Praxi-centric Phenomenology: from Nâgârjuna through Dôgen to Martin Heidegger

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Abstract t Buddhist practitioners in the Zen tradition have repeatedly located the tension between : 4 'd theory (theoria) and practice ipraxi^ when describing profound reality or the way things '? are/are becoming {yathabutani). The subjective stance is constantly challenged as not just I a limiting but entirely mistaken perspective with which to approach reality/meaning. Although the Buddhist practitioners and teachers considered here propose teachings distinctive to each other, there is consistency in emphasising the necessity o f practical experience expressed via sûnjatà and tlie ultimate realisation of egolessnessness or no-self {anàtman!nairâtmjâ). Nâgârjuna's logical critique works to free the mind from conceptual foundationalism so that practice is effective and unfettered by delusion. Practitioners ■ 'A' within the Yogacârâ school such as Asanga recognise the powerful effectiveness of meditation that highlights the tension between no-self and a perfected self necessary to the Bodhisattva-marga. Dôgen explores the relationship between the cosmic reality of Buddha-nature and personal participation in seated meditation such tliat letting go of ego-self is tlie very manifestation of the Buddha-self. I consider these Buddhist approaches to reality/meaning in relation to Western phenomenology, as especially borne out in Martin Heidegger's work to allow for an authentic attitude in and toward truth event (Ereigms). Ultimately, I argue that the Buddhist approach to reality embodies what I term a “praxi-centric phenomenology" that encourages Western phenomenological reflection to remain practical but egoless.

Table of Contents

Praxi-centric Phenomenology: from Nâgârjuna tlirough Dôgen to Martin Heidegger

1. Introduction 2. Nâgârjuna and the Working of Emptiness 3. Yogacârâ: No Mind tliat Knows 4. D ôgen's Datsuraku-datsuraku 5. Martin Heidegger tlie Reluctant Priest 6. Conclusion 7. Bibliography Additionally, I express my gratitude to my thesis advisor. Dr. Kiyoshi Tsuchiya and tlie members of die Faculty of Divinity for their support of my research. I dedicate tiiis work to my husband, Jeffrey F. Keuss, and to my daughters, Clara Ruth, Eilidh Elizabeth and Miriam Grace.

Introduction

This thesis will explore a particular phenomenological approach in Buddhist thought as found in the development of the Zen tradition from the teachings of Nâgârjuna, through Yogacârâ and Dôgen that I will refer to as “praxi-centric phenomenology"/ I will consider how Buddhist thought and teaching reflect this particular phenomenological approach which is similar, although not identical, to tlie course o f tliinking developed and labeled such in tlie West by Edmund Husserl and further reflected upon by Martin Heidegger. Recognizing certain phenomenological aspects o f Buddhist thought is certainly not unique for a number of scholars, Kasulis, Laycock, King, Stambaugh, Kopf, among otliers, have demonstrated phenomenological overtones witliin Buddhist thinking. Buddhist thinking from a phenomenological perspective continually asks where meaning and essence can be encountered. Although tlie Buddhist sources I present express and/or describe the route to the heart of tilings in their own way, there is continuity and agreement tliat the individual actively engage in the trutli event for tliere to be any encounter witli ultimate meaning. Thus, praxis, the practical engagement in the truth event, is central to any phenomenological reflection. Furthermore, the passivity of “reflection” in context of phenomenological reflection, takes on the active nature of practical engagement instead of mere projected analysis. The term “phenomenology" originates in Western philosophy and has been used to describe whole schools o f thought; it generally describes an approach to philosophical investigation which is in direct contrast to positivist methods of investigation (Comte) and the enlightenment model (Kant). The phenomenological approach seeks to clear away tlie prejudices tlie subjective perspective brings to seeing/understanding experience so that reality, meaning, or things as they exist ‘in tlieniselves' are able to show themselves in an autlientic manner. Auguste Comte, as the fatlier of Positivism, set forth to organise and analyse the phenomenal world by scientific and measurable means. Because certainty lies only in tlie phenomenal realm of experience and in what is measurable, mystery and the undefinable are not recognised as valid and verifable 1 1 introduce the phrase, “praxi-centric phenomenology,” in order to better locate and clarify what I mean by ‘a particular Buddhist phenomenological approach’, being fully aware o f tlie pitfalls and limitations o f classification and categorization. There is often tension between praxis and theoria, and, particularly in the West, although I locate the same in Eastern thought, theory dominates and at some points obliterates practice in philosophy, religion and other disciplines, including phenomenological movements. To say “praxi-centric” is not to dismiss theory, but to locate theory as supportive rather than the dominating partner when considering the profundity o f reality. components of phenomenal reality. The subject, as the organiser of the information provided in the phenomenal realm, is in turn measured by how sophisticated he/she has become at interpreting such reality. Further, all meaning is located in the immanent f realm. Society, as well as the human subject, is treated as a progressive science with ever increasing aptitude. One problem with this approach is the zeal with which the phenomenal world is considered witliout allowance for a deeper understanding o f reality. Additionally, tlie subjective stance becomes evaluator and mediator of meaning (that is, information) which in turn ultimately demands perfection from the subject. Limiting meaning to tlie measurability of the phenomenal realm as well as relying solely on the perception o f the subjective stance results in its trivialisation in the positivistic approach. The phenomenological approach recognises tlie limited perspective of tlie subject and works to clarify how the subject is able to evaluate information. Furthermore, phenomenology is no mere descriptive science, concerned widi cataloguing the various appearances of reality. Ratlier phenomenology, as Jan Patocka states, is about the meaning of existents and about being as tlie presupposition for the description carried out.^ Patocka continues to explain tliat phenomenology considers as its highest goal not an explanation subordinated to the principle of sufficient reason ... but ratlier a comprehension of the tiling, tliat is, o f all that has to do witli meaning, in the structured richness o f its nature and substance.^ With this turn in philosophical investigation, reason tliat eschews from the subject is not allowed to subjugate the objective field of perspective. Instead, the subject-object split is set aside in order to consider where and how meaning itself speaks and abides. This approach destabilizes tlie foundational (ontological) assumptions at the root o f most Western philosophical pursuits and allows for tlie possibility of movement so tliat trutli or meaning may emerge. In contrast to Comte’s readiness to find tlie phenomenal realm a fully “real” situation in which to carry out scientific evaluation, Immanuel Kant proposed that there was a ^ Patocka, Jan, A n Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd, Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 16 2 Patocka, Jan, A n Introduction to Husserl’s Phenomenology, trans. Erazim Kohak, ed. James Dodd, Chicago: Open Court, 1996, p. 16 4 See for example the discussion o f Kant’s understanding o f phenomena and noumena in Melnick, Arthur’s “Kant on Things in Themselves,” Themes in Kant’s Metaphysics and Ethics, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University o f America Press, 2004, pp. 147-152 5 Kant writes, “I have therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to make room for faith.” Quoted in Pinkard, Terry, German Philosophy, 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 44 ^ See for example the discussions o f spontaneity, autonomy and freedom with regard to the subject in “Part One; Kant and the Revolution in Philosophy,” Pinkard, Terry, German Philosophy, 1760-1860: The Legacy of Idealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002

, ft

difference between the “phenomenal” and the “noumenal.” He considered the phenomenal realm to be a ‘form of intuition,’ that is a shared condition for human J experience to take place. Both time and place are forms of intuition; they are not “real” in-and-of-themselves, but a priori conditions that enable people to have comparable experiences.^ In fact, according to Kant, all human experience must take place in time and space, so tliat meaningful exchanges between different people may occur. Similarly, Edm und Husserl (as father of phenomenology), also speaks of a shared perspective on A tlie phenomenal so tliat meaning is possible — he eventually locates this perspective in tlie transcendental realm and calls tlie vantage point a transcendental subjective one. For Kant, the noumenal, however, is separated from the phenomenal realm as it is the M location of essence, or the things in-and-of-tliemselves. That is, the phenomenal realm of experience merely allows for descriptive experience, but not a participation in the essence of a tiling. The noumenal realm cannot be experienced as such, but it must exist for the phenomenal realm to make sense. Wliere a platonic understanding o f tilings and their ideal forms differ from Kant’s division between the phenomenal and noumenal understanding of reality is tliat Plato regarded the ideal forms as constant and immutable — one living among the world of tilings merely sees a shadow of the ideal. Kant eventually allows that the subject, in his discussion of free-will, not only must manipulate tlie information gleaned here in the phenomenal realm, but has tlie freedom to evaluate the noumenal realm (in which he places God and moral law). Although it may not have been Kant’s intention, tliat he insists tlie subject possesses free-will allows for tlie subject to impose will on botli die phenomenal and noumenal realms. The subject is situated for a measure of will and control tliat has not been recognised in previous European philosophical discourse. Although Kant states in Critique of Pure Blason that he has allowed for faith in God through his philosophical position,^ the way Kant will be read by many thinkers following is through the critique of a powerful subject. Kant’s critiques bring to the forefront the capabilities and fundamental makeup o f the subject oriented around categories of knowledge.*^ Kant never suggested that the subject has knowledge 8 o f God, however, his allowance for free-will opens the door to the noumenal for the reasoning subject. Distinctive from Kant’s liberation of the subject to apply reason and all faculties of the mind to reality, phenomenological investigation places reason in a complementary role with praxis and discovery, and tlie limitation of the subjective perspective is emphasised. Sokolowski discriminates between tlie role of reason and the role of phenomenological reflection without denigrating one for die otiier, recognising the value each brings to the odier. Reason, he states, is “the disclosure and the confirmation of what things are”; and diat furthermore, “reason is ordered toward the truth of tilings.”^ Reason is the tool by which we analyse and interpret die natural world and our experiences within it. Phenomenological reflection is also deeply concerned with trudi, but approaches trudi from a reflective stance that allows aspects of truth that may have been otiierwise hidden or unrecognisable from the empirical standpoint of reason to show fordi. He states that: Phenomenology is the science that ... stands back from our rational involvement widi tilings and marvels at die fact that there is disclosure, that things do appear, that the world can be understood, and that we in our life of thinking serve as datives for die manifestation o f things. Phenomenology also examines the limitations of truth: die inescapable “other sides” that keep things from ever being fully disclosed, the errors and vagueness diat accompany evidence, and the sedimentation that makes it necessary for us always to remember again the things we already know. Phenomenology acknowledges these disturbances of trudi, but it does not let them drive it to despair. ... It insists tiiat along widi these shadows, truth and evidence are achieved, and that reason finds its perfection in letting tilings come to light.® The phenomenological approach also recognises that meaning and truth are more often illusive to die identifying mechanisms that mediodologies depend on for revelation. The attitude o f allowing meaning and trudi “come to light” is contradistinctive to the subjectivistic attitudes of discovery in the enlightenment or positivistic models. Letting truth arise recognises die necessary movement involved in seeing or ascertaining truth/meaning. Furdiermore, die subjective stance, rather dian controlling or willing the event to take place, is participant in die activity of a trudi or meaningful event. Despite die possibility for movement and the emergence of meaning within the ^ Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 185 ® Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 185-6 4S::g 'I 9 s phenomenological approach, typically. Western philosophical investigation, even within g the phenomenological tradition, slips back toward ontological grounding or subjectivistic prioritising. In chapter four, when discussing Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, I will address the breaktlirough thinking of Edmund Husserl, fatlier of phenomenology, and the subsequent reverting to a subject oriented system. Even Heidegger struggles with tendencies towards an ontological rendering of reality that grounds movement. Lester Embree sees within the phenomenological movement four “tendencies” which tS have marked the projection of phenomenological thinking unto the present. He calls these threads o f phenomenological thought: ‘realistic phenomenology,’ which concentrates on the descriptive science of investigation; ‘constitutive phenomenolog)^,’ which delves into the consciousness to account for objects in the phenomenal world; ‘existential phenomenology,’ which brings human existence and experience to the L ' -V'l forefront; and ‘hermeneutical phenomenology,’ which sees interpretation as key to the ‘A subject’s relation to tlie world.^ All these “tendencies,” however, clearly find their roots in Husserl and the developments of Heidegger. Witli a praxi-centric focus to the phenomenological approach of certain Buddhist practitioners, I am suggesting that in contrast to tlie direction most phenomenological tliought has developed in tlie West, there is a particular emphasis on practice tliat informs certain Buddhist thought and which ought to inform phenomenological thought. This emphasis on practice/praxis is often up against the overbearing emphasis that theory/theoria can claim in religious as well as philosophical thought. Repeatedly even in the history o f Buddhist thought, certain doctrinal teachings take precedent and restrict effective practice. Wlien a praxicentric approach is reinstated, as tiiese practitioners describe, then there is opening, opportunity and movement that allows for the release that Buddhism teaches. The religious emphasis to Buddhist tliought is a defining factor to its development. Buddhist thought, particularly in the practitioners considered here, insists that religion is simply tlie authentic practice that opens for the practitioner an autlientic participation in profound reality — an experience that defies description. This “description” o f authenticity is remarkably complementary to the phenomenological approach H eid e^er exemplifies in his philosophical thought. That Heidegger is careful to avoid tlie religious discourse and terminology of his Christian tradition belies a deep mistrust in the ability o f this tradition ^ Craig, Edward, general editor, Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, London/New York: Routledge Press, 1998, p. 334 10 to communicate his thought. However, Heidegger must use words and terminology to convey his thought and he chooses Greek metaphysical terminology and occasionally a mystical concept from Meister Eckhart to convey his meaning. Because of this reticence to use religious dialogue, but a clear indication that he wanted to speak of profound reality, or matters of ultimate concern,^” I have called him a ‘reluctant priest’ in the Heidegger chapter. Heidegger himself has allowed tliat the course o f his thinking is in great debt to his early religious training,^^ and it can be seen tliat his desire as a ‘thinker’ was to lead students along a path of reflection that would transform their perspectives and create openings for truth and meaning. As Martin Heidegger was dispensing of tlie term “phenomenology” itself as institutionalised and tliereby unusable, Buddhist philosophers such as NiSHIDA Kitaro were expressing an affinity for what the European “phenomenologists” were trying to achieve, although any real exchange between tlie two was mitigated at best.^^ NiSHIDA penned his own philosophical appraisal of living autlientically that he called “acting intuition” {kdiUki chokkan) based on a rich history of Buddhist phenomenological thought, albeit not named as such. In the subsequent chapters I will show how this phenomenological bent embedded in Buddhist thought has informed and shaped the development of the Zen tradition and its roots^®, in particular Nâgârjuna’s interpretation o f mnyata and his “two truths” teaching which pose a radical relativism making possible Buddhist practice, the Yôgacârin “conversion o f the basis” {àsrajaparàvrtti) which generates movement between the ultimate and the subjective and again facilitates See Tillich, Paul, “religion is ultimate concern,” from “Religion & Secular Culture,” 1946, cited in Paul Tillich: theologian of the bomidaties, ed. Mark Kline Taylor, London: Collins, 1987, p. 123 II Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 10 O h a s h i Ryosuke asserts that NiSHIDA did read Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit, pubUshed when N is h id a was already 57 years old, but was not greatly impressed by the work. See ]apan und Heide^er: Gedenkschrift derStadt Mepkirch c^um hundertsten GeburtstagMattin Heideggers, Hartmut Buchner (Hg.), Jan Thorbecke Verlag Sigmaringen, 1989, p. 33-34. YUASA Yasuo suggests that NISHIDA’s student M ik i Kiyoshi, who did read Heidegger, may have influenced NISHIDA to a lesser extent. See, YuASA, Yasuo, The Bocpi: Toward an Eastern Mind-Bocpi Theory, ed. T.P. Kasulis, translated by N a g a t o m o Shigenori and T.P. Kasulis, SUNY Press, 1987, p. 53. Heidegger is said to have read D.T. Suzuki’s Zen philosophy (see Barrett, William, “Zen for the West,” in Zen Buddhism, Selected Writings of D.T. Sucyuki, edited by William Barrett, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956, p. xi in which Heidegger reportedly comments that what Suzuki is saying, he has been trying to express his whole life) which is strongly influenced by Chinese thought including Taoism, and continumg his interest in Chinese thought he even attempted a joint translation o f the text o f the Tao Te Ching with a Chinese scholar. This project did not meet with much success as Heidegger never moved beyond the first couple stanzas. Dumoulin, Hemrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, India and China, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company 1988, p. 10, 34-35. Although Madhyamaka and Yogacara are not Zen, they are regarded as part o f the Zen tradition by Zen Buddhists through the link o f patriarchy. 11 Buddhist practice, and Dogen’s datsuraku-datmrakuf a ‘letting go o f letting go’, as a personal expression o f enlightenment via a “trans-descendence”^ in which only Buddhist practice in the mundane sense reflects the true activity of the Buddha body. Trends in current practical philosophy: Pragmatism and practical philosophy, as understood from an American perspective^® through Thoreau and Dewey, is the realigning of philosophical inquiry to tlae immediate concerns o f an individual living in the world in a specific political and social context. The individual, tlirough philosophical inquiry and practice, is asked to evaluate the better course o f action given societal pressures and demands and to face hardship over compromising values that exceed individual preference. This tradition has generally attempted to avoid the apparent metaphysical quagmires of continental philosophy and focused on living properly, uprightly, according to the best potential o f tire human. Current descendents o f such pragmatic thought include Richard Shusterman and Lou Marin off. However, the pragmatic strain of current philosophy, although centering on experience and existential Imowledge, tends also toward a humanistic idolatry and egocentric understanding o f the world, Marinoff writes tlrat tire highest virtue a human may exhibit is ahmya, non-violence^^ for ultimately, in MarinofPs view, practical philosophy is applied etlrics.^^ And, Marino ff argues, the methods for cultivating human ethical behaviour are varied, including yoga, martial arts, biofeedback, etc.,^® for a quiescent mind generates the inclination toward etlrical behaviour: “active insights ... rise from the deptlrs o f inactive clarity.”^^ Marino ff envisions this pragmatic etlrical practice starting at a personal level The tenn “trans-desceiidence” is suggested by T a KEUCHI Yoshinori in deference to NISHIDA's “immanent transcendence” (see NISHIDA, Kitaro, “A n Inquiry into the Good, Trans. Masao Abe & Christopher Ives (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990, originally published by Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1921), p. xvii ), however, 1 beheve a fuller understanding o f die concept can be found much earlier with Dogen's “datsuraku dasturaku." 1^ Both Shusterman and Marino ff see pragmatism as a specifically American contribution to philosophy. See Shusterman, Richard, Practicing Philosophy: Pragmatism and Philosophical Life, New York: Routiedge, 1997 and Marino ff Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 44. Alternatively, Sukale suggests that tire pragmatism o f Dewey and the phenomenological existentialism o f Heidegger are more hr line philosophically than has been recognised, see Michael Sukale, Comparative Studies in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1976, pp. 121-151 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 35, note 12 47 Marhioff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 48 48 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 63 4^ Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 63 s 12 3 20 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 67 24 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 129 22 Marinoff, Lou, Philosophical Practice, San Diego: Academic Press, 2002, p. 170 2^ Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold 1. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 107 with active and inactive meditation techniques and moving outward in a “concentric”^ manner to philosophical counselling o f another, group philosophy (e.g. using the Nelsonian Socratic dialogue^^), and finally tlie “summit” of practice, that of “organizational consulting.”^^ His vision is that o f a philosophical revolution starting small and working its way into tiie m ost powerful social institutions, corporate and governmental etc., and who could disagree that tliese institutions would benefit from ethical training. However, an emphasis that relies solely on social paradigms and human achievement (even if it is ethical achievement) is still not enough to impart or draw out some kind o f meaning for human existence itself. Wliat it encourages, subtly, is the 3 valorising of the human and tlie human capability for improvement and achievement — in other words, it makes an idol o f the human and grounds the ego in the “concentric” middle of the world. Pierre H adot suggests to Western philosophers tlie significance in taking up an existential approach to philosophical enquiry and, as reflected in tlie title o f his book. Philosophy as a Way of Life, he understands philosophy to be trans formatively active. His indepth study of the ancient Greek and Latin philosophical texts provide Hadot a relief upon which to compare the modern attitude to philosophy and living, which has been heavily influenced by Scholastic segregating of spiritual matters to Christianity (i.e. religion) and theoretical matters to philosophy, and tlience the structural and systematic efforts of 17 tlirough 19 century philosophy.^® Although H adot does not suggest a return to tlie ancient philosophical worldview of the Stoics and Epicureans per se, he values their understanding o f a philosophical approach that must necessarily bring out meaning and transformation in the human condition by seeking wisdom. Hadot claims that in fact, wisdom, as tlie ancients perceived it, is the “natural state” of humanity, that ... wisdom is notliing more than the vision of tilings as they are, the vision o f the cosmos as it is in tlie light of reason, and wisdom is also nothing more than tlie mode of being and living that should correspond to this vision. But tlie philosopher also knows that this wisdom is an ideal state, almost inaccessible. For such a man, daily life ... must necessarily appear abnormal, like a state of madness ... nonetheless he must live this life every day, in this world in which he feels himself a 13 "I Stranger ... A nd it is precisely in this daily life that he m ust seek to attain that way o f life which is utterly foreign to the everyday world/** Hadot claims that although difficult, it is nevertlieless possible to be a “practitioner of the ever-fragile exercise of wisdom.”^® How does one practice philosophy? Most ancient Greek schools of philosophy agree that human desire and fear^^ are the root of poor decisions and behaviour, bad living and that philosophy aims to change one’s “mode of seeing and being” by bringing tlie individual back to living in the present moment, not the past or future/^ The exercises utilised by the ancient Greek schools are varied, e.g. meditational writing as exemplified by Marcus Aurelius or Socratic dialogue eitlier with another or oneself, and H adot does not view the specific means as pertinent, but ratlier concentrates on the intended results: the attainment of wisdom.^® Philosophy lived as “a way o f life” is marked by effort and spiritual exercise for tlie attainment of wisdom, not tliat humans can “know” things better, but the attainment of wisdom so tliat humans can “be” in a different way. Specifically, as understood by the ancient Greeks, wisdom gives (1) peace of mind, as philosophical inquiry is a “therapeutic” to address human “anguish,” (2) inner freedom so that tlie “ego depends only on itself,” and (3) cosmic consciousness, such that tlie finite nature of humanity is balanced witliin tlie infinite nature of the c o s m o s .T h u s , we learn from tlie ancient philosophers that philosophy ‘as a way o f life’ is “living out” logic, physics and etliics instead of merely discussing tliem, that is, speaking and thinking well, contemplating tlie cosmos, and acting in a morally and just manner toward o tlie rs.F in a lly , wisdom offers the equilibrium between peace and passion necessary for living in tliis world properly: as Hadot claims, “inner peace is indispensable for efficacious actions.”®^ Thus, it is evident that the current trend in practical philosophy regards hum an activity as best filtered through a quiescent mind, emphasises living in the present (not the past or future), sees the philosophical attitude as a way o f life (not an academic subject o f 24 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 58 25 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Wcy of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 211 2*^ Notably, Buddhist scriptures also identify “desire” as one o f the most significant problems in die human condition that relegates humanity to the sphere o f sa/£A sâra, see SanLlyutta Nikàya v. 421-2. And “fear” is another human condition that is overcome, especially via meditation; see DlghaNikaya 11.156, “the fearless, calm and self-controlled state o f meditation.” 27 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 83 28 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 265 2^ Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 266 8° Pladot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 267 34 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 274 14 A ■A- 32 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 211 33 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold 1. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 108 34 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 59 33 Hadot, Pierre, ed. by Arnold I. Davidson, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Oxford: Blackwell, 1995, p. 60 investigation), and realises that proper philosophy transforms the way people see the world around them. In this regard, current trends in practical philosophy remain phenomenologically attuned. However, some of tlie pragmatically minded philosophical thought would continue to invest the ego with substantive qualities, including a centering ground. For although Hadot criticises Foucault’s “techniques o f the self’ as far too focused on self cultivation and self concern, his corrective is to reorient the focus outward, an “exteriorization”: “In this way, one identifies oneself with an “O ther”: nature, or universal reason, as it is present within each individual. This implies a radical transformation of perspective, and contains a universalist, cosmic dimension Fladot’s transformation o f perspective, dependent upon the universalising of the personal or individual, is grounded in a totalising universal reason which, if ‘tapped into’ invigorates tlie individual to a sage-like being-in-tlie-world. Thus, although H adot argues that each human must live those “trutlis whose meaning will never be exhausted by the generations of man”®® — that meaning is born in the existential moment and runs through J; the course of human existence but certainly cannot be captured and hardly categorised — he is still bound to the ego-centric attitude that characterises much of Western philosophy. Therefore, Hadot, in his claim that the pursuit of wisdom calls the human out of a mundane and meaningless attitude toward the world, still retains tlie canopy of the human mind and holds tightly to reason as a guiding principle and cannot enter the Buddhist concept of emptiness or no-self, and perhaps not even Heidegger’s living into tlie void. Hadot clearly draws distinction between a Buddhist understanding of meditation, which he characterises as a “corporeal attitude” and what he means by meditation, which he calls an “excersice of reason.”® And though he does not regard theory as an end in itself, but tlie avenue to “nature and life itself,”®® unlike Nâgârjuna he does not use rational excercises to move the mind beyond itself. What is Zen? The American Academy of Religion meeting in Washington D.C. in 1993 provided one of the first venues in the English-spealting academy for the voicing of “Critical Buddhism,” recent Japanese scholarship critical of certain Japanese Buddhist teachings, particularly Zen Buddhist teachings. The text, Pruning the Bodhi Tree, published in 1997 in 15 response to the AAR forum, begins with the chapter, “Wliy They Say Zen is N ot Buddhism.”®® Critical Buddhism was coined by H a ic a y a m a ®^ Noriaki who, with additional support from colleague M a TSUMOTO Shiro, penned a number of papers reviewing Buddhism from a critical standpoint.®® According to Jamie Hubbard and Paul Swanson, Critical Buddhism addresses the following; on a sectarian level, the hongaku (original enlightenment) issue that has engendered certain discriminatory tliinking; on a Buddhalogical level, that hongaku tliinking attaches more weight to an enlightenment experience than an intellectual standpoint and favours an authoritarian standpoint; on a social critical level, that certain Buddhist thought has been aligned with Nationalistic tendencies; and SuEK i Fumihiko adds a fourth level, the philosophical, whereby Critical Buddhism has aligned itself with the critical approach in contradistinction to the topical itopos)?'^ As SUEKI points out, the “critical” attitude of Critical Buddhism is one that corresponds more with modern rationalism than “pre-modern irrational approaches” or “post-modern criticism”® and ultimately, the objective of Critical Buddhism is to determine which doctrines are truly Buddhist ones (i.e. praUtya-samuipadd) and which doctrines are clearly non-Buddhist (i.e. hongaku or tathâgata-garbhà). SUEKl finds both constructive and disturbing aspects in the aims of Critical Buddhism as he says: One of the great achievements of Critical Buddism is that it has challenged the tradition o f objective, value-free, positivistic Buddhist studies. The main concern o f religion is not with objective facts o f the outside world but witli a way o f life. Critical Buddhism is right to have insisted on this point, but it is inconsistent to turn around then and insist on the objectivity of their historical and doctrinal claims widiout falling into the very objectivism they set out to criticise.'" Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997 37 All Japanese surnames will be presented in small caps to avoid confusion between given and family names. 38 See SUEICI, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Flonolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, and Heine, Steven, ““Critical Buddhism” (Hihan Bukkjo) and the Debate Concerning the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle Shôbogencyô Ttn\%P ]apanese Journal of Religious Studies, 1994 21/1 35 SUEICl, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, pp. 324-326 4° SUEICi, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Flubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. 325 44 SUEICI, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. 334 16 11 With this debate currently underway, one might ask in earnest, ‘what is Zen?’ — an offshoot of Buddhism? a school of Buddhism? its own religion? SUEKl’S suggestion that Buddhism be approached as a “method”^ rather tlian a set of doctrine or religious institution is certainly helpful. As a method, Buddhism is repeatedly brought back to its praxi-centric roots, and Zen falls squarely into this same praxi-centric phenomenological tradition. Respected scholar and historian of Zen Buddhism Heinrich Dumoulin begins his two volume work, Zeti Buddhism: A Histoty with the following description of Zen: Zen (Chin., Ch’an, an abbreviation of ch’an-m, which transliterates the Sanskrit term dhydna or its Pâli cognate jhâna, terms meaning “meditation”) is the name of a Mahâyâna Buddhist school of meditation originating in China and characterized by tlie practice o f meditation in the lotus position 0pn., Chin., tso-ch^mi) and die use of the koan (Chin., -ad), as well as by tlie enlightenment experience of satorif Dumoulin goes on to state that as much as Zen is rooted in Buddhist teachings originating with Gautama (or Sakyamuni, as favoured by the Zen tradition), Zen has also richly enhanced Buddhism — that, in fact, “Zen represents one o f the purest manifestations of tlie religious essence of Buddhism; it is die fruit and flower of that larger tree.”' Dumoulin spealcs o f Zen as a historical sect within Chinese Mahâyâna Buddhism with its own set of original religious characteristics, the significance o f which rivals the tradition from which it sprung. Dumoulin’s historical approach to describing Zen is useful, but lacks a critical edge that is necessary for die fuller elucidation of Zen practice. Daisetz T. SUZUKI is m ost credited with introducing Zen to die W est and he writes, The basic principle ... underlying the whole fabric of Zen is directed towards the growdi or self-maturing of die inner experience. 42 suElCl, Fumihiko, “A Reexamination o f Critical Buddhism,” Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The Storm over Critical Buddhism, edited by Jamie Hubbard and Paul L. Swanson, Honolulu; University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. 334 43 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, India and China, trans. James W. Fleisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988, p. xvii 44 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, India and China, trans. James W. Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988, p. xvii 17 He also maintains that as much as we would like to describe Zen objectively as philosophers, this is no way to have “an effective and all-satisfying understanding” which is only possible by living within the tradition itself/® He further writes that Zen defies all ... designations ... there is no object in Zen upon which to fix tlie thought. Zen is a wafting cloud in tlie sky. N o screw fastens it, no string holds it . . f This mystical rendering o f Zen places it outside philosophical categories, and spurns a collective religious description of experience or knowledge. Ironically, however, tlie focus here must return to the subjective self to whom the unique revelation o f ‘self is made and which individual experience confirms. Joan Tollifson provides tliis description o f the experience within Zen meditation and how the experience works to adjust reason: Flower, carhorn, rain, contractions, headache, person, word, tliought, wheelchair. What is it? Zen invited me to listen to each mom ent and wonder. The mind divides and evaluates. It provides answers. It imagines bondage and liberation, desirable and undesirable. In sitting quietly and listening without explanation or ideas, I discovered tliat there is no body. If tliere is just listening and experiencing, what is tlie body? Wliere is it? Wliere does it begin and end? Meditation reveals that the body is just a painting tliat appears and disappears in imagination. It seems solid when we tliink about it, or if we look into a mirror (and tliink), but in quiet sitting we can actually experience the body as permeable, borderless, empty space. And we can experience how nothing is separate from this space.’ Tollifson’s experience in breaking down tlie barriers between one’s own body and tlie objective space of otlier bodies and reality is one o f tlie first steps towards realising tlie Buddhist ‘no self where tlie subjective ego lets go o f not only the barriers o f the physical realm but also of the psychological and social. H er emphasis on meditation is in line with the classical description of meditation levels in which subject-object boundaries are among the first to dissipate. From this stage, one looks to achieve also tlie great 43 Su z u k i, Daisetz T., The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, edited and forward by Bernard Phillips, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1962, p. 26 4<^ as quoted in Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, India and China, translated by James W. Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1988, p. xix 47 Tollifson, Joan, “Enjoying the Perfection o f Imperfection,” in Being Bodies: Buddhist Women on the Paradox of Embodiment, edited by Lenore Friedman and Susan Moon, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1997 p. 20 18 experience of transcendent association such tliat compassion radiates outward and ones’ experience is no longer singular but corporate or connected. Zen master YasuTANI Hakuun, in a recently translated commentary of Dogen’s Genjokdmi, criticises those who study Dogen’s work — and by extension, Zen — conceptually, calling such a pursuit idiotic for, “philosophy and die Buddha way are as different as the moon and a snapping turtle,” and “thought and reality are as different as clouds and mud.” In laying out what the Zen life or Buddha way means, he writes. For philosophy it may be all right to miss the point, but as for the Buddha way, it’s meaningless. In the end [[[philosophical]] pursuits] are conceptual amusements and not guideposts for practising die Buddha way, for experiencing great enlightenment, or for daily life.® YASUTANI re-emphasises here the connection between daily life and enlightenment: the commingling o f im m anent and transcendent. For A be Masao, prominent Japanese Zen philosopher of what is known as tlie Kyoto School of Philosophy and respected Dôgen scholar, Zen botli is and isn’t a form of Buddhism. ABE deems what he terms “traditional Zen” a particular school of Buddhism in diat it has developed its own doctrines and methods. However, he also speaks of Zen as tlie “root-source” of all Buddhism, for Zen cannot be contained in doctrine but “directly points to one’s mind as the universal Buddha Mind” and tlierefore is independent of any particular siitra or doctrinal teaching.'"’ A be quotes the famous verse attributed to Bodhidharma, the Zen patriarch credited witli bringing Buddhist scriptures to China, to back-up this assertion; N ot relying on words or letters, An independent self-transmitting apart from any teaching; Directly pointing to tlie human Mind, Awakening one’s Original Nature, tliereby actualizing Buddhahood. A be explains that in remaining independent of scriptural fundamentalism, Zen does not ignore tlie sutras but seeks to “return to tlie source” of the sûtras. In other words, in the likeness o f Sakyamuni’s self-awalcening, Zen seeks to “transmit tliis Mind of self- 48 YASUTANI, Elakuun, F/omrsFall: A Commentary on Dogen’s Cenjôkôan, translated by Paul Jaffe, Boston & London; Shambhala Press, 1996, p. 12 45 Abe, Masao, Zen and Comparative Studies, edited by Steven Heine, Honolulu; University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. xiii 19 awakening from person to person, from generation to generation.”®® Ab e argues that this special transmission “outside” tlie teachings actually points to the inner essence o f the teachings, that is, religious realisation. Thus, that Zen may appear heretical at times should not be threatening to Buddhism, ratlier the Zen way is meant to pierce the dogmatism and philosophical speculation clouding the real essence of tlie religion. T. P. Kasulis relates the following conversation at tlie beginning o f his book, Zen Action! Zg/7 Person: “You have asked permission to practice Zen meditation in this temple, but tell me: Wliat is Zen?” After some hesitation and embarrassed smiling, I said something about Zen’s being away of life rather than a set o f dogmas. Laughter filled the tatami-matted reception room. “Everyone comes here to study Zen, but none o f them knows what Zen is. Zen is ... Imowing thyself. You are a Western philosopher and you know of Socrates’ quest. Did you assume Zen would be something different?”®' Wliat the Zen master in tlie conversation above means by “Imowing tliyself ’ is indeed the crucial question. But this story also illustrates both the fascination and naïveté that surrounds Zen. Aspects of Zen which have reached Western hearers and sparked a searching response include ideas of mystical oneness, of enigmatic koan sayings which drive students to frustrated silence, and esoteric wisdom not found in Western philosophy or religion. Kasulis works from tliis introductory statement on Zen, stressing the integration of tlie transformative activity of gcrgen and tliis activity’s ultimate transformation of ‘self,’ which in Buddhist terminology is rendered ‘no self.’ The activity o f tjasyen is transformative of both perception and experience of the perception. In addition to those like Kasulis who describes Zen experience as the “prereflective experience” at die ground of all experience,®^ NISHIDA, Kitaro, founder o f die Kyoto School of Philosophy, speaks of the [[[Zen]]] Buddhist worldview as an “immanent transcendence” in which the individual encounters the absolute by 35 Abe, Masao, Zen and Comparative Studies, edited by Steven Eleine, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1997, p. 19 34 KasuHs, T.P., Zen Action/Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Elawai’i Press, 1981, p. ix 32 Kasulis, T.P., Zen Action/Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1981, p. 146 20 transcending tlie self inwardly, in the temporal direction — in the direction o f the absolute’s subjectivity/® N is h id a ’s description seeks to arrest the inclination to desire transcendence from tem porality to an atem poral or eternal realm. In tliese brief descriptions, Zen is spoken of in historical, mystical-religious, philosophical, existential and phenomenological terms. That tliere are certain core Buddhist teachings such as dependent origination ipratîtya-samutpâdà) and no-self {anàtmmî) that Zen is also characterised by, the authors cited above would recognise. Similarly, Zen can certainly be characterized as a sect of Mahâyâna Buddhism as Zen shares specific Mahâyâna teachings such as expedient means [upâyà) and Buddha nature (pussshd) in all sentient beings (although interpretations within Mahâyâna vary). And Zen itself is marked by its own teachings, such as the direct transmission of Buddha-mind from teacher to student. And yet, this Idnd of categorising does little to fully elucidate Zen. By investigating tlie formative background teachers and schools to Zen, including a comparison chapter on Heidegger, I intend to show that viewing Zen as tlie ‘root and marrow’ of Buddhism or critisising Zen as not a valid form of Buddhism at all, is eventually transcended by just Zen, itself; that is, Western and Buddhist approaches to phenomenology: How, then, does introducing the philosophical category of ‘phenomenology’ assist in clearing away designations of sect and parameters o f orthodoxy that would obscure tlie promise of liberation that Gautama Buddha taught? As I will elucidate in tlie chapters to follow. Buddhism is rooted firmly in daily experiential existence with all of its fears and joys, pain and pleasure, while simultaneously promising liberation from the attachment to any o f tliese fleeting emotions and experiences, tliat is, ultimate bliss and rest. From the founder of Buddhism, Gautama Buddha, through some of the seminal Buddhist teachers and schools, certain means are proposed by which seekers of this liberation may attain their goal. The means presented here, when understood and lived into, strike a chord with the Western school or method of phenomenological investigation. O ut of a strong metaphysical and ontological tradition within Western philosophy, the phenomenological approach comes closest to challenging the foundational tendencies exhibited along the 33 N is h id a , Kitaro, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religions Worldmew, translated and introduction by David Dilwortli, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1987, p. 99 - - , . - " ' ' ' ' ■" 21 I^',"A trajectory of Western thinking. Although it may appear as if Buddhism, a religion, and phenomenology, a philosophical approach, are categorically different, it has well been noted that Eastern thinking is less concerned with categorical classification than with the elucidation of truth so tliat philosophy and religion, science and spirituality, are merely different vantage points pointing to the ‘way things are/are becoming’ iyathabfitani). ■Nâgârjuna’s philosophical style and logical approach to religious truth is a clear example | "a:; of how one may use a tradition such as philosophy to direct the individual to ultimate concerns. In a complementary way, phenomenology has worked in the Western tradition A A to destabilize foundational thinking so that when encountering a thinker such as Heidegger, the staid avenues of religious discourse are abandoned completely and yet, one encounters an undeniable awe and profundity in his philosophical musing that is generally associated with religious experience. This is to say that, investigating Buddhism, or the Zen tradition, through a strict categorical system would hardly be ■fruitful, and yet allowing a method to announce itself, moreover one which has similar aspects to a particular strain of Western investigation, suggests an approach to reality or truth tliat may be useful. We will see in the discussion outlined in the chapters to follow that a praxi-centric phenomenology that bridges Buddhist and Western traditions shares a number of common concerns with the Western philosophers discussed here in terms o f striking at the heart o f meaning, where such meaning cannot be forced into view by pure reason alone. Botli Western and Buddhist phenomenological methods are orientated to consider reality in a way that does not “negate the hidden or absent qualities” as Sokolowski has described of die phenomenological practice of ‘reduction’ and ‘epoche’ which considers die ‘object’ from its natural state and seeks to not negate die hidden or absent qualities encountered. Botii Western and Buddhist phenomenological approaches critique the positivistic, purely logical, solely subjective methods of analysis when approaching meaning and profound reality. However, while in West it is the philosophical tools o f reduction and epoche which work to recognize die hidden or obscured elements of reality, Buddhist practice ultimately turns to meditation, in which practice embraces the ineffable reality instead of describing or analysing it and through such embrace claims to actually experience die indescribable. Thus, bodi Western and Buddhist phenomenological mediods emphasize a natural or intuitive approach to the phenomenal world in order to find authenticity, although it may be

