THE YOGACARA IDEALISM

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Delhi Varanasi Patna Madras

First Published 1962 Second Revised Edition 197$; Reprinted 1987

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Bungalow Road, Jawabar Nagar, Delhi 110 007 Branches

Chowk, Varanasi 221 001 Ashok Rajpatb, Patna 800 004 120, Royapettab High Road, Mylapore, Madras 600 004

C MOTD..AL

BANARSIDASS

FOREWORD The Yogacara-Vijnanavada Idealhm was the last great creative synthesis of Buddhism and its position in that tradition is comparable to that of the Ad vaita V edanta in the orthodox Hindu tradition. It is perhaps the only original epistemological idealism to be formulated on the Indian soil. Its impact on the other systems of thought was trem::ndous. Even those philosophies that were completely out of line with idealism, like the Nyaya, the Mimari:lsa and Jainism, had to reckon with it. Considering the important role played by the Yogacara Idealism in Buddhism and in Indian philosophical and religious thought in general, ~t is surprising that there had been no full or reliable expositions of this philosophy. This gap in our knowledge is admirably filled by the present work of Dr. Chatterjee. The author deals with the Yogacara-Vijfianavada in all its aspects a:t-1 b!a:ingl, historically, analytically and comparatively. The first tw:> chapters of the book show, with great clarity and sufficient detail, the origin and development of the Yogacara idealism as an outcome of those fruitful and dynamic ideas associated with the previous schools of Buddhism, especially with the Sautrantika and the Madhyamika. The originality of the Yogacara synthesis of Buddhist teachings has been clearly brought out, and the individual contribution made by the philosophers of this school, such as Asanga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Digaaga., Dharma.kirti and Santarak~ita, has received adequate attention. The subsequent chapters, which form the core of the work, represent a constructive and critical exposition of the Yogacara meta~ physics, its idealism and absolutism as well as its spiritual discipline. Dr. Chatterjee has utilised nearly all the sources available on t!Ie subject and has given a faithful and persuasive account of this system of thought. He has .not hesitated to go behind the literal meaning of the texts to extract their real significance. There is a measure of risk in such a venture, and at some places one might choose to disagree with the author's interpretation. However, the duty of a scholar is not just to reproduce literally, but to re-interpret and to re-construct his theme. Comparison of the Yogacara with other forms of idealism and absolutism, Indian as well as European, has been undertaken in the

FOREWORD

last two chapters of the work. This serves to bring out the affinities and distinctions which are only too often blurred. These comparative studies are among the best specimens of the author's keen analysis and lucid exposition. I cannot help feeling that the work of Dr. Chatterjee would have gained considerably more in comprehension and authoritativeness if the Yogiicara texts in Chinese and Tibetan or their translations in French had been made use of more fully. I have no manner of doubt, however, that the work of Dr. Chatterjee, even as it stands, will prove a valuable and outstanding contribution to our understanding of a very important phase of Indian thought. It is an e1.cellent piece of philosophical writing, both with regard to the range of problems covered and the delightful manner of presentation. There is hardly any dull or unstimulating page in a work of 230 pages. It is a matter of personal gratification to me that the line of thought nitiated by" me in dealing with the basic philosophy of Buddhism in my study of the Miidhyamika system (The Central PhilosopbJ of Buddhism, George Alien & Unwin, London, 1955) has been largely accepted and carried out by my student and friend, Dr. A.shok Kumar Chatterjee. His study of the Yogiiciira Idealism may well be considered as a sequel to my book on the Miidhyamika Absolutism which together constitute the revolutionary" Mahiiyiina movement. T.R.V.Murti

PREFACE An attempt is here made to expound the metaphysics of the Yogadira school of Buddhism and to analyse its logical implications. It may not be rash to think that little apology is needed for making ~uch an attempt. The expository' literature on the Yogacara system is plentiful, but unfortunately, not adequate. Scholarly studies on the subject from the historical point of view are not lacking. There is hardly any work, however, which treats of the system as an original ·contribution to philosophy. At best, it is construed as a phase in the historical development of Buddhism. The account of theYogacara philosophy given in the standard histories of Indian thought is necessarily all too meagre. The details cannot be discussed with sufficient fulness within the limited space in such works. Treatises devoted ·entirely to the exposition of Buddhism fare no better. The analysis is som:times positively misleading. The Yogacira is described merely .as idealism. For a correct appraisement of the system it is very' necessary to remember that it is a form of absolutism. This is the central problem in the Yogacara philosophy-the problem of effecting a logical synthesis between idealism and absolutism. The Yogaclra is wise enough to perceive that idealism, when pressed, yields an absolutism by the sheer dynamism of its own inner logic. This point needs bring· ing out with sufficient deductive clarity. In the existing accounts this point is not utterly lacking, but it is hardly given that attention and emphasis which.it demands. The late Stcherbatsky was a notable exception which only proves the general statement. Other constructive details also of the system have not been fully analysed. In the present essay I have simply tried to present a more or less complete picture of the system, to collect the scattered details into a coherent connected picture and to size it up, not merely as a phase of Buddhism, but rather as an original and constructive philosophy. Completeness has been with me more an ideal than an actual achievement. I have neither the soundness of scholarship nor the maturity of judgment required for this. Certain omissions are however deliberate. The first chapter professes to be a historical introduction to the Yogacara metaphysics, but history, in its popular sense of chronology

PRBPACB

of dates and events, will not be found there. Not that such a chronological study is uninteresting or urumportant ; it is simply that in a morphological analysis of any metaphysics, chronology of dates and events is absolutely beside the point. In the present essay I have attempted to show that the Yogacara philosophy is a logical elaboration of the basic epistemological pattern of Buddhism. The :fir$t chapter is a history of the gradual development of the fundamental logic of Buddhism, culminating in the Yogacara idealism. The omission of actual chronological details appeared excusable, and is deliberate. For the same reason, minor doctrinal differences, if any, between various Yogacara acaryas, have not been discussed. I have taken Vasubandhu's Vijii~ptimiitratiisiddhi as the basic work on the system. Other texts are consulted only as throwing light on the problems raised in that treatise. The other omission is· regarding the insufficient space devoted to th~ 8th and 9th chapters, dealing with the discipline and the religion of the Yogacara system. In a strictly metaphysical essay, they could very well be deleted. I have said a few words only for the sake of completeness. Here also the shifting of emphasis away from these problems appeared to be justifiable, though I do not know how far this point of view is really justified. All that I ask is to have the essay judged purely on its merits as a philosophical analysis, and not as a piece of historical survey. As regards the plan of the essay, the first two chapters are more or less historical. The first chapter discusses how the Yogacara school emerged out of the inner dynamism inherent in Buddhism from the very outset. The second chapter is devoted to the important acaryas .. texts, '.lub-schools, and other such minor details. These two chapters are in no way integrally related with what follows. The third and fourth chapters analyse the epistemological basis of the system. The third is concerned with the refutation of the category of the objective, and in the fourth realistic arguments are considered f:wm the Yogacara standpoint. The fifth chapter sets forth the elaboration of the Yogicara idealism as a constructive metaphysics, and attempts to show how consciousness, the sole reality, is actually diversified into the multi-dimensional forms of the so-called empirical world. The sixth chapter is again a concession to the ideal of completeness. It deals with the Dharma-theory, a doctrine of central interest in entire Buddhism, as adapted by the Yogacara.

PREFACE

ix

The seventh chapter attempts to analyse the Yogacara metaphysics as a form of absolutism. This problem can certainly be said to represent the very heart of the system. All the other details are to be understood as leading upto this logical climax. To this chapter is added a section on the doctrine of Three Truths. The last two chapters are comparative and, as such, do not materially add to the understanding of the system. They are included in order to make clear the spiritual affinities and differences between the Yogacara and other allied schools of idealism and absolutism. For this purpose, Berk.eley and Hegel are selected as representing different forms of idealism. I had intended to add a section on Leibrutz too; but had to refnrin from doing so because of considerations of space. A section on Gentile is added however as an appendix to that on Hegel. The Advaita Vedanta and the Madhyamika are chosen as two other definitive form.s of absolutism. A few words may be said about the use of the term •idealism' in the present essay. Idealism is so ambiguous a term and is employed in metaphysics in so many" totally" different senses, that its use might lead to gross misunderstanding unless it is defined with great precision at the very outset. Some scholars choose to understand it in a very loose manner. Prof S. N. Dasgupta, for example, sars, 1 "I shall call anr theory idealistic which asserts that 'Reality is spiritual' ..•. Idealism is not committed to any" particular kind of epistemological doctrine ... the concern of the idealist is with regard to the assertion of the nature of reality, and it is not difficult to conceive that there should be an idealism which is largely in agreement with some forms of realism in the field of epistemology but may ret be thoroughgoing idealism.'~ I venture to think that epistemology is a more primary discipline than ontology, and idealism therefore should essentially be understood in an epistemological sense. Any" theory of reality" presupposes a theory of knowledge by which it is determined. Nothing can be asserted about the nature of reality" unless certain assumptions are tacidy made regarding the nature of knowledge. Prof. Dasgupta's contention that idealism is committed to the doctrine "Reality is spiritual" would include as idealistic s:y'stems like those of Ramanuja and Nimbarka, while exclude systems like that of Kant. This appears to me as something of an anomaly. The use of the term in the history of Western 1. Indian Idealism, p. 25.

X

PREFACE

philosophy would also show that idealism is primarily an epistemological doctrine. Kant, for instance, in the famous section on "Refutation of Idealism", does not seek to r~fute any theory of reality being spiritual or otherwise. The controversy raised by the Neo-Realists and the Critical Realists is purely an epistemological one. Idealism as an epistemological doctrine means that knowledge is constructive. It does not reveal ; it creates. Even this, however, is not free from ambiguity. Any metaphysics which makes a distinction between appearance and reality, accepts the creativity of the subjective in some form or other. In this sense, Kant, the Sautrantika, and the Advaita Vedantin, would all be idealists. Idealism, in the strictest sense of the term, connotes three important things, viz. (a) knowledge is creative; (b) there is nothing given in knowledge ; and (c) the creative knowledge is itself real. Though Kant, the Sautriintika, and the Advaita Vedanta, accept the first proposition, viz., the creativity of the subjective, they are also committed to a doctrine of the thing-in-itself, which is not made or unmade by being known. These systems are idealistic, but are not pure forms of idealism. For the Miidhyamika, there is no thing-in-itself ; he accepts the second proposition as well. But he thinks that the creative knowledge also is only appearance; it is the denial of all metaphysics, including ideallism. My contention is that the Yogiiciira alone represents idealism in its strict sense in Indian philosophy. In the Advaita Vedanta the reality of the given, which is not known but is the implicate of all knowledge, is scrupulously maintained and as such, it is not idealism. The system is named 'Yogiiciira' in preference to the more wellknown appellation 'Vijiianavada' merely for the sake of drawing a convenient distinction. The school of Digniiga and Dharmak.irti occupies a peculiar position. They essentially accept the doctrine of Vijnaptimatratii, and the unreality of the object. When they enter into logical discussions however they endorse the Sautrantika standpoint of something being given in knowledge. The name 'Vijiianaviida' can be reserved for this school and the pure idealism of Maitreya, Asanga and Vasubandhu be called Yogaciira. The entire system may be called, as is actually done by some scholars and historians, the system of Yogiiciira-Vijiianaviida. Mention might also be made of the standpoint adopted in the essay. I am not an idealist. I believe that no speculative metaphysics can

PREFACE

xi

stand the corrosive test of criticism, and idealism is no exception. The Yogicara is just the illustration of a great pattern of metaphysics, but it is no better than other possible patterns. The only solution of the Antinomies of Reason appears to be the Midhyamika dialectic. Speculation is not the correct method of metaphysics and must be superseded by criticism. The Yogiciira. system, as a speculative metaphysics, is dogmatic. Its redeeming feature is however that it is not merely an idealism; it is essentially an absolutism. It represents one of the alternative approaches to the Absolute, conforming to the form of absolutism set once for all by the Midhyamika. The shortcomings and defects in the essay are legion. They can be excused only by the justifiability of an attempt at such an exposition, and not by any positive achievement. Of orginality I can claim little. I am not presenting a novel metaphysics. I dare to hope however that there may be found some novelty of presentation and the raising of some problems wh'ich are generally slurred over. I do not know how to express my indebtedness and gratitude to my revered teacher, Professor T.R.V. Murti. Whatever little I know of philosophy, I have learnt at his feet. The defects in the essay would have been infinitely greater, had not the entire essay been thoroughly revised by him with loving care. Those that are still lurking are only due to my inherent limitations. His great work, "The Central Philosophy of Buddhism", forms the theoretical basis and background of the present essay. It is in fact only a continuation and further elaboration of some of the problems raised in that book.

A. K. Chatterjee

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

The first edition of this book was published in the Darsana Series, Banaras Hindu University, 1962, with a Foreword by Prof. T. R. V. Murti who was then the General Editor of the Series. Much research work has appeared in print since then-textual, exe• getic and critical. Texts have been brought out in many new editions, while original work has been done, mainly by Japanese scholars. To utilise all that material would have meant writing a completely new book. I have not however seen anything which would make me revise the standpoint adopted here, though some details might need modification here and there. A careful rereading of the basic sources convinces me that any deviation from the line of interpretation adopted by me is misinformed, not warranted by ·the tradition itself. I might have been mistaken in my attempt to reconstruct the system, but that, I think, does not affect the soundness of the general perspective. I have not therefore made any alteration in the text, apart from correcting minor errors. I am grateful to Messrs Motilal Bana;rsidass for bringing out this edition.

A. K. Chatterjee

CONTENTS PAGE

Foreword

v

Preface

vii

Preface to Second Edition

xii

Abbreviations

xv

Ch. I

A Historical Introduction

Bodhlcaryavatara by Slntideva (Bib. Ind.) Bo:lhicaryavatarapafijikli by Prajfilikaramati (Bib. Ind.) Brahmasutra Sankarabha~ya (Nir.J:layasagar) The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, by Prof. T. R. V. Murti, Alien & Unwin, 1955. Buston's History of Buddhism, Tr. by Obermiller (Heidelberg 1931). History of Indian Literature by Winternitz Vol. II (Calcutta University 1933). Lankavatarasutra, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto 1923. Madhyamakavatara by Candrakirti, Ch·. VI(incomplete) res'tored by Ai_yaswa:r:ni Sastri (Journal of Oriental Research, Madras, 1929 ff). MHhyamikakarikli> by Nagarjuna (Bib. Bud. IV). Madhyamikakarikav~ti by C'lndrakirti(Bib.Bud. IV). Mahayanasutralariklira by Asa.nga, ed. S. Levi, Paris. Madhylntavibhaga-sutrabh~ya!ikli by Sthiramati, Part I, ed. V. Bhattacharya. and G. Tucci (Luzac & Co., 1932). Nyd.yasutrabha~ya by Vatsylyana (Vizia.oagara.m Sanskrit Series). Nylyabndali by Sridhara (Vizianaga.ram Sanskrit Series). Nyayam1njari by Jayanta (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series). Nyayasutra by Gotama. Nylyavarttika by Udyotakara (Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series). Pramli!}.avarttika by Dharmakirti, ed. R. Sank~tya­ ya!la (Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research S:>ciety, XXIV-XXV, Patna). PramiJ:iavarttiklila.rikara by Prajnakaragupta., ed. R. Sitikrtyayana, Patna.

Slokavarttika by Kumarila (Chowk.hamba Sanskrit Series). TS Tattvasa.ilgraha by Santarak~ita, 2 Vols. (Gaekwad Oriental Series). TSN Trisvabhavanirdesa by Vasubandhu ed. S. Mukhopa.dhyaya, Visvabharati. TSP Tattvasa.ilg,rahapaiijika by Kamalasila (Gaekwad Oriental Series). VMS Vijiiaptimatratasiddhi by Vasubandhu, ed. S. Levi, Paris. VMS(JBORS) Vijiiaptimatratasiddhi by Hsiian Tsang, partially reconstructed by R. Sankttyayana (Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society, XIX-XX, Patna). VSM Vedantasiddhantamuktavali by Prakasananda, Banaras. (Other works consulted are referred to in full)

CHAPTER

I

A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION Subjectivity is the key-note of Buddhism. From the very outset Buddhism had been subjectivistic and critical.l A sceptical attitude W'as always maintained regarding the reality of the whole of experience. Unifying categories like substantiality,universality, wholeness, etc., were rejected. The significance of these categories in empirical experience can certainly not be denied. Thus the initial postulation in Buddhism is the distinction between what obtains in reality and what appears empirically. The discovery of the subjective nature of certain aspects of experience was a great achievement which revolutionised, not only the subsequent development of Buddhism, but the trend of entire Indian philosophy. A content is said to be subjective, when it is merely in thought, and has no grounding in external n:ality. Subjectivity thus entails a constructive mechanism ofthcught. This is the basic concept in Buddhism which sharply distinguishes it from all realistic theories of knowkdge. The history of Buddhism is to be read as the gradual deepening of this cotsciousness of the subjective, beginning from a more or less realistic metaphysics to full-fledged idealism. 2 But even the earliest phase of Buddhism was not realism in its tea-called objective classification. The perception of a whole, identical and permanent amidst change and difference, is the work cf constructive imagination (kalpana). This postulation of a whole was called satkavadr~ti, the imposition of a pudgala up3n the real dharmas. The negative or critical attitude thus operates even in the earliest phase. It is still called realistic because dharmas are accepted as objectively r~al. Though construction is possible on the basis of the dharmas, these latter are independent of construction and are free from any trace of subjectivity. The the.:>ry of dharmas is, therefore, realistic. But it

3. For an exp:lsition of the three· phases see Stcherbatsky, Bt~ddhist LDgic, Vol. I, pp. 3-14; Obermiller's The Doctrine of Praj;iaparamita, pp. 91-10:); CPB, pp. 1-2, and pp. 66 ff.

4. Regarding the meaning of this elusive term, see Stcherbatsky's fine exposition in his Central Conceptio'l of Bt~ddhism, pp. 4-6; Cf. also p. 42.

A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION

is to be distinguished from naive realism which unquestioningly accepts the reality of a content of perception just as it appears. For the Sarvastivadin, the pudgala, though appearing in knowledge, is yet imaginary, subjective. The the:>ry combines the elements of criticism as well as of realism, and is best termed as 'critical realism'. The allied school of Theravada presents a peculiar problem. Though the texts ordinarily supposed to be the authentic canons of original Buddhism 2re in Pali and belong to this school, little mention is made of them in any of the subsequent schools. When the later schools subject the early realistic phase to criticism, they invariably refer to Sarvlistivada or the Vaibha~ika. Whatever truth there might be in the contention that the Pali texts represent the original teaching of Buddha, there is little doubt that Theravada exerted little or no influence in the subsequent development of Buddhism.& The philosophy of Theravlida is surprisingly akin to that of Sarvlistivlida, so that, from this t:cint of view even, Theravada does not present a new system, meriting study for its own sake. The intere&t in this school remains antiquarian. It prevaiJs, however, in Ceylon, Burma and other parts of southem Asia. In the Sarvlistivada, doctrines are stated dogmatically, with no attempt' at their rational defence. This is remedied in the Sautrantika school. This is not so much a new philosophy as the analysis of the implications of the Sarvlistivada realism. The Sautrlintika must be understood as Sarvastivada itself, aware of its own logical basis. They are not two schools, but two phases of the same metaphysical pattern. The criticalspirit, characteristic of all Buddhism, gets intensified here. Certain dharmas of dubious status, accepted by the early schools, are deleted by the Sautrlintika. s Problems of a purely logical nature are raised and discussed threadbare, in conformity with the basic metaphysics of critical realism. But, though the realistic pattern is retained, the transition is yet very fundamental and is fraught with far-reaching consequences. The statement can be hazarded that, without the Sautrlintika,there would havf. been no Mahavana philoscphy.

5. Cf. Mcgovern's A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, .pp. 16-17. 6. Cf. The Central Conuption of Buddlism, pp. 41-43.

THE YOGACARA IDEALISM

In his metaphysics the Sautrantika maintains three theses. 7 Every· thing is transient and perishing (anitya); everything is devoid of selfhood or substantiality (anatma); everything· is discrete and unique (svalak~a~). The first militates against permanence and endurance of things; the second precludes all unity and substantiality and wholeness; the third does away with the reality of universals. I. A real thing, according to the Sautra.ntika logic, cannot be perman:nt. The criterion of reality is efficiency (artha-kriya-karitva). If a thing is to be real, it must have some causal determination; it must have some bearing orrelevance to the other existents. A sky-lotus or a barren woman's son are not the links in any causal series and are, therefore, not real. An utterly unproductive thing is unr.eal. A real thing must make itself felt.

Tq have efficiency is to change. An efficient permanence is a contradiction in terms. It might be held that the permanent is not something having eternal duration; it endures only so long as the effect is not produced, after which it is destroyed. But it is either in the nature of a thing to be destroyed or it is not. If the latter, it can never be destroyed; but if it is its very nature to perish, it will die the next moment it is born. Theq again a permanent entity is one which never changes its nature. Otherwise it will not retain its identity-for two consecutive moments. But ifit is eternally unchanging it can never pass from an unproductive state to a productive one. If it is unproductive at first it will never produce anything; if it is productive from the very outset, it will never cease producing. If it does anything contrary to this rule it cannot teally be permanent. Dharmakirti urges8 that objects cannot be pe:rmanent. If they were, the knowledge of the present would by itself give rise to the knowledge of the entire future, there being no change, no novelty. And relative permanence is still more indefensible. If a thing changes at all, it must change incessantly. The real is momentary. II. Th~ substance and the whole are unintelligible categories. Whatever the seose'l perceive is a discrete sense-datum. If the substance also were to be perceived, it can be perceived only through some sense. 7. On these points see Six Buddbist NytiJ·a Tracts; TS; Stcherbatsky, Buddhjst L1gic, Vol. 1; and Satkari Mukherjee, BJ((/dhist Philosophy

of Universal

A HISTORICAL INIRODUCTION

But the eye perceives only a colour, never a colour and a substance. The ear hears a sound, but nothing else. The -substance, therefore, is only a name which is given to a collection of sense-data; the latter are all really particular and discrete. There is no blue ol?iect apart from the blue. Logically l' lw, the concept of the substance is indefensible. If the substance is something different from the attributes, how are the two related to one another ? The apple is sweet as well as smooth. But is one half of it sweet and the other half smooth ? It is no longer one then, and is not an ol?iect at all. But if the whole of it is both, these two aspects cannot be related to each other. So far as the apple is sweet, it repels other attributes. But it is also smooth, i.e., not sweet, at the same time. This is evidently a contradiction. The same consideration can be applied against the reality of the whole as well. What is the whole over and above the parts ? When the parts are all separated, is something left over ? How does the whole exist ? Does it exist wholly in each of the parts or only partially? If the former, it would be exhausted in one part which would be superfluous. But if it exists only partially in the parts, then it is only an unneceesary duplication of the parts themselves, and the dhtinction between one whole and many parts can no longer be maintained. Moreover, if the parts have contradictory attributes, which attribute should be ascribed to the whole ? It must possess both, but contradictories cannot be reconciled in the bosom of the same entity. The whole, like the substance~ is a mere construct, imposed on the discrete parts. III. The concept ofthe universal also is subject to the same criticism. If things are different, nothing is found identical in them. The universal is supposed to be present in all its particulars. But how can one thing be identically present in different places, and ftill remain one ? Does it exist by parts ? If not, the existence of one universal in different particulars cannot be explained. I fit exists by parts, it cannot be known till all its particular~ are known-an impossible task. Howistheuniversal cognised ? Senses cognise only sensedata; but the universal is not a sense-datum. When a thing is produced, how does the universal enterinto it ? Where was it before the production of this particular ? Did it come out of another particular, which wodd then be devoid of any universal, unless it had two ? When and where does it go away when a particular is destroyed ? Can the .universal exist without inhering in the particulars ? The five fingers are perceived, but never the sixth, viz., fingerhood. The universal is only a thought-construct, a

6 vikalpa

Only the particular is given. The real is unique and discrete

The Sautrantika puts the Anatma tradition on a logical basis. A thorough-going Analytic is expounded, more or less on the Kantian lines. The distinction between the thing-in-itself, the objectively given and the thought-construct, the work of the a priori, is relentlesF ly dtawn, with the full consciousness of all the implications of this metaphysics. It is not that one detached element in experience is accidentally subjective; it is rather that all experience is a synthesis obtained by superimposing the a priori categories on the given. All empirical experience, therefore, is necessarily conditioned by the :subjective. Even the bare act of naming a thing is not possible without construing it as an object, a whole of parts, a particulu belonging t·:> a class, in short, without thoughtconstruction (kalpana). Unity, substantiality and universality are all the work of the a priori; they are transcendental functions of the subjective. The stabilisation of the pattern of the Sautrantika metaphysic~ entailed a detailed analysis of the constitution of empirical knowledge. On the one hand there is the thing-in-itself, viz., the particular and unique dharmas, a momentary and incessant flow of unrelated reals; on the other hand there are the relations read into them by constructive imagination (kalpanii). A relation is a subjective construction, an a priori category. This analysis, well-known to us in its Kantian form, is undertaken by the Sautriintika. Knowledge can be traced to two sources, belonging to entirely different levels, viz., the thing-in-itself on the one hand which is objectively given and the transcendental categories of synthesis on the other, which are apriori functions of the subjective. Intuition of the pure given is pratyak~a according to the Sautrantika. Manipulation of the universal, which is a creature of the subjective, is anumiina. All kn:>wledge is exhausted by these two pramih;tas, there being no third kind. This pramiiJ;~.avii.da is the original contrihution of the Sautrantika; the critical or the destructive work is merely the elucidation of the implications of pudgalanairii.tmya. The historical imp.:>rtance of the Sautriintika school is very great, as it is this metaphysics which paved the way for the later Mahayiinistic developments in the bi~tory of Buddhit.m. The transitior., from a philosophical point of vievt, from the realistic Hinayana to the absolutistic and idealistic Mahii}lioa was made possible by the Sautrant!.ka analysis of experience. The Sautriintika prepared the way of the Madhyamika

on the ot~e.hand and the Yogaciira on the other, and is, in a sense, the parting of the ways. B. Subjectivity, the a priori character of which had been demonstrated by the Sautrantika, receives a still deeper interpretation in the Ma:l.hyamika philosophy. The scope of subjectivity is infinitely widened by demolishing the category of difference as well. The Sautrantika had established a kind of nominalism. The unifying categories like identity, permanence, universality, wholeness, substantiality, these were all sh:>wn to be merely conceptual, lacking an objective basis. The Ma..ihyamika completes the dialectical movement of criticism; he urges~ with great logical cogency and rigour, that difference fares no better. Identity and difference are purely relative categories. One derives all the significance that one has only in and through the other. The Sautrantika had refuted the reality of the pudgala, but had maintained that of the dharmas. The pudgala was a thought-construct projected upon the real dharmas which alone existed objectively. A dharma was the ultimate existent and was a unique particular. The list of dharmas included 75 in the Sarvastivada, but was cut down to 43 by the Sautrantika. The Madhyamika continues this critical process to its logical extreme and refuses to accept the reality of the dharmas even. If an object is nothing apart from its various aspects, nor are the a~pects to be arbitrarily grouped together without an objective basis. The subject is not a predicate-less unity. The predicates on the other hand are not independently real ; they are not floating universals but can exist only within the context of the subject. The Ma.:l.hyamika Dialectic is simply the analysis of this relativity of thought. Thought cannot take a stand on the category of particularity' and difference, after demolishing its contrary. All thought is relative ; pick a hole at any point and the entire structure collapses. And this relativity is not peculiar to any one fragment or one aspect of thought; it infects thought or Reason as such. This point is pressed with great dialectical skill in connection with every traditional problem of metaphysics. It can be illustrated in the case of the two most important ones, viz., the problem of causation and the problem of self. Like any other relation, causality& implies two things, viz., relation and distinction. The effect must be related to the cause; otherwise the 9.

THE YOGACARA IDEALISM

cause would not be relevant to the effect. The latter must at the same time be distinguished from its cause, or there would be no transition, no novelty. Neither of these two aspects of causation can ever be dispensed with, and yet they are mutually irreconcilable. Different metaphysics try either_ to explain one aspect away or effect s.ome sort of impotent compromise. The causal relation may be understood as one of difference. This is done in a radical way by Hume and the Sautrantika, and by the NyayaVaise~ika in a qualified way. The basic argument of this metaphysics is that without distinction there is no causation. If the effect is nothing new, what is it then that has been produced ? There is indeed no relation at all without a distinction between the two terms which sustain it. A thing cannot be related to itself. The causal relation would lapse along with the denial of the causal distinction. Nothing new would ever be produced. A thing would eternally be what it is, with the result that the universe would be reduced to a monotony of bare unchanging elements. As contrasted with this there is the other metaphysics, represented by the Sankhya and the Advaita Vedanta, which stress the relational aspect of causation. The effect must be the effect of a cause. The cause must bear upon its effect. Unless the two are related one would not be the cause of the other. An identity, or rather a continuity, is to be traced between the cause and the effect. Without this minimum identity between them, the two terms would utterly fall asunder. There would be no cause at all, or everything would be the cause of everything, the lack of relation being available everywhere. The Madhy'amika points10 out that these two points of view are absolutely irreconcilable, and that neither position can yet be completely given up. The concept of causation is inherently unintelligible; ?Jl the speculative devices to render it intelligible are riddled with insoluble antinomies. Pure identity or pure difference does not explain causation; they expl~n it away. Causation requires both at same time, and this is a logical impossibility. It is therefore only' a figment of constructive imagination, and is purely subjective. It is not that one aspect is subjectively constructed while the other is real. Within the context of 10. Cf. :MK, Ch. 1, Pratyaya-parih,a.

A HISTORICAL INIRODUCTION

empirical experience one cannot be had without the other (paraspara.siddhib na tu svabhavik.i); identity and difference are relative to one another and are both equally subjective. A similar impasse confronts us when we come to the problem of self.U Our empirical experience has two distinguishable aspects, viz., change and continuity. Experience is a stream of consciousness, a succession of fleeting states, perishing every moment. On the other hand, this stream somehow coheres around an identical centre, which appropriates and holds together the various discrete moments. Different metaphysics take one or the other of these aspects as the pattern of explanation ; the Madhyamika shows that the other aspect stubbornly refuses to be explanined away. Change or succession in experience cannot be denied. Experience is, as Hume found out, a "bundle of different perceptions." Whenever Hume strives to discover his innermost self, he invariably stumbles on some particular perception or other. The identical and unchanging self is only an ideal construction. The Sautrantika also arrives at the same conclusion. The pudgala is a projection of kalpana, it being only an assemblage of discrete skandha-moments. Only the dharmas are objectively real; identity or continuity is an illusion. The Atma-metaphysics, on t;he other side, stresses this continuity permeating our entire experience. Experience is not merely a series of discrete moments. They must all be gathered togther into an individual consciousness. A perception is not a solitary unit; it is always the perception of a .Person. Particular ideas are not sufficient to constitute a fully articulated experience; without a form imparting unity and determinateness to the ideas they would not adhere to a single stream, a form which Kant names the Transcendental Unity of Apperception. A self is therefore posited to serve the function of an identical reference of the various mental states. This motive can be seen underlying the analysis of experience in all the Brahmanical systems. The Madhyamika simply brings to light12 the essential relativity of both these factors of experience. One is not intelligible without the other. The assertion of change presupposes the awareness of change, which awareness therefore must be distinguished from the change itpe~ik.i

self(ye!ju vyavarttam.ane~u yad anuvarttate tat tebhyo bhinnam). Change requires an unchanging perspective, without which the affirma.tion of change remains dogmatic. Personal identity and memory are inexplicable on the hypothesis of pure difference. Pure identity' on the other hand fares no better. To affirm identity' we must be able to trace the continuity of the identical content between different contexts. There must have been some change in order to make possible the assertion of the pervading identity. A non-relational identity cannot be affirmed. Pure identity can never be made relevant to change. Even to know change as change, identity must come down from its high pedestal of perpetual monotony. Absolute identity cannot serve the function of knowing change, for which it is posited; it has no means of noting the change, as succession plays no part in its being. At the same time change cannot be known without identity, and there is no means of making consistent these two concepts, viz., change cannot be known without identity and identity cannot know change. This is the bankruptcy of all speculative metaphysics. All this is only to illustrate the universality of the subjective. Every category of thought is infected with rela,tivity and is therefore void of reality' (nissabha.va). As such it is purely imaginary, is subjective. In early Buddhism only one aspect of experience was subjective; difference, change and particularity were objectively real. The Madhyamika however repudiates the reality of al1 experience, all thought-categories. The whole is unreal(pudgalanairli.tmya) ; the discrete and momentary elements ' on which the whole is supp:lsed to have been superimposed are no less unreal (dharmanairatmya), as they become meaningless without the whole. Sarvastivada accepted as many as 75 dharmas; the Sautrli.ntika acce?ted only 43 and rejected the rest as. subjective; for the Madhyamika, even the remaining ones are subjective, by the extension of the same logic. Subjectivity is another name of relativity. If a thing were objective and real, it w~uld be able to exist by itself ; it must not be in need of being understood through something else. 13 But nothing is found in thought which is not relative; everything is relative to everything else. Relativity is the mark of the unreal, of the subjective. The Ma.dhyamika concludes that our entire experience is purely subjective;

things have only an apparent existence (samvrti); in reality they are imaginary (kalpita) and subjective. C. This wholesale rejection of all experience as illusory appeared to be an extreme position and could not be maintained for long. Speculation is an inveterate demand of human reason and its silence, when criticism reveals its inner fissures, is only transient. The denial by the Madhyamika of all metaphysics seemed to be an unqualified nihilism and a barren scepticism, and we have the 'Third Swinging of the Wheel," represented by the Yogicli.ra idealism. This was a return to speculation and to constructive metaphysics, and was, in this respect, spiritually akin to the Sarvistivada and the Sautrintika. The Yogacli.ra also takes his cue from the Sautrantika, which thus plays a pivotal transitional role. The Sautrintika had stressed the subjective factor in all experience. 'There is no experience into the constitutior- of which subjectivity does not enter. 'The Yogacara endorsed this analysis, but to him the accep[ance of subjectivity by the Sautrintika appeared to be only half-hearted. Coming as it did in the wake of the Madhyamika, the Yogicli.ra looked at the critical realism of the Sautrintika as an illogical compromise between realism and criticism. Criticism meant to him giving up realism altogether. If the number of dharmas could be cut down from 75 to 43, and the rest relegated to the realm of the subjective, the process may as well be continued to its logical finish, and the last trace of a thing-in-itself be wiped off. 'Thus far the Yogacli.ra accepted the Madhyamika criticism of the Sautrantika position. He also advocated dharmasii.nyata. His revolt against the extremism of the Madhyamika centres around the interpretation of subjectivity. 14 For the Madhyam.ika subjectivity creates. unreality and is itself unreal ; the Yogacli.ra however contends that subjectivity, though the source of unreality, is real. 'The demand of speculation is to reach the ground of all phenomena. The Madhyam.ika showed that this demand can never be met within Reason, as Reason by its very nature leads to insoluble antinomies. 'The Yogacira, as a speculative metaphysics, could not rest satisfied with such a purely negative result. The Sautrli.ntika and the Madhyam.ika were both critical, and had demonstrated the subjective character of phenomena. 'This insight into the nature of experience was not lost by the Yogacara. He also

maintained the unreality of phenomena. But, unlik,e the Madhyamika, he urged that phenomena, though unreal, must be rooted in some reality. A groundless appearance is uninteligible. 15 This ground cannot be anything objective ; the ·concept of objectivity was effectively demolished by the Sautrantika and the Madhyamik.a, and could not be resuscitated again. The alternative left to the Yogacara was to hold that subjectivity is in itself real ; only its objective projections are unreal. Consciousness is the only reality. Everything that appears in experience is only within experience ; it is some form of consciousness or other. The appearance of a form of consciousness as sol:llething objective and independent is illusory. Every thing is subjective, though appearing as something different. This appearance is unreal; its essence however, as a mode ~f subjective existence, is real. For the Sautrantik.a subjectivity is purely epistemic ; the ultimately real is tbe unique particular which exists objectively and independently. For the Madhyamika, nothing is independent. The subject and the object are entirely correlative to each other, and are both only subjective. Subjectivity is conceptual and lacks any real basis. The Yogacara declines the notion of objectivity, but the subjective becomes ontological ; it really exists, while the objective does not. The Yogacara is thus the culmination of Buddhism, arrived at by a gradual reinterpretation and successive reorientationofits central concept of subjectivity. And it is the Sautrantik.a which makes this reorientation possible, by establashing subjectivity on a logical basis and by unfolding various implications of this position. The content on which subjectivity mak.es its construction is still there, but the scope of the subjective becomes so enormous as to threaten to engulf that shadow of a thing-in-itself. The next step is obviously to dispense altogether with the ghostly conten~, and the Yogacara, emboldened by the Madhyamika criticism of the unstable position of the Sautrantika, takes this next step. The thing-in-itself is itself a projection of the subjective, the most primal projection out of which the entire empirical experience evolves. Whenever in the history of philosophy criticism makes a distinction between the subjective and its content, the former invariably tends to get inflated and to swallow its content completely. This comedy was played out in the development of British empiricism. Locke held that the material

substance is not what actually appears in knowledge, but that it is shrouded by the so-called 'secondary qualities,' which are subjective creations. The result is that the material substance becomes merely an '!-knownot-what' and Berkeley had little difficulty in showing up the inherent instability of the logic of empiricism. The same comedy was played out, though after an infinitely larger pattern, in the development of German idealism. Kant thought that the real object, the thing-initself, never appears in knowledge. Knowledge is determined by certain trancendental functions, viz., the a priori categories of understanding. The known object is therefore a synthesis of these subjective categories and the thing-in-itself to which thought cannot penetrate. Fichte, and after him, Hegel, strove to abolish this dualism. If the categorised content is all that we know, the assertion of an unknown thing-in-itself is dogmatic to the extreme. Criticism paves the way for idealism by reducing the object to a precarious existence and by extending the scope and importance of subjectivity. The emergence of the Yogacara idealism was made possible by the Sautrantika emphasis on the subjective constitution of experience. The Yogacara simply equates subjectivity with the whole of experience, so that creative Will becomes the sole reality. But the Sautrantika contributed to the evolution of the Yogacara in another and more specific way. His analysis of the problem of perception was the specific factor which led to the rise of idealism.l& Perception is the direct intuition of the object. It is very easily the basis of all knowledge, all other pramlit_las being dependent on it. Without perception knowledge would lack a starting-point ; it would have a floating character, as it is this pramlit_la that knowledge Ultimately falls back upon. If therefore any metaphysics fails to explain perceptual knowledge, it rings its own death-knell. Metaphysics cannot dictate to experience; it can only try to interpret it. The perceptual relation requires at least two terms, if complications are av0ided. Perception means cognition of an object by a subject. Were there only the object, there would be facts but no experience of facts. And this assertion itself presupposes experience. The subject therefore must be taken for granted. Knowledge cannot be transcend16. Cf. Keith's Buddhist Philosophy, C?llception of Bud.lbism, pp. 54-65.

