What is and isn’t Yogacara

Dan Lusthaus

Yogacara is one of the two schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhism. Its founding is ascribed to two half brothers, Asanga and Vasubandhu, but its basic tenets and doctrines were already in circulation for at least a century before the brothers lived. Yogacara fo- cused on the processes involved in cognition in order to overcome the ignorance that pre- vents one from attaining liberation from the karmic rounds of birth and death. Yogacarins' sustained attention to issues such as cognition, consciousness, perception, and epistemo- logy, coupled with claims such as "external objects do not exist," has led some to misinter- pret Yogacara as a form of metaphysical idealism.

They did not focus on consciousness to assert it as ultimately real (Yogacara claims consciousness is only conventionally real since it arises from moment to moment due to fluctuating causes and conditions), but rather be- cause it is the cause of the karmic problem they are seeking to eliminate. Yogacara introduced several important new doctrines to Buddhism, including vijnapti-matra (nothing but cognition), three self-natures, three turnings of the Dharma- wheel, and a system of eight consciousness (all explained below).

Their close scrutiny of cognition spawned two important developments: an elaborate psychological therapeutic system that mapped out the problems in cognition along with the antidotes to correct them, and an earnest epistemological endeavor that led to some of the most sophisticated work on perception and logic ever engaged in by Buddhists or Indians.

1 Historical Overview

Though the founding of Yogacara is traditionally ascribed to two half-brothers, As - anga and Vasubandhu (fourth-fifth century C.E.), most of its fundamental doctrines had already appeared in a number of scriptures a century or more earlier, most notably the Sandhinirmocana Sutra (Elucidating the Hidden Connections). Among the key Yogacara concepts introduced in the Sandhinirmocana Sutra are the notions of "only-cognition" (vijnapti-matra), three self-natures (trisvabhava), the alaya-vijnana (warehouse con- sciousness), overturning the basis (asraya-paravrtti), and the theory of eight conscious- nesses.

The Sandhinirmocana Sutra proclaimed its teachings to be the third turning of the wheel of Dharma. Buddha lived ca. the fifth century BCE, but Mahayana Sutras did not be- gin to appear until roughly five hundred years later. New Mahayana Sutras continued to be composed for many centuries.

Indian Mahayanists treated these Sutras as documents that recorded actual discourses of the Buddha. By the third or fourth century CE a wide and sometimes incommensurate range of Buddhist doctrines had emerged, but whichever doctrines appeared in Sutras could be ascribed to the authority of Buddha himself. According to the earliest Pali Suttas, when Buddha became enlightened he turned the wheel of Dharma, i.e., he began to teach the path to enlightenment, the Dharma (Pali: Dhamma).

While Buddhists had always maintained that Buddha had geared specific teachings to the specific capacities of specific audiences, the Sandhinirmocana Sutra estab- lished the idea that Buddha had taught significantly different doctrines to different audi- ences based on their levels of understanding; and that these different doctrines led from provisional antidotes (pratipaksa) for certain wrong views up to a comprehensive teaching that finally made explicit what was only implicit in the earlier teachings.

In its view, the first two turnings of the wheel-the teachings of the Four Noble Truths in Nikaya and Ab- hidharma Buddhism, and the teachings of the Madhyamaka school, respectively-had ex- pressed the Dharma through incomplete formulations that required further elucidation (neyartha) in order to be properly understood and thus effective. The first turning, by em- phasizing entities (dharmas, aggregates, etc.) while "hiding" emptiness, might lead one to hold a substantialistic view; the second turning, by emphasizing negation while "hiding" the positive qualities of the Dharma, might be misconstrued as nihilism.

The third turning was a middle way between these extremes that finally made everything explicit (nitartha). In order to leave nothing hidden, the Yogacarins embarked on a massive, systematic syn- thesis of all the Buddhist teachings that had preceded them, scrutinizing and evaluating them down to the most trivial details in an attempt to formulate the definitive (nitartha) Buddhist teaching. Stated another way, to be effective all of Buddhism required a Yogacarin reinterpretation. Innovations in abhidharma analysis, logic, cosmology, medita- tion methods, psychology, philosophy, and ethics are among their most important contri- butions.

Asanga's magnum opus, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), is a comprehensive encyclopedia of Buddhist terms and models (which draws heavily on the Agamas - the Sanskrit counterpart of the Pali Nikayas), mapped out accord- ing to his Yogacarin view of how one progresses along the stages of the path to enlighten- ment. Vasubandhu's pre-Yogacarin magnum opus, the Abhidharmakosa (Treasury of Ab- hidharma) also provides a comprehensive, detailed overview of the Buddhist path with meticuluous attention to nuances and differences of opinion on a broad range of exacting topics.

Though both half brothers were born Brahmins, Asanga is believed to have early on joined the Mahisasikas, a non-Mahayana school of Buddhism deeply steeped in the Aga- mas. Asanga and Vasubandhu became the first identifiable Yogacarins, each having ini- tially been devoted to other schools of Buddhism.

Both were prolific authors, though As- anga attributed a portion of his writings to Maitreya, the Future Buddha living in Tusita Heaven. Some modern scholars have argued that this Maitreya was an actual human teacher, not the Future Buddha, but the tradition is fairly clear.

After twelve years of fruit- less meditation alone in a cave (or forest, according to other versions), during a moment of utter despair when Asanga was ready to quit due to his abject failure, Maitreya appeared to him and transported him to Tusita Heaven where he instructed him in previously un- known texts, Yogacarin works, that Asanga then introduced to his fellow Buddhists. Pre- cisely which texts these are is less clear, since the Chinese and Tibetan traditions assign different works to Maitreya.

According to tradition, Vasubandhu first studied Vaibhasika Buddhist teachings, writing an encyclopedic summary of their teachings that has become a standard work throughout the Buddhist world, the Abhidharmakosa (Treasury of Abhidharma). As he grew critical of Vaibhasika teachings, he wrote a commentary to that work refuting many of its tenets.

Intellectually restless for a while, Vasubandhu composed a variety of works that chart his journey to Yogacara, the best known of these being the Karmasiddhi- prakarana (Investigation Establishing Karma) and Pancaskandhaka-prakarana (Investiga- tion into the Five Aggregates). These works show a deep familiarity with the Abhidharmic categories discussed in the Kosa, with attempts to rethink them; the philosophical and scholastic disputes of the day are also explored, and the new positions Vasubandhu for- mulates in these texts bring him closer to Yogacarin conclusions.

A few modern scholars have argued, on the basis of some conflicting accounts in old biographies of Vasubandhu, that these texts along with the Abhidharmakosa were not written by the Yogacarin Vas- ubandhu, but by someone else. Since the progression and development of his thought, however, is so strikingly evident in these works, and the similarity of vocabulary and style of argument so apparent across the texts, the theory of Two Vasubandhus has little merit.