22 argued that the Buddhist approach, with its unapologetic religious agenda, will embrace f the ineffable mystical aspects of arrival more readily than will the Western philosophers. Heidegger fights the term “mystical” because o f its non-philosophic or unserious connotations, however, in the same way tliat Heidegger abandons traditional religious discourse but speaks of experience best described as “religious,” he also spurns the label “mystical” but effectively argues for what can be described as a “mystical” experience. 34 Heidegger, Martin, Der Satt^ vom Grund, 4. Auflage. PfulHngen: Giinther Neske, 1971, p. 68, cited by Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 238. 33 Sokolowski, Robert,, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 15 33 A n exception may be a portion o f N ish id a ’s writings and others from the modern Kyoto School o f Philosophy in which the political climate o f WWII surrounding their philosophical writing encouraged an historical interpretation not reflected in Nâgârjuna, the Yogacâra school or Dôgen. Once Buddhist phenomenological methods meet the twentieth century and the advent o f the Kyoto School o f Philosophy, tliere is clear indication that historicity is a more significant factor. A- When finally encountering meaning or ultimate truth, the Buddhist approach criticizes A the West for reifying meaning and thus robbing it of its efficacy. NiSHIDA asserts that pure experience has “no meaning,” which is not to claim its insignificance, but to liberate the pre-reflective ineffable Imowledge/experience from the confines of language and conceptual categories. Heidegger, incidentally, agrees as he claims that the authentic occurs because it occurs, and he quotes from the mystic poet Angelus Silesius to support this claim: “The rose is without why; it blooms because it blooms”.®"' In otlier areas tliere will be complementary concerns but different emphasis. Botli Western phenomenologists and Buddhist practitioners recognize the unique and essential role of time. Sokolowski describes within a phenomenological understanding of time, the “internal time consciousness” which provides the clearing or opening for meaning or truth {alethid) so that one relies neither solely on the subject (which would indicate a lapse into the psychological) nor the object (a lapse into worldly processes or phenomenalism).®® Both Husserl and Heidegger recognise that temporality is part of how meaning intersects with tlie human life, that time and being are inextricably connected, and yet unlike the Western thrust, in the Buddhist pursuit tliere is generally not the same emphasis on historicity or im port of the historical moment.®® Interestingly, despite a mutual recognition o f tlie import of time, the Buddhist approach criticizes tlie West for undervaluing or ignoring altogether the role place (bashâ) plays. WaTSUJI’s meditations on basho and climate in Fudo highlight the import of place as a necessary Finally, as Husserl and Heidegger perhaps only began to explore, a Buddhist praxi-centric phenomenological approach will see meaning expressed in tlie existential-ontophenomenological rather than in a transcendental subjectivistic ego-consciousness which perceives reality as existing dualistically in the phenomenal world. The Buddhist phenomenological approach will take a more radical approach to the Husserlian 'Lebetwvelt, an approach in which praxis is the transcendent noumenal reality, and only here can tlie duality o f two worlds disappear. In broad generalities. Western philosophy presupposes the subject, the ego, and wonders how to reconcile that subject to the lived world and any other transcendent reality such as God or “the good’' or “the beautiful.” After Descartes, transcendence is claimed for the subject, the ego, but the problem of W a TSUJI Tetsuro, Fiido (Climate and Culture), 1935, as cited in Japanese Philosophy by H. Gene Blocker and Christopher L. Starling, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 2001, p. 128 As Y u a s a states, “Nishida’s basho vis-à-vis nothing is the basho that can be reached by letting egoconsciousness disappear.” YUASA, Yasuo, The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-bodp Theoy, edited by Thomas P. Kasulis, translated by N a g a TOMO Shigenori and Thomas P. KasuHs, Albany: State University o f New York, 1987, p. 61 23 com ponent in understanding the relation between human existence and the lived world.^^ The necessity of place is also implicitly important in Dôgen’s reflections and NiSHIDA later develops the concept of place and meaning when he writes of mu no basho or the | “basho [place or top os] vis-à-vis nothing.”^® 'iI Further, in common with Husserl and Heidegger, Buddhist praxi-centric phenomenology si accepts human existence as a given. However, tliere is strict warning against cultivating ■ .:iy. an ego-self so that Buddhists will reject the Western model of mitigating meaning through a transcendental ego-self. Husserl, and even to a certain degree Heidegger, was determined to recover the transcendental subject. Husserl tried to clear away or suspend the filtering impurities which obscure subject and object participating in the same reality, and eventually proposed a transcendental subject much in the same vein as Kant did before him. Heidegger tried to find the ground in which subject returns to itself, authentically, and found that the object has always already been there, at die origin o f die subject bound togedier widi the unity of beitig. But Buddhist phenomenology will deny the subject-object split fundamentally, for die ultimate expression of a self is the realisation o f anàtta “no-self’ by means o f sünyatà or emptiness at the basis of every assertion. Dôgen’s discussion o f tiji or “being-time” exemplifies this non-dual rendering o f being and time. 24 î reconciling tlie now transcendent subject to tlie lived world and any “otlier” in it is no nearer a resolution. Furthermore, altliough Husserl and Heidegger return to tlie phenomenal realm in search for authentic meaning, they still presuppose die ego, either in die form o f the transcendental subject, or in Da-sein who finds itself “dirown” into this world of beings. Generally speaking, Buddhist thought recognises the subject-object split as 'y fundamentally mistaken. NiSHIDA attem pts to explain how die subject (ego) recognises the structure of reality in which prior to the problematic assertion of the ego there is unity, and tiius effects the disappearance o f the ego. In this way, die Western movement to “transcend” or cross back over the boundary or gap between subject and object is described by Eastern thinkers from die opposite perspective, as a trans-descendence prior to any possible split between a supposed subject and object. Chapter Outiine In Chapter One I address Nâgârjuna’s criticism of the Abhidharma scholars to present “an inventory o f objects as they appear to our pre-reflective consciousness (phenomenology)” but which later became a way to talk ontologically about the way things really are/exist.^® Nagarjuna’s critique is levelled against any kind o f foundationalism whetiier it is external and ontological in nature or internal and psychological in nature. Ontological investigations, such as exhibited by the Abhidharma scholars, as well as a psychologised internalisation of reality, a criticism levied against the Yogâcâra school, will according to Nagarjuna’s critique ultimately dead-end in tiieir attempts to lay a foundation for Buddhist practice. Obviously neither the Abhidharma scholars nor the Yogacara school intended to institute any form o f foundationalism, however Nagarjuna’s critique forces the trajectory of each approach in order to show a propensity within each toward a foundationalism that was never present in the original message o f Buddhism. Nâgârjuna claimed to have offered no new doctrine and no new interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings, ratiier he sought to strike to the heart o f the Buddha’s message with a deconstructive dialectic and radical emptiness {smyata) that intends to ultimately free one to Buddhist practice, the activities carried out in the mundane sphere which provide movement to realise the supramundane or ultimate. King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 84 25 4 Despite the critical appraisal of Nâgârjuna against what appears to be psychological ontologising by tlie Yogâcâra school, in Chapter Two I critically examine thinkers witliin tlie Yogacârâ tradition, such as Asanga and to a degree Vasubhandhu, who offer a view o f meditative practice which again pushes die practitioner beyond the psychologicallyessentialist parameters of the mind via a phenomenological approach which moves tlie practitioner to a breakthrough in which not only is there no actor nor other acted upon, but there is “no mind that knows.” Only “direct cognition” (Jtîdnâ) or an intuitive behaviour can move to this point beyond (or before) cognition. In Chapter Three I show how Dogen moves the philosophical discussion from the anonymity o f paradigms to the personal narrative by means of koan and another ri rendering o f radical emptiness {mnyata) that involves letting go or casting off {datsurakudatsurakü) the ego-self so that a “traceless enlightenment” is manifest eternally. For Dogen, praxis is the participation o f the individual in tlie cosmic revealing of Buddhanature. Time and place, for Dogen, reflect the law o f pratltya-samutpàda (conditioned arising or co-dependent origination); but ratlier tliaii transcend tlie world or arising and passing away, Dôgen’s practice is located there purposefully in order that Buddhadharma is manifest. Given tlie criticisms Buddhist thinkers assert against Western phenomenologists, many have turned to Martin Heidegger, a philosopher who began his career under Edm und Husserl, founder and father of the phenomenological method, and who publicly “gave up” the descriptor “phenomenology” but who continued to operate along the phenomenological vein o f investigation. I consider Heidegger’s thought and methods in Chapter Four as well as the parallels o f his thought to Buddhist thinkers in the Zen tradition whom I consider to exhibit a particular phenomenological emphasis in their f approach to profound reality. Chapter 1. Nâgârjuna and the Working o f Emptiness In this chapter I will explore the way in which Nâgârjuna’s logical critique o f smbhava or self-nature and his introduction of tlie concept of “two-truths” work to challenge substantialist thought and a strict ontological concern that is not evident in the original teachings of Gautama. Specifically, Nâgârjuna engaged in debate a contingent of abhidharma scholars whose dharma matrices reflect a move from identifying and working out its cessation in a process of dhyànic meditation to tlie strictly ontological concern of identifying dharma elements. This indicates a move by tlie abhidharma scholars towards a metaphysical tiiinking which concentrates on tlie cultivation process o f good dharma in contrast to the more mystical emphasis o f quieting die mind and bringing discursive thought (prapancd) to an end. Nâgârjuna proposes as the only effective possibility for Buddhist practice a radical relativism couched in paradoxical language, for language is necessarily derivative and always problematic. Wliat Nâgârjuna effectively questions is whether one may realise no-self iandtmart) doctrinally or solely through praxis. He ultimately argues tliat liberation (realising no-self) can only be experienced as a result of Buddhist practice; once tlie doctrine has been heard, a Buddhist practitioner must learn how to effectively internalise the truth therein, and dispense with the structure which would bind die mind anew. As widi what I term Buddhist praxi-centric phenomenology, Nâgârjuna’s critique aims to discourage and disengage the grasping mind so that practice is meaningful and effective. Nâgârjuna’s signature tools for accomplishing such critique are (1) a radical employment of sUnyatd such that not only external objects in the phenomenal world are accepted as empty, but self, the perceiving subject, is also emptied, and (2) the two-truths teaching in which Nâgârjuna collapses the understanding o f transcendental trudi and mundane reality such that the practitioner is freed to participate meaningfully in die Buddhist activities o f release. Named among the patriarchs of a number of later Buddhist schools, including the Zen sect’s tradition of Dharma lineage, Nâgârjuna is championed as one o f Buddhism’s philosophers par excellence^ and has undeniably shaped the Mahâyana strain of Buddhism tiirough to die modern era.^° Nâgârjuna lived and taught at some point between the first Heinrich Dumoulin emphasises Nagarjuna’s important place within the Zen tradition in Xm Buddhism: A History, India and China, Macmillan Publishing Company, New York, 1988, p. 10, 34-35, Garfield, Jay L., trails and commentary. The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nâgârjuna's MûlamadbyamakakârikâsfDMosà University Press: Oxford/New York 1995 ^2 Ruegg names five “minor” works after the MMK, the Yuktisaastika, the Èùnyatâsaptati, the Waidalya- ‘Satra\ the Vigrahayydvartam and the Ratndvalt, in Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981. Lindtner considers the following works “authentic” to Nâgârjuna: MMK, Èùnyatâsaptati (SS), Vigrahayavartanî (flY), Vaidalyaprakara{ia (VP), *Vyavahàrasiddhi (VS), Yuktpa^fka (YÇ), Catuhstava (CS), Èatnâvalï (RÀ), Pratîtyasamutpâdahydayakârikâ (PK), Sütrasamuccaya (SS), Bodhicittamaraya (BV), Suhflekha (SL), '^Bodhisambhâra\kâ[ (BS), in Lindtner, Chr., Nagafuniana: Studies in the Writings andPhiksophy ofNâgâtjuna, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag Press, 1982, p. 11. Although it is noted that he does not use the term “Madhyamaka” in any o f his writings. Prasafiga is the Sanskrit term for the logic which leads to reductio ad absurdum. The Indian school o f logic that bears the name Prdsangika reflects their usage o f this particular logic. See Sources of Indian Tradition, Vol. 1, Gen. Ed. Wm. Theodore De Bary, New York: Columbia University Press, 1958, p.156 Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981, p. 35. Tucci agrees, stating in regard to the Hymns o f the Catuh-stava that there can be “htde doubt” as to Nâgârjuna’s authorship, Tucci, Guiseppe, “Two Hymns o f the Catuh-stava o f Nâgârjuna,” International Loyal Asiatic Society, 1932, p. 309. Nagarjuna engaged in a thorough deconstruction o f the prevalent ontological arguments championed by such non-Buddhist schools as the Nyâya and similar tendencies towards forms o f foundationalism in some Buddhist schools, namely those scholars enmeshed in the Abhidharma literature and tlie emerging doctrine o f the Yogâcâra school. 27 3 and third century CE, and is arguably best known for writing the Mitlamadhyamakakànkàs (translated Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle W a yf abbreviated hereafter as MMK)'^^ the y contribution o f which helped establish what has become known as Madhyamaka tliought. Altliough scholars are not in agreement over how many of the other treatises and hymns may be reliably attributed to him, there is no convincing reason for why a greater corpus of writing, including the hymns of praise, may not also be considered valid. Ruegg argues that the strictly philosophical prasangf'^ arguments in the MMK and Vigrahaiyàvartanî do not necessarily preclude the possibility o f Nâgârjuna using other genres o f writing, including the more cataphatic approach found in the hymns, and thus genre alone should not dictate tlie authenticity of Nâgârjuna’s authorship.®^ Ï argue that that Nâgârjuna’s deconstructive or prasatiga type writing, such as exhibited in tlie MMK, is only validated within the larger context of Buddhist practice. Otherwise, without the element o f practice, and purely as an exercise in logic, the MMK may be justifiably accused of attempting to totally annihilate the precepts of tlie Buddha. Wliat Nâgârjuna does attem pt witii the MMK is a refutation o f the tiieoretical and philosophical grounding that he sees supplanting true Buddhist practice. Nâgârjuna sought to rekindle the essence of the Buddha’s message with his radical criticism o f any theory o f “self-nature” {svabhâvà)F His critique deconstructs tlie conventional descriptors of subject and object insisting that the law of dependent origination (pratitya-samutpdda) makes for radical relativism. No respecter of dogma, Nagarjuna subjects tlie very tenets of tlie Buddhist doctrine to his deconstruction process 28

• 5'^ from MMK as quoted by Herman, A. L., A n Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A Philosophic History of Indian Buddhism, Lanham: University Press o f America, Inc., 1983, p.289

68 "Here, O Sariputra, aU dharmas are marked with emptiness; they are not produced or stopped, not defiled or immaculate, not deficient or complete.” The Heart Sutra in Buddhist Scriptures, selected and translated by Edward Conze, London: Penguin Books, 1959, p. 163 see Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, “Mystische Erfahrmig und logische Kfitik bei Nâgârjuna,” Kedgiose Etfahrung und theologische Reflexion: Festschrift fur Heinrich Ddring, Armin Kreiner and Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Hg.), Paderborn: Bonifatius, 1993, p. 386; and Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogâcâra Bttddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun, Roudedge Curzon, 2002, p. 232 in order to reveal tlie original intention of the Buddha o f a complete liberation, re-cast by Nâgârjuna in his verse of dedication to Buddha as “no birth nor death; no annihilation nor persistence; no unity nor plurality; no coming in nor going out.”®^ One might note the similarity o f Nâgârjuna’s verse to the later well-known verse from the Heart Sutra (Prajnàpâramitra Hrdqya Sütrà) that dharmas are empty of own-being, witliout marks, neither produced nor stopped.®® Nâgârjuna insists on the absence of any kind of selfnature or essence isvabhâvà), even within the dharmas tliemselves. All existents are empt)?- o f such essence, for all are completely co-dependent and radically relative. Nâgârjuna intends to lead his adherents tiirough a logical process of release that parallels the yogins’ steps to a deep formless state of meditation.®^ In tliis way, as Nâgârjuna also insists, there is no ultimate position or argument, not even the Buddha’s “teaching,” as such. Practice is beyond any mundane doctrinal teaching, beyond and much more profound than the metaphysical and logical explanations for how tlie transitory ego-consciousness can make sense of the nature of tilings; and yet true Buddhist practice takes place nowhere else tlian among die skandhas and in a transitory world, just as described in the scriptures. Nâgârjuna’s purpose is to remind his followers of the true “essence” o f the Buddha’s message by driving them away from the apparent safety of a bordered knowledge o f the true path to tlie ultimate freedom and release that has no proper description but which is experienced as siva, “blissful”. He operates by laying out tliese tenets of the Buddha for re-interpretation in order to preserve them, ultimately, from reification and the perils of foundationalism. In order to contextually situate Nâgârjuna’s praxi-centric paradigm shift, it is necessary to review the praxiological instantiation of tlie Buddhist teaching within tlie Four Noble Trutlis. Background: establishment o f key Buddhist teachings Four Noble Trutlis Wliat has been called Gautama Buddha’s “enlightenment” can accentuate the epistemological breaktlirough to the detriment of recognising what was the Buddha’s 29 profound experience o f release. In a similar vein Nagarjuna has been viewed as one of Buddhism’s greatest philosophers, but this has also tlie possibility for gravely misunderstanding his purpose in engaging in debate, what in Buddhist terminology would be called the skilful means by which he engages in teaching. What both tliese teachers, Buddha and later Nâgârjuna as reviver of the spirit of his teaching, sought to deliver was a way o f living into true reality such that the experience of living is completely transformed. The Buddha’s teaching of die four noble truths and eight-fold noble path was aimed at identifying what was problematic about life and setting out the prescription for the transformation. He never intended tiiat these instructions become the basis for a religious/philosophical system. That Nâgârjuna subjects these hallowed teachings to rigorous critique is his condemnation not of die Buddhist patii itself but of how the path has been corrupted by the constructing thrust o f the ego-consciousness. With this in mind it would be beneficial to revisit the Buddha’s teachings before considering Nâgârjuna’s critique. The Buddha’s first sermon at Benares, die setting out of the four noble truths, and his teaching o f the “law” o f dependent origination ipmtîtya-samutpàdà), was based on Gautama’s individual experience of universal trutlis. Gautama’s long journey to enlightenment came via saturation in die world, examining die limits o f pleasure and pain, comfort and extreme denial, and his eventual penetrating insight was borne out of what trutlis were presented to him during a prolonged session of meditation. His understanding did not come from outside the world itself nor from beyond his personal experience in and o f this world. The nature of things, how things really are/are becoming {yathâbütamf'^ was revealed to him in the moment o f his enlightenment experience. The first noble truth, he taught, is that people experience duhkha in their daily life. This is die noble trutii of suffering {dukkhap birth is suffering {dukkha), ageing is suffering (dukkha), sickness is suffering (dukkha), dying is suffering {dukkha), sorrow, grief, pain, unhappiness, and unease are suffering {dukkhap, being united witii what is not liked is suffering {dukkha), separation from what is liked is suffering {dukkhap, not to get see Herman, A. L., A n Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A Philosophic History of Indian Buddhism, Lanham: University Press o f America, Inc., 1983, p. 55 30 what one wants is suffering {dukkhap, in short, the five aggregates of grasping are suffering {dukkha) f D ukkhd' {duhkhd) is pain or dissatisfaction; human life is fraught with the existential angst of uncertainty during good times, and the pain of sickness and death during the w orst times. A person must come to an existential awareness of duJokha before any kind of religious understanding makes sense. Driven by the angst of duhkha, humans reach out for stability in eitlier the physical or metaphysical realm but what is grasped in tliese efforts merely leads back to duhkha again for the act of grasping itself is what binds the human to this desperate cycle of pain {samara), not the object “grasped.” It ought to be noted, however, tliat tlie experience o f duhkha is universal to human life and thus works simultaneously to position humans for liberation from tlie experience duhkha. The second noble truth identifies the origin o f duhkha, that it arises directly out of the individual, specifically tlie desires or thirst {tanhâ) of that individual This is the noble trutii of the origin of suffering {dukkhap. the tiiirst for repeated existence which, associated witii delight and greed, delights in tiiis and that, namely the tiiirst for tlie objects of sense desire, the thirst for existence, and tlie thirst for non-existence.^^ Humans tend to grasp onto (this is what is meant by “thirst”) what looks stable and satisfying, to desire pleasing things and feelings and to avoid the unpleasant aspects of life. Humans tend to look eitlier for tlie comforts of eternity, that human existence may transcend death and dying, or humans tend to grasp and tiiirst for annihilation to cancel the experience of duhkha. Both these extremes, tliat of eternity and annihilation, are objects or states o f being/non-being that seduce human grasping but neither are ultimately obtainable for the trutii that the Buddha discovered lies in the relinquishing o f all grasping. Any “grasping” after objects or states of being is tlie activity of denial and cannot lead to release. However, as noted already, duhkha, or existential angst can act as the sigial in human experience which points out the limitations o f tlie world (“lived world”, Lebensm/i), and Santyutta Nikqya v. 421-2, as quoted in Gethin, Rupert, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998, p. 59-60 Samyutta N ikdjav. 421-2, as quoted in Gethin, Rupert, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998, p. 59-60 31 tliereby suggests the possibility of rest, of satisfaction, of letting go o f the activity of grasping and thirsting. The third noble truth assures diat there is a release from duhkha, called elsewhere nirvana, literally “expiration:” This is tlie noble truth of the cessation o f suffering {dukkhap the complete fading away and cessation of this very thirst — its abandoning, relinquishing, releasing, letting go. Finally, the forth noble truth details the way in which an individual masters desire so that nirvana may be experienced. As such, tlie fourth truth, which is the noble eight-fold patli, is tlie way o f practising and living which can quiet and eventually put out the fires of desire and passion which give rise to the thoughts and actions which manifest themselves in the world as duhkha. The noble eight-fold path is taken and applied to the life dedicated to finding release from the cycle of duhkha -laden existence. This path is described as a list o f beneficial activities, both psychological and ethical behaviour, which would address the problems of duhkha. By training oneself to see where the paths o f pain and release are charted in life’s experiences and activities, one embarks on the path to liberation. The aspects o f duhkha and liberation are classified as dharmas by practitioners. Are tlie thoughts and actions tliemselves dharmas} Once monks began to identify thoughts and actions as dharmas, as existents separated from the cyclical reality of life {samara), the thrust o f the Buddha’s teaching is dramatically changed. This very change was borne out in the proliferation of abhidharma literature which will be addressed later in this chapter. D ependent Origination (pratitya-samutpadd). No Self {anâtmaiî). Emptiness {sttnyata) In addition to the Buddha’s sermon at Benares, his teaching of the “law” o f dependent origination {pratltya-samutpâdà), also translated 'conditioned causality,’ ‘conditioned arising’ or ‘co-dependent origination,’ is essential to Buddhist practice. The Buddha’s experience in die world underscores the relativity o f phenomena, including thoughts, actions andmatter. Wlien Nâgârjuna reinforces the importance of seeing phenomena as radically relative, instead o f working witli what had become a reified conceptual model, the “law o f dependent origination”, he recasts tlie argument in terms of sfmyatd. First, a look at the original teaching and context out of which Nâgârjuna’s sünyatà teaching arose. SamyuUa Nikdya v. 421-2, as quoted in Gethin, Rupert, The Foundations of Buddhism, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1998, p. 59-60 32 D ependent origination denies tlie substantial/eternal existence o f anything and is abstractly stated in tlie Sanyutta Mikdja (II .28): “That being, tliis comes to be; from die arising o f that, this arises; that being absent, this is not, from die cessation o f that, diis ceases.”^'^ The first noble trudi underscores die transitoriness of all diings, good and evil, formed or unformed. N ot only does die life cycle in botany and biology reflect this “law” but even what appears static, like mountains and a concept o f “s e lf, conform to dependent origination.’^ The Buddha teaches that diis “s e lf is actually a conglomerate of five groupings {skandhas)'. form, feeling, cognition, character aspects, and consciousness.’® What we call “s e lf is merely a conventional use of language, and indicates nodiing beyond the everchanging skandhas. According to the earliest Buddhist teachings, skandhas are characterised by impermanence {anityà), which effectively undermines a sense of stability and permanence. Vratttya-samuipdda indicates diat there is nodiing which can be said to originate of itself; all is bound to give rise to furdier phenomena. Part o f the teaching behind die four noble truths is that the human conglomerate of skandha delivers pain and suffering duhkha and any pleasure or happiness one perceives is always only “fleeting” {anityd). The psycho-corporeal entity tiiat is conveniently called a “s e lf cannot deliver itself eidier into eternal existence or non-existence — die eternalising or annihilation of tiiis grouping of skandhas is not witiiin the “control” o f a so-called acting subject. With this in mind, die Buddha advocates letting go (cease grasping) the ego-self as it can never ultimately be grasped. The effort to do so is misspent and futile. Instead of a centring immutable essence, the Buddha taught that die human, like any other existent, is simply a composite of skandha, or aggregates that have arisen and come together in accordance with die karmic direction of previous skandha. The five as cited in Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, Cambridge: University o f Cambridge Press, 1990, p. 54. '^5 Dogen brings this out in his writing when he speaks o f mountains walking and proclaiming Buddhanature in the Sansuigyo Fascicle o f the Shôhôgent^. See Master Dogen’s Shobogentio: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NishijimA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, pp. 167-179 Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Bttddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, Cambridge: University o f Cambridge Press, 1990, pp. 49-50 33 # As H iraicawa points out, this is the meaning o f nlpam the early texts; however, later in the Àgamas, rilpa comes to refer to all material things, and a distinction is drawn between impermanent phenomena, called “conditioned dharmas” {samskrta dharma, p. sankhata dhammd), and the unchanging or eternal existents {asamskrta dharma, p. assankhata-dhammà), in HlRAl<CAWA, Akira, A History of Indian Buddhism from Sakyamuni to Early Mahâyâna, translated and edited by Paul Groner, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1990, p. 44 Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices, Cambridge: University o f Cambridge Press, 1990, pp. 49-50 Majjhima-Nikdya 22, The Collection of The Middle Length Sayings Çvlajjhima- Nikdya), Vol. I: The First Fifty Discourses (Mtllapanndsa), trans, I. B. Homer, M.A., London: Pali Text Society, Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1954, p. 178 Chdiidogya UpaniyadYlll, X ll, 1, cited in Klostermaier, Klaus, H S urney of Hinduism, Albany: State University o f New York, 1989, p. 195. Ruegg makes the following clarifying note with regard to the usage o f siinya, sunyatva and sfmyatd: “Sû/tyais an epithet o f all dharmas, and sûnyatd designates emptiness as the quality characterizing all dharmas. Èûnyatva on the other hand is the fact, or truth, o f the emptiness o f all dharmas. Thus the words sûnya and sunyatva pertain to the conventional surface level o f samvtyir, while sUnyatdh used to indicate or point to the level o f ultimate reality (paramdrthd) (to the extent that this is at all possible in temis o f language and aggregates that compose a human are form or material shape {rtlpd)f feeling (vedand), cognition which includes recognition and interpretation {samjna, p. sanna), constructing activities for the character {samskdra, p. sankhdrd), and discriminative consciousness (vijndna, p. vinndnd)?^ These skandha are constantly being formed and unformed, and cannot be said to construct a reliable “self” As recorded in the Majjhlmanikdya'. ■Wlierefore, monks, whatever is material shape, past, future, present, subjective or objective, gross or subtle, mean or excellent, whether it is far or near — all material shape should be seen thus by perfect intuitive wisdom as it really is: This is not mine, tliis am I not, this is not myself. Whatever is feeling ... whatever is perception ... whatever are the A habitual tendencies ... whatever is consciousness ... ail ... should be seen thus by perfect intuitive wisdom as it really is: This is not mine, this am I not, This is not myself.’^ Altliough clearly based on tlie Buddha’s early teaching o f the mutable, changeable nature o f skandha tliat compose a so-called “self,” the Buddhist doctrine of no-self [andtmati) can easily become antitlietical to the Hindu self {dtmaf) and lose the flexibility and relativity o f tlie Buddha’s original teaching. Buddhism taught andtman against the ‘fallacy’ o f tlie Hindu dtman prevalent in scriptures such as the Chdttdogya Upanisad: Verily, tliis body (sarlra) is mortal. It has been appropriated by Deatli. But it is the standing ground of the deathless, bodiless Self (atman).®” Thus, it becomes clear that Nâgârjuna has not introduced a new term when he speaks of sünyatà but has revived and in some senses radicalised one of tlie Buddha’s original teachings. The term mnyati^ can be traced back to tlie Nikayas in connection with the I discut'sivity).”Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981, p. 3 Omatowski, Gregory K., “Transformations o f “Emptiness”: On die Idea o f sünyatà and the Thought o f Abe and the Kyoto School oiPhH o^ofhyf Journal of Ecumenical Studies, (34:1, 1997), p. 94 Nanananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought, Kandy Sri Lanka: Buddhist Publication Society, 1976, p. 101 Nanananda, Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thottght, Buddhist Publication Society, Kandy Sri Lanka, 1976, p. 92 34 idea of no-self {andtman) and denotes the impermanent nature of all phenomena.®^ In tlie Sarrpyiitta Nikdya, (S.N. IV 54), die Buddha explains, “Because the world is void \sünyà\ of the self, Ananda, or o f what belongs to the self, therefore, it is said: ‘Void is the world.”’®^ In the Majjhima Nikdya {Cfila Sunnata Suita), the Buddha describes to Ananda what he means by “abiding in the void {smiyat^' and encourages Ananda diat a monk may also abide there. He describes a detachment in which a monk may gradually let go of die sense perceptions of “village” and “people,” etcetera, to eventually find himself concentrating only on die “signless.” The monk may then reflect that “This concentration of mind diat is signless, is effected and thought out. But whatever is effected and thought out, that is impermanent and liable to cease.” And die Buddha sumarises that, other than the “disturbances” which indicate that the m onk is still alive, diis practice is “the true, unperverted, pure and supreme descent into voidness.”®'^ That is, sfmyatd is tied to an experience and is described most adequately in this passage as an y experience resulting from a deep form of meditation. Here, exhibited in the earliest literature, is a connection between sUnyatd and andtman, which is likewise expanded to all dharma — the world o f form and cognition — thus implying pratltya-samutpdda. Further, sfmyatd is tied to the specific practice of deep meditation in which one practices going beyond die distinctions diat inform everyday life to the “signless” — to “seeing” or perceiving that what seems to exist in separation, in a duality of being and non-being, is not so. And it is clearly not sufficient to remain here, for still the mind is at work making observations and analysing diis new stage. The monk realises that all the work o f the analytical mind is, like the dharma of the world, “impermanent and liable to cease”. Thus, only when die practitioner can get beyond an analytical mind to an intuitive or precognitive mind can he/she experience die “true” or “pure” sense o f sfmyatd. Different Buddhist schools take this experience and recommend alternative modes of activity or interpretation for how it impacts daily life. In Nâgârjuna’s case, he chooses to see this as preparation for re-entering die mundane world of “people” and “villages”, as is taught in the Boddhisattva-ideal — at least for diose who are qualified to teach. It may be that this was the impetus for Nâgârjuna himself to become a teacher. For, in addition to the 3 35 See Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981, p. 32 and Tucci, Guiseppe, “Two Hymns o f the Catuh-stava o f Nâgârjuna,” International Rjtyal Asiatic Society, (1932) p. 309. Streiig, Frederick,}., Emptiness: A Study in Religions Meaning Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 11,156 Ornatowski, Gregory K., “Transformations o f “Emptiness”: On tlie Idea o f sünyatà and the Thought o f A b e and the Kyoto School oiPhRo^ophY," Journal of Ecumenical Studies, (34:1, 1997) p. 94 highly sophisticated arguments in the MMK, there are also the orthodox hymns o f the A Catuh-stava considered an authentic document of Nagarjuna’s by David S. Ruegg and '■1' Giuseppe Tucci®^ as well as the Buddhist treatises addressed to the regional king, Gautamiputra, To A Good Friend (Suhrlekha) and Precious Garland (Ratnavali). How does this fit with the sophisticated and challenging deconstructive methods o f the MMK? The Buddha’s teaching of skilful means {upayd), a technique or teaching device highly praised | ■in the Mahâyana schools that was developed more fully after Nâgârjuna, however must have been recognised during Nâgârjuna’s time, may offer the appropriate link to explain such divergence in one teacher’s approach. Or, as demonstrated later in this chapter, one I may view Nâgârjuna’s choice to adopt both the apophatic and cataphatic methods o f teaching as indication diat he believed that living into the extreme o f emptiness yields simply the practice of orthodox Buddhism which is the heart of praxi-centric phenomenology. In addition to “emptiness”, smyata has been translated as “relativity,” “undifferentiatedness,” and “non-duality” in addition to “nothingness” and “voidness.”®® Part of die difficulty In translating this term is the way the term has been given different emphasis throughout various Buddhist literature and traditions. And, depending on the y intention of the Mahayanist, the term will certainly be nuanced. Nâgârjuna’s use and development of sUnyatd emphasises reladvity, empiness of own-nature {svabhdvd), and undifferentiatedness, somedmes in surprising ways as evidenced in die way he characterises both satnsdra?iX\à nirvdnaNFF sünyatà. After its introduction in die Nikayas, die next radical interpretation of sûnyatd is found in the Prajndpdramitd (usually translated, “The Perfection of Wisdom”) literature where die idea of the non-substantive or “empty” character o f self and phenomena came to be extended to include everything, including die dharmas, the causal factors o f existence diat the Abhidharma school viewed as substantive.®’ 36 Although clearly found in the earlier literature (as discussed above), this concept of emptiness extended to all dharmas is now given emphasis and status from which it will influence not only Nâgârjuna’s tliought but tlie development of the greater Mahâyâna school of thought. Ruegg comments that Nâgârjuna is tlie first to give a systematic scholastic exposition of tlie tlieory o f emptiness (sünyatà) and non-substantiality (nihsvabhâvatâ) not only of the self (âtman) or individual (pudgala) but also of all factors of existence (dharma), one of the most fundamental ideas o f the Maliâyânasütras.®® And Ruegg connects Nâgârjuna’s emphasis on emptiness of all dharmas to that same overarching theme of emptiness in the Prajnâpâramitàsütras as he asserts that Nâgârjuna “is indeed credited with having rescued parts of them from oblivion.”®^ Lindtner describes tlie tenets of the Prcynâpâramità literature tlius: Their view of the ivorld is that fundamentally all phenomena {dharma) are void of substance, i.e. illusory or empty. Their view of the individual is tliat as a bodhisattva gradually recognizing this fact one should, accordingly, live in the equanimity of universal emptiness, and, at tha same time, through compassion, devote oneself to the task of liberating all other beings without scorning any means for the achievement o f that ideal {tipâyakausalyà) f There are echoes o f tlie Prajndpdramitd literature in Nâgârjuna’s work as he compels his listeners to reject the categorical and difference-bound language o f description and embrace instead reality wholly defined by sfmyatd. Moreover, as Battacharya points out, Nâgârjuna uses terminology in, for example, his Vigrahaiydvartani which clearly originate from the Prajndpdramitd literature.’^ It is this development of sfmyatd that Nâgârjuna chooses to further when he uses sunyatd'^.s a synonym for the Buddha’s pratitya-samutpdda. In effect, Nâgârjuna is asserting tliat what the Buddha really meant by his teachings of pratîtya-samutpdda and anitya can be understood through Nâgârjuna’s use of sfmyatd?'^ Abhidharma response f Ruegg, David Seyfort, “The Literature o f the Madhyamaka School o f Philosophy in India,” in A History of Indian Literature, vol. VII, Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, p. 5-6 Ruegg, David Seyfort, “The Literature o f the Madhyamaka School o f Philosophy in India,” in A History of Indian Literature, vol. VII, Weisbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981, p. 6 Lmdtner, Chr., Nagarjuniana: Studies in the Philosophy of Nâgârjuna, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982, p. 261 Battacharya, K., The Dialectical Method of Nâgârjuna, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1978, p. 24 as will be seen later in this chapter during a closer look at MMK 24:36 and 24:40 37 Before engaging fully in Nâgârjuna’s arguments, it is necessary to introduce the doctrine contained in the abhidharma literature, for it is in response to this literature that Nâgârjuna levies some of his severest critique. Several hundred years after the Buddha’s death, the first Buddhist literature was recorded and collected into three groupings or “baskets” ipitaka)\ the rules for tlie Buddhist monastic communities {Vinaya-pitaka), tlie discourses o f the Buddha (the sUtras), and the systematised doctrines o f the Buddha (Abhidharma-pitakâ). Altliough originally tlie abhidharma literature was created out of w hat can be called a phenomenological concern — to “provide an accurate account o f the way objects appear to our pre-reflective consciousness” that would aid in memorisation and meditation practice — by the 3'"'^ century BCE the AF\FFF2,sm2i~pitaka was an elaborate collection of dbamm lists systematically categorised according to distinctive characteristics.’® Wliat the Buddha taught his disciples in terms o f an existential approach to tlie liberation from duhkha becomes in the approach of the abhidharmacists a systematic and dogmatic approach to categorising dharma elements. This re-orientation to tlie Buddha’s teaching meant for Buddhist practitioners such as Nâgârjuna, tlie compromise of the very essence of the truth to which the Buddha had awakened. Systematic doctrinisation of tlie Buddha’s message moved the emphasis from lived practice and internalisation of the values and behaviours suggested in tlie eight-fold path to the ontological concern of dharma-as objects to keep or reject. The phenomenal world gains an essence quality, doctrinal teaching and ideas are reified, and behaviour is externalised to levy the necessary dharma elements. Dharma “Dharma,” indicates (1) the Buddha’s teachings or (2) phenomena, mental and physical, that constitute the elements o f existence as tliey are perceived. Dharma (Pali dhammâ), has the root “dhr,” meaning “to hold or keep.” In early Indian culture the term dharma meant “tliat which does not change” and was used to describe certain customs and duties that upheld the social and moral order based on such crucial ideas as the good, what is Herman, A. L,, A n Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A Philosophic Histoy of Indian Buddhism, Lanham: University Press o f America, Inc., 1983 p. 81 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 84 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 85. 38 A virtue, and trutii.’® Thus, the Buddha teaches the true Dharma, tlie eternal trutii or insight into the way things really are. When Buddhism began to employ the term dharma in tlieir teachings, the term was broadened in two ways: (1) to include even defilements {klesa-dharmd) and evils (pâpakà-akusald-dharmàB), and (2) dharma became associated with an element of existence {bhdvdjf In the metaphysical system of the Ahhidharma-pitaka, mental and physical phenomena are considered to be composed of certain dharma. The five aggregates (skafidhd) that make up an individual are themselves dharma components, and each individual aggregate can be divided into further groups of dharma until the elemental dharma is ascertained. At tliis point, die Abhidharma scholars considered die elemental dharma the lowest denominator, and attributed to diat dharma characteristics whereby it might be classified. The material world is also said to be composed o f five categories: forms, sounds, smells, tastes and tangible objects, all of which may again be broken into dharma components. The Buddhist practitioner who studied the Abhidharma matrices hoped to approach reality widi die discernment of one who can see dirough the confusing mass of conglomerates to the very base building blocks of reality in order to see die true order and nature of diose building blocks. Such discernment would allow the practitioner to concentrate on the cultivadon of the path, that is right views, right speech etc, and through such culdvation cool die passions which cause the accumulation of karma, which in its turn causes the advent of furdier rebirth.’® The practitioner wished to reverse diis build-up of karma to die mom ent in which all such proliferation comes to a stop and die equanimity of nirudna is experienced. Vasubandhu recorded in the Abhidharmakosa (translated Treasury of Metaphysics) die emphasis o f such investigation: Apart from close investigation of existents \dharmas\ diere is no means of pacifying die passions; and it is because of passions diat the world H ir a KAWA points to the Dhammapada for evidence o f this understanding o f dharmcr. “Enmity is not eliminated by enmity. Only when enmity is abandoned, is it eliminated. This is an unchanging and eternal truth. (Pah dhmima sanantano)-” H ir a k aw a , Akira A History of Indian Buddhism from Èâkyamuni to Early Mahdydna, translated and edited by Paul Groner, Honolulu: University o f Hawaih Press, 1990, p. 45 H ir a k a w a observes: “Dharma is used to refer to that aspect o f phenomena that has a lasting, enduring quality, the quality o f truth. To “see the Dharma” is to see “self as dharmas” or “self made up of dliarmas” ...” HIRAKAWA, Akira, A History of Indian Buddhism from Èdkyamuni to Eatty Mahdydna, translated and edited Paul Groner, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1990, p. 45 Lindtner, Chr., Nagarjunia: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy ofNdgdpuna, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982, p. 252. Lindtner explains that “... while the ingenious device laid down in Abhidharma on one hand had the advantage o f forming, so to speak, a highway to mokya, its abstract and systematic spirit ■ did, on the other, inevitably embody a tendency to dogmatism, an attitude which, in the end, was to render it unfaithful to the original intention o f the founder.” I i'.Si 39 wanders in this ocean of being. Hence, they say that the teacher spoke this [text].” The commentary accompanying the verse reads: Because there is no means of pacifying the passions witliout close investigation of existents, and because it is tlie passions that cause tlie world to wander in tlie great ocean of transmigration, therefore tliey say that the teacher — which means the Buddha — spoke tiiis metaphysical system aimed at tlie close examination o f existents. For a student is not able to closely investigate existents without teaching in metaphysics.^” Teachings such as these indicate a shift away from tlie phenomenological emphasis on clarity of perceptions for meditation purposes, to the ontological task o f identifying and classifying dharmas. Focusing on dharmas themselves, as elements of reality, externalises the activity of meditation and encourages the practitioner to see reality in a dualistic manner. This externalisation undermines the purpose of meditation as exemplified by the Buddha whereby meditation is an exercise that gives tlie practitioner an ever-clearer understanding of tlie mutability of existence. Externalising one’s understanding o f reality tiirough the categorisation of dharma elements emphasises the activity of an ego-self and establishes tlie duality o f release and bondage. Nâgârjuna will address this issue when he deconstructs the fundamentalist or essentialist view. The strong adherence to the teaching of “no self’, as provided in the Buddha’s early teaching, was part o f the impetus of die Abhidharma scholars for creating dieir m a trice s.H o w ev e r, in their turn toward an ontological categorising o f dharma elements, they in fact worked out a system by which to locate die fundamental elements diat make up that very “no self’ and in diis way undermined the teaching. This gravitation towards explanation and categorisation exhibits the tendency of “grasping” pointed out in the four noble truths which binds instead of working toward a “letting go.” As quoted in Griffiths, Paul J., On Being Mindkss: Buddhist Meditation and theMind-body Problem, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986, p. 49. 1°° As quoted in Griffiths, Paul J., On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and theMind-body Problem, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986, p. 49. Sutton, Florin Giripescu, Existence and Enlightenment in the Eankàvatâra-Sutra, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1991, p.97 40 Importantly, although the Abhidharma scholars did not consider dharmas themselves substantial or eternal (for dharmas clearly arise through dependent co-origination), still their use of dharma matrices suggested an element of truth. Talceuchi writes tliat dharma carried the sense of a conceptual unity, permanently maintaining its own essential provisions in a self-identical way, these essential provisions in turn serving as a norm to make otlier things (phenomenal existence) intelligible. Accordingly, even though the fact of impermanence is accepted and thus all phenomena subject to tlie law of impermanence are transient and liable to change, tlie law o f impermanence itself is taken as eternal, unperishing, and constant.^” This being the case, as the Abhidharma scholars systematically broke existents down into the dharma-elements to ascertain their quality of help or hindrance along tlie path to perfection, tlie very teaching o f anitya and praULya-samuipada is compromised. Lindtner also points to this shift: become thoroughly conversant witli those dharmas to be developed and those to be abandoned.^’® The dharma elements are given far more attention than aspects of the path such as right samàdhif^ The metaphysical speculation into the make-up o f dharma-elements for the destruction of hindrances pursued witli the best intentions to find and cultivate tlie noble eightfold patli undermines the very teaching o f the Buddha in establishing such a path. Identification is no longer helpful when concentration is directed solely towards the externalising activity o f cultivating “good” dharma instead of toward the liberating activity o f letting go. The Buddha’s teaching of the four noble truths, eight-fold noble patli, and dependent origination aimed at the practical realisation of no-self icmdtmafi) tiirough the ceasing of grasping and Nâgârjuna’s reinterpretation via sUnyatd hold the same goal of liberation. What they both promote is abandoning the misguided notion o f finding and ultimately grasping after an essential self. T a k e u c h i, Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism: In Search of the Timeless Spirit of Primitive Buddhism, edited aiid translated by James W. Heisig, New York: Crossroad, 1991, p. 71 Lindtner, Chr., Nagafuniana: Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nâgârjuna, Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1982, p. 252 Samâdhi understood as a general term indicating the various forms o f meditation, TAKEUCHI, Yoshinori, The Heart of Buddhism: In Search of the Timeless Spirit of Primitive Buddhism, edited and translated by James W. Heisig, New York: Crossroad, 1991, p. 161 A: Through the exercise and gradual development of his intellectual faculty the monk was thus enabled in a most rationalized manner to 41 Svabhâva The term svabhâva can be translated “self-nature” or “self-essence.” As Paul Williams describes of the Abhidharmic texts, there svabhâva is the defining characteristic which differentiates the category of primary existents from that of secondary existents. Primary existents (or dharmas) are said to possess self-nature which marks these entities as fundamental in contradistinction to secondary existents which may be conglomerates of primary existents or even non-existents (or as Williams puts it, quasi-nonexistents).^’® However, this characteristic o f self-nature in dharmas did not effect a change in ontological status in the primary existent, for the fundamental law of impermanence still applied, so tliat determining whetiier or not the primary existent could be located in tlie present time and space was not a question o f it being primary, but instead a question of whether or not it had a function.^’® Witliout a “function” tlie dharma still “exists” just not in time and space. As Williams points out, the categorising o f the dharmas into primary and secondary existents was a critical process o f clarification for a religious community which concentrated on contemplative ratlier than physical activity.^” For, as already noted, Abhidharma matrices aided in the memorisation of the early Buddhist teachings and served as “headings” for meditational reflection.^” Further, and m ost interestingly, Williams explains tliat for Samghabhadra, who made an effort to better explain the Sarvastivadin position “that all exists,”^” the categorisation into primary and secondary existents was to be conducted under the general umbrella of existence {sai) and “the distinction between primary and secondary existence corresponds to that between ultimate and conventional truth {paramdrthasatya And samvrtisatyâ)M^'^ A few things emerge from this analysis. First, it appears that the analysis o f existence or reality is in fact three-fold: primary or ultimate, which is usually understood to be ineffable; conventional or relative, generally taken to be unenlightened or samjdiic existence; and finally, the descriptive category of “existence” which claims to speak to botli the ultimate and conventional realities. In a similar vein, Stcherbatsky explains svabhdva (“own existence, essence”) as understood in Indian philosophical and philological terms: 105 wqiiams, Paul, “On the Abhidharma Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), p. 234 106 Williams, Paul, “On the Abhidharma O niologYf Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), p. 243 107 Wüliams, Paul, “On the Abhidharma Ontology,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), 244 108 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 84 109 Williams, Paul, “On the Abhidharma Ontology,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), p. 230 110 Williams, Paul, “On the Abhidharma Ontology,” Journal of Indian Philosophy, 9 (1981), p. 237 « î ■ : ■A'H O ne thing, e.g., simsapâ, is said to be the “own existence” o f the other, e.g., “tree”, when it contains the latter in its intention (comprehension, connotation) and is itself contained under the latter’s extension, being subaltern (vyapya) to the latter. Both are tlien said to be “existentially identical” (tadâtman) and become subject and predicate of an analytical judgement, e.g. “Asoka is a tree” . According to tlie Buddhist conception it is not a judgement or a proposition with two terms, but an inference with three terms, since a point-instant o f reality, a localisation in timespace, must be added, or understood, in order to make it a real cognition, or a cognition of Reality. It is interesting to note that Husserl’s investigation o f time yielded a triad as well, for how A better to reconcile the subject/object split but with a defining or grounding third? Similarly, tlie Yogacârâ system also suggests a nebulous “source” although there are no grounds for assuming tliat this “source” has ontological or idealistic aspects (see next section). Nâgârjuna also will refer to the distinction between ultimate and conventional truth, but instead of finding an ontological ground for tlie two (that of existence), he will apply sfmyatd, emptiness, to botli. I Second, the association o f primary existents, those existents which can be said to possess svabhdva, with the ultimate (paramdrthd) truth has implications for the perception an d /o r f conception of such existents. If ultimate truth is ineffable, then the nature o f the dhamms y (those existents witli svabhdvd) would be beyond conception and /o r perception in the realm of conventional truth. And yet, according to the above, secondary existents are often conglomerates of dharmas. Nâgârjuna will argue in his Mulamadhyamikakdrikds that the endeavour to identify discreet primary existents, either ontologically or epistemologically, results in the establishment of false or empty metaphysical categories. Once embarked upon tliis line of thinking, there is no satisfactory answer, but an infinite regression precisely because o f the nature o f reified language and thought: it cannot hold A ultimate truth and is not a promising way to approach ultimate truth or enlightenment. Moving from the Abhidharma analysis to tlie Mâdhyamika critique, Huntington finds two different but related uses of tlie term svabhdva in Mâdhyamika texts; svabhdva as Stcherbatsky, F. Th., Buddhist Logic: In Two Volumes, vol. II, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1962 p. 60-1 £n. 5 '1