ed. The object of knowledge however does not enjoy the same indi.$putable status. That ~omething appears in knowledge and confronts the subject is certainly not to be denied. But whether it is a term independent of the relation in which alone it is foWld, or it is exhausted in that relation itself, is an open question. If it is, we have a realistic theory of perception; if not, we have full-fledged idealism. Early Buddhism was, as already seen, realistic. Though the subjective factor in the constitution of experience was recognised, the reality of the object existing independently was maintained. The pattern is closely akin to that of the Kantian Analytic. Kant also detects the presence of the a priori in experience. But experience is not all a prir;ri ; there is an irre::lucible element of the given, the thing-in-itself, without which no experience would be possible. There is however a very important distinction between these two· theories of knowledge. Kant believes that the thing-in-itself is never known as it is. Whenever it is given to knowledge, it is necessarily refracted through the categories of Understanding, so that what we know is always a categorised object, and never the pure given. The possibility of our ever transcending these categ:1ries in empirical knowledge is not visualised by Kant. "Intellectual Intuition" is impossible, at least for human beings. The Sautrantika however holds that intuition of the pure given is possible. There is one kind of knowledge where the bare object in all its particularity and uniqueness is cognised, without the operation of any subjective construction. The logic for the acceptance of this kind of cognition of the pure given is very cogent. For the Sautriintika, as also for Kant, knowledge has a two-fold root, viz., the given and the construction. This distinction itself is not possible unless the given is also cognised without construction. Were the constructed object all that we ever could know, we would not even have the suspicion of there being any construction at all. Or, if the fact of illusion awakened us to its function, we would go to the other extreme and deny any element of the given. That something is given and something constructed can be affirmed only when both are known in isolation. Moreover, the Sautrantika asserts that the p3.rticular alone is given and that the universal is a construction (nam1jatyadi-yojana kalpana); this knowledge also cannot be had a priori or by mere logic. We must know that the particualar lone is given which must therefore be immediately perceived.

This cognition of the pure given is termed Perception17 in the Sautrantika theory of knowledge. The knowledge of the constructed universal is the other pram1ir}a which i~ accepted, known as Inference. This conception of the two pram:iJ:las is radically different from that held in other systems oflndian Philosophy. There is also another fundamental difference between the Sautrantika and other systems. For the Sautrantika, the content of perception can never be inferred and vice versa. This is technically known as pram:iJ:laviplavavada, as opposed to the orthodox view of pram:iJ:lasamplavavada. Perception, according to the Sautrantika, is this cognition of the ultimately real dharmas. These dharmas are not static; they are undergoing incessant change. No dharma endures for any duration of time. It is absolutely momentary(~at_llka). But here arises a grave complication. If the object is momentary, the cognition of it is no less so. The~e is no abiding self behind the various mental states. These states are all that are found on the dissection of a personality and they are fleeting, momentary. "But if the object and its cognition are both momentarv, perception become~ an inexplicable riddle. Perception is a process in which the mind, whatever it might be, somehow comes into contact with the object through the various sense-organs, and the resultant is the perceptual knowledge, viz., the cognition of the object. This whole process can not take place in one moment. Granting even that the process itself is a series of moments, the object must at least endure till the process is completed. 1B One moment cannot possibly know ancther moment, since, by the time it reaches the latter, both are dead. Supposing that the cognition-moment leaves its impression and efficiency on the succeeding moment, the moment to be cognised is no longer there. If another moment has emerged in its stead, the know ledge is not oft he first moment; and if ont- moment cannot be known, it is difficult to imagine how any subsequent moment can be known, the original predicament remaining unaltered. Ultimately nothing can ever be known. This is the impasse to which early Buddhism is inevitably led by its hypothesis of radical momentariness of things. In this hypothesis the germ of idealism is already latent. Early Bu:idhism is critical realism. Being realism, it is committed to accept-

17. Cf. Nyqyabindrt, I ; PV, II, 123. 18. varttamanalambanagrahar,te ea k~ar,tabhailgabadha.Q., MVSBT, P· 21.

ing something absolutely given; being critical as well, the given is not supposed to be just what appears in knowledge. Permanence and stability is denied to the given; it is momentary. Being momentary, the given cannot enter into any causal rdation to knowledge ; the hypothesis fails to explain knowedge for which purp::>se alone it was posited. The object is supposed to be the cause (ii.lambana-pratyaya) of its knowledge. Its cognition is causally determined by its being given to knowledge. Causality' however entails a determinate temporal sequence. The cause, as Kant demonstrated, cannot be related to the effect in any order; it must invariably precede the latter. The object therefore must be antecedent to its cognition to which it is supposed to stand in the causal relation. 19 But, being momentary, it will perish by the time its cognition is produced. 2° Knowledge cannot reach a momentary object.21 We have therefore the paradox that there appears in knowledge something which is no longer existent. 22 But a past moment is, according to the Sautrii.ntika, unreal. The content of perception is thus unreal from the objective point of view, having no objective counterpart. This is idealism. Since knowledge is that of a nonexistent object, 23 the latter may very' well be dispensed with. If the content is cognised even when it is no longer existent, then everything past and future will be the content of knowledge.24 Perception of a real object and the m::>m'!ntariness of that object are thus mutually irreconcilable. The object precedes knowledge and must also endure, if the pitfal of idealism is to be avoided, till the completion of the knowledge-process. This endurance militates against the Buddhist hypothesis of momentariness. Theravii.da here offers a very ingenious subterfuge. 25 According to the Theravii.da analysis the full process of cognition takes 17 moments. Since realism requires that the object 19. PV, II, 247. 20. Cf. Abhidharn1akofa, I, 43. 21. k~at~asya jfi.anena prii.payitum asakyatvat, N;•ii.J•abindutika, p. 16. 22. na avidyamanasya svarupe!}.a darsanam, hetutvena ea jfianat purvatvam. purvatve ea k~a!}.ikataya na jfiii.nakale astita. PVA, p. 108. 23. yadarthas tada na jfiii.nam yada jfianam tadii. niirtha iti kuto vyangyavyafijakabhii.vas tayol;l, PV, p. 243. 24. MVSBT, p. 21 ; PV, II, 418-419. 25. Cf. AbhidbanJmattlasauJgabo, IV, 8.

should endure throughout this process, Theravada boldly declares that one object-moment is equivalent to 17 cognition-moments. Both are momentary, but the speed of the perishing of the object is slo\\ ed down 17 times, so that, for the purposes of knowledge, it is relatively stable. The stability of the object is secured without absolutely giving up its ultimate momentariness. This device can succeed however only at the cost of logic. Logic cannot tolerate such discrimination in the treatment of the subject and the object. Their respective momentarinesses cannot be measured by disparate standards. If the object can survive for 17 moments, it may as well do so till infinity. We cannot thus play fast and loose with the hypothesis of momentariness, paying lip-service to it and giving it up when it suits our convenience. The Sarvastivada and the Sautrantika are aware of these difficulties. Their theory is not that the object precedes its cognition ; otherwise the proposition that knowledge cognises something non-existent and unreal cannot be refuted, and that would be playing into the hands of the idealist. In the Sarvastivada, the object is not the cause, in the ordinarily accepted sense of the term, of its cognition. The two are rather flashed together simultaneously. In any case of knowledge, three distinct elements appear simultaneously. Causality, in the sense of a determinate temporal sequence, is not to be found there. A perceptual knowledge is generated by a contact (sparsa) 26 of three things, viz., an objective dharma (alambana), a sense-activity (indriyavikara), and a moment of pure consciousness (vijfiana). There .is no actual contact between these three, each dharma being unique (svalak~~a). There is contact only in the sense that the three appear simultaneously (trikasaimipata). Because of this contact, a moment of consciousness emerges bearing the form of an object-moment. This is all that is meant by the causality of the object ; it i~ not a dead antecedent, but lives at the same moment as its cognition does. In this way perception of a real (existent) and objective dharma is sought to be reconciled with the momentariness of that dharma. The reconciliation is however only apparent ; the inner logical contradiction still remains. The object is no longer the cause of its cognition; its emergence is merely the occasion for the eme~gence of its cognition-moment. These two parallel emergences are simultaneous. 26. The Central Conception

Contact is not interaction, b\1t only this simultaneity. But, whether the object is a cause or an occasion, there is no doubt that it determines the cognition-form, and that without its existence the latter also would not be. No relation of determination can subsist however without a temporal order. Simultaneity is not a sufficient ground for determination.27 Occasionalism is theoretically unintelligible. In Western philosophy a God was always there to fall back upon in the last resort; deus ex n1achina was the solution of all insoluble problems. Sarvastivada did not have even this last resort of dogmatic philosophy. If two moments are simultaneous, one cannot be supposed to determine the other. Or, if determination is still insisted upon, there is no reason why it should not be construed the other way round. Cognition and the object are both simultaneous. It is difficult to conceive why the former should be determined by the latter, instead of itself determining it. 28 Simultaneity may as much be an argument for idealism as for realism. The object-moment loses its causal efficiency, as two simultaneous moments cannot be causally related to each other. And if it determines cognition even without being related to it, cognition would then be determined by everything whatsoever, the lack of ~ny relation to cognition being common to all things. DB The iilambanapratyaya, so long as it is consistently held to be momentary, cannot explain its perception, since there is no way of relating the owo. Cognition therefore,in the absence of any external determination, acquires this from the preceding moment of cognition itself. The samanwtarapratyaya is the fundamental condition of perception. 30 A real aliunbana, being unrelated, is superfluous. The a.Iambana-pratyaya means simply that cognition arises having the form of an external object. This 27. samlinakalayos ea hetuphalatvii.yogiit, Abhisamayiilankariiloka, p. 381. 28. Sarvastivada holds that there is a peculiar relation known as Sarupya" betweeo consciousness and object, which determines that consciousness should "grasp" the latter and not otherwise. This is however "a confession of ignorance. Central Conception, p. 56; 64. 29. atha yadaiva asti tadaiva grahat;1am, hetubhavam antarel}.api. .na samanakilasya hetuta tathii apratiteQ.. asambaddhagrahat;1e ea sarvam eva gfhyeta. PVA, p. 108. 30. PV, Il, 323.

appearance of the semblance of an object is the form of consciousness itself; there is no real alambana. This is idealism, born out of the inherent lack of coherence in the account of perception given in early Buddhism. The contradiction becomes more explicit in the Sautrantika, as it is here that the hypothesis of momentariness is fully analysed in all its implications. The Yogacara philosophy is the logical outcome. It can now be seen how the Yoglic..iira is only the extreme development of the logic implicit in Buddhism ~en from the very outset. The discovery of the subjective is the great achievement of Buddhist epistemology. The Sautrantika lUldertook the task of clarif~ing the implications of such a po~ition. This clarification made explicit the inner contraJiction of a half-hearted acceptance of the subjective. Idealism is an attepmpt to remove the contradiction by giving up t~e dualistic theory of know ledge. Moreover, the Sautrantika analysis had ·shown the inexplicability of perception, as being inccmistent with its theory of momentariness. Idealism again tries to solve the riddle by making perception independent of anything given. Here arises an interesting problem of historical SJ?eculation. The Yogacara is directly the result of the attempt to remove the inconsistencies of the ~autrantika position. The Madhayamika is another similar attf mpt, though with radically different results. The Sautrantika thus occupies a central position in the histoq of Buddhism. The problem is as to whether the emergence of the Yogacata school would have been possible even without the mediation of the Madhyamika. As a matter of fact, the Madhyamika intervened between the Sautrantika and the Yogacara. The speculative possibility is however there :is th: Yogacara school the last phase of Buddhism because of a merely historical coincidence or is the development a matter of logical sequence as well ? The Madhyamika is a very extreme position, and it is generally expected that the extremes should come last. Tht Sauttiintika and the Yogacara are both speculative systems and are spiritually akin; the Madhyamika is the champion of pure criticism entailing the rejection of all metaphydcs. It appears to be an accidental episode between two speculative philosopHies. Is it really so, or is the Madhyamika a necessary step in the logical developmt.nt of idealism ? It has been seen that the Sautrantika theory of knowledge is unstable. The least tampering with the integrity of the object opens the door to idealism. Subjectivity, once accepted in any form, refuses to be limited

to any single aspect of experience ; it threatens so to swell as to engulf everything foreign to it within its corrosive fold. Give up rank realism, and there is no stopping anywhere ~hart of idealism. The Yogacara is therefore the natural s.equetlce to the Sautrantika logic ; the intervention of the Madhyamika is an accident which could have been dispensed with. The Sautrantika prepared the ground for the emergence of idealism also in another important nspect ; his analysis exposed the unintelligibility of perception, as inconsistent with the Buddhist logic. All these considerations tend to prove that the transition from the critical realism of the Sautrantika to the Yogadi.ra idealism is a logical and a natural one, and that it does not stand in any necessity of being mediated by the Madhyamika criticism. But this is not the whole story. The Yogacara is not merely idealism, but also absolutism. The system cannot be sized up unless this latter aspect also is taken into consideration. And the transition from mere idealism to absolutism is made possible by the Ml'idhyarnika dialectic. The contradiction inherent in the Sautrantika position would have yielded an idealism and it did so. The concept of the given is utterly unintdligible and has to be given up. But the insight that the subject and the object are correlative categories and that one cannot be had without the other is a legacy of the Madhyamika. The subject cannot be obtained in its purity. In isolation from the object, it becomes the Inexpr~sible (siinya). Absolutism cannot be reached except through a dialectical approach, and this norm is established by the Madhyamika by inexorable logic. The Yogacara, as a dogmatic metaphyrics, has a speculative bias in favour of the subject, but is at the same time aware that idealism cannot be a final position. Pure subject ceases to be subject at all ; it becomes something non-conceptual. This awareness is dialectical, and compels the Yogacara to transcend mere idealism. This then is the part the Madhyamika plays in the evolution of the Y6gacara system. Idealism it could have been even without the Madhyarnika, by the sheer dyanamism of the Sautrantika logic itself, but it would have stopped at that. It would not have occurred to it to take the further step to absolutism, but for the fact that there was the .Miidhyamika criticism to which idealism provided no answer. It is thus seen that the two-fold character of the Yogacara system is to be traced to two different influences. Idealism is the result of the attempt to remove the incompleteness of the Sautrlntika logic and

epistemology. Idealism passes into absolutism due to the pressure exerted by the Madhyamika dialectic. But in spite of all this evolution the Yogacara remains true to the essential spirit of Buddhism. The development takes place within the fold of Buddhism of which the Yogacara remains only a phase to the last, though a most important one. The central concepts of Buddhism are radically modified, but never discarded. This point can be illustrated by considering the development of some of the basic doctrines of Buddhism, such as Siinya.ta, Pratityasamutpada and Madhyama Pratipad. Siinyata can easily be supposed to be the most central doctrine in entire Buddhism. It does not connote however one single meaning acceptable to all the schools. Different schools construe it in different wa}fll. Early Hinayana Buddhism understood siinyata to mean merely pudgala-siinyata. The substance and the whole are unreal fictions ; they are void of reality (siinya). The dharmas however are real (asiinya) existents. The Madhyamika deepened the conception of siinyati. Unreality or essencelessness is not confined to any particular aspe i.e. consciousness having the form of the blue.11 It cannot be said that in that case we shall not be justified in speaking of the consciousness of blue, but should speak only of a 'blue consciousness', as though the consciousness itself were coloured, since, the Yogacara would argue> the sensa have no physical existence at all, and the question of a blue cJnsciousness does not arise. There is no blue, but only the idea of blue. Nor should we be debarred from speaking "this is blue" and start speaking "I am blue"12instead, for that particular idea has this very form of "This is blue." Just as the blue has no independence of its own, so the "I" also has no separate existence apart from the discrete consciousness of "I" ; hence "this is blue " is not less justified than ccr am blue." It must be conceded, however, that the argument from "the egocentric predicament"13 (the famous sahopalambhaniyama of the Yogicara) does not prove the idealistic thesis. To say that the realists' contention is unwarranted is one thing; to conclude from that that idealism is therefore established is quite another thing. Though sahopalambhaniyama might seem a p:>sitive argument, in reality it is only an apagogic proof. The real sting of the argument lies in the fact that to assert the independence of the object we must find a way of knowing it when ex-hypothesi it is not known. How the Vedantin does it has already been indicated. This is evidently a correct appraisement of the realists' position. But to infer from this that the object does not exist at all when not known is a false inference. The realists' retort that an epistemic predicament is being raised to an ontological statusl4 holds good. It is like arguing that because we need microscopes to perceive bacteria, the bacteria cannot live without microscopes.15 What is undoubtedly true of our knGwledge of things is falsely held to be true of the things themselves. Be11. na hi kesoQc.Iuka-jnanavise~asya grihakavad gri.hyal) ke~iva.yavo"' sti. kim tarhi kesabhisal) prakasa eva. kevall\];l. PV, p. 218. 12. SV (Sii'!Jalliida), 229 ; NM, p. 541 ; Prame;·a Kamala Martafl!a, p.

13. The phrase coined by Perry. 14. The Ntw Realism, pp. 11-12; Perry, Present Pbilosophita/Tendenfies,. pp. 131-132. 15. Lltalism, by A. C. Ewing,' p. 31.

cause we can never see without light we cannot infer that light is a constituent of things seen. A person who wears red spectacles is certainly justified in say:ng that he can never see things which are not red; he cannot say that all things he sees are red. We cannot know without knowing-that is a tautologt; things cannot exist without our knc.wing them-that is false. To be true, it must be supported on other grounds. It must be p{oved from the very nature of objects that they are essentially dependent upon the consciousness of them; the mere unavailabiLty of them without consciousness holds good only for us. To say that things exist without our consciousness of them is a demand to know them as transcending knowledge; to say that they do not so exist is a similar demand. The predicament is the same in both cases. The sam: argume.::J.t that invalidates realism refutes idealiam as well. ldealism must be founded on some more positive grounds than the sahopalambhaniyama. Rea.lists hold that consciousness is different from the object conceived. The two hav-e attributes contradictory to each other. Objects are characterised by physical qualities; they are great or small, are hard or soft; they are relatively nearer to or farther from each other. It is clearly absurd to call consciousness small or soft, or oniPCOnsciousness being nearer to another in space. This, however, is a silly argument and is easily waived aside. The Yogicara does not say that an idea itself has spatial attributes-some Western thinkers have gone even so far as that-but that it has ~ form mmifesting those attributes. The attributes have no indep:ndent physical existence apart from their appearance before consciousness. By the creativity of consciousness should not be understood the illusory notion that consciousness creates real physical objects. Its creativity consists in being diversified into so many modesle which. though having an apparent exter.!tality, are really but modes of consciousness. One idea generates another idea and not an external object. The idea itself masquerades as an external object. Objects are hypostatised ideas. It is clear that by consciousness realists and the Yogicara understand two entirely different things. Consciousness for one is a diapha16. na ea vi~ayapratibhisatmana utpattim muktvi vij.fiinasyanyi kriyisti, MVSBT, p. 21. 4

nous entity through whose transparence objects pass in and out without suffering the least modification. In itself consciousness is entirely formless, ~eutral. The forms we perceive are those of the objects, directly and immediately revealed by consciousness. Since the idealist has no other reality but consciousness, the forms perceived must pertain to consciousness alone, there being no external object17. Consciousness creates its own forms. The content of consciousness is not imported from outside, but is inherent ih the states of consciousness themselves18. The issue between the idealist and the realist is whether consciousness is sakira, i.e., has a prakira (content) of its own or whether it is nirakira, is contentless in itself. The realist derives his strength from his criticism of the 'ego-centric predicament' which, however, proves nothing as seen just now. We need not also discuss the argument that the forms perceived cannot belong to the objects, since they are never percehed apart from consciousness, as this brings us back to the sahopalambhaniyama. And this moreover would land us in a form of agnosticism. What is required is that the idealist should put forward cases where the creativitv of consciousness is definitely evident. Illusion and hallucination furnish such cases. Of other mental states memory may be discussed to show that consciousnes: is- not entirely formless, does not merely reveal, but has an activity ofits own, i.e., is sakira. Memory As Subjective What is the content of memory ? What is the nature and status of that content ? The realistic hypothesis requires that it should be as external and independent as the content of perception. The object remembered should enjoy the same status as the object perceived. Recognition is another enigma to the realist. If consciousness were nothing but pure transparence what happens when we are said to recognise a thing, with the added consciousness of having cognised it before? The object certainly does not inform us of the fact of its having been 17. dhiyo niladiriipatve bahyo'rtha}J. kim pr~aka}J.. dhiyo' niladiriipatve sa tasyinubhava}J. katham. PV, 11, 343. 18. svabijaparipakid riipadyabhisam vijiiinam pravarttate na tu rupadiko' rtho'sti. MVSBT, p. 20. Cf. vai~varupyid dhiyam eva bhivanam visvariipati. PV, 11, 204 ; Cf. also 479.

cognised before;· it has not acquired any extra. chatacteristic11 owing to our previous cognition of it. Nor can consciousness retain any. memory of its previous cognitions, bei,ng a. purely_diaphanous entity. Hence either the hypothesis of an entirely formless (nirikira). consciousnes has to be given up, or, over and above the dirikita. consciousness, a ~ind-stuf£20 has to be a.dmit~ed which is transformed according to the variqus cognition& leaving their traces in it. But this unnecessary duplication of the subjective side only adds to, instead of solving, the difficulty. Alternatively, this subjective dualism itself can be retained and the reality of the object given'up. . In memory, we may say, the actual presence of the object is not requ,ired to be cognised.and hence this difficulty does not arise; bllt it does arise in a slightly different form. Being transparent (nirikita), consciousness can have no memory; it can reveal the object only as actually manifested before it; it has 1\0 past or fututre. To aamit, over and. above pure consciousness, a mind which does .acquire forms like wax;impressions, is to raise several ~ther problems as to the relationship between pure consciousness, mind and the object.

19. Here a curious doctrin~ of the Bhittas may be noted. The Bhana is a frank realist. In connexion with the problem of knowability of knowledge, he holds an interesting doctrine. In being known the object acquires a familiar aspect~ i.e., "knowaness". This is a novel and peculiar quality called jiiitati or. prikatya, and is the sole ground for an ~hipatti for the existence of knowledge. cf. 1\[yayakaqiki, p. 267. " 20. The Sitikhya and the Advatia Vedint~ accept tht reality of pure consciousness and have consequently to admit a mind-stuff buddhi or citta) ; it is burdened with all the functions that cannot be attributed to pure consciousness. I,n the Advaita V edlnta, for example, the sa~i-consciousness knows everything all at once. Change or succession plays no part in its knowledge. It is the pramiti or consciousness as limited by antal;lk~ (an aspect of the mind-stuff) which can know succession and makes memory posaibl~. But it is difficult to make the universal consciousness (s~i) relevant to the particular acts of knowledge (buddhi-vrttis).

The more consistent realists have boldly declared the memor}dmage to be as objective as the perceptual content. It is objectively giver.~.21. It is not a fonn of consciousness, as the latter is ur.mcdi:fiable and merely reveals it. But how is the memory image to be conceived objectively ? Some hold that the same object which was previously perceived is the content of memory as well. Memory cognises the same object as past. This, however, makes no sense. Ho.w can the object which is past yet appear to a present consciousness i 22 It might have been destroyed in the meanwhile, for aught we know • .A1i image standing midway between .the object and· consciousness cannot be admitted, since it can be made of neither. The conclusion is that consciousness itself projects these images, and is therefore sakara23•

The Illusory as Subjective Illusion is the mire in which all forms of realism flounder. Realism which is but self-conscious commonsense, holds that consciousness reveals the object literally as it is. It cannot disto:rt or falsify; it can only discover. It is like light which does not add to or take anything away from the things it illumines. So long as the course of knbwledge flows on smoothly without any hitch, this naive theory works out well. The immediate perceptibility of the content receives a rude shock when we consider that difference of perspective makes a considetable difference in the content perceived. There is a personal equatior.2' in most perceptions, and how is this to be ever eliminated ? "A penny is a circular object; but what we di:rectly perceive in the penny when we look at it from different positions is a series of ellipses of varying eccentricity, and it is impossible to deny this and also accept the facts of direct perception. 25 Which of these appearances should be accepted as truly revealing the object ? There is no ground for preferring any one to the others. The same object", when near, appears big, but upon walking away from it, it appears to diminish in its size. What then 21. Cf. Concept 6/ Gon.rciou.rne.rs, by E. B. Holt. Also A Study in Realism, by Laird, p. 64. 22. PV, II, 375, oar: had bhavastadabhavat; PVA, p. 112. 23. Imagination raises the same difficulties. 24. PV, 11, 358 ; also 341. 25. A Study in Redism, p. 28 ; als~ Berkeley Three Dialogues, pp. 213-14 (J;!.veryman's Ed.).

is its real size ? The notion of oneness of the object precludes the hy?othesis of its being merely a collocation of different sizes, or to put it in general terms, of different sensa. Again, no two percipients perceive any object in an identical manner. "How can the object be identical when the so-called revelations of it are mutually conflicting ?"Ill The realist might retly th11t though the perceptions are thus varying, the object remains identical because there is a ccmmon meani~g and an identical reference in these perceptions17 • But this identical reference itself is never perceived, and hence the alleged identity remains always problematical. It may be said that these difficulties do not affect the fw:damental contention that knowledge is discovery. The elliptical appearances ot' .a round coin or the bent appearance in water of a straight stick are due merely to an optical predicament; these facts are not sufficient to establish the opposite theory, viz., knowledge is a construction. The appearances are not in any way mental; they are not imported into the perceived data by the mir:.d. The elliptical coin is as objective as the circular coin.118 .Though this is far from being a satisfactory reply, there yet remains the stubborn fact of the illusory content which refuses to fit in any reaEstic framework. The elliptical coin is not a mistake in the sense that it could not be perceived otherwise. Hence the act.ivity of mind may not be directly evident here. But where there is a positive confusion, it cannot similarly be brushed aside. Were consciousness purely revelatory, the passibility of mistake, i.e., taking one thing for another, would be entirely precluded. We shall always see a rope as a rope and never as snake. Bu1 we do sometimes see a snake when there is none and this entirely upsets the commonsense theory. An .!asy way out of this difficulty is to reject the transparence of consciousness and to hold that consciousness does not directly reveal the object but that it can perceive only its own 'ideas.' We have no longer a tw.:>-tcrm theory of knowledge but replace it with a three-term theory. According to this hyp::>thesis consciousness is mediated by its 26. VMS, p~ 39 ; also PV, 11, 400, 344 ; NM, p. 540. 27. A Study in Renli.rm, p. 29. 23. This is known ~s the theory of subsistence, and this would be discussed later on.

own representations in its perc~ption of objects. Here we have, not m!r.::ly' con.sciousness on. the one hand and the object on the other, but in between these two we have a tertiu111 quid-the images or 'ideas.' Objects are not immediately presented to consciousness but are represented indirectly thro~gh 'ideas' \yhich are but signs of their presence and character. It is. no longer "A perceives B", but now it is "A p~rceives· C which 'stands fqr B." When C corresponds with B, we have riglit knowledge; if not, it is a .;;ase of illusion. Once the immedi~cy of the; perceived content is given.up, the floodgates of idealism are opened. If it be conceded that consciousness perceives only its own representations, the external objects dwindle into shadows ~d are perilously on their way to total discarding. If we· can." never perceive the objects, how can we even know .that they exist ? There is no way to proceed from· the images to the objects, if the 'latter_ are not ind~pendently known. The representative theory of perception was put forward to explain cases of illusion w;here the theory of direct perception failed. When the image is referred to. its correct original we have a case of veridical perception;·but when it is supposed to refer to a:n object which is no~ its· original, we have" a case of mistaken perception oi: illusion. This is obviously a form of the 'Cort(;spondencc theory of truth' as formulated ia the perceptual realm. The truth of a perception eo.O.sists in its correct referenc::. But th;:re we must distinguish. Truth may consist ·in thi~ correspondence, -which, to be truth, need. not be known. But to know a perception as true is a different matter. I.n this case we must compare the image with its· original29 in_ order to know of their cort:espondence and yet, once the original is known, the know ledge of the . correspondence seems futile. 30 If we are confin~d merely to perception of the images, we capnot ,recognise them as images and, even if we get somehow l:o know them as such, we c~ never compare them to the objer.ts which, ex-hypothesi, lie beyond our konwledge. Represent~tive theory of knowledge, to be true, presupposes a presentative theory of knowledge which, however, makes the former superfluous. 29. na hi dve. nile kdacit'samvedyate,ekam jiianapratibimbakam aparam tadarpakam. TSP, I, 574: 30. Cf. A Collmtentary to Kant's Critique of Pnre Reason qy N. Kemp Smith, '587.

Lastly, it is not easy to explain how the reference is at one time correct and at other times becomes misleading. We are not asking for the genesis of illusion; that, as will be seen later on, cannot be explained. We merely ask that, granting illusion, all that is required to explain it must be posited. The representative theory fails in this respect. But this theory has at leastthe merit of narrowing down the possible explanations. It demonstrates that no three.-tcrm theory is a consistent hyp:::>thesis and that, ultimately, either a self-conscious realism with a two-term theory, or ful!-fledged idealism, must be acce!_)ted. Realists contend that though the identification of the rope with the snake may be false, yet neither of the two factors involved is individually false. 31 The snake and the rope are each separately real; illusion consists only in the wrong relation between the two unrelated reals. It is not that the snake is not; it is not a creation of the cognising consciousness. The snake is perfectly real in its own right. Its cor.sciousness becomes false only when it perceives the snake where it is not. 32 Even then the illusory snake does not appear anywhere and everywhere.aa An elephant is never mistaken for a snake. Some of the special features by which a snake is recognised are also present in the rope. Hence the perceiving consciousness does not create the snake from absolute nothing, nor does it project it anywhere it likes, but has to perceive it according to the rigid laws of objectivity. But, the idealist objects, the sting of the_illusory lies in its obstinate refusal to be appropriated by the empirical; the realist tries to find physical antecedents of the illusory. Once the illuscry is found to be regulated by laws governing empirical experience, 34 an illusion becomes merely an optical predicament. The essential features of the snake cannot be the same as those of the rope; otherwise the snake would be identical with the rope. To conclude from some closely resembling feature of the snake to the being of the snake itself is the work of mind having no counterpart in the objective. The resemblance may be objective but there is always a gap left. If the rope were perceived in its entirety,

the perception of it as snake would be impossible. Hence wme firing in oft he gap35 is involved here, and this must be the work cf the subjective. Were the nature of consciousness merely revelatory, a gap would always be perceived as gap. This transcendence of the given data indicates that mind can perceive only in fixed patterns, even if they are not. to be fou.•1d in the objective. It has a mechanism of its own.• A consistant realist therefore cannot accept even th!s much falsity of a wrong relation, since creativity in any form would undermine his fundamental contention. For a self-conscious .realist aware of these pitfalls, illusion simply does not exist. His analysis of the so-called cases of illusion is very ingenious. Apparently an illusion consists in perceiving a thing where it is not. A rope is mistaken for a snake. But the realist holds that the snakeconsciousness is not a unitary consciousness at au.aa According to his analysis, the consciousness of 'this is a snake' dissolves itself into these of the 'this' and the 'snake.' The 'this' is actually perceived and is real. The 'snake' however is not a percept at all. It is a memory image and its objective counterpart too is perfectly real. "Perception is in principle veridical. " 37 What happens in the so-called perception ofthe rope-snake is this: the rope being imperfectly apprehended, only its thisness is perceived, i.e., only its !::are presence is noted. Its similarity \\ ith the snake evokes the memory of the latter, which is a perfectly real consciousness. These are two distinct states of consciousness having two distinct ~nd real objective counterparts. But this distinction is nGt apprehended and, consequently, what are in reality two indepecdent consciousnesses, having nothing to do with each other, are perceived as one unitary consciousness. Consciousness carrot perceive what is not given ; it cannot import foreign matter to the given data. But it can perceive less. It cannot distcrt, but it can select. It is never the case that what appears in consciousness is not found in the objective. Confusion is not distortion, but merely con-apprehension of the distinction (vivekagraha). 35. Cf. The Gestalt Theory of Perception. 36. This theory is the famous akhyati-vada of Prabhii.kara, who is in som~ respxts even mare consistent in his realism than the Nyaya. Cf. Prakara1Ja-paiicika, p. 43 ff. 37. A Theory r{ Direct Realism by Tuuer, p. 9.