The writings of Asanga (and/or Maitreya) and Vasubandhu ranged from vast encyc- lopedic compendiums of Buddhist doctrine (e.g., Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Mahayanasam- graha, Abhidharmasamuccaya), to terse versified encapsulations of Yogacara praxis (e.g., Trimsika, Trisvabhava-nirdesa), to focused systematic treatises on Yogacara themes (e.g., Vimsatika, Madhyanta-vibhaga), to commentaries on well-known Mahayanic scriptures and treatises such as the Lotus and Diamond Sutras.

Since the Sandhinirmocana Sutra offers highly sophisticated, well-developed doc- trines, it is reasonable to assume that these ideas had been under development for some time, possibly centuries, before this scripture emerged. Since Asanga and Vasubandhu lived a century or more after the Sandhinirmocana appeared, it is also reasonable to as- sume that these ideas had been further refined by others in the interim.

Thus the tradition- al claim that the two brothers are the founders of Yogacara is at best a half-truth. Accord- ing to tradition Asanga converted Vasubandhu to Yogacara after having himself been taught by Maitreya; he is not known to have had any other notable disciples. Tradition does assign two major disciples to Vasubandhu: Dignaga, the great logician and epistemo- logist, and Sthiramati, an important early Yogacara commentator. It is unclear whether either ever actually met Vasubandhu (current scholarship deems it unlikely). They may have been disciples of his thought, acquired exclusively from his writings or through some forgotten intermediary teachers. These two disciples exemplify the two major directions into which Vasubandhu's teachings split.

After Vasubandhu, Yogacara developed into two distinct directions or wings: 1. a lo- gico-epistemic tradition, exemplified by such thinkers as Dignaga, Dharmakirti, santaraksita, and Ratnakirti; 2. an Abhidharmic psychology, exemplified by such thinkers as Sthiramati, Dharmapala, Xuanzang (Hsiian-tsang), and Vinitadeva. While the first wing focused on questions of epistemology and logic, the other wing refined and elaborated the Abhidharma analysis developed by Asanga and Vasubandhu.

These wings were not en- tirely separate, and many Buddhists wrote works that contributed to both wings. Dignaga, for instance, besides his works on epistemology and logic also wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosa. What united both wings was a deep concern with the process of cognition, i.e., analyses of how we perceive and think. The former wing ap- proached that epistemologically while the latter wing approached it psychologically and therapeutically. Both identified the root of all human problems as cognitive errors that needed correction.

Several Yogacara notions basic to the Abhidharma wing came under severe attack by other Buddhists, especially the notion of alaya-vijnana, which was denounced as something akin to the Hindu notions of atman (permanent, invariant self) and prakrti (primordial substrative nature from which all mental, emotional and physical things evolve). Eventually the critiques became so entrenched that the Abhidharma wing at- rophied.

By the end of the eighth century it was eclipsed by the logico-epistemic tradition and by a hybrid school that combined basic Yogacara doctrines with Tathagatagarbha thought. The logico-epistemological wing in part side-stepped the critique by using the term citta-santana, "mind-stream," instead of alaya-vijnana, for what amounted to roughly the same idea. It was easier to deny that a "stream" represented a reified self. On the other hand, the Tathagatagarbha hybrid school was no stranger to the charge of smuggling no- tions of selfhood into its doctrines, since, for example, it explicitly defined tathagatagarbha as "permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure (nitya, sukha, atman, suddha)."

Many Tathagatagarbha texts, in fact, argue for the acceptance of selfhood (atman) as a sign of higher accomplishment. The hybrid school attempted to conflate tathagatagarbha with the alaya-vijnana. Key works of the hybrid school include the Lankavatara Sutra, Ratnago- travibhaga (Uttaratantra), and in China the Awakening of Faith. In China during the sixth and seventh centuries, Buddhism was dominated by sever- al competing forms of Yogacara.

A major schism between orthodox versions of Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha hybrid versions was finally settled in the eighth century in favor of a hybrid version, which became definitive for all subsequent forms of East Asian Buddhism. Yogacara ideas were also studied and classified in Tibet.

The Nyingma and Dzog Chen schools settled on a hybrid version similar to the Chinese Tathagatagarbha hybrid; the Gelugpas subdivided Yogacara into a number of different types and considered them pre- paratory teachings for studying Prasangika Madhyamaka, which Gelugpas rank as the highest Buddhist teaching. The Tibetans, however, tended to view the logico-epistemolo- gical tradition as distinct from Yogacara proper, frequently labeling that Sautrantika in- stead.

2 Yogacara is not Metaphysical Idealism

The school was called Yogacara (Yoga practice) because it provided a comprehens- ive, therapeutic framework for engaging in the practices that lead to the goal of the bod- hisattva path, namely enlightened cognition. Meditation served as the laboratory in which one could study how the mind operated. Yogacara focused on the question of conscious- ness from a variety of approaches, including meditation, psychological analysis, epistemo- logy (how we know what we know, how perception operates, what validates knowledge), scholastic categorization, and karmic analysis.

Yogacara doctrine is summarized in the term vijnapti-matra, "nothing-but-cognition" (often rendered "consciousness-only" or "mind-only") which has sometimes been inter- preted as indicating a type of metaphysical idealism, i.e., the claim that mind alone is real and that everything else is created by mind. However, the Yogacarin writings themselves argue something very different. Consciousness (vijnana) is not the ultimate reality or solu- tion, but rather the root problem. This problem emerges in ordinary mental operations, and it can only be solved by bringing those operations to an end.

Yogacara tends to be misinterpreted as a form of metaphysical idealism primarily because its teachings are taken for ontological propositions rather than as epistemological warnings about karmic problems. The Yogacara focus on cognition and consciousness grew out of its analysis of karma, and not for the sake of metaphysical speculation. Two things should be clarified in order to explain why Yogacara is not metaphysical idealism: 1. The meaning of the word "idealism"; and 2. an important difference between the way Indi- an and Western philosophers do philosophy.

2a. The Term 'Idealism'

The term "Idealism" came into vogue roughly during the time of Kant (though it was used earlier by others, such as Leibniz) to label one of two trends that had emerged in reac- tion to Cartesian philosophy. Descartes had argued that there were two basic yet separate substances in the universe: Extension (the material world of things in space) and Thought (the world of mind and ideas). Subsequently opposing camps took one or the other sub- stance as their metaphysical foundation, treating it as the primary substance while redu- cing the remaining substance to derivative status.

Materialists argued that only matter was ultimately real, so that thought and consciousness derived from physical entities (chem- istry, brain states, etc.). Idealists countered that the mind and its ideas were ultimately real, and that the physical world derived from mind (e.g., the mind of God, Berkeley's esse est percipi, or from ideal prototypes, etc.). Materialists gravitated toward mechanical, physical explanations for why and how things existed, while Idealists tended to look for purposes - moral as well as rational - to explain existence.

