, Germano 2005a and Higgins (forthcoming). For an systematic overview of Bon rDzogs chen philosophy, see Rossi 1999. 2 The three periods referred to in this article are the Royal Dynastic Period (610–910), The Period of Fragmentation (910–1249), and the Period of Monastic Hegemony (1249–1705). I have adopted a somewhat pared down version of the periodization scheme proposed by Cuevas 2006. I sometimes use ‘‘classical’’ with reference to the Period of Monastic Hegemony. 3 The principal distinctions are traditionally associated with the hearing lineages (snyan brgyud) of Vimalamitra and other early rDzogs chen masters. They receive their first systematic treatment in the seventeen Atiyoga tantras, their commentaries (six of which are extant) and supporting materials in the Bi ma snying thig and canonical collections. For specifics regarding these sources, the reader is referred to Higgins (forthcoming). 4 On the chronology of the Bi ma snying thig and seventeen tantras, see Prats 1984, 197–209 and Achard 1999 pp. 78–83. 5 These arguments are adumbrated in gNyag’s commentary to the Mirror of Manifestation (’Phrul gyi me long dgu skor kyi ’grel pa, 983.2 f.). On these arguments, see Higgins (forthcoming). 6 gNas lugs phyag chen is widely used as a descriptor of goal-realization in Tibetan Mahamudra teaching introduced in the so-called Upper ’Brug pa bKa’ brgyud tradition by rGyal ba Yang dgon pa mGon po rdo rje (1213–58) and made famous by the 17th century ’Brug pa master Padma dkar po. At several points in his celebrated Ri chos skor gsum, Yang dgon pa draws a distinction between Mahamudra in its mode of abiding (gnas lugs phyag chen) and Mahamudra in the mode of errancy (’khrul lugs phyag chen). 7 Zab don snying po, in Zab mo yang tig pt. 1, 452.1: ‘‘Concerning the reason for using the term [‘mind’]: Because of the three factors of what is ‘minded’, by what means it is minded, and what does the minding, we speak of ‘mind’.’’ This analysis resembles the phenomenological analysis of intentional experience in terms of an intentional act (noesis), intentional object (noemata) and what Merleau-Ponty called the intentional arc (l’arc intentionel). 8 Tshig don chen mo s.v. ye shes: (1) ye nas gnas pa’i shes pa ste sems can thams cad kyi rgyud la rang bzhin gyis gnas pa’i stong gsal gyi rig pa, (2) ’phags pa’i mkhyen pa. 9 Tshig don chen mo s.v. ye: (1) thog ma dang| gdod ma| rtsa ba| … (2) gtan dang| nam rgyun…(3) nges par dang| mtha’ gcig||… 10 Indeed, it is on account of the ratio-cognitive bias sedimented in terms such as ‘consciousness’, ‘mind’, and ‘cognition’ that I have frequently resorted to the admittedly more ambiguous and wide-ranging term ‘experience’ in my discussions of ye shes and other gnoseological terms. For a discussion of this problem in the context of Western mystical traditions, see Steinbock 2007, 24-5. et passim.

Works Cited

Achard, Jean-Luc Achard. (1999). L’Essence PerlA˚ e du Secret: Recherches philologiques et historiques sur l’origine de la Grande Perfection dans la tradition rnying ma pa. Bibliothe`que de l’E´cole des Hautes E´tudes. Section des sciences religieuses, 107. Turnhout: Brepols. Almogi, Orna. (2009). Rong-zom-pa ’s Discourses on Buddhology: A Study of Various Conceptions of Buddhahood in Indian Sources with Special Reference to the Controversy Surrounding the Existence of Gnosis (jn˜ana : ye shes) as Presented by the Eleventh-Century Tibetan Scholar Rong-zom Chos-kyi-bzang-po. Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.