It is a very bold attempt by the self-ccnscicus reaht to explain the illusory away, but it is far from being convincing. Were the snake merely a memory-image the form of cancellation ought to be reinstating the snake as an image. But our sublating consciousness is not of the form that what is really an image was not distinguished from the consciousness of objectivity : it is rather that what appeared to ccnfront us is absclutely nothing.28 To equate the snake which appears here ar:d now to some dubious creature seen we kr..ow r_ot when is to assert something which by its very nature cannot be proved. 39 There is not simply nor--apprehension of the distircticn, but positive codusicn. The realist is in fact aware of the dstir:cticn bet wecn the real arrd the illusory; otherwise how does he explain the latter in terms of the former ? .At:d yet his attempt is to obliterate this very distinction. His whole analysis is therefore self-stultifying.4° One other attempt which is in a way realistic may be r..otcd here. This is the thecry of Essenc.es.41 It is a bold declaration that tl::ot:gh the illusory ccnter:.t cannot be incorrcrated into the realm of ex:ster:ce, it is yet objectively real, belonging to ar:other realm altogether. Ordinarily we do not distinguish between the charr.ctor of a thing and its objective existence. In illusion the distinction. bet we en that which appears and that which exists must be made. Something appears and yet is not. It is a mere essence. An essence is what immediately and literally confronts conscim.:sness, without having any existential implicaticn. An object which is supposed to existmightlatcr0n turn out to be illusory. But the fact of its appearance cannot be denied. An esser:ce is not at all affected by the vicissitudes of ex.ister:ce. It is scmething timdcss. «An essence is what anything turns into in our eyes when we do not believe in it. We c!onot cease to conceive that which we explicitly deny,

38. Cf. anirvacaniya-rajatotpatti of the Vecianta. 39. The Nyaya attempts to evade this difficulty by boldly assertir..g that we are in direct contact with the real snake even here. The contact however is not an ordinary one ; it is jftana-lak~ar;a-pratya­ satti. The knowledge of the sr:ake itself is the pratyasatti here. 40. Cf. Tattv3 Pradipika (Citst~khi), p. 63. 41. or that of Subsistence which finds its best fcrmt!ation in Santayana's Sceptici.rm and Animd Faith.

and for us then this conceiv(d but denkd thing is an essence .... An essence is anything definite capable of appearing or being thought of ; the existence of something possessing that esser..ce is an ulterior question irrelevant to logic and to aesthetics."42 An essence is neither true nor false. The essence perceived in the so-called illusory cognition is as much true as any other essence. It is not in space or time, is neither inside nor outside ou:: consciousness, has no depth beyor:.d what it :~eems h in short just what appears. If we rigorously ar.d consistently confine ourselves just to what is literally perceived we arrive at the realm of essence. The empirical objects as well as empirical concepts are so many constructions posited by our 'animal faith,' an irrational instinct. The essrnc's are symbols or signs for the external world which is never reallt perceived but is always posited. What we do perceive are merely the essenc;::s, w:1ich constitute a pictorial alphabet as it were,with which we spell the dark. w Jrld c:lnfronting us. This world is to be established not by an app;::al to the testimony of our senses,but rather is to be taken for gran~e:l, as p Jsited by the 'animal faith.' "Matter is in flux; spirit~ w:1ile existe.:ltially c1rried along in that .movement, arrests some datum, lending it an ideal unity, fixity, and m:>ral colour such as ne:ther the organ of sensation nor the stim~1lus can p'Jssess in themselves. We are, in the texture of our impressions, in the realm of essence ; ar.d it is oaly in the langu:tg.:: of essence that sp:rit can describe its fortunes." 43. If the content of our sense-perception or conception is taken to be real objects and not pare essences, scepticism would disslove every shred of that objective world. Our perception invariably refers to what is not giv.!n, i.e., invariably involves a construction. What is actuallygiven might be just a patch of blue, but we perceive a blue object in its stead. Scepticism would go so far as to assert that ·the patch of blue is not even sensed by the senses, since the mechanism of sensation itself has to be established first. The conclusion is that the essence is not even presented to the senses, but is som;::how directly intuited by consciousness.

It m.1y be seen th1t this theory closely resembles that of representationism in many important respects. It rejects the naive realism and makes some third entity intervene between the consciousness and the object. But the resemblance stops here. The essence has no subjective associations like an idea or an ima.ge. It is not bwughtinto existence by b~ing perceived. It is not a m::ntal fact at all. It is more like a Platonic Idea., eterml and self-subsistent, but has again no implication of universality arid superiority over the sensed content like the latter. The th::::>t:y is an attempt to· combine apparently incongruous elements. An analy3is qu~te in the Humean lir:es is m1de to yidd a conclusion in the tndition of Platonic realism. And these com_?lications merely add to the confusion. The argument of this theory is rather curious. Criticism is exet:dsed to destroy all evidence for the existence of the objective world, not excluding the spirit, and atthe same time, to pwtect the same world, posited dogm<J.tically by 'a..r1im1l faith,' from the onslaught of scepticism. Wnen the world is said to be posited by 'animal faith' it is not made cleat: w!l.ether that world exists only in thus being p·::>sited, or has a real though u.:1known existence. Criticism ·cannot accept the latter ~Iter­ native, as· that would land us in a vicious form ·of agnosticism. But · accotding to the former.alter.aative~ the wor!d would be a construction evo.ked by the mi"nd because of the perception of the realm of essence.. That w0uld entail a full-fledged theory of A vidya of the Sautrantika or 1:he .K.ntian pattern, w:th the im::nrtant diH:crence that i:he essences vt.:uld n:Jt b:! the constitue.at data on w:1ich the transcendental construction is based, but would always form a separate world of its o·.vn. If a.'linHl faith be ~he last wor~ of critici-sm, any dogm1tism may crown the critical e.aquiry. 0.1ce the emplrical categories are dissolved by scepticism, they can never b~ resuscitated by the ~a.gic ~f animal faith, since one .:logm1tism is as good as ~nother. · Moreover, if the ·whole ~f the em?iric.1l w0rld be a mer.! constrnct-as it would be if animal faith W.!re discarded-then the~e rem1in only the innumerable essences to be acc::>unted for ; and if there are only the simple essences, intuited im:n.diately bv the sp:rit, the illusory-; to accm1~t for which the theory was pnp:;~u.:1de.:l, rem1ins as enigmatic;: as ever. This brief a.p.alysis of the tiature of illusion points to the conclusion that the creativity of consciousness must be accepted in one form or the other. But this is not enough to establish idealism, as it leaves a cere of objectivity entirely unaffected. Granting that the snake is a subjective

creation, it does not in any way tamper with the objectivity of the rope, whose reality in fact made it possible for the make to appear. Hence the Yoglidi.ra takes that class of illusion as his norm where the object is nothing ; dreams supply this norm. In dreams we get a petfect semblance to the real world which yet has no grounding in objectivity at all. That dreams are illusory there can b'! no doubt, since they are cancelled on waking.44 And yet dreams present, not one appraently realeventin a world of real events, as the perception of the rope-snake does, but a whole world, complete in itself,. having events of its own and regulated by its own laws. Wh~n the rope-snake is cancelled, the world remains as it was ; merely one element is detached which explodes into nothing; that is to slly, it borrows the reality of the external world. But the dream-world is a unique achievement of the creativity of the subjective ;it is a complete world in itself; it evinces its own certitude as long as it endures. Its apparent plamibility does not lie in the existerce of the real object on which it is superimposed, as that oft he snake depends on the existence of the rope, but its existence lies solely in its being projected. The idea of objectivity is certainlv there but it is never more than an idea. The fundamental point in this an.alysis is that the apparent reality dreams possess is not derived from any concrete objective world b~t inerelt from the idea of objectivity.n The realist wculd object that this idea, though efficient in crea:ing the illusion of objectivity, is itself derived from our consciousness of an objec:ive and real world. Even to mistake for the objec:ive world,. we must have come across the real objective world. Had we never experienced any real world, we could not have even the idea of objectivity. The Yogaclira answers that this icea is not empirical at all:: its origin is sought in experience in vain. 46 The more pertiner.t objec ion is that though creativity in the sense of novel arrangement may be admitted, yet the content or the details of the dream-worl~ are all supplied by our waking expe.rience. The objectivity of the individual elements

44. Cf. PVA, p. 23. 45. na ea yad yasya kliratp.m tadabhlive tasyotpattir yujj•ate. tasm1_1. niralambanam eva svapnadavivanyatrapi svabijaparipakad arthabhasam vijiilinam utpadyate ityeva jneyam. MVSBT, p. 10. 46. See furLher Ch. 4.

of the dream-world is never cancelled. 47 No dream is fantastic enough to present an absolutely strange phenomenon ;48what it can do is to loosen a thing from its familiar setting and present it in a new context.49 Its laws are not, it is true, the physical laws of the objective world, yet are the psychological laws of association. 'The idealist ccntends that it must be conceded that the objects experienced in dreams lack any immediate objective basis, an.:l the hypothesis of their being constituted by identically the same factors as constitute the waking experience is a possibility that has to be proved and not taken for granted. What the Yogacara is imm:diately interested in is to show that a peculiar experience having a complete correspondence to the waking experience-so much so as even to be mistaken for the latter-is yet utterly destitute of any real perceptual basis. It might have a remote connection to the ordinary perception, but during its actual experience is merely a creation of subjectivity. 'The dream-snake, even if produced by a real snake, is immediately caused by the idea of snake. Dreams illustrate that consciousness can not only create the contents of perception but can even project them as objective, so that the experience of objectivity is no proof of their independence. Objectivity, rathet objectification, is an act of consciousness, a transcendental function. Sahopalambhaniyama demonstrated that the object can never be experienced apart from the consciousness of it. The analysis of dreams completes the argument by showing that consciousness can create and perceive even in the absence of real objects. It shows that consciousness is not transparent or nir.ikara, but is creative.so All this amounts, the realist urges, only to the admission that in some exceptional cases, consciousness mav be creative in some of its aspects ; the reality of the content in a veridical perception remains unchallenged. 'The idealist now engages himself to the task of demolishing the objective

49. The dream-objects must have been experienced before NS, IV, 11, 34 ; also SV (Nira/.u;;b.mavada), 107. The dreamobjects are contents of perception according to Gautama, of memory according to Kumarih. 50. MSA, pp. 60-61.

as such. The argument that the world is a dream 51 is, it might be said, an unwarrented universalization of what is applicable only in a limited sphere. Illusion is due to specific and determinate causes and cannot be universalised. Hence it must be shown by an aM lysis of the object itself that it is by its very nature unten;tble. Sahopalambhaniyama supplies an epistemological refutation of realism ; to show that the concept of the object is rlddlecl with inherent contradictions, even apart from its relationship to the knowing consciousness being unintelligible, is to refute realism on metaphysical grounds. The question as to how the idealist becomes first aware of the fact of the whole of experience bdng of the nature of a dream is a different problem altogether and is to be tackled in a different context.s2 The Category of the Object is Self-Contradictory What is the content of perception ? What is it that we actually sense ? Obviously the everyday empirical objects, the realist answers. These objects exist independently of their own right, irrespective of their being perceived. The idealist urges that the notion of this object is not tenable. An object can be conceived either as a substar.ce with its attributes cr. a whole of parts. 53 Mere sense-data ar.e not sufficient to explain the notion of an object. ln the perception of sugar, for instance. the senses convey the impressions of whiteness and sweetness. They are conveyed by different senses and yet the object perceived is identical. To connect these different sensations and to impart the sense of uPity, the r.!alist posits a substance over and above the attributes. The St!bstance is not a construction but is actually perceived, and perceived br the same sense as conveys the corresponding impression of sense-data. A coloured objectis perceived by the sense which perceives colour. But, the idealist asks, what is the substance apart from the various attributes which go to constitute the concept of an object ?54 This concept is indeed riot Lockian ; substance in the Lockian system is never perceived but is postulated. Realists hold that substance is perceived along with its attributes. It is not intdligible, however, how the senses can see an

object. The eye can see a blue object, but never a blue and an object. Hence this distinction is not perceptual and it is not tcld how it has been acquired. It mav be said 5 5 that the same object which is seen to be white, also tastes sweet and hence the distincroadly of two orders-one which unifies, sy.1thesises, connects and the other which makes for plurality, difference and diversity. The former functions according to the pattern of space and the latter to that of time. That philosophy which takes time as its norm of categories will necessarily be committed to a form of pluralism, and will accept the most unitary and simple as the ultim1.te real. Obviously only the point-instant (svalak~at}a) cao be the real according to this philosophy and that realism which explains things from the standpoint of time will accept the "attributive :~tomism." 65.

But the other philosophy which is modelled after the space-pattern will admit substance, the whole, the universal, etc., as the Wlifying categories. It can accept the attrib~tes over and above the substance, or it may .110t. Ifit does, we shall have the "substantive atomism"••. But if it does not accept the attributes and has the substance as the sole reality we shall get one universal substrantum on which the plurality of atributes is super-imposecl. 87 It will be a form of monism-as it is in the Siilkhya and the pre-Sankara Vedinta-and when rigorous, absolutism, as in Sankara's system. It may be realistic, as the substance is conceived as something in itself, but is not realism; the empirical plurality is dor.e away v.ith and yet pluralism is the very essence of realism. The uniff.ng tttdency is strong here and the danger always lurks of unifying the subject too with the object. Thus the only forms of realism are first, the rank realism, and secondly, the critical realism oft he Sautrantika type, each explaining phenomena from totally different points of view and each having its own atomism characteristic of its system. The monism68 of the substance-metaphysics is also realistic, but cannot be called critical realism, since it excludes pluralism. Hence all forms of realism are atomistic in their ontology, and this is because they are necessarily committed to some form of pluralism 9r other. This pluralism must be radical and ultimate and notto be accepted half-heartedly. The realistic formula for the deduction of ontological categories is that nothing is merely in thought. Every form of thought must have its corresponding form in reality as well 69 • Whatever appears in consciousness is also a factor governing reality. Nothing is merely cpistemic. This transference of all thought-categories to the objective realm is the secret of realism. The analysis of thought-forms discloses all the categories : tmity and diversity, identity and difference, the universal and the particular, the whole and the parts, are a11 given in 66. This, for instance, is the Nyaya theory of substance and attributes. 67. This pattern is illustrated in the systems of the Samkhya, preSankarite Vedanta and Rimanuja, Sru:ikara and Spinoza. 68. The Advaita Vedinta is the most consistent form of this metaphysics. NM, 69. vi~ayatisaya-vyatirekeJ;ta pratyayatisayinupapattel;t, p. 314.

thought and are therefore real and objective according to the realistic principle. If a plurality of real categories were not accepted, one or the other of these m·1st be given up as m ::rely subjective, as mere thoughtconstruction, and this would be giving up realism altogether. Hence the necessity for a pl!.!ralistic metaphysics. But there is a still deeper reason for the acceptance of pluralism by the realist. Pluralism is necessary for the discovery of the subject. Were the object absolutely one, the experience would be one of uniform manatonous going-on-ness, with no succession or change. In that case,. it would be known not even as one; in fact it would not be a case of knowledge at all. 70 The subject would not be dissociated from the object ; only when one exp;!rience ceases and another begins are we aware of a third factor whose continuity71 is not affected by the change of content. Consciousness itself may not be admitted to be continuous_ but its e~istence is evidenced only by a change in experience. When our experience is of the form 'I know A' and again 'IknowB', only then are we aware of the 'I' which is distinct from both A and B. The discovery of the subject is not the same as that of the subjective. since nothing is subjective for the realist. In fact, only when the subject has been extricated, can we speak of its work being strictly limited to revelation. The subject must first be discoyered and analysed as such in order to be shorn of any trace of creativity .

.. The discovery of the subject is utilised for realistic purposes. The subject being denuded of all activity except that of bare revelation, it loses its place of supremacy and takes its rank as one more object in the dernacracy of objects. The spirit has nothing spiritual left in it; it is justlikeany other object. Thesubjectofknowingand the contentknowa bath b:long to the same category, viz., the objective. Everything is an object. The one does not enjoy any special privilege that the other does not have in the kingdom of things. The subject can even be made

70. Cf. Theory of Mind as Pure Art, by Gentile, p. 31. .. 71. We are not giving a particular theory of self ; we are only pointing. out how we become aware of the subject as an entity of a different order. This entity, once discovered, would be interpreted differenty in different metaphysics.

the object of a subsequent k.cowledge; knowledge itself is known like a11'J other object.7a The point of the realistic objectification of spirit lies in the fact that the subject being like any other object, its relation to the object is exactly the same as the relat!on of any one object to another. When a book lies on a table it is only accidentall'J related to the latter. The relation is temporary and is destroyed as soon as the terms are separated. 73 The book does not suffer any increase or decrease in its being because of its connection with or sep:uation from the table. This doctrine of telations being accidental to the terms related is known as the 'theory of External Relations'. A relation is not intrinsic to the relata-!ntrinsic in the sense that the latter would not be what the'J are but for their relation. And sin.ce the subject is just another object, the relation of the object to the subject even is only external to the former. A book when known is just like the book on the table. It remains what it is in itself, unchanged before a..fl.d after the process of being known, as it does in its relation to the table. This theory of relations ~an be criticised on general grounds apart from its application to the knowledge-situation. If relation is so external and superficial as not even to touch the terms, it fails in its ver'J purpose of relating. It is not quite intelligible how the relation, without enteri~g into the texture of terms, or affecting their being in any way, can yet bind them together. If it is their nature to be together, they will always be so without the necessity of any via media ; if it is against their nature, 7' no rdatlon can make one relevant to the other. They cannot be ccmpJetely indifferent to their being related, since relation does bring about a novelty, a situation which did not obtain before. A distinc1ion mur.t be made between mere A-B and A r B. Oite must bear upon the other and make its presence felt. Moreover, if relation is a third factor in betweenthetermsit must itself be related to each of them and this le;~ds to an infinite regress. 75 And relation, by its ver'J nature, can never 72. Cf. The -doctrine of anuvyavasaya in the Nyaya; also Perry, Present Phi/r;sophkcl Tendencies, p. 321. 73. The New Realism, p. 118 ff. 74. tasmat prakt:ti-bhinnanam sambanciho nasti tatvata'Q. SamhtJIIIiha Pariktii, 2, quoted in Prameya Kamala Martatztfa, p. 505. 75. Sambandha-pariktii, 4, ibid, p. 506.

be an independent tertium quid (paratantryam hi sambandha.Q.)76. In the case of knowledge, were the object absolutely extetnal to the former, it is not seen how the gulf can ever be bridged. 77 The unknown will always remain unknown. It must not be thought however that because the idealist rejects the docttine of external relations, he falls into the other errot of accepting that of Internal Relations. Generally stated, the theory means that relation is an integral constituent of the tema. It enters into their very being and constitutes them, either partly or wholly. Be:ng krown is an essential ingredient of the things known. This might appear to be identical w~th the idealist's hypothesis, but is not so. If relation ccnstitutes the terms wholly, there is nothing to relate; but if only partially, the term so constituted consists then of two heterogeneous parts, one that is precipitated by the relation and the other which is independent. But these two patts must themselves be related and the difficulty reappears in an aggravated form. In the knowledge-situation, if the object must be known, knowledge is not dependent on its knowing act. 78 In fact thete ate no two terms in idealism. Its logic is that one term, viz., the object, is wholly precipitated by the relation while the other, viz., the subject, remains entirely free. This co!'ception of relation is neither external nor internal. To return to atomism. This digtession is to show that pluralism gives rise to atomism in some form or othet and that realism is necessarily com~:_tted to pluralism, so that atomismis chronic in realistic theories. Now the atomistic hypothesis itself must be examined. The concept of the atom is rather peculiar and realists differ in tl:eir accounts of it. The atom is nothing empirical and is never perceived. It is posited by a regressive cosmological analysis. It is a pattern of explanation or what Kant calls an Idea of Reason, postulated in quest of the U1conditioned in Cosmology. It is the Unconditionec, beiflg the uncaused last link in the causal chain of conditions. It is arrived at by arthapatti (postulation) ot speculation and is therefore subject to all the vagaries of this pramliQ.a whose employment is nototious in metaphysics; An atom has magnitude and yet is composed of no furthet patts. It

can b: compared to the mathematical point78 which has no extension and still occupies space. It must never be lost sight of that the postulation of the atom is only the consequent of the pluralistic tendency and if the latter be discountenanc!d atomism is no longer inev-itable. It is the necessary accompaniment of realism which has a predilection for difference rather than identity. Realism has been shown to be untenable on epistemological grounds. It remains to convict it or its atomistic implicaticns of inherent contradictions. so If the ultimate constituents of everything pt'rceived be the atorr.s they should be p!rceived as such. Whatever is perceived is of a gross magnitude while the theory maintains that the}' ace really atoms. 81 This dispar:ty cannot be accounted for. 82 It cannot be held that what is perceived is the whole,sswhich, itself not being atomic,is yet made of atoms, since no whole can be admitted over and above the atoms or the ultimate parts." So the dilemma is : the atom is not an obpct of perception,81 yet the obj!ct of perception is nothing apart from the atoms. 88 Hence the conclusion that what appears in perception has no objective basis is inescapable. The logic of atomismis that whatever is gross must have parts which have further puts and so on, till we r.!ach the atom which is indivisible and is not of gross m~gnitude. It might be asked as to why one should stop with the atom. !low is it to be certified that it is not constituted of fu::ther parts ? W'ny not continue the process of further sub-division llli infinitum ? The rC'\list replies that in that case the biggest and the

79. Cf. Hindu Realirm, by J. C. Chatterjee. 80. For the Madhya.mika criticism of atomism see Catuh!ataka pp. 46-56. Abbiramayiiiankariiioka, pp. 372-74. . ' 81. sthiilakaragrahakam vijiianam na hi alambeta siik~makaram vi~aya.m. anyalambanavijiianam anyilJ.mbananupagrahat. VMS (JBORS), XIX, p. 24; VMS, p. 16 ; MVSBT, p. 21 ; Aiamb:znaparikfii, 1 ; PVA, p. 10. 82. PV, II, 321. 83, Cf. SB, 11, 2, 28. 84. MVSBT, p. 21 ; VMS, p. 16. 85. TS, I, 1968-69. 86. VMS (JBORS), XIX, p. 24 ; Alt~mbanaparikfa, 2, 5.

smallest objects would be equal in magnitude. But if an object cannot have inlinite parts and yet ifthe process ofsubdivision cannot be stopped unwanantedly, it only sho'W's that the hypothesis of irambhavida, of wholes being produced out of parts, is itself to be entirely rejected. The acceptacce of atoms is only an evasion of the contradictions inherent in iira.m.bhavada. Once this order of creaticn is accep ed, our stopping anywhere would be arbitrary to the extreme. The acceptance of mere atoms cannot help the problem of perception. without the whole also being admitted. And yet atoms, even when combined, cannot give up their intrinsic nature (svabhava).87 How are the wholes created at all out of the atoms ? An eJfect cannot have characteristics not produced by any cause. The cause being atomic, wherefrom can the effect have acquired a totally different magnitudethat of grossness ? The parts of a gross object are themselves grc~s (sthiila) and so on ; then how does that·entity which is supposed to stand lowest in the order of gross objects have parts of a different nature ? The hiatus cannot be explained and has to be dogmatically swa!lowed. Some try to solve the difficulty by adopting the view that atoms have adualasp::ct,ss viz.,individualand general. Only the latter is percep ible. The former can be perceived in Yogi-pratyak~a. But this subterft1ge hardly answers. How can one thing have a dual nature ?89 In fact we would have, not a single object, but two distinct objects having Cisparate natures. Dignaga urgesao that all objects being atomic, they would give rise to identical perceptions. Diffrences in the perceived objects can be imported either by the number of atoms constituting them or by thdr size. But the latter alternative is ruled out as the atoms themselves do not have any size. And mere number of the constituent atoms canno_t propuce objects of different natures, unless the atoms themselves are different in nature. But, as Sankara argues 81, atoms can have different natures only because of their having different qualities. One atom is different from another because it has a lesser or a greater number of qualities than the other. This is not possible w~thout the atoms varying in size as well, which is not accepted. 87. TS, I, 1970. 89. TS, I, 1984. 91. BSSB, 11, 2, 16.

Thus the crux o( the problem is the wa.y in which atoms combine. They must clmhine in order to produce the gross objects p::rceived, and yet their nature as som::thing uni~ary and impartite precludes their combination. It is not easy to understand how one atom is to be conj:>ined to another92 or how atoms corneinto contact with each other. All contact is of parts with parts. ea M atom being absolutely pa,rtless cannot come into contact with another atom. M a~om has either further parts or it c!oes r.ot have : if it ha~_, it can no longer be called one and cannot really be an atom. It would become a whole. On the other hand, an absolutely unitary atom would always lead a solitary monadic life. To give rise to extension they must be arranged side by side. One side would be in contact with one atom, another with another. And that which has sides must have parts.D4 Contact is either wholly or partially; if it is partial, an atom is not impartite and indivisible, i.e., it is not an atom. 95 But if one atom is wholly conjoined to another, the resultant too would be but atomic, as tl;ere would he no increase in size. If one atom touches another atom at the same point as a third one does, there would be no increase in size.96 In order to get rid of these difficulties the critical r_ealist (the Sautrantika) might contend that ~toms are in reality ever discrete; the whole is only a construction (vikalpa) superimposed upon these by constructive imagination (kalpar.i). But this is a treacherous pcsiticn to take, as it unwittingly leads to idealirm. The constructicn of the whole is admittedly not due to any objective factor ; and if construction is granted to be purely subjective, the hypothesis of atoms is rendered superfluous, as the whole is all that is required for empirical purposes. Moreover if subjectivity is constructive enough to posit the whole, it can, with equal plausibility, posit tl:e parts. If a basis for construction be required, consciousness itself wculd serve the purpose. It is thus seen that the concept of objectivity is a futile one and must be cancelled without compunction. It is consciousness alone that makes its own creation appear as though they were outside it (yadantarjfieyarupam tu bahirvad avabhasate).

Cf. Theory of Mind at Pure Act, p. 114, 169. TSP, I, p. 556. digbhagabhedo yasyasti tasyaikatv:un na yujyate. VMS, p. 7. TS, I, 1992. 96. TSP, p. 556.

SOME OBJECTIONS ANSWERED The argument of the previous chapter amounts to the refutation of r~alism, on epistem0logical as well as metaphysical grou:1.ds. But this is not enough to establish idealism. In metaphysics the Law of Excluded Middle cannot be applied in the form of an apagogic proof. Hence all systems of philosophy establish their own theories in two ways : (i) by employing the apagogic proof, and (ii) also by p:1tting forward a claim to interpret exp~rience consistently on its OW.i.l principles. The first or the critical part of the Yogadira Dialectic consists in refuting the hyp:Jthesis of objectivity-of an independent object existing outside consciousness and confronting it,- and to this e:;:tent it makes common cause with pure criticism (the Madhyamika Dialectic). But being a speculative system it has to be on the defensive whe.1 it comes to the second part of its argumeJ.t. Here, m:Unly the objections by the realist are to be considered.

The Empirical World is Regulated by Laws The first question that arises is obvious enough. If the whole of our empirical experience be but a dream, what happens to the physical world, regulated by physical laws, strict and rigorous ? We ca...'111ot cause the falling of a single leaf from the tree, however hard we may think of it. If the objectis only a creation of our mind, why can we not produce it at our sweet will ? No effort need ever be made1 to bring anything about since all one has to do is to shu.t one's eyes a:1d let loose unreal fancies. Mere ideas cannot feed and clotl:e; if they could all empirical intercourse would be at an end. Nobod..,. has any rdish for a Bermecide's feast. An idea has no efficiency. The objection is based on a misunderstanding. If the nature of the dream-experience had been correctly understood the objec ion would not arise. It is accepted on all hands that creams are sheer crea-

tions of the subjective. Even then we cannot cause any particular event to happen in the dream-experience. Nobody likes to have bad dreams, yet bad dreams do happ::n. In fact J.reams are governed by th::ir own laws, different indeed from those which govern the so-called empirical world, bu.t none the less exact for that. Our conscious or waking wlll has ordinarily no jurisdiction over the dream-experience. Seeds of the dream experienced at the present moment have possiblY' lain dormant for a considerable time till they were ripe enough to burst into efflorescence of the variegated dream. The cause of it lies deep in the innermost recesses of consciousness where ordinarily we cannot exercise our will and which is generated by our past experiences. Now we can se~ ~hy the empirical world, in spite of being a construction, can yet not be m:>dified or affected b}" our empirical will. We cannot choose thf' objects of our experience. One can avert one's eyes, but if one sees at all, one cannot help seeing the empirical objects as they are. These latter indeed seem almost to force themselves upon our senses. That willin fact which constructs the empirical world is the Transcendental Will. No system of philosohpy can afford to tamper with the least factor of the empi:ical experience. To reducf. the whole of experience to a subjective construction is indeed a radical departure in metaphy:>ics,and yet it leaves all our empirical activities entirely unaffected2. The Yogliclra is an idealist only transcenJentall y; in empirical matters he has no quarrel with the realist. All philosophical issues lie between the conflicting interpretations of facts and not between the facts themselves. It is not the case therefore that idealism violates the empirical activities.

EfBciency is The Mark o£ The Real Waiving these considerations aside, is it possible for a mere idea to do the work of the real objects ?3 Can an idea be efficient ? Efficiency

or arthakriylikliritva is the pragmatic test of reality. 4 Whatever has no efficienc:r can lay no claim to reality. It is obvious that ideas cannot have efficiency; ideas cannot feed and clothe us. Even if fantasies do seem to have som::: efficiency, in that they can elate or depress, no amount of

2. TSP, I, p. 553 ; PV, II, 394. sapi tadrtlpanirbhasli tathli niya~asangamli]:l. buddhirasritya kalpyeta yadi kim vli virudhyate. 3. Prakara1Ja Paiicika, p. 58. 4. TSP, I, p. 553.

ideas can fill an empty stomach6• Moreover, even this limited efficiency is itself possible because of the existence of real, physical objects. An imaginary amour can entice one only so long as it is mistaken for reality. Were an idea to be steadily realised for what it is, it loses all power to fascinate us. Its apparent efficiency is a borrowed one.

An ideal feast would not be objected to ifit were clearly distinguished from one enjoyed by the empirical imagination. The objec ion presupposes that the dittinction between the imaginary' and the real has been overlooked,6 whereas the idealist is very much aware of the distinction. As has been said before, to reduce everything to idea!ity makes no empirical change. 7 That our experience is madfold and variegated cannot be gainsaid; the point is whether the content experienced is wholly within it, or enjoys an exister:.ce even when not experienced.• Even if it does not, experience as such remains what it would be were the content real. If the feast and the satisfaction therefr:>m were both ideal or real, it matters little; the incongruity will arise only if the feast Were ideal and the satisfaction real, not otherwise. 9 Experien€e would remain the same. What is required is that this ideality should be sharply distinguished from the empirical one. It is not true to say that an idea has no efficiency. 10 Who has not suffered from the horrors of nightmares ?-a suffering not a whit less poignant than the suffering engendered by real horrors. The fright of a rope-snake is not seldom potent enough to kill a man. Efficiency itself is a mere idea.n If it be said that here the apparent e~cier.cy does not belong to the idea as such, but is acquired only when it is mistaken for reality, the idealist answers that this mistake is all that is required. He never maintains that an idea, even when realised as such, will sdll be efficient. An idea can bind, only when the illusion of objec ivity is present. But it is never more than a mistake. Hec.ce the ideal efficiency 5. Cf. Kant's Hundred Dollar Argumec.t. 6. SV, Niralambanavada, 88-91 ; BSSB, II, 2, 28. 7. Cf. na jatu riipasya abhava (iti briimaQ.), vijiiiinapari!)ama~:u tad. VMS (JEORS), XIX, p. 22. 8. PV, 11, 334. 9. PVA, p. 98. 10. TSP, I, p. 553. 11. Ibid, p. 553.

4:onsists in this transcendental illusion of perceiving the ideal as something objective. This objectificationis a transcendental category. An idea is itself generated only when impelled by this primordial Avidya, so that its being and its efficiency are both due to the transcendental illusion. Real objectivity' is superfluous; the illusion of one is sufficient.

Illusion is not Possible Without Reality But is illusion possible without a real experience ? Even to be mis· taken, that for which a thing is mistaken, must have been previously experienced.12 A person who has had no real experience of a snake can have no illusory experience of it either. 13 Even dreams where the subjective is most at play do not present us with a totally novel experience. No dream is so strange but that its individual constituents can Be traced to past experiences. Hence if we had not come across real objective things, the idea of objectivity could not have arisen and the transcendental illusion itself would not be possible. The argument resolves itself into two totally different contentions. One is that the contents of an illusory experience can be traced back to real experience.14 _ Since the illusory snake can be caused only by the idea of snake, which again is the impression of the experience of a real snake, so, the latter is the indispensable antecedent to the experience of the rope-snake. But to insist too much on the supposed causal connection:is to rob the illusory of its whole sting. The illusory snake would in that case be no more than the memory of a snake-experience. Granting even this,that an ideal snake has been objectified cannot be questioned, and so idealism is essentially established. The further question as to whether the idea itself is generated by a real experience is not so important after this concession. The idea h::s certainly a cause, but this cause itself may be ideal,lli without any appeal to reality at all, and with no detriment to experience.xa If all that is required for illusion is an idea:, this may be supposed to be ger..erated by another idea1 7 and so on.

12. VMS, p. 17 ; VMS (JBORS), XIX, pp. 43-5 ; MVSBT, p. 15. 13. PV, 11, 361-3 ; also Cf. MA, p. 54. 14. NB, IV, 2, 34; NM, p. 545 ; NK, p. 185 ; SV(Niralambanallada), 108-11. 15. TSP, I, p. 582 ; PV, 11, 323. 16. !bid, p. 553. 17. Alambanaparikta, 6-7 ; PVA, p. 21.

The case with the idea of objectivity is different. There is no idea of objectivity in general. Particular things can be perceived as objective, but pure objectivity can never be perceived. In other words, objectivity is not a sensum; it is only a category, the most fundamental one for the idealist, which is d.iversified into all other categories. In f.1.ct this category itself projects the contents categoriesd (atmadharrnop\l.cira in vijfianaparit).ima), as if the form were to create its m:1tter, It is the presupposition of all experience. So the realists' contention that were there no exper.ience of real objective things the idea of objectivity could not arise, misses the point. Particular things ca:n be experienc~d as objective and they can leave their impressions. Objectivity, not being a sensum at all, has no impression corresponding to it. Hence the idea of objectivity is strictly speaking not an idea at all, notwithstanding the fact that it governs all particular ideas constituting empirical experience. To perceive a thing and to perceive it as objective is one and the samd, the whole thir.g is set upside down, the realist urges, by the idealist. Experience in general is taken to be unreal, just like a dream. The argument cannot be enfot:ced, since the example itself cannot be. established. We are thus led into a curious predicament. The reality of the waking experience is the presupposi-.