Idealism meant "idea-ism," frequently in the sense Plato's notion of "ideas" (eidos) was understood at the time, namely ideal types that transcended the physical, sensory world and provided the form (eidos) that gave mat- ter meaning and purpose. As materialism, buttressed by advances in materialistic science, gained wider acceptance, those inclined toward spiritual and theological aims turned in- creasingly toward idealism as a countermeasure. Before long there were many types of materialism and idealism.

Idealism, in its broadest sense, came to encompass everything that was not materi- alism, which included so many different types of positions that the term lost any hope of univocality. Most forms of theistic and theological thought were, by this definition, types of idealism, even if they accepted matter as real, since they also asserted something as more real than matter, either as the creator of matter (in monotheism) or as the reality be- hind matter (in pantheism).

Extreme empiricists who only accepted their own experience and sensations as real were also idealists. Thus the term "idealism" united monotheists, pantheists and atheists. At one extreme were various forms of metaphysical idealism which posited a mind (or minds) as the only ultimate reality. The physical world was either an unreal illusion or not as real as the mind that created it. To avoid solipsism (which is a subjectivized version of metaphysical idealism) metaphysical idealists posited an overarching mind that envisions and creates the universe.

A more limited type of idealism is epistemological idealism, which argues that since knowledge of the world only exists in the mental realm, we cannot know actual physical objects as they truly are, but only as they appear in our mental representations of them. Epistemological idealists could be ontological materialists, accepting that matter exists substantially; they could even accept that mental states derived at least in part from mater- ial processes. What they denied was that matter could be known in itself directly, without the mediation of mental representations. Though unknowable in itself, matter's existence and properties could be known through inference based on certain consistencies in the way material things are represented in perception.

Transcendental idealism contends that not only matter but also the self remains tran- scendental in an act of cognition. Kant and Husserl, who were both transcendental ideal- ists, defined "transcendental" as "that which constitutes experience but is not itself given in experience." A mundane example would be the eye, which is the condition for seeing even though the eye does not see itself.

By applying vision and drawing inferences from it, one can come to know the role eyes play in seeing, even though one never sees one's own eyes. Similarly, things in themselves and the transcendental self could be known if the proper methods were applied for uncovering the conditions that constitute experience, even though such conditions do not themselves appear in experience. Even here, where epi- stemological issues are at the forefront, it is actually ontological concerns, viz. the ontolo- gical status of self and objects, that is really at stake. Western philosophy rarely escapes that ontological tilt.

Those who accepted that both the self and its objects were unknowable except through reason, and that such reason(s) was their cause and purpose for existing - thus epistemologically and ontologically grounding everything in the mind and its ideas - were labeled Absolute Idealists (e.g., Schelling, Hegel, Bradley), since only such ideas are absolute while all else is relative to them.

With the exception of some epistemological idealists, what unites all the positions enumerated above, including the materialists, is that these positions are ontological. They are concerned with the ontological status of the objects of sense and thought, as well as the ontological nature of the self who knows. Mainstream Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle has treated ontology and metaphysics as the ultimate philosophic pursuit, with epistemology's role being little more than to provide access and justification for one's onto- logical pursuits and commitments.

Since many of what are decried as philosophy's ex- cesses - such as skepticism, solipsism, sophistry - could be and were accused of deriving from overactive epistemological questioning, epistemology has often been held suspect, and in some theological formulations, considered entirely dispensable in favor of faith. Ontology is primary, and epistemology is either secondary or expendable. 2b. Differences between Indian and Western approaches to Philosophy In Indian philosophy one finds the reverse of this. Epistemology (pramanavada) is primary, both in the sense that it must be engaged in prior to attempting any other philo- sophical endeavor, and that the limits of one's metaphysical claims are always inviolably set by the parameters established by one's epistemology.

Before one can make claims, one must establish the basis on which such claims can be proven and justified. The Indians went so far as to concede that if one wishes to debate an opponent with a differing view, one must first find a common epistemological ground upon which to argue. Failing that, no meaningful debate can transpire. Since one's ontology (prameya) depends on what one's epistemology makes allow- able, many Indian schools tried to include things in their list of valid means of knowledge (pramana) that would facilitate their claims.

Hindus, for instance, considered their Scrip- tures to be valid means of knowledge, but other Indians, such as Buddhists and Jains, re- jected the authority of the Hindu Scriptures. Therefore if a Hindu debated a Buddhist or Jain, he could not appeal to the authority of Hindu Scriptures, but had to find a common epistemological ground. In the case of Buddhism that would be perception and inference; in the case of Jainism, only inference. All schools except Jains accepted perception as a val- id means of knowledge, meaning that sensory knowledge is valid (if qualified as non- erroneous, non-hallucinatory, etc.).

What is not presently observed but is in principle ob- servable can be known by inference. Without actually seeing the fire, one knows it must exist on a hill when one sees smoke in that location, because both fire and smoke are in principle observable entities, and an observed necessary relation (vyapti) exists between smoke and fire, viz. where there is smoke there is fire. Were one proximate to the fire on the hill, one would undoubtedly see the fire. One cannot make valid inferences about things impossible to perceive, such as unicorns, since no observable necessary relation ob- tains, so one cannot infer that a unicorn is on the hill. Perceptibility therefore is an indis- pensable component of both perception and inference, and thus, for Buddhists, of all valid knowledge. In order to be considered "real" (dravya) by the standards of Buddhist logic, a thing must produce an observable effect.

Buddhists argued among themselves whether something was real only while it was producing this observable effect (Sautrantika posi- tion), or whether something could be considered real if it produced an observable effect at some moment during its existence (Sarvastivada position), but all agreed that a thing must have observable causal efficacy (karana) in order to be considered real. This helps explain the centrality of perception and consciousness for Yogacara theory. The logico-epistemological wing of Yogacara drew a sharp distinction between per- ception and inference.

Perception involves sensory cognitions of unique, momentary, dis- crete particulars. Inference involves linguistic, conceptual universals, since words are meaningful and communicative only to the extent they designate and participate in uni- versal classes commonly shared and understood by users of the language. Inferences are true or false depending on how accurately or erroneously they approximate sensory par- ticulars, but even when linguistically true, they are still true only relative (samvrti) to the sensations they approximate. Conversely, sensation (and only sensation) is beyond lan- guage. Sensory cognition devoid of linguistic overlay or theoretic assertions (samaropa) is correct cognition and precisely, not approximately, true (paramartha).

While this seems to involve metaphysical claims about categories such as particulars and universals, sensation and language, in fact it is a request that we should cognize things as they are without im- posing any metaphysical assertions or conceptual framework whatsoever. The cognitive and epistemic, not the metaphysical, is at stake. What is the case is beyond description not because it is something ineffable residing outside or behind human experience, but be- cause it is the very sensory stuff of human experience whose momentary unique actuality cannot be reduced to universalistic, eternalistic language or concepts. To interpret this pos- ition itself as a metaphysics of particularity is to remain trapped in a conceptual frame- work and hence to miss its point.

Epistemological concerns pervade Indian philosophy. This is especially true of Buddhist philosophy. Many Buddhist texts assert that higher understanding has nothing to do with ontology, that focusing on the existence or nonexistence of something (asti-nasti, bhavabhava) is a misleading category error.