S 43

“intrinsic being” and smbhava as “intrinsic nature”. W h e n the morally and spiritually (I neutral concept of “relative being”, a description in everyday reality o f “being as opposed h to nonbeing/’^^^ is reified or abstracted so that it becomes a '‘^metaconcept’' and thus is 1 used to re-interpret the everyday reality from which it was taken, it can be called % “intrinsic being,” It is this use o î svabhâva as “intrinsic being” which y operates as the unexamined presupposition behind idealist and rationalist philosophies and, drawing on the power o f the natural interpretation at its core, it serves as a filter for all of everyday experience, exerting a profoundly detrimental influence on both the individual and society.^'^ A very similar propensity among Western philosophers who presumed “being” without examination prompted Heidegger to begin his philosophical meditations on “being”. But where Heidegger would initially like to recapture the meaning of “being,” Nagarjuna’s critique aims at isolating tiiat assumption logically and then destroying it. The second connotation for svabhâva in Mâdhyamika writings is that of “intrinsic nature” which is simply another way of expressing the idea of “relative being.”^^® In other words, that phenomena are to be found in tlie world points to their existence as it is “manifest through tlieir participation in the nexus o f cause and effect” or the Buddhist concept of dependent origination. Common to botli connotations of svabhâva is a “fundamental natural interpretation that finds expression in both the conception and the perception of individuality.”^^® Svabhâva is identified as the defining characteristic o f a dhama, as its essence, as that which gives the dharma its individuality. The abhidharmists’ dependence on dharma and its svabhâva betrays a dualistic view o f reality where svabhâva is used to ground Buddhist doctrine and practice and is as such the very undermining of botli doctrine and practice. ^^2 Huntington, C.W., Jf. with Geshe Nangyal Wanchen, The Emptiness oJEmtiness: A n Introduction to Early Indian Mâdhyamika, Honolulu; University o f Hawai’i Press, 1989, p. 48 Candrakïrti’s definition o f “relative being”, as cited by Huntington, C.W., Jr. with Geshe Nangyal Wanchen, The Emptiness ofEmtiness:An Introduction to Early Indian Mâdhyamika, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1989, p. 48 Huntington, C.W., Jr. with Geshe Nangyal Wanchen, The Emptiness of Emtiness: A n Introduction to Early Indian Mâdhyamika, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1989, p. 49 115 Huntington, C.W., Jr. with Geshe Nangyal Wanchen, The Emptiness of Emtiness: A n Introduction to Early Indian Mâdhyamika, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1989, p. 49 lie Huntington, C.W., Jr. with Geshe Nangyal Wanchen, The Emptiness of Emtiness: A n Introduction to Early Indian Mâdhyamika, Plonolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1989, p. 48 44 Nâgârjuna’s critique I prostrate to the Perfect Buddha, The best of teachers, who taught tliat Wliatever is dependently arisen \pratftya-samutpâdd[ is Unceasing, unborn. Unannihilated, not permanent. N ot coming, not going. Without distinction, witliout identity. And free from conceptual construction ^rapcûcd^W Nâgârjuna critiqued the ontological basis of the Abhidharma investigation by showing that what tliose scholars perceived as distinctions between the dharma was logically impossible given tlie “law” of dependent origination (pratîtya-samutpâdà). Nâgârjuna is indiscriminate in his application of this teaching and whereas the Buddha’s teaching may be seen as existentially founded and fully practical, Nâgârjuna drives the teaching to its extreme logical conclusion. By doing so, however, Nâgârjuna is intent on recovering tliat very existential and practical nature of Buddhist practice. In Nâgârjuna’s thesis, nothing has foundation, all is empty {sünyâ)\ all is radically relative so as to malce any strict ontological investigation ultimately futile. The “law” of dependent origination (pratltyasamuîpâdà) points directly to tlie fact that ever^Tliing is empty (jünyà) of any possibility of stability or static self-nature. Nâgârjuna subjects the most revered Buddhist tenets to his critique, including tlie idea o f no-self {andtta}, nirvana and the holy Dhamta, or true teaching o f the Buddha. He insists that the Buddha’s intention does not lie in dismantling the self in a way that it can be re-built differently. The Buddha’s teaching of no-self is aimed at encouraging his followers, steeped in tlie Hindu doctrine of an immutable transmigratory “self’ to let go of this additional fetter and prepare instead for the great liberation. The Abhidharmists furthered this line of thought by attempting to drive backward toward the very source material for the complicated activities and composition tliat makes up what appears to be a person. Nâgârjuna saw, however, in the Abhidharma language tlie pursuit of a ground of being, tlie stable element that might be reversed and stopped through diligence in meditation and cultivation o f the virtues. This Idnd o f thinking, Nagarjuna argues, is no better than tlie non-Buddhist idea o f an immutable self, which as Nâgârjuna points out via a reductio ad absurdum, is absolutely unworkable. The Vundamentd Wisdom of the Middle Way.Ndgarjunds Mülamadhjamakakàrka, translated by Jay Garfield, O xford/N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 2 45 Nagarjuna’s use of the tetralemma {catuhskoti) 4 ■ Nagarjuna, working out of the environment o f logical and philosophical argument, y| utilises the tetralemma {catuhjkotî), botli positive and negative, with purpose. The tetralemma, a common Indian logic tool, recalls the early dialogues with tlie Buddha himself, famously the account o f the poisoned arrow. In Majjhimanikdya 63, a monk is dissatisfied with having accepted the Buddhist patli after he realises tliat the Buddha never bothered to explain to him a number of “speculative views,” namely, whether tlie world is eternal or not and whether the Tatliagata lives after dying or not. The Buddha responds by telling a parable of a man pierced by a poisoned arrow who will not take it out until he is told who shot him: a tall or short man, a black, brown or golden man? O r he demands to know what kind o f arrow or shaft from which it was shot: spring-bow or cross-bow, swallow-wort, reed, sinew or hemp? The man might die before all these questions are answered satisfactorily. The Buddha returns to the questions at hand and declares (using the form of a tetralemma) that there are a number of things he has not f explained, for example whether after dying the Tatliagata (“thus-gone one” or enlightened being) is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not. Why haven’t these tilings been explained? The pursuit o f such knowledge and information is not connected in any way to the goals of the Buddhist path. The Buddha declares that what he has taught and explained are tlie Four Noble Truths, for it is embarking on the Buddhist path that is related to an awakening and the attainment of nirud'iia. The tetralemma embedded in the dialogue above concerning tlie Tatliagata takes the conventional form of: A N ot (A) Botli (A) and (Not A) Neither (A) nor (Not A) The purpose of using the devise conveys tliat tlie monk is searching for tliorough knowledge, but more importantly, that the monk’s search is fundamentally misguided. The monk is concerned with questions and information tliat are completely irrelevant to knowledge tliat will ultimately ‘save’ him from the poisoned arrow already lodged in him. The four-fold negation exhibits tlie path of linear logic, and in the Majjhlmanikdya this 46 framework is juxtaposed against the Buddha’s Four Noble Truths which culminate in the Eight-fold Noble path of release that is aimed at a wisdom gained through purposeful practice. Thorough but linear knowledge is not sufficient or even applicable to what is of ultimate meaning, that is, what triggers tlie calming and quieting of the mind tliat allows for significant understanding and wisdom which allows for an awakening and realisation of nirvmia. Just like the Buddha, Nâgârjuna also makes use of the tetralemma to reveal what is essential and ultimately meaningful as opposed to what is misguided searching. However, as Garfield notes, Nâgârjuna draws a distinction between the “positive tetralemma” and “negative tetralemma” and the effective utilisation of each.^^® Nâgârjuna will actually assert tlie knowability of conventional reality utilising a “positive tetralemma”, but when it comes to ultimate reality Nâgârjuna will employ a “negative tetralemma.” Garfield cites MMK 18:8 for an example of a “positive tetralemma,” in which Nâgârjuna claims that “Everything is real and is not real, /B oth real and not real, /N either real nor not real. /This is the Lord Buddha’s teaching.”^” According to Garfield, Nâgârjuna intends to assert a level of analysis of tlie conventional realm from the conventional perspective: (1) Everytliing is conventionally real. (2) Everything is ultimately not real. (3) Everything is botli conventionally real and ultimately not real. (4) Everything is neitlier ultimately real nor completely unreal.^” When regarding reality from an ultimate perspective, however, all manner of assertions are misguided for the ultimate perspective cannot be described or otherwise analysed by conventional tliinldng. Garfield cites as example of a “negative tetralemma” MMK 22:11 in which emptiness is regarded in context o f the nature of Buddahood; “Em pty” should not be asserted. “Non-empty” should not be asserted. Neither both nor neither should be asserted. They are only used nominally. (MK 22:11)^^^

• 1® Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophj and Cross-Cultural Interprétation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 57

1*^ Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 57

• 20 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cidtural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 57
• 21 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 57

47 Here, as Garfield argues, Nâgârjuna strongly cautions against making assertions for conventional wisdom is deficient in describing an ultimate perspective. The form of tlie negative tetralemma then is: N o t (A) N ot {Not A} N ot (Both A and (Not A)} N ot (Neitlier A nor (Not A)} Garfield notes that . . . Nâgârjuna is drawing a logical distinction between two epistemological standpoints; as long as we remain within the conventional standpoint, we can, providing that we are careful, say many things, mundane and philosophical. But once we transcend that standpoint, no matter what we try to say, and no matter how carefully we hew to a via negativa, we can say nothing at all consistent with the via media Nâgârjuna is determined to limn. This will provide a valuable clue to the sense in which Madhyamaka philosophy requires us to regard emptiness not as an entity, and to relinquish all views when we understand emptiness. As Garfield reads Nâgârjuna’s use of the negative tetralemma, it is meant to push one beyond the realm of discursive identity, beyond the mundane view of the world in which statements of any kind are useful. Radical Relativity Nâgârjuna begins the MMK in chapter one. A n Analysis of Conditioning Causes (pratyaya), with an argument aimed at shaking the foundational thinking of tliose who had taken the Buddha’s teaching of dependent origination ipratîtya-samutpâdà) as a descriptive analysis of tlie origin of duhkha whereby one could see the development and locate tlie causal factors. Nâgârjuna’s thesis statement for tlie chapter utilises the tetralemma {catuhskoti) and sets his premise for the remaining chapters o f tlie MMK that nothing, no element or activity, no sensation or holy teaching stands independent and self-sufficient, can be defined, described or isolated apart from the relative web of what surrounds it: all is radically relative. Indeed, all is empty, including empiness itself.