18. BSSB, II, 2, 28 ; Savarabharya, 1, 1, 5 ; SV, p. 237. 19. NK, p. 130 ; MA, VI, 55. Another poin:: of distinction is also made that dreams are not subject to the moral law, while the other is. VMS, p. 9 ; Cf. NV, IV, 3, 34.

tion of the sublation of dreams, and yet the former itself is sought to he proved unreal on the strength of the latter 20• Were the waking exp!tience unr.!al, we lack the only m:ans for realizing the unreality of dream>, a~d this therefore cannot serve as an index of the unreality of the former~ The Yogacara contends that these considerations do not affect his idealism. As to the argument that since the waking experience is never sublated21 it cannot be unreal, he replies that the unreality of an experience cannot be realised so long as the experience is actually enjoyed. The com.mon folk who are under the sway of the Cosmic Illusion are not expected to find the empirical world illusory. Only the elect who, after practising a strenuous discipline, literally sees everything as subjective, can realise the illusoriness of the empirical experience and to him alone is the world but a dream.22 In fact, were the world real no discipline would ever be needed. Because it is ideal it does not mean that the empirical world is subject to no laws. 18 ldeality should not be construed as chance or lawlessness. Dream-objects are admittedly ideal, yet they are governed by their own laws. That an empirical object is determined by a fixed space and time is no proof of its reality, since even a dream-event does not happen anywhere and at any time. As said before, creativity belongs, not to our em?irical imagination, but to the transcendental will. Past ideas and experiences leave their impressions in the Alaya-Vi jiiana, which are the seeds ripening into the present ~deal experiences. Simply because all eflici~cy (arthakriyakaritva) is transferred to the ideal realm, it does not detract one whit from their rigour and precision. That there does obtain a difference between the dream and the waking experience, it is not in the interest of the idealist to deny. He does make a distinction between them though he may assert their natures to be identical. The sublation of dreams by waking experience means, not that the latter must be accepted as real, but that respective subjectivities of the two experiences are ·of different orders. Dreams are relatively more unreal than the other; their ideality is more easily recognised. 20. Cf. Prameya Kamala Martaflia, p. 50. 21. lbid, p. 78. 22. VMS, p. 9 ; PVA, p. 59. 23. PV, 11, 336.

It is as though there are dream-episodes in one universal drama of dre:tm, and the former may serve as index of the subjectivity of the latter. The subhtion of dreams is still within the background of a cosmic subjectivity. The difference is one of degree, not of kind. Dreams are of short duration, i.e., are less coherent than the other; the sublation of the latter is not of anything in particular, but of the objectivity itself. There is no incongurity in both of them being e;sentially the same, and yet one maintaining a sort of a relative distinction from the other. The world perceived by the waking experience may be taken as real for all empirical purposes; it is ideal only transcendentally. The Empirical World is Intra-Subjective .A.nother objection which is really fatal to some kinds of idealism is made much of by the realists. The object is nothing apart from the experience of it. In dreams things appear to exist outside consciousness but are merely subjective projections. This is to be applied to the waking-experience as well. This overlooks a fundamental difference between dreams :J-<J.d the waking experience. A cream is peculiar to that person alone who is actually experiencing it. Other minds have no inkling even of it. Such is not the case with the waking experience. 2' It is not the exclusive privilege of any one individual to perceive it. Whosoever has the capacity of experiencing can perceive itirrespective of his individual mental make-up. It is not a privateworld, as the dream-world is; it is the world. This intra-subjective nature of the empirical world would not be possible were it identical with the experience ofit, since in that case there would be as many worlds as there are persons experiencing. No two persons can communicate with each other, having no common platform to stand on. The Yogacara agrees that what we call the common world does not really exist. The so-called intra-subjective world is oro.ly another name for the harmony between the experiences of the various streams of consciousness (cittasantana). Each subject creates his cwn world 25 which exists solely in his experience of it. The creation of one coincides, not

24. bahu-cittalambanibhutam ekam vastusadharaQam, tat khalu naik.acittaparikalpitam .•.. kintu svaprati~tham. YogasiitrabhM.)a, IV, 15. 25. MVSBT, pp. 16-17.

indeed in all respects, but in some important respects, wit~ that of another ; this produces the semblance of the world. What obtains in reality is an infinite pluulity of worlds,2 6 i.e., of experiences, each experience being objectified into a world ; the objective world is not a reality. The partial coincidence of the various experiences results in a harmony ; and since one cannot jump out of one's skin and see the other people's worlds, the slight differences in the various worlds remain unnoticed, there being no way of comparison. It is as though two persons were to suffer from the same or similar hallucination.27 The experience of each is peculiar to him and yet their . similarity seems to be a corroboration of the objectivity of the contents projected by the hallucinations. This is not all, the realist urges. The existence of other minds is itself not compatible with the idealists' doctrine of sahopalambhaniyama. The same consideration which does away with the objective world makes short work of other minds as well. If whatever is experienced has no existence apllrt from the experience of it, other minds also must be reduced to so many ideas in '":Y mind-other minds returning the compliment to me. There is no justification in distinguishing between the objective world a..11d other minds; both are in the same predicament. This doctrine entails therefore the absurdity that 'I' am the sole existing being, everything else, including other minds, being just so many creations of my own ideas. The logical conclusion of idealism is a solipsism of an extreme type, and theidealist wanders about, poor and solitary, with nothing more substantial than his ghostly phantasmagoria. As to who this privileged 'I' is to he, the minds, if any, may quarrel with one another ; each 'I' will think this quarrel itself as purely ideal. 26. This hears a close resembl~nce to Leibnitz' Doctrine of Pre-established Hllrmony. Monads are 'windcwless' ; they cannot interact. Each is governed by laws intrmsic to itself. Its entire experience is merely the budding forth of its own latent seeds. But because of a partial identity, confuse.ily apprehended, there arises the illusion of interaction and the intra-subjective world. Cf. The Pf.ilosophy rf Leibnitz by Bertrand Russell, pp.43-48 ; 137-38. 27. VMS, p. 9; MVSBT, pp. 16-17 ; Buddhist Logic by Stcherbatsky, I, p. 523. 6

Here we shall make two points ; first that solipsism is not as contemptible a doctrine as realists try to make it ; and secondly, that the Yogacarais not a solipsist. As to the first contention. Since the subject evaporates along with the object, it is wrong to urge that the subject or the ego alone remains. The 'I', if not as unreal, is as unstable as the object. The experience of the seemingly independent object can alone sustain the subject-object relation. Hence even solipsism might serve as one of the approaches to the Absolute28 • Nor is any of the empirical activities violated by solipsism. If we can dispense with the intra-subjective world, the other minds can as well be dispensed with. Whether the whole of the empirical experience be real or ideal, the facts themselves are not changed. Only their metaphysical status is affected and that too fundamentally. Hence no empirical activity nor any discipline need be any the worse for solipsism. Granting even thl.t solipsism a!' s metaphysical doctrine is seriously inadequate, it is no charge against the Yogacara, since his idealism does not entail solipsism. To be involved in the subject-object relation presupposes a lapse on the part of pure Will, which lapse car. not be further explained; it has to be taken for granted. Once this is clearly grasped, the question whether the number of the subjects should be one or many would seem a fruitless one. The subject is a subject only so long as the false duality ofthe subject and object (grahadvaya) is superimposed upon pure Will, i.e., so long as it suffers under an illusion. There can be no necessity in Cosmic Illusion. The very essence of illusion is that it is something arbitrary, a freak out of nothing as it were. Just as there is no justification for the undivided consciousness even to assume the role of a solitary subject, so it may as well become many, due to the same transcendentallapse. 29 ~o the plurality of subjects may not be established on epistemological grounds and may yet be granted on metaphysical considerations. Taking this ultimate arbitrariness into consideration, the Yoglicara is not repugnant to the existence of other minds.

28. Cf. The doctrine of ekajivavada in the Vedanta. SiddhantaLd.z-Samgraha, pp. 20-21 ; Cf. Cit.rukhi, p. 383. 29. Cf. Bradley, Appearance ar.d Reality, p.

Svasamvedena is Unintelligible A very fundamental objection is raised by the realist against the Yogacara. Knowledge by its very nature is knowledge rf someth:ng outside know ledge. The 'of'-relation is a real relation. Were cot'sciousness the sole reality, knowledge cannot even arise. If the idea of blue be the only reality, and the blue be identical with it, then the idea has to perform two functions at once: 30 it has to project the blue appearing as its form or prakara and at the same time to know it as blue. It has to be both the subject and the object and thes' tw-o are incompatible with each other.31 An idea cannot turn upon itself and view itself as the other. How can one thing become the knower and the known at the same time ? It is as plausible as an axe cutting itself. That which operates and that which is operated upon are two totally different,. if not opposed, things and cannot be reconciled in th' bosom of the same entity. Were knowledge to know itself, its mode would be 'I know knowledge' and not 'I know blue.' This latter is possible when the blue is something distinct from the experience of it. The Yogacara answers that the content-knowledge arises because knowledge has that peculiar form. Know ledge as such cannot be known and this precludes the possibility of the mode, 'I know knowledge." A knowledge is a particular idea which has its specific content projected by itself. As to the same thing performing two functions at once, his contention is not only that it is possible for consciousr..ess to knew itself, but that it is even necessary for any knowledge to occur. Strictly speaking, it is not only two, but even three functions performed at once. An idea is objectified, and has to know this objectified self ; this awareness itself must be immediately known. Consciousness is bifurcated into subject and object, and the subject knowing the object must be aware of its knowledge. And yet these three are not different parts or aspects of a single thing. To be objectified and to be aware of this object is one and the same function. All consciousness is selfconsciousness, not indeed in the sense that the knowledge 'there is a blue' is identical with 'I know blue', but in the sense that the knowledge of blue is not to be evidenced by another knowledge. Each knowledge

sta..'lds self-revealed.32 Were it the case that knowledge did not know itself, it would have to depend upon another to be made known,and this would lead to aninfiniteregress. 33 Moreover,if one moment of consciousness is to be cognised by another, the former can no longer be said to be consC:ousness ; it becomes for all intents and purposes an object. In fact, the subsequent moment cannot know the rrevious moment at all, since the latter is dead by the. time the former arises 34 • The knower has to know and cannot therefore be in tht. necessity of being know.n. It is because knowledge is self-evident, that it can make other things evident.3 5 If knowledge were not self-revealed, it woul.-l be on a par with the object. 36 Light reveals objects, but if it had itself to be revealed by another factor, there would be no end to the process, with the result that nothing would b~ revealed after all. 37 That which does not know itself, cannot know anything else. 38 Even if, per impossible, it does know other things, it would not be aware ofits knowledge, and that is the same thing as not knowing it at all. To kno'I."V is at the same time to be conscious of knowing; unconscious knowledge is a contradiction in terms. ' case of knowIt is not that the subject is explicitly refetred to in each ledge; the subject stands self-revealed. Realists cannot accept this. 0.1.ce it is admitted that objects depend upon another to be evidenced while consciousness is self-evident, the latter must necessarily be put in a higher category than the object, and the main plank of realism, viz., everything is an object, is demolished. The place knowledge occupies in the kingdom of things becomes unique and the relation to knowledge becomes a necessity for all objects, thus losing their independence. Realists therefore reduce knowledge just to one object among other objects. Knowledge itself is known, like any other object, by a further knowledge (Nyaya) ; or, awareness of knowledge is deemed impossible (Bhana). In either case knowledge

is not p::>ssible. In the Vedanta, consciousness itself is never known39 ; but it is the presupposition of all particular knowledge. The Yogacara does not accept pure consciousness in empirical knowledge ; for him all knowledge is sakara ; hence its form and the awareness of that form are identical. Therefore the phala of perception is said to be, not content-knowledge, but only self-knowledge.40 It perceives its own form, i.e., itself. It may be asked : how is inference to be distinguished from perception ? Inference is understood as mediate knowledge, i.e., where the object is not actually perceived, but is accepted to be present because of some mark or sign. But since nothing exists apart from the knowledge of it, the distinction between mediacy and immediacy cannot be m1intained. The fire perceived and the fire inferred are alike in both b.!ing non-different from their respective knowledges, and hence the question does not arise whether the fire is immediately present or not. The distinction between the perceptual and the inferential knowledge is that in both cases the object remains identical while our mode of knowing it differs. But since each knowledge creates its own object, the object of perception would be different from that of inference, the knowledges being different. And without the identity of the object the distinction between the pramaQas cannot be maintained. As has been repeatedly urged, idealism has nothing to do with ex?::rience as it obtains empirically. All distinctions are scrupulously retained ; only they are enveloped by one sweeping experience. Granting that the objects are different with difference in knowledge and their identity is not factual, an idea yet arises having that very form of identity. Real identity is not required, the semblance of one being sufficient. The same consideration is applicable to the case of memory also. In memory, the object perceived and the object remembered are different41 , since the knowledges are different. Yet the semblance of identity is itself just an idea, which refers indeed to the previous idea

having the form of perceptual content. The knowledge of a recalled object is rather a very complex idea, but a mere idea nevertheless. Some realists contend that the idealists' assertion that an idea is produced as though like an,external object is very queer. A thing can be like another when the latter itself is real. Nothing can be compared to a barren woma.'l's son or a square-circle. Were objectivity as fictitious. as these, it cannot be said that an idea is rrojected like an external object. The idealist is in fact aware of the distinction between an internal idea and an external object,42 and still his whole task is to obliterate this very distinction. The objection is only a new guise of a previous one that there can be no illusion without a real objective basis. Objectivity is a transcendental category which is not reducible to any further extent. An idea is 1-rojected having the form of objectivity48 and there the matter ends. These and similar objections"' can be infinitely multiplied, but c:an. be met if the fundamental pattern of idealism be kept in mini. The Yogadira concludes that objectivity is an illusion; experience suffers no loss, loses none of its richness and variety, if an unintelligible hypothesis is discarded.

42. BSSB, II, 2, 28 ; Also Prameya Kamala Miirlaf!~a,pp. 50-51. 43. MVSBT, p. 15 ; PVA, p. 95. 44. Objections against the momentariness of consciousness, raised in very many plac~s in Brahmanical texts, are not considered here, as k~at;tikavi jfianavada is not the ultim.ate position of the Yogacara. Cf. Chapter 7.

THE THREE VIJtll"ANAS In the last chapterthe_Yogicira maintained that there is no ur.surmountable difficulty in accepting idealism,that no empirical distinction is ever done away with, whatever metaphysics be embraced. But establishing idealism merely on these general grounds is not enough. The daim that all phenomena are explicable on its own principles must be substantiated. Vijiiina which is the sole reality, yet diversifies itself into the complex of terms and relation, and every step of this process must be shown in detail. Here we come to the system proper, i.e. the constructive aspect of the Yogicira metaphysics for which the last two chapters have paved the way. The only existent is Vijiiina, and yet what we perceive is an infinite plurality. This plurality must be reflected in Vijiiina itself. .Kinds of Vijiiina therefore must be accepted to account for the empirical distinctions. The Yogidira accepts three kinds of Vijiiinas, viz., 1. Alayavijiiina, 2. Manovijiiina, and 3. Pravrtti-vijiiinas. The evolutes ofVijiiina are infinite, and yet these are the three stages of its evolution. These three are not to be construed as distinct and static categories, but rather as so many phases of the cosmic evolution of Vijiiina. Vijiiinadiversifies itself and gives rise to the whole panorama of empirical existence, and these three Vijiiinas represent different stages of this· diversifying process. The difference is only that of the degree of selfdetermination. Again, just as none of the evolutes has an absolute existence ofi ts own so here none of these three is ultimate. The evolution itselfis not ultimate, though it is a real process; it is caused solely by an illusory idea. Once this idea of objectivity is eradicated, all the three Vijiiinas revert to the pristine purity of Vijiia;..timatrata. Nevertheless each of them is.a Vijiiina, being essentiall,. creative. The essence of Vijiilina is creativity, since the whole being of the content consists only in its being projected by the knowing consciousness ; and this activity is exercised by all the three.

Alaya-Vijiiana The first and most fundamental of these three is the Alaya-Vijnana. It is the first phase in the process of differentiation of pure Vijiiiina. It is called Alay'a,1 as it is the place or the receptum in which are contained the seeds or impressions (vasana) of any karma whatsoever, good, bad or indifferent. All dharmas ensue from it as its effects or evolutes. 2 It is called therefore 'sarva-bijaka,' being the cause of everything empirical. It is vipaka because any kind of karma, done by the individual in any sphere of existence, leaves its trace in the Alaya. Thus the Alaya. serves two functions in the cosmic process. It is the receptum of the impressions of past vijiliinas, while in its own turn it gives rise to further vijftanas by maturing those impressions. a The whole order is cyclic. The cosmic evolution has therefore two aspects : first, the replenishment of vJ.sartas in the Alaya, and secondly, the frueti.fication of these into further vijnanas, which again lay their ow:n seeds in the Alaya and so on. The accumulation of seeds of vijftana in Alaya is called the hetupariJ,lama, while their actualisation, the phala-paril,liima.4 Both are pariJ,l.iima, since the A! aya incessantly undergoes change; it is momentary. Hetu-pari1,1.ama is the development and matudty of vasanas in the Alaya, and phala-pari1,1ama is the emerging into existence of their respective effects. Vasana is to be understood as the motive force 6 governing the evolutionary process. It is of two kinds. 6 : 1. Vipaka-vasana 1. VMS (JBORS), p. 49 ff. ; MVSBT, pp. 27-28; Cf. Note sur I' Alt:Ja-vijfiana by Poussin, MCB, 11, 1934-5, pp. 148-168 ; also G. Lamotte, MCB, Ill, pp. 169-255. 2. sarvadharma hi alina vijfiane te~u tat tatha. anyonyaphalabhavena hetubhavena sarvada. Abhidharmasiitra quoted in MVSBT, p. 28. 3. dharmiil). alaya-vijftane dharme~u ea vijftanam tatha phalasvabhavasca anyonyam hetusvabhav.:. api sada. Mahifyana-Abhidharma-Sutra quoted in VMS (JBORS), p.53. Cf. also Mahifyanasan;gra·'Ja quoted in the same page. Also, MVSBT, p. 28. 4. VMS (JBORS), p. 46-47 ; VMS, p. 18. 5. I~y.a.te vasanavidbhi}). saktiriipa hi vasarra. PVA, p. 22. Cf. jnanasyaiva saktimatram vasana. NyP:Jaratnakara on sv, Sunyavada, 17, p. 273. 6. VMS, p. 18 ; MVSBT, p. 28.

THE THREE VIJNANAS

and 2. N·b~yanda-vasana. Vipaka-vasana is more ultimate, being that which keeps going the stream of mental prccess, i.e., the continuity of the individual through the successive b:rths. When the repercussions of previous karmas come to an end and death intervenes, the activity of v"paka-vasana fcrces the Alaya-vijiiana into a new stream, beginning from the next birth of the individual. Nib~yan­ davasanii is the fructification of the present experiences ; due to the maturity of this, the other vijfianas-kliga manas and the various pravrttivijfiiinas-evolve out of the Alaya. Vipakaviisanii maintains the cycle of births ; ni}.l~yandavasanii supplies the content of each birth. Pravrttivijfiiinas alone, being conscious experience proper, c:.1.n lay both sorts of vasaniis in the AlaJ a ; only a conscious experience can be good or bad and c:;~n supply the seeds of futt\re experiences. Mar..ovijfiana is more or less a function; it supplif.s only the nib~yanda-viisana, the force \\hich impels the present experiences. It has been seen before that vijiiana is essentially creative. A tra.t1sparent and diaphanous consciousness cannot be admitted. It must by its very nature have a content, a content projected. by itself. 7 The Alaya therefore must have a content. Its content caP-not be any empiric:.1.l ne, since it is itself nothing empirical. Its content is an objectivity not -differentiated into specific forms. It is anindt-terminate content, 8 a bare otherness confronting the Alaya. The object is so pure that it is not even felt as an 'other.'9 Since the object is absolutely indeterminate, the subject is totally engrossed in a colourless contemplation of it with no idea of its own dissociation. It is not know ledge in the ordinary sense of the term. The subject is not even a subject in the sense of a self-conscious knower. The knowledge here is a mere 'going-on-ness,' a perpetual monotony. This bare objectivity is the first pr~cipitation of the tnnscendental illusion, the primal projection by pure consciousness. The Alaya is not therefore pure : it already contains the seed of self-disruption in the form of this implicit duality. The prccess of bifurcation of consciou>.::tess has started. Hence it is said that the ~\laya functions in two

7. Why the Absolute Consciousness does not have a content with be discussed in the seventh chapter. 8. VMS, p. 19. 9. lbid, p. 19. ys : (1) internally, i.e., consciousness appearing as the constituents of an individual, and (2) externally as consciousness of the undifferentiated objectivity 1 o (aparicchinnaklirabhajana). This bifurcation is very essential for the .Alaya to give rise to further determina:ions. Were an entity integrally one and wholly of one piece, nothing can disturb its eternal quiescence. It will be just like space whose unitary nature precludes the possibility of its ever being unbalanced. Hence an initial lack of harmony must be posited to acccurt for the cosmic evolution. It mu11t be internally unstable. The idea of pure objectivity or of bare otherness, confront3ng the Alaya, cannot let it rest in peace; as soon as the externality is consciously realised, its indeterminateness cissolves itself into an infinite plurality of empir:cd determinat:on.s,sir.ce it has been shown above that there can be no cor:scious awareness of bare objectivity. To realise anything as object:ve •. it must be known as dissociated from the subjective, ar.d this is possible only when the objective is a plurality. Consciousness as ridden by nsciousness of a determinate other leaves its impression in the Alaya as a vasma,which makes it imp::>ssible for the Alaya to be wholly mE nlllEE VIJNANAS

cannot combine to produce even the semblance of it. A moment of consciousness is a time-point merely. Here the doctrine of Pra:lqti presents a difficulty. Prakrti is not in time, the latter not being available apart from it. The very essence of Time is succession, perishing. Pure Time is a chimera ; it can onl}" be the succession of events. There is a perpetual succe-ssion going on in Pralqti ; so far the assertion that it is Time itself is clear enough. The difficulty begins with the consideration that Prakrti is not mere succession. The modes change, but the substantial background remains identical. It persists through all change and succession. Hence Prakrti. is Time, and yet is something over and above it which is not time, and these two should neutralize each other. The contradiction is due to the fact that the Satikhya system is based on the Space-pattern ; change is a superimposition on it which does not fit in well with it. 17 It can now be perceived that a Time-pattern of pure succession precludes all continuity and all identity. It is absolute difference, and :tot the modal difference of the surface alone, as it is in the case of Prakrti. All the moments of A.laya are utterly discrete, as indeed all dharmas are in Buddhism. If the Time-pattern be undermined, the whole structt~re of evolution must be abolished. The fact that the Alayais momentary nises another important issue. It has been shown that the A.laya is the primal subject. It is the most fundamental term in the initial opposition of the subject-object duality. The question arises as to what the nature of this subject is. There are many gradations in the subjective side corresponding to the nature of the objective content projected. To what level does the Alaya belong? The Alayais not the ego. The ego is the most empirical of the subjective order. By ego is not meant the Unity of Apperception which is the very presupposition of experience ; it should rather be understood as the "I" which is explicitly referred to in any case of knowledge,. when such reference is made at all. This "I" is not a presupposition,. since in that case it can never be referred to, but is a reflex. It is that w~1ich appr~priates all knowledge as its own. The sense of "I" arises only- as a reflex, i.e., only when a conscious dissociation frcm the object takes place. That, as shown before, is possible when the objective is a plurality-. In the case of the Alay-a, the content being~ indeterminate 17. Cf. CPB, p. 62.

objectivity, such dissociation is not available and this reflex or turning back upon itself cannot be had.

Alaya and S:ik~i Nor is the Alaya. to be confused with th·e Atman as propounded in the Brahmanical systems. It is the most ultimate category on the subjective side in these systems, as the Alaya is in idealism. However variously it may be conceived, its real significance can be understood if the essential function it serves in the Atma-epistemology be ar..alysed. The very essence of Atman is changelessness or persistence through time. This is true even where no distinction is made between the.Atman and the ego, as the sense of "I" endures throughout one's life. The acceptance is necessitated for supplying the unity which binds together the discrete acts of knowledge. It must always be borne in mind that the epistemology of the whole Atma-tradition is based on the nature of consciousness as knowledge. Atman is invariably understood as a passive spectator of the temporal series of knowledge. The willfunction of the subjective, if accepted at all, is an element foreign to the nature of the Atman. To supply the stability of the perspective, the changelessness of the Atman is necessary. In the Yogacara, the nature of consciousness is understood in an entirely new light. The subjective is not a passive spectator of what goes on before it, but is the dynamic will which creates its contents. It must change therefore with the least change in the content, which change .cannot otherwise be accounted for. The Alaya therefore is said to b;! momentary. Even the unity binding all knowledge, which entails the acceptance of Atman in the Brahmanical systems, is itself a projection. If the objectivity of the dharmas is an illusion, the unruffled continuity of a changeless Atman is no less an illusion. Both are equ1lly projections created by the willing consciousness, apart from which neither has any reality. The .Atman is not therefore a reality. It was discarded by other systems of Buddhism, and the A.laya., which apparently is the Atman appearing in a Buddhist guise, 18 is something fundamentally different, the entire metaphysical pattern having changed. The Yogacara offers

some argum::nts19 against the reality of AtmUl. It can be conceived either as identical with the mental states or as different from them, or lastly as both identical with and different from them. If it is identical with the.states its separate existence is superfluous; nor can it act as the unifying link. But if it is different from them, they can have no relation whatsoever, and its acceptance is again futile, it not being affected by the change in the states. The third alternative is unstable, and must be dissolved into either of the former two. Again if the Atman be of an eternal ubiquitous nature like space, it is hard to distinguish its individuality, and yet without this distinction all empirical intercourse would come to an end. It is difficult to connect an all-pervasive A.tman to a specific body ; on the other hand, it cannot be limited by the body. since the body being of a variable m1gnitude, it would militate against the changelessness of the Atman. The fundamental contr!ldiction in the Atman is that it must enter into the various ro!ntal states, and retain its identity inspite of them, and these two functions cannot be reconciled. The A.laya therefore represents a stage where the sense of ego has not yet arisen. The closest parallel to this conception in the Brabmanical systems is that of the Sik~i in Advaita Ve::lanta. The S~i is pure consciousness as covered by indeterminate ignorance (avidyivacchinna) and is sharply distinguished from the empirical subject ( pramata). Consciousness has not yet been individualised by mind ( anta}.lkaraJ;J.a ). Ignorance here performs only its obscuring function ( ivaraQ.a ). It is just undifferentiated darkness. The similarity in nature between this indeterminate veil and the indeterminate objectivity confronting the Alaya should be noticed. The veil is still a "whole," and has not started importing difference to the Pure Being. Both the A.laya and the Sik~i are the first p~1enom::nalisation of the Absolute. The defilement determining the Absolute is in both cases still pure, i.e., not empirical. The duality of the Sak?i is not knowil as such, and that for the same reason that the bare objectivity confronting the A.laya is not known as an other. It is pare contemplation. The nature and functron of the Sak~i is discovered by a regressive analy3is of the state of consciousness in deep 19. MSA, p. 154-160 ; VMS, pp. 7-13 (JBORS), Vol. XIX. 7

98

niE YOGACARA IDEALISM

sleep. It is characteristic of speculative metaphysics thll.t the same state of deep sleep is described as evincing the working of the Alaya. Further, though the Sik~i itself is not sarvabijaka, the ignorance belonging to it may be taken as the material stuff, out of which the empirical determinations emerge and return to it again. Avid yi is P rakrti rendered , epistemic. Again, in both the Alaya and the Sak~i, the terms of the duality belong to different orders altogether. Ignorance and consciousness do not lie side by side in the Sak~i ; one is of the other. So also, the other posited by the Alaya is not another co-ordinate reality; there is no real objectivity, but only the idea of one. The duality is within the A.laya itself. The difference between the evolutionary process in the Sak~i and the cyclic development of the A.laya is that all determinations return to Avidya in a very subtle form, while in the Yogacara tht:y" themselves perish and leave only their seeds in the A.laya. It is like a lotus alternately unfolding and shutting itself up in the case of Sak~i, while in that of the A.laya it is like one wave giving rise to another. The difference between the doctrines of the Sik$i and the A.laya ensues out of their different standpoints. The Sik$i consciousness is a contentless and changeless transparency, while the Alaya is a momentary series, each moment creating its own content. This is so because the defilement of the Sak~i is a superimposition which leaves the purity of consciousness unaffected, while in the Alaya consciousness has undergone a real transformation. The difference between these two patterns will be dealt with in the seventh Chapter. The A.la:y'.l. is that consciousness where individuality has not yet arisen, it being the most basic substratum of all empirical consciousness. It is something more fundamental than the ego. The question arises therefore whether the Alaya, being the store-house of the seeds which constitute egohood, is one universal receptum on which the plurality of egos is based, or whether it is peculiar to each ego, in which case it will itself be a plurality. Here again the conception of the Sak~i offers an illustration of the same problem. The Sik$i is more fundamental than the pramata ; it represents a stage where egoity has not arisen. It might be held20 therefore that it is one universal consciousness, covered 20. Cf. Siddhanta lelasangraha, pp. 31-34.

by bare ignorance, but not individualised into a plurality of subjects. The other theory is that individuality is inherent in ignorance. It is the very nature of ignorance to make pure consciousness a centre of experiences. Hence even in the Sa~i, though individuality is not explicit,nor is it known as an "I", yet it is present in an indeterminate manner. Were individuality not present in the S~i, a person might wake up from a deep sleep as somebody else, since the Sak~i consciousness is itself c::>ntentless, and its ignorance has absorbed all empirical de terminations of individuality. Were the Sa~i universal, the genesis of individuality is inexplicable. The ~rthodox tradition however favours the former view of the Sak~i as one universal consciousness. Its individuality can be due either to the fact that ignorance is a plurality',. or that ignorance, though indeterminate, cannot swallow individuality. The latter alternative is unsound since intellect (ant~karatJ.a) itself, the root of egoity, returns to its primary cause,ignorance, as a mere potency. The plurality of ignorance cannot be maintained ; the only ignorance is that of oneself and self is the Absolute ; ignorance is therefore one. It provides individuality by a mere freak as it were, in spite of its being one. Individuality has to be taken for granted and cannot be explained further. The predicament of somebody waking up as somebody else is precluded by the consideration that the one. indeterminate ignorance contains nevertheless the germs of an infinite plurality of egos in a subtle and implicit form.. The same considerations are applicable to the concept of A.laya also. It may be taken as one universal under-current of the Unconscious in which every ego stores its individual share of karmic seeds ; or, the conception may be interpreted as an infinite plurality of store-house, a separate receptum for each ego. The latter alternative is apparendy more plausible than the other. There are reasons for believing that the Yogacara is not a solipsist, that he accepts a plurality of empirical subjects. This being so, there would be parallel streams of karmas which cannot give rise to an identical series of seeds. The .Alaya is not a repositary in the sense of a holdall in which all kinds of things are put. It is a dynamic series each moment of which is conditioned by an empirical consciousness. Each Alaya moment is simple and unitary ; it is not engendered by a plural series of karm.as. It may be said that there is a kind of spread-outness in the Alaya ; different egos may have theic individual cycles~

clliferent centres of one Alaya-like waves in one sea. This is possible only by conceding a substantial identity of .Alaya which is incompatible with its nature as an incessant total substitution. If parallel series in the Alaya be accepted, it would amount to a plurality of self-sufficit"1lt series. There cannot be only one series, since different orders of vasanas cannot be reconciled in it. Conversely, one identic.al Alaya-moment cannot sprout into moments of empirical ccnsciousness perta"ning to different egos. If different trees cannot give rise to an identical seed, one seed cannot produce and nourish different trees. The case with the Sak~i is different. Ignorance, the material stuff of the plurality of egos, is one. But here there can be no question of a universal upadana The very conception of universality is repugnant to Buddhism. The unity and universality of the Alaya is not so plausible, but can be argued. The unity of the Alaya can certainly not mean the continuity of a single series ; that, as we have seen, is not defensible. The unity can only be the harmony obtaining between the moments belonging to different series, as between moments of a single series. It mt'.st be understood horizontally as well as vertically. Causality is interpreted as substitution. One moment is succeeded by a similar moment, bearing no real relation to it, and yet, the latter occurs only on the cccurrence of the former. This is the unity of the temporal succession. There can be a similar unity of simultaneous occurrence. The different series have no connection with each other, and yet one somehow bears upon the other. In connection with the doctrine of the intra-subjective world, it was seen how the different worlds, though utterly distinct from each other, do yet evince a marked resemblance. The same is the case here. The parallel series are all cooperating and interacting with each other, retaining nevertheless their indhiduality and uniqueness. The unity of the Alaya can be construed only as this coordination. The difficulties in this hypothesis -are similar to those confronting the doctrine of the unity of the temporal or vertical series. Each moment is unique, and yet one happens because of the other. This is, however, more a plea for realising the instability of the doctrine of non-relational coordination than a defence of the unity of the Alaya, horizontal as well as vertical. Reciprocity is as unintelligible as causality. Lacking any textual support, we refrain from coming to a conclusion, but this much is clear ; the Alaya as a constructive hypothesis must be accepted either as one or as many ; in neither case is

it free from difficulties. This indicates only that it is not ultimate, that we cannot stop with the A.taya, but must go further back.

Xlifta :Mano-Vijalna So much about the A.laya, the first of the three stages in the evolution of consciousness, enumerated above. We come to the second, the mano-vijfiana. The function of this consciolisness in the evolutionary process is rather obscure, and the text is not very illuminating. Why is this consciousness accepted at all ? What is its significance and importance ? The pravrtti-vijfi.anas present no problem because, according to the idealistic principle, they are the universe itself as identical with the knowing consciousness. And without a repositary in which the latent forces lie dormant, the flow of phenomenal existence would come to a stop. Consciousness is momentary, and unless its seeds are stored in the A.laya, its further continuity will of its own accord comet" an end. 21 Further, in certain states like deep sleep and trance, the empirical consciousness does not exist at all. Here the unbroken sequence of the A.laya must be posited to account for the resuscitation of the waking life. The A.laya must therefore be accepted over and above the various pravrtti-vijfili.nas.