They typically remove important items - such as emptiness and nirvana - from ontological consideration by explicitly declaring that these have nothing whatsoever to do with existence or nonexistence, or being and nonbe- ing, and they further warn that this is not a license to imagine a higher sense of existence or being into which such items are then subsumed or sublated. The Buddhist goal is not the construction of a more perfect ontology.

Instead its primary target is always the remov- al of ignorance. Hence while Buddhists frequently suspend ontological and metaphysical speculation (tarka), denouncing it as useless or dangerous, correct cognition (samyag- jnana) is invariably lauded. Even Madhyamakas, who question the feasibility of much of Buddhist epistemology, insist that we should understand where the errors lie and correct the way we cognize accordingly. Stated bluntly, Buddhism is concerned with Seeing, not Being; i.e., epistemology rather than ontology.

Tellingly no Indian Yogacara text ever claims that the world is created by mind. What they do claim is that we mistake our projected interpretations of the world for the world itself, i.e., we take our own mental constructions to be the world.

Their vocabulary for this is as rich as their analysis: kalpana (projective conceptual construction), parikalpa and parikalpita (ubiquitous imaginary constructions), abhuta-parikalpa (imagining something in a locus in which it does not exist), prapanca (proliferation of conceptual constructions), to mention a few. Correct cognition is defined as the removal of those obstacles which prevent us from seeing dependent causal conditions in the manner they actually become (yatha-bhutam).

For Yogacara these causal conditions are cognitive, not metaphysical; they are the mental and perceptual conditions by which sensations and thoughts occur, not the metaphysical machinations of a Creator or an imperceptible do- main. What is known through correct cognition is euphemistically called tathata, "such- ness," which the texts are quick to point out is not an actual thing, but only a word (pra- jnapti-matra).

2c Yogacara Philosophical Approach

What is crucial in the forgoing for understanding Yogacara is that its attention to perceptual and cognitive issues is in line with basic Buddhist thinking, and that this atten- tion is epistemological rather than metaphysical. When Yogacarins discuss "objects," they are talking about cognitive objects, not metaphysical entities. Cognitive objects (visaya) are real, integral parts of cognition, and thus occur within acts of consciousness.

While con- firming visaya as integral to cognitive acts, they deny that any artha (that toward which an intentionality intends, i.e., an object of intentionality) exists outside the cognitive act in which it is that which is intended. Intentional objects only appear in acts of intentionality, i.e., consciousness. In other words, Yogacarins don't claim that nothing whatsoever exists outside the mind. First of all, there is no overarching mind for Yogacara; each individual mind is distinct.

Yogacarins are not monadologists in the Leibnitzian mold. Second, artha does not signify a mere neutral 'object;' but rather a telos toward which an act of conscious- ness intends. This focus of intent — intent being a form of desire — is integral to con- sciousness, and, as a focus, never occurs anywhere other than in such an act of conscious- ness. For Yogacara visaya (cognitive object) and artha (intentional object) exist, but only in the acts of consciousness within which they are constituted as cognitive and intentional.

It is important to keep in mind that for Yogacara an act of consciousness is as much consti- tuted by intentionality and cognitive factors as vice versa. Consciousness enjoys no tran- scendent status, nor does it serve as a metaphysical foundation. Consciousness is real by virtue of its facticity -- the fact that sentient beings experience cognitions — and not be- cause of an ontological primacy. Rather than offer up one more ontology, Yogacarins attempt to uncover and elimin- ate the predilections and proclivities (asrava, anusaya) that compel people to generate and cling to such theoretical ontological constructions. Since, according to Yogacara, all ontolo- gies are epistemological constructions, to understand how cognition operates is to under- stand how and why people construct the ontologies to which they cling. Ontological at- tachment is a symptom of cognitive projection (pratibimba, parikalpita). Careful examina- tion of Yogacara texts reveals that they make no ontological claims, except to question the validity of making ontological claims.

The reason they give for their ontological silence is that were they to offer a metaphysical description, that description would be appropriated by its interpreters who, due to their proclivities, would project onto it what they wish real- ity to be, thereby reducing the description to their own presupposed theory of reality. Such projective reductionism is the problem and symptomatic of the most basic proclivities af- flicting sentient beings.

That is what vijnapti-matra means, viz., to mistake one's projec- tions for that onto which one is projecting. Vasubandhu's Thirty Verses (Trimsika) states that if one clings to one's projection of the idea of vijnapti-matra, then one fails to truly dwell in the understanding of vijnapti-matra (verse 27). Enlightened cognition free of all cognitive errors is defined as nirvikalpa-jnana, "cognition without imaginative construc- tion," i.e., without conceptual overlay.

Ironically, Yogacara's interpreters and opponents nevertheless could not resist reductively projecting metaphysical theories onto what Yogacarins did say, at once proving Yogacara was right and at the same time making actual Yogacara teachings that much harder to access. Interpreting their epistemological analyses as metaphysical pronouncements fundamentally misconstrues their project.

The arguments Yogacara deploys frequently resemble those made by epistemologic- al idealists. Recognizing those affinities Western scholars early in the twentieth century compared Yogacara to Kant, and more recently scholars have begun to think that Husserl's phenomenology comes even closer. There are indeed intriguing similarities, for instance between Husserl's description of noesis (consciousness projecting its cognitive field) and noema (the constructed cognitive object) on the one hand, and Yogacara's analysis of the (cognitive) grasper and the grasped (grahaka and grahya) on the other hand.

But there are also important differences between those Western philosophers and Yogacara. The three most important are:

(1)Kant and Husserl play down notions of causality, while Yogacara developed complex systematic causal theories it deemed to be of the greatest importance; (2)there is no counterpart to either karma or enlightenment in the Western theories, while these are the very raison d'etre for all Yogacara theory and practice; (3)finally, the Western philosophies are designed to afford the best possible access to an ontological realm (at least sufficient to acknowledge its existence), while Yogacara is critical of that motive in all its manifestations.

To the extent that epistemological idealists can also be critical realists, Yogacara may be deemed a type of epistemological idealism, with the proviso that the purpose of its ar- guments was not to engender an improved ontological theory or commitment, but rather an insistence that we pay the fullest attention to the epistemological and psychological conditions compelling us to construct and attach to ontological theories. 3. Karma, Matter, and Cognitive Appropriation

The key to Yogacara theory lies in the Buddhist notions of karma which they inher- ited and rigorously reinterpreted. As earlier Buddhist texts already explained, karma is re- sponsible for suffering and ignorance, and karma consists of any intentional activity of body, language, or mind. Since the crucial factor is intent, and intent is a cognitive condi- tion, whatever lacks cognition is both non-karmic and non-intentional.