• 22 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 57-8

48 I

Garfield argues that Nâgârjuna, in beginning tire MMK with an argument against efficient causes but in defence o f dependent origination, is setting in place tlie argument for the whole of the MMK, to culminate in in chapter 24:18 (“Wliatever is dependently co-arisen,/That is explained to be emptiness./That, being a dependent designation,/Is itself the middle way.”). Garfield calls this Nâgârjuna’s “doctrine o f the emptiness o f causation.”^^^ Nâgârjuna begins the MMK widi the following two verses: Neither from itself nor from anotlier, N or from botli. N or without a cause. Does anytliing whatever, anywhere arise. There are four conditions: efficient condition; Percept-object condition; immediate condition; Dominant condition, just so. There is no fifth condition. Nâgârjuna draws distinction between an efficient cause (described in verse 1) and a condition (described in verse 2). Garfield suggests drat when Nâgârjuna speaks o f “a cause,” he means an efficient cause which possesses a self-nature and the power to bring about an effect; however, when he speaks of a “condition” he is describing an “event, state or process” that might explain anotiier event, state or process.^^^ The former Nâgârjuna denies as logically possible, and the latter Nâgârjuna supports as the correct understanding o f dependent origination (praUtya-samuîpâdà). Nâgârjuna denies die operation of efficient causes — diey themselves cannot have conditioning causes for tiiat would contradict the definition o f “efficient”: for an efficient cause to support a conditioning cause it is tiien correctiy defined as a conditioning cause. In fact, an “efficient cause” can not be located, and one is lost in a reductio ad absurdum. This argument is developed in die following chapter addressing movement and indeed diroughout the MMK. In contrast, die way Nâgârjuna describes a “condition” is in line with his description o f die two-fold truth. Garfield explains: 123 Garfield, Jay L., 'Empty W^ords: Buddhist Vhihsophj and Cross-Cultural Tntetpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 26-7 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 28 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 27 He who rejects the emptiness O f dependent origination. He rejects all Worldly conventions/^’ As Garfield explains: “Common sense holds the world to be a network o f dependently arisen phenomena. So common sense holds tlie world to be empty. Again, die standpoint o f emptiness is not at odds with the conventional standpoint, only widi a particular philosophical understanding of it — that which takes die conventional to be 126 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words; Buddhist Philosophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 30 127 Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Phibsophy and Cross-Cultural Interpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 37 1 49 ... if one views [[[phenomena]]] as having and as emerging from casual powers, one views them as having essences and as being connected to the essences of otiier phenomena. This, Nâgârjuna suggests, is ultimately incoherent, since it forces one at die same time to assert the inherent existence o f tiiese things, in virtue o f their essential identity, and to assert their dependence and productive character, in virtue of their causal history and power. But such dependence and relational character, he suggests, are incompatible widi their inherent existence. If, on die other hand, one regards things as dependent merely on conditions, one regards diem as merely conventionally existent. And to regard something as merely conventionally existent is to regard it as witiiout essence and widiout power. And this is to regard it as existing dependendy. This provides a coherent mundane understanding of phenomena as an alternative to the metaphyisics of reification Nâgârjuna criticizes. And in fact, Nâgârjuna is driving toward one o f the crucial arguments o f die chapter: if one accepts an essentialist or efficient cause, one would not be able to accept the foundational Buddhist teaching of dependent origination ipratttya-samutpàdâ). Nâgârjuna writes: If things did not exist Without essence. The phrase, “Wlien this exists so this will be,” Would not be acceptable. Nâgârjuna's point here is that we are only able to make assertions and observations in an everyday sense if indeed all things are empty, and are not independent in and of themselves. Our assertions about die phenomenal world around us, and our experiences as well, are described as dependently arising by die Buddha and Nâgârjuna: 50 more than merely conventional.”^^® Nâgârjuna is working to destroy tlie logical constructs which seek to show tlie ontological foundations for Buddhism such as suggested by the abhidharma matrixes. He sees as the outcome of such foundationalism a deeply dualistic view of the world which is contradictory and counter-productive the Buddhist goal o f liberation. Altliough the abhidharma scholar would never propose that one view reality in a dualistic manner, nevertlieless, as suggested above, tlie very externalising activity of analysing dharmas for either rejection or assimilation creates a dualistic stance between tlie acting subject (ego self) and his/her activities, and ultimately this dualistic perspective is applied to salvation and bondage. Nâgârjuna will argue against this ontologising of the Buddha’s message for it creates a dualistic approach tiiat divides and separates what cannot be taken apart (even in the extreme example of samsara and nirvana), and even more damaging, encourages die kind of mindset (which is to be examined later as prapancd) diat moves out o f meditative practice to engage in analysis, an activity dependent upon distinction and duality. In fact, as Nâgârjuna has stated in his dedicatory remarks, die truly 'dependendy arisen’ is ‘without identity’ and thus die activity of searching for explanation, origin and the rest of the analytical investigation will surely fail. In the fifteenth chapter of the Mülamadhyamakakdrikàs, Nâgârjuna introduces the categories of self-existence and odier-existence to examine the ontology of being and nonbeing. For there to be distinctions, diere must be self-existence and otiier-existence. However, it is not logical that somediing with self-existence could be produced by something else, for then it would be not self-existent, but something produced. Nâgârjuna writes tiiat: Those who perceive self-existence and other-existence, and an existent tiling and a non-existent thing. Do not perceive die true nature o f the Buddha’s teaching.^^® N othing can be said to hold a discrete identity in and of itself without being relative to some other factor. This critique holds to phenomena, relationships, time and religious doctrine. Garfield, Jay L., Empty Words: Buddhist Philosophj and Cross-Culturallnterpretation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 37 129 MMK 15:6, translated by Streng, Frederick J., Emptiness: A Study in BsUgious Meaning, Nash ville/N ew York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 199 51 Nâgârjuna’s use of sünyatâ Key to understanding Nâgârjuna’s unequivicable denial o f “self-nature” and radical relativism is his description o f how emptiness works within the Buddhist context. One accusation among the contemporaries o f Nâgârjuna was that with his critique, Nâgârjuna has denied the existence of the four noble trutlis, tlie monastic community and the Buddha himself, what are known as the tliree “jewels” of Buddhism that the aspiring monk would take refuge in — in other words, the very foundation of tlie Buddhist r e l i g i o n . Nâgârjuna’s response includes at least two important aspects that must be understood for his general critique to hold any meaning and not be classified as an expression o f nihilism. First, Nâgârjuna reinforces his argument of emptiness, and insists that the very “law” of dependent origination is exactly what he means by “emptiness” (v. 18).^®^ He states that (v. 19-20): Since tliere is no whatever originating independently. No whatever exists which is not empty. If all existence is not empty, there is neither origination nor destruction. You must wrongly conclude tlien that the four holy trutlis do not exist.^^^ That is, dharmas, as Nâgârjuna shows, do not originate “independent” o f anotlier factor. In other words, they have no selFnature {svabhâvà). Having no self-nature, dharmas f: should be designated as “empty” (smiyata). Only seen thus, as originating dependently hence empty of self-nature, can Buddhist practice be ‘practiced’. The very act of positing ' that tlie noble truths exist as such, in fact denies tliem outright. For only when existents are recognised as empty of “self-nature” (tliat is, be seen as dependently originating) can tliey engage in the act of becoming and tliereby participate in the conventional world. no MMK 24, translated by Streng, Frederick J., Emptiness: A Study in 'ReHgiousMeaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press; 1967, p. 213 Matilal points out that ‘‘siinya means in mathematics” thus, “To say that a concept is stlnya means that it is like the zero because it has no absolute value o f its own but has a value only with respect to a position in a system.” This rendering o f sünyatâ so well with his critique, Matilal wonders if Nâgârjuna developed his argument around sûnyâtavfïÛi this mathematical sense in mind. Matilal, Bimal Krishna, Epistmology, Logic, and Grammar in Indian Philosophical Analysis, The Hague: Mouton, 1971, p. 152. D. Seyfort Ruegg denies this possibility stating that the usage o f sünyatâ for the mathematical zero place came later than Nâgârjuna and certainly later than the canonical literature from whence the term first appears. Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981, p. 3 132 MMK 25:19-20, as translated by Streng, Frederick, in Streng, Frederick,]., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 217 133 MMK 24:36, as translated by Streng, Frederick, Emptiness: A Stucty in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 215 MMK 24:40, as translated by Streng, Frederick, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 215 1 52 Nâgârjuna also insists tliat his understanding o f tlie emptiness o f existents is crucial for undertaking the path to enlightenment, for witiiout the movement allowed in dependent origination, there would be no avenue towards liberation. An essentialist or strictly ontological understanding of the Buddhist doctrines renders them ineffectual and A impossible to act upon. Arguing for the concrete existence o f sometliiiig delivers it into the realm of the absolute tliat can not be “touched” and certainly cannot, by virtue o f its definition as absolute and immutable, sustain the fluid activity of religious practice. The only way to avoid diis problem is to accept the non-foundational stance of sünjatâ tliat opens up tlie possibility for practice. In like manner that the Buddha sets up the possibility of freedom and release out of the dissatisfaction {dtth,khà) of the conventional world, Nâgârjuna sets up transformation (not ontologically, but practically) within tlie necessary condition of satnsara. Nâgârjuna states near the end of the chapter that: You deny all mundane and customary activities When you deny emptiness [in tlie sense of] dependent co-origination (praUtya-samttfpâdà) and a few verses later: He who perceives dependent co-origination ipraUtya-samiitpâdd) Also understands sorrow, origination, and destruction as well as tlie path [of release]. That is to say, the Buddha’s teaching in light of tlie non-foundational stance of hinyatà makes possible all of tlie activity o f the sangha, the instruction o f the noble trutlis, participation along tlie eight-fold noble path, and any liberation that the Buddha experienced. Nâgârjuna brings his followers back to the Buddha’s teaching of pratityasamutpada by reinterpreting it in the light o f the radical relativism o f sünyatâ. Nâgârjuna’s introduction of two truths This leads directly into the second major point tliat Nâgârjuna makes to tliose accusing him o f denying the tliree jewels o f Buddhism. He introduces the concept o f two trutlis, conventional trutli {sarnvfti-sapyd) and ultimate truth (paramdrtha-satyd). He asserts that without conventional truth, there is no access to ultimate trutli, and of course without 53 MMK 24:10, as translated by Streng, Frederick, Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 213 136 MMK 24:9,as translated by Streng, Frederick,]., Emptiness: A Stucty in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 213 Paramartha is translated “ultimate” as in “ultimate reality” by D. Seyfort Ruegg (The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 1981, p. 3), and “highest” as in “highest truth” by Frederick Streng (“The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” Eastern Buddhist 11(1978), p.13). The intention is to differentiate between samvrti (the limited or delimited) realm and paramartha (an ultimate or transcendent) realm. It is awkward to discuss Nâgârjuna’s thought in terms o f an “ultimate” given his injunction against such substantiahst ideas. However, even the discussion o f “two truths” is awkward until Nâgârjuna applies sünyatâ in order to empty both polemics. I will use the optional phrase “profound reality” that Streng has used to describe the Buddha’s understanding o f the argument (Streng, Frederick,]., “The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” Eastern Buddhist p.l3). •% ultimate truth it is impossible to understand nirmna}^^ The teaching o f tlie two trutlis is one o f the key ways in which Nâgârjuna avoids a total deconstruction o f the Buddhist doctrine and allows for meaning within the full retinue of Buddhist teaching. Nâgârjuna introduces the two trutlis in order to demonstrate that his aim is not to destroy Buddhist practice, which is carried out in tlie realm o f “mundane and customarjr activities,” but to re-invigorate it — free it from the ontological quagmire so as to be realised in its full im port which carries witli it a soteriological message. Nâgârjuna’s attacks on tlie rhetoric o f tlie religious groups, taken within the context of the two truths, now reveals his motive for teaching and writing. Nâgârjuna is hopeful that those who mistakenly looked t among dhamia matrices for die path to enlightenment will abandon such a limited approach and enter instead the path of releasement. J Nâgârjuna suggests diat his detractors not only do not understand mnjatd but do not understand how sünyatâ “works” with the Buddha’s dharma which is as dangerous as grasping a snake from the wrong end (MMK 24:11). Nâgârjuna explains that in order to understand the “profound ‘point’” (tattvd) of the Buddha’s teaching, one must realise the f “distribution {vibhagam) of die two kinds of trudi.”^®^ Much scholarly discussion has taken place over what Nâgârjuna meant by “two truths” which seems to suggest an utterly dualistic understanding o f reality. Wliat Nâgârjuna is really proposing, however, is the participation of die Buddhist practitioner in profound reality^®’ through the everyday “mundane” activity o f die eight-fold path. The verses in MMK 24 read; The explanation of the true nature of things by die Buddhas has recourse to two kinds o f truth: The delimiting {samvrti) trudi and the highest (paramartha) truth. Those who do not know the distribution o f die two kinds of trudi Do not know the profound reality o f the Buddha’s teaching. 54 The highest truth is not taught apart from conventional practice, And without having understood tlie highest trutli one cannot attain This description of the two levels of truth or reality in chapter 24 o f tlie MMK is followed by one o f Nâgârjuna’s most influential verses to tlie later schools of Mahâyâiia Buddhism where in chapter 25, he relates niwdna directly widi samsara;. There is nothing whatever which differentiates the existence-in-flux (samsara) from nirvana',! KvM diere is nodiing whatever which differentiates nirvana from existence-in-flux/®^ Streng understands Nâgârjuna’s teaching of two truths as one o f “ultimate transformation”: one perceives “die highest truth [which] is the realization that all distinctions are “empty.” This realization requires a transformation of self-awareness. Streng is basically saying tiiat knowing the trutii is a state of mind. This interpretation is problematic, however, for it suggests a metaphysical understanding o f the subject (egoself) in which the subject is privileged as master of knowledge or truth; it is a dualistic and subjectivitic understanding o f Nâgârjuna’s two-truths. Shlomo Biderman, in his discussion of samsara and nirvana, suggests that we understand Nâgârjuna’s two-fold trudi as “‘a performance’ of a change of s t a t u s . I n diis way, Biderman maintains, Nâgârjuna is addressing neidier metaphysics nor psychology in asserting that samsdra is no different from nirvdna. What Biderman seems to suggest by proposing that one understand the two-fold trudi as a change o f status is that the relationship between the self/subject and die world changes while all other phenomena remain unchanged. He says, “Wlien the philosopher ceases to search for the fixed and stable, sanisdra remains samsdra just as before, but ceases to cause suffering.”^'*^ Furdiermore, and most interestingly, he calls the change of status a “performance” o f a change of status. Thus, Nâgârjuna encourages us to change our view of reality from one 138 MMK 24:8-10, as translated by Streng, Frederick,]., “The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” Eastern Buddhist 11(1978), p.13 139 MMK 25:19, as translated by Streng, Frederick,]., Emptiness: A Stud)! in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 217 1'*° Streng, Frederick,]., “The Process o f Ultimate Transformation in Nâgârjuna’s Mâdhyamika,” Eastern Buddhist 11(1978), p.25 Biderman, Shlomo, “Scepticism and Religion: On the Interpretation o f Nâgârjuna,” Indian Philosophy of ReUgion (1989), p. 73 Biderman, Shlomo, “Scepticism and Religion: On the Interpretation o f Nâgârjuna,” Indian Philosophy of Religion (1989), p. 73 I I of svabbava to one of sünyatâ and this “transition” comes about via a kind of “performance.” One thinks of performing the usual Buddhist activities, studying sutras, A meditating, cultivating aspects of the patii, as what is meant here by “performance” so that the mundane activities of tlie Buddhist practitioner can, via such performance, be transformed into the perfected activities o f a Buddha or Boddhisattva. This is a closer description of what is meant in die meeting/merging of practice and profound reality/ truth. NAGAO, Gadjiii M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K a w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 13 follower o f Nâgârjuna and founder o f the Mâdhyamika school o f the Prasangika disciple o f Vasubhandhu 146 NAGAO, Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. KAWAMURA, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 21 147 NAGAO, Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. KAWAMURA, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 19 NAG AO Gadjin addresses Buddhist practice in his analysis of Nagarjuna’s two truths and endeavours to bring out the importance of motion or movement in Nâgârjuna’s understanding of how mundane or samsàric practice interacts with profound reality or A âj nirvana. Aldiough certain aspects are fascinating, N a g a o ’s analysis is not without problems. In addressing the two-fold trudi construct, NAGAO analyses the term, samvrti, in contrast with paramartha and shows the gradual development of paradoxical meaning surrounding die term samvrti. Samvrti usually “refers to being conventional, mundane, profane, worldly,” in contrast to 'paramartha, which means being super-worldly, supermundane, absolute.”^^® NAGAO shows diat one root of the term samvpti, vrt, can mean to come into being, manifesting or clarifying trudi, while in contrast the root, vr, indicates a covering or darkening of die trudi. Wlien tracing die term through uses of these roots, N A G A O shows a fascinating development o f the term samvfli differentiated by Candraklrti^'^'^ and Sthiramati.^'*® NAGAO notes diat Candralurti tends to choose only the negative perspective o f samvfti so diat effectively, “paramârdia can never be seen: to look at paramartha is not to see it at all,” while on die odier hand, Sdiiramati “affirms the value of samvrti as die sole medium through which paramartha can manifest itself.”^'*'^ Candraklrti’s usage o f “concealment” and Sdiiramati’s usage of “manifested” are combined by the Chinese founder o f the Vijnânavâda School, Tz’u-en, who uses samvftisatya to convey a “covering-and-manifesting truth” in his Chapter on the Two-fold Tm thf'^ According to NAGAO, the paradoxicality in “covering-manifesting” is essential to the B odhisattva-mârga for it describes die compassion of die Bodhisattva who, “not abiding 56 in Nirvana,” returns to diis world and “dwells in the very midst of defilement.”^® Therefore, according to NAGAO, Nâgârjuna’s achievement in his use o f mnjata, was the negation of this world — proving die “non-existence” of diis world. This, however, is only half the equation for Nagao; non-existence only achieves the “upward movement,” that o f transcending this world. The completion of this movement for NAGAO can be found in the Yogâcâra method, especially exhibited in Asanga, who speaks o f the “existence o f non-existence” which is the complementary “downward movement” and affirmation of this world. This is the completion of the Bodhisattva ideal. This is part of the groundwork for N a g a o ’s proposition of the “two-directional activity” in which he asserts that: The identification of dependent co-origination with sünyatâ is the activity in the direction o f ascent, and the identification of sünyatâ widi designation based upon some material (which designation, I diink, is another name for dependent co-origination) is the activity in the direction o f descent ... The final situation, called the “middle path,” synthesizes the two directions Here one sees that sûnjatü, associated with dependent co-origination {praütyasamutpâàâ), contains the activity o f both ascent and descent. This is what NAGAO means when he asserts that dependent origination (praUtyasamutpàdd) is “die ground or basis on which final deliverance takes place.”'® I agree diat it is fruitful to consider Nâgârjuna in relation to the Yogâcâra school rather diaii view bodi as antidietical to each otiier. However, although Nâgârjuna may not state it as emphatically as the Yogâcarins, Nâgârjuna’s positive view o f samvrti is exhibited by die ultimately positive attitude he has for samsàric existence, for die Boddhisattva-;^^?^?/^^? is directed towards this existence. The ultiamate response to Nâgârjuna’s negative logic is that of bodhisattva practice which takes place in tiiis mundane existence. Therefore, I question N a g a g ’s portrayal of Nâgârjuna’s sünjatà moving dependent origination only in the direction of assent. Furthermore, elsewhere NAGAO speaks o f sünyatâ as the abstract which lacks a personal and practical aspect; the practical aspect is fulfilled, according to N AG AO , by die ^48 N a g a o , Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K a w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 22 449 N a g a o , Gadjin M., “Ascent and Descent: Two-directional Activity in Buddhist Thought,” in Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. Ka w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 205 42° N a g a o , Gadjin M ., “Buddhist Subjectivity,” in Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. Ka w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 8. Wliat is originating co-dependently, we call emptiness. It is a designation based upon (some material). Only this is the Middle Patl-i.'® 421 N a g a o , Gadjin M., “Yogâcâra - A Reappraisal,” in Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K a w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 221 422 The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle ~Way: Nâgâfuna’s Mûlamadhyamakakârikâs, translated with commentary by Jay L. Garfield, O xford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 297 423 The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Wcy: Nâgâtjuna’s Mfdamadhyamakakârikâs, translated with commentary by Jay L. Garfield, O xford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 304 424 As translated by NAGAO, Gadjin, “From Mâdhyamika to Yogâcâra: An Analysis o f MMK, XXIV. 18 and MV, 1.1-2,” in Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K aWAMURA, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 190. Garfield criticises N a g a o ’s interpretation o f “material” in the way NAGAO shows the descending direction o f sünyatâ \x\ The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nâgârjuna’s Mülamadhyamakakdrikàs, translated with commentary by Jay L. Garfield, O xford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p.306 = .y; 57 Yogâcâra teachings.'®' This is why NAGAO prefers to consider Nâgârjuna and the Yogâcâra school as fulfilment to each other rather tlian totally at odds theoretically; the Yogâcâra school balances Nâgârjuna’s negative, abstract sünjatà. Is this a valid reading of Nâgârjuna’s mnjatad In a strong sense, one might argue die opposite for it is Nâgârjuna’s sünjatà which, as an agent o f relativity, acts as a leveller and indeed elevates die practical purpose OÎ santsàra‘ào Ûmtpratttya-samutpàda has relevance again as Buddha’s teaching. As f will be discussed in the following chapter on Yogacara, views are split as to where the Yogâcâra teachings lead, either back to a substantive view of consciousness, or furthering the teaching o f Nâgârjuna that only a radical employment of simjatà is effective in providing proper preparation for praxis. I believe tiiat die latter teaching is clearly exhibited in the Yogâcâra school and works conjunctively with Nâgârjuna’s sünjatà. I find N a g a o ’s negative treatment of Nâgârjuna’s sünjatâ to call into question die possibility that Nâgârjuna intends a practical way to enter the living reality o f sünjatà. Understanding Nâgârjuna’s two trudis is key to interpreting his dialectic within his religious intentions. In his commentary, Garfield maintains tiiat die two truths, conventional and ultimate, are ontically one, however, he claims diat the “ultimate trudi is epistemologically and soteriologically more significant than the conventional.”'®^ He then goes on to lay out Nâgârjuna’s argument in MMK chapter 24 to climax with vs. 18 in which he sees Nâgârjuna.constructing a “critical diree-way relation between emptiness, dependent origination and verbal convention” which, according to Garfield, is itself the “middle way.”'®® The verse in question, from MMK 24:18 is: 'I . I . . - ' . . . . - , , - - . .. . . . ■ ' # In tliis relationship, conventional reality dependently arisen has no identity outside of tlie verbal designations made about it: it is clearly empty. Emptiness, too, has no essential identity and is seen to be designated dependently and is tlierefore also empty. That the conventional world and emptiness are “designated dependently” make tlie very relationship between tlie two empty - tliis is ultimately the middle way, hanging between the two extremes o f essentialism/absolutism and nihilistic emptiness/nothingness. The problem with Garfield’s proposal that verbal convention could be a middle way between emptiness and dependent origination is tliat Buddhist release clearly transcends verbal designations. Nâgârjuna only seeks to move the practitioner beyond verbal convention tliat creates verbal designations (prapmlca), not to create a dependency on them. Wliat Nâgârjuna allows for instead is the possibility for practice. Dependent origination, relativised by emptiness, becomes the movement necessary for true praxi-centric engagement. The apparent duality of Nâgârjuna’s two truths is ratlier the non-dual recognition that activity in the mundane world strikes directly at tlie so-called “transcendent” trutli. “The highest trutli is not taught apart from conventional practice, /A nd without having understood tlie highest truth one cannot attain nirvmiaP Remarkably, with tlie suggestion o f two truths Nâgârjuna challenges the problematic dualistic approach to reality which sees the mundane world and interprets the phenomena therein either just as it appears to the discerning conscious, which has exactly and only its self-conscious viewpoint, or as an image with neither substance nor meaning that the conscious must deny to remain honest. In other words, seeing phenomena only from the viewpoint o f samvtyi pushes the self-conscious to choose eitlier eternalism or nihilism. Paraphrased from the Ratnavalv. Because he resorts to neither existence nor non-existence he who is not fixed in duality (advayanisrita) is released ... On tlie contrary, if one erroneously takes the world — which is at the same time causally conditioned and mirage-like (marîcipratima) — to be either existence or non-existence of something (like water in a mirage), one is not released.'®® Rather, Nâgârjuna suggests approaching the phenomenal world through the lens of sûnyatà so tliat the undeniable reality of samvrti does not snare the conscious, but encourages the conscious to let go even of the idea of self-conscious. The importance 425 Ruegg paraphrasing the Ratiiavali vs 51-57 in Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Uterature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981, p. 24-25 59 now does not lie in tlie way the subject conceives o f phenomena, but whether the subject can then apply tlie understanding of sünyatâ to the conscious perceiving subject. Only then can phenomena be just phenomena, and tlie subject is obliged to neitlier affirm nor deny that reality; no judging activity is necessary. The apparent dualism of samvrti and paramârtha cannot be sustained if botli are characterised by sünyatâ. Likewise, and equally importantly, altliough this logic leaves us room to say tliat “nothing whatever ,.. differentiates ... [samsârâ] from nirvâtiaf trutli is not the great equaliser in terms of erasing distinctions. Sünyatâ allows for the kind of practical approach to the world which doesn’t seek to grasp but intuitively ‘touch’ tlie ineffable wonder o f profound reality. With tlie two truths, Nâgârjuna recalls tlie Buddha’s message within the four noble truths to respond to tlie duhkha, die dissatisfaction in daily life, with practical, transformational activity. Buddhist practice, wholly in the realm of the mundane, is the proper way by which one experiences ultimate transformation, realises the highest trutii. Yet, importantly, tliis does not entail departing from one reality into another, but letting go of the empty categories samvrti and paramârtha and abiding in the totally ineffable state that cannot be reduced to such verbal designations. ‘“All things are void’ is not a “proposition.” It only expresses the Inexpressible, witii the help o f the conventional truth Thus, Nâgârjuna is proposing with his two truths a kind o f praxi-centric phenomenology in which clarity of vision and understanding gained through the practical activity of the Buddhist patii yields a transformation within the practitioner tiiat cannot be fully explained nor described, but which makes all the difference between continually wandering through sanisâric existence and full liberation. Conceptual Diffusion iprapanca) and Bliss {siva) One could note tiiat Nâgârjuna’s philosophical might and his use o fprâsatiga argument is ironic considering his desire to push tiiinkers out of disputation and into practice. It shows that at some level, an awareness is necessary; not of self-as-an-end, but the insightful knowledge (or wisdom, prqjna) that enables one to see reality for what it is — empty o f self, empty o f own-being. It also shows tlie practical usefulness o f “argument,” in itself a dead end, as a means of prompting one to that understanding. In Buddhapâlita’s commentary on tlie MMK verses 22:15 (“Those who verbally elaborate the incessant Buddha who has transcended verbal elaboration Sprapancd\ — none of them, impaired by verbal elaboration, can see the Tathâgata”), he explains that the term Battachaiya, K., The Dialectical Method oJNagarjuna, Delhi: Motilal Baiiarsidass, 1978, p. 24 60 427 in Wayman, Alex, Untying the Knots in Buddhism, Delhi; Motilal Baiiarsidass Publishers, 1997, p. 185. Streng translates pmpanca “phenomenal extension” (as in MMK 18:5, “On account o f the destruction o f the pains ikksd) o f action there is release;/For pains o f action exist for him who constructs them./These pains result from phenomenal extension (prapancd)', but this phenomenal extention comes to a stop by emptiness”), Streng, Frederick,}., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 204. And Garfield uses “mental fabrication” (MMK 18:5, “Action and miserj^ having ceased, there is nirvana,/Action and misery come from conceptual thought./This comes from mental fabrication \prapanci^fRû}ià.C2LBon ceases through emptiness.”) in The Eundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Ndgdtyuna’s Mülamadhyamakakdrikàs, translated with commentary by Jay L Garfield, O xford/N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 48 428 Candrakirti, Prasannapada as quoted by Huntington, C.W., Jr. witli Geshé Mangy al Wanchen, The Emptiness of Emptiness: A n Introduction to Early Indian Mâdhyamika, Honolulu: University o f Flawai’i Press, 1989, p. 30 429 Nanananda, as quoted in Huntington, C.W.,Jr. with Geshé Nangyal Wanchen, The Emptiness of Emtiness: A n Introduction to Early Indian Mâdhyamika, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1989, p. 209 prapanca, or “verbal elaboration” in tliis text, points to the mistaken perception of ‘existence and non-existence,’ ‘permanence and impermanence,’ and so forth brought on | by ‘passionate craving.’ Thus, prapanca suggests “divisive crosspurposes” {dvandvà), or “two things when there are really one” so that one does not see objects ‘as they are’.'®’ Candrakirti, in his commentary on MMK 18:5, states that the purpose for the sünja “doctrine” is to: ... Erradicate the innate tendency of conceptual tliought to construct reified notions of being (bhava) and nonbeing (abhava). Such reified notions generate philosophical positions referred to as absolutism and nihilism ... [Tjhese positions are representations of exactly the sort of .| conceptual diffusion (prapanca) that lies at the root of clinging and antipadiy and therefore all forms o f fear and suffering.'®® Nanananda suggests tliat prapanca. ... refers to both ontic and to epistemic diffusion — botli to the universe as the totality of the contents of perception and to language and conceptual thought. Thus, when conceptual tliought becomes confused and diffuse, so does the external world.'® That is, allowing oneself to be drawn into the activity o f searching for sources, foundational teachings and premises, all of which characterise tlie philosopher’s mode, is a kind o f mental fog which produces illusions of answers and prevents the true seeker from seeking clarity of mind, a quieting of the mind, which properly developed yields liberation. It may be said that tliere is a fine line between teaching the dharma and engaging in “verbal elaboration” o rprcpanca. Nâgârjuna ends the MMK witli the verse: I prostrate to Gautama Wlio through compassion Taught me the true doctrine, Which leads to the relinquishing of all views.' ' I 61 % As Nagarjuna intimates that the true doctrine is no doctrine, Ruegg suggests that 3;. Nâgârjuna’s approach to reality is comparable to the epoché. according to which only silence — a philosophically motivated refraining from the conceptualization and verbalization that belong to the discursive level of relativity and transactional usage — is considered to correspond in the last analysis to the paramârtlia, which is as such inconceivable and inexpressible in terms of discursivity. Wliile no doubt related to apophaticism this latter approach goes beyond negative or positive tlieory; and in Madhyamaka it is distinguishable from both.'^' Thus, when Nâgârjuna makes the statement that “no dharma was ever taught by Buddha to anybody anywhere” (MMK 25:24) or makes the assertion that on tlie level o f absolute reality (paramartha), “designata and discursive development have come to a stop,”"'^ he approaches the sceptic’s epoché. Gomez rightfully cautions against such a privileged stance which as a “classical religious maneuver o f claiming iiieffability for foundational beliefs” results in a shift of autliority from tlie public domain to the “hidden, protected realm o f unquestioned authority” whereby the “ârya’s silence” is truly “aryan authoritative ... hense unassailable.”'^® Instead of viewing the ineffable nature o f the ultimate truth Nâgârjuna points to as an authoritarian manoeuvre of exclusivity, Gomez affirms Nâgârjuna’s dialectic which he argues “creates space for the unsayable that will carry in its train tlie vast and complex retinue of Buddhist doctrines, practices and institutions.”'^ So that, despite the ineffable nature of ultimate truth, Nâgârjuna’s teaching reclaims, in a way, the mundane “public domain” in which Buddhist practice occurs and as such, works against elitist foundational authority. 42° The Fmdamental Wisdom of the Middle Waj.Nâgâ!juna’sMülamadhyamakakârkâ, translated by Jay L. Garfield, O xford/N ew York: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 83 424 Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981, p. 34 422 Ruegg, D. Seyfort, The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden 1981, p. 34 423 Gomez, Luis O., “Two Jars on Two Tables: Reflections on the “Two Truths,” Silk, Jonathan A. ed. Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 2000, p.l07 424 Gomez, Luis O., “Two Jars on Two Tables: Reflections on the “Two Truths,” Silk, Jonathan A. ed. Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 2000, p. 108 “ It has been recorded that after tlie Buddha’s enlightenment, he sat in meditation another 49 days contemplating what he had gained in his moment of penetrating insight/^® As canonical records indicate, what motivated tlie Buddha to return to the “lived world” instead of departing fully into nirvmia was his feeling of loving-kindness, or compassion, toward all suffering individuals whom he desired should also experience this same liberation (moksa). In other words, the Buddha was compelled to attempt to teach tlie Dhamm, tlie saving truth, to others in order tliat his experience would be emulated and all who seek release from duhkha would at the very least have a roadmap, a guide to such release. That is to say, far from being dogmatic, the four noble trutlis aim to be the insightful observations o f one who has seen things for what they are (or are becoming, yathdhtttani), and who has experienced liberation. His statement elsewhere in the collected sayings, “I only teach suffering and tlie release from suffering” is just tlie kind of statement which overshadows the dogmatic tendencies of his followers who would have the Buddhist system nailed down in concrete terms. It is perhaps telling that the Buddha himself never recorded any of his own teachings, but intended them as words to be lived into practice and eventually discarded, as in the well-known parable in which a raft is ÿ "abandoned once the traveller has successfully crossed tlie stream. Deconstructing the self into constituent parts, as the Abhidharmists have done, can only be useful when situated in the realm of practice. It is not tliat the ontology of tlie Abhidharma efforts was fundamentally wrong, but tiiat the ontology was not moved into the active realm of compassion, a move which both empties tlie ontological concerns and in a way redeems them by re-establishing such deconstruction witliin the functional realm of practice. It is this understanding tliat Nâgârjuna wanted to move his students into and he pursued witli them the rigorous path of logic as a means by which tliey were to let go of the “grounding” elements o f knowledge and move instead into the active and more mystical realm o f wisdom. True prajna is not merely knowing limits and parameters but practically living into true reality where all notions o f ego-consciousness are surpassed by a wiser approach. In this respect, cannot be separated from dhyâtia for the acquisition of prajna depends on the practical activity of dhyàna. Alex Wayman suggests that Nâgârjuna’s intent behind writing the MMK is in the tradition of skilful-means {upàyâ) combined with wisdom (prajna) according to tlie Boddhisattva-bumi; that Nâgârjuna -422 Herman, A. L., A n Introduction to Buddhist Thought: A Philosophic Histoty of Indian Buddhism, Lanham: University Press o f America, Inc., 1983, p. 55 63 meant his MMK to be “a kind o f discerning to be combined witli calming (tlie mind).” Wayman cites from the Mâdhyamika text, Srî-màlàdmsimhanâda. Wlien he matures any sentient beings by meditation [dhyànd), he matures them by having an undisturbed mind, his mind not straying outside and having no mistake of mindfulness. By not being side-tracked though he acts for a long time or speaks for a long time, he protects and matures their minds. They having been so matured stay in tlie Illustrious Doctrine. This is his Perfection of Meditation.'^® Wayman concludes his remarks on Nâgârjuna’s purpose behind writing tlie MMK by asserting that “the text of practice of tlie MMK is that Nâgârjuna does not give up, ratlier stays with it to the end without straying from his purposeful discourse. The MMK kind o f contemplation aims at a fruit . . .”'®’ As suggested at the outset of tliis chapter, Nâgârjuna’s method has been compared to tlie âmpa-jhàna meditational program'®® in which the practitioner is encouraged to relinquish the constructing activity of the mind through deep formless meditation stages. It is quite plausible that Nâgârjuna is again reverting back to the example of the Buddha’s own enlightenment experience tlirough his repetitive use o f the catuhjkoti, the fourfold negation, as a means by which one quiets the mind of arguments, by negating each . logical possiblity. The Stittas record how Gautama gradually developed a meditation program from techniques he learned while studying under various famous teachers'®" ,| until he exhausted the techniques practiced by the religious aspirants o f his day, but he had not yet achieved enlightenment. It is recorded that Gautama attempted, while practicing extreme acetism, to control the sense sensations through an act o f the will. A poignant inhibitor Gautama cited was that altliough he was able to achieve impressive meditation stages, he was plagued by physical pains and an untranquil mind.'’® Wliat has I 166 Wayman, Alex and Hideko, The Lion's Roar of Queen Srimâlâ, (A Buddhist Scripture on the Tathâgatagarbha Theory), Delhi: Motilal Baiiarsidass Publishers, 1974, p.42 167 Wayman, Alex, Untying the Knots in Buddhism, DelhkMotilal Baiiarsidass Publishers, 1997, p. 77 42® see Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, “Mysrische Erfahrung und logische Kritik bei Nâgârjuna,” Religiose Lfahrung und theologische Reflexion: Festschriftflir Heinrich Doring, Amiiii Kreiner and Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Hg.), Paderbom: Bonifatius, 1993, p. 386; and Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogdcdra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 232 429 He achieved die meditation stage, “the sphere o f nothingness” while studying under Alâra the Kâlâma (M.I.163 ft), the “sphere o f iieither-cogiiition-nor-iion-cognition” from Uddaka the son o f Râma. See Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, histoty and practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 18 47° M.L240 f£, Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachitigs, histoty atidpractices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 19