If these two strata of consciousness suffice to explain phenomena, the manas need not be accepted as a distinct consciousness. It cannot however be dispensed with, because it mediates 'between these two consciousnesses. Whenever two terms are posited, the intervention of a third entity as a connecting link becomes necessary. If two unrelated reals are accepted, they cannot even be known as two. In the case of manas the mediation is all the more necessary since the empirical consciousness arises wholly out of the A.laya; the question of unrelated reals does not arise. On the one hand there is the A.laya with an indeterminate content; there are the pravrtti-vijfianas with wholly determinate contents on the other : in between these is the process of determination. This transitional function is served by the manas. It makes possible the emergence of the object-consciousness out of the A.laya, and at the same time maintains the distinction between the two. It may be said that if a tertium quid is required to establish the separation and at the same time to mediate the relation between two terms, by parity of reasoning 21. Cf. LAS, p. 38.

another entity must be posited between one of the original terms and this ttrtium quid, and this clearly leads to an infinite regress. This only means that ultimately two distinct terms cannot be accepted as separately real. The consideration here is that the acceptance of two entails that of a third as well, and for empirical pw.poses this complex must be granted. Theoretically any duality requires the intervention of a third entity, including the duality between a term and this third entity itself; practically, the acceptance of three serves all purposes, but three at least must be accepted. Hence the necessity for manas. Manas is so-called because the process of intellection (mananar~~ is always going on in it. The content of A.laya is indeterminate objectivity. As soon as this content is known as an other, its indeterminateness gives place to empirical determinations. And known it must be; pure contemplation of the other cannot last for ever. The transition from the act of willing of this fundamental content to those of the determinate contents is the work of manas. It breaks up the monotony of the indeterminate objectivity by projecting the latter through categories; its essence is categorisation. The bare otherness is indeed itself a category, the most fundam-::ntal one; but it has not been differentiated into categories of empirical knowledge. It is only in the case of a self-conscious awareness of objectivity, that these categories are brought into play. The pure objectivity is not categorised, except by itself. This work of determinate categorisation is done by the mana~. It actualises the empirical contents which are implicitly contained in the pure objective. Manas is not the consciousness of these contents but is the function of this actualisation itself. The 'other' can b. realised only as a determinate other and the splitting up of the pure form into determinate forms resulting in the precipitation of matter or content is intellection. The bare 'other' is certainly itself matter, but is so only in relation to the transcendental consciousness of the Alaya ; in relation to empirical objects it is their form. It is so bare that it cann'>t be distinguished from its form, i.e., from its awareness. Only after consciousness is determinately categorised, does the awareaess of the distinction between form and matter, or consciousness and its· content, characteristic of empirical knowledge, arise. Maoas is not the r~sult of this process, which are the several object-know-

ledges, but is the process itself. It is the fructification of the seeds lying dormant in the A.laya into the content-consdousness. It is the ripening of the fruit, not the ripe fruit itself. An apparently different account of manas is given in the text. It is invariably referred to as defiled (kli~ta) because it is surcharged with a particular class of "Mentals" 23 (caittas), i.e., the four nivp.avyalqta klesas. As long as manas functions, it must be accompanied by these four, 24 viz., The false notion of an ego (atmadr~ti) ; 2. ignorance about ego (atmamoha) 3. elation over it (atmamana) and 4. attachment to it (atmaprema). The imposition of the false notion of an ego upon t1 e cons itue ts of an in ividual (upadana-skandhas) is the atmadr~ti, also known as satkaya-drHi. In reality there is no "I" but only the momentary constituents (skandhas). This notion of the "I" arises out of ignorance about the real nature of the A.laya. As soon as the sense of ego arises,' one gloats over it, proudly proclaims its existence, witm the result that one gets attached to this false notion. It is clear that the manas is understood more as concerned with the projection of the ego, than that of the objective, and this seems not to be in accordance with the mediational function just now attributed. to it. A deeper probing into the problem will however reveal that these two accounts are not so disconnected as might appear. Manas represents the stage of categorisation of the objective. The knowledge of the objective is connected with the sense of "I" in t\VO ways. First, "I know" is the invariable condition for any knowledge to occur. This alone imparts the unity required in the synthesis of knowledge. Without this, the manifold would not be appropriated, and consequently there would be no synthesis. It is however only a presupposition; there is no self-consciousness in the sense of the consciousness of the self. The form of ordinary knowledge is 'there is a tree', though the other form, viz., 'I know the tree', is always there in the background. The explicit reference to the knowing subject takes place when the content-knowledge has thrown 1.

23. An explanation of these will be given in the next chapter. 24. VMS, p. 23.

the subject b:tck up:>.n itself, i.e., when the subject is consciously dissociated from the content. Here the knower turns back upon himself; the former 'I' is a presupposition while the latter a reflex. The two forms of the "I" are radically different, but m.ay. be comprised in a common concept of ego. The notion of ego is thus the alpha and omega of all empirical knowledge in a literal sense. The dawn of ego-consciousness indicates that the process of categorisation of the objective has started, since an uncategorised objective would be indeterminate which cannot yield any reference to the ego. The twin processes of the Cl!-tegorisation of knowledge and the dawning of the notion of ego are very vitally connected with each other and are rather two ways of looking at the same function of manas. The ego is real neither in this system nor in the Advaita Vedanta. In both, it is a construction; -yet a construction in fundamentally different senses. In the Yogicira, it is a construction superimposed upon the incessantly fleeting states of .Alaya-m.oments, while the Vediintin thinks it to be ascribed to the un·changing pure Sik~i consciousness. Though the ego is unreal according to both the systems, it is so for opposite reasons. In Vedinta it is unreal, because it veils the universality and the ubiquity of consciousness; it is unreal because it imports change into the unchanging real. In the Yogidira the reason for its unreality is precisely antipodal to this. The ego masquerades as something permanent and stable, while in ~eality the Alaya is a continuous series. It is unreal because it imports permanence to the changing series. Experience requires both analysis and synthesis. Metaphysics picks up one p1ttern and universalises it to such an extent as to explain the other away. The function of manas is more synthesis. It binds together the different states under the common concept of the ego. It supplies the requisite element of stability which makes discursive knowledge possible. In common with the whole Buddhist tradition, the Yogicara is initially prejudiced in favour of impermanence. The other aspect of knowledge is explained away as an illusory construction. The pram.ati, on the other hand, makes room. for analysis, i.e., change and succession, which the Real, as .unchanging consciousness, cannot render explicable, and which is yet required to make experience possible. The activity of ml.nas is directed towards the actualisation of the p:>tential forces stored in the Alaya; it is the .Alaya therefore which

supplies the data on which manas operates. Manas is not an independent consciousness; its status is somewhat different from that of the Alaya as well as the object-consciousness. It is more or less a, relational function, and requires a base of operation. Its locus 25 (asraya) is the Alaya. Categories cannot float in vacuum ; they require a locus staltdi which is to be categorised. The category of the 'other' in the .Alaya is indeterminate and manas determines it empirically. It has been said above that no contentless consciousness can be admitted. If the mana.s is to be accredited as one, it must have its own content. Peculiarly enough, its content26 also is said to be the Alaya. That is to say, it projects no new ·content ; its function is exhausted in categorising the indeterminate objective created by the Alaya. It projects the same content through many more lenses added, . as it were. This again shows that manas enjoys no independent status of its own. Just as a relation is exhausted in relating its terms, but is not a term in itself, so the manas is not a consciousness co-ordinate with the Alaya or the prav~tti-vijfianas. The activity of the Alaya itself, as its content gets differentiated into this and that, is the ma11as. It is the function of incessant unrest in the Alaya.

By certain meditations and practices this process of intellection c2n be stopped 27 ; the categorisation of the determinate content c ver wl-.ich our will has ordinarily no jurisdiction, can be affected by intense meGitation. In the state of Arhat who has destroyed all the defilements without any residue, the kliHa manas does not function; the flc v: of the .;\laya itself ceases there an,d hence the manas is stopped automatically. So also in certain transic states the manas does r:ot exist ,28 and after \he trance is over, it arises again out of the Alaya. During the trance, the Alaya revolves round· itself, with no categorisation, like the sajWya. parir)llna of prak~ti. Manas is said to be absent in no less than fiye states. 2 9 This again shows the close parallel existing between the concepts of the Alaya and the Sak~i. In the stzt.e of nirvikalpa samadhi, the pramata or the empirical subject napcrates, but arises again out of the Sak~i at its termination. 25. 26. 27. 28.

Pravrtti-Vij fianas The third stage of the evolution of consciousness is the determinate awareness of the object. This is the only consciousness which matters in empirical discourse. This alone is empirically known ; the former two form its submerged base as it were. For all practical purposes this constitutes our universe, since it includes everything whatsoever as can be presented before the empirical consciousness. This consciousness is not a unity but 1\ class, comprising six kinds of consciousness, a,ll of which are grouped togt>ther because of their common empirical nature. These six kinds of consciousness can be classified into : (1) External; (2) Internal. The former includes the .five consciousnesses corresponding to the five sense-organs which give us all the information we have about the so-called external world. The five senses make possible the awareness of matter (riipa), sound (sadba), smell (gandha), taste (rasa) and the tactual data (spraHavya). The sixth or the internal consciousness is manovijfiana, the knowledge of ideas (dharmas). Though these ideas are "internal' they are as much objects of consciousness as riipa etc are. Dharma is a miscellaneous category which includes whatever confronts c:onsciousness, except in the objective way. This manovijfiana is not to be confused with the kliHa manas; the latter is a transcendental function, while the former is merely the knowledge of empirical ideas. There is one point about the five sensual consciousnesses that needs clarification. The senses give us, the Yogacara holds in accordance with the Buddhist tradition, merely the sense-data, and the resultant consciousness also is of this alone. Colour is a sense-datum; the coloured object is not. The consciousness also is of colour alone. Then how is it that one has the knowledge of a coloured object at all ? If consciousness is identical wih the object known, consciounsess itself should be of a coloured object, and not of a bare colour. It has been said before that though the object known is identical with the knowledge of it, yet, owing to the cosmic Illusion, it appears as independent and as objectively present. So, though in reality there is merely the consciousness of colour, that colour, when objectified,is known only as a coloured object. The concept of substance is a category through which the form of knowledge, when objectified, must be cognised. We cannot perceive an 9bjectivity which is bare colour; it would invariably be an object merely by the fact of its b:ing objectified. To invest the sense-data with this

object-hood is the work of manas. The seme-data are certainly not objectively real; but consciousness has that form alone. Of the objecthood there can be no consciousness ; it is the form of projeclion ; to be projected is to be projected as an object. All these six vi~aya-vij.fianas arise out of the Alaya due to their respective seeds; they can arise either singly or simultaneously. ~ 0 T() create the illusion of a full-fledged object, many sense-data must combine which is possible if their consciousnesses arise simultaneously. This conception can be compared to the emergence of waves in an ocean : the number of the waves is not fixed, but depends upon the wind passing over the ocean. So also the empirical consciousnestes arise out of the .Alaya, due to the presence of alambana-pratyayas (object-conditions), one or many. By the ocean should not be meant a,n identical and substantial substratum ; the whole ocean must change every moment, to be comparable to the .Alaya. None of the three or rather eight vij.fianas is ultimate. Consciousness is disturbed owing to the impact of a wrong idea, and once this idea is eradicated or realised to be illusory, the agitated commotion of consciousness is calmed down, and it regains its eternal quiesce1:ce. This progression of the evolution of consciouwess must be understood merely in a logical sense and not as a historical process. Because it is said that the object-consciousness arises out of the Alaya, mediated by the manas, it !Dust not be imagined that at first thete was only the Alaya, and that in course of time the other vi jftanas em~rge. Pure consciousness has no tendency to get defiled; it must be posited as already defiled. So also the cycle of the karmic forces and their actualisation is an infinite one,a1 like the trite cycle of the tree and its seed. The dependence is reciprocal ; one cannot be had without the other. The pravrttivijftanas arise because of the seeds latent in the Alaya, while the Alaya itself is further replenished by the former, 32 but for which it ·would come to a stop. The priority is merely logical, and not factnl. The Alaya with all its parapharnalia must be accepted as beginningless and it lasts upto the cessation of the phenomenal existence itself. The other vijftanas have gaps in. between them, but the Alaya suffers no break whatsvever in its continuous flow.

30. VMS, p. 33 31. Alambana Parik1a, 8. 32. vasanatasca tajj.fianam bhavet tebhyasca vasana; PVA, p. 22.

DHARMA THEORY IN THE YOGACARA We have 'seen-in the first Chapter that the Y oglidira accepted the of the early realistic Buddhism, and yet radically modified it so as to incorporate it within the folds of idealism. Being a constructive system, it does speculate about the dharma-theory-their number and the nature of each-but never forgets their merely phenom~nal reality. From the transcendental point of view, consciousness alone exists ; the rest is appearance. phenom~nology

The problem. aris~s as to the relation idealism bears to the dharmatheory. O.J.ly consciousness is real, objectivity is an appearance. Objectivedharmas are therefore in the same predicament as all things objective are ; their independence is Illusor}". But the diversification of consciousness itself is because of the illusion-because something, as though external, confronts it as ~ other to· it. The natural state of con·· sciousness is a 'pure Act'. unchecked by an}" content. Dharmas are not real then even as pertaining to consciousness. Pure consciousness harbours no dharmas. And granting even that consCiousness does get diversified, it 'is bifurcated into the subject-object duality: where do the dharmas come in then ? Since objectivity is an illusion there can be no objective dharmas. If there is no substance apart from the consciousness of it, nor can the external modes be accepted as real. Hence if the dharmas are admitted at all, they can be accepted only as qualifying the subjective, as sustaining its internal diversity~ The transcendental Will as pure Act has no dharmas. They enjoy therefore only a phenomenal reality ; they pertain to the Will-Consciousness when it is no longer a pure Act, but is actually creative. When consciousness gets phenomenalised by being infected with the idea of objectivity, it acquires various forms or modes. It then becomes particular and discrete; its universality is broken up into

infinite "moments" of consciousness. One moment of consciousness .::an be individualised only by being qualified by some factor which colours it in various ways. This extraneous factor cannot be intrinsic to consciousness, since in that case the moments will be stabilised, and this, as will be seen in the next Chapter, must be rejected as contrary to Absolutism. But nor can it be an extraneous factor, as there can be nothing which is other than consciousness ; this otherness is an illusion. When consciousness is diversified, its moments are qualified by so many overtones as it were; these eo not form an integral part of consciousness, but nor can they be granted .an independent status. It must be clearly understood that they pertain to consciousness only in its infected or bifurcated aspect; they are evolved only in its phenomenalised state. '.fhese are· the dharmas in the Yogacira. system.. Though the dharma-phenomenology is accepted, yet its entire significance has been radically altered. Fe .::merly they were accepted as ultimate elements of existence. Now their ultimacy is rejected altogether ; they belong only to the empirical realm. They are yet real as pet1:aining to consciousness; consciousness never loses its reality in whatever form it may be. Consciousness infected by the subject-object duality is conscious.ness still, and as such is perfectly real. And if the phenomenal forms of consciousness are real, so are their various modes of existence. The importance of the dharmas lies in this very fact, since their function is to keep these forms individual and discrete. The particularity of consciousness is real, and yet not ultimate (Ch. 7), and so are the dharmas ; they qualify consciousness nly in its phenomenal state, and not in its absolute aspect. That .does not make them unreal, but only takes away their ultimacy. Consciousness qua consciousness is invariably the same. Yet we have to distinguish one mom.ent of consciousness from another. This .distinction is not possible if regarded from the standpoint of the object, since the individuality of consciousness lies, not so much in the object cognised, but rather in the at itude consciousness takes towards it. The same object may give pleasure to one person and offence to another. Moreover, since the object itself is nothing but a mode of existence of consciousness, the reason for the individuality or particularity of the latter must be sought in itself. Dharmas perform this function, being the marginal fringes as it were of the central focus of c-:>nsciousness, and serve to set each

moment into sharp relief against all others. Moreover, the whole of the objective world is reduced to consciousness, in the sense that the object is a form of appearance of the latter. Hence the objective distinctions between the various sense-data, between visual sense-dil.ta and sound for instance, must be incorporated as the distinctions between different moments of consciousness. Consciousness itself appears in these forms and therefore the respective moments are distinguished only by these. Here these forms, i.e., riipa etc., are the dharmas. That is to say, though the whole of ocjective reality is reduced to consciousness, the objective distinctions between riipa etc., can yet be accepted as so many dharmas qualifying the respective moments of consciousness. It is now clear how riipa etc., inspite of appearing as something objective and external, are in reality dharmas qualifying consciousness. Each moment of consciousness is thus a complex constituted by ever so many dharmas which nevertheless are not distinct and independent realities. The several dharmas can only be distinguished as so many tonal aspects whr:h lend the distinctive colour to the complex. The dharmas are not to be had by themselves, nor can they be separated, or the unity of the complex would be lost. All empirical distinctions are retained in the shape of the distinctions between the various dharmas, and yet the fundamental logic of idealism is unaffected, since all these distincticns are fused into the central unity of consciousness. Nor does it militate against the supremacy of consciousness for two reasons: first, because the dharmas are not independent, and secondly, they are not ultimate, and these two circumstances are closely related. The speculation about the dharmas supply the data for constructing a cosmic phenomenology within the framework of idealism. In the Yoglicara cosmology2 as many as one hundred dharmas are

2. The table of elements according to Sarvlistivada is given in the Central Conception cf Buddlism, APP. 11, pp. 95-107. The Theravada list is discussed in Abhidhammatthascngaho. The supposed Sautrlin· tika list is collected from Tamil sources and given, also as an Appendix (D), in the Adyar Edition of Alambana Parfkta, ed. by Pt. Aiyaswami. In the third Appendix to the same work, the editor gives a restoration of Vasubandhu's Mahqyana SataJharma Vidya·

DHARMA THEORY IN THE YOGACARA

accepted. They are classified under five heads 3 : (1) The citta-dharmas, (2) the cetasikas or caittas, (3) rupa-dharmas, (4) citta-viprayuktasanskara-dharmas, and lastly (5) the Asarilskfta-dharmas. From this classification it is clear thatdharmas are divided first into the Asari:lskrta and the sarilskrta, the noumenal and the phenomenal. Phenomena are comprised by the first four. The sarilskrta dharmas themselves may be divided into two broad classes; first, those which are closely con• nected with consdousness in some way or other, and secondly, those dharmas which have nothing distinctive about them in their relation to consciousness. Related to consciousness they must be, as ap!lrt from the latter they are nothing. Yet their peculiarity does not obviously lie in this relation. Dharmas whose bearing to consciousness is more directly apparent are further sub-divided into those which are material or objective and those which are not. The latter finally consist of mind and the mentals, i.e., consciousness proper and its satellites, as explained above. The classification is strictly dichotomous and can be tabulated thus: Dharmas (elements of existence)

I. The first class of dharmas is constituted by consciousness itself. It is rathet intri!?Jlling that consciousness is classified as one of theultimukham, which is a list of the 100 dharmas accepted by the Yogadira. The list is in perfect agreement with that given in VMS, pp. 25-33. The 100 dharmas are discussed, with comparative details on every point, in Mcgovern's A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, Vol. I. The;t are also enumerated in Sogen's Systems of Buddhist Thought, Pfi· 219-230. 3. Cf. MSA, XI, 37.

ate factors of existence. We have just seen that consciousness is not one of the reals but is reality itself. It is the only redity. The ether dharmas are not coordinate to it. They can be real only as being the tonal aspects qualifying consciousness. Why consciousness ar:d the other satellites are both indifferently classed as dharmas, as though both enjoythe same ontological status, is apparently perplexing. That it has no such implication will be clear if we pay attention to the structure of the dharma-phenomenology. The earlier doctrine of the dharmas being the ultimate exister.ts is not discarded, but is, en the other hand, radically modified. The entire dharma-theory is based on a pragmatic standpoint and has nothing to do with metaphysical considerations. All kinds of categories ate classed together as dharmas, irrespective of their various ontological status. Even the Absolute, as will presently be seen, is enumerated as a dharma. The broad denotation of the dharmas is thus everything which is accepted in this system ; whether this is in the ultimate ser:Ee or notis beyond the scope of the dharma-theory. Some dharmas are accepted only in the empirical stages of consciousness, some are noun:enal dharmas, and again consciousness itself, the centre of the whole system of dharmas, is classed along with them. Consciousness, thcuf_h fundamentally one, has various stages in the process of its evclution. First, there are the various empirical kinds of consciousness. These __are enumerated as six, according to the six senses, :five external and one internal, which are instrumental in the arising of their respective consciousnesses. Their nature nevertheless is the same, and together they are called the pravrttivijfianas (also vi~ayavijiianas). The seventh and eighth are the subconsicous vijfian.as, viz., the kliHa Manas and the Alaya. Early Bucldh:sm admitted only the first six ; moreover, consc!ousness in early Buddhism was accepted as pure or contentless, her:ce it was counted as or.e single dharma. The differences were imported in it by extraneous factors, and it became six. The last two were added by the Yogacara and this addition completely changed the significance of the dharma-phencmenology, and indeed the ultimate metaphysical pa.ttemitself. An explanation Ofthese vijiiiinashas already been given in the previous Chapter. II. Next in importance are the "mentals" (the cetasikas or, more briefly, the clittas). Strictly speaking, only these should be classed as

dharmas, and Vasubandhu takes cognizance of these alone. The various vijfianas are reality itself, and not merely dharmas. Or rather, if the denotation of dharmas includes them, then the cetasikas are certainly not dharmas. Since everything however is indifferently classed as a dharma, the cetasikas take their places along with the vijiianas. In early Buddhism, these were really distinct realities, besides the one contentless citta. They were ultimate e:ristents, indepenc!ent and absolute. Here, on the other hand, they are merely the phases in which the complexiJy of consciousness is exhibited. They are so many hues as it were, radiated by the prismatic consciousness. Consciousness in its pristine purity is absolutely indeterminate, nnd no caittas can pertain to it in that state. They are not independent as in early Buddhism but ensue out of the conmplexity of consciousness itself. In early Buddhism, one moment of consciousness is constituted by the moments of citta atld the appropriate caittas :in the Yogacara, it is merely one unitary moment in which different aspects however can be distinguished. Cetasikas are 51 in number, as against 46 accepted in the Sarvastivada and as many as 52 in Theravada. Thesf' are further divided into 6 subclasses : (1) universal cetasikas-5; (2) determinate cetasikas-5; (3) meritorious cetasikas-11 ; (4) defilements-6; (5) minordefilemrnls-20; and lastly (6) indeterminate cetasikas-4, making up a total of 51. (1) The .rarvatraga dharmas 4 are those universal features which are invariably present whatever the type of consciousness may be. No consciousness can be without them. These alone are present in the Alaya. Wherever there is the cognitive distinction between 1he k.nower ar.d the known, the sarvatraga dharmas accompany the mental state. The Alaya is no exception though the distinction is still on a transcendental level. It is however difficult to see how they can pertain to the Alaya. Take sariljfia for instance. This is the relating activity of the mind-apperceptive synthesis, in Kantian terminology: this can be present only when there are distinctions in the objective. But the object of Alaya is indeterminate and there is nothing to synthesize or relate. Perhaps the doctrine of sarvatraga dharmas was taken over from the Sarvastivada, and the modifications required in idealism 4. VMS, pp. 20-1 ; VMS (JBORS), p. 69 if. 8

were not made. They are five in number, viz., sparsa, manasklira, vedli.tli, samjiii and cetani. (a) Spar/a is defined as trikasannipata. In every case of knowledge there are three factors present-the content cognised, the instrument of cognition, and the c:>gnising consciousness. These three must flash simultaneously in a causal relation. Consequently the instrument or the sense-organ is excited in a certain way and gets a particular form (viklira), evoking a feeling, pleasant or unpleasant as the case may be. The contentis accordingly determined by consciousness, and this definite awareness of the object, which touches as it were the sense-organ, but in reality is a determination of the object, is spada. Its action is to excite feelings. (b) Mt~narleara is that by' which citta is attracted towards the object (cetasa libhoga).& It is attention, which holds citta towards the object. This last clause in the definition is necessary because manasklira or attention functions, not in a single moment of consciousness, but in the series. One moment of citta does certainly go to some object or other, and there would be no case of inattention. Attention means, not the attention of a single moment which is exhausted in that very moment, but the directing of the citta again and again, to the same object. (c) Vedana is affection or reaction of consciousness (anubhava-svabhava). towards its contents. It can be of three kinds according as the reaction is pleasant, painful, or merely indifferent. The object however being in reality non-existent, these different feelings are due to one's past karma, good or bad. Pleasant feeling means having pleasure in coming in contact with the object and pain in being separated from it. So painful feeling is pain in contact with, and pleasure in separation from, the object. (d) Samjna is specifying or defining the object by its characteristic marks (nimittodgrahat].a) . It is of the form, "this is blue, not yellow." It is the conceptualising activity of the mind-marking and defining the object by means of a concept. In Buddhism, things are discrete and particular, and therefore unrelated.- Knowledge however cannot even begin without ju:igment, i. e., without relating things by naming them. This function is served _by samjiia, which thus accompanies 5. The YIJgariitrabhiilya also uses this term "libhoga," p. 21.

all knowledge. How this can be present even in the indeterminate knowledge of the Alayais not made clear. (e) Cetana is volition, that by which citta is impelled towards the content as iron is towards magnet (cittiibhisarllskaro manasasce~tii)· It is more active than attention. (2)

The Viniyata caittas6 also are five in number: (a) chanda, (b) adhimok~a, (c) smrti, (d) samiidhi and (e) d!d. They are not so univer-

sal in scope as the sarvatraga class, but are peculiar to some kinds of consciousness. (a)Chanda is wish for a desired object(abhiprete vastuni abhilii~a,b). It is not a universal caitta; its essence is desire so that without it

there can be no chanc!a, and desire is not universal. Desire is the urge to make the object a content of the senses. To wish for the sight, and hearing, etc. of the object is chanda. It gives rise to effort (virya). (b) Adhimokta is determinate judgment . about an object made definite (niscite vastuni tatraiva avadhiirat;tam). The object is defined either by reasoning or by testimony, and to determine it as it really is is adhimok~a; it is a judgment of consciousness (cetasa abhinivesab). One who has adhimukti or firm belief cannot swerve from one's own doctrines. (c) Smrti is memory (sa.rilstute vastuni asampramo~as cetaso abhilapanatii)7. When an object experienced before is made the object of consciousness again, so that citta remembers it repeatedly as its former object, this steady activity of the mind is smfti. (d) Samiidhi is concentration of mind on the object which latter is exmined either on its merits (gut;tato) or its demerits (do~ato) (upaparik~ye vastuni cittasya ekigrata). This gives rise to correct knowledge, since the concentrated mind knows a thing as it is. (e) Dhiis prajfiii or insight into the nature of things. It is metaphysical insight as to whether the object is apprehended rationally or fallaciously, i.e. right knowledge regarding the validity or otherwise of the svalak~at;ta and the siimiinyal~at;ta. Rational apprehension can be either by pratyak~a, or anumiina, or iiptopade8a. The correct ascertainment of an object is of three kinds, or rather stages, viz. srutamaya,. 6. VMS, pp. 25-26. 7. Cf. The Yoga S iitra definition of Smfti : anubhiitavi~ayasya asampramo~ab smrti};l ; I, 11.

intamaya and bhavanimaya. 8 First, there arises a verbal knowledge through iptavacana. This is deepened by pondering over it through reason. Then it is realised in samidhi. Empirical knowledge (lauldka vyavahara) is neither yogavihita(valid through reason) nor ayogavihita (fallacious). Dhi or prajfia removes false doubts by correctly ascertaining the nature of things. These five viniyata cetasikas do not necessarily arise together; where one is present, the re!it may or may not be present. The distinction betmeen the sarvatraga and the viniyata dharmas is not recognised in the Sarvastivada. In the latter, all the ten are cittamahibhumika, present in every moment of consciousness, while in the Yogacira there are only five sarvatraga (universal) dharmas. (3) Then come the ku/.:Jia(meritorious) caittas 9 • They are eleven in number, viz. (a) sraddha, (b) hri, (c) apatrapa, (d) alobha, (e) adve~a, (f) amoha, (g) virya, (h) prasra~dhi, (i) apramada, (j) upek~a and (k) ahitnsi. Vasubandhu mentions only 10 by name and omits upek~a. Sthiramati however thinks that it is also included by implication. Sarvistivada has only 10 kusalam1habhiimika dharmas, and omits amoha a which, according to it, is already subsumed under prajfii or mati, a universal dharma, but for which no knowledge would occur. There it connotes merely discrimination between one dharma and another, so th;;.t there is nothing especially meritorious about it. In the Yogacara, not only prajfia or dhi is not a universal factor-it is one of the vlniyata dharmas explained above-but amoha is distinguished as a kusala dharma. (a) Sraddha is faith in the Noble Truth of Karmaphala and the consequent equanimity (prasada) or purity of dtta. Being the contrary of mental impurity (cittakilu~ya) it removes all kldas and upak1das. It is the incentive to chanda (desire). (b) Hri is shame (lajja) due to the idea of sin committed, either because of one's conscience or ~ecause of religious injunc-tions (atminam dharmam vi a::lhipatim krtva avadyena lajja). The sin may or may not be actually committed. It prevents evil conduct(duscarita-samyama) but does not rule out the desire for such conduct. 8. The corresp:>nds to the sravat}.a, manana and nididhyii.sana of the Vedinta. 9. VMS, pp. 26-8.

(c) Apatrapii is also shame, but it is distinguished from the former in that this shame is because of social disapproval or fear of public censure. This serves the same purpose as hri. (d) Alobha is the contrary to lobha. Lobha is attachmtnt to and desire for the world (bhava) an.i its luxuries. It ~akes away the incentive to evil conduct (duscarita-prav~tti.). ltis distinguished from hri in that here even the desire for evil conduct is eradicated. (e) Advep is benevolence (maitri). It is contraryto dve~a, which is a parsuit leading to pain to t:he people. Adve~a also leads to the absence of desire for bad conduct. (f) AmJhalO is the opposite of perverse knowledge, which latter is the knowledge of things as they are not and ignorance of the Noble Truth of Karmaphala. Amoha is the knowledge of things as they are, and serves the same function as alobha and adve~a. (g) Virya is enthusiasm for the good (kusale cetaso abhyutsiihal;l). It is the opposite of kausilya which is enthusiasm for the bad (kli~ta). Virya lends support to the side of the good. (h) PraJrabdhi is the opposite of dau~thulya. DauHhulya is the dullness or inertia (akarmal.].yatii) of bo:iy and mind, and is the root of all bad dharmas. The opposite of this is the activity of body (kaya-karmal.].yata), i.e., the application of it to its object with ease, and the activity of tnind (citta-karmal].yatii) which arouses proper attention, delight and ease in it, making the mind flow towards its object. This makes possible the withdrawal of the phenomenal activity of vijiiana (i.e. iisraya.-pariiv~tti) and the consequent destruction of all kleslS (ase~a-kle5iivara1].a-ni~kar~a1].a). It is only because m=nd remains petrified and passive before the object (cittasya akarmal.].yatii) that the object seems to be independent of it, and this leads to all kinds of defilements. When the mind becomes active, it absorbs the object in itself, and then the Alaya ceases functioning. (i) Apratniida is the opposite of pramiida. Owing to apramiida, the activity of alobha etc., is directed towards the avoiding of the akusala dharmas and the concentration on the kusala dharmas. 10. Vng..Ust!cally these terms, "alobha" etc., appear to be negative but they are really p::>sitive. Thus amoha is not merely the absence of false knowledge ; it is rather the positive presence of right knowledge.

These alobha etc., are apramada. Its function is the accumulation of benefits in this world and in the world to come (laukika-lokattatasampatti-paripiirat}a-karmaka1)). (j) Vpe/e!ii has three stages : (i) citta-sarnata ; (ii) citta-prasathata ; (iii) citta-anabhogata. (i) Citta-samatii is equanimity of mind, its balance and poise, and absence of waywardness (auddhatya). (ii) Citta-praia!hatii : Then the mind becomes steady (samahita),. and its poise (sama) is applied to empirical activities without the least effort. That is to ·say, it is only an application of cittasamata. (iii) Anabhogatii : mind reaches then such a height of meditat:on (bhavana-prakar~a) that the waywardness of mind cannot even arise. It has been completely destroyed. Mind has no longer the need to concentrate on the opposite of waywardness : the state becomes natural to it. Upek~a pr.!cludes the possibility of the arising of all klesas and upaklesas (sarva-klesopaklesa-anavakiisa). (k) Avihitiuii is the contrary to cruelty. It is compassion for beings (sattve~u ka.rut].i), being grieved at the grief of others, and the desire to relieve them from death and bondage. (4) Akulala caittasU are classified into the (A) 6 klesas and (B) 20 upakle5as 12, making up a total of 26 dharmas. The 6 klesas are (a) raga, (b) pratigha, (c) moha, (d) mana, (e) dr~ti, and (f) vicikitsi. The 20 upakle5as are (a) krodha, (b) upanaha, (c) mrak~a, (d) pradi~ (e) ir~yi, (f) mitsarya, (g) maya, (h) sithya, (i) mada, (j) vihirilsi,. (k) ahrik.ya, (1) anapatrapya, (m) styana, (n) auddhatya, (o) asraddhy~ (p) kausidya, (q) pramada, (r) mu~ita smrti, (s) vik~epa, and (t) asamprajan.ya. In the Sarvastivida, the klesas and the upaklesas are not subclasses of the akubla dharmas but are coordinate with it, so that the vicious caittas are divided into three classes, and not two as here, viz., (A)

11. VMS, pp. 28-32. 12. The basis of this distinction is never discussed. The klesas perhaps are understood as basic and primary, while the upaklesas are their derivatives. In this connection, the admirable account given by Spinoza in his Ethics, Pt. IV, 'Of Human Bondage,' may be profitably consulted.

·1:he klesa-mahabhiimika dharmas, (B) the aku5ala-mahahhumika dharmas, and (C) the upakle~a-mahabhiimika-dharmas. Kle5as are of the same number as those in the Yogaclira, viz., 6, hut the two -.sets do not correspond to eaJverse is not a relevant one, and the classification of the riipas is confined to the gross things actually apparent before consciousr..ess. Riipas are eleven in number, viz., the five senses, their five resp:!ctive sense-data, and the 11th rupa is that included under dharmayatana or dharmadhatu. It is significant that only sense-c a'a are enumerated here ; re1lists would necessarily admit a substance over and abov.:: these, which would impart unity and thinghood to them. This corception of a substance is repugnant to the whole tenor of Buddhism, a tradition accepted by the Yogacara only empir:cally; really speaking sense-data are equally projections of the knowing consciousness. The 11th riipa in the Sarvastivada is the avijfiaptiriipa. The conceptions of this riipa ·in the two systems are however poles asunder. Avijfiapti-rupa is the general character of a man-"the vehicle of moral qu:~.lities" (Stcherbatsky)-which is, peculiarly enough, held to be materia-l in the Sarvastivada. The riipa included in the dharmadhatu is, according to the Yogacara, matter not sensuously known, e. g., atoms etc. It includes matter objectively existent (empirically speaking), or only imagined to exist. It is thus a miscellaneous category including, among other things, avijfiapli-rupa as well. IV. (itta-vipra;•ukta-samskara-dharmas are the next class of dharmas. They are so called because there is nothing distinctively conscious about them. Though they must ultimately pertain to consciousnes in order to attain reality, their relation to consciousness is not very apparent. They are r.::ally 'forces' or functions which are neither specifically material nor mental ; they can belong to either indiffer-

ently. It is a miscellaneous class including all kincs of categories, like space and time, number and order, conjunction and separation, subsistence and impermanence, significance of words, etc., all more or less abstract, and as such the principal point of attack by the Sautrantika. They are 24 in number, viz., (a) prapti, (b) jivita (-indriya), (c) nikayasabhagata, (d) prthagjati (aprapti), (e) a~ar:ijfii-samapatti, (f) nirodha-samapatti (these two are inch:ded l:ere as, in these two stages of samadhi, consciousness becomes so subtle as practically to cease), (g) asar:ijfiivipaka, (h) namakaya, (i) padakaya, (j) vyafijanakiiya, (k) jati, (1) jara, (m) sthiti, (n) anityata, (o) prav~tti (srota~ santati), (p) evam bhagiya (samadhyantara), (q) pratiba!'.dha, (r) javanya, (s) krama, (t) desa (dik), (u) kala, (v) sankyha, (w) samagri (samyoga), and lastly (x) bheda (viyoga) . In the Sarvastivada, only the first 14 are accepted as riipa-citta-vipraryukta-sar:iskaras. V. The Asa11iskrta dharmas are not subject to causes and conditions ; they are the "immuta}?le dharmas." Nor are they governed by the law of impermanence since they are not phenomenal at all. That does not make all of them noumenal however. In the Sarvastivada, three asarhsk~ta dharmas are accepted. The Sautrantika rejected the class altogether. Even nirvat:ta was merely of a negative import ; it was the total extinction of all dharmas. The Yogacara, as an absolutist, had to reinstate the asarhs~a dharmas, and indeed increased their number to six, viz., (a) akasa, (b) pratisar:ikhya-nirodha, (c) apratisankhya-nirodha (these three are common to Sarvastivada as well), (d) acalanirodha, (e) sarhjfia-vedayit~-droC:ha, and lastly (f) Tathata. 20 This last is the ultimate essence of everything (bhiita-tathata), the Absolute itself. Really speaking, this is the only asarhsk~a ; there can be but one Unconditioned. That Tathata also is enumerated as one of the c!harmas leaves no room for doubt that the dharma-phenomenology is entirely unaffected by any metaphysical considerations. Whatever is accepted, whether in the ultimate sense or merely for empirical purposes, is counted as a dharma.