Hence, by defini- tion, whatever is non-cognitive can have no karmic influence or consequences. Since Buddhism aims at overcoming ignorance and suffering through the elimination of karmic conditioning, Buddhism, Yogacarins reasoned, is only concerned with the analysis and correction of whatever falls within the domain of cognitive conditions. Hence questions about the ultimate reality of non-cognitive things are simply irrelevant and useless for solving the problem of karma.

Further, Yogacarins emphasize that categories such as ma- teriality (rupa) are cognitive categories. "Materiality" is a word for the colors, textures, sounds, etc., that we experience in acts of perception, and it is only to the extent that they are experienced, perceived and ideologically grasped, thereby becoming objects of at- tachment, that they have karmic significance. Intentional acts also have moral motives and consequences. Since effects are shaped by their causes, an act with a wholesome intent would tend to yield wholesome fruits, while unwholesome intentions produce unwhole- some effects.

In contrast to the cognitive karmic dimension, Buddhism considered material ele- ments (rupa) karmically neutral. The problem with material things is not their materiality, but the psychology of appropriation (upadana) - desiring, grasping, clinging, attachment - that infests our ideas and perceptions of such things.

It is not the materiality of gold that leads to problems, but rather our ideas about the value of gold and the attitudes and ac- tions we engage in as a result of those ideas. Those ideas were acquired through previous experiences. By repeated exposure to certain ideas and cognitive conditions, one is condi- tioned to respond habitually in a similar manner to similar circumstances. Eventually these habits are embodied, becoming reflexive, presuppositional.

For Buddhists this process by which conditioning becoming embodied (samskara) is not confined to a single life-time, but accrues over many life-times. Samsara (the continuous cycle of birth and death) is the karmic en-act-ment of this repetition, the reoccurrence of cognitive embodied habits in new life situations and life forms.

For all Buddhists this follows a simple sensory calculus: Pleasurable feelings we wish to hold on to, or repeat. Painful feelings we wish to cut off, or avoid. Pleasure and pain, reward and punishment, approval and disapproval, and so on, condition us. Our karmic habits (vasana) are constructed this way. Since all is impermanent, pleasurable feel- ings cannot be maintained or repeated permanently; painful things (such as sickness and death) cannot be avoided permanently.

The greater the dissonance between our actual im- permanent experience and our expectations for permanent desired ends, the more we suf- fer, and the greater tendency (anusaya) toward projecting our desires onto the world as compensation. Though nothing whatsoever is permanent, we imagine all sort of perman- ent things - from God to soul to essences - in an effort to avoid facing the fact that none of us has a permanent self.

We think that if we can prove something is permanent, anything, then we too have a chance for permanence. The anxiety about our lack of self and all the cognitive and karmic mischief that anxiety generates is called several things by Yogacara, including jneyavarana (obstruction of the knowable, i.e., our self-obsessions prevent us from seeing things as they are) and abhuta-parikalpa (imagining something - namely per- manence or a self - to exist in a locus in which it is absent).

Previous Buddhists - most notably the Sautrantikas, but also the Abhidharma schools - had developed a sophisticated metaphoric vocabulary to describe and analyze the causes and conditions of karma in terms of seeds (bija).

Just as a plant develops from its roots unseen underground, so do previous karmic experiences fester unseen in the mind; just as a plant sprouts from the ground when nourished by proper conditions, so do karmic habits, under the right causes and conditions, reassert themselves as new experi- ences; just as plants reach fruition by producing new seeds that re-enter the ground to take root and begin regrowing a similar plant of the same kind, so do karmic actions produce wholesome or unwholesome fruit that become latent seeds for a later, similar type of ac- tion or cognition.

Just as plants reproduce only their own kind, so do wholesome or un- wholesome karmic acts produce effects after their own kind. This cycle served as a meta- phor for the process of cognitive conditioning as well as the recurrent cycle of birth and death (samsara). Since Yogacara accepts the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, seeds are said to perdure for only a moment during which they become the cause of a similar seed that succeeds them. Momentary seeds are causally linked in sequential chains, each mo- mentary seed a link in a chain of karmic causes and effects.

Seeds are basically divided into two types: wholesome and unwholesome. Unwhole- some seeds are the acquired cognitive habits preventing one from reaching enlightenment. Wholesome seeds - also labeled "pure" and "unpolluted" - give rise to more pure seeds, which bring one closer to enlightenment. In general Yogacara differentiates inner seeds (personal conditioning) from external seeds (being conditioned by others). One's own seeds can be modified or affected by exposure to external conditions (external seeds), which can be beneficial or detrimental. Exposure to polluting conditions intensifies one's unwholesome seeds, while contact with "pure" conditions, such as hearing the Correct Teaching (Saddharma), can stimulate one's wholesome seeds to increase, thereby dimin- ishing and ultimately eradicating one's unwholesome seeds.

Another metaphor for karmic conditioning that accompanies the seed metaphor is "perfuming" (vasana). A cloth exposed to the smell of perfume acquires its scent. Similarly one is mentally and behaviorally conditioned by what one experiences. This conditioning produces karmic habits, but just as the odor can be removed from the cloth so can one's conditioning be purified of perfumed habits. Typically three types of perfuming are dis- cussed: 1. linguistic and conceptual habits; 2. habits of self-interest and "grasping self" (atma-graha), i.e., the belief in self and what belongs to self; and 3. Habits leading to sub- sequent life situations (bhavanga-vasana), i.e., the long-term karmic consequences of spe- cific karmic activities.

Yogacara literature debates the relation between seeds and perfuming. Some claim that seeds and perfuming are really two terms for the same thing, viz. acquired karmic habits. Others claim that seeds are simply the effects of perfuming, i.e., all conditioning is acquired through experience. Still others contend that "seed" refers to the chains of condi- tioned habits one already has (whether acquired in this life, in some previous life, or even "beginninglessly") while "perfuming" denotes the experiences one has that modify or affect the development of one's seeds. "Beginningless" might be understood as a corollary to Husserl's term "transcendental," i.e., a causal sequence constituting a present experience whose own original cause remains undisclosed in this experience. Some claimed that one's possibilities for enlightenment depended entirely on the sort of seeds one already pos- sessed; perfuming merely acted as a catalyst but could not provide wholesome seeds if one did not already possess them. Beings utterly devoid of wholesome seeds were called ic- chantikas (incorrigibles); such beings could never reach enlightenment. Some other Mahayana Buddhists, feeling that this violated the Mahayana dictum of universal salva- tion, attacked the incorrigibility doctrine.