Cuevas, Bryan J. (2006). Some Reflections on the Periodization of Tibetan History, Revue d’Etudes TibA˚ taines, 10, pp. 44–55. Dudjom, Rinpoche & Jikdrel, Dorje. (1991). The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals & History. Translated and edited by Gyurme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein. Summerville: Wisdom Publications.

gNyag Jn˜anakumara. (1990). ’Phrul gyi me long dgu skor and ’grel pa. In: rNying ma bKa ’ ma shin tu rgyas pa 120 vols. Compliled at Katok Monastery by students of Kenpo Munsel and Kenpo Jamyang, pp. 965–1002. Chengdu: vol.

gTsug lag ’phreng ba. (1975). Zab rgyas snying po = Byang chub sems dpa ’i spyod pa la ’jug pa ’i rnam par bshad pa Theg chen chos kyi rgya mtsho Zab rgyas mtha ’ yas pa’i snying po. Rumtek: Dharma Chakra Centre. Germano, David. (2002). The Seven Descents and the Early History of rNying ma Transmissions. In: Helmut Eimer and David Germano (eds.), The Many Canons of Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 225–59. Leiden: Brill.

——. (2005a). The Funerary Transformation of the Great Perfection (rDzogs chen), Journal of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, 1, pp. 1–54. ——. (2005b). Dzogchen. In: Lindsay Jones (ed.), Gale Encyclopedia of Religions (2nd edn), pp. 2545–50. Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, vol. 4. Guenther, Herbert. (1975–76). Kindly Bent to Ease Us (3 volumes). Emeryville, California: Dharma Publishing. (An annotated translation of the root texts of Klong chen pa’s Ngal gso skor gsum.)

Higgins, David. (forthcoming). The Philosophical Foundations of Classical rDzogs chen in Tibet: Investigating the Distinction Between Dualistic Mind (sems) and Primordial Knowing (ye shes). PhD Dissertation, Switzerland: University of Lausanne.

Karmay, Samten Gyaltsen. (1988). The Great Perfection: A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching of Tibetan Buddhism. Leiden/New York: E. J. Brill. Klong chen rab ’byams pa. (1999a). Chos dbyings mdzod ’grel: Klong chen rab ’byams pa, Chos dbyings rin po che’i mdzod kyi ’grel pa Lung gyi gter mdzod. mDzod bdun. 83–765 Oddiyana Institute edition published by Tarthang Rinpoche, Khreng tu’u: vol. 3.

——. (1999b). Sems dang ye shes kyi dris lan. In: Kun mkhyen Klong chen pa Dri med ’od zer gyi gsung thor bu. Reproduced from xylographic prints from A ’dzom ’brug pa chos sgar blocks. 2 vols. Pema Thinley, Gangtok, vol. 1, pp. 377.2–93. ——. (1999c). Sems nyid ngal gso ’grel: rDzogs pa chen po Sems nyid ngal gso’i ’grel pa. In: rDzogs pa chen po ngal gso skor gsum, Reproduced from xylographic prints from A ’dzom ’brug pa chos sgar blocks. pp. 113–729. New Delhi. 3 vol. 1 and vol. 2, 1–439. ——. Zab don snying po. (1970–71). In: Zab mo yang tig, pt. 1, vol. 12 of sNying thig ya bzhi, pp. 446–467. (13 vols.). New Delhi: Trulku Tsewang, Jamyang and L. Tashi.

Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho (Vth Dalai Lama). (1991). Ngag dbang blo bzang gsung ’bum = The Collected Works (gsung ’bum) of the Vth Dalai Lama Ngag dbang blo bzang rgya mtsho. 25 vols. Lhasa Edition, Published by Sikkim Research Institute of Tibetology. Gangtok: Sikkim National Press. Prats, Ramon. (1984). Tshe-dbang nor-bu’s chronological notes on the early transmission of the Bi-ma snying-thig. In: L. Ligeti (ed.), Tibetan and Buddhist Studies Commemorating the 200th Anniversay of the Birth of Alexander Csoma de Koro¨s, vol. 2, pp. 197–209. Prague: Akade´miai Kiado´.

Rossi, Donatella. (1999). The Philosophical View of the Great Perfection in the Tibetan Bon Religion. Ithaca, New York: Snow Lion Publications. Steinbock, Anthony J. (2007). Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Taylor, Charles. (1995). Overcoming Epistemology. In: Philosophical Arguments, pp. 1–19. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Tshig mdzod chen mo = Bod rgya Tshig mdzod chen mo. (1984). Krang-dbyi-sun et al. Chengdu: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang. Zahavi, Dan. (2009). Naturalized Phenomenology. In: S. Gallagher and D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, pp. 3–19. New York: Springer.