20. The introduction of this as a dharma made a complete revolution in the theory of dharmas. Instead of being eternally distinct they became but modes of the Absolute.

THE YOGACARA CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE From Idealism to Absolutism Idealism as a constructive pattern for explaining phenomena has been established. It is proved that the object is nothing apart from the consciousness of it. The subjective alone is real. 'The blue is a form of consciousness, and as such is real. Its externality is only the mode of its appearance. It appears to be 'out there', possessing independence and self-existence ; that however is cnly the way in which consciousness projects its contents. The subjective is governed by its own laws ; it is independent of the object. One state of consciousness gives rise to another owing to its inherent dynamism. The causal law operates between moments of consciousness and not between consciousness and the object. Is this position ultimate ? Can the object be negated and yet its form in consciousness reinstated and retained ? Consciousness is momentary when ridden by the false idea of objectivity ; when this idea is realised to be false, will consciousness still go on perishing every moment ? The issue needs clarification, if only to realise its implications. Negation must be total and absolute. The content negated must be rejected totally. A half-hearted negation is no negation. Even if negation is partial, that part which is negated is absolutely rejected.l If the part again is only partially negated, it clearly leads to an infinite regress, with the result that nothing is negated at all. If objectivity is to be negated, its sublation must be rigorous and consistent. The objective does not merely mean extern.ality to consciousness. Any content which is an 'other' to consciousness is its object. Ideas which 1. Cf. the doctrine of Aristotelian logic that even an 0 Proposition distributes its predicate.

THE YOGACARA CONCEPtiON OF THE ABSOLUTE

are the contents of manovijfHlna, the sixth pravt"tti-vijfi.ana, are objects of the latter in the same sense as the so-called external objects are. Negation of the object means an absolute denial of the 'other' in any form. If it is surreptitiously introduced in the subjective order, consciousness is still confronted with an 'other', so that nothing has been negated after all. The assertion that consciousness is the sole reality is belied by the continued existence of the 'other'. The negation of the object is only half-hearted. Why is the object rejected? What constitutes its unreality? The object is rejected as false because it has no independent existence, it cannot be had apart from the consciousness of it. All negation implies an evaluatio.:t. Consciousness is real because it is something sui generis. It enjoys an absolute self-existence and, to be manifested, does not depend upon the 'other'. This preference in favour of consciousness can hold good only when consciousness can be shown to exist in its ow..1 right. The object is rejected because it is not independent. It m·1st necessar:Iy be revealed by consciousness. This dependence is one-sided ; if it is reciprocal there can be no ground for preferring one to other. If the 'other', whether external or not, is an intrinsic form of consciousness, we walk into the realists' parlour. The object must then be granted a co-ordinate status with consciousness. Or, if it is rejected because it is dependent upon consciousness, the latter also, being in the same predicament, must be deemed unreal. 2 The sole reality of consciousness requires that it should be free from any trace of objectivity, that it should be capable of existing without any other to it. This is the great advance that the Yogacara makes over Hegel. Por Hegel idealism does not mean the rejection of the object. Its externality and independence is denied, but that does not make it a creation of the subjective. Both the terms are related to each other ;, their falsity consists in their being viewed in isolation. Abstraction is the only thing that is condemned by Hegel ; otherwise the concept of unreality finds no place in him, there being no ground for evaluation. Of the subject-object opposition, each of the terms requires the other for its own realisation, and one therefore cannot be preferred to the other. Both of them are indeed included in a higher unity2. This is the Madhyamika view.

that of Reason ; but Reason again is itself bifurcated into this opposition, because of its inherent necessity. T~e 'other' can never be dispensed with ; hence the assertion that the 'other' is a projection remains dogmatic. The counter-asseertion that the subject itself is a projection of the 'other' would in that case be equally justified. To substantiate the formrr statement what is required is that the subject should be shown as existing without projecting the 'other'. Only then can it be known as the basic reality, and the 'other' as a mere creation. To envelop the whole of phenomena in an all-comprehensive Reason leaves the relation b.:!tween the subject and object entirely unaffected. The subject does not create the object, but rather both are creations of the universal Reason. They are related through a third entityReason ; in themselves they should have nothing to do with each other. Curiously enough, this position is little different from that of the rank realist. He also maintains that both are ultimate, and that the object cannot be dispensed with. The Hegelian position is certainly not realism, since here the object has no independence ; it is esse.:1tially related to the subject. Nor is it pure ideali9m, since the subject is not primal and the object is not its own creation. Hegel stops short with relativity ; his system may be described as Rational Idealism, since both the terms are projections of Reason ; it is not, howev!r, E)i>temJbgical Ide1lism which makes consciousness the sole reality. The Hegelian Absolute is also consciousness, but it has no absoluteness in it ; it is a mere system of determinate relations. The Yogacara is wise enough to perceive that if the object is to be rejected, it cannot be retained even as a form of consciousness. If cJnsciousness is invariably confronted by an 'other', be it by its own form, the sublation of the object is meaningless. Knowledge is the only index for us of phenomenal existence, and if the object persistently raises its head in knowledge, it matters little whether it does not objectively exist. No change has been effected in our knowledge by the negation of the object. Is it possible for consciousness to be aware of an 'other' which is not e.:ternal to itself ? In reality, externality is an illusion ; what exist are only the forms of consciousness. But can these forms be known as the 'other' even when their objective projection is lacking ? If the object is not an other to consciousness, it is not an object at all. Consciousness is a consciousness of something : that 'of'-relation may

be an illusory one ; it is required nevertheless to sustain the knowLtdge of objectivity. Consciousness is essentially the subject ; it projects the form of objectivity owing to the primary illusion; of itself it is never -objectified. When the illusory form of objectivity falls away from it, its s'.lbj~c~-function also lapses a'.ltonu.tically. 8 The subject acquires aU its significance and meaning because of its relation to the object ; with-out the latter it is nothing. If one of the terms of a dualism is rejected as false, the other also cannot be maintain~d. In order to sustain the internal diversity of consciousness, the existence of the 'other' is reqctired. That 'other' may be in itself illusory ; nevertheless, if consciousness is diversified at all, it is diversified only .as the 'other confronting it. When the 'other is negated, the duality is made internal, it might be held. Here there are three alternatives to be considered. First, though there is no real objectivity, the idea of objectivity is present ; and this is all that is required for the bifurcation of consciousness. This position however just misses the point.. The object is nothing in itself, and cannot therefore be sublated. When the object is said to be negated, it is meant that its false idea should be eradicated. To reject the object is therefore to annihilate the idea -of an object. Secondly, the object may not be objectively known, but may be preas a mode of consciousness. Even the idea of objectivity is lacking . here. The consciousness of blue does not project the 'blue' as an external Qther. Still there arises the consciousness of blue owing to its own inner conditions. This hypothesis is hardly plausible. What is this consciousness of blue ? It is.not a unitary entity but must be split into its various ·elements. First, there is the 'bl:te'. It may not be an 'other', but only a form of consciousness, but still, so far as it is a 'blue', it is a form appearing in consciousness, and not consciousness itself. Secondly, there is the awareness of blue.' The mere factual occurrence of 'blue', whether in or outside consciousness, has no meaning. It must be known. Hence though it is a mode of consciousness, yet its function of awareness must h ~ carefully distinguished from this mode. This does not entail the accep~ent

tance of a transpuent awareness, because the distinction is r..ot of di~­ tinct factors, but of aspects merely. Thirdly, the consciousness of blue must stand sdJ-revealeJ; it must not be in necessity of being known by a separate act of knowledge. 5 This function of self-awareness must again be distinguished from the conscicusness of blue. There are thus three functions in consd01:sness : (1) the appearar..ce of blue (r.ila), (2) the consciousness of blue (nilavijiiana), and (3) the self-awareness of this consciousness (svasamvedana). These three are by no means so many separate factors in each case ofknowlt:d ge, but are rather the distinguishable aspects of a unitary cor.sciousness. It is one ar..d the same consciousness that has these three functions. Still this concept is hardly intelligible. How can these three aspects be distingui5hed, s ar..d yet the wholestrictly speaking no whole, since there are r:o parts-the whole remains a unity, is an unsolved enigma. Moreover, there is another fundamental difficulty in accepting this position. Consciousne.ss is the one unitary whole which may be differer.tiated into the three aspects ; it is however also the second of the three aspects differentiated above. It is therefore in a peculiar position: it must occupy two positions ator.ce; it is one of the aspects, and also that of which it is an aspect, and these two militate against each other. Ore thing cannot be both at once. Howe'\"er strongly we may defend the unity and partlessness of conscioufness, so lQng as it has different aspects, it must act in this double role, and this is theoretically indefensible. Ar:d aspects it must have; otherwi~e. tcere would remain only the bare consciousness, and the distincticn between bh:e and yellow cannot be maintained. There is still a third posibility to be cxplcred. '!he ccnEdcuu:e(S of blue is r:ot a whole which can be differentiated into separate afpects, but a unitary surd r.ot to be further explained. Each consciousness is what it is. The consciousness of blue is not consciousness and blue, but is a brute unity. This theory however is still more fantastic than the previous one. If there are no aspects in that unitary consciousness one might as well call it the object as the consciousness of it. The

5. svariipavedanaya anyad vedakam na vyapek~ate na ea aviditam asti idam ityartho' yan svasamvidal).. TS, I, 2012. 6. kriyiikarakabhedena na svasamvittirasya tu, ekasya anam!ariipasya traividhyanupapattitab. TS, 1, 2001.

subject is known only as contrasted w:th the object; here this distinction is lacking, and it is indifferent to the surd, whether it is an object or not. Again, consciousness of blue is not blue consciousness, since cJ.l.sciousness cannot b:: b:udened wlth physical attributes. Therefore the 'of' here is a real 'of' ; blue is merely a form. which can be maintained o.:tly by b::ing projected as the 'other'. The subject knows the object ; brushing the question aside whether this object is a form of consciousness or an e:s:ternal reality, if the dhtinction itself is done away with. it m ut know itself to b:: entitled consciousness. Even the distinction of aspects is repudiated here; the same thing is both subject and obj_ect at once. B:~t this is an im.nssible feat : even the mJst expert acrobat c1nnot clim~ his ow.1 shoulders. The sam:: finger cannot touch itself. nor can an axe cut its OW-l self. A thing can turn back upon itself only when it is arrested in its forward movement; the subject is aware of its ow.1 fu!lction by realising theotherness of the object. Here this reflex is an im.;_JJssibility ; but dll it h~s to know itself, since there is nothing else to be known. MJreover, without m1king a di;tinction of aspects how is the consciousness of blue to be di~tinguished from. that of yellow ? Each is a surd and is what it is ; then why are both called consciousness ? Waatis the com'llJn ground underlying both, which prevents each being m !rely a blue or a yellow, but makes both of them consciousness ? These questions cannot be m,;:t if form,3 of consCiousness, which are yet not 'other' to it, are accepted. Idealism must therefore find a consciousness which is absolutely free from. any tuce of objectivity. Merely making it internal is not su..'li:ient to e3tablish idealism,. It is indeed the first step, but a further step m '.1St be taken. The object is so identical with consciousness, that it cannot be distinguished even as -its form. It loses its individuality entirely and without any residue. The forms of consciousness are there m!rely because of the illusory reflection of the unreal object. With the sublation of the external object, the forms are automatically merged in cJnsciousness. This does not mean, however, that an identical or continuous p:ue co.:l.Sciousness underlies the various forms of blue and yellow7 • Consciousness itself is diversified into these forms and when identity is established b:!tween the object and its consciousness, the

lODDS are completely lost in it. We may not call this consciounsess pure, in the sense of transparence, but it is pure in the sense that the fonns cannot be distinguished in it. These considerations apply with equal force to the doctrine of mcmentariness of consciousness as well. When the specific fonns are lost in consciousness, even the different moments cannot be distinguished. This does not make consciousness identical; it means only that difference is no longer perceptible. The same argument which establishes Identity between blue and its consciousness, makes away with the distinction bet\veen consciousness of blue and that of yellow. Each is so completely identical with consciousness that neither can be maintained apart from it, and hence their mutual distinctions also lapse. Moments are distinguishable so long as difference of content holds ; a pure difference is no difference, there being no novel emergence. We arrive therefore at the conception of a consciousness which is not diversified into the empirical form::. 8 , and of which momentarines cuw.ot be predicated. Consc!ousness acquires these forms because of an illusory 'other'. When the blue is sublated, even the consciousncs of blue must go.' It might be urged that even after the cancellation of the illusory snake, the snake-consciousness, which is real by itself, remains. Hence it is possible that when the objective world as a whole is negated, its consciousness might still persist. This possibility is ruled out because there is a difference between the negation cf the snake and that of the world. When the snake is negated, the-world as such suffers no loss. The idea of objectivity reigns unchallenged. The forms of subjectivity, which are sustained and nourished by their projections,. are still there. When objectivity as such is negated, there being nothing to -confront consciousness, it cannot serve even as the subject.10 Even to know a form as subjective, it must be distinguished from the objective, which indicates that the negation of the latter has been merely -verbal. The consciousness of there being nothing objective entails the entertaining of this objectivityll before consciousness. It has not been ftduced to mere naught.

Consciousness therefore is diversified into the various forms because of the illusory idea of the 'other'. These forms are sustained by being projected as objective. With the sublation of objectivity, there remains nothing to confront consciousness, and hence these forms, which are so many reflections of the objective, dissolve themselves into consciousness again. Consciousness is intrinsically free frcm the duality of subject and object. 19 Nor does succession inherently belong to it. It is the Absolute. The Conception of the Absolute Absolutism is the logical culmination of idealism. Conscicu~ne~s is the subject so long as it is opposed by an other. Negation of the latter entails the disappearance of the former. When there is nothing to know, the knowing function also ceases.13 The Absolute is a non-dual consciousness. The duality of the subject and object does not pertain to it. 14 It is said to be void (siinya~, devoid of duality ; in itself it is perfectly real, in fact the only reality. It is sunya, because it cannot be characterised by any of the empir:cal predicates, of which the subject-object relativity is the most fundamental. It is nothing empirical, being free from all determim.tions.15 A th'ng can be characterised only by its relation to other thir gs, i.e., by beir:g deter~nined by its relations. The subject-object relation is the matrix of all relations,l& and when this itself falls away, there remains noth:ng to determine the Absolute, and as such it is siinya. It is eternal, as it is beyond Time ; Time is, as we have seen, nothing else than the succession of forms of consciousness. When these latter have subsided, all change in consciousness lapses. 17 It is transcendent to Reason or discursive thought. Thought works within the framework of the 'other'; relation and distinction are the very essence of thought. Though the 12. PV, II, 354. 13. gra.hyabhave tadagrahat ; VMS, p. 43 ; MVSBT, p. 10, 14, 22-23 ; PV, II. 213 ; LAS, X, 563 ; TSN, 36. 14. MSA, 15. 16. 17.

Absolute is arrived at by an analysis of the natute of consciousness as evinced by empirical knowledge, it is yet something beyond it. There is no consciousness of the Absolute ; Consciousness is the Absolute. It is intuited by the Intellectual Intuition, the culmination of the Transcendental Wisdom.tB The Absolute is not however a mere bundle of negatives. 1 ' Itis indescribable in terms of empirical discourse ; in itself it is very positive. Tn:: negatives are req lired to show its transcendent nature. It is characterised as what cannot be characterised. It is contentless consciousness, Will as pure Act, unilike the passive Being of the Advaita Vedanta. The latter seems onl 'f a dead inertia to the idealist, for whom consciousness, divested of its creativity, is nothing. The Absolute as Pure WUl The form being identical in all absolutistic systems, no distinction can be made in the Absolute itself. Only different approaches to it indicate the different metaphysical standpoints. The idealist will not however adm"t the possibility of an alternative approach, being himself the champion of a speculative system. The Yogacara approach is the conception of consciousness as pure Will. Consciousness denotes a determinate relation between the subj!ct and obj:!ct. This rdation will differ fundamentally according to the emphasis placed upon either of the two terms. It may be understood as mere revelation of the object which exists in its own rlght. Or, the object may be construed as being nothing apart from its consciousness. The latter is the idealistic approach, as exemplified in the Will consciousness. The willed content owes whatever reality it possesses to the fact of its being willed. If exists soleJy in and through the willing of it. In itself it is nothing. Consciousness however is not so dependent upon the content, ~>ince in that case it would have to depend upon a thing which is itself not establishe:l. The subject is th: primary reality ; the content is real only as its form. In r;:alism and realistic systems the relationship is put on an entirely different footing. The object is the only reality ; whatever is found in consciousness is traceable in the objective ; consciousness of the object 18. VMS, p. 43 ; jfianam lokattaram ea tat. 19. Cf. MSA, VI, 1 ; IX, 24.

is itself one more object. It has no unique position of its own. Consciou;ness is helpless before the object which is absolutely indifferent to the former. Knowing is the knowing of something objectively given. The subject has nothing which it can call its own, i.e., which is not given to it by the object. It is pure awareness. Hence when the subject is nothing, consciousness is understood as knowledge, whereas when the object is nothing, it is will. It is a paradox that the willed content is the negation of that will. When a contends willed, it becomes an accomplished fact and consciousness loses all hold over it. It becomes in fact a content known, though by its origin it is a willed content. When I will to do a particular deed, my consciousness rem1ins will, only so long as it is not realised. As soon as the action is done, no am::>unt of will can undo it again. It can only be known, as it has already taken its place in the comity of thing;. The will is re;:dled by the actualised willed content which constitutes a limitation or negation of it. 2o Action is generally taken to be the jurisdiction of the will consciousness. Our information about the so-called external world is supposed to be received by our knowing consciousness. Metaphysics is interested in ab::>lishing this dual conception of consciousness. If action, which is accepted as the realisation of will, yet constitutes a negation of it, consciousness of the external world is a far greater negation of it ; here there is not even the faintest consciousness of willing. Thewill has been completely paralysed here. The paradox is that consdousnecs can be termed will only when it wills contents, but the latter negate it at the same time. That very characteristic by which will is recognised constitutes its negation. The reason is that no em?irical consciousness can be obtained in its absolute purity. Every em?irical case of will is subdued by the knowing function ·of consciousness which is its nego1.tion. Even in the highest flight of productive im1gination where will as the subjeetive reigns supreme, there is yet an alien element of knowledge. When I imtgine that I go to· a dream-land and do all kinds of fantastic things, I am conscious of the fact that this is all within my mind, without the least vestige of objective truth, and to this extent it is a case df will. I am not taken in by it, and the corrective self-consciousness is there all along. But still 20. Cf. Mind as Ptm AGI, p. 261.

it is not free from the knowing function, and is not therefore a case of pure will. Can anybody imagine anything whatsoever which is not imagined objectivdy, i.e., as occurring in space and time ? One may certainly be aware that this is all subjective, but so long as one imagines at all, one does it only as though the content were objective. That is to say, there is no case of will which is not still-born, not waylaid by knowledge. The same is the case with knowledge as well. By definition the knowing consciousness is one where the subject is nothing apart from the revealed object. It must not oppose itself to the object. But in any - case of knowledge, however transparent consciousness might be, it will yet be an other to the object ; it will contemplate the object only from outside, and not reveal the inner nature or essence of it. Strictly speaking, knowing an object must be being 21 it; there is no other\ ·ay of knowing it. lbwever negligible the subject might be, it will yet C0nstitute an op?:->sition or dualism, and as such negation of the object. Consciousness can will a content, only by ceasing to be will; hence, paudoxically again, the pure will wills nothing. 22 As soon as it wills a particular CQntent, the latter is instantaneously precipitat,d into a known content. In all empirical consciousness there is this perverse confusion of the subjective functions, so that one annuls the other. To reach the purity of the will we must go beyond phenomenal consciousness. Pure Will is the Absolute, where all dualism 23 of the will and the willed content is done away with. The Absolute is the pure activity of Will, unobstructed by the willing o.f any content. No empirical will is pure. Its will aspect, if made pure, will become the Absolute. This aspectis the only reality. The other aspect, which is invariably associated with it and makes forits defilement, is the knowing aspect ; this is unreal. Knowledge makes its object independent of the act of knowing ; hence this idea of an independent 'other', or of objecti vlty in general, is the falsification of will. Objectivity is the transcendental illusion, and is the work of Avidya. What is really 21. Cf. brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati. 22. Citta is thus really acitta. VMS, p. 43. 23. na hi abhiitaparikalpa);l kasyacid grahako napi kenacid grhyate kim tarhi grihya-grihakatva-rahitam vastumatram ; MVSBT. 10.

willed is taken to be kno.wn, because of this. The content is real as a form of consciousness. Its appearance as external, as an other to consciousness, is false. Avidya is therefore the objectification of consciousness. The Absolute consciousness is non-dual, but when infected by the illusory idea of the 'other', it is diversified into the subject and object. 2• The function of Avidya is the creation of this fundamental duality. Pure Will, as we have seen, ceases to be will,i.e., it wills no contents. It is like an ocean, unruffled by any hostile element. The idea of an 'other' acts like the wind which disturbs its calm, compelling the insurgence of waves. 25 These waves are as it were the particular moments of consciousness, whose contents are projected as though objective. This creates the duality of the subject and object, which in reality does not belong to consciousness. The subject is certainly not unreal as the object is, but consciousness assumes the function of a subject as soon as it is confronted by an 'other. It does not inherently belong to it, as that would mean the perpetuation of the object. With the negation of tht> object, the subject also lapses. Advaita Vedanta arrives at a form of the Absolute by an analysis of the knowledge function of the subject. The object is indifferent to the knowing of it. Its being is not relative to its being known. It may be known, but it need not. Whether the rope is perceived as a snake or as a rope, it remains entirely unaffected. We have said that no empirical consciousness is pure. It is neither pure will nor pure knowledge, but is invariably a confusion of 1hese two. Our experience is constituted by both the factors; but their different origin is lost sight of, since one is superimposed upon the other. What is the contribution of the subjective is taken to be objective and this is the nature of the Cosmic Illusion in both the forms of absolutism. They depart from each other in their evaluation of these two factors of experience.2e For the Vedantin, the real is the pure object, as unrelated to the kno~ng act ; subjectivity constitutes its negation. The Yogacara makes subjectivity itself the only reality ; 24. avibhago'pi buddhyatma viparyasitadarsanail;l grayhagrahakasamvittibhedavan iva lak~yate ; PV, 11, 354. 25. Cf. MA, VI, 46 ; LAS, X, 56-7. 26. CPB, p. 320.

the in~ependence of the object is its negation. The illusion of the rope-snake occurs because the snake which is subjective in its nature is yet projected as though objective. For the Vedantin the function of Avidyli. consists in covering up the real which is the unrelated object, the rope, and showing in its place, the snake ; the snake is false because it is subjective which has being only as it is related with consciousness (pratibhasika). The Yogli.cli.ra holds that the function of Avidya is just the reverse ; the snake is perfectly real as the form of the subjective ; its illusoriness consists in its objectification ; the snake is false because it is objective. 27 The acceptance of subjectivity as real is connected with another imp::>rtant issue. The illusory appearance of the object may be condemned, but the fact of its appearance cannot be denied. Vedli.nta is interested in denying even the fact of the appearance. The real is the rope, and from its point of view, the appearance of the snake is not a fact. The rope as the unrelated was never involved in it. 2B The snake is· a freak of the subjective, and the subjective does not exist, in the sense that the rope does. The fact of the illusoriness is itself illusory; or at no time was the snake real; it never existed. But the Yogacli.ra m1kes this unrelatedness of the object false. The snake is real only as a subjective fact. The snake-illusion may be cancelled, but that it did appear, and did create a problem, cannot be in dispute. The subjective being real, the fact of the appearance, which is a subjective creation, is also real. Hence for the Yogacli.ra the Real does get involved in the transcendental Illusion ; it cannot remain neutral (kiitastha) in the presence of the illusory. It can certainly regain its purity on negating the object ; but the subjective does change and get modified according to the false app~arance. Vivarttavada cannot be maintained by the Yogacara. The Real is the Will. Will must get involved in the projection of contents. It will be modified according to the forms which it creates and objectifies as the 'other'. Were it unaffected by the change of contents, it will no longer be will ; it will degenerate into a mere passive spectator of the change presented before it. It will be reduced to 27. Cf. Bhamati, p. 26. 28. pratipannopadhau traikii.likani~edha-pratiyogitvam va mithyatvam ; Advaitasiddhi, p. 94.

knowledge, and will lose its creativity. Since the forms are ider..tical with the creating will, the latter cannot be a dead inert Being, but must evolve into the diversity of forms. Avidya defiles the Real ; this defilement itself is unreal in Vedanta, whereas, according to the Yogadira, the Real is really entangled, though that can be helped. Pure will gets defiled when it falsely takes what is its own form as something objective. The transcendental Illusion consists in confusion between the subjective and the objective, and its cancellation is the analysis or distinction between these two. But the question arises : why can we not stop with this distinction ? Only the ascription of the objective on the subjective is false. For the correction of this illusion all that is required is the denial of this ascription or false relation between the two. The negation of objectivity as such seems unwarranted. Both may be real in their own places ; their confusion gives rise to all the trouble, and only this much need be condemned. The two terms are individually real ; only their relation is false. 29 This contention is based upon a wrong understanding regarding the nature of negation. The negation of the illusory will itself show that the two terms are not on a par. With the problem of the negation, that of reality also is intrinsically cor.riected. When the illusory is negated, the real is perceived in its true form. The issue is therefore as to which of the terms is taken as basic, and the other the falsification of it. The 'other' may be real in its own right, but that which appeared herein place of the real is totally negated. That it is real somewhere else has nothing to do with its appearance here. All negation involves an evaluation ; one is preferred to the other. The negation cannot be false without one of the terms being false. 30 When the appearance of the snake is sublated, the sublating consciousness is that the objective snake is absolutely nothing ; it never existed. That the snake is somewhere else objectively real is irrelevant to the present ap?earance. Its objectivity is cancelled once for all. It cannot be urged "should we evaluate at all ?", since evaluation is the very form of 29. This is a variation of the anyatha-khyativada. 30. This logic applies to the Advaita Vedanta also. For the Madhyamika, both the terms, i.e., the entire relational complex, are false. Cf. CPB, Ch. 13, passim.

negAtion. When the snake is neg1ted we realise that its objectivity has no self-ex:istence. It is nourished only as a projection of willconsciousness. In Adva.ita Vedanta, when the snake is negated, it is not reinstated as a subjective fact. The subjective in fact can function onl}" through a mistake, only by falsifying the objectively real. In itself the subjective is nothing. There cannot be a consciousness of snake which does not app:ar as an objective snake. The subjective is only the way of distorting the real. The distortion itself is not a fact; it is only distortion of a fact. And when the Yogacara takes the dreamconsciousness as illusory, he is aware that the apparent objectivity in dreams can never be an individual fact by itself. All the contents of th: dream are in reality only subjective facts : when these are subtracted, there rem1ins nothing which can be said to belong to the o!:>j ::ctive realm. There cannot be a contentless bare objectivity. It is in fact only the way in which these subjective facts are projected, o_1ly a form. of the subjective itself. In both the systems, one of the term5 which gives rise to the confusion is reduced to nil.

The Nature of Avidyll. This gives a clue to the nature of Avidya. Being itself unreal, it cnnot exist by itself. ln.itself it is nothing.a1 It exists only through its fu:tction ; it is what it does. Its entire nature is falsification of the RealH. It exists only bJ exploiting the latter. It is essentially parasitical in its n1ture. Tnough objectivity is an illusion, it can yet be nourished only by the Real, the subjective itself. It is a mistake on the part of the Real, due to ignorance of its own nature. It is the Rea.l which suffers under the illusion of objectivity, by negating itself. Avldya exists only in a.nd through the self-forgetfulness of the Real. Objectivity is unreal ; there is only the idea of objectivity which governs all empirical experience. This idea being a subjective fact, there arises a misunderstanding rega-rding the nature of the subjective. The subjective is the real, and yet the idea of the object being also subjective is again unreal. This is due to a confusion of the two senses in 31. svayam asad api yad akare.1,1a pratibhasate sa bhrantir mayavat ; MVSBT, p. 18. 32. MVSBT, p. 29.

which the term 'subjective' is used. First, the subjective means the epistemic, i.e., the knowing of a thing, not the thing itself. Secondly. the subjective is taken to be the false, as it imports to the objective what is not there. In the Vedanta, these two meanings are equated what is subjective is false, and vice versa. The Yogacara keeps these two separate. The subjective is the only reality ; it is epistemic, and yet exists ontologically. It is at the same time the locus of unreality, since Avidya cannot exist anywhere else. The subjective thinks itself to be something other than what it is ; this thinking itself is subjective. In this sense there is a subjectivity in the subjective, and the former is the falsification of the latter. There is however no contradiction involved in this. A vidya has 1:his peculiar nature that it exists in the Real, and yet is nothing. The two are in fact not of one order, but belong to different planes altogether. They cannot be put side by side, and compared. Avidya exists only so long as the Real is not know:1. This apparent contradictbn exists in the Vedanta as well. Subjectivity is unreal ; universal objectivity or the pure Being is the only reality. But since subjectivity is no·thing in itself, and yet must somehow exist, it can exist only in the Pure Being, i.e., in the objective. It seems that there are two objectives then, one ontological, and the other epistemic. The contradiction can arise, only when they are on a par. But the epistemlc, in the sense -of falsification, is a fact in neither of the two systems. It is, as we have .said, parasitical, and can exist only by exploiting the reality of the Absolute. The difference b::com::s clear when we co!ltrast the idea of objectivity with other ideas. Both are subjective, but the former can exist only through the projection of the real subjective facts. There is no idea of objectivity as such, compuable to the ideas of blue or yellow. It is in fact only the form of the app!arance of the latter. The distinction is that of the transc::ndental function and its empirical product. the objectifying tendency and the object 'blu-::'. This ap?earance being unreal, the form also must be denied. Whatis the genesis of Avidyli ? How is it that the Absolute forgets its pristine purity, and gets phenomenalised ? It is difficult to conceive how the Absolute becomes ignorant all at once. There is no -reason why it should change its natural unruffled existence for a defiled one. If it was not ignorant at any one time, it can never be so. Igno-rance must be pos:ted as alr!a-:ly defiling the Absolute. There is no con-

scious falling into illusion. Avidya is therefore beginningless, but can be cancelled. The progression is invariably from the unreal to the real, and never the other way. If the real becomes involved in unreality without being so beginninglessly, the realisation of freedom, would be futile; the possibility of bor.dage again will always be there.