■Arl 64 471 paraphrased from the Anguttara-Nikaja IX, 32. AN IV 276f. and Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, histoty and practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 252 472 Harvey, Peter, A n Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, histoty and practices, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 252 become known as the four “formless attainments” (anipa-samapatti or ampa-jhànas) are described as follows'’': 1. passing beyond the perception of sense-reactions (leaving the perception of tlie realm of manifold phenomena), one abides in the sphere of infinite space 2. passing beyond tlie sphere o f infinite space, one focuses on being aware: one concentrates on infinite consciousness 3. passing beyond the consciousness one encounters the nothingness tliat remains 4. passing beyond nothingness (leaving even tliis cognition) one abides in the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception k The Anguttara-Mikâya (IX, 32. AN IV 276f) records that beyond the four artipa-jhànas k one may experience the ending of perception and feeling, or as recorded in the Visuddhimagga, one achieves the “attainment of cessation” (nirodha-samdpattt)}'^'^ The Buddha’s death, in which he moves on to parinihhdna, has been described in the Dtgha Nikdya (D. 11.156) as his “exit from the world, in the fearless, calm and self-controlled state of meditation” in which he passed tlirough the four formless modes of meditation and then returned to die four jbdnas o f form meditation before passing on to parinibbdna. This deatli record indicates that tlie Buddha, instead of conquering some kind o f ultimate meditation test (as he attempted in his ascetic practices), has acquired skill over his mind, but in passing to parinibbdna from the form meditation suggests practice that is natural, positive and perhaps even indicates compassion. One notices tlie similarity of the deep level of formless meditation in which one moves beyond contemplating the infinity o f space, the infinity of consciousness, the sphere of nothingness, finally arriving at “neither perception nor non-perception” and Nâgârjuna’s metliodical use of the four-fold negation to disrupt and release his followers from their perceptions, their conceptual diffusion {prapanca). Beyond such perceptions is the ultimate cessation — the realisation of profound reality. Description fails completely, and only negative or paradoxical language can be used to “point” to this stage, yet tlie 25 î experience o f such realisation is suggested as “bliss,” complete calm. Nagarjuna seems to approve o f this existential indication o f ultimate truth/reality: “N ot caused by something else,” “peaceful,” \sântâ\ “not elaborated by discursive tliought,” “Indeterminate,” “undifferentiated”: such are the characteristics of true reality {tattvà)A^ In this passage, tlie only positive characteristic listed in an otlierwise completely negative description o f true or profound reality is “peaceful” (or “blissful” siva / “tranquil” santd). It has already been suggested tliat Nâgârjuna uses prasanga type argument to move the student beyond discursive and analytical tliought, but that Nâgârjuna never suggests nihilistic nothingness. Moreover, in line witli accepting that Nâgârjuna has also written songs o f praise and training manuals for those embarking on the Buddhist path, he surely would not advocate a catatonic immobility. Following the example, again, o f tlie Buddha’s return to form meditation after he successfully moves through the arûpajhânas, it may be suggested tliat beyond Nâgârjuna’s negating philosophical campaign there lies the possibility for engaging in true practice. The bodhisattva-marga is active caring in the world o f form, but this activity is pursued via the wisdom and insight o f a bodhisattva. Perhaps the beginning point for later Mahâyâna developments in substantialist tendancies, Nâgârjuna has used “true reality” (tattvd) as synonymous with niwmja. It is clearly sûnyatà which characterises and enables diis insight into nirmia reality. That is, to follow Nâgârjuna’s thought development, sûnyatà is what the Buddha meant h j pratttyasamutpàda. But in supplanting or reinterpreting pratttya-samutpàda as sûnyatà as the crucial characteristic of nirvàtia, Nâgârjuna perhaps instigates a new train of thought, as Nagao has suggested, which again pushes to find an absolute/abstract aspect in profound reality, what is described in later Mahâyâna tliought with terms such as “suchness” (pathata) and real nature {dharmata). As Nagao and otliers have suggested, Nâgârjuna’s sûnyatà seen by die Yogâcâra school as providing the philosophical basis for understanding diat “emptiness is not merely “non-being” but also the “being o f non-being””.'’'* This paradoxical understanding o f sûnyatà, of which the Yogâcâra school was fully aware, was adopted by the Chinese schools o f Buddhism including the later Ch’an and Pure Land 473 MMK 18:9, Streng’s translation, m Streng, Frederick, J., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 204 474 N a g a o , Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K a w am u h a , Delhi: Sri Satgum Publications, 1991, p. 215 66 schools where “true emptiness” is equated witli “wondrous being”/ ’® It seems clear that Nagarjuna certainly does not mean for his use of sünyatâ to be misconstrued this way as he submits even sûnyatà to the fourfold negation to warn against the reification of any concept including sûnyatà'. One may not say tliat there is “emptiness” {sûnyà), nor that there is “nonemptiness” N or tliat botli [[[exist]] simultaneously], nor that neitlier exists; the purpose for saying [“emptiness”] is for tlie purpose of conveying knowledge/’® That is, although there is a clear purpose behind teaching sûnyatà there is no more foundational concept here than tlie illusory svahhàva of dharma. And yet it appears clear tliat future developments in Buddhist tliought were influenced through Nagarjuna’s unique use o f sûnyatà. Again, an example of Nâgârjuna’s reticence to assert anything beyond the blissful experience of ultimate trutli/reality; Since all dharmas are empty, what is finite? What is infininte? Wliat is both finite and infinite? Wliat is neither finite nor infininte? Is there anything which is tliis or something else, which is permanent or impermanent. Which is both permanent and impermanent, or which is neitlier? The cessation o f accepting everything [as real] is a salutary {sivà) [“blissful”] cessation of phenomenal development (prapancd)'. N o dharma anywhere has been taught by the Buddha of anytliing/” Nâgârjuna’s message, like tlie Buddha’s, emphasises a different knowledge from closedsystem substantialist thinking. The systematic approach may offer insightful analysis into the construction of itself, but it cannot move outside itself. Once die dharma or mind is located, the system is complete. True Buddhist practice does not operate widiin the confines o f such a pursuit. It is the openness and groundlessness of practice based on emptiness, on dependent origination, which gives opportunity^ for further practice and eventually a patii to liberation. This is die “working of emptiness”. It would seem diat both Nâgârjuna and the Buddha had experienced that the world opens up to a mind in meditation. Beyond this, nothing can be said about the nature or reality o f niruàtia or the experience o f liberation. 475 N a g a o , Gadjin M ., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited and translated by L.S. K a w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, p. 216-217 472 Streng’s translation, MMK 22:11, in Streng, Frederick, J., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967 p. 210 477 Streng’s translation, MMK 25:22-24, in Streng, Frederick, J., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 217 67 Nâgârjuna begins MMK 22 by questioning any attempt to define the tathagata\ it is not one composed or defined by the five skandhas nor can it be one who is other than tlie very five skandhas (vs. 1). One defined by tlie five skandhas is clearly a dependent being still in the samsàric realm and yet, one not defined or composed o f the five skandhas would be self-dependent and clearly in no relation to tlie five skandhas. In this case, there would be no possible connection between die two: how could the fully completed One become so if not ever dependent and defined according to the five skandhas (vs. 6)? Wlien engaged in diis kind o f pursuit, one is simply working in the realm of identity/difference {tattva!anyatvd) which has only limited relevance or effectiveness. A tathâgata cannot be adequately expressed as either existing or not existing (vs. 13) and any attempt to do so is a “crude” attempt (vs. 13) and further one liable to “complete defeat” (vs. 15). Wlien trying to categorise, as Streng points out, one must always speak in worldly designations.” ® Murti attempts to describe die tathâgata as a “mediator” between the absolute ipathata) and the realm of phenomena: “Though free [a Tathâgata], one still has enough of die phenomenal in one to feel kinship with fellow human beings and help them out o f samsâra.”' ” The problem with this account is the absolute understanding of profound reality. Murti sees samsdra and nirumya as two ontologically different realms and die tathâgata as participating in both for awhile before eventually disappearing into the transcendental Real. It is this understanding of satnsara and nirmna tiiat Nâgârjuna sought to overturn with his use of sünyatâ. Hence, Nâgârjuna’s assessment of nirvdtia in which he can deny the differential between nirmna and satnsara and insist that the “extreme limit (koti) o f jürvàna is also the extreme limit o f existence-in-flux \samsârâf (25:20). That is, the same fallible categories o f mundane thought and speech have applied such difference. Further, Nâgârjuna may prepare die way for, but is certainly not suggesting, die Japanese Buddhist understanding of ‘identity in difference’ (i.e. A be, N ish id a , NishiTANi). Perhaps it is telling that Nâgârjuna prefers die descriptors sdnta, “peacefol”, or siva, “blissful” which is beyond die mental constructing activity iprapanca) of the ego when he speaks o f nirvdna instead of using this term itself replete with its reified images, because 478 Streng, Frederick, J., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, Nashville/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967, p. 74 479 Murti, T.R.V., The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Mâdhyamika System, Tinling & Co., Ltd., London, 1955, p. 279 bliss speaks o f concrete experience.'®® Or, as Lustliaus explains, Nâgârjuna’s “Diamondtruth shredder” negational logic “gives way to aporetic living, to that special type of indeterminacy that is freedom.”'®' ISO suggested by Perry Schmidt-Leukel during a Buddhist philosophy seminar in the Centre for Inter-Faith Studies, University o f Glasgow. See also, Schmidt-Leukel, Perry, “Mystische Erfahrung und logische Kritik bei Nâgârjuna,” Religiose Etfahrung und theologische Reflexion: Festschriftfur Heinrich Doring, Armin Kreiner and Perry Schmidt-Leukel (Hg.), Paderbom: Bonifatius, 1993, p. 384-5 484 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng \Xdeishih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 235 ■I;; ? a ■ y- ■"3 Chapter 2. Yogâcâra: No Mind that Knows That indeed is the supramundane knowledge When one has no mind {adttd\ that knows, | And no object for its support \anupalamhhd\'. It follows the revulsion \parâvriti\ of basis'®^ 182 Tfimsatika29, translated by Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works ofVasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Baiiarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 160 The emergence of what has come to be known as the Yogâcâra school, or the Consciousness/Mind-only {vijnàna-vàdaldttamàtrà) school within the Mahâyâna tradition 3; is difficult to date, generally accepted as arising between the third and fiftli century CE. The Yogâcâra school, in presenting what appears to be a systematic rendering o f the # subjective subconscious through teachings such as the “three natures” doctrine Y (prisvabhâvà) and the seed- or store-consciousness {âlayavpnànà) has received criticism for undermining the radical relativity Nâgârjuna demanded with mnyatd. However, the Yogâcâra school is also well-defined by its insistence on the practice of yoga meditation and its paradoxical assertions such as realisation comes when one has “no mind that knows” (Trimsadkd 29). Instead o f reading Yogâcâra teachings as re-asserting foundationalism or idealism, I suggest tlirough the course o f tliis chapter tliat Yogâcâra is attempting to come to terms witli the personal aspects of liberation by following tlie path o f release through layers o f subconscious. Nâgârjuna pursued liberation by means of a rigorous dialectic aimed at frustrating the logical and constructive activity o f the intellect; however, once this intellectual frustration has been achieved, he has little to say about the personal experience or working of liberation in the realm of tlie psyche. Yogâcâra, on the otiier hand, is deeply concerned with tlie personal experience and tlie way in which liberation is worked out such that the school aims to deconstruct tlie ego-self through the rigors o f meditation practice even into the latent areas of tlie psyche in the subconscious realm — all in order to overcome this latent tendency to construct the egoconsciousness. As will be discussed in this chapter, tlie tension between the establishment of an origin and location for the ego-self tlirough the systématisation of meditation sltills and tlie assertion tliat the ego-self itself must be “founded” on mnyatd will continually destabilise tlie doctrinal teachings of the ‘three natures’ and the ‘storeconsciousness’ o f this school. 70 The brotliers Vasubandhu and Asanga, of the fourtli or fifth century CE, are credited for authoring many of the important texts which provide the philosophical and analytical foundation of what is called Yogâcâra Buddhism. It is clear, however, that proto- Yogacara texts were already in existence before Asanga and Vasubandhu’s contributions worked to establish the movement as a proper school, most notably, tlie Samdhimrmocana Sutra (Eluddating the Hidden Connections, or Unravelling the Mysterf) from the third or fortli century CE.'®® Although contested by most scholars, tradition states that Yogâcâra’s Vasubandhu is tlie self-same Vasubandhu who entered first class Indian Buddhist thinkers with his seminal work in cataloguing tlie Vaibharika tradition, tlie Abhidharmakosa, which proved foundational for the Abhidharma scholastic argument.'®'* According to tradition, Vasubandhu’s brother, Asanga, deeply impressed with Vasubandhu’s achievements as an Abhidharma scholar, however also deeply concerned that Vasubandhu was missing an integral revelation into the Buddha’s teaching, eventually converted him to the Yogâcâra approach with the divinely inspired teachings of Maitreya who appeared to Asanga while he was in deep meditation. From this point o f conversion into the Yogâcâra school, all Vasubandhu’s subsequent writing and teaching efforts contributed to tlie Yogâcâra tradition. In light of tlie investigation here in this chapter, tlie issue o f one or more Vasubandhus is largely irrelevant. Furdier, w hether or not Asanga owes his writing to the appearance of celestial Maitreya whilst in meditation, or to a human teacher named Maitreya, is also not tlie concern here, and tliose works generally attributed to Asanga, or Asanga via Maitreya, will be treated as Asanga’s texts. What can be said in response to the tradition which upholds a converted Vasubandhu is tliat tlie Yogâcâra scholars recognised the achievements of tlie Abhidharma scholastic tradition, but felt that it did not provide the skilful means necessary for expounding tlie Buddha’s teaching. What tlie Yogâcâra scholars undertook in developing the doctrinal tenants of die eventual school was a fresh clarification o f the Buddha’s teaching in dieir unique language and systematic understanding o f die 483 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation o f Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 65 484 In fact, there is suggested as many as tliree Vasubandhus: the Vasubandhu who wrote the Abhidharmakosa and lived in Peshawar (Gandhara), the Vasubandhu who wrote the commentary o f that work, the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya who lived in Ayodhya, and the teacher Vasubandhu also brother o f Asanga who worked to establish the teachings o f the Yogâcâra school. See Frauwallner, Erich, On the Date of the Buddhist Master of the Law Vasubandhu, Rome: Is. M.E.O., 1951 and www.dharmafellowship.org/library/ essays / yogacara-partl.htm ■ ........... 71 i;S established Buddhist doctrines o f karma, pratitya-samutpada, nairatmja or atidtman, and ultimate release and elemental to an understanding of a praxi-centric phenomenology. 485 Davidson, Ronald Mark, Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Asraya-parivrtti/ pardvrtti Among the Yogâcâra, unpublished doctoral thesis conferred by University o f California, Berkeley, 1985, p. 126 482 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999 p. 96 487 'pMs foundational practice was explored in the previous chapter in connection with the Buddha’s enlightenment experience. 488 see Silk, Jonathan A., “The Yogâcâra Bhiksu,” Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for IJnderstanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao, ed. Jonathan A. Silk, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 2000, p. 266 489 for a synopsis o f scholarly positions on the origins o f the Yogâcâra school’s name, see Silk, Jonathan A., “The Yogâcâra Bhiksu,” Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding: The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao, ed. Jonathan A. Sdk, University o f Honolulu: Hawai’i Press, 2000, p. 273 The school is kiiown as the vijmna-vàda (consciousness only) or cittamdtra (mind only) school because the doctrine developed by its teachers is a systematic rendering of the . working of the mind or consciousness. However, in addition to its doctrine, the school was also deeply committed to the practice o f seated meditation, and thus also is known by its practical rmt\^,yogdcdra (practice of yoga meditation). Thus, even with the naming "o f the school, there is introduced a tension between the doctrinal and practical for what I is considered the effective Buddhist patli and this tension will be evident tlirough out both teaching and interpretation surrounding the Yogâcâra school. The multiple names o f the school say much about its practical emphasis and the extent it has been understood and interpreted both by contemporary students of the school as well as modern scholars. Dawdson argues tliat part of the issue surrounding the multiple interpretations of Yogâcâra Buddhism is the fact that although material began to appear which supported what developed into a proper school, early on there was much less doctrinal cohesiveness to the movement. This is a tradition inspired by multiple sources, hence there exist multiple emphases.'®® This may certainly be true to tlie extent that most movements and schools arise out of a multitude of voices. However, it is also possible to recognise, especially with the pairing of Vasubandhu and Asanga, the complementary voices o f a new vision of the Buddha’s Dharma. Yogâcâra can be translated “practice of yoga”'®® which reinforces and renews the emphasis on meditation that has been an important aspect o f Buddhism since its inception.'®’ The Xsaimyogdcdra is not unique to Buddhism and has denoted “tlie practice or observance of Yoga” in Classical Sanskrit.'®® It is not at all clear how or why the t e r m w a s adopted by the school o f Buddhism that bears tlie name, however, the emphasis it brings of dhydnic or yogic meditation practice is undeniable.'®" 72 49° King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 101 494 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 96 492 both Lusthaus and B3ng suggest this linking; see Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogdcdra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, and King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999 Furtliermore, in connection witli its emphasis on practice and meditation, tlie Yogâcâra school developed the doctrine of tlie “conversion of the basis” iâsraya-parâwttî) in order to describe the generation of the movement necessary to transform the egoconsciousness to the point beyond cognition in which “no-mind” is realised. This | Yogâcâra doctrine, “conversion of the basis” so to realise the “true self,” however, has two distinct interpretations and each has powerfully influenced tlie trajectory of Maliâyâna Buddhist teaching and the way it treats self-nature {svabhâvâ). King refers to the dichotomous understanding o f “true self’ as ‘No-Mind’ versus Ture Mind’: There is evidence o f considerable doctrinal diversity within the Yogâcâra school in India. Some strands emphasise what one might call a ‘No- Mind’ {acittà) interpretation, seeing the ‘revolution of the foundation’ (âsrqga-parâvrtti) as the cessation rather than the transformation of the àlaya-vtjnàna or store-consciousness. From this perspective the final goal involves a transcendence of mental activity and the attainment of a nonconceptual awareness (nirmkalpa jnànà) of reality as it is. On the other hand, there is also much in the early Yogâcâra literature which is suggestive of a ‘Pure Mind’ interpretation. On this view tlie goal of Yogâcâra practice is to purify the store-consciousness o f defilements rather than to eradicate it. The ‘revolution of the foundation’ does not require the cessation o f the mind but rather the uncovering of the intrinsic purity o f consciousness, which then shines through. Nonconceptual awareness on diis view is pure consciousness reflectiving realit)^ like a mirror tliat has been cleaned o f all defilements. Flowever, this school has also been called the “doctrine of consciousness” school (pymna-vddà), “doctrine o f cognitive-representations only” school ivijflaptimdtratâ) (the term vifndna means “cognition” or “consciousness” while the term vljnapti means “representation”), or “mind-only” school {dttamdtraj^^^ descriptions which encourage interpretation towards idealist tendencies and the “positive” use of language that contrasts so poigiantly witli the “negative” approach of the Madhyamika. It has been argued that tlie Yogâcâra school internalised tlie Abhidharma ontology to tlie psychologised working of the consciousness.'"^ The Yogâcâra school also wished to stop tlie build-up of karma, in particular what they described as the seed-consciousness 73 .,1: King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 101 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edhiburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 101 {àlayav'ÿnànâ), or the location within the psyche, the dependent nature {paratantra-svabhàvà), where the intentions and impulses begin and eventually bear the fruit of action m id/or manifestation of dharma. Before they are manifested, actions and consequently dharmas exist only as hidden seeds in the consciousness. Drying up this store-of seeds is one effort of the Yogâcâra Buddhist school. This “pure mind” emphasis of die Yogacara school, according to King, creates a tension between die seemingly contradictory goals of realising “no mind” and die endeavour to “purify the store consciousness o f defilements radier than eradicate it.” In diis sense, “non-conceptual awareness” is “pure consciousness reflecting reality like a mirror cleaned of defilements”. T h i s understanding o f a “pure mind” which merely needs to be cleansed o f defilement is 5 picked up by Dharmapâla's disciple, Hsüang-Tsang and brought to China where it was developed and solidified by die Fa-Hsiang school of Chinese Yogâcàra.^®'^ Bodi emphases, that o f a school bent on engaging meditative practice in order to transcend the paradoxical realm of language and concepts brought about via the working o f the mind, | and that of a school searching to uncover the purity of the original mind through meditative practice, will be brought to bear here in investigating die Yogâcâra teachings. Furdier, whether or not diese emphases are fundamentally at odds with each other will be investigated in diis chapter. If the Yogâcâra school is proposing that the end of illusion lies within the reach o f die mind or ego-consciousness itself, Yogâcâra begs die question of acute subjectivity and die idealism the school has been charged widi. The choice o f the Yogâcâra school to employ positive language and work with die concept svahhàva that Nâgârjuna condemned as dangerous and misleading, has caused schisms of thought in ancient as well as modern scholarship with a distinct contingent who view die school’s doctrine as an expression of idealism. Although diere are many convincing arguments for why diis would be an anathema to die Yogâcâra practitioners, it is die specific choice o f language which makes the school particularly susceptible to this interpretation. In choosing, for example, to describe the levels o f consciousness until one locates at its base die source of die egoconsciousness that is to be converted, or furthermore, to describe the “ultimate” in positive terms, such as “eternal”, “good”, and “pure”, it is all too easy to slip back into 74 I ontological or idealistic thinking as die emergence of die Chinese Fa-Hsiang school proves, Wlien one approaches the Yogâcâra teachings from diis perspective one sees a methodological similarity between die Abhidharma and Yogâcâra scholars. As the Ahhidhamakosa revealed die Abhidharma scholars’ meticulous and analytical approach to categorising die dharmas into diose beneficial aspects to be cultivated, and the defilements to be stopped, the Yogâcâra doctrine can be described as an internalisation o f die Abhidharma ontology to die epistemological and psychological concerns o f consciousness whereby on a subconscious level die seeds of release are cultivated and die seeds o f defilement are dried up. Earlier I suggested that the abhidharma system o f categorising dharmas 'externalised’ the Buddhist path such that a dualistic rendering of reality emerged. Should the Yogâcâra School be internalising die abhidharma mediod of investigating, tiieii it too will suffer from a dualistic perspective of reality whereby instead o f a fragmented rendering of reality in which the ego-self is set up against external existeiits, diere results a fragmented self, the core of which is the existent ego-self. Either way, the ego-self is not destroyed nor seen for what it is, and this remains the crucial flaw according to die historical Buddha. Yogâcâra Vaipulya — 3’^'^ Turning of Dharma-wheel As almost all schools of Buddhism, Yogâcâra too sees itself well established in die orthodox teachings of the Buddha. However, in introducing their unique Yogâcâra interpretation of such teaching, the school found it necessary to propose an expansion, or formal “development”, to what had become the established Buddhist canon. This “development” literature was called by die school the Vaipulya, and was justified by introducing die first two major “developments” in die history of Buddhism, the recording o f die nikdjas coupled with the vast cataloguing work o f the Abhidharma scholars, and second, die emergence o f die Madhyamika school, as die first two turnings of the wheel o f Dharma. The third turning o f die Dharma-wheel is claimed by the Yogâcâra school to be their own teachings of the “doctrine o f consciousness” {vyndnavâdà) Vasubandhu’s Trlmsatikd^^, or Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consciousness Onty, introduces die Yogâcâra extension o f die traditional six levels of consciousness in Buddhist thought to See Williams, Paul, Mah^âna Buddhism: The Doctrind'Poundations, London: Routledge, 1989, p. 79 Unless specifically indicated, the translation used is from: Three Texts on Consciousness Only: Demonstration of Consciousness Only by Hsiian-tsang, The Thirty Verses on Consciousness Only by Vasubandhu, The Treatise in Twenty 75 eight. The traditional Buddhist levels of consciousness^^^ are described in the treatise as the “perception” o f tlie object witli a “sixfold distinction” (vs. 8-14). Underneath such perception lies the level o f thought iynanas) and supporting thought and all perceptions is the store consciousness (âlayavijmnà), the holder of all seeds {bijd) (vs 2). The store consciousness, the treatise explains, “evolves like a flowing stream” (vs. 2) while the perceptions (the traditional sixfold sense perceptions or consciousnesses) are due to “conditions” and are like “waves supported by water” (vs 15-16). The suggestion may be: quiet the water (the alaya, or subconscious stream of consciousness) and die waves (cognitions and sensations) disappear. However, another possible interpretation is: stop the stream altogether so diat there is no further “material” for the mind to generate and entertain perceptions. This divergent interpretation for what die Yogâcâra “goal” for the dlaya consciousness is again reiterates the tension between divergent direads o f thought widiin the tradition. Part o f the justification behind introducing the different turnings of the Dharma wheel is based on die rapidly popular idea of skilful means {updya). If this doctrine is implied in Nâgârjuna's use and development of sUnyatd, it is explicit in die Yogâcâra school’s introduction of the diree turnings of the Dharma Wlieel. As Lusthaus explains o f the introduction o f the third turning of die Dharma wheel in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, the first two turnings (die teaching o f die four noble trudis in the nikdyas and Abhidharma Buddhism, and of mnyatd by the Madhyamaka school) “had expressed the dharma dirough incomplete formulations that required furdier elucidation {mydrthd) to be properly understood and dius effective.”^^^ In the wake of the previous turnings of the wheel, in which first mnyatd and next the “positive qualities of the dharma” were “hidden”, the Yogâcâra school endeavoured to “leave nothing hidden”. T h i s desire to “uncover” is well established in Yogâcâra texts as the levels o f consciousness are plumbed to discover and remedy what we call die subconscious (normally “hidden”) level o f consciousness, the seed/store consciousness, dlcyapyndna. Furdier, in light o f the meditative practice assumed by the school, one can read samddbi as sam (bring together) + Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, translated by Francis H. Cook, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999 The six consciousnesses are described as the activity o f the five sense-organs plus the mind {mano), see King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 97 Lusthaus, Dan, “Buddhism, Yogâcâra School of,” Boutledge Dngclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, General Editor Edward Craig, London & N ew York; Routledge, 1989, p. 68 Lusthaus, Dan, “Buddhism, Yogâcâra School of,” Routledge Bncyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 2, General Editor Edward Craig, London & New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 69 76 âdhi (to place on, put, to impregnate, to give, to receive) whereby samadhi “brings together the cognitive conditions such that the mind is “impregnated” and brings to term deep seeded c o n d i t i o n s . I n other words, even Yogâcâra meditation emphasises bringing what has been obscured or hidden to light as objects of cognition. Thus, on tlie basis of dieir own grounds for introducing the Yogâcâra interpretations, one ought to consider where the probing search to uncover even the subconscious level o f consciousness in order to reverse the construction of images and perceptions until there is “no mind that knows” has led as well as how effective this turning o f tlie wheel has been and can be in establishing die clearly fundamental Buddhist “no-self’ {iiairdtmjalanâtmmï). In light of their own claims to provide clarification we can ask of tlie Yogâcâra movement at least three related questions of efficacy. First, by psychologising the Abhidharma systematics, have the Yogâcâra masters provided a clearer path to a transformative experience of enlightenment? Second, have the Yogâcâra doctrines provided a necessary clarification and justification for the Maliâyâna Bodhisattva ideal not previously found in tlie Mâdhyamika apophatic approach? Finally, tlirough fusing the experiential aspect o f praxis witli systematic explanation, have the Yogâcâra scholars provided a clearer path for personal liberation or merely established a self-defeating systematics? Concerning the origins of Yogâcâra doctrine Many scholars have traced tlie development of tlie Yogâcâra terminology in order to ascertain not only what tlie Yogâcâra scholars meant in their teaching, but also to determine how close to tlie original Buddhist teachings the Yogâcâra teachers remained. As tlie Madhyamalca, led by Nâgârjuna, used mnyatd as a radical interpretive tool for the Buddha’s no-self {giairdtmya, andtman), Rahula argues tliat Asanga and Vasubandhu chose dttamdtra and vijnaptimdtra to establish the very same teaching of nairdtmya. Rahula points to tlie “early” texts in the Buddhist canon to authenticate the Yogâcâra starting point of the constructing or imaginative working o f the mind. The Angiittara-nikdya states tliat “ ... the world is led by tliought icittd). By thought it is drawn along ...” (AN, II (PTS), p. 177, see also: Samyutta-nikdya, I (PTS), p. 39) and Asanga quotes tills reference in his MahdydnasutrdlankdraV^ Additionally, in reference to the passage from Sanyutta-nikdka 200 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Weishih lun, Routledge Curzoii, 2002, p. 113 201 Rahula, Walpola, Zen and the Taming of the Bull, London: Gordon Fraser, 1978, p. 81 Schmithausen’s in-deptli investigation into the origins of the Yogâcâra âlqyavynâna shows the gradual growth and maturation o f this ‘doctrine o f the mind’ which in early literature lies hidden in the material sense-faculties but which gradually gains importance until it is established as a “fundamental constituent of personality, on a par with corporeal matter” and tlien eventually “superseding tlie latter [corporeal matter] in its function of basis [-ofpersonal- existence] {asraya)f^^^ Accordingly, we see in Schmithausen’s analysis tlie gradual emphasis of the psychological and personal aspect of personhood taldng precedence over the physical components. This shift in emphasis supports the suggestion tliat altliough the Abhidharma and Yogâcâra teaching is different in content. 202 Rahula, Walpola, Zen and the Taming of the Bull, London: Gordon Fraser, 1978, p. 82 202 Rahula, Walpola, Zen and the Taming of the Bull, London: Gordon Fraser, 1978, p. 82 20“* Rahula, Walpola, Zen and the Taming of the Bull, London: Gordon Fraser, 1978, p. 99 205 Griffiths, Paul J., On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and theMind-bodj Problem, La Salle, 111: Open Court, 1986, p. 93. Griffiths goes on to criticise the seed-consciousness doctrine for being incongruent with the early Buddhist understanding o f consciousness which, like all other dharma h transitory. The seedconsciousness, he contends, contains the tendency for permanence (p. 95). 20Û Schmithausen, Lambert, Alayavijndna: On the Origin and the Barly Development of a Central Concept of Yogâcâra Philosophy, Tokyo: Studia Philologica Buddhica, 1987, p. 29 and 51 77 , “Nothing exists more than a name” (SN, I (PTS), p. 39), Rahula suggests that Asanga interprets nâma-màtra (“only a name”) to mean vijnaptimdtra (“only a conception”), again y '"in the MahdjdnasidrdlankdraV^ Further to the references and development o f mind and concept, Rahula makes the case that Asanga’s development of the dlayavyndna is also based on early or ortliodox Buddhist texts. In tlie Mahdvaggavannand (Colombo 1900, p. 153) dlaya is associated with an ‘attachment to the five sense-pleasures’.^°^ Rahula further y draws attention to the similar “goals” in the following contexts: the Yogâcâra “goal” is dsrqga-pardvrtti or a “revolution o f dlayaviJndncC which points to nirvdtta, in the Atiguttara- | nikdya, dlaydsamugghdta or an “uprooting o f alayd points to nirvana', and the Pali term khïnahïja (here we are to recognise the reference to Ufa “seed”, which suggests the | Yogâcâra dlayavijndna as the seed storehouse) referring to an Arhat whose “seeds of defilements are destroyed”.™'* These connection points are all plausible seed ideas from which the Yogâcâra school developed their doctrine or “extension” teaching, the r| Vaipulya, However, critics remain sceptical of the idea of seed-consciousness; Griffiths, i for example, does not see evidence o f a clear development of this doctrine in early Buddhist writings, and has described it as a “philosophical construct”™^ o f Yogâcâra to explain how the early Buddhist doctrine of ‘no enduring self can co-exist philosophically with the equally foundational doctrine o f karma in which the actions one performs in life are causally connected to the arising o f further phenomena. 78 their systematic approach is complementary. Furthermore, the shift away from physical elements, dharmas, to the multi-layered psyche/mind, dtta, allows Yogâcâra to explore questions of personal liberation and the plausibility of the hodhisattva-marga. Thus, the tension between a doctrinal systematic and liberative praxis is carried into even modern scholarly interpretation of tlie school. Three Natures {trisvabhàvâ) From the Mâdhyamika perspective, the choice of the Yogâcâra school to employ the very term svabhdva, specifically condemned by Nâgârjuna and the Madhyamika school, requires a certain justification, given the ongoing debate between Buddhist schools. The Mâdhyamika had criticised the concept of svabhdva for, as tliey argued, it led to an ontological grounding which has no basis in Buddhist teaching, and furtiiermore it represented the end o f any practical aspect of Buddhism for absolutes subvert the activity o f liberation.™^ The Yogâcâra school not only employed tlie term, but developed out of it a theory concerning the psychological make-up o f tlie self, the dtman and the world with which tliat self engages. The theory o f the three natures (trisvabhdvd), or “the three forms o f being (svabhdvâ)”'^'^^ is elucidated in Vasubandhu’s Trl-svabhdva-nirdesd^^ in which the three natures are analysed in terms of dieir reality, existence, and their relation to tlie otlier two for ultimately, according to this treatise, tliey cannot be described independent of each other. As tlie treatise explains, the three-natures consist of: the imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhavd), the dependent nature iparatantra-svabhdva) and the ultimate or “absolutely accomplished”^™ nature iparinispanna-svabhdvà). The imaginary nature iparikalpita-svabhdvd) is tlie fully illusionary “reality,” generated by tlie untrained mind, which constitutes the empirical world o f duality {samsdrà). The dependent nature iparatantra-svabhdvà) is the “unreal mental creation” iasatkalpà), the mind {cittâ), and is ultimately the cause or generator of the imaginary nature. The ultimate nature or “perfected aspect of 202 see chapter One on Nagarjuna 20® Tola, F. and Dragonetti, C., “The Trisvabhavakaiika Journal of Indian Philosophy, 11 (1983), p. 232 200 Wood expresses doubt that the Tri-svabhàva-nirdesa\% in fact an authentic work o f Vasubandhu’s in Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijfîànavàda, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 31 210 Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 90 79 experience”^** iparinipanna-svabhâvâ) is that “inalterable” reality which is the nonexistence of duality, tlie perception of the wise, tlie enlightened, the buddha. The dependent nature (pamtantra-svabhava) is the working of tlie mind {dttd) which is divided conceptually into two parts, tlie seed or store-consciousness {alayavijndna) and the active consciousness (pravrttwjndnd). The active consciousness is made up of the seven variant manifestations of consciousness, e.g. sensory data and mental cognition discussed above as part of tlie eight levels of consciousness. The seed-consciousness “holds” or “contains” the residue o f conscious diought created by the mind; and this residue is “subliminal”^*^ in that it is not consciously registered by the active conscious. Eventually, the residual elements are “reactivated”^*^ or “transformed”^*'* as tliey pass from tlie seedconsciousness into the active consciousness and become manifest. The three natures doctrine is metaphorically described in tlie example of an “elephant” conjured from a magic spell using pieces o f wood. In this metaphor, Vasubandhu explains that the “elephant” is the “imagined aspect of experience”^*^, the “image” or the “illusion” (the pankalipita-svabhàvâ). Its (the elephant’s) appearance is the otherdependent nature or tlie “relative aspect” of mind which allows for dualistic rendering (the paratantra-svabhdva). This other-dependent or “relative aspect” o f mind arises out of the store-consciousness and uses tlie activity o f the seven remaining levels of consciousness to create or generate the illusion o f the elephant. The “non-existence o f the elephant” is the perfected view or die absolutely accomplished nature iparinispannasvabhdvà) which does not operate with a perception of duality and therefore does not “see” an elephant. The nature of the pieces o f wood is not explored in this metaphor for it is irrelevant to the point at hand, namely the false constructing activity of the dependent nature. 211 Griffiths, Paul}., On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-body Problem, La Salle, 111: Open Court, 1986, p. 89-90. He also translates it “perfected experience,” ibid, p. 88. 212 Tola and Dragonetti’s tenn from “The Trisvabhavakarika oiNtsAB-dsAcssxP]ournaloJJndian Philosophy, 11 (1983), p. 232 212 Tola and Dragonetti’s term from “The Tris vabhavakarika ]ournal ofIndianPhilosophy, 11 (1983), p. 232 214 Kochumuttom's term from Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Mofilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982 p. 95 21® Vasubandhu , verse 28 o f the Tti-svabhava-nirdesa translated by Griffiths, Paul J., On Being Mindless: Buddhist Meditation and the Mind-bocj Problem, La Salle, 111: Open Court, 1986, p. 89