The karmic cause of the fundamental dis-ease (duhkha) is desire expressed through body, speech, or mind. Therefore Yogacara focused exclusively on cognitive and mental activities in relation to their intentions, i.e., the operations of consciousness, since the prob- lem was located there. Buddhism had always identified ignorance and desire as the primary causes of suffering and rebirth. Yogacarins mapped these mental functions in or- der to dismantle them. Because maps of this sort were also creations of the mind, they too would ultimately have to be abandoned in the course of the dismantling, but their thera- peutic value would have been served in bringing about enlightenment. This view of the provisional expediency of Buddhism can be traced back to Buddha himself. Yogacarins de- scribe enlightenment as resulting from Overturning the Cognitive Basis (asraya-paravrtti), i.e., overturning the conceptual projections and imaginings which act as the base of our cognitive actions. This overturning transforms the basic mode of cognition from conscious- ness (vi-jnana, dis-cernment) into jnana (direct knowing). The vi- prefix is equivalent to dis- in English - dis-criminate, dis-tinguish, dis-engage, dis-connect - meaning to bifurcate or separate from. Direct knowing was defined as non-conceptual (nirvikalpa-jnana), i.e., devoid of interpretive overlay.

The case of material elements is important for understanding one reason why Yogacara is not metaphysical idealism. No Yogacara text denies materiality (rupa) as a val- id Buddhist category. On the contrary, Yogacarins include materiality in their analysis. Their approach to materiality is well rooted in Buddhist precedents. Frequently Buddhist texts substitute the term "sensory contact" (Pali: phassa, Sanskrit: sparsa) for the term "materiality." This substitution is a reminder that physical forms are sensory, that they are known to be what they are through sensation. Even the earliest Buddhist texts explain that the four primary material elements (mahabhuta) are the sensory qualities solidity, fluidity, temperature, and mobility; their characterization as earth, water, fire, and air, respectively, is declared an abstraction. Instead of concentrating on the fact of material existence, one observes how a physical thing is sensed, felt, perceived. Yogacara never denies that there are sense-objects (visaya, artha, alambana, etc.), but it denies that it makes any sense to speak of cognitive objects occurring outside an act of cognition. Imagining such an occur- rence is itself a cognitive act. Yogacara is interested in why we feel compelled to so ima- gine.

Everything we know, conceive, imagine, or are aware of, we know through cogni- tion, including the notion that entities might exist independent of our cognition. The mind doesn't create the physical world, but it produces the interpretative categories through which we know and classify the physical world, and it does this so seamlessly that we mis- take our interpretations for the world itself. Those interpretations, which are projections of our desires and anxieties, become obstructions (avarana) preventing us from seeing what is actually the case. In simple terms we are blinded by our own self-interests, our own pre- judices (which means what is already prejudged), our desires. Unenlightened cognition is an appropriative act. Yogacara does not speak about subjects and objects; instead it ana- lyzes perception in terms of graspers (grahaka) and what is grasped (grahya). Yogacara at times resembles epistemological idealism, which does not claim that this or any world is constructed by mind, but rather that we are usually incapable of distin- guishing our mental constructions and interpretations of the world from the world itself. This narcissism of consciousness Yogacara calls vijnapti-matra, "nothing but conscious construction." A deceptive trick is built into the way consciousness operates at every mo- ment. Consciousness projects and constructs a cognitive object in such a way that it dis- owns its own creation - pretending the object is "out there" - in order to render that object capable of being appropriated. Even while what we cognize is occurring within our act of cognition, we cognize it as if it were external to our consciousness. Realization of vijnapti- matra exposes this trick intrinsic to consciousness's workings, thereby eliminating it. When that deception is removed one's mode of cognition is no longer termed vijnana (con- sciousness); it has become direct cognition (jnana) (see above). Consciousness engages in this deceptive game of projection, dissociation, and appropriation because there is no "self." According to Buddhism, the deepest, most pernicious erroneous view held by sen- tient beings is the view that a permanent, eternal, immutable, independent self exists. There is no such self, and deep down we know that. This makes us anxious, since it entails that no self or identity endures forever. In order to assuage that anxiety, we attempt to con- struct a self, to fill the anxious void, to do something enduring. The projection of cognitive objects for appropriation is consciousness's main tool for this construction. If I own things (ideas, theories, identities, material objects), then "I am." If there are eternal objects that I can possess, then I too must be eternal. To undermine this desperate and erroneous appro- priative grasping, Yogacara texts say: Negate the object, and the self is also negated (e.g., Madhyanta-vibhaga, 1:4,8).

Yogacarins deny the existence of external objects in two senses. 1.In terms of conventional experience they do not deny objects such as chairs, colors, and trees, but rather they reject the claim that such things appear anywhere else than in consciousness. It is externality, not objects per se, that they challenge. 2.While such objects are admissible as conventionalisms, in more precise terms there are no chairs, trees, etc. These are merely words and concepts by which we gather and interpret discrete sensations that arise moment by moment in a causal flux. These words and concepts are mental projections.

The point is not to elevate consciousness, but to warn us not to be fooled by our own cognitive narcissism. Enlightened cognition is likened to a great mirror that impartially and fully reflects everything before it, without attachment to what has passed nor in ex- pectation of what might arrive. What sorts of objects do enlightened ones cognize? Yogacarins refuse to provide an answer aside from saying it is purified from karmic pollu- tion (anasrava), since whatever description they might offer would only be appropriated and reduced to the habitual cognitive categories that are already preventing us from see- ing properly

4Eight Consciousnesses

The most famous innovation of the Yogacara school was the doctrine of eight con- sciousnesses. Standard Buddhism described six consciousnesses, each produced by the contact between its specific sense organ and a corresponding sense object. When a func- tioning eye comes into contact with a color or shape, visual consciousness is produced. When a functioning ear comes into contact with a sound, auditory consciousness is pro- duced. Consciousness does not create the sensory sphere, but on the contrary is an effect of the interaction of a sense organ and its proper object. If an eye does not function but an object is present, visual consciousness does not arise. The same is true if a functional eye fails to encounter a visual object.

Consciousness arises dependent on sensation. There are altogether six sense organs (eye, ear, nose, mouth, body, and mind) which interact with their respective sensory object domains (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental spheres). Note that the mind is considered another sense since it functions like the other senses, involving the activity of a sense organ (manas), its domain (mano-dhatu), and the consciousness (mano-vijnana) resulting from the contact of organ and object. Each domain is discrete, which means vision, audition, and each of the remaining spheres func- tion apart from each other. Hence deaf can see, and blind can hear. Objects, too, are en- tirely specific to their domain, and the same is true of the consciousnesses. Visual con- sciousness is entirely distinct from auditory consciousness, and so on. Hence there are six distinct types of consciousness (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental consciousness). These eighteen components of experience - viz. six sense organs, six sense object domains, and six resulting consciousnesses - were called the eighteen dhatus. Ac- cording to standard Buddhist doctrine these eighteen exhaust the full extent of everything in the universe, or more accurately, the sensorium.