Absolute and Phenomena Phenomena are the defiled existence of the Absolute. It is the empitical world precipitated by the subject-object duality. Owing to the · idea of an illusory other, the pure Will acquires the subject-function~ and this duality constitutes the empirical world. The reality of the latter is the Absolute, which shines forth when the negation limiting it is removed. The way in which the Absolute is implicated in phenomena must be indicated. The Absolute, as we have said, is defiled by the subject-object duality~ which constitutes its negation. The two terms of this duality are however not on a par. The subject is not unreal. Only its relation to the object is negated. The object is utterly unreal, and is therefore subject to total rejection. The subject is the result of this illusion, but is not itself illusory. Here the speculative bent of the Yo gadirais exemplified. He is aware that the Absolute is free from any relativity, and cannot even be called the subject; yet in the phenomena themselves he distinguishes two aspects, one absolutely unreal, the other real. He has not the heart to condemn the whole of phenomena as illusory. He is interested in showing the Absolute as working in phenomena. The Absolute itself is beyond Reason, ar~d as such is neitherthesubject northeobject. 33 But the two are not equally foreign to it. The Absolute becomes the subject, when infected by the idea of objectivity. The two elements of our empirical experience are not both phenomenal. The subject is in phenomena, but has its root somewhere else. The Absolute is reached by the negation of phenomena. This negation operates in two ways. The object is tot ally rejected ; it is absolutely unreal. The subject on the other hand is real, and as such cannot be negated. It is only purified, i.e., purged out of the idea of the unreal object. The subject, when not confwnted by an 'other• 33. Cf. MSA, p. 55.

to it, is the Absolute. 34 The pure subject is no subject. In the phenomena themselves, one aspect is retained and purified, though however it will not remain phenomenal. This provides an easy transition to the Absolute ; it does not remain utterly dark to us. The Advaita Vedanta provi.:ies another speculative approach to the Absolute. He also distinguishes aspects ·in phenomena themselves, though he will not call one aspect of it phenomenal. The Pure Being is the implicate of all phenomena; it is the pure object. It is not however an object, but its approach is through the realistic analysis of the object. The subject is real only as identical with the object. When it becomes distinct from the latter, and claims to know it, it is unreal. The knowing of the object is rejected 35 ; the object when free from all knownness is the Absolute. The Vedanta analysis of knowledge being realistic, the Absolute is never affected by phenomena. The object of knowledge is indifferent to the knowing of it; it rem1ins identical (kiitastha). Hence the Absolute is never really objectified. What appears before knowledge is largely subjective; the pure object is only the "thatness" (satta) of things which never appears. The Absolute is not really the object, but the implicate of it. It does not become the object. The appearance of the object is superimposed upon it ;it is an ascription (vivartta). In the Yogacara idealism the Absolute is really involved in phenomena. It actually becomes the subject; its diversification (pari1).ama) into different knowledges having different forms is a fact. The reason has already been indicated. The Will cannot rem1in neutral in willing its content. The content is identical w~th it, and constitutes therefore its determination. But in spite of its evolution being ontological, it does not militate against its absoluteness, since the change is not integral to it. In any form of absolutism the relation between the Absolute and phenomena can be understood in two ways. The Absolute can be wholly immanent in phenomena, so that it is nothing apart from the latter. Hegel may be taken as the representative of this view ; the Hegelian Idea is merely the totality of phenomena. It is not the deni34. yada tvalambanam vijfianam naivopalabhate tada, sthitam vijfiana-matratve grahyabhave tad agrahat ; VMS, p. 43. 35. It is avedya (unknown), though aparok~avya.vahara-yogya (the implicate of all knowledge.).

of an Olympic realm, looking down upon the mundar..e world below. The Absolute Idea i.r the world as viewed with all abstractions removed. Other thinkers hold that in this hypothesis the Real will be subject to all the defilements characteristic of the empirical world. In their attempt to keep the purity of the Absolute intact they contend that it is wholly transcendent to phenomena, that one has nothing to do with the other. In the so-called dark period of the Western philosophy this controver5y raged high. This is based however on a misunderstanding of the nature of the Absolute and its relation to phenomena. The Yogacara is aware of the fact that not only these two do not militate against each other, but both are even necessary for an adequate comprehension of the Absolute. They are in fact different aspects of the same relation which phenomena bear to the Absolute. The Absolute is both immanent as well as transcendent to phenomena. It must be immanent, as because it is the reality of the latter. Were it an other to phenomena, the two would lie side by side, and one would not constitute the falsity of the other, and the other its reality. Absolutism is not a two-layer metaphysics. If the two are different, the negation of phecomena cannot yield the Absolute. Phenomena cannot even be negztcd; sir ce, if they are other than the Real, they would exist in their cwn right, ar_d would no longer be parasitical. Difference therefore cannot be maintained between the Real and the illusory. But nor can they be identical. 27 If the Absolute is nothing other than phencmeca, it would itself become illusory. In this case also, pher_omena cannot be negated ; they are deemed unreal only because of some norm or stacdard which itself is not phenomenal. In a total immanence this norm cannot be had. The Absolute must transcend phencmena ; otherwise it will not be Absolute at all. There is however no contradiction involved in this. This is the peculiar nature of the relation that the false bears to the real ; it can neither be identical with nor different from the latter. In the Advaita Vedanta th's ccncept presents no problem, since the Real is never involved in phenomena ; it always transcends the latter, though phenomena are nothing apart from it. But in the Yogadira system it would seem that the transcendence of the Absolute cannot be main2eO

tained, since its defilement is ontological. The Absolute becomes phenomenal, and this becoming is factual. Still however, the transeendence is there, since this change or becoming is not an integral part of the Absolute ; it can be helped. The change itself may not be illusory, but it happens because of the transcendental illusion. Once this illusion is dispelled, the Absolute regains its transcendence. We have said that the negation of the phenomenal gives us the Absolute. Yet so long as one thinks of having realised the reality of pure consciousness with no trace of an other to it, the negation of phenomena has not been complete.ss There can be no sdf-consciousness, i.e., the consciousness of freedom, in the pure Will. This consciousness can arise only by contrasting it with the empirical consciousness ; along with the total negation of the la,tter even the consciousness of freedom must go. 89 It can be accepted only during the process of realization., not in the realised state. Self-consciour.ness of phenomena is inherendy unstable. It must be distinguished from the ordinary consciousness, where the notion of falsity finds no place ; yet it car. not be separated from the latter, since it is the consciousness of the phenomenal itself, viewed as illusory. This cor. sciounsess cannot be dispensed with, because the quest for the Real will not even arise without it. It is not however ultimate ; in the Absolute, even the consciousness of having achieved it cannot remain. 40 It is an absolutely non-dual consciousness, pure Will, enjoying itself with no disturbing presence of an 'other', even if that other be its own reflex. There being no 'other', the contingency of turning back upon itself, which is implied in the consciousness of freedom, is precluded. It is Tathata or Vijiiaptimatrata par excellence. 41

Doctrine of Truths All forms of absolutism are necessarily committed to the doctrine of a plurality ·of Truths. An absolutistic metaphysics cannot stop with 38. MSA, XI, 47 ; also 48 ; VMS, p. 42-3. 39. MVSBT, p. 23-24. 40. tathatanimittaparivarjanam tathateyam ity api abhoganimittaparivarjanat ; MSA, p. 191; MSA, XI, 47 ; MVSBT, p. 23 ; VMS, p. 43. 41. VMS, p. 42 ; MVSBT, p. 41.

the empirical experience ; it must make a distinction between what i.r and what appears. What exists is real ; what appears to exist has only a semblance of reality. In itself it is naught. This distinction between phenomena and noumenon, between the relative and the Unconditioned, is the very essence of absolutism. The acceptance of a plurality of Truths-the real (paramartha) on the on hand and the apparent (samv!'ti) on the other-is therefore common to all systems other than rank realism. The realist identifies these two ; for him the apparent is the real. For the Yogacara what appears is an illusory duality ; the Real is non-dual consciousness. The Real is invariably obscured by appearance,42 There are therefore two orders of existence, one empirical, the other transcendent. Empirical existence is conditioned by the subjectobject duality, while the other is free from the least trace of it. These two orders of existence constitute the so-called plurality of Truthsthe paramartha and the samv!'ti.4 3 A p::>ssible misconception must be avoided here. If there are two orders of existence, it may be objected, these would constitute two reals, and this militates against the absoluteness of the pure Will, which does not allow an other to stand out against itself. Both the realms cannot be true sim'.lltaneously. There is no common factor present identically in these two which can make both of them true. The objection would not arise if the relation between samv!'ti and paramartha were correctly understood. These two do not consdtute different realms of existence, each independently ~:eal. There is only one Truth ; pltamartha is the only reality. Samv!'ti is only empirically real ; it suffic~s so long as one is rootd in phenom'!nal activities. With th:: dawn of philosophic consciousness, the superficial texture of phenomena is torn asunder, and the inner core, the essential reality of dharmas (dharmata), is revealed. Samvrti is truth by courtesy. Strictly sp;!aking, it is mere appearance, unreal like a drearr. or a mirage. It is called a Truth because it is taken as such by the ordinary folk, for whom it is the only truth. Paramartha is not another reality along with samvrti, but is the essence of samvrti itsel£. 44 Phenomena, freed 42. tattvam saii=hii'.:lhya balanam atattvam khya.ti sarvatal;l ; MSA, XIX, 53. 43. MSA, XI, 16. 44. MSA, XI, 13.

from the false notion of objectivity, are the paramartha or the Absolute. This also disposes of the question as to why samvfti need be considered at all? If it is a mere naught, its discussion is an idle task; one should confine one's attention to the transcendentally real. Dreams as they are, phenomena should not engage one's serious notice. The ob jection would have been pertinent, were the objector already consicous of the falsity of phenomena. For him its consideration is futile enough. But for the phenomenal beings, samvrti is not a mere naught. It does appear and create a problem. Dreams are realised to be nothing only on waking. Moreover there is no other way to realise the Absolute than by being aware of the nothingness of phenomena.46 It is only by a serious a~d sustained consideration of phenomena that the paramart:ha is known. There is no other mysterious access to it. Samvrti may be nothing in itself-in fact it is nothing-it needs to be realised as such nevertheless. The negation of samvrti is the dawn of paramartha. Since the negation is to be significant, the consideration of samvrti cannot be avoided. To denounce all phenomena as samvrti is however an extreme position. For a system which is all criticism and has no view about the real, as the Madhyamika4 6 is, there is nothing to pick and choose in phenomena themselves. Since he offers no account of his own for the explanation of phenomena, he is not interested in preferring any particular aspect of it to another. He can therefore relegate the whole of empirical existence under one category, viz., samvrti and condemn it as unreal. But the Yogacara is a speculative system, and professes to give a constructive interpretation of all experienr.e. He leads to the Absolute (paramartha) through a particular approach ; he shows that the Real is working within phenomena in a particular way. The whole of empirical experience is therefore not equally despicable. In phenomena themselves there are two asp~cts-the one utterly unreal, and the other real, though infected by the former. Sam.vrti must be split into two, 45. tathyasamvt:tisopanam antarel:}.a vipascital, tattvaprasadasikhararohal:}.am na hi yujyate ; quoted in Abhi.ramayalankiiraloka, p. 150. Cf. also MVSBT, pp. 11-12 ; 47. 46. For the Madhyamika conception of Two Truths, see CPB, p. 243. ff.

the subject and the object. These two factors of all experience are not of an equal status. There are thus three, and not merely two, Truths. First, there is the paramartha which is called parinitpanna in this system. This is the Absolute. Secondly, there is the phenomenalized aspect of the Real. This is known as the paratantra which denotes the subjective. The third is the object, which has no reality whatsoever, apart from the consciousness of it. It is merely imagined to exist ; it has no intrinsic existence of its own ; it is therefor:! only parikalpita. The parat. ntra and the parikalpita together constitute our emp!rical t..tperience (samvrti), while consciousness as non-conceptual is the Absolute (paramlirtha). The Advaita Vedlinta provides another spi!culative approach to the Absolute. It also has a constructive theory of phenomena, a norm of explana'ion for all things. Phenomena of themselves however do not indicate why they should be interpreted in a particular way. Different kinds of patterns are exemplified in our empirical experience. Speculative metaphysics stresses one at the cost of all others, and universalizes it to the extent of fitting all experience without exception to it. Identity as well as difference are required to make an} knowledge possible. Why the Vedlinta should prefer identity to difference and make it basic, while explaining the other aw ~y as illusory, is inexplicable. This much initial dogmatism is intrinsic to all speculative metaphysics. The pattern which is thus universalized is therefore taken from the empirical experience itself. If the whole of phenomena is but an appearance, this universalization also must be shown to be an extension of a particular factor of empirical exp:!rience. The w::>rld-illusionis interpreted analogically, as illustuted by the parallel case of emp!rical illusion. Empirical illusion therefore must be distinguished from the transcendental illusion, since the latter is established on the strength of the former. Both the Vedhta and the Yogliclira employ the analogical argument, but their interpretaton of the empirical illusion itself is from radically oppJsite standpoints. This gives us two degrees of the illusory which are know.1 in the Advaita Vedli.:tta as the prltibhlisika and the vyliva.hlirika. It involves no distinction of kind. The vylivahlirika is equally unreal as the other is; butit enjoys a relative stability, while the other is illusory even empirically. They must be distinguished because the prlitibhlisika provides the pattern for exphining the vylivahadka, i. e., the w .lrll-ill u si on.

Strictly speaking, there is no qualitative difference between the natures of the two. From the point of view of ultimate reality, even the vyiivahiirika is tuccha. 4 7 The Real, or the pliramarthika, as it is termed in this system, remains absolutely self-identical through all these gradations of the illusory. Everything phenomenal, as well as the priitibhasika, can be equally rejected as illusory, because the Real is affected by neither. It is indifferent as to how many appearances ar nanayal}. p.1ratantratal}.. LAS, CX, 151. VMS, p. 40.

system of judgments, can claim complete truth. On the other hand nothing is completely false. No element in experience need be utterly rejected. Only its abstraction is removed and it takes its place in the total harmony. So each element is true to the extent it reaches to the Idea, and false in so far as it falls short of it. Thus a gradation is. constituted of the varying "degrees of Truth," beginning from the most abstract and culminating in the whole Idea. This is hardly the place for entering into a detailed consideration of this theory. It is clear however that the Yogacira doctrine of the three Truths cannot be interpreted to mean degrees of Truth, and still' less, kinds of Truth. Truth is one, and that is the Absolute. There cannot be more or less of Truth ; a thing is either wholly true or utterly false. If it is only partially true, it has a composite being then, and must be split up into the true and the false. Paratantra is not less true than the parini~panna; it is parini~panna, when divested of the illusory idea governing its paril).ama. Nothing is added to or subtracted from vijiiana, in negating parikalpita, when it becomes parini~panna. Parini~panna is not mere of paratantra ; it does not include the latter and something else, as the Hegelian Idea does the lesser truths. Because of the presence of the parikalpita, consciousness is diversified into the paratantra-into the willing of determinate contents. When the illusory infection is taken away, will becom::s pariri~panna and ceases to will any content. Strictly speaking it is no will. Consciousness ( citta) becomes acitta. Yet it is vijiiana itself that is both. Hence it is stated that there is no difference between experiencing a content (upalabdhi) and ceasing to experience it (anupalabdhi)65; consciousness remains essentially the same, whether it be in its absolute purity (parini~panna), or be diversified into the willing of contents (paratantra). The two realities are not certainly completely identical, but nor are they absolutely different. That which appears is then the Abhiitaparikalpa, and it appears into the form of the subject-object duality. When the former (parata.ntra) is freed from this illusory duality, it becomes the non-dual Consciousness, the essence of dharmas (advayadharmata). The first is absolutely non-existent. As to the second (paratantra), only its form of appear65. MVSBT, p. 23-4; tasmac ea samata jiieya nopalambhopalambhayol}..

THE YOGACARA CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE

ance-the subject-object duality-is non-existent ; it exists, but not as it appears to exist. The third (parini~panna) is reached through the non-existence of this duality. 66 All the three are thus based on the same act of negation which culminates in the Absolute Consciousness.67 The whole of em.?irical discourse (vyavahara) is constituted by the parikalpita. The basis of it is the p.uatantra. The parini~panna is of the nature of the negation ofthis. 68 Abhiitaparikalpa is consciousness or the subjective, since this is the b1sis (adhi~thana) of the constructive imagination (avidya). That which is co:1structed is the object which has no existence whatsoever, apart from the activity of its -construction. &9 The Absolute is reached through a process of negation. This negation applies differently to the three Truths. Each is declared void {nil_l.svabhava), but in different senses. All the three are sadasat ; affirm:1.tion and negation are both applied to each of them. The naive affirmJ.tion of the p:uikalpita and the pa.ratantra must be sublated, while the affirmation of the parini~p.1nna is reached through this negation alone. There are three kinds of nissaphaV.ltas (essencelessness) according to the three kinds of Truths 70 : (1) Lak)a~a-nissvabhavata, (2) Utpatti-nissvabhavata, and (3) Paramartha-nissvabhavata. (1) The Parikalp:ta is unreal by its very nature. The object has absolutely no being. Its apparent characteristics (lak~at:J.a) only appear to belong to it ; in reality they are chaucteristics of the forms of consciousness. The object cannot be characterised by any real predicates. It is essentially void, like the sky-lotus.71 Its naive affirmation must be sublated.u The p1rikalpita has therefore the Vtk~aQ.anissvabhavata. (2) The case with the p:uatantra is different. It is as we have s:::en real. fetters of mind ; it is a b.llanced equanimity of m'nd, unruffled by any objective vicissitude. Spiritual discipline is thus purely a subjective process. It is true that philosophy cannot change facts ; but it can effect the greatest of

THE YOGACAR. DISCIPLINE

all changes ; it can change ourselves. A philosophic discipline has nothing to do with the objective world. Moreover, in the Yoglidira system, there is no such world at all. Consciousness is the sole reality. Both bondage and freedom therefore pertain only to consciousness. What is the c:ause of bondage ? In agreement with the essential spirit of Indian philosophy, the Yogliclira holds that bondage is due to ignorance ( avidya )5. A.s to the nature and function of ignorance, systems differ in accordance with their different standpoints. In idealism ignorance consists in taking the apparently objective world as independently real. The object is not external to consciousness ; it is only a mode of the latter. Ignorance about the real nature of the object evokes attachment and aversion in mind, because of which it suffers bondage. Bondage or suffering is therefore caused by the false idea of there being som::thing external and real. 6 Dreams can move us only so long as the dream-contents are supposed to be external. On waking they are realised to be purely imaginary, subjective, and they lose their power of making us suffer. So long as a content is supp:::>sed to be som::thing external to us, it constitutes a limitation of ouroelves The acquisition of that content appears to be a real increase of the ego. If it is something obnoxious we would like to protect ourselves by avoiding it. When however the ideality of that content is realised, it becomes one with ourselves , and therefore no longer to be desired or feared. It can make us suffer only so long as it is supposed to be something external and foreign to us. Objectivity is therefore bondage. Owing to this false idea, consciousness becomes infected by the subject-object duality (grahadvaya). It begins to project contents as though objective. The vicious chain of pratityasamutplida is started. Pure Will evolves into the three vijfianas, the root of which is the .Alaya. .Alaya is the Abhiitaparikalpa since it projects contents where they are not. .Alaya is samslira and .is bondage. 7 Because of the false projection of objective dharmas, an ego also is 5. MVSBT, p. 29. upaplutli]:l., 6. klimasokabhayonmadacaurasvapnady api pasyanti purato' vasthitan iva ; PV, 11, 282. 7. MSA, XI, 32 ; also XIX, 49. 8. MSA, XI, 49.

at the same time posited.8 This is klesa, along with its attendant satellites.' This is the defilement of Will. The object is a negation of will. When an object is projected by w.ill-consciousness, it loses its hold over it. It becomes merely a p1ssive spectator, helpless before the cJntent which, thouGh willed, is crystallised into a known content. The object is thus an obstruction or limitation of will. It ceases to be will, when c:>nfronted by the object. Liberation is the regaining of the soverdgnty of Will by negating the object and breaking down its obstinate externality. When will pnjects a content, it becomes limited by the latter. The consciousness of blue cannot be that of yellow at the same time. But when the blue is negated and its essential identity with consciousness established, the latter is no longer determined by the blue. Consciousness becomes uaiversal. 1 0 It is not the consciousness of any p1rticular content. This universal Will is the Absolute. Nirva!).a is the realization of this u.,iversality.u It is the freedom of consciousness from the duality of the subject and the object.l2 It is the retracting of Alaya fr::>m its forward movement (asrayaparavrtti)1 3 • .Asrayaparavt:tti is the disap?earance of the unreal object, and the realisation of Tathata ; a:1d this is freedom (m:>k~a) 14. Impelled by the Transcendental Illusion of the idea of objectivity, it goes on projecting the forms of the so-called empirical objects, giving rise to various pravt:ttivijiianas which, in their own turn, replenish it further. The .Alaya is thus the support (asraya) of the entire phenomenal world. A vicious c:rc!e is started from which there is no escape. The .Alaya creates an tentially a Bllddha, i.e., contains the potentialities of complete Buddhahood. Everybody is tathagatagarbha2' ; this is the great advance the Mahii.yii.na made over the Hinayana. Everybody does not actually strive for freedom however because of the differences in the sprititual attitude ( gotra )" of different persons. People are not all alike in having parallel spiritual developments. 28 Only one in millions is aware of the intensity and universality of evil and misery, and for . him alone is the spiritual d,iscipline significant. The gotra has two aspectsl1 : fundamental ( pralq:tistha ), existing in every living being £rom the very outset, and paripu~ta, that which undergoes the pr:>cess of development. Since everybody is a potential Buddha, the former aspect is essentially identical in all' persons. But there are very great differences indeed so far as the second aspect is concerned. It is this that distinguishes a layman who is not yet spiritually awakened from a saint who has attained the matudty of spiritual or philosophic consciousness. All>ng with the develop01ent of spirituality the gotra produces a Dletatnorphosis ( parii.vttti ) of the elements of a personality

23. tasmat sail.klebvi~uddhikii.layoo 'iinyataiva vUuddhyata iti ; MVSBT, p. 42. 24. MSA, IX, 37. 25. MSA, Ill, 2. 26. Cf. MSA, IX, 15-16 ; also 34. 27. Obermiller. The S11biime Science, p. lOO.

(i.e., the eight vijiianas ) into the elet11ents of Buddhahood.• The gotra is a kind of forceD or dynamism latent in man, which makes him strive for spirituality. This force is exhausted at the time of realisation of nirviQa. 30 The gotra is in fact identical with the Absolute31.

The Spiritual Discipline The various stages of the tortuous path of spiritual discipline have been discussed with a wealth of minutest details, born out of p-ersonal realisation, in texts like Abhiramayalank4ra, Mtzhayanarutrilatik4ra etc. The details are out of !_)lace in a metaphysical essay. Only the broadest outline can be indicated here. The initial stage is known as the Sambharamiirga ( the Path of Accumulating Merit), and is only preparatory to the higher levels of the disciplina!"Y path. Consciousness is defiled by the two obstructions which hide its real nature. These are klesavaral}.a and jiieyivaraJ].a.111 The klesas are pain and evil pertaining to the empirical level. The root of all pain is however intellectual. When the object is wrongly imagined to exist as it is not, it repels the will-consciousness. This is the primary obstruction, imagining that there is something to be known. This is jiieyivaraQa. These obstructions can be removed by the accumulation of merits and wisdom ( pw;J.yajiiana-sambhira ).sa Mere accumulation of merits is not sullicient, since the root of all evil is intellectual. The real antiodote is therefore knowledge, knowing things as they really are. This is the highest wisdom ( prajiiiparamiti) and this alone "Can remove jiiey~araQa by realising the nothingness of the object and consequently, the purification of consciousness. It is jiianas ambhlra therefcre that is the basic remedy for 'the evil of empirical existence ; pw;J.yasambhara is only subsidiary. 28. The Sublime Stiente, p. 100-1. 29. Ibid, p. 102. 30. Ibid, p. 103. 31. AbhiraiiJayilalikiira, I, 39. For a discussion of the differ-ant interpretations of the concept of gotra see The Sublime Stiente. pp. 97-102. 32. VMS, p. 44. 33. MSA, VI, 6.

J

iiana is philosophic wisdom. The root of all evil being theoretical, viz., ignoranca, the antidote can only be philosophy, right knowledge of things as they are. At first this knowledge remains only verbal and mediate ( §rutamaya). Mere intellectual knowledge is not however sufficient. This insight must be intensely meditated on ( cintam1ya ), and lastly, one must deeply concentrate on this theoreticll understanding of things ( bhavanamaya) so that it is immediately realise:l ( aparapra.tyaya ) as the ultim1te truth. Complete realization comes howe~er only in the subseqcent stages. Next comes the Prayogamarga (the Path of Training. ) The Bodhiuttva undertakes an intense cultivation of the philosophic wlsd om, th::::>r!~ically a; well a'S pr.a.ctically. Realising that the objects are only s11bjective creations ( manojalp1 ), he ceases to perceive any objective dharma ( sarva.:lharmin na pa.syati) ; he realises that they are only the two kinds of projections of the subjective imagination, viz., the svalak~aQ.a and the saminya.lak~aQ.a. This is the V{magatiivasthiiM of the di.,ciple. He obtain> the first sparks of the spiritual enlightenment ( dharmiloka) which he strives to make steady, and cultivates still m:>re ·intense practices ( d~~ham viryam arabhate ). This is the Miirtlhiiuasth!i.ao With the intensification of the insight, the Bodhisattva realises the sole re tlity of consdousness ( cittatnatre avati~thate cittam eta_d iti prativedhiit ). He sees everything only as appearances of consc;iousness ( citta eva sarvarthapratibhisatvam pasyati ). Nothing is independent and external to consciousness. Thus the diversification of consciousness as the object to be known ( grahyavik~epa ) is removed ; there remains only the other diversification, viz., consciousness as the knowing subject ( grahakavik~epa ). This stage is known as the K.ryi.1fyJVJstbii. 36 The sublation of the object is comparatively easier than the realisation of the unreality of the subject ; the latter dawns only in the subsequent higher stages of the path. The former only paves the way for the latter ( grahakanupalambhanukiila) which is the real freedom of consciousness. After this there is the LtJuki/e.iigradharmJuasthiJ3'1 in which the Bod!lisattva enters into. the A.nantarya-

samadhi. The trance is so-called because the deeper diversification of consciousness as the knower ( grahakavik~epa) is removed immediately after this ( anantara ).38 Realising the unreality of the object, even the awareness of the sole reality of consciousness ceases. 39 After this all the subsequent stages are transic. The Bodhisattva enters into higher and higher transic states. The next stage is the Darfanamiirga ( the Path of Vision ). The sage has an intuition of the highest realit:;·, free from the false dualism of the knower and the known ; he has a non-dual, non-conceptual and pure ( since the two obstructions have been completely destroyed) intuition of the ultimate and unique substance of the universe ( sarvatragadharmadhatu ), and enters into the first bhiimi, characterised by the withdrawal of the A.laya ( asrayaparavp:ti ). 40 He realises the essential identity of every living being and thinks of them in terms of himself.u He acquires the characteristic excellences of the attainment of Enlightenment ( Bodhi ), like smrtyupasthana etc. Though he has no pain of his own, he grieves at the misery of suffering mankind. The next and highest stage is the Bhiivaniimiirga ( the Path of Concentration) in which the Bodhisattva enters into the rest of the bhiimkHe obtains a complete mystic intuitio~ of the Absolute. This intuition is twofold. 42 First is the nirvikalpa or the samahita ( transic )jiiana.&s "It is a mystic Gnosis, a direct supernatural intuition of the Saint ( arya) . " It is immediate and entire 1y personal. The other is the prHhalabdha-jiiana, the empirical ( laukika) knowledge that arises in the wake of the first transcendental intuition. This knowledge is conceptual ( savikalpa). "It is a logically constructed explanation of what has been perceived in trance, as far as it is capable of logical explanation."" Unlike the first, this can be communicated to others 38. MSA, XIV, 27. 39. MVSBT, p. 23 ; MSA, XI, 47. 40. MSA, XIV, 28-9. 41. MSA, XIV, 30. 42. MSA, x"V, 43 ; MVSBT, pp. 29-30. 43. The form of this non-conceptual intuition is the same in the Madhyamika and the Yogacara. cf. MSA, p. 191. 44. Obermiller, The Doctrine of Prajiiiipii,.amita, p. 20.

who are still ignorant. The transic culmination is reached in the Vajroapamasamadhi, which is so-called bt:ing impenetrable ( abhedya) by any subjective construction ( vikalpa )". The process of the retracting of the Alaya ( i~rayaparivftti) is completed. The intuition is absolutely pure, being free from any trace of the two obstructions ( sarvaklda-jiieyivarat}.a-nirmali ). The disciple at1ains the universality of consciousness ( sarvakarajiiata ), which is no longer limited by particular objects. He rests in the absolute and ultimate reality ( anuttarapada ), and strives for the well-being of all humanity. The different stages of the disciplinary process ( yogabhiimis) are sometimes condensed into 6ve,'8 viz., adhara, adhana, adarsa, aloka and abaya. Adhara is the reception of the verbal knowledge, taught by Buddha. Adhana is deep attention and meditation regarding the same. A.darsa is the resting of consciousness in its own essence by the sub!~' tion of the object. A.loka is the correct vision of things as they really are by negating their externality and affirming their reality, viz. identity with consciousness. Asraya is the consequent retracting of the .Alaya. This is nirvit}.a. As already discussed in the last chapter, consciousness of freedom is incompatible with freedom~ One can be self-conscious of one's freedom only by contrasting it with the consciousness of bondage, ~d this entails entertaining the idea of objectivity still. With the total sublation of this idea, even the consciousness of having attained freedom must go. To be aware of freedom is to allow something to stand out against consciousnes~, be it the idea of its own freedom, and this militates against the absoluteness of consciousness. 47

Bhilmia and Plrami.tls No account of the Yogacira discipline can be complete without some mention of the elaborate and detailed formulation of the payamita discipline and the minute description of the bhiimis. The details are out of place here, since the paramita discipline is nothing peculiar to the Yogicira. It is found in a crude form in the early Hinayana texts ; 45. 46. 47. gmta\1

the Yogadira simply accepted the entire doctrine elaborated in the Mahayana. The traditional theory is the analysis of the disciplinary process into the six piramitis,• viz., Dina, Sila, K~inti, Vlrya, Dhyina and Prajiia.4B The preliminary 111:ages are more or less ethical rather than distinctively spiritual. The pl!ramiti discipline is not however the mere practice of morality. The guiding principle throughout is the Prajiiapiramiti, which informs and sustains the entire process from the very beginning. It is saturated by the philosophic wis~om regarding the ultimate.truth. The discipline is intellectual through and through, being governed by the theoretical understanding of the nature of things. It is Prajiii alone from which the process takes its cue, and in which it reaches its complete fruition. The parami.ta discipline is not peculiarly characteristic of the Y.ogacara, since it can go along with any philosophy so far as the latter makes a distinction between the apparent and the real. The piramiti discipline is common b:>th to the Midhyamika and the Yogicara. The difference between them is purely theoretical ; it centres around the content of Prajiii, i.e., the standpoint from which intuition of the ultimate reality is obtained. Apart from this philosophic understanding of things, the paramiti discipline is adopted by all the schools of Buddhism. The conception of bhumis also appeared early in the history of Buddhism. In the Mahavastu are described50 ten bhumis, but the list differs totally from that given in the Mabi!Janasiitralankara, Dafabhiimi,~siitra etc. T~e bhumis ar'e not physical planes of. existence, but are stages of .spiritual development of the Bodhisattva's career. The Yogadira list of the ten bhumis is51 : (a) Pramuditi, (b) Vimala, 48. MSA, XVL 49. "The list of the first six appears to be original, as it ends with the attainment of full knowledge of wisdom, Prajiii. But the Dafabhiimikasiitra has four more, which make a list fitting imperfectly with the ten stages." E. J. Thomas, The History if BNI!dhist ThougM, p. 211. 50. The Histury of Buddhhist Thought, p. 203.

(c) Prabhikari, (d) Arci$mati, (e) Sudurjayi, (f) Abhimukhi, (g) Diiratigami, (h) Acali, (i) Sidhumati, and (j) Dharmameghi. The bhumis are sometimes also described as vihiras .. In the Bodhilattvabhiimi, the number of vihiras is increased to twelve or (including the Buddha stage) 'thirteen.lll These are all scholastic elaborations which are not of any theoretical importance. The only point to be noted is that all through the career of the Bodhisattva run two motives, the aim of becoming a Buddha in order to save every human being (mahikaruQi) and the attainment of absolute truth in Prajii.ipiramiti.

THE CONCEPT OF THE TATHAGATA The Tathagata occupies the same place in Buddhism as Isvara does in Advaita Vedanta. He is the God of religion, an object of worship and veneration. He has also infinite compassion for the suffering mankind but for Whose grace their redemption would not be possible. Can an absolutism have any place for a personal God ? He must be distinguished from the Absolute ; ·the latter is not a person but a principle. Nothing can be predicated of the latter, it being th"e negation of all thought-categories. The Tathagata however is conceived of as having infinite good qualities, supernatural powers etc. Moreover the Absolute can tolerate no other to it. It is a nondual principle. The Tathagata on the other hand is posited only to lend succour to the ignorant humanity. If there were no finite persons, struggling in a finite world, a God would be utterly superfluous. He cannot therefore be simply equated with the ultimate reality, as is done in theistic systems and religions. But nor can He be anything phenomenal, since in that case He would be m~ely one among other phenomenal beings, and subject to the same sufferings for the removal of which a God was admitted. A being under the sway of Avidya is not free ; when he attains freedom he becomes one with the Absolute. A per.-on who is yet free is an absurdity. The argument for the existence of Tathagata has two aspects, viz.,. its metaphysical necessity in the system and secondly, its logical tenability. The Yogacara represents a particular line of approach to the ultimate reality. This latter is conceived by him as the Absolute of Will. This entails a particular explanation of phenomena, based on the fundamen_tal doctrine of consciousness as creative. The question is: how does the Yogacara become aware of this fact ? The knowledge of the illusoriness of the object is not an empirical one.l The object does not proclaim itself to be illusory. The obvious answer 1. Cf. Ch. 7.

that the total failure of all devices to render the object intelligible sets the norm of explanation is not satisfactory : this presupposes a prior prejudice in favour of the subject. Once this basic concept is given the rest of the dialectic of idealism can be worked out by reason : but what reason cannot account for is how this "basic concept or pattern itself is given. This problem as to why one particular Analytic is chosen in preference to other possible Analytics equally plausible is inherent in all speculative metaphysics. It indicates an alogical source though working by means of logic. A -being rooted in phenomena can ha-ye no inkling even of the existence ofthe Unconditioned2; or, if the demand for the Unconditioned be a natural disposition of mind, as Kant would have it, he cannot have the faintest conception of the positive content or character of the Unconditioned. That can only be revealed by a person already in the possession of such a know ledge. That person can certainly not be any one of us; the problem as to how he comes to know of it would remain unsolved. The person can only be that who was never ignorant, who is not phenomenal at all. God or the Tathagata is such a person. But the necessity for the Tathagata in the Yogacara metaphysics would be of no avail if the concept were inherently unstable. The next step in the argurhent is to show the logical tenability of the concept of Tathagata. Consciousness, as we have already seen, is creative. This creativity has two aspects 3 ; first, when it is governed by the idea of objectivity, it goes on projecting an 'other' ; the 'other' is in reality only the form of consciousness, but is yet invariably perceived as something obje::tive. This is the C()smic Illusion under which the will suffers. When the illusory 'other' is sublated, Will reverts back to its natural state of pure A.ct, where it wills only itself. This is the se'tond aspect of its creativity. But the possibility of an intermediate state between those two aspects must be recognised, where the Will is self-conscious of itself. Here the 'other' is still present, but its apparent externality is realised to be illusory. It is a transitional stage from ignorance to knowledge. It is neither pure Will nor again defiled will. 4 It is not pure since it is still a consciousness of the 'other'. Nor is it defiled

as it does not mistake the 'other' as something objective, is l\Ot taken in by it. The self-conscious Will can be neither identical with nor different from the defiled will. If it is identical with the latter, it cannot be the consciousness of it, it cannot analyse and correct it. But if it is different from the latter, it would not be relevant to it. It will simply be another consciousness but would not be self. consciousness. In that case also it cannot analyse or correct the defiled will. This state of ·self-consciousness is obviously unstable as the two aspects in it cannot be reconciled with its Wlityl. It cannot be made ultimate. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied. It is that state where Will has become free from its objective entanglements, but is yet short of the Absolute in that it is conscious of its freedom. • The personality of Tathigata is constituted by such a self-conscious WiiJ, and this concept lies at the basis of Isvara in the Advaita Vedinta'. It cannot be denied since that would entail the denial of any consciousness of the hollowness of objectivity. Such a consciousness must be accorded a third place as it refuses to be identified either with the contentless Will, i.e., the Absolute, or with will as petrified by the idea of objectivity, i.e., will suffering under Avidya. 'The Tathagata is the co~mic counterpart of this consciousness of the illusory object, i.e., the consciousness of freedom. He is not, and cannot be, ultimate. He condescends to be still confronted by an 'other' out of his boundless compassion for the suffering mankind. He is not bound by it, since the corrective self-consciousness of the illusoriness. of the 'other' is always present. He perceives the 'other', but always as a creation of consciousness and is therefore never taken in by it. He enjoys an amphibious status. Though He is in phenomena and is Himself but 5. Cf. Ch. 7. 6. Cf. VMS, p. 42-3. 7. This concept is even stabilised and raised to an ultimate status in the Pratyabhijiia system (Kashmir Saivism). In this system there obtains an inexpressible and non-relational identity between the principle and the person, i.e., between the Absolute and its creativity (between Siva and Sakti). Its creativity is not therefore due to Avidya as in the Yogacara, but ensues out of its consciousness of freedom itself. Siva is free to create or not to aeate. Here the Absolute and God are identified.

phenomenal, He yet knows the true nature of phenomena and therefore transcends it at the same time. These two aspects of His being are very aptly put in Mahiiyiinasiitrii/ankiira where it is said that the Bodhisattava has two kinds of sambhliras6 , viz., pui}.yasambhara and jftanasambhara. Because of the former He does good to the world, but by His jftanasambhara His existence here is not defiled by the kle5as. The Buddha therefore, though essentially one with the ultimate reality, is yet not absolutely identical with it. Because of this, speculation about His personality, i.e., about His mode of existence after the mahaparinirvlii}.a, is condemned. It is treated as avyakrta. He is a person, though a free one. The free descent of the Tathagata into tbe world is therefore a temporal event from the phenomenal point of view. It has a before and an after. He appears to take birth and die; and yet all this is part of the cosmic illusion which it is His mission to dispel. n is therefore said that He is neither pure nor impure.• He cannot be said to be pure because He appears in time and is therefore pratitya-sam,utpannolute itself. Again, it is said that He is neither one nor many.l3 From the phenomenal point of view He is not one, since He has taken innumerable births. Each incarnation is an individual Buddha. In fact, as has b::en said in the last chapter, every one of us is a potential Buidha ( Tathagatagubha ) and it is 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

MSA, XVIII, 38, p. 139. MSA, IX. 22, p. 27. IbiJ, IX, 15, p. 36. lbid, IX, 4, p. 34. Ibid, IX, 24, p. 38. Ibid, IX, 26, p. 38.

this fact alone that lends significance to our spiritual aspirations. But, speaking from the ultimate point of view, He is not many because He has no body. That is to say, He never identifies Himself with the particular body that He has freely assumed for the time being. He is one like ikisa. All the usual powers and excellences associated with the notion of God-head are ascribed to Him. But His most important aspects are two, viz., Praj"iii and KatuQi. The first makes Him one with the Absolute while the latter keeps Him in phenomena. The first is spoken of under four heads :U. 1 . .Adadajiiina, 2. Samatijiiina, 3. Pratyavek~ijiiina and 4. Kftyanu~thinajiiana. The first is the basic one and is invariable while the other three depend upon it and are variable. (a) Adarf:Jjniina is that knowledge which is not limited to any personality ( amamam ). It is spatially undifferentiated and temporally all-comprehensive. That is to say, this knowledge extends to everything existing in all- three times. It is not therefore obstructed by anything knowable, as it is free from all obscurations. Such a knowledg~" is infinite because it is indeterminate, and not because it depends up:>a anything knowable. All other knowledges spring out of it; it is their fountain as it were, because it reflects the Tathagata and His knowledge like a mirror. (b) Samatajiiana is the knowledge of the essential identity pervading all existence. (c) Pratyavektiijiliina is that knowledge which perceives all things without confusion. That is to say, it is by virtue of this knowledge that the Tathagata has a correct knowledge of each individual thing without confusing one with the other. It indicates the vibhiiti of the Lord, i.e., His omniscience, and removes all doubt. (d) K.rtyanut!hiinajnana is the knowledge meant for the projection of His apjnritional bodies, infinite in number and variegated in naturf', for the purpose of b::nefitting mankind. Such a projection cannot be rationally worked out ; it depends on the different purposes to be served by it ; hence the number to be projected and the place where it is to take place cannot be determined a priori. 14. Ibid, IX, 67-76. In some Madhyamika texts a fifth, viz. Advayajiiana, is added. Cf. Obermiller, The Doctrine of Prajiiiipiiramitii, p. 45 (Acta Orientalia, Vol. XI) ; CPB, p. 281.