80 Vasubandhu further explains in the Tri-svabhàva-nirdesa that the appropriate approach to the three natures doctrine is a three-fold application of knowledge (parijna), rejection iparytla), and attainment iprdptb) whereby one comes to correctly understand that the subject-object reality is only imagined, at which point one ceases to participate in tlie duality of perceptions and effects a “direct realisation” {sâksàt-kriyâ) into tlie three natures doctrine itself which is to say, one perceives reality as a Buddha. Wliat can be gained by viewing the self from the three-natures perspective? Wliy did the Yogâcâra school put forward such a teaching, which at tlie outset appears problematic to tlie other Buddhist schools? This “positive” investigation of the mind, coupled with an intricate system o f self-nature to contextualise the mind-only teaching, is set up in clear contrast to the sceptical Madhyamika approach o f Nâgârjuna and his students. Asanga, in the Dharmaviniscaya (section concerning teaching) of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Higher Teaching), addresses the issue of die value of language and concepts by cataloguing and analysing “four searches ipayesanaâf. Asanga identifies (1) the search for names for which it must be concluded that the “own-characteristics {svaladsanaf' o f names, phrases and consonants are “not absolute (aparinispannd)”-, (2) the search for substances for which it must be concluded that the characteristics o f the “aggregates (ykandbd), elements {dbàUÎ) and spheres {ayatanap" are “not absolute”; (3) the search for the “designation of own-nature {svabhàvaprajncpüpayesanâf for which it must be concluded tiiat “with regard to the relationship between the name {abhidhânà) and the diing named {abhidheyâ), own-nature is only a designation iprcÿncptimàtrà) in as much as it is a linguistic sign {vyavahâranimittàf'and (4) the search for particularities for which it must be concluded that “witii regard to the relationship between the name and die diing named, particularities are only desigiations in as much as they are linguistic signs. Asanga seems fully aware o f the Madhyamika concern with die limitations o f language to convey the Higher Teaching and clearly takes the view that a sldlful approach to language as a medium for conveying Higher Teaching is die only recourse one has to lead a student toward a realisation o f the Higher Teaching. In the same chapter, Asanga cautions that it is possible to appreciate and desire to penetrate the Higher Teaching and still fail specifically because of an “adherence to the meaning o f the sound (letter) (yathâmtàrtbàbhinivesàp', Furdier, even a bodhisattva may take a “superficial” approach to Ï 21® Abhidharmasamuccaya : The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy) by Asanga, trans. into French by Walpola Rahula, English by Sara Boin-Webb, Asian Humanities Press; Fremont CA 2001, p.185-6 81 212 Abhidharmasamuccaya : The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy) by Asanga, trans. into French by Walpola Rahula, English by Sara Boin-Webb, Asian Humanities Press: Fremont CA 2001, p. 190-1 21® King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 160 21® Abhidharmasamuccaya : The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy) by Asanga, trans. into French by Walpola Rahula, English by Sara Boin-Webb, Asian Humanities Press: Fremont CA 2001, p. 190 220 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Weishih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 227 the teaching (the Vaipulya) and consider it only according to “the meaning o f the sound ;(letter) {yathàmtàf\ In doing so, Asanga charges, the bodhisattva exhibits as many as twenty-eight false ideas, including the idea o f “grasping”, “misapprehension”, “intense A "'delusion”, even “repudiation of practice”. A l s o included in the list o f twenty-eight false ideas is the problem of tlie “idea of signs (yiimittadrsttf' fumitta means “external causes”^*®) which is described in an explanatory note as ... grasp[ing] superficial signs and characteristics widiout understanding the profound meaning of tlie teaching .., one conforms to words, one clings to words. One arouses abhivivesa “attachment”. One says nihsvabhâvâh sarvadharmâh, etc., but one is attached to superficial signs and characteristics.^*^ Taldng “signs and characteristics” for anything other than the empty pointers that they are is akin to giving tliem agency. The problem with an “external cause” in the Yogâcâra system is that such a suggestion allows for a “real” subject-object duality when the Yogâcâra school is arguing for a totally internal construction based on the graspergrasped duality o f consciousness. Lusthaus explains diat nimitta “signifies the characteristic sensorial marks of an object (e.g. a snake’s color or shape), especially in the sense that such marks serve as the efficient cause (fiimitta-kâranà) o f the cognition of something that is observable.”^™ Asanga is reinforcing that there is a correct and skilful approach to the Yogâcâra Vaipulya, in which one is fully aware o f the limitations and ultimate failure of language and conceptual-based teaching to generate tlie movement or change necessary in tlie mind for understanding tlie “profound meaning of the teaching”. Asanga therefore suggests diat systems and elaborate doctrine (including that of the Yogâcâra) are means that are never sufficient on their own for they are ultimately just signs, lacking any efficacy o f dieir own. One is reminded of the caution that Nâgârjuna gives his students who might take his teaching utilising mnyatd wrongly — it is as dangerous as handling a snake from the wrong end. Dharmas are natureless {nihsvabhdvâ) 82 . . In addition to tlie necessary awareness o f a limitation in language, tliere is tlie question of where tlie teaching endeavours to lead and if it is successful in its method. Vasubandhu’s Trimsatikà (Treatise in Thirty Stanzas) begins with a verse that suggests that all discussion o f self idtmaii) and dharmas is carried out in a metaphorical sense and is coherent only witliin the context o f the activity o f the consciousness: The metaphor of self \âtmatï\ and dharmas Evolves in various ways Upon tlie transformation o f consciousness.™ Kochumuttom suggests diat Vasubandhu employs the terms dtman and dharma as broad categories meant to encompass all representations of subjectivity (dtmaii) and objectivity {dharmd) and understands Vasubandhu to be establishing this wide array o f subject-object duality in reference to the “transformations of consciousness.”™ That is, all creation of subject-object reality arises directly out of, and it wholly dependent upon die activity of die consciousness. Indeed, concepts (as die subject-object reality created by the mind) are really not different from die consciousness itself.^™ Again, verse 17 This [threefold] transformation of consciousness Is [just] die distinction [between subject and object]; Wliat is thus distinguished. Does not exist as [[[subject]] and object] Therefore this is all mere representation o f consciousness.™ Lusthaus prefers to speak of the problem o f grasper/grasped duality rather than a subject/object duality lest we are led to tiiink in ontological categories not addressed in Yogâcâra Buddhism. The Yogâcâra school of thought would insist that it is not an external subject-object struggle that the practitioner is engaged in, but the internal epistemological one of perception where the ego-consciousness, die mind, is deluded into creating a reality for itself to engage with. Wliat both Kochumuttom and Lusthaus 221 Trimsatikà 1, Three Texts on Consdousness Only: Demonstration of Consdousness Only by Hsüan-tsang The Thirty Verses on Consdousness Onty by Vasubandhu, The Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, translated by Francis H. Cook, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999, p. 377 222 Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 128-133 22® Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 133 224 Trimsatikà 17, Kochumuttom’s translation in Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 146 83 agree on, however, is the propensity toward a false duality that the ego-consciousness engages in when “reality” is decidedly non-dual. The subsequent verses explain that the “transformation of consciousness” consists of the dlaya or store consciousness, the manas or thought consciousness, and die ‘perception of the object’ consciousness with its sixfold distinctions. In odier words, die treatise is speaking of what the Yogâcâra tradition has called die eight-fold consciousness, as discussed above. Thus, when engaging in the “world” of die consciousness, one utilises the concepts of self and dharmas metaphorically and not as expressions of profound reality. That is, the world of duality in which “grasper” and die “object grasped” encounter each other is seen by the Yogâcâra school as evolving out o f die activity of die eight-fold consciousness. The treatise emphasises this fact by first describing die make-up and working of the three natures in some detail, and dien in verses 23 dirough 25 announces that the whole purpose of the teaching of the three-natures theory is to arrive at the realisation that dharmas are truly natureless in dieir profound reality: O n the basis o f diese three natures The threefold naturelessness is established. Therefore, the Buddha taught with a hidden intention That all dharmas are natureless.™ That is, dharmas are wholly dependent upon die movement (transformation) of die mind {dttd), and their appearance, as established by die diree-natures doctrine, arises ultimately from the dlaya or store consciousness. In other words, dharmas have no nature o f their own, but depend upon the activity of the dtta. Thus, the three-natures doctrine establishes the naturelessness of dharmas by demonstrating dieir origin in the egoconsciousness, which is itself, according to ordiodox Buddhist teaching and reinforced by die Yogâcâra texts, natureless. Verse 24 shows this progression of naturelessness, implying the coordinate three natures: The first is naturelessness o f characteristics \laksand\‘, The next is naturelessness o f self-existence; The last is the nature diat results from die privation of die former Self and dharmas that are grasped.™ 225 Trimsatikà 23, Three Texts on Consciousness Only: Demonstration of Consciousness Only by Hsüan-tsang The Thirty Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, The Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, translated by Francis H. Cook, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999, p. 381 226 Trimsatikà vs. 24, Three Texts on Consdousness Only: Demonstration of Consdousness Only by Hsiian-tsang The Thirty Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, The Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consdousness Only by 84 The imaginary nature iparikalpitâ) is the “illusion” tliat tliere are characteristics to perceptions. The dependent nature (paratantrd) works from the activity of duality which generates the material which “substantiates” the pankalpita. And the ultimate or accomplished nature {parinispanna) is die direct realisation into die ultimate nature o f the three natures: that they are all empty (smya), natureless {nihsvabhâvà). This is the ultimate trudi of all dharmas And is also the same as true suchness, Because it is eternally so in its nature. It is the true nature of consciousness only.™ Kochumuttom views the discussion of the three-natures doctrine as the establishment of die concept o f non-duality as die ultimate description of no-self. The Tn-svabhdva-nirdesa (A Treatise on the Three Natures) explains diat the three-natures doctrine is not a description of tiiree independent realities, rather, die three natures are “not mutually different in definition.”™ Through implementing a dialect of existence/non-existence and duality/non-duality, Kochumuttom reads Vasubandhu as showing diat the three natures ultimately share a conceptual basis, tiiat is, non-duality: All these three natures Depend for dieir definition O n [the concept of] non-dualit)r; For, [widi reference to die imagined nature], There is the unreality of duality, [With reference to the other-dependent nature]. It is not in the dual form in which it appears, And, [with reference to the absolutely accomplished nature]. It is by its nature die absence o f that duality.™ Similarly, in die Trimsatikd the “absolutely accomplished nature” (parinispanna-svabhdva), Vasubandhu explains, relates to the “other-dependent nature” iparikalpita-svabhdvà) as the Vasubandhu, translated by Francis FI. Cook, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999, p. 381-2 227 Trimsatikà vs. 25, Thm Texts on Consdousness Only: Demonstration of Consdousness Only by Hsuan-tsang The Thirty Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, The Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consdousness Only by Vasubandhu, translated by Francis IT. Cook, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999, p. 382 22® Tri-svabhàm-nirdesa vs. 10, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982 p. 98 229 Tri-snabhâva-nirdesa vs. 26, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. I l l 85 “perpetual devoidness” o f such otlier dependency, or duality.™ One must “realise” that the “subject-object designations” are all “mere representation of consciousness” to move out o f such a mundane perception and achieve supramundane knowledge.^^* Again, Sthiramati’s commentary explains that tliis “realization of mere representation of consciousness is equated witli ‘seeing tlie tiling as such’ {yathâ-bhûta-darsanà}” Thus, profound reality as such is not equated witli “mind” nor “mind activity” but with the realisation that all form perceived in a pre-enlightened state is “mind only” or entirely unreal. Wliat is real can only be perceived by the “great sage” who utilises “supramundane knowledge” and “has no mind tliat knows”: That indeed is the supramundane knowledge \jmnd) Wlien one has no mind \acittd[ that knows. And no object for its support \anupalambhdg. It follows the revulsion \paràvittd[ of basis Through the twofold removal o f wickedness; That itself is tlie pure source-reality \dbàU{\, Incomprehensible, auspicious and unchangeable; Being delightful, it is the emancipated body \vimukti-kàjd), Wliich is also called the truth [-body] \dharma-kàyd\ o f tlie great sage.^^^ Thus, the distinction is made between the functioning of the eight levels of consciousness, which is botii dependent upon and generates the dualistic construct of language and a dualistic construct of tlie lived-world, and the functioning of the true nature of consciousness-only which does not construct a dualistic lived-world, but penetrates the “ultimate trutii o f all dharmas”, emptiness or naturelessness itself. Wliat seems to be suggested is a “two-fold trutii” o f consciousness in which, as in Nâgârjuna’s understanding, emptiness or naturelessness is the common defining “character” of each level, what Kochumuttom calls non-dualism. N ot creating a dualistic lived-world via the eight-fold working of the consciousness is what is meant by “no-mind” or “there is no mind that knows”. Directly realising emptiness is an experience beyond the mundane categories o f knowledge and perception. Wliat is not meant by this description o f the 2®o Trimsatikà vs. 21, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the W^orks of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Bauarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 154 2®i Trimsatikà vs. 26-28, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 158-159 2®2 Sthiramati, Trimsatikà Bh. 28, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 160 2®® Trimsatikà 29-30, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 160 86 “true nature o f consciousness only” is that there is no profound reality beyond what tlie mind creates. Recalling the metaphor of conjuring an elephant out o f pieces of wood, the Yogâcâra school is not as concerned with the nature of the pieces of wood as w penetrating the true nature of consciousness through which liberation comes. Whatever y the nature of the pieces of wood, tlie important factor for the accomplished nature is tliat tlie elephant is not perceived as an ultimately real entity. Perhaps seeing things as they MQ., jathâbütam, is for the accomplished nature “no-perception” or what is meant by a “non-conceptual” {iiiwikalpà} perception. O r again in tlie example from Vasubandhu’s Vimsatika of the person suffering from cataracts of tlie eye who sees a hair across his/her vision: tliere is no hair, and tlie hair perceived is not onto logically “created” by the individual’s mind, but is merely an illusionary perception by tlie person suffering from the vision problem. The illusionaiy perception will necessarily be brought to bear on the existential experience o f tlie person and it is at this level that one can muse about the “creation” o f sometliing. For indeed, although the hair does not ontoiogically enter the realm o f profound reality, it does alter tlie way tlie subject is able to interact, understand and engage profound reality. In tliis way, it is clear that Yogâcâra concern lies within the realm of tlie existential ratlier than idealistic. Lusthaus claims that Yogâcâra exposes the solipsism and narcissism of the mundane cognitive world; that arriving at “no-selP’ for Yogâcâra Buddhism is to undermine tlie narcissistic ego-consciousness by negating die object {artha). Without an object, the self is thereby negated.^^'* Yogâcâra then uses naturelessness as an expression of mnyatd to establish no-self, not in tlie manner of expressing physical substancelessness but ratlier to convert the ego that lies at the base of the human conglomeration of skandhas and consciousness. Tension between “no-self’ and perfected self Wood suggests that verses 25 and 29-30 of the Tnmsikd contradict each other in defining what is meant by “mind only” or “the nature of mind only” {yynaptimdtratdlvijndnamdtratva). In verse 25, it is stated that “The true nature of mind only {yynaptimdtratâ) is the true nature (paramdrthd) of all dharmas, because, remaining as it is at all times {sarvakdlam tathd-bhdvdt) it is suchness {tathatâ)f This suggests that “mind only” refers to what is immutable, to tlie suchness of reality (and also mnyatd as Wood 2®4 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophicd Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Weishih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 539 87 points out)™. Contrast this to verses 29-30, stated above, in which it is suggested that in the realm of no mind iacittà) and no perception is the source reality or “pure realm” idhatu) and one is confronted with, what is for Wood, tlie “unacceptable conclusion” tliat “mind only” in its pure form is really “no mind,” that it both reflects the immutable aspects of reality as well as arises dependent on causes and conditions. Wood cites what he describes as Sthiramati’s “murky” commentary on this passage to underline his thesis that Vasubandhu is attempting to line up the Mahâyâna idea of the unoriginating, unchanging nature of things (paramàrthâ) witli tlie orthodox Buddhist teaching that tlie mind, like any other skandha, is based on the reality of mutability and change.^^^ Stliiramati says, The self nature o f the perfected nature is tlie true nature o f things. Since the perfected nature is tlie true nature o f the dharmas Axvdh are essentially dependent on causes and conditions — tliat is, because such is the very nature o f things (dharmata) — tlie perfected nature alone is the self nature of things. In truth, everything lacks a self nature {paramàrtha-nihjvabhàvatâ} in virtue of the non-existent self nature (abhàva-svabhâvatvâh) o f tlie perfected nature.™ Wood identifies a struggle in the Yogacarin texts between a Mahâyâna teaching of essence and immutability witli the classic Buddhist doctrine of dependent co-origination (praUtya-samuîpàdd), Thus, the Yogâcârin texts provide the conceptual groundwork for the working out of what Wood has identified as a tension between the doctrine of pratftya-samuipada and that of dharmadâtti and tathagatagharbha, the concept o f immutable essence that takes different forms in Mahâyâna texts. U e d a , conversely, returns to Sthiramati’s commentary on karika 28 to elucidate Vasubandliu’s meaning, part of which reads: ... tlie Yogin ... sees an object as it really is (jatbabhûtàrtbâ) ... and tlie mind is established in the state of being aware of everything as well as o f itself as tliey 2®® Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A Philosophicd and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijmnavdda, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 56, Wood also finds that the understanding o f sûnyâtâ'm the Yogâcârin texts deviates from the earlier Buddhist concept o f the emptiness o f all dharma. What Wood calls the “otlier emptiness” in Yogâcâra may point toward the reality that mind is asatlw tliat mind is “false or deceptive”, however, this does not achieve the same effect as the Mahâyâna doctrine “that all dharmas are void {sarva-dharma-smyata)." p. 26 2®® Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijiiânavàda, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 59 2® 7 Wood, Thomas E., Mind Only: A Philosophical and Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijnànavàda, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, 1991, p. 59 88 2®® U ed a, Yoshifumi, “Two Main Streams o f Thought in Yogâcâra Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 17 (1967) Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i P ress, p. 163-4 239 U ed a, Yoshifumi, “Two Main Streams o f Thought in Yogâcâra Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 17 (1967) Honolulu: University o f Hawai'i Press , p. 164 240 U ed a, Yoshifumi, “Two Main Streams o f Thought in Yogâcâra Philosophy,” Philosophy East and West, vol. 17 (1967) Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, p. 164-5 241 Sponberg, Alan, “Dynamic Liberation in Yogâcâra Buddhism,” JIABS 1979:2, p. 52 242 see King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 151 really are. There is not only (no object) to be grasped (and there is no grasping consciousness either) but also there arises the super-mundane, non-conceptualizing Yision in which subject and object {âlambhya-âlamhhakà) are identical with each other without nullifying and extinguishing their distinction {sama-sama)T^ UEDA’s understanding is that Vasubandhu and Sthiramati describe witli tlie doctrine vijnaptimàtratà nothing otlier than reality as it is: non-duality realised. This is to say, die mind, as “grasper,” does not see objects to be grasped as such, but in fact die mind must “become identified” with the “object” so diat whatever takes place through diis new non-dual “perception” is experienced in an entirely different way.^^** As UEDA illustrates: ... the mountain is seen from widiin, or by itself widiout the seer outside it ... thus, when the mind sees a thing as it really is, it is the mind seeing itself as it really is, and, at die same time, by losing itself in die mountain (no-mind), die mind sees the mountain from widiin, or, as it were, the mountain is seen by the mountain. There is no seer outside except for die mountain.^'**’ Wliat Ue d a describes as the identification of subject and object seems to be related to what is meant by “non-conceptual” {nhvikalpd) perception, or “non-conceptual awareness” {niruikalpa jnânà) which has its roots in die Indian Nyaya school of philosophy. Sponberg notes that die meaning of nirmkalpa jiïâna can be rendered “nondiscriminating” but also carries the positive connotations o f “direct and intuitive cognition of the Absolute”, or more simply, “intuitive wisdom”.^"** The Nyaya school made a distinction between “determinate conceptual perceptions” (vikalpa), which include sensory and consciousness data expressed via language and other determined routes, and “indeterminate, non-conceptual perceptions” {tiiwikalpa jnânà) which constitute the initial contact a subject has widi reality. These non-conceptual perceptions create experience which is ineffable and widiout die possibility of error. E rror can only occur once the subject engages in sensory and/or mind activity.^'*^ Asanga’s The Stmtmaty of the Great Vehicle devotes a chapter to explaining the degrees o f nirdkalpajmna (there are three) and the way this intuitive wisdom works to achieve what Sponberg considers the ! 89 “characteristic Yogacara innovation of an explicitly dynamic notion of liberation.”™ The three degrees of nirdkalpa jm na are 1) the preliminary stage in which the bodhisattva endeavours to pursue this intuitive wisdom upon die faidi o f hearing about it from odiers who have achieved it; 2) the fundamental or root stage in which the bodhisattva achieves this intuitive wisdom personally; 3) and a “subsequendy-acquired” stage which is die “fruit” o f the second or fundamental stage.^'*'* In otiier words, it is not enough in Yogâcâra Buddhism for a bodhisattva to achieve intuitive wisdom personally, but the true bodhisattva must commit this break-through to practical activity. Compassionate activity comes on die heels of the personal achievements of those who would emulate the Buddha. Interestingly, here die Yogâcâra school is using a concept which establishes the direction that is taken by subsequent Chinese/Japanese schools of returning to or attempting to recover the initial error-free perceptual experience. This effort is seen in Chinese idealism and exposed widi the parable of the 6* patriarch who likens die error of attempting to recover die pure self to one who would polish a mirror clean of dirt and find the true unblemished surface beneadi.™ Wliat die movement of return and reversal indicate is the circular nature of religious awakening whereby the boundaries o f experiencing truth and untruth are blurred to allow die movement between them to occur. Wliat the image of a circle doesn’t allow for is die absolute boundarilessness of the Buddhist direct penetrating experience of awakening, an experience completely non-graspable. Once the direction o f ‘return’ is suggested, it is a short step to idealistic and ontological arguments which pull away from die more uncertain space of how nirvikalpa jm na is used in some Yogâcâra texts as an expression of “no self’ in nonduality, ultimately beyond the scope of language and open only to die realm of experience. The nonduality expressed through a “direct and intuitive cognition o f die Absolute” balances the apparent opposite poles o f “no-self’ and “perfected self’ by establishing no-self in the realm o f experience. By working to keep no-self in the realm of activity, whereby a bodhisattva will continue to engage in ‘perfecting’ levels of meditation and practice whilst engaged in the compassionate activity of leading others to liberation, die tension between ‘no-self and ‘perfected self will not and should not be reconciled, but remain a paradoxical reality. 24® Sponberg, Alan, “Dynamic Liberation in Yogâcâra Buddhism,” JL4BS (1979:2), p. 53 244 Sponberg, Alan, “Dynamic Liberation in Yogâcâra Buddhism,” JIABS (1979:2), p. 53 245 The direction o f reversal is also exhibited in N is h id a ’s philosophy whereby he attempts to recover an “intuitive” experience o f reality through cultivation, best accomplished via the arts or religion. 90 Dan Lusthaus states that, in general “Buddhism is concerned with seeing, not being, tliat is, epistemology rather than ontology” for questioning being is “a misleading category error.”^*^ Furthermore, he argues tliat “Yogâcâra may be deemed a type of epistemological idealism” in that it insists “we shift our attention to the epistemological and psychological conditions that compel us to construct and attach to ontological theories.”™ Likewise, when Kochumuttom analyses the vijnapti-màtratà (consciousness ^ only) doctrine, he concludes that “basically, vijnapti-màtratà is an epistemological theory” . in which “one’s (empirical) experience of objects is determined by one’s psychic dispositions, especially tlie idiosyncrasy for subject-object distinction, and that, tlierefore, one in the state of sargsdra can not know the things in their suchness (jathata). Kochumuttom further explains tliat Sthirimati’s explanation that '‘sûnjatà is considered defiled or purified depending upon whetlier it is looked at from tlie sphere of samsara [or] nirvana (MK 1.22)”™ reinforces the epistemological argument. However, it must be recognised that this is a different approach to mnyatd dian what is put forward in Nâgârjuna’s teaching. Wliat lies “beyond” conceptualisation for Nâgârjuna is never described in such absolute terms. At most, there is the suggestion that the bliss of experiencing tlie ultimate can be anticipated. However, nothing like tlie descriptions of “pure” an d /o r “eternal” are entertained by the Madhyamika contingent. Further, there has occurred a shift in the understanding o f mnyatd by Sdiirimati from tlie relativising tool o f deconstruction used against any and every concept, including itself, to a kind o f realm, an ultimate in and of itself. Wliat Nâgârjuna explicitly warns against, tliat is, using or entertaining “self-nature” in any instance, seems to have snared at least the rhetoric of some Yogâcâra masters. Perhaps care was taken after the systematic explanation of the three-natures ijri-svahhdvà) to eloquently drive tlie narrative toward “no-self’ and paradoxically step beyond self-nature with “empty self-nature” {nüjsvabhdvà)', however, have and can the same steps be taken in reference to mnyatd, tathdgata, etc? This is tlie troubling legacy which the language, in addition to the interpretation, of tlie Yogâcâra school, has helped establish. Conversion o f the basis {dsraya-pardvrtti) 24® Lusthaus, Rutledge Engclopedia of Philosophy, 1989; http://www.rep.routIedge.coiu 242 Lusthaus, Rutledge Enydopedia of Philosophy, 1989; http://www.rep.routledge.com 24® Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 84 91 Convinced that there is a much stronger alliance between tlie Madhyamaka and Yogâcâra schools, N a g a o writes that because o f the emphasis on vijnana (cognition) o f the Yogâcâra school, “to the universal [[[Mâdhyamika]] sünyatà) there was added the particular, the individual, and tliereby the concrete seen in yogic practices emerged on the stage of sünyatâ, the abstract.”^'**’ In addition to bringing forward the individual through concrete practice, N a g a o sees the Yogâcâra doctrine of the conversion o f tlie basis iasrayaparàvrttî) as the counter-balance to Mâdhyamika negativity, specifically Nâgârjuna’s smyatâ. I have already discussed in the previous chapter the problem and misunderstanding of mnyatâ viewed solely from a negative perspective, as NAGAO purports. However, N a g a o ’s suggestion tliat tlie Yogâcâra school engages the individual in perhaps a more concrete manner, through tlie insistence of a concrete practice and hence an existential transformative experience is worth investigating. Interpretations based around epistemological idealism or realism, or non-duality make no more sense in Yogâcâra than in any Buddhist school when existeiitially one confronts duhkba. The Yogâcâra “conversion of the basis” is key in locating the school’s Vaipulya in the larger context of Buddhist practice. Vasubandhu describes in tlie Trimjatikd tlie worldngs of the three-natures doctrine and concludes by stating that only tlirough a “transmutation of support” {dsraya-pardvrtti) or a “conversion of the basis” (Nagao’s r e n d e r i n g ) d o e s one cease creating unreal images with the mind. At this point, one has attained the supra-mundane knowledge which is notliing short of the source reality {dhdtii), the trutli-body {dbarma-kdyà) of the Tathâgata. Wlien Asanga writes in the Summary o f tlie Dharma body (the dbarma-kdya o f the Tathâgata), he also describes the “conversion o f support” whereby “the dependent pattern with impurities is eliminated” and converted instead to a “dependent pattern in pure aspect.”^^* In Asanga’s Dharma body all the outward manifestations of a conventional body have been “converted” so that tlie skandhas such as form, sensation, 249 N a g a o , Gadjin M., Mâdhyamika and Yogâcâra, edited aiid translated by L.S. Ka w a m u r a , Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1991, 123 250 Francis Cook translates âsraya-parâurtti “transmutation o f the support” and defines it as a “crucial change in die nature and function o f ordinary consciousness and personality. It ends delusion and error and precipitates a pristine, nondeluded cognition o f events, which is the awakened perception o f a Buddha.” Three Texts on Consciousness Only: Demonstration of Consciousness Only ly Hsüan-tsang The Thirty Verses on Consciousness Only ly Vasubandhu, The Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consciousness Only by Vasubandhu, trans. Francis H. Cook, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999, p. 374 251 Asanga, The Summary of the Great Vehicle, trans. from the Chhiese o f ParamSrdia (Taisho, Volume 31, Number 1593) by John P. Keenan, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research: California, 1992, p. 105 252 Asanga, The Summary of the Great Vehicle, trans. from the Chinese o f Paramartlia (Taisho, Volume 31, Number 1593) by John P. Keenan, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research: California, 1992, p. 107 25® Asanga, The Summary of the Great Vehicle, trans. from the Chinese o f Paramartha (Taisho, Volume 31, Number 1593) by John P. Keenan, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research: Cahfomia, 1992, p. 113 254 Schmithausen and Schmit-Leukel for example do not recognize this version o f the Buddha’s enlightenment 255 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Phibsophical Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Weishih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 99 conceptualisation etc. are expressions o f purification or mastery.^^^ And yet, lest one " t: think of tliis “conversion” in a dualistic manner in which impurities are systematically scrubbed clean, Asanga also insists tliat “There is notliing that can be awakened, but it is not the case that there is no perfectly awakened one at all. At every mom ent [[[Buddhas]]] are immeasurable and are manifested tlirough the non-existence of existence.”™ In tlie Trimsatika, “abiding in perfect bodhi changes beings forever” (my emphasis). After the “transformation o f support” tlie “liberation body” is realised. Quite noticeable in these descriptions of the conversion of the alaya consciousness is the | 'S' emphasis placed on “body”, even a proper working of skandhas which operate in and .1 among the world of form, rupa. Lusthaus supports this understanding of the conversion o f the alaya consciousness which necessarily depends on the realm o f form witli his analysis of how die Yogâcâra tri-smbhdva system parallels one version of the ampya-jlfdna progression. Aldiough die subject o f contention in early Buddhist dialogue, and continued scholarly dispute,^^"* one version of the story of die Buddha’s deadi suggests diat he progressed dirough die mpa-jndna and dien dmpya-jndna levels of meditation, only to then descend completely and pass through the rupafndna levels once more before he died. This story, if accepted by the Yogâcâra school, supports according to Lusthaus, the idea of the npa-dhdtu as the typically Mahâyânan “middle way” between extremes such that the ideal is not arupya but instead a purified or converted rupaT^ This is how the dlaya consciousness should be approached, that is, not as something to be annihilated or as die stream that should be completely dried up, but as die consciousness which needs to be penetrated, all aspects unveiled, and die working of the mind seen for exactly what it is as a dependent nature. This seeing things for what diey are/are becoming iyathdbhtJtam) is die ultimate goal for the Yogâcâra and it does not entail leaving one realm of existence (the existence of vijndpti-mdtrâ) for another (some transcendental ultimate realm). Sponberg notes tiiat in Asvabhâva’s commentary on Asanga’s Mahdydna-samgraha, Asvabhâva identifies as die “antidote” which instigates the revolution involved in dsraya' I 93 I 25® Sponberg, Alan, “Dynamic Liberation in Yogâcâra Buddhism”, JIABS (1979, 2:1), p. 51 257 Trimsatikà v%. 22, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 156 258 Trimsatikà 25, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 157 pardvrtti, “non-discriminating cognition {nirdkalpa jn d n à ff^ Sponberg goes on to assert tliat to support tlie teaching that a bodhisattva could be free from samsaric conditioning yet continue to work actively in the realm of sanisdra to free other humans, the Yogâcâra school promoted the working of nirdkalpa jndna which would allow for a direct seeing into sanisdra wridiout partaking of the cognitive activity o£ sattisdra. This view o f Yogâcâra A teaching - the penetrating experience of nairdtmya — brings together what was earlier identified as tlie two emphases tliat create tension in the development o f the school’s doctrine, that of realising “no mind” and tliat o f purifying the mind. To return to the Trimsika verse. 22: As long as this absolutely accomplished nature Is not seen, That otlier-dependent nature, too. Is not seen.™ Wliich is to say, without the perspective of the ultimate vantage point, one does not see the dependent nature as it is, in its suchness, i.e. as a mind which engages in constructing imaginary cognitive structures. Only die perspective from the absolutely accomplished nature can make it clear. And verse 25 clarifies how the absolutely accomplished nature “sees”: That from which all elements have dieir ultimate reality, [Is die third naturelessness,] It is also called suchness,^^^ Suchness, tathatd, is that direct knowledge of reality in its imaginary and other forms which signifies an awaloening. As Lusdiaus asserts: ... tadiatâ does not so much involve the eradication of delusion as such, as much as it involves seeing delusion as delusion .., Wlien a delusion is recognized as a delusion, in an important sense it no longer functions as a delusion. Instead its delusive power is neutralized and it is understood simply as a phenomenon. A phenomenon, however, is understood by the ■■■'54 94 Buddhist as a complex web of conditionality. Thus, properly understood, tathatâ is synonymous witli pratîtya-samutpâda, i.e., conditionality.^^^ So, although tlie epistemological edge of Yogâcâra is evident and forcefully argued by both Kochumuttom and Lusthaus, still there is the insistence that what is meant by direct knowledge fniwlkalpa jm nâ), or “seeing tilings for what they are/becoming” tathatâ or jathà-bhütam, as Lusthaus admits above, cannot be extricated from experience. Again, the Tnmsika verse 27-8: One does not abide in the realization O f mere representations of consciousness Just on account of the [[[Wikipedia:theoretical|theoretical]]] perception That all tliis is mere representation of consciousness, If one places [=sees] something before oneself. One does abide in the realization O f mere [[[representation]] of] consciousness Wlien one does not perceive also a supporting consciousness, For, the graspable objects being absent, A There cannot either be the grasping o f that, [Namely, the grasping o f the supporting consciousness].™ In short, tlieory does not give release. Only die true experience of the accomplished nature, in which one is released from the activity of grasping, can account for direct knowledge. Thus, even diough the Yogâcâra school has certainly developed and established an intricate dieory of cognition, this is not to supplant experience and praxis. Meditation Widi regard to the importance o f meditation within the context o f teaching, Asanga states unequivocally that the person striving to “dwell in the teachings” cannot rely on the teachings alone but must engage in meditation and diat, vice-versa, engaging in meditation is not sufficient in itself but must be coupled widi listening and reflecting on die teachings for its full value.^^* Asanga makes it clear that the systematic teaching of the Yogâcâra school is not meant to stand in the place of Buddhist practice, but rather A* that both aspects of theory and praxis are complementary and indeed co-dependent on 259 Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenobgy: A Philosophicd Investigation of Yogâcâra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Weishih lun, Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 255-6 260 Trimsatikà vs 27-28, Kochumuttom, Thomas, A., A Buddhist Doctrine of Expetience: A New Translation and s Intepretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin, Delhi; Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1982, p. 159 261 A.bhidharmasamuccaja : The Compendium of the Higher Teaching (Philosophy) by Asanga, trans. into French by Walpola Rahula, English by Sara Boin-Webb, Asian Humaitities Press; Fremont CA 2001, p. 188 . J 2®2 Asanga, The Summary of the Great Vehicle, trans. from the Chinese o f Paramartha (Taisho, Volume 31, Number 1593) by John P. Keenan, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research: California, 1992, p. 68 2®® Asanga, The Summary of the Great Vehicle, trans. from the Chinese o f Paramartha (Taisho, Volume 31, Number 1593) by John P. Keenan, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research: California, 1992, p. 69 95 each other For full value, to move intellectual understanding toward the “profound ■"meaning of the teaching,” knowledge toward penetrating insight. A ' -Asanga, in The Summary of the Great Vehicle, investigates how meditation moves the bodhisattva forward in attaining the stages of perfection which allow for spiritual maturing. There is a point at which the bodhisattva is ready to “once again become aware of conscious construction only” which Asanga describes as the mom ent A meditation and the teaching fuse to achieve the same end: Through a transcendent wisdom of quietude and insight focused on the I all-pervading doctrine and tlirough a wisdom characterized by a variety of images and conscious constructs attained subsequent to non-imaginative wisdom [[[nirvikalpa]] jnana], he eradicates all the causal seeds in his fundamental container consciousness and nurtures all die seeds that enable one to contact the Dharma body. He converts his support and comes to attain the true qualities of all Tathagatas, and he attains the wisdom of omniscience. This is why he [again] becomes aware of conscious construction only. Seeing magical illusions in all the constructs that arise from tlie container consciousness and all die images of diose imagined constructs, diat wisdom attained subsequently to non-imaginative wisdom is fundamentally exempt from error. Just as a magician is himself undeceived by his magic tricks, so the bodhisattva, when enunciating the padi of cause and result, always remains free from error in all his descriptions.^^^ Thus, Asanga explains the bodhisattva’s ability, dirough the merging of perfect meditation and doctrine and die subsequent transformation that occurs to the bodhisattva, to remain and occupy die “space” of mind-only, yet not be deceived by die illusionary reality of mind-only. Asanga further expands his discourse on the bodhisattva’s meditation practice by asserting tiiat once the bodhisattva has achieved a concentration diat “bring[s] to presence the truth not mediated dirough language” and further “intensifies his meditative practices in order to bring about an attainment of the three Buddha bodies”,^'*^ diat 96 meditation is more than a means to an end. Asanga quotes from the Treatise on Meditating on Conscious Construction-. In states of quiescence the bodhisattva Understands that images exist only in his mind. And, abandoning externalized ideas of objects, He assuredly understands them to be only his own thoughts. Abiding witliin himself, the bodhisattva Understands that tlie objective realm does not exist. And also that tlie subjective realm is empty. He then directly experiences the unobtainability of both.™ This can be read as an abbreviated description o f how the Yogâcâra path internalises the Abhidharma concern witli dharma elements to describe tlie working of the psyche, clarifies die Madhyamika emptiness, and maintains the experiential component of awakening, for widiout this last practical aspect the bodhisattva cannot pursue the compassionate work o f instructing and freeing otiiers. Furthermore, this passage highlights the similarity Yogâcâra thought has with Nâgârjuna’s two-trudis whereby emptiness renders both realms of sanisara and nirvana relative and reverses any action of transcendence. Here, the Yogâcâra practitioner internalises the argument so that neidier die subjective ego realm nor an objective external realm o f dharma activity can claim transcendence. The non-duality described by the Yogâcâra text is not die opposite o f duality but rather “neither-nor” which is how the super-mundane is commonly described by language which always falls short. King maintains that For die Yogâcâra school the doctrine o f emptiness (sünyatâ) is ‘relocated’ into a phenomenological and meditative context. To realise that everydiing is empty is to understand diat the entirety of one’s experience is devoid of subject (grâhalta, ‘one who grasps’) and an object (grâhya, ‘that which is grasped’). This does not mean that there is nodiing at all but rather to clarify precisely what is real and in what sense it is so.™ 2®4 Asaiiga, The Summary of the Great Vehide, trans. from the Chinese o f Paramartha (Taisho, Volume 31, Number 1593) by John P. Keenan, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research: California, 1992, p. 69 2®5 King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 99 97 experience. Clearly the Yogâcâra doctrine is not intended to substitute the Abhidharma material dharmas for the psychologised and internalised substrata of the mind, or àlaya, yet tlie parallels in systematic development are obvious. Anacker points out the tension in Vasubhandhu whom he sees as both asserting “nothing” along witli the Madhaymaka sûnyavàda and at the same time prescribing a “therapeutic course o f action (acard) rooted in meditation This tension is not confined to Vasubhandhu’s treatises, but is also evident in Asanga, as has been shown in the texts above. And the tension is not 2®® King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: A n Introduction to Hindu andBuddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 98 2®2 Anacker, Stefan, Seven Works of Vasubandhu: the Buddhist Psychological Doctor, Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, 1984, p. 194. King also identifies in the Yogacara path the reality that “We are only truly aware o f our f own perceptions, not sure of anything external; all we can depend on is our •ydebilitating to the Yogâcâra argument but in fact integral to it in that sünyatâ and meditation therapy come together to define the individual liberation experience. Thus, Yogâcâra asserts criticism both on tlie Abhidharma pre-occupation witli the material realm which is not how it appears, and on Madhyamika sünyatâ for not recognising how sünyatâ redefines individual experience, actualising it so that the Dharma can properly be worked out. Lusthaus’ summary of the Yogacara position is useful to these concluding remarks: The mind doesn’t create tlie physical world, but it produces the interpretative categories through which we know and classify the physical world, and it does this so seamlessly tliat we mistake our interpretations for the world itself. Those interpretations, which are projections of our desires and anxieties, become obstructions (âvarand) preventing us from seeing what is actually the case. In simple terms we are blinded by our own self-interests, our own prejudices (which means what is already prejudged), our desires. Unenlightened cognition is an appropriative act. Yogâcâra does not speak about subjects and objects; instead it analyzes perception in terms o f graspers (grâhakà) and what is grasped (grâhyd). Consciousness projects and constructs a cognitive object in such a way that it disowns its own creation — pretending tlie object is “out tliere” — in order to render tliat object capable of being appropriated ... That selfdeception folded into the very act of cognition is what Yogâcârins term ahhüta-parikalpa. Realization of vijnâpti-mâtra exposes this trick intrinsic to consciousness’s workings, catching it in the act, so to speak, thereby 98 eliminating it. Wlien that deception is removed one's mode of cognition is no longer termed vymna (consciousness); it has become direct cognition One might say, then, tliat tlie activity generating experience is as much in question for Yogacara Buddhism as the epistemological foundation o f reality. “Seeing” things correctly is better defined witliin an experiential field, at least for Mahâyâna Buddhism which in its different forms is always concerned witli how tlie bodhisattva teaches or otlierwise relates to the unenlightened. As explored in the previous chapter, Nâgârjuna implemented a deconstructive four-fold negation, paralleling an ampya-jmna progression o f meditation, in order to lead the practitioner out o f the realms of limitation, field by field, until tliere is nodung left by which to define and characterise experience; his m ethod has completely transformed traditional Buddhist activities and teaching. According to his own assertions, the Four Noble Trudis and entirety of die Buddha’s teaching can only be implemented and acted upon in light of mnyatâ. Similar in motive, yet differently oriented, is die Yogacara endeavour to uncover die working of die mind, layer by layer, until there is “no mind diat knows”, which is to say, an utterly transformed mind which does not create its own objects for consumption. Nâgârjuna attempts to recover samsaric activity dirough a mystical apophatic approach whereas the Yogâcâra school is prepared to be much more descriptive in their approach. Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Vhenomenolog^: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng Weishih lun^ Routledge Curzoii, 2002, p. 538 Chapter 3. Dôgen’s Datsuraku-datsuraku Mastering the Way in sitting meditation is awakening the mind for enlightenment. Awakening the mind is not one or different, sitting meditation is not one or different .. Dogen talces the physical activity of seated meditation and applies tliis practice to the metaphysical speculation o f the mind. The body-mind/mind-body unit is bound together for Dogen and is tlie ego-self that must be put aside before true practice is possible. As will be examined in this chapter, Dogen is not satisfied to merely transcend the ego-self, rather tlie more profound movement is a ‘trans-descendence’ to the simple practice in the here and now that lacks all vestiges of self and ego. As an exemplar of praxi-centric phenomenology, Dogen introduces, out of the historical discussions and teachings of twelfth century China and Japan, a unique interpretation of the issue of hongaku (original awakening) which he expresses as 'original realisation and wondrous practice’ {bonshd mjdshu) or as tlie 'unity o f practice and realisation’ {shusho itto). In order to denote a dynamic non-dual rendering of praxis and tlieory, Dogen offers a renewed presentation o f die concept o f Buddha-nature (bussho) whereby being-time {ujt) is integral in expressing, instead of transcendence, the direction o f trans-descendence. For Dogen, trans-descendence recalls Buddha-nature that is expressed mutually with a personal manifestation of no-self through a particularly phenomenological approach to awakening (expressed stylistically datsuraku-datsurakip. His contribution to die development o f Buddhist thought and practice has been recentiy recovered by the 20* century philosophers o f the “Kyoto Scliool”^^" and since that time he has gained an everwidening audience inclusive of Buddhist practitioners and philosophers East and West alike. Modern philosophical scholarship has noted his discussions surrounding beingtime igtji), ceaseless practice total dynamism iyenki), total exertion igûjiiî) and compared these discussions with Western existential and phenomenological thinkers, including Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger. However, it must be noted that Dogen wrote and taught for the express purpose of making clear the Buddha patii for others so 2*’^ Cleary, Thomas, Rational Zen: The Mind of Dogen Zenji, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1992, p. 100 ™ namely, W a t SUJI Tetsuro, N is h IDA Kitaro, T a n a b e Hajime, N ish itANI Keiji, PCa r a k i Junzo, lENAGA Saburo, T a m a k i Kôshirô, HiSAMATSU Shin’ichi, and A b e Masao, see Editor’s Introduction to A b e , Masao, A Study of Dogen, ed. Steven Heine, Albany: State Umversity o f New York Press, 1992, p. 1-3 100 that his soteriological intentions should not be lightly separated from what may be termed his “philosophy.” Dogen is clear about his reasons for writing, as he records in one of his first essays, the BendOwa (Discourse on Practice): I decided to compile a record of tlie customs and standards that I experienced first-hand in the Zen monasteries of the great Kingdom of Sung togetlier with a record of profound instruction from a [good] counselor which I have received and maintained. I will leave this record to people who learn in practice and are easy in the truth, so that they can know the right Dharma of tlie Buddha’s lineage.^^^ This testimony, which occurs early on in Dôgen’s prolific writing career, emphasises anodier aspect to Dôgen’s teaching in addition to his penetrating philosophical essays and religious instruction, that is the personal and autobiographical nature o f Dôgen’s teaching which works to break down tlie systematic development of dogma and enforces tlie phenomenological aspect of Dôgen’s presentation of reality and one’s participation in that reality. Development of Buddha-nature (Jp. Bussho) To prepare for the way in which Dôgen treats Buddha-nature, it is helpful to trace the development and history of this term and its relation to the concept of dharmakdya. As discussed in the Nâgârjuna chapter, Dharma, literally represented by the Chinese character for “law,” is a Sanskrit word witli a variety o f nuanced meanings tliat may best be understood in context. The “myriad dharmad' often indicate physical and mental phenomena, die multiplicity o f things in the world.^^^ However, from the earliest Buddhist texts, dharma also indicates the teaching o f the Buddha himself, the “eternal trudi.” Later Mahâyâna developments, in particular, die treatment of the Buddha’s Dharma in the Prajnâpâramïtà literature, is taken to mean 'die way things are’ in their own nature (tathata or dharmatd) and it is referred to as the dharmakdya or the body of his truth, his teaching, and not in a personal sense at all. The Buddha himself is no longer with the community, but his teachings, the dharmakdya, are what sustain the community. As discussed briefly in die Nâgârjuna chapter, die Prajndpdramitd literature strongly emphasised diat ultimate reality or the nature of things was in fact empty (smyd). Williams notes that as the Dogen, Master Dogen’s Shobogent(p: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 3 The ‘myriad dharmas’ can also indicate the teachings o f tlie myriad Buddhas and bodhisattvas in the Maliâyâna structure o f the Buddha realms. 101 ... dharmakâya was taken to equal die essential ultimates (dharmas) which, possessed to a full degree, make up the Buddha’s realization, in die Perfection of Wisdom literature die dharmakdya comes to refer not only to the Doctrine which sets forth the true nature of things, but also the the realization and the true nature of diings itself. In diis way, a shift occurs away from understanding the Dharma stricdy in terms of the teaching of the Buddha, his “Doctrine,” to die notion of the all encompassing nature o f the Buddha’s Dharma vrhich is called the dharmakdya. Direcdy corresponding to diis shift is the development of the diree bodies of Buddha. Through Nâgârjuna, there is accepted a two-body system, the Buddha’s historical body and die eternal truth of his teaching. However, widi the development o f die Yogâcâra, a diree-body system is introduced that corresponds widi the tri-partite aspect of selfnature (trisvabhdvd). The dharmakdya (or svdbhdvikakdyà) as described in Asanga’s Mahdydnasamgraha is the “purified Thusness or Suchness,” the “true nature of things taken as a body (10:1)”^^^ and is the basis for the odier bodies because it has undergone die “revolution o f the basis” and is thus “pure revealed.’’^^'^ Important for understanding Dôgen’s Buddha-nature in diis development of dharmakdya is to note a gradual move toward a cosmic understanding o f Buddha reality, one in which Buddha’s teaching infuses all of reality, and the sigiificance that the dharmakdya is interpreted dirough sttnyata. A nother teaching introduced in Mahâyâna scriptures is diat of tathdgatagarbba or die “womb o f die Perfected O ne” (or “womb of Buddhahood”^’^) which, according to the Dankdvatdra Sutra, functions in the same fashion as the storehouse-conciousness {dlayavijndnd), storing the “seeds” of previous actions and dioughts.^^® The Tathdgatagarbba Sutra claims diat “all the living beings, diougli they are among die defilements of hatred. 273 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinaTFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 173 274 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinalToundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 1 7 5 275 WilUams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinalFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. ' 176 276 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctfinaiFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 176. The other two bodies are the Sâmbhogikakâya or the Body o f Complete Enjoyment, a physical body (rüpakâyd) and impermanent, it is considered by the Mahâyânists to be the “actual Buddha in his supramundane form”276 the Transformation Bodies or Nairmànikakâya^^hich. occur throughout history, such as the historical figure o f Siddhartha Gautama, and work as “a mere image manifesting becoming enlightened for the benefit o f beings.” See Williams, p. 178 277 Cook, Francis H., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jem lNet of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 36 278 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, Volume One: India and China, Indiana: World Wisdom Inc., ■ p. 52 ' ‘-p’rz % 102 A. 279 97 280 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinalFoundations, London and New York; Routledge, 1989, p. 98 281 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinalFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 101 282 Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The DoctrinalFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 99 283 See Cook, Francis FL, Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 8, 30 and Williams, Paul, Mahâyâna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 119-20 anger and ignorance, have the Buddha’s wisdom, Buddha’s eye, Buddha’s Body sitting firmly in the form of meditation” that they “are possessed of the Matrix of the Tathâgata y \tathâgatagarbhà\, endowed with virtues, always pure Additionally, the Mahâyâna Mahàparlnirvafia Sûtra teaches that enlightenment is a universal reality and that there is the . presence o f the tathagatagarhha, eventual Buddhahood, in even the unforgivably wicked people {iccbàntikas), a concept not accepted in previous Buddhist teaching,^®® In the Srîmàlâdmsimhanàda Sûtra, the tathagatagarhha is equated with dharmakdya, as the unenlightened, “defiled” mode o f the “permanent, steadfast, calm, eternal” Dharma- if body: “The Dharmakâya o f the Tathâgata when not free from the store of defilement is referred to as the Tathâgatagarbha.”^®^ Altliough most of tliese scriptures also assert tliat the dharmakdya must be understood in terms o f hlnyata, this assertion loses effectiveness in the context o f teachings that strongly suggest permanence as either Mind Y (consciousness) or even some ontological realm of Self Williams notes o f the A Mahdparinirvana Sutra that although the Buddha teaches no-self, in a manner of speaking this teaching may as well be stated: the very Buddha-nature is Self/®^ This teaching is not intended to exhibit the unreliability o f language, as did certain Madhyamika teaching; f rather, it is bent on portraying the indisputable reality of Buddha-nature which can be f 'b' spoken of negatively or positively. The foregoing scriptures teaching dharmakdya and tathdgatagarbba doctrine were part of y; . the basis for the Chinese schools of Buddhism, finally by the T ’ang Dynasty flourishing sufficiently separate from Taoism (although certainly influenced by Taoist thinking as to be a thoroughly Chinese interpretation of Buddhism.^®® The Hua-yen School (Flower O rnam ent School) takes its name from the Flower Ornament Scripture, the Mvatamsaka Sutra and its systemetiser, tlie tliird patriarch of Hua-yen, Fa-tsang’s writings are influenced by both the Avatamjaka as well as the Awakening of Faith in the Mahdydna (Ta- — ------ Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The DoctrinalFoundations, London and New York: Routledge, 1989, p. 103