Early Buddhist Abhidhamma, focusing on the mental and cognitive aspects of karma, expanded the three components of the mental level - mind (manas), mental-objects (mano-dhatu), and mental-consciousness (mano-vijnana) - into a complex system of cat- egories. The apperceptive vector in any cognitive moment was called citta. The objects, textures, emotional, moral, and psychological tones of citta's cognitions were called caittas. Caittas (lit.: "associated with citta") were subdivided into numerous categories that varied in different Buddhist schools. Some caittas are "universal," meaning they are components of every cognition (e.g., sensory contact, hedonic tone, attention, etc.); some are "special- ized," meaning they only occur in some, not all, cognitions (e.g., resolve, mindfulness, meditative clarity, etc.). Some caittas are wholesome (e.g., faith; lack of greed, hatred, or misconception; tranquility; etc.), some unwholesome, some are mental disturbances (klesa) (appropriational intent, aversion, arrogance, etc.) or secondary mental disturbances (anger, envy, guile, shamelessness, etc.), and some are karmically indeterminate (torpor, remorse, etc.).

As Abhidharma grew more complex, disputes intensified between different Buddhist schools along a range of issues. For Yogacara the most important problems re- volved around questions of causality and consciousness. In order to avoid the idea of a permanent self, Buddhists said citta is momentary. Since a new citta apperceives a new cognitive field each moment, the apparent continuity of mental states was explained caus- ally by claiming each citta, in the moment it ceased, also acted as cause for the arising of its successor. This was fine for continuous perceptions and thought processes, but difficulties arose since Buddhists identified a number of situations in which no citta at all was present or operative, such as deep sleep, unconsciousness, and certain meditative conditions expli- citly defined as devoid of citta (asamjni-samapatti, nirodha-samapatti). If a preceding citta had to be temporally contiguous with its successor, how could one explain the sudden re- starting of citta after a period of time had lapsed since the prior citta ceased? Where had citta or its causes been residing in the interim? Analogous questions were: from where does consciousness reemerge after deep sleep? How does consciousness begin in a new life? The various Buddhist attempts to answer these questions led to more difficulties and disputes.

Yogacarins responded by rearranging the tripartite structure of the mental level of the eighteen dhatus into three novel types of consciousnesses. Mano-vijnana (empirical consciousness) became the sixth consciousness (and operated as the sixth sense organ, which previously had been the role of manas), surveying the cognitive content of the five senses as well as mental objects (thoughts, ideas). Manas became the seventh conscious- ness, redefined as primarily obsessed with various aspects and notions of "self," and thus called "defiled manas" (klista-manas). The eighth consciousness, alaya-vijnana, "warehouse consciousness," was totally novel. The Warehouse Consciousness was defined in several ways. It is the receptacle of all seeds, storing experiences as they "enter" until they are sent back out as new experiences, like a warehouse handles goods. It was also called vipaka consciousness: vipaka means the "maturing" of karmic seeds. Seeds gradually matured in the repository consciousness until karmically ripe, at which point they reassert themselves as karmic consequences. Alaya-vijnana was also called the "basic consciousness" (mula- vijnana) since it retains and deploys the karmic seeds that both influence and are influ- enced by the other seven consciousnesses. When, for instance, the sixth consciousness is dormant (while one sleeps, or is unconscious, etc.), its seeds reside in the eighth con- sciousness, and they "restart" when the conditions for their arising are present. The eighth consciousness is largely a mechanism for storing and deploying seeds of which it remains largely unaware. Cittas occur as a stream in alaya-vijnana, but they mostly cognize the activities of the other consciousnesses, not their own seeds. For Yogacara 'ignorance' (avidya) in part means remaining ignorant of what is transpiring within one's own alaya- vijnana. In states devoid of citta, the flow of cittas are repressed, held back, but their seeds continue to regenerate without being noticed, until they reassert a new stream of cittas. Warehouse Consciousness acts as the pivotal karmic mechanism, but is itself karmically neutral. Each individual has its own Warehouse Consciousness which perdures from mo- ment to moment and life to life, though, being nothing more than a collection of ever-chan- ging "seeds," it is continually changing and therefore not a permanent self. There is no Uni- versal collective mind in Yogacara.

Enlightenment consists in bringing the eight consciousnesses to an end, replacing them with enlightened cognitive abilities (jnana). Overturning the Basis turns the five sense consciousnesses into immediate cognitions that accomplish what needs to be done (krtyanusthana-jnana). The sixth consciousness becomes immediate cognitive mastery (pratyaveksana-jnana), in which the general and particular characteristics of things are dis- cerned just as they are. This discernment is considered nonconceptual (nirvikalpa-jnana). Manas becomes the immediate cognition of equality (samata-jnana), equalizing self and other. When the Warehouse Consciousness finally ceases it is replaced by the Great Mirror Cognition (Mahadarsa-jnana) that sees and reflects things just as they are, impartially, without exclusion, prejudice, anticipation, attachment, or distortion. The grasper-grasped relation has ceased. It should be noted that these "purified" cognitions all engage the world in immediate and effective ways by removing the self-bias, prejudice, and obstructions that had prevented one previously from perceiving beyond one's own narcissistic conscious- ness. When consciousness ends, true knowledge begins. Since enlightened cognition is nonconceptual its objects cannot be described. Thus Yogacarins provide no descriptions, much less ontological accounts, of what becomes evident in these types of enlightened cognitions, except to say they are 'pure' (of imaginative constructions). One more Yogacara innovation was the notion that a special type of cognition emerged and developed after enlightenment. This post-enlightenment cognition was called prsthalabdha-jnana, and it concerned how one who has understood things as they actually become (yatha-bhutam) now engages the world to assist other sentient beings in overcoming suffering and ignorance.

5Three Self-natures

The Three Self-nature theory (tri-svabhava), which is explained in many Yogacara texts including an independent treatise by Vasubandhu devoted to the subject (Trisvab- hava-nirdesa-sastra), maintains that there are three "natures" or cognitive realms at play. 1.The conceptually constructed realm (parikalpita-svabhava) ubiquitously imputes unreal conceptions, especially permanent "selves," into whatever it experiences, in- cluding oneself.

2.The realm of causal dependency (paratantra-svabhava), when mixed with the con- structed realm, leads one to mistake impermanent occurrences in the flux of causes and conditions for fixed, permanent entities. It can be purified of these delusions by 3.the perfectional realm (parinispanna-svabhava) which, like the Madhyamaka notion of emptiness on which it is based, acts as an antidote (pratipaksa) that "purifies" or cleans all delusional constructions out of the causal realm.

The conceptually constructed realm is the erroneous narcissistic realm in which we primarily dwell, filled with projections we have acquired and habituated and embodied. Paratantra (lit. 'dependent on other') emphasizes that everything arises causally dependent on things other than itself (i.e., everything lacks self-existence). The perfectional realm sig- nifies the absence of svabhava (independent, self-existent, permanent nature) in everything.

When the causally dependent realm is cleansed of all defilements it becomes "en- lightened." These self-natures are also called the Three Non-self-natures, since they lack fixed, independent, true, permanent identities and thus shouldn't be hypostatized. The first is unreal by definition; the third is intrinsically "empty" of self-nature, i.e., it is the very definition of non-self-nature; and the second (which finally is the only "real" one) is of un- fixed nature since it can be "mixed" with either of the other two. Understanding the puri- fied second nature is equivalent to understanding dependent origination (pratitya- samutpada), which all schools of Buddhism accept as Buddhism's core doctrine and which tradition claims Buddha came to realize under the Bodhi Tree on the night of his enlight- enment.