All knowledges are but the different expressions of the highest wisdom of the L~rd, ensuing out of the realisation of His identity with the Absolute. The second aspect in the conception of the Tathagata is His KaruQ.ii., infinite compassion for the suffering of p~ople. It is because of this that He freely consents to continue as a phenomenal Being. That compassion is not however on a par with the love, say, of a father for his son. The love that the T athagata has is neither impure nor mundane. 16 Love that is tainted with attachment and craving cannot be pure. But the love that the Tathagata has for people struggling in the tempestuous sea of misery and passion, groping in the darkness of ignorance, is of a different kind. It is absolutely disinterested and hence is pure. He is not affected by any consideration of 'I' and 'mine', but purely by that of finding a way for their rescue. Nor can such compassion be termed 'tlundane. The conception of a more loving god could hatdly be found.

The Three Kiyas The concept of the Tathagata is constituted by different metaphysical principles. This fact is illustrated in the theory of the three kayas of the Buddha. It is one of the most important doctrines in the whole of Mahii.yina religionta and it is nothing peculiar to the Yogacara who accepted the traditional doctrine. There are three asp~cts of the God-head , technically known as the three k.ayas of the Tathagata. They17 are : 1. The Svabhavika kaya, 2. the Sambhogika kaya and 3. the NairmaQ.ika kaya.

1. The Su,bhavakiiya of the Buddha is the principle of pure Will ( visuddha Tathata)IB which is the ultimate reality. As such he is identical with the Absolute. It is also called Dharma-kaya, being the dharmata (essence) of things.tll Its essential character ( lak~aQ.a) is asrayaparav~~ti,2o i. e., the withdrawing or retracting of the Alaya. 15. MSA, XVII, 43-44, p. 127. 16. See for further details Dutta, Aspects of Mahiiyana Buddhism, p. 96-128 ; CPB, pp. 284 ff.. 17. MSA, IX, 59, p. 44. 18. MSA, XXI, 60, p. 188-189. 19. MSA, IX, 4. 20. MSA, p. 45.

When under the influence of Avidya, the illusion of objectivity, the Alaya is compelled into a forward movement. It goes on creating f'orms of objectivity which in their turn further replenish it. On the ~ublation of this disturbing illusion a retracting movement of this Alaya is started. It no longer posits an 'other' but rests in itself. This is the state of Vijfiaptimatrata, of consciousness as pure Act. It is the Dharmakaya of th~ Buddha and is His natural aspect. Being essentially identical with the Absolute, the question of the number of Buddhas21 has no meaning. Certain arguments, 112 it is true, are offered for the plurality of Buddhas. Every person being a potential Buddha ( bu:lhagotriil;l sattval;l) it cannot be maintained that only one out of that infinite number attains liberation ; since, in that case, the accumulation of merit and wisdom ( puQya-jfianasambhara) in the rest of the Bodhisattvas would be futile. Moreover, the Buddhahcod itself cannot be established on the hypothesis of there being only one Buddha. There is no one original Buddha who is to reveal the do~tr;ne to others and yet, without this revelation, the attainment of Buddhanood on anyone's part ·is inconceivable. The tradition of revelation is therefore beginningless and this can be accounted for by positing an infinite number of Buddhas. All these considerations, it will be seen, are relevant to the fact of a Buddha appearing among ourselves for an infinite number of times. They are by no means pertinent to the ultimate metaphysical status of the Tathagata. The Dharmakiya of all the Buddhas is identical, as all are identical with the Absolute. 23 It is also beyond thought as this identity cannot be grasped with m.ere concepts. 2. The second aspect of the Buddha is His Siimbhogika Ki!JaHis body of Bliss. It is this body with which the Buddha enjoys His creation ( dharmasambhoga ) 2'. Strictly speaking, this is the concept of God par excellence. All the glorified descriptions of the Buddha found in the scriptures, e. g., rays emanating from the innumerable pores of His skin and penetrating to the remotest corners of the universe, pertain to this kaya. The Buddha dwells in the Akani~~ha 21. 22. 23. 24.

Heaven, surrounded by a host of Bodhisattvas and other m.inor personages. Sambhoga kiiya is the personality of the supreme God, associated with all powers and exc!llences. 25 It is comparable to the concept of Goa in the Briihmanical systems which finds the best illustration in the Eleventh Chapter of the Bbagavad Gitii. 28 3. The 1Yairm.I1}ika Kaya is the apparitional body of the Bu:ldha. Hence one is explicitly warned that the human form which the Lad might temporarily assume should by no mFans be mistaken for His real body. This assumption is s-<Jlely for the purp::>se of lending succour to mankind. 37 The forms assumed can be infinite in number ( aprameyaprabhedam buddhanirmiif).am ). Whereas the body of Bliss characterises the Divine qualities of the Budd~a existing for Himself ( svarthasampattilak~af).al}.), the assumed hod y characterises such qualities existing for the sake of others ( pariirtha-samp attilak~a1.1a1J ) .u In short, the hum1!1 Bu:ldha who is ordinulity seen in the various worlds and exemplified in different individuals is the Nirma1_1akaya of the Buddha. It is of this kaya th1t any historicity ca.n be ascribed. That body which is visible to some heavciou;!le>s., can be ultimate, does not even arise in Berkeley. His ide1lism itself is half-hearted and can by no means yield an absolutism. The Yogacira however, as we have already seen, is nothing if he is not an., absolutist.

Il Hegel Hegel has been called the "prince of idealists." He is generally supposed to represent the most perfect type of idealism in comparison to which other types of idealism are all found to be defective in some respect or other. It is incumbent to see how the Yogadira compares with Hegel and what are their spiritual affinities and differences. Our account of Hegel is necessarily very summary and is therefore somewhat arbitrary. But in a comparative account not only is it excusable, it is arther inevitable. The key to the understanding of the Hegelian system is provided by the logic of unity-in-difference. Neither identity by itself nor pure difference is sufficient to render a thing intelligible. If a thing is supposed to be constituted by bare identity of the form 'A is A,' it is hardly distinguishable from its negation. A thing must be a determinate something, and "all determination is negation" as Spinoza said long before. It must contain therefore negation as well as affirmation in its constitution, and its complete explanation cannot dispense with either. To posit a thing, it must be differentiated from all other things in the universe ; otherwise, it would not be able to maintain its identity. Identity, if it is to be significant, must be supported and defined by difference. The norm of explanation is this identity-in-difference; it is not abstract identity, but rather unity mediated by difference, identity as expressed in and through difference. This logic is realised in the concept of the 'concrete universal.' Truth is the whole, but this whole is not to be had apart from the parts which constitute it and whose organic totality is the whole. Ordinary consciousness perceives things as merely different :scientific consciousness at the level of "understanding" perceives things as relative to each other where one essentially depends upon another for its reality. But even "understanding" is not the complete truth of things: it leaves tb.ings in an unreconciled contradiction. Understanding is to be transcended by Reason or the philosophic consciousness. Here things are not merely particulars relative to each other, but rather particulars permeated by this universal, the unity underlying at the back of the differences, and which is the reality of the partciulars. This universal is however concrete. A universal,

whiCh ·is realised apart from the particulars of which it is the universal is an abstraction and defeats its very purpose of functioning as a universal. It cannot be different from its particulars. Nor is it completely identical with them ; it enjoys a mediated identity, or unity in difference. If relativity is the nature of things by which their apparent opposition is to be resolved, still more is it true of the most fundamental opposition, that of the subject-object duality. A complete explanation of a thing is not furnished until it is shown to be essentially related to the knowing subject for which it exists. The hypothesis of an independent object existing unrelated to consciousness is refuted by the logic of relativity. This has two implications. First, there can be no irreducible surd, no unknown and unknowable thing-in-itself outside knowledge, which cannot be made transparent to knowledge. Secondly, even the known object is shown to be necessarily known ; being known enters into its being but for which fact it would not be what it is.a2 But the other aspect of the concrete universal is equally true. The subject is as much relative to the object as the latter is to it. If there can be no object without the subject, nor can there be a subject unrelated to the object. Pure will is an abstraction. To will only itself is to will nothing at all. There cannot be a knower without there being something to be known. Thus the opposites, thought and its content, are not left apart but are reconciled as being relative to each other. But this is not enough to establish idealism. An essential interrelation between the subject and the object does not give the subject a prefer-=nce over the latter. At best it would be a philosophy of indifference. All difference presupposes a basic unity which alone makes the differents intelligible. The subject-object opposition also must therefore be resolved and transcended in a higher unity. But this unity is not one of the opposites. It has no nearer affinity to the subject than it has to the object. Hegel escapes this objection by making the ultimate reality, not indeed bare consciousness, but self-consciousness. The two terms of the epistemological duality are not on a par. Though the subject is

apparently just one of the terms as the object is the other, it has this peculiar nature that it is at the same time conscious of the opposition. The distinction between the subject and the object is a conscious distinction ; its opposition to the object is an opposition for itself. The subject therefore transcends or 'overreaches' the opposition. The full elucidation of the nature of self requires that its opposition to the not-self also be included in itself. It is one of the terms of the opposition and also its spectator, the opposed term as well as the reconciled unity. The distinction between these two aspects of consciousness is not a factual one ; it is purely logical. The subject as one of the opposed terms does not exist in its solitariness ; it is an abstraction. All reality is me:liated ; hence the reality of consciousness is self-consciousness, where it is not asserted by itself but has been made· concrete by overreaching all opposition to itself. The object is therefore just a moment in the life of the subject. It is necessary for the latter to go out of itself only in order to return to itself with all possible richness. As has been said before, the awareness of the objective is the necessary condition for consciousness to pass into self-consciousness. 33 The relation between the subject and the object is not pure identity; it is one of identity-in-difference, the most ultimate form of which is illustrated in self-consciousness. The unity of consciomness does not do away with the reality of the object. If the object were not an existent, consciousness would not be mediated self-consciousness and would cease to be even consciousness. The difference between the subject and object is to be maintained. It remains to be seen in what sense they are identical. The object is a determinate existent among other determinate objects. Hegel accepts the K.antian analysis that all determination is categorisation by the intelligence. The object has two aspects, viz., one is its apparent discrete existence, and the other is its organic existence where it shades off as it were into other objects. The first is its particularity as the second is its universality. The latter is its essential nature and here consciousness recognises its own counterpart. Reflection pene~rates through the external surface to the iP..ner reality and finds this to be ideal in nature. 33. See Supra Ch. 5.

So also in the case of the subject itself the two aspects must be carefully distinguished. The merely subjective is constituted by the ideas peculiar to each individual. It may be quite important in the history ·of a particular person but it is important in that respect alone. Unless •consciousness rises above the subjective and accidental associations and takes the objective attitude it must bid farewell to all real intellectual discourse. The unity to be discovered between the subject and object is made possible by the dual nature of each of them. When it is recognised that the categories and forms of thought which constitute mind are also the categories determining the object, the consciousness dawns that the .reality of the object is spiritual. It is only necessary to remove the external accidents which hide this spiritual core and the unity would be revealed in all its concreteness. Mind can take an objective attitude only because it finds itself in the object. "Nature is the extreme self-alienation of spirit in which it yet remains one with itself." And the object is a necessity in the life of the subject because ~'the reality is the universal, which goes out of itself, patticularises itself, opposes itself to itself, so that it may reach the deepest and most comprehensve unity with itself. The Absolute is the most conctete "Idea" where all oppositions .are reconciled. It necessarily breaks forth into the subject-object duality in order to attain self-consciousness. The object is not a creation of the individual consciousness. It is given to it, and consciousness is not creative in the ordinary idealistic sense. Its cteativity consists in :5triving to make the object its own. What is really creative is the Idea, the universal Reason, which enters into the utmost opposition to itself .and yet maintains its identity. The subject is not simply identical with the object. Their distinction is to be scrupulously maintained and the Idea realises itself only through this distinction. Its creativity is an expression of self-determination. What is not determined is indistinguishable from nothing and yet the ultimate reality cannot be determined by an 'other,' for the simple reason that it includes all oppositions within itself ; it is therefore determined by itself, and in all its determinations it cannot go out of itself. The object is proved to be a determination of spirit by the fact that what necessarily exists for intelligence must be a manifestation of intelligence. The Idea could not be the Absolute if it did not exist for itself.

There are other unities exemplified in nature, e.g., life, which cannot yet said to be ultimate as they exist for another, for a conscious subject. It is only self-consciousness that exists for itself and it is by the light of this that we must explain itself and all other things. It is by virtue of self-consciousness that all-individual subjects partake of ~he being of the universal Reason, the Absolute, whose creativity is ' renewed in every conscious subject. Hegel therefore is not an idealist in the ordinary sense of the term, unless the term be so defined as to rob it of all definiteness as a specific theory. The Yogacara is a true idealist. For him reality is the subjective, the creative consciousness. Hegel however aspires to go beyond the merely subjective and penetrate to the core of it which is a universal. Creativity does not belong to the individual and discrete moments of consciousness but to the objective Reason. But here the Yogacara would urge that either thought is creative or it is not, and if it is not my thought which is creative it matters little what else is. If the Yogacara is c1lled a psychological idealist, the Hegelism system can by contrast be termed logical idealism ; it is the system of logical categories, culminating in self-consciousness, which is creative. Creativity is interpreted as differentiation and integration in a higher level. But this differentiation must be on the part of my thought. Hegel however would brand this theory as subjective idealism. These difficulties arise because llegel would not accept the reality of simple consciousness. For him ail reality is mediated, hence consciousness must pass into self-consciousness in order to be real. Though the Yogacara also accepts self-consciousness (svasamvedana), it is so only because it cannot be helped. When consciousness itself is the sole reality, it must take the place of both the knower and the known. But he is conscious of the instability of the position. The object, though only an illusory one, is still present there, and hence the illusion on the part of consciousness of knowing something other than itself persists. With the sublation of this illusion the emptiness of self-consciousness is exposed; and consciousness again rests in itself (cittasya citte sthanat). But Hegel accepts self-consciousness as the highest reality, even higher than consciousness itself. The latter is merely a moment, as the object is another, for the realisation of this reality. For the Yogacara, consciousness is necessarily self-consciousness as there is nothing else to be known. For Hegel, the latter is a return to consciousness, from the

simple 'abstract' unity of the mere subject to the mediated 1Ulity transcending the subject-object duality. Hegel's insistence on concreteness as the mark of reality would be utterly unintellgible to the Yogacara. It is all very well to say that reality must be mediated. A thing must be something in itself to be mediated even. The necessity for conceiving the unity or universal as concrete is felt, since it cannot be realised apart from the particulars. This however is not a correct appraisal of the Yogacara or the Vedanta p:>sition. How is such a universal to be related to its particulars ? That it cannot be different from them has been proved by He gel himself. Nor can it be identical with the latter, as it would cease then to be their universal. But identity-in-difference fares no better. The differents cannot be reconciled with the identity. What is the relation between the differents when they are opposed to each other and when they are reconciled in the identity ? How to trace their identity in these two states ? It is said that in the latter position their abstraction is removed. But abstraction is the very soul of a particular. With the removal of this it is changed beyond recognition. Hence it cannot be asserted that the same particular enters into the unity even when without its abstraction. The conclusion is that the universal can in no way be reconciled with the particulars if the reality of both be insisted upon. The universal can be retained only if the particulars are given up. Particularity is an illusion and the universal is their reality. 34 It is realised, not through the particulars, but by negating the particulars. This brings us to the fundamental difference of approach in the Hegelian and the Yogacara analyses. The Yogacara bases his absolutism on the negative judgment. The object is negated totally and absolutely ; it is not retained even as a form of consciousness. In Hegel the object is a necessity ; without it the subject would not be a subject. Negation finds no place in Hegel, in the sense that nothing is rejected in his system. The negation that is there is better called difference ; it is simply on a par with affirmation. Difference-it is not even an absolute opposition-is merely a prelude to a greater and more perfect affirmation. But negation, 34. The other solution is to accept the reality of the particulars and to make the universal a thought-construct, as the Sautrantika, Hnme and Kant do.

i.e., a self-conscious rejection of a mistake, totally and absolutely, cannot even be conceived of by Hegel. For the Yogacira the projection of an 'other' is a negation of will 35 ; hence this negation is to be negated, and he arrives at the concept of an undifferentiated consciousness. Hegel however welcomes the diversification of the (universal) Reason as a necessary moment for achieving a more 'concrete' unity with self, i.e., self-consciousness. That is to say, no element of experience is false. Even to appear, a thing must exist, a.11d whatever exists must be incorporated in reality.as An absolute non-entity cannot even appear. The only falsity that there is is abstraction or one-sidedness. No theory of Avidya is worked out. His system admits of no cancellation, but only of rearrangement. Any illusion that might exist is to be resolved by removing its one-sidedness, i.e., self-existence. He has no conception of the Transcendental Illusion in the Yogacara sense. For the latter the subject-object rela· tion is something inherently unintelligible. There is no way to rendet consistent the notion of the object. It can be understood neither apart from the subject nor along with it. The Yogacara way of resolving the difficulty is to make it, and consequently the whole relation, unreal. The relation is unintelligible because the object is naught; there is no way of relating the unreal to the real. For Hegel, both the terms of the relation are self-discrepant so long as they are kept apart ; once make them relative to each other and the inner unity, which manifests itself in both, reveals itself. There is thus no necessity to go beyond thought. Thought, containing all possible differences, is itself the reality. For the Yogacara also thought is reality, but he finds no way of reconciling the manifold differences-than:Uversity it. With the negation of the object, the diversification of thought also comes to an end. He gel would not countenance any such theory. For him whatever exists, exists for thought and only a definite thing can so exist. An undiversified entity is indefinite and is therefore equivll.lent to nothing. But to swallow a contradiction is not to resolve it. The self-existence of the object must be given up ; is this not tantamount to giving up the reality of phenomenal experience a.ltogether ? Can an object be experienced which is not conceived as 35. See Supra Ch. 7. 36. Cf. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, pp. 120, 123, 404.

an independent 'other' ? The sublation of its independence amounts to the cancellation of the object as such. Hegel must concede at least this much that the viewing of things as external to thought, i.e., in their abstraction, is an illusion. If even this be not granted the philosophic enquiry would be utterly devoid of any value. When thought is disinfected of this illusion, its character is radic"lly and fundmentally altered ; to persist in calling it thought even then is to fail to appreciate this important fact. Hegel asserts that there can be no higher knowledge which quarrels with the ordinary consciousness of things, or rather this higher knowledge is only in continuation with the latter. This again indicates that Hegel has no conception of the Transcendental Illusion. Illusion and its negation cannot be put on the same footing or be only quantitatively distinguished. Since Avidya finds no placein his system, it cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be an absolutism. Though he apparently tries to go beyond the mere!}" phenomenal, his attempt is vitiated by the fact that this entails no rejection of phenomena. The transmutation of phenomena can be r~ndered intelligible only when the resultant is itself not phenomenal. But that would mean that an object in its transmuted state has been m'ltilated be}"ond recognition, so much so that it cannot be said to be the, same object that has been transmuted. This amounts to a total rejection ofits pre-transmuted existence, in fine, to a transcendence of the empirical. But abhorring all forms of transcendence Hegel tries to perform the impossible, viz., to make the Absolute sometbJng more than the sum-total of the empirical differents and yet it can be nothing apart from the latter. The Yogacara solution is easy : the Absolute is the reality of appearance, i.e., of the illusorY' ; it is the illusory itself perceived in its true form. It is not the mere ilusory and at the same time not another existence different from the illusory. But without positing the illusoriness of appearance the 'of'-relation in "reality of appearance" cannot be made intelligible. Is the Absolute exhausted in its manifestations or not ? If it is, it would cease to be something distinct from and higher than the latter ; it would be the empirical itself. But if it is not so exhausted, it must haYe a transcendent existence unaffected by the difference and this would militate against its concreteness. In short, there can be no Absolute wh~se relation to phenomena is not both transcendence as well as immanence. 37 To insist upon 37. See supra Ch. 7.

one at the cost of the other is to fail to understand the true nature of the Absolute. It is the reality of phenomena, itself not being phenomenal, which can never be realised without making phenomena an illusion. To retain pheomena withont their abstraction is unmeaning. When two differents are reconciled in a unity, does the removal of their abstraction effect any change in them or not ? If not, they remain still unreconciled, and their unity is a chimera. But if it has, can we still speak of the same differents being present in the unity ? Some other thing is concerned then, and the former have been totally cancelled. Aga.in and again Hegel stumbles against the fundamental fact of illusion, but in his attempt to retain all the differences he refuses to profit by it. Notwithstanding his violent protest to the contrary, his Absolute remains just a system of relatives ; it cannot realise its absoluteness without giving up being involved in the latter, i.e., without ceasing to be 'concrete.' Ill

Gentile Gentile comes nearer to the Yogadi.ra in his theory of the mind as 'pure Act' than Hegel. Hegel as we have just seen is har.dly a true idealist in the strictest epistemological sense. His system is be,tter termed logical or rational idealism. In Gentile we again meet with a full-fledged idealism, pleading for the supremacy of the subject, and doing full justic~ to its creativity. Reality is conceived by Gentile as process or act. "Nothing but the c::>nstructive process is." 38 Though thought is reality for Hegel, there is yet a very important difference between him and Gentile. Hegel concentrates on the objective thought, i.e., the logical content of thought, its meaning ; the actual process as to how this is being thought is dismissed by him as inessential. Gentile restores to thought its idealistic prerogative. There is no thought apart from thinking. In Hegel the dialectic "is understood as a dialectic of thing thought," whereas the true dialectic "can only be conceived as a dialectic of the thinking outside which there is no thought." 29 When reality is conmes. Its being consists in becoming, and becoming can have neither antecedent nor consequent without ceasing to become. "'1111 The doctrine that the spiritual world is only conceivable as the re1.lity of my own spiritual activity would be absurd if it referred to my' empirical activity. A distinction must therefore be drawn between this mind and the empirical ego. "Applied to the empirical ego the doctrine is mel!lingless." Its limitations are obvious. The creativity that is the reality of the spirit must therefore be referred to a deep:r level of consciou~ness. This transcendental ego is the fundamental re1.lity. It is the Absolute. It however does not exclude the reality of the empirical ego but even implies it. A closer parallel to the Yogacara could hardly be found. The negation of the independGnce of the object, the assertion of the supremacy of the subject, the conception of the subject as being essentially process or creative act, these are all the fundamental doctrines of idealism and as such are common to both these systems. This parallel is so close as to refer the creativity of consciomness to a transcendental level in both the systems, to the transcendental ego in Gentile, and to the Alayavijii.ana in the Yogacara. The difference however between these two is no less fundamental, and that because of the strong Hegelian tendency in Gentile. The difference is no less than between bare idealism and absolutism. Like Hegel, the latter also conceives the ultilhate reality as self-consciousness. "The self-concept, in which alone mind and all that is is real, is an acquiring consciousness of self. " 68 It is not a consciousness of self, but rather the process itself, that is consciousness, become selfconscious. "It is realised in the position affirmed when the self is subject and that identical self is object .... It duplicates itself as self and other, and finds itself in the other." 52. Theory of Mind at Pnre Act, pp. 39-40. 53. !bid, p. 248.

The necessary implication of this is that the 'other' can never be dispensed with, as it is only the diversification of consciousness that makes self-consciousness possible. "The self which would be self without other would clearly not be even self because it only ~sin so far as the other is." 54 He accepts the Hegelian principle of identity-in-difference and does not countenance therefore the concept of pure will realised through the negation of the 'other.' The positing of multiplicity is a necessity for consciousness. As it is creative it must go on creating. "The very word dt;velopment includes in its meaning both unity and multiplicity." "Multiplicity is necessary to the very concreteness, to the vecy dialectical reality of the unity ... Its infinity is realised through the multiplicity, for the multiplicity is nothing but the unfolding which is the actualising of the reality." 66 For the Yogacara, as we have seen, positing of an 'other' constitutes a negation of will. The idea of an 'other' is the Transcendental Illusion but for which consciousness would not be diversified. Gentile, a Hegelian as he is, has no conception of Avidya. The 'other' is not imposed on consciousness by any illusion, but it is the vecy nature of consciousness to create an 'other'. And because of this he perceives no possibility of consciousness ever being freed from its objective entanglements, the process ever coming to an end. The Yogacara however, for reasons already discussed, arrives at the notion of pure Will or pure Act, which is just willing without there being anything willed, or rather, which wills itself. This entails viewing the ob;ect as an illusion, the cancellation of which is not complt..te by merely denying its independence. The object, when it is perceived no longer as an 'other', ceases to be perceived as a form of consciousness even. Externality is its very essence the negation of which leaves nothing to prevent eonsciousness regaining its absolute unity.

Idealism is one of the greatest philosophies of the world, and the Yogacara system, it has been the contention of this essay, represents idealism in: its pure epistemological form. It cannot be stigmatised as m'!rely subjectivism, since absolutism is its inevitable logical goal. In spite of being absolutism however it does not give up its idealistic bias. This shows its speculative character. It is subject to the inherent contradictions latent in all dogmatic metaphysics. This defect, common to all constructive systems, is to be found in the Yogacli.ra too. The other contradiction however, viz., that of inconsistency, of making an assertion which as idealism it cannot make, does not vitiate the system. Inconsistency arises because of the lack of awareness of the implications of one's own position. The Yogli.cli.ra is, as is indeed all Indian philosophy, free from this grave error. The other contradiction cannot be removed, being ingrained in speculation. The Yogli.ngst other such great system>, no better and no worse.

Glossary abhiitaparikalpa : imaginir.g the object to exist as indc:pendc:nt of ccnsciousness. alamb:znapraty'aya : the object as a condition of its cooscicusness. alaya : 'storehouse consciousness', where the fruits of actions are stored. artatma : soulless, unreal. anitya : transient. arthakriyakaritva : eau~ al efficiency. air4y:zp:Jravrtti : transformation of the 'storehouse conscicusnt'&$' when it ceases evolving and merges into pure Consciousness. itman : soul. avidya : ignorance. avyakrta :the inexpressible. ·caitta : the 'mentals', factors inhering in consciousness and introducing distinctions in it. citta : consciousness. dharma : element of existence. d.b4rm zti : Jlcali ty oft hings, the Absolut;e. d!!!i : view; speculative or discursive thought, which can grasp rfality only through concepts. griihadv:.zya : the subject~object duality. }flryiJarafJO : ignorance, hiding the true nature of consciousness, .and positing an unreal object instead. kalpana : imagination, construction. klef.iv:Jr.in:J : ignorance of reaiity due to passions. kli1!a m.1nas : consciousness as defiled by the sfnse of 'I' or ego. ktatJika : momentary. m:zdhyam.i pratipad :the middle course, avoiding two extremes. nairat111ya : unreality. neyirtba : teaching which is true only of the phenomenal wodd. nirakara : contentless. nirvafJ!l : freedom; Ab~olute. niss!Jabha!Ja : e.>senceless, unreal. flltartha : teaching about the ultimate reality. p:zram."irtha : ultimate reality. par:z1nita : infinite excellence; perfection.

paratzntra c:>nsciou3ness as dependent on its object. parikalpita : imagined, unreal. ParinitPanna :the Absolute; pure Consciousness without duality. Prajnapiramita : highest wisdom. prajn:~ptisat : apparent existence. pramlil}a : instrument or source of knowledge. pratitya samutpada : the law of dependent emergence, according to which one moment emerges upon the cessation of another, though havir..g no other relation to it. pratyakta : perception. pravrttivijnana : empirical consciousness. pudgala : substance or soul; a constructed whole . .tzhopalambhaniyama : the availability of the object invariably along with its consciousness, thus refuting its independence. sakara : having a form or content, determinate . .tamznantarapratyaya : the preceding moment. of consciousness, as 3 condi ion for the emergence of the succeeding moment. s lmurti : appear~nce, phenomena. santana : a stream-like succession of moments. sariipya : a p!culiar relation between consciousness and its object by virtue of which the latter is grasped by the former. satk!iyzdn!i: postulating a whole where there are only parts, including the postulation of the soul. lii?Jz : phenomena as void of reality; also the Absolute as non-conceptual. svalaktal}a : unique particular. svasamuedana : consciousness cognising itself. tathagata : the Lord Buddha. lathata : essence of things, the Absolute. trikaratmipata : the flashing together of three factors necessary for knowledg-e, viz. a content, an instrument of cognition and consciousness, each being momentary. viisana ·: the motive force guiding the evolution. of consciousness. vijnana : consciousness. vijn:zptimiUratii : pure consciousness, the Absolute. vikalpa : creativity ofthought.

INDEX Abhhidhammatthasaligaho, 16_, 110. Abhidharmakcfa, 16, 36-37, 41. Abhidharmasamuccaya, 31, 34. Abhisamayiilankara, 33, 161, 163. Abhisamayiilankariiloka, 18, 70,147, 176. -abhutaparikalpa, 153 ff. absolute, abs ~lutism,20ff,92, 133ff, 143ff, 152ff, 169, 178, 189, 201. and phenomena, 142ff. Aduaitasiddhi, 85, 138, 182, 183, 184, 186, 189. Advaita Ve.danta, 8,47, 51, 97, 104·, 137, 141, 143 ff, 148, 179ff. Agamafiistra of Gauc;l.apiida, 43. akhyati, 56. Alambanapariktii, 41, 45, 70, 76, 107, 110. alambanapratyaya, :i6ff. Alayavijfiana, 87, 88ff. and prakrti, 91ff. and ego, 95. and siik$i, 96ff. -anumana, according to the Sautrantika, 6, 15. -anuvyavasli}a, 68. -anyathakhvati, 55. -apagogic proof, 73, 201. Appearance and Reality, 82, 222. arthakriyakaritva, 4, 74. Aryadeva, 43. Asanga, 31, 33ff. Aspects of Mahayiina Buddhism, 174. asrayaparavnti, 160, 165. A Study in Realism, 52, 53.

Asvagho$a, 29 ff. A Thtory of Dircet Realism, 56. iitman, 96ff. atomism, 65ff. Autobiography of Collingwood, 4 7. avi dya, 136ff, 140ff. avyakna, 26. Awakening of Faith, 29. Bendall, 34. Berkeley, 52, 204ff. Bhiimati, 138. Bhattacharya, B., 35, 44. Bhattacharya, V., 32, 34, 42, 43. bhumi, 166ff. B~dbicaryiiuatiira, see under abbreviatiom. Bod.bisatt1Jabln7mi, 34, 36. bondage, 159ff. Bradley, 82, 222. Brahmas titra-SiiJikarabhiirya, see under abbreviations. Buddha-avataitsaka-.riitra, 28. Buddhism, three phases of, 2. authenticity of the schools of, 24ff. Buddhist Logic, 2, 4, 43, 81. Buddhist Philosophy, 1, 13, 41, 43. Buddhist Philosophy of Ut1iversal Flux, 4, 44. Buston,2,27,30,32,34, 38,39, 40, 41. caitta, 112ff. Catupfataka, 70. causality, 7ff. Central Conception of Buddhism, 2,

3, 13, 17, 18, 22, 110. Central Philosophy 6f Buddhism, see under abbreviations. Chatterjee, D., 42. Chatterjee, J. C., 70. Collingwood, 4 7. Conception of Buddhist Nirvii1;a, 29, 31, 40, 41, 91. Concept of Conscioranes.r, 52. concrete universal, 216.

consciousness, accord i.r. g to the Yogiiciira, 49, 109-10, 111-12, 127ff, 133ff. dadanabhiiga, 90. Dafabhiimik.:siitra, 28, 34, 39, 167. Demieville, 30, 39. dharma, 2, 7, 10, 11, 108ff. asamskrta, 125. nairiitmya, 10. Dharmrdharmatavibhatiga, 32, 39. Dharmakirti, 42-3. Dhruva, A. B., 42. Digniiga, 41-2. Doctrine cf Prajiiiiparamitii, 2, 44, 165, 173. dream, 60ff. 78ff, 140. dr~tiST~tivada, 185ff. Dutta, N., 174. ekajivaviida, 187. epistemic, 12. Essays in Critical Re.1lism, 58. essences, theory of, 57ff. Ethics of Spiooza, 118, 119. Ewing, A. C., 48, 213. Fragments from Dignii6a, 41, 42. Friedmann, 32. Gavl/avyiihasiitra, 28. Gau~apaiakarika, 28, 43. Geiger, 34.

Gentile, 6.7, 224ff. 6hanavyiil:as iitra, 28. God, 169. grlihadvaya, 153. Hegal, 127, 216ff. Hetubindu, 43, Hetucak,ranirt.J.t!.Ja, 42. Hindu R~alism, 70. History of Buddhism, see under abbreviaticl\s. History rfBuddhist TloPght, 167, 1(8. History of Indian Literature, see under abbreviations. Holt, 52. Hsuan Tsang, 39, 40. Hume, 8,