cVmg cFi hsin As Cook notes, Hua-yen thought sought to “syncretise various Buddhist doctrines, primarily those o f emptiness and tathagatagarhha^ such tliat in the cosmic understanding of reality, “[t]here is notliing mean or inferior, or anytliing to be despised in die whole of existence, when it is properly seen apart from self-interest.”^®^ Ill fact. Cook claims diat ultimately, the Hua-yen philosophical system is “an elaborate reworking of die Indian concept of emptiness” through the understanding o f a “conditional interdependence” of all phenomena.^®^ The famous example of the Huayen understanding o f die interdependent and “mutually causative”^®^ nature o f reality is the Jewel N et o f Indra, in which a great net of infinite dimensions is studded with an infinite number of jewels that are positioned such diat they reflect each other perfectly ad infinitum. Thus, the one jewel holds the entirety o f die whole net in its face, and the whole net dependent upon die one jewel. That the Hua-yen school called itself die “school of the “interdependent origination of die universe” (dharma-dhatu pratîtyasamutpâdàfi^^^ is furdier evidence o f their concern. The understanding of the ' tathagatagarhha doctrine (synonomous widi dharmakâya as discussed above) diat equates phenomenal and noumenal reality as portrayed in die Awakening of Faith, is seen by Fatsang through “mutual identity” and “interdependence” as the equating of phenomenon f with phenomenon. In this way, Buddha-nature is expanded from the One Mind as #consciousness only, to a cosmic Mind idharmadhâtiî) such that nothing in the vast universe is without Buddha-nature, including “ants, grass, and dirt.”^®^ A prolific writer, Dôgen’s collection o f writings entitled the Shobogetityp is his seminal teaching studied and revered by bodi religious practitioners as well as philosophers. The Shôbügent^d has die distinction of being die first significant writing composed in Japanese during an era in which scholarly work was written solely in Chinese. Dôgen also composed poetry, and compiled in the Shinji-shôbôgent^, a stylistic collection of koan 28'^ Cook notes that the Awakening o f Faith scripture, although claimed to be written by Asvaghosa, is most likely a Chinese document, in Cook, Francis H., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 51 285 Cook, Francis FL, Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 55 285 Cook, Francis FI, Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 30-1 287 Cook, Francis FI., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania I State University Press, p.2 28® Cook, Francis H., Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel N et of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 30 285 Cook, Francis FL, Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel N et of Indra, University Park and London: Pennsylvania State University Press, p. 52-3 250 Tsujimura, Kôichi, as cited in Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, Vol. 2: Japan, trans. James Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1990, p. 74 251 Dôgen, Master Dogen’s Shobogen:yp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 5 252 Dôgen, Master Dogen’s Shobogenyp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p, 6 104 composed in Chinese. The term Shobogen^p is composed of four Chinese characters. Truth-Law-Eye-Treasure, and is commonly translated as “the treasury o f the true dharma eye.” However, Dumoulin points out tliat a meaningful translation is difficult to ascertain and he cites Wilhelm Gundert, who indicates that these characters point to “all the precious things that fill the eye which beholds the real, true law [[[Dharma]]] of Buddha.” It has already been noted that dharmajDharma can be used to convey both the S mundane, i.e. aspects o f phenomena, as well as the supramundane, i.e. the teachings o f the Buddha(s). Dôgen allows for tlie word-play to express the ambiguity exhibited between these “categories”. ’Bndàh.^.-Dharma is reality and ‘the way things are’ manifested in the Universe in the myriad forms or dharmas. Thus, according to Tsujimura Kôichi, Shobôgentyô can be rendered “the eye o f the authentic law (subjective and objective genitive) tliat contains in its vision the all — that is, everything in the entire world.”^^® Tsujimura’s translation recognises the possibility of word-play that Dôgen may have had in mind: the Dharma as manifested through the myriad dharmas. Echoing the Hua-yen school, Dôgen says in tlie Bendom, ... everything in tlie Universe in ten directions — soil, earth, grass, and trees; fences, walls, tiles, and pebbles - performs the Buddha’s work.^®^ And further. The grass, trees, soil, and earth ... all radiate great brightness, and their preaching of the deep and fine Dharma is witliout end.^^^ In other words, to separate the world of objects, the world of multiplicity, as delusion from an ideal Buddha reality is to misunderstand Buddha Dharma. This attitude towards everyday existence is one repeated tlirough the history of Zen anecdotes and koan. Barrett records this familiar Zen saying: Before you have studied Zen, mountains are mountains and rivers are rivers; while you are studying it, mountains are no longer mountains and 105 rivers are no longer rivers; but once you have had Enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and rivers are rivers Also brought to bear in this title is the occurrence o f die “eye” which sees the Dharma made manifest through myriad dharmas, A human eye has limited vision, in scope and deptii, but die Buddha eye sees perfecdy and renders reality transparent to the truth. As will become apparent, Dôgen emphasises a praxi-centric phenomenological approach to enlightenment and his inclusion of the image of an eye serves to reinforce the existentiality o f this approach. He was not, of course, the first to utilise the image, however, it factors into die tide of his ma^mm opus appropriately. Finally, the etymology of the term Dharma also carries die meaning o f method or practice.^^'^ Again in the Bendmva, Dôgen describes the Buddha’s Dharma as die transmission of die “right- Dharma-eye treasury” according to the “supreme and great m ethod” — that is, die method of Therefore, Dôgen’s writings in the Shobdgentyp are his efforts to reveal the treasury such that one may dynamically see die Buddha-Dharma made manifest throughout the myriad dharmas by means o f skilful praxis, t^atyen. Original Awakening {hongaku) thought in Tendai Born in 1200 during die Kamalcura era in Japan, Dôgen began his Buddhist training as a young acolyte o f the Tendai Buddhist order on Mt. Hiei and upon his ordination as a monk was given the name “D ôgen” (Foundation of the Way).^^*^ Scholarship surrounding medieval Japanese Buddhism and the remarkable development o f Kamakura era schools diat have survived and flourished to diis modern day have generated a number o f theories regarding die intellectual and religious environment of that period. It is certainly remarkable that from the training ground o f Mt. Fliei’s Tendai sect came die influential religious leaders Eisai, Hônen, Shinran, Dôgen and Nichiren and speculation both sectarian and non-sectarian agree that a strong catalyst creating the divergence of 253 Barrett, WiUiam, “Zen for the West,” in Zm Buddhism: Selected Writings of D,T. Su:piki, edited by William Barrett, N ew York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956, p. xvi-xvii 25-^ NISHIJIMA and Cross reference the Sanskrit-English Dictionary (arranged by Sir Monier-Williams, Oxford: Oxford Press, 1899) in Master Dogen’s Shobogen:yp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 329 255 Dogen, Master Dogen’s Shobogentrp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NiSHljiMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: WindbeU Publications, 1994, p. 12 256 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, V ol 2: Japan, translated by James Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1990, p. 52 106 views and eventual schools o f tliese monks was tlie issue of hongaku t h o u g h t . Hongaku or “original enlightenment” thought has its primary origins of influence in the Awakming of Faith in the Mahâyâna treatise and the Mahâyânamahâpariniwa'tia Sutra, in which the âlayavijnana consciousness of the Yogâcâra school is redefined to fit within the concept of tathâgatagarhha (the seed or womb of Buddha nature) so that conventional and ultimate truth are found to have the same ontologically grounded place in the pure mind.^^® As noted, the Chinese Hua-yen school adopted tlie Awakening of Faith treatise along side the Flower Ornament Sûtra as basic texts. Developing parallel to the Hua-yen school was the Chinese T ’ien-T’ai sect which is established in Japan as the Tendai sect by Saicho (767- 8 2 2 ) In Japan, hongaku thought is developed in terms of Tendai’s recognition of the primacy of tlie Saddharmapunàanka Sûtra or Hotus Sûtra which subsumes all previous vehicles under the over-arching superiority of the Fotus Sutra, the understanding that perfect bodhisattva precepts are an “expression of innate Buddhahood and also the direct cause for its realisation,”®®® and tlie establishment of esoteric ritual which effected both “spiritual liberation” as well as “practical, worldly ends” (such as good harvests, healings etc) and thus reflected tlie monistic non-duality of ultimate and mundane t r u t h . F o l l o w i n g Saicho’s establishment o f the Tendai doctrinal direction, Jacqueline Stone identifies five noteworthy developments instigated by his disciples and further shaping the sect in which Dôgen would eventually begin his training. These developments are 1) amalgamating esoteric teaching with the Fotus Sûtra, which contains no such overt teachings, witli tlie result that the lj)tus became recognised as tlie “one great perfect teaching” transcending both time and space; 2) redefining the historical Buddha within an esoteric reading of the H)tus so that tlie historical Buddha becomes a timeless, cosmic Buddha who preaches continuously throughout time and space; 3) tlie “valorising” of the phenomenal world in which all being both sentient and non-sentient is imbued witli Buddha-nature, hence all form participates in tlie same ontological reality which is Buddhahood; 4) the shortening o f the length of time in which one might attain 257 see Stone, Jacqueline L, Original Endghtenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, Chapter Two: Tendai Hongaku T h o u ^ t and the New Kamakura Buddhism: Rival Theories 258 Stone, Jacqueline I., Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, p. 6-7 255 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, Volume 2: Japan, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1990, p. 6 805 Stone, Jacqueline L, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, p. 18 301 Stone, Jacqueline I., Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, p. 20 107 Buddhahood from the aeons described in earlier doctrine to the possibility of attainment in a mom ent by eitlier monk or common layperson; 5) tlie introduction o f the Pure Land nembutsu practice of “constantly walking samadhi” as a ritual institution on M t Hiei.®®^ D ogen’s koan This background concerning the question o f “original enlightenment” helps establish a portion of tlie religious and intellectual environment tliat Dôgen stepped into as a young monk training on Mt. Hiei. Biographical sources record that Dôgen eventually confronted the issue o f hongaku with the zeal of attempting to bring what seemed to be contradiction within tlie teaching to existential reconciliation. Dôgen confronted the problem personally, by travelling to China for more input into the teachings. This move to resolve a matter o f theory existentially establishes early Dôgen’s inclination toward Aj experiential learning, and paves the way for the development o f his praxi-centric phenomenological approach. According to the biography Kent^eiki, recorded by his disciple after Dôgen’s death, Dogen left Mt. Hiei consumed by “great doubt,” dissatisfied tliat no teacher could explain how original enlightenment could be reconciled with the practices pursued by the bodhisattva.®®® Altliough Dôgen’s own writings do not mention his “great doubt” as the reason for leaving Mt. Hiei, and some modern scholars credit this reading to sectarian interests in creating a break between medieval Tendai original awakening thought and the new Kamakura era Buddhist thought,®®'^ he did express the contradiction himself early in his career, shortly after returning from China, in lAcVukant^t^ngi {General Teachings fo r the Promotion ofXat^ti): The Way is basically perfect and all-prevading. How could it be contingent upon practice and realization? The Dharma vehicle is free and untrammelled. What need is tliere for man’s [sic] concentrated effort?®®® 802 Stone, Jacqueline L, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, p. 21-34 803 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, Vol. 2: Japan, translated by James Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1990, p. 52 804 see Stone, Jacqueline L, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Medieval Japanese Buddhism, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1999, p. 72-3 805 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, Vol. 2: Japan, translated by James Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1990, p. 57 108 Further, that tlie question o f enlightenment and practice become such an integral theme in Dogen’s life-long writings should clearly indicate tliat reconciling the issue of original enlightenment (hongaku) with tlie alternative Mahâyâna path of acquired awakening (shikaku) was core to his own enlightenment experience and crucial to tlie development o f his teaching. D ôgen’s struggle over die issue of hongaku and die simultaneous need for practice, and the way the quesdon played into his own enlightenment experience has been aptly called by Joan Stambaugh, his koan. As Dôgen was to become idendfied as die founder o f the Sôto sect of Zen Buddhism in Japan which emphasises the practice of (seated meditation) in contrast to the Rinzai sect of Zen which utilises koan practice as a primary niediod o f inspiring enlightenment, it is not perhaps an obvious association; however, it is surprisingly appropriate. Dôgen himself compiled a collection o f koan. Understood primarily as an enlightenment device, a koan is an enigmatic story or saying diat a teacher gives a monk in training to ponder and meditate over until the monk discovers the key, unlocks the mystery and gains an enlightenment experience (satori). However, considered only widiin diese parameters, koan practice becomes formulaic and restrictive, causing enlightenment to take on a linear, goal-driven manner which all but undermines the enlightenment. S h im an o Eido defines koan as “the time and place where Trudi is manifest” which suggests a dynamic aspect to the koan and further, diat there is an experiential expectation, SHIMANO asserts that “every place, every day, every event, every thought, every deed, and every person is a koan. In that sense, koans are neither obscure nor enigmatic.”®®® Thich N hat Haiili also emphasises the inseparability between the personal and practical nature o f koan as he states: In Zen, practitioners use kung-an jkôan] as subjects for meditation until their mind come to awakening. There is a big difference between a kungan and a madi problem - the solution of the madi problem is included in the problem itself, while die response to the kung-an lies in the life of the practitioner. The kung-an is a useful instrument in the work of awakening, just as a pick is a useful instrument in working on the ground. Wliat is accomplished from working on the ground depends on the person doing the work and not just on the pick. The kung-an is not an enigma to resolve; this is why we cannot say that it is a theme or subject o f meditation.®®’ 306 Sh im a n o , Eido T., “Zen Koans,” in Zen: Tradition and Transition —A n Overview of Zen in the Modern World, edited by Kenneth Kraft, London and Melbourne: Rider, 1988, p. 70 307 Nhat Hanh, Thich, Zen Keys, New York and London: Doubleday, 1995, p. 57 109 Dôgen’s koan consists o f his efforts to reconcile what he had learned from his Tendai Buddhist teachers at Mt. Hiei, that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature and yet that the monks must engage in and recite the scriptures. Dôgen is caught in tlie classical argument which had split school from school in China and eventually would do so in Japan, the opposition between tlie doctrine of original awakening (2#:#, hongakiJ) and that of acquired awakening shikakuf^^. In philosophical terms, as Abe points out, Dôgen is caught in a dualistic-minded struggle to idealise Buddha-nature by subscribing to either the doctrine of original awakening or that o f acquired awakening, thereby making one primordial and subjecting the other to it. Indeed, by subscribing to either the doctrine o f original awakening or acquired awakening, one understands Buddha-nature “as a reality arising directly beyond time and space, something with a real existence independent of all practice.”®®® From tlie perspective o f “original enlightenment” alone, one possesses an innate Buddha-nature which is more valuable tlian any scripture or practice merely pointing toward Buddha-nature. Considered thus, the question o f practice becomes moot, it is out-weighted by tlie essential and /or ontological reality of Buddha-nature. From the perspective of acquired awakening, one dedicates oneself to arduous practice and study with the hopes of obtaining or partaking in Buddha-nature. In this case, Buddha-nature is dualistically separated from the practitioner as an idealised “other” reality to be obtained through effort and human activity. Both views, argues Abe, “abstract equally in taking as an object the Reality of the Buddha-nature or awakening, which is fundamentally unobjectifiable and cannot be idealized.”®^® Possessing an innate Buddha-nature or striving to achieve or realise Buddha-nature are views which equally idealise as ontological or essential tlie Buddha reality. D ôgen’s great awakening (daigo) Dôgen’s “great awakening” (daigo) came during a meditation session and is recorded in tlie Meishu version (1538) of tlie biography, the Kem^eiki, as follows: 808 The Japanese character for “shikaku” is PaM. The first portion o f the character, ^ (“shi”), literally means “beginning” in a temporal sense. 805 Abe, Masao, A Study of Dogen: His Phiiosophj and Religion, edited by Steven Heine, New York: State University o f New York Press, 1992, p. 19 810 Abe, Masao, A Study of Dôgen: His Philosophy and Religion, edited by Steven Heine, New York: State University o f New York Press, 1992, p. 21 311 Heine proposes that shinjin datsumku is “perhaps the single most compelling and characteristic doctrine in Dogen’s philosophy o f Zen,” Heine, Steven, “Dôgen Casts off “What”: An Analysis o f Shinjin Datsnrakuj journal of International Association of Buddhist Studies, (9:1), p. 53 312 Heine, Steven, “Dôgen Casts o ff “What”: An Analysis o f Shinjin Datsurakuf journal of International Assodation of Buddhist Studies,^ 9:1), p. 67 313 see N is h id a , Kitarô, A n Inquhy into the Good, translated by Masao A b e and Christopher Ives, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990 (originally published by Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1921), p.xvii 110 A ... Ju“ching chided the monk sitting next to Dogen, who had fallen asleep during a prolonged and intensive meditation session, “To study Zen is to cast off bodymind. Why are you engaged in single-minded seated slumber rather than A single-minded seated meditation Upon hearing this reprimand, Dôgen attained a “great awakening” {daigâ) from his previous doubts concerning tlie relation between meditation [or practice] and enlightenment. He later entered Juching’s quarters and burned incense, reporting, “I have come because body-mind is cast off.” Ju-ching responded approvingly, “Body-mind is cast off [[[shinjin]] datsurakti)', cast off body-mind idatsuraku shifjiit)f Wlien Dôgen cautioned, “Do not grant the Seal [of transmission] indiscriminately,” Ju-ching replied, “Cast off casting o ff’ [datsuraku dasurakd)W^^ Heine points out tliat tliis version of Dôgen’s enlightenment dialogue is supported also by tlie account in the early 14* century biographical material, the Eiheiji sanso gyogo-ki. However, the latest version of the IQnt^iki (the Menzan text of 1738) ends Dôgen’s enlightenment dialogue witli the phrase, “cast off body-mind” instead o f tlie tautological “cast off casting o ff’ of tlie earlier manuscript.®^® As will become apparent, however, tlie climax of the instruction, datsuraku datsuraku, poignantly locates tlie enlightened “self’ witliin Buddhist emptiness [sUnyatd), effectively resolving the hongaku — shikaku impasse dirough a trans-descendence which redefines the nature of practice. The English term “trans-descendence” was used by Takeuchi Yoshinori to describe N iSH ID A Kitarô’s concept o f “immanent transcendence,”®^® however, it is clear diat Dôgen exhibits an even deeper understanding of diis concept when he introduces his datsuraku datsuraku. As exhibited below, Dôgen works dirough the transcendent activity of abandoning one’s ego-self and circles back to reclaim the mundane through the very event of enlightenment; this movement is a trans-descendence. D ôgen’s enlightenment story begins widi die tension between the mundane activity of slumber iya) juxtaposed with die activity o f enlightenment iyatyeiî). And the master’s question, why would one prefer to engage in slumber when one could be participating in the activity o f the Buddha’s, recalls Dôgen’s first encounter of the “Way” upon arriving in China. Dôgen had recentiy arrived in Ming-chou and met a monk from Mt. A-yuI l l A wang monastery in charge of making meals. Dôgen, restricted to tlie boat for immigration reasons, wanted to continue his discussion witli tliis monk whom he found compelling. Dumoulin describes the encounter thus: Dôgen implored tlie worthy monk to stay aboard a while but he declined because he had to return to his work in the monastery. Wlien Dôgen asked what was so pressing about his work, tlie monk explained that kitchen work was his form of Zen practice. Surprised, Dôgen inquired why in his advanced years he did not prefer to devote himself to meditation and kôan practice. At tliat die old monk laughed out loud. “My good fellow from a foreign land,” he said, “you do not yet know what practice (Chin., pan-tao\ Jpn., bendo) means, nor do you yet understand words and scriptures (Chin., m o n jf Abruptly bidding good-bye he vanished into die dusk. Later diat year, Dôgen was to meet die cook a second time ... Taldng up where they had left off, Dôgen asked him what he meant by “practice” and “words and scriptures.” The monk replied, “Words and scriptures are: one, two, three, four, five. Practice means: nothing in the universe is hidden.”®" The tension diat is introduced into the setting of Dôgen’s enlightenment account between the obviously disparate realities o f sleep and meditation echoes die profound encounter Dôgen had widi this enlightened monk in diat die transformation of the activity of just cooking to Zen practice has less to do with the apparent activity itself and much more to do with die personal experience out of which it flows. In diis regard, until Dôgen is able to actively realise what Buddha-nature is, his has all the efficacy of mere Wliile overhearing Ju-Ching admonish die sleeping monk, Dôgen himself experienced a great awakening which he shared to his master as “body-mind is cast o ff’ {shinjindatsuraku). One may interpret body-mind {shmjhïf^^ as die simplest description of the two aspects in Dôgen’s kôan. ‘Body’ is the temporal and transient form, a mere collection of skandha, in which one acts out religious practices such as reading the scriptures, engaging in koan practice, and meditation iyat^îî). ‘Mind,’ as discussed in die previous chapter, underwent a slow transformation from being merely another skandha to housing die seed-consciousness iâlaya-vÿnanà), a transformation which gave increasing importance to die mind as die source of Buddha-nature, or at least the potentiality for 334 Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, Vol. 2: japan, translated by James Heisig and Paul Knitter, New York: Macmillan Publishing company, 1990, p. 53-4 335 111 the Japanese the two characters that make up shinjin 'L&are shin (/fb,mhid) and jin (body, M). A # 112 316 YUASA, Yasuo, The Body: Toward and Eastern Mind-Body Theory, ed. Thomas P. Kasulis, trans. NAGATOMO Shigenori and Thomas P. Kasulis, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1987, p. 118 337 Heine, Steven, “Dôgen Casts o ff “What”: An Analysis o f Shinjin Datsurakuf Journal of International Assodation of Buddhist Studies,( 9:1), p. 55 338 Heine, Steven, “Dôgen Casts off “What”: An Analysis o f Shinjin Datsurakuf Journal of International Assodation of Buddhist Studies,^ 9:1), p. 55 s realising Buddha-nature. This trend of hongaku tliought inherited by the Tendai sect, as discussed above, eventually matured into the teaching of an innate Buddha-nature in every sentient, if not also insentient, being. Consequently, ‘mind’ in Dôgen’s shinjin can be understood as representing original enlightenment, the innate or all-pervasive Buddhanature. Essentially, body-mind (shinjiii) refers to the “whole self’ in Dôgen’s terminology. Thus, the most appropriate way to read 'fhitjbT is ‘body-mind,’ not ‘body and mind.’ The phrase body-mind (shinjifi) repeatedly occurs in Dôgen’s writings throughout his teaching career and clearly indicates his understanding tliat practice and enlightenment belong inseparably to the experience of the individual and that neitlier aspect can endure alone. Elsewhere he expresses the integrated relationship between body and mind witli the phrase shinjin ichinyo (oneness of body-mind). Consequently, by emphasising tliis inseparable relationship between mind-body/body-mind [shinjiii), Dôgen brings his original problem o f original enlightenment [[[shin]] - mind) and acquired enlightenment jin — body) togetlier in order to finally shed tliem both. Thus, I disagree with Tamaki Kôshirô’s interpretation of Dôgen’s fascicle. Slutting the Way with the Bodymind iShinjingakudo), in which he suggests that because Dôgen places body before mind in the title, and discusses body after mind in the text, he is thereby “indicating that the body A 'is rather more important than tlie mind.” On the contrary, Dôgen makes every effort to present the concepts o f body and mind as inseparable before he asks searchers on the Way to shed the body-mind. For Dôgen affirms to his teacher that he has “cast o ff’ idatsurakif) body-mind. Datsuraku is a great challenge to translators, for “cast o ff’ in English sounds like an action arising purely out of tlie will, which is unsuccessful in capturing the nuance of the term. Words such as “molt,” “drop off,” or “shed” have also been used to avoid the problem of tlie will®" and yet, according to Fleine, tliey still fall short of conveying both the active and passive subtleties o f the term: cast off body-mind, body-mind is cast off. Fleine proposes the alternative translation “letting cast o f f ’ ®" which comes close to the way Fleidegger uses the term Gelassenheit to describe the way Da-sein lets Being be. Literally “letting113 ness” in English, Gelassenheit can be translated as “the ‘releasemenf o f the will to will as well as the will to not-wilL”®" 1I Surprisingly, after affirming tlie inseparability of body-mind with the integration of tlie term shinjin, it is now suggested that this body-mind is cast-off {shinjin-datsurakih) in its entirety. As reflected in the Buddhist doctrine o f no-self {andtman), this “whole self” must be let go. “Letting go” is an encouragement to molt or drop away the “whole self’ which may enforce the duality that Abe identified as the idealising of Buddha-nature (A either as a goal o f practice, or as the innate possession of all beings. According to Dogen’s suggestion o f shinjin-datsuraku, die true “gain” is not finding and asserting one’s whole-self, it is allowing the whole-self, die body-mind, to be let go. However, Dogen’s enlightenment story takes a further step: “cast off casting o f f ’ (daturaku datsuraku), as Dogen’s teacher Ju-ching instructed him. Datsuraku-datsuraku indicates a letting go of the step o f transcendence one took away from the ego-self It is, | in fact, a movement of trans-descendence in which die oneness of body-mind is finally fully realised dirough ultimate emptiness. This tautological teaching recalls the “emptiness of emptiness” of Nagarjuna, but within Dôgen’s phenomenological paradigm, acts as a kind o f return to one’s Buddha-nature in the plain authentic way one is, in this body at diis dme. Dôgen suggests diat as ego-selves, we merely slumber in diis world. Dôgen’s enlightenment story, concluding with a trans-descendence, datsuraku datsuraku, is die relinquishing of any spiritual high place and establishes Dôgen’s future teaching as operating out of an existential realisation of sünyatâ. Genjô-kôan In the Genjô-kôan fascicle of die Shôbôgetyo, Dôgen reinforces the process of his own enlightenment story discussed above in terms of an existential realisation of sfmyatd. Aldiough Nishijima and Cross translate “The Realised Universe,” KasuHs notes the diverse interpretations o f what Dôgen intended by the title. Getjd has been understood to mean “manifestation,” “being present already in its completed form,” and “to presence” (this latter Kasulis favours because of its active connotations). Kôan has 335 Heine, Steven, “Dôgen Casts off “What”: An Analysis o f Shinjin Datsurakuj journal of International Assodation of Buddhist Studiesf 9:1), p. 57; Newman Robert Glass proposes that Gelassenheit for Heidegger’s purposes, “A spacing in wliich there is no “thing” hi the usual sense; it might be called a spachig or clearing or no fhhigness.” Glass, Newman Robert, Working Emptiness: Toward a Third Reading of Emptiness in Buddhism and Postmodern Thought, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995, p. 17 114 “equality” and the an translated “keeping to one’s own sphere” whereby die endre phrase is understood to mean “die individuality o f things manifesting themselves equally.” This latter translation is favoured by Waddell and Abe. However, diere is also the possibility o f taking kôan to indicate a paradox, such as given to students as an object o f meditation (Waddell/Abe and Dumoulin reject this possibility while Masunaga Reiho, Deshimaru Tais en, Kim Hee-Jin and Kasulis are willing to consider it plausible) and dius die phrase 320 Kasulis, Thomas, Zen Action!Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1985, pp. 83-6 323 N ish ijim a and Cross insert “[seen as]” in their translation o f this passage in Master Dogen’s Shoboge/yo: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 33 322 as cited in Stambaugh, Joan, The Formless Self, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p. 3 « either been interpreted from its literal meaning of “public notice” thus rendering the entire phrase “the presence of public (or objective) reality”; or the kô has been translated .33 •■genjôkôan can be understood to indicate that “presence itself’ can be a kôan. That one may become “direcdy aware of impermanence” ®®° contains a kind o f existential paradox and is further indication of Dôgen’s phenomenological approach to enlightenment. A Outside of die fact that modern or medieval Japanese can be an ambiguous written language, Dôgen often engages in wordplay and wilful manipulation of language in order to free up meaning or disrupt conventional images. That Dôgen might intend for the title to be ambiguous, or at least be aware of die multivalent nuances is certainly within the realm of possibility. However, in the context of Dôgen’s enlightenment story recorded above, the suggestion that becoming direcdy aware of impermanence contains the elements of an existential kôan is compelling. The Genjôkôan fascicle begins with die introduction of the categories of Buddha-dharma and the myriad dharmas, illusion and enlightenment, buddhas and ordinary beings, and insists that the practitioner enter into diis seeming duality. He writes: Wlien all dharmas are [seen as]®®^ the Buddha-dharma, there is illusion and enlightenment, contemplation and action, birth and Death, buddhas and sentient beings. Wlien myriad dharmas are of die nonself, diere is no illusion or enlightenment, no buddhas or sentient beings, no arising or perishing. Because the Buddha-way intrinsically leaps out of plentitude and dearth, there is arising and perishing, illusion and enlightenment, sentient beings and buddhas. Still do flowers fall to our pity and weeds grow to our displeasure.®®® 115 ■ ” 323 s According to Stambaugh, Dôgen has introduced a “dialectic” in this first paragraph in order to suggest that “form, duality, and emptiness (nonduality) are still present”.®®® She sees the first statement to be a positive “tliesis” statement, an “is”, in which myriad dharmas denote differentiation. The second statement she likens to an anti-thesis A statement, an “is not”, in which, although it does not simply negate the thesis, it proposes that nonduality is exhibited through nonself. The third statement, she asserts, is not a synthesis but a transcendence, a “neitlier is nor is not” in tliat the Buddha-way “leaps out” o f both the categories of plentitude (myriad dharmas) and deartli (emptiness, nonduality). Finally, the last statement that flowers fall and weeds grow she sees as tlie ‘resolution’ of Dôgen’s dialectic, a “both is and is not,” a paradoxical situation of “suchness” in which one must grapple witli tlie presenced reality of form and emptiness.®®'^ Interestingly, Dogen’s “dialectic” as suggested by Stambaugh seems to contain an inversion of the famous negative catuhskoti dialectic employed in Indian I' philosophy and utilised by Nâgârjuna (see the discussion of positive and negative cattihskoti in Chapter 2: Nâgârjuna), and tlius proposes an altogether different outcome. The negative caUihskoti is expressed: N ot {A} N ot {Not-A} N ot {Both (A) and (Not-A)) N ot {Neither (A) nor (Not A)}®®® The negative catuhskoti drives logic and understanding to its final and ultimate negation, a technique tliat Nâgârjuna used to push practitioners beyond tlie conceptual realm and into the practical, and ultimately “empty,” realm. Dôgen’s dialectic, as proposed by Stambaugh, turns Nâgârjuna’s dialectic of the four-fold negation on its head for emptiness {sünyatâ) is subsumed within a paradoxical “preseiicing” instead of extended as the (non)-foundational reality of all dharmas. To understand clearly what Dôgen is expressing in the Genjôkôan it is beneficial to consider more of the text. In the next section Dôgen writes: 323 Stambaugh, Joaii, The Formless Self, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p. 4 324 Stambaugh, Joan, The Formless Self, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p. 4 325 See for example MMK 22:11: “One may not say that there is “emptiness”/ (smyd), nor that there is “non-emptiness”/ Nor that both [[[exist]] simultaneously], nor that neither exists; the purpose for saymg [“emptiness”] is for the purpose o f conveying knowledge.” Streng, Frederick, J., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning, NashviUe/New York: Abingdon Press, 1967 p. 210 ' "'AT' Sî 116 s| 326 Dogen, Master Dogen’s Shobogentyp: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu N ish ijim a and Chodo Cross, Windbell Publications, Woking, Surrey, 1994, p. 33 327 Dogen, Master Dogen’s Shobogetyo: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Windbell Publications, Woking, Surrey, 1994, p. 34 Driving ourselves to practice and experience the myriad dharmas is delusion. When tlie myriad dharmas actively practice and experience ourselves, that is the state o f realization. Those who greatly realize delusion are buddhas. Those who are greatly deluded about realization are ordinary beings .. In this paragraph, Dôgen critiques the single-minded wilful activity o f the person who would attempt to create or bring into being individually the reality of the myriad dharmas. A This is foolish for Dôgen has already asserted in the first passage the nonself of the dharmas, and tlius attempting to bring fortli their true nature (their Buddha-nature) via practice is simply delusional. And yet, when one allows tlie myriad dhamas to act according to their true nature (one tliat is in alignment with Buddha-Dharma) there occurs a mutual realisation. Letting the dharmas act according to their nature frees them to express tlie deepest reality in a way that is meaningful to the practitioner. This mutual awakening is brought out in other portions of the Shôbôgent^o and will be considered later. Again, Dôgen emphasises tlie distinction between buddha and a deluded being. Echoing the difference between slumber and the deluded being in the above verse is caught in a rote routine of practice whereas tlie buddha has pierced to the essence of practice. In the next paragraph, Dôgen comments furtlier on the experiential nature of awalcening and cautions further against the one-sided activity of wilful exertion: Wlien we use the whole body-and-mind \shinjitî\ to look at forms, and when we use tlie whole body-and-mind to listen to sounds, even though we are sensing them directly, it is not like a mirror’s reflection of an image, and not like water and the moon. Wliile we are experiencing one side, we are blind to tlie other side.