6Five Stages

Yogacara literature is so vast that one should not be surprised to find that many of its attempts to provide detailed systems run into conflict with each other. Since it was a self-critical scholastic tradition, it was not uncommon for Yogacara texts to discuss and cri- ticize the positions of other Yogacara texts as well as their more obvious opponents. Yogacara positions on the stages of the path are diverse. The Dasabhumika-sutra-sastra, a commentary attributed to Vasubandhu on the Ten Stages Scripture (Dasabhumika-sutra), describes the progress of the Bodhisattva path to Mahayanic liberation in ten stages, com- parable to the ten stages implicit in the Mahayanic formulation of the ten perfections of wisdom. Asanga's Yogacarabhumi-sastra describes a series of seventeen stages. There are other formulations, such as the five stage path that offers a useful overview of the other formulations. We will briefly summarize the five stage path as set out in Xuanzang's Cheng weishilun.

The first stage is called "provisioning" (sambharavastha) since this is the stage at which one collects and stocks up on "provisions" for the journey. These provisions primarily con- sist of orienting oneself toward the pursuit of the path and developing the proper charac- ter, attitude and resolve to accomplish it. It begins the moment the aspiration for enlighten- ment arises (bodhicitta).

The next stage is the "experimental" stage (prayogavastha), in which one begins to exper- iment with correct Buddhist theories and practices, learning which work and which don't, which are true and which are not. One begins to suppress the grasper-grasped relation and begins to study carefully the relation between things, language, and cognition. After honing one's discipline, one eventually enters the third stage, "deepening under- standing" (prativedhavastha). Some texts refer to this as the Path of Corrective Vision (darsana-marga). This stage ends once one has acquired some insight in nonconceptual cognition.

Nonconceptual cognition deepens in the next stage, the Path of Cultivation (bhavana- marga). The grasper-grasped relation is utterly eliminated as are all cognitive obstructions. This path culminates in the Overturning of the Basis, or enlightenment. In the "final stage" (nisthavastha), one abides in Unexcelled Complete Enlightenment and engages the world through the five immediate cognitions (see above). All one's activit- ies and cognitions at this stage are "post-realization." As a Mahayanist, from the first stage one has been devoting oneself not only to one's own attainment of enlightenment, but to the attainment of enlightenment by all sentient beings. In this stage that becomes one's sole concern.

Select Bibliography

Anacker, Stefan. (1984) Seven Works of Vasubandhu. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (important translation and discussion of key works by Vasubandhu, including some of his pre- Yogacara treatises) Buswell, Robert E. (1989) The Formation of Ch'an Ideology in China and Korea: The Vajrasamadhi-Sutra, a Buddhist Apocryphon. Princeton: Princeton University Press (the introductory essay to this book contains the most thorough published account in English of the debate between Chinese Yogacara and Tathagatagarbha schools. However its presentation represents the latter's viewpoint which substantially dis- torts actual Yogacara positions)

Griffiths, Paul. (1986) On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-Body Prob- lem. La Salle, IL: Open Court (Analytic philosophical discussion of the "mindless" cessation meditations, translating and examining some relevant sections of Theravada, Vaibhasika, and Yogacara texts. This book is helpful for understanding how Yogacarin positions relate to Buddhism at large)

Griffiths, Paul, Hakamaya Noriaki, John Keenan, and Paul Swanson. (1989) The Realm of Awakening: Chapter Ten of Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha. NY and Oxford: Oxford University Press (collective effort from a class taught by Hakamaya at the University of Wisconsin. Compares and translates Chinese and Tibetan versions of the root text as well as major commentaries. A good presentation of the scholastically dense style of some Yogacara texts)

Hayes, Richard P. (1988) Dignaga on the Interpretation of Signs. Studies of Classical India, Vol. 9. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers (A superb and challenging examina- tion of Buddhism's most famous logician)

Kochumuttom, Thomas. (1982) A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience. Delhi: Motilal Banarsi- dass (translation and critical analysis of Vasubandhu's major Yogacara texts that ar- gues they should be interpreted as Critical Realism rather than Idealism) Lamotte, 'Etienne (translator). (1935) Samdhinirmocana-sutra. Louvain and Paris: Uni- versit'e de Louvain & Adrian Maisonneuve (richly annotated French translation drawing on Tibetan and Chinese versions. John Powers has published an English translation from the Tibetan - 1995, Wisdom of the Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Mahayana Sutra, Berkeley: Dharma Publishing)

Lusthaus, Dan. (2000) Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophic Investigation of Yogaacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng wei-shih lun. London: Curzon Press (An investigation of the transmission of Yogacara philosophy from India to China)

Nagao, Gadjin. (1991) Madhyamika and Yogacara. translated by Leslie Kawamura. Albany: State University of New York Press (a fine collection of essays by one of Japan's lead- ing Yogacara scholars)

Powers, John. (1991) The Yogacara School of Buddhism: A Bibliography. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press (A fairly comprehensive bibliography, listing virtually all known Yogacara works in Sanskrit and Tibetan and most standard Western language works. Its coverage of East Asian Yogacara is less complete) Rahula, Walpola (translator). (1971) Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine d'Asanga (Abhidharmasamuccaya). Paris: Publications de l"Ecole Frangaise d'Extreme Orient (the only Western language translation of this important Asanga text) Sparham, Gareth (translator). (1993) Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa's Commentary on the Yogacara Doctrine of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press (transla- tion of an interesting work by the Great Tibetan Gelugpa reformer from his early days)

Tatz, Mark. (1986) Asanga's Chapter on Ethics with the commentary of Tsong-kha-pa. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press (translation and discussion of the section on ethics from the Bodhisattvabhumi chapter of the Yogacarabhumi)

Xuanzang (Hsii;an-tsang). (659) Cheng weishilun (Treatise Establishing Vijnapti-matra). Taishou Shinshu Daizokyou 1585.31 1-59; translated into French by Louis de la Vall'ee Poussin, (1928) Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, Paris, 2 vols.; translated into English by Wei Tat, (1973) Ch'eng Wei-Shih Lun: The Doctrine of Mere Consciousness, Hong Kong; partial English translation by Swati Ganguly, (1992) Treatise in Thirty Verses on Mere-Consciousness, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (Xuanzang's seventh century Chinese work, a commentary on Vasubandhu's Trimsika that drew on Sanskrit commentaries, became one of the standard expositions of Yogacara doctrine in East Asia. Vall'ee Poussin's rendering is very loose, drawing on old Japanese scholarship and Chinese commentaries. Vall'ee Poussin interprets the text Idealistically. Tat's ver- sion is an English rendition of Vall'ee Poussin's French text, minus the latter's extens- ive annotations. Ganguly's abridgement is convenient but frequently mistaken)

Source

http://www.acmuller.net/yogacara /articles/intro-uni.htm