®®’ It is not enough to that we actively experience tlie surrounding world, even utilising tlie whole body-mind. The experience is one-sided and belies a problem o f perception. This brings us to the much quoted and arguably the thesis statement of the entire fascicle: 117 To study the Buddha-way is to study the self; to study the self is to forget the self; to forget tlie self is to be verified by [or “experienced by”]®®® myriad dharmas; and to be verified by [“experienced by”] myriad dharmas is to drop off the body-mind o f the self as well as the body-mind o f the other. There remains no trace of enlightenment, and one lets this traceless enlightenment come fortli for ever and ever.®®® Here Dogen’s assertion of a true emptiness again comes to the forefront and we are able to consider the question o f how presence and emptiness are meant to relate to one anotlier. This seminal passage in tlie Genjôkôan echoes the existential expression of sünyatâ described in Dôgen’s enlightenment story (via datsuraku-datsuraku). Studying tlie Buddha-way, one is made aware of the dual importance of practice and enlightenment and, perhaps accepting the precepts of the bodhisattva-way, one vows to carry out this initial faitli in tlie actions charged of tlie bodhisattva. Taking on the activity of die bodhisattva, one learns to put ego interests aside and concentrate on the precepts of giving, compassion, etc. In this body-mind frame, one is prepared to become aware o f die activity in the body-mind frames of the surrounding phenomenal world whereby die body-mind structure, in its false duality, is no longer what sustains the bodhisattva’s activity nor the activity of the surrounding phenomenal world. No structure to maintain, mutually and direcdy experiencing profound reality, one rests on an enlightenment which is traceless, an enlightenment “based” on sünyatâ. And yet, tiiat traceless enlightenment “come(s) forth” which is to say it participates in and through die depeiidently originated world o f phenomena. Returning to Stambaugh’s suggestion diat Dôgen’s dialectic affirms diat “form, duality, and emptiness (nonduality) are still present” we should be clear in understanding what “presence” or “presencing” means for Dôgen.®®® Dôgen concludes the Genjôkôan fascicle widi die re-telling o f a famous kôan followed by his commentary on it. The story is recorded dius: 328 N ish ijim a aiid Cross use “experienced by” in Master Dogen’s Shobogeiyo: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu N ish ijim a and Chodo Cross, WindbeU Publications, Woking, Surrey, 1994, p. 34 325 Dogen, Genjo-koan, as cited in Joan Stambaugh The Formless Self Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p 1 330 Newman Robert Glass criticises Stambaugh (and others, including T.P. Kasulis, David Shaner, Michael Zimmerman, Francis Cook, Masao ABE, and Christopher Ives) for reading in Dôgen’s work a bias toward presencing, whereas Glass maintains that a proper reading identifies true emptiness, sünyatâ, as beyond presence or absence/difference. See Glass, Newman Robert, Working Emptiness: Toward a Third Reading of Emptiness in Buddhism and Postmodern Thought, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995, p. 30 118 In this kôan, Dôgen speaks metaphorically o f the Master’s practice o f t^tyen, despite of and because of his original awakened state, as an expression of true Dharma. The Master’s actions have the effect of transmitting tliis true Dharma to his student who does prostrations to show his realisation. Dôgen’s commentary following tlie story reads: The real experience of the Buddha-Dliarma, the vigorous road of the authentic transmission, is like tliis. Someone who says that because [the air] is ever-present we need not use a fan, or that even when we do not use [a fan] we can still feel air, does not know ever-presence, and does not know the nature o f air. Because the nature o f air is to be ever-present, the behaviour o f Buddhists has made tlie Earth manifest itself as gold and has ripened tlie Long River into curds and whey. As Dôgen states, the “behaviour of Buddhists,” that is the practice of tyâtyen, is according to the natural activity of Buddha-nature in phenomena - tya^en, or practice, is a natural manifestation o f ‘the way things are’ [tathàtâ), or Buddha-Dliarma. A static “presence” does not allow for the manifestation o f Buddha-Dliarma, thus air as “ever-present” witliout the activity o f the Master’s fan is dead air. Only tlie dynamic unity of practice and realisation togetlier {shushô ittâ) can explain how tlie Buddha-Dliarma is “everpresent.” And “presence” can only be understood in the context o f dependently originating phenomena. Wliat Dôgen is suggesting is the mutual inter-dependence of mundane and profound reality, which is in fact an assertion beyond what Nâgârjuna proposes when he argues tliat mnyatâh the (non)-foundational base for botli samara■md nirvana. However, practically speaking, these approaches may be closer together than tliey appear dialectically. Thus, Stambaugh perceptively notices that Dogen is comfortable with the paradoxical “resolution” o f “both/and,” however, altliough she may develop tlie nature of activity that the practitioner engages in she does not sufficiently clarify how Dôgen deals witli the paradox of “presence” witliin tlie context o f emptiness in tlie Genjôkôan. 331 Master Dogen's Shobogetyo: Book 1, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 37 A Zen Master Hotetsu of Mayoku-zan mountain is using a fan. A m onk comes by and asks, ‘The nature of air is to be ever-present, and there is no place that [[[air]]] cannot reach. Why then does the Master me afanV^ The Master says, “You have only understood that the nature of air is to be ever-present, but you do not yet know the truth y that there is ?io place that [[[air]]] cannot reach. ” The monk says, “What is the truth of there being noplace [[[air]]] cannot reach?At this, the Master just [carries on] using / the fan. The monk does prostrations.®®^ A 119 Buddha-nature {bussho) and Being-time jiji) D ogen’s understanding o f Buddha-nature as it is is a complete rejection of the picture of a transcendent, timeless, constant profound reality separate from mundane existence. Rather, Buddha-nature, expressed tlirough the impermanence of tlie skandhas dhamas is a dynamic penetration of everyday reality in which both Buddha-nature and its manifestation in ordinary beings celebrate togetlier a mutual realisation, a “total existence” ishitsu-d). It is in the Bussho fascicle of the Shobôgetyô that Dôgen performs what has become one of his most well-known reinterpretations of a Buddhist scripture. By manipulating tlie Chinese character u (W) within the phrase shitsu-u (^ W ), Dôgen offers a profound commentary on Buddha-nature which has influenced Japanese Buddhist religion and Japanese philosophy alike. The sentence in question, from the Mahdpamiiwma-sUtra, reads: A ll living beings totally have [shitsuai] the Buddha-naturef^ Taking instead the noun form o f u which means “being” or “existence” the sentence is rephrased as: A ll living beings totally are [or “totally exist as”] the Buddha-nature. Or, as Dôgen re-states it again: “In short. Total Existence is the Buddha-nature, and the perfect totality of Total Existence is called “Mvifig beings. However, Dôgen is concerned that he not be misunderstood to be suggesting that Buddha-nature and manifest beings are some kind of monistic ontology or ideology. Furthermore, what he has in mind with Total Existence is not a state or condition at all defined by die common understanding of time. He states; Remember, the Existence [described] now, which is totally possessed by the Buddha-7iature, is beyond the “existence” of existence and non-existence. Total Existejice is die Buddha’s words, the Buddha’s tongue, the Buddhist patriarchs’ eyes, and die nostrils of a patch-robed monk. The words, “Total Existence are utterly beyond beginning existence, beyond original existence, beyond fine existence, and so on. How much less could they describe conditioned existence or illusory existence? They are not connected widi “mind and circumstances” or with “essence and form” and the like. This being so, object-and-subject as living bemgs-aîid-Total Existence is completely beyond ability based on karmic accumulation, beyond the random occurrence o f circumstances, beyond accordance with the Dharma, and beyond mystical powers and practice and experience ... [At die same time] “The entire Universe is my possession" 'm the 332 Master Dogen’s Shobogenyo: Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu N ish ijim a and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 1 333 Master Dogen’s Shobogenyp: Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu N ishijim a and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 2 120 wrong view of non-Buddhists. [Total Existence] is beyond originallyexisting existence; for it pervades the eternal past and pervades the eternal present. It is beyond newly-appearing existence; for it does tiot accept a single molecule. It is beyond separate instances o f existence; for it is inclusive perception. It is beyond tlie “existence” of “beginningless existence”; for it is something ineffable commg like this. It is beyond tlie “existence” of “newly arising existence”; for the everyday mind is the truth. Remember, in the midst of Total Existence it is difficult for living beings to meet easy convenience. Wlien understanding of Total Existence is like tliis. Total Existence is tlie state of penetrating to tlie substance and getting free.®®'* Dôgen desires to free Buddha-nature from tlie philosophical categories of being and non-being, from tlie locations of mundane or ultimate, from the mytlis o f past, present, future. Locating Buddha-nature, even witli the Dharma itself, can never do justice to tlie true reality of Buddha-nature. In one sense, Buddha-nature is never sometliing that one is able to pin down with definitions and descriptions. Thus, Dôgen’s initial affirmation that Buddha-nature is Total Existence and tliat Total Existence is living b ein^, is tempered with the caution of approaching these descriptors carefully. Dôgen cautions tliat Total Existence is beyond tlie categories of time, substance, or place; it is beyond identities o f real or illusory; and it is beyond tlie pure or mystical experience of practice. However, unlike Nagarjuna who would make no positive assertions for tlie very reasons that Dôgen points out, Dôgen makes a series of positive statements that he hopes will be guides to understanding how living beings encounter and participate in Buddha-nature, or inversely, how Buddha-nature participates in the world of beings. He claims tliat, as Total Existence, Buddha-nature pervades past and present, and is not reliant upon tlie future; that it is ineffable; that it recognises the everyday, mundane. Wlien freed from categorical placement and the strict parameters of ontology or idealisation, only then can one explore tlie dynamic activity o f “penetrating to the substance and getting free.” Later in the fascicle, Dôgen describes the dynamic interdependence o f Buddha-nature and living beings: So now let us ask the National Master: “Do all buddhas have the Buddhanature, or 7iot?" We should question him and test him like this. We should research tliat he does not say “A ll living beings are the Buddha-nature itself," but says “A ll living beings have the Buddha-nature. He needs to get rid \datsurakd\ o f the have in have the Buddha-nature. Getting rid \datsurakih, is 334 Master Dogen's Shobogenyp: Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 2 121 tlie single track of iron, and the single track of iron is the way o f the birds. Then the nature o f all buddhas possesses living beings. This principle not only elucidates living beings, but also elucidates the Buddhafiaturefi^ Here Dôgen again stresses the importance o f datsuraku, the “letting go” o f dualism — in tliis case, the dualism of idealising Buddha-nature as innate possession, however, given tlie list of categories in tlie previous paragraph, Dôgen should now be stylistically understood as encouraging the “letting go” of all categorical parameters — so that the mutual manifestation and realisation o f Buddha-nature and living beings is possible. In this dynamic and interdependent formula, “presence” can never become the subtle ground for either Buddha-nature or living beings. The freedom o f letting go \datsurakti\, and the trans-descendence of allowing die categorical parameters of both Buddha-nature and living beings be shed \datsuraku-datsuraku\, begin to elucidate how “presence” and Buddha-nature can interpenetrate one another without cancelling or over-shadowing the other. Once Dôgen has freed both Buddha-nature and living beings from the categorical parameters of ontology, epistemology and the like, establishing all of reality within the dynamic and paradoxical tension of “presence” and emptiness, he turns to elucidating how diis paradox o f “presence” and emptiness works to express and manifest Buddhanature. In this discussion, he emphasises that the understanding o f Buddha-nature is intimately connected to a proper conception of time and how time works. The manifesting body preaching Buddha-nature is therefore open, clear, and bright — vast emptiness. The “preaching Buddha-nature” bodily manifesting is thereby expressing the original body o f all buddhas. Nowhere is there even one buddha not making the “diereby expressing” his buddha-body. The buddha-body is die manifesting body, and there is always a body manifesting Buddha-nature. Even buddhas’ and patriarchs’ capacity of uttering and understanding that die four great elements and five skandhas [are Buddha-nature] is a moment-to-moment expression o f the manifesting body.®®® Uji or “being-time” is how Dôgen tides anodier Shobogeti:^ fascicle in which he discusses the dynamic way time is to be understood by the enlightened. Heine describes Dôgen’s 335 Master Dogen’s Shobogent^: Book 2, translated by Gudo Wafu NISHIJIMA and Chodo Cross, Woking, Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1994, p. 22 336 “Shôbôgenzô Buddha-Nature,” translated by Nonnan Waddell and Masao A b e , The Eastern Buddhist, Kyoto, (9:1, 1976), p. 98 122 distinction between a “derivative” view o f time, whereby time is ignorantly thought o f as dualistically separate from living beings as the expression “time flies” indicates, and a dynamic or “significant” view of time: Dôgen accentuates tlie dynamic nature o f movement and continuity, which is no longer statically conceived as time points “piled up on top of one anotlier or lined up side by side” in a linear uni-directional fashion. Ratlier, movement is disclosed as the simultaneous interpenetration of all beings occurring right-now and throughout the unity of past, present and future. Dôgen distinguishes the genuine significance of passage {kjOryaku) from the derivative view tliat “time flies,” which is conceived o f as “something like the wind and rain moving from east to west” ... Kyoraku is not merely passing away. Rather, it signifies the comprehensive asymmetrical process of the True Man’s [sic] enlightened existential projection and ontological understanding right-now moving simultaneously in and through past, present and future, actively engaging tlie passenger and passageway as well as the full context of the experiential reality surrounding and permeating tlie movement.®®’ Exhibited in Dôgen’s description of a “moment-to-moment expression of the manifesting body” is what Heine describes as an “asymmetrical process” in which all of time is brought together meaningfully and significantly to provide expression of the Buddha-Dliarma through form, through the dependently originating bodies o f tlie buddhas and patriarchs. No uni-directional reduction occurs, whereby Buddha-nature is brought into the restricted realm of arising and subsiding phenomena, but ratlier the realm of arising and subsiding {samsara) is permeated by the significance of Buddhanature as those who actively practice {t^atiefi) continually bring the two realms (the ultimate and the mundane) togetlier through their active realisation {shushô itto). In this way, time cannot be understood from the mundane perspective of a series of points marching from a distant past “beginning” point toward a distant future “ending” point by the enlightened practitioner, for at every moment time is dynamically struck through, permeated by the ultimate such that its fullness is represented at each and every m om ent as it enables tlie mundane arising and subsiding activity to continue. Dôgen’s view of dependent co-origination ipraütya-samutpâdà) is far removed from the earlier systematic portrayal o f a doomed cyclical existence recorded in the Samyutta-Nikqya (12,1. SNlVf) such tliat Buddha-nature finds a natural manifestation witliin the very cycle of birth and death. However, tliis is not to say that Dôgen sees witliin “grasping” or “craving” a 337 Heiiie, Steven, Existential and Ontological Dimensions of Time in Heidegger and Dogen, Albany; State University o f New York Press, 1985, p. 54-5 123 shining Buddha-nature, as can be the outcome of some tathàgatagarhha tliought. Rather, more in keeping with Nâgârjuna’s understanding of pratitya-sanmtpada^ both the mundane and the ultimate share the “foundation” of smyatâ which enables both practice and realisation. Cosmic Buddha-nature In contrast to the cosmic aspects of Tendai Buddhism which would regard the nonduality o f sentient and insentient beings from a monistic standpoint, effectively erasing and denying individual aspects, Dogen castes non-duality in the light of his discussion ^ surrounding the Buddha-nature. Radier than viewing die participation o f non-sentient phenomena in Buddha-nature as indicating die transcendence o f an profound reality, that is, diat somehow Buddha-nature has infused or resides in all phenomena, die non-dual relationship is more dynamic. Dogen does not entertain transcendence but a transdescendence so that there is no duality of sentient/non-sentient when regarding expressing profound reality. There are only different perspectives (e.g. a fish's view of the ocean). In the Bussho fascicle, Dogen reminds his readers of Bodhidharma’s words: “Each mind is like wood and stone.” And then he goes on to explain: “Mind here spoken of is die suchness o f mind (or mind of objective reality), it is the mind o f the whole earth; dierefore it is die mind o f self and other. Each mind, o f all the people on earth, as well as the enlightened ones in all worlds, and the celestials and dragons and so on, is wood and stone. There is no odier mind outside o f diis. This wood and stone is o f itself un trammeled by the realms of existence, nonexistence, emptiness, form, and so on.”^^* In her comments on Dogen's nonandiropological perspective, Joan Stambaugh points out diat for Dogen, we humans are but one aspect of die myriad dhamas/phmomeri2i. Wlien discussing nature in the Yama (Mountain and Water Sutra), Dogen “does not relegate mountains and waters to die dubious status of picturesque “landscapes,” but considers them dioroughly alive in a manner not identical widi human life, yet at die same time nondualistic widi it. [Tjlie categories of identity and difference alone are not Cleary, Thomas, Rational Zen: The Mind of Dogen Zenji, Boston: Shambhala Publications, 1992, p.95 124 sufficiently subtle to encompass what Dogen wants to convey.”^^^ And, as Dogen asserts in this chapter tliat tlie Green mountains walk, he also claims tliat: Green mountains are neither sentient nor insentient. You are neither sentient nor insentient. At tliis moment, you cannot doubt the green mountains' walldng.^"^” Thus, although humans exhibit tlie tendency to establish tlie human consciousness as Dogen and phenomenology Kasulis notes tliat the descriptor “phenomenological” can be meaningfully applied to Dogen, albeit in a limited sense of the way Husserl introduced the science. That is, Kasulis recognises an element of “intentionality” in Dogen's understanding of how situation and conditioning influence one’s perceptions, however, Dogen does not develop a theory of “intentionality” as did Husserl. Where Dogen offers more development is in the particular way he proposes his own understanding o f “bracketing.” As Kasulis says of Dogen's approach: ... Dogen is not a naïve realist insofar as he is sensitive to tlie contribution of mind in tlie constituting of experience. Yet he is no subjective idealist either. Although mind cannot be separated from reality, reality cannot thereby be reduced to mind. Dogen's tack is to concern himself only witli what is experienced. Limiting himself to tliis, he is not concerned witli notions of reality outside this process of experiencing consciousness. In ShohOgent^, Dogen frequently takes a seemingly metaphysical statement from the T’ien-t'ai or Hua-yen traditions and interprets it as a descriptive statement about the structure of a specific experience; in effect, he suspends metaphysical and epistemological commitments outside the realm of tilings as experienced. In tliis respect, Dogen is implicitly carrying out his own form of Stambaugh, Joaa, The Formless Self, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p. 41 Dogen, “Momitain and Waters Sutra” as cited in Stambaugh, Joan, The Formless Self Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p. 43 Dogen, "Mountain and Waters Sutra” as cited in Stambaugh, Joan, The Formless Self, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1999, p. 47 1 : "S interpreter o f reality, this small-mindedness itself is in fact the inhibitor of our experience. According to Dogen, “If you do not learn to be free from your superficial views, you will not be free from tlie body and mind of an ordinary person. Stambaugh notes Dogen's remarkable originality in proposing a “nonantliropomorphic way o f experiencing.” ,,3 4 1 125 bracketing and tlie term phenomenological is surprisingly appropriate to characterize the nature of his methodology/'^^ A meaningful and direct “seeing” of phenomena as they are in themselves is not dependent upon the desires and efforts of beings, nor tlie inviolable essence o f the phenomena themselves, but is ratlier the celebratory activity o f a mutual realisation. Only Buddhist emptiness {sünyata), which as Nâgârjuna exhibited is synonymous with tlie Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination (pratftya-samutpada), allows diis to take place. So, Dogen’s “phenomenology” Is a particularly Buddhist one in which seeing/realisation is mutually dependent with the arising of Buddha nature. It arises and is manifest in phenomena, but dynamically so — and becoming manifest in dbamas, it must necessarily retain tlie quality of emptiness and participate in the “form” of pratîtya-samutpàda. Thus, it is natural that tlie rocks, mountains and hills proclaim the true Dharma, not because, as in earlier Tendai tliought they have Buddha-nature, but because Buddha-nature is manifest thus, naturally in the 'way things are’ co-dependentiy with active realisation. This distinction highlights Dogen’s metliodology as one of praxi-centric phenomenology. Glass makes the interesting suggestion tliat Dogen’s re-writing/visioning of “all beings have Buddha nature” to “whole being is Buddha Nature” (Glass’ phrasing can be viewed as a “switch from figure to field sensitivities. Buddha Nature is not a property o f the figure within tlie field (the self is empty) but rather is the radiant and luminous force of the field itself (emptiness is the self). The “self’ is re-located from figure to field. This observation perceptively shifts emphasis away from the form itself and allows for a proper treatment o f space. However, what is lacking in tliis understanding of emptiness and self is the praxiological emphasis that is so important to Dogen. The following fascicle of tlie moon (Tsukl) exemplifies Dogen’s suspension of metaphysical and epistemological concerns to strike directly at Buddha-nature as it is. In the Tsuki (Moon) chapter o f the Shôhôgentjô, Dogen asks his students to consider tlie nonduality o f phenomena and our perception of tliem. Using tlie image of the moon on water as an example, he argues that this image, usually regarded an idealised abstracted Kasulis, Thomas, Zm Action!Zen Person, Honolulu: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1985, p. 69 Glass, Newman Robert, Working Emptiness: Tomrd a Third Reading of Emptiness in Buddhism and Postmodern Thought, Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995, p. 99 Glass’ premise is that hiere are three ways to treat emptiness: (1) as presenciiig, (2) as absencing, taking away, or difference, (3) Buddha essence. Glass says o f the third way, Buddha essence: “the third reading o f the working o f emptiness” is that “the reahsahon o f emptiness is not the realization o f things which are empty but the realization o f emptiness alone. Forms, whether emptied or not, are not primary in this third understanding o f emptiness.” 63) 126 notion of tlie real m oon in tlie sky, is in no way less realBvm the physical m oon we see in its gradation of fullness in the sky at this very moment. He quotes Sakyamuni Buddha’s words as recorded in the Golden Ught Sutra: “The BuddhYs true Dharma-hody jIs just like spaceS‘^‘^ I Manifesting its form according to things f i t is like the moon in waterP Then Dogen expounds on this verse: “The reality as it is in this “is like the moon in water" m 2.j be the [[[oneness]] of] water-and-moon, or it may be tlie wateTs reality, or the mooTs reality, or being in reality, or the reality of being in. “Being like" does not express resemblance; being like is concrete existence. “The Buddha’s true Dharma-body" is the reality itself of space. This space is the Buddha’s true Dharma-body or reality itself Because [[[space]]] is tlie Buddha’s true Dharma-body, die whole earth, die whole world, the whole Dharma, and the whole of manifestatmi, are diems elves naturally space. The reality itself of the manifest hundred things and myriad phenomena is totally die true Dharma-body of Buddha, and it is like the moon in water.”^^^ Dogen’s pairing of Dharma-body and space/emptiness in the context o f perception and experience works paradoxically to validate experience in the context of “no-self.” Dogen’s “bracketing” here indicates that categorical thinking and analysing miss the profound impact “no-self’ has on experience; emptiness of self, emptiness of phenomena, work to make manifest die Dharma-body of Buddha. Dogen is asserting diat, regardless o f how you wish to 'come at’ reality, be it from the oneness o f water-andmoon, be it from the water’s perspective, or the m oon’s, whether you describe yourself from reality’s perspective, or reality from yours, none of diese angles, none o f diese expressions can deny by way of abstraction or idealised form the tangible reality that all shape. 'Air here includes anything we can think of and much more. Thinking, living, being, performing religious actions, are diis same reality. None enjoys more reality. Dogen describes the phenomenon of a cloud passing over the moon and our perception that the moon moves. Our inclination is to distinguish between die real movement of die cloud and the mistaken perception that die moon moves. However, in Dogen’s understanding of non-duality, all phenomena participate in the true Dharma-body of the Buddha (and inversely, the Dharma-body o f die Buddha participates in all phenomena). Dogen’s discussion of “is like” is not to point out the essential unreality or illusion of phenomena, but to establish Buddhist “diusness” and the invitation for all phenomena to The Chinese translation o f smyatâ R often rendered “space” in English. For example, tlie familiar verse from the Heart Sutra, “form is emptiness {sûnyatâ\, emptiness form,” reads in Chinese “space is colour, colour space.” Dogen, Alaster Dogen’s Shobogenpo: Book 3, translated by Gudo Wafii N ish ijim a and Chodo Cross, Woking Surrey: Windbell Publications, 1997, p. 2 127 .1 manifest tlie Buddlia-Dharma. This openness to the world of phenomena and celebration o f tlie mutual experience of realisation is conspicuously positive; however, D ogen’s purpose is not to establish the position of “presence” or “being” but to open up experience to tlie extent that Buddha-Dharma is able to be made manifest. Instead of delineating the distinction between real and unreal, Dogen asks that the practitioner work witli what has been given and see there the Buddha’s true Dharma-body. This is the treasury that Dogen means to help elucidate: ripe in the practice o f is the whole o f profound reality. One must perceive it thus to realise its all pervasive existence. Chapter 4. Martin Heidegger tlie Reluctant Priest ' C This chapter will explore phenomenological thinking in the West, as exemplified in the work o f Martin Heidegger. For Heidegger, the opening of Da-sein aligns with the action o f becoming in tlie world — a journey that Da-sein engages via “pathways” that metaphorically wend around some of the thinking already discussed in earlier chapters with regards to certain Buddhist masters/schools. As laid out in previous chapters, tlie tension between theory (theonà) and practice (praxis) is a constant one throughout Buddhist history and although each master/school responds differently to the issue, it is A one that demands renewed thinking as well as renewed practice. Theory, as a A patli/roadm ap/guide to correct practice, for example tlie noble eight-fold path given by Siddhartha to his followers, draws the practitioner out of him /herself with the promise o f transcending the ego self by pointing to the transcendent. Practice is tlie living into all that tlieory attempts to describe and point toward and the honing o f the skills necessary to experience the transformation promised. The merging of theory and practice, where experience brings theory to life and lives are transformed, is often attempted in the A " religious calling; Buddhism calls such a nexus point enlightenment. Enlightenment therefore exemplifies tlie phenomenological nexus of seeing and experience in the Zen/Mahâyâna tradition. Perception is not just output of tlie mind and seeing enters the realm o f living experience — it entails individual transformation that must be contextual, personal and never static. Similarly, Heidegger’s Da-sein moves, especially in his later work, in the direction o f removing the barriers of subjectivity which would keep Da-sein in “control” o f its “destiny” (and ultimately Being itself) through the avenue of “thinking” which has been compared to Mahâyâna “meditation” as a practice which constantly moves the individual into lived experience of ultimate meaning. This never static relation of the individual to ultimate meaning destabilizes the cogito reliant subject and provides opportunity for transformation. In both Zen meditation and Heidegger’s thinking, individual transformation occurs after a shift in the perception/perspective of the individual engaging actively in the present situation. The transformation that occurs in the individual has the effect of transforming all aspects o f the individual in his/her situation recalling Dogen’s teaching tliat a single enlightenment transforms tlie entire world. Paradoxically, of course, the world remains exactly as it has always been, and the activity of the individual continues ... in meditation, thinking, washing potatoes, walking 129 through the forest. In the Zen/Mahâyâna tradition, the enlightenment experience is a reorientation to tilings in dieir suchness so that tlie practitioner’s activity does not necessarily change but tlie new perspective brought to the activity unveils what is truly happening and the change is likened to a meditation practitioner deep asleep to one deep in meditation. For Heidegger, tlie re-orientation is the difference o f allowing trutli to become manifest by remaining open to the possibility and the occurrence is likened to the blooming of a rose, “without why.”^'*^ Heidegger refers to this cleared and open being Da-sein, “there-being”. Altliough Western philosophy made a brealc witli the religious concerns o f tlieology, more often tlian not, tlieology still provides philosophy witli questions and philosophy often seeks to set tlieology straight. Martin Heidegger wrestled early in life witli tlie concerns o f theology, first witli the Catholic church under which he studied towards a rectorate and soon after witli the Protestant community. However, once he entered the philosopher’s guild as a student under Husserl, he gave the appearance of giving up religion altogether, carefully writing around “G od” as though participating fully in Husserl’s dictum of reduction. But Heidegger’s investigation of being in his first work of philosophy Sein und Zeit\'& indication o f his lifelong concern witli meaning and “ultimate” things such as die theologians struggled with in their overtly religious arenas. Furthermore, Heidegger’s experience digesting Christian tlieology informs his own philosophical writing. In “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” Heidegger states that “without tliis theological background I should never have come upon the patli of thinking”^'*^ tlirough the voice of the Inquirer qua Heidegger himself. In a 1935 lecture on Holderlin, Heidegger speaks metaphorically of “two thorns” in the flesh (after tlie Apostle Paul), as Poggler explains, “the alienation from the beliefs o f his origins and tlie failure o f his r e c t o r a t e . C l e a r l y influenced by Meister Eckliart, Heidegger employs certain terminology from the German mystical tradition to best describe the relationship between Da-sein and Being. This blending of mystical Christian influence, Heidegger’s interest in Chinese Taoism, and his exposure to certain In D erSatz vom Gmtd, Heidegger quotes ftom mystic poet Angelus Silesius: “the rose is without why; it blooms because it bIooms;/It cares not for itself, asks not if it’s seen” cited by Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heide^er’s Concept ofAuthenticiy, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 238. ^47 Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Eanguage, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 10 348 Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press (originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 326 f 130 i The phenomenological response The modern phenomenological movement was borne partly out o f a reaction to the unresolved “gap” problem - that is, tlie gap between tlie immanent subject and transcendent eternal that provides the subject witli meaning — never addressed satisfactorily by Western philosophy to date, although, the problem had been located by a number o f thinkers, even pre-Socratics such as Parmenides. Husserl, in particular, reacted against the enlightenment model o f ascertaining meaning from a purely transcendental subject, consequently he began to look more closely at the world, and the relationship between the individual and tlie world, in order to reveal tlie essences of tilings for he considered truth or meaning to be located at or with the essence of a tiling. Meaning located outside the experienced world, the lived world ÇLebetiswe/i), such as provided by Kantian transcendental idealism, is predicated on unverified data and, in the end, unreal. Considered the founder of modern phenomenology, and the champion of tlie phenomenological method, Edmund Husserl intended to get at truth which he saw as grounded in the phenomenal world and “visible” only through applying a method o f I Zen texts,^^ will be followed up with later in the chapter. Suffice it to say here that Heidegger did not scorn or deride tlie arena of the tlieologians, yet still chose to express himself carefully outside the “language” of religion. This bracketing of religious terminology (with the few exceptions noted above) gives him the appearance of attempting to become the philosopher par excellence and yet his writing does not come close to the systematic clarity o f Hegel’s for example, for he reworks language to attempt to express what is deep within him, what he knows/kens and tliinks together. This manipulation of language is frustrating for the systematic philosopher and is much more empathetic to the expressions o f the poet to whom Heidegger entrusts the utterance of the holy. Moreover, Heidegger’s employment of language may be seen as a method itself for capturing the imagination o f his readership and prompting not only academic critique, but individual response. So Heidegger may in fact be viewed as a reluctant priest in terms of how his philosophy beckons the individual to hearken and re-attune to the resounding call tliat issues fortli from the deep. And regardless o f Heidegger’s own dismissal o f the term “phenomenological,” he exhibits in his life of tliinkmg a phenomenological approach that supports praxi-centrism by example if not overtly. Heidegger read D.T. SUZUKI, see Barrett, WtUtain, “Zen for the West,” Zsn Buddhism, Selected Writings of D.T. Sue^uki, edited by William Barrett, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1956, p. xi 131 investigation which endeavours to clear away all distracting preconceptions, so that truth in accordance to its nature as self-revealing, can be seen. Truth perceived under these conditions is tangible; it will present itself to the ready conscious. In viewing truth as tangible and available, Husserl suggests tlie collapsing of tlie dual worlds o f the noumenon and phenomenon. Steven Laycock writes, Husserlian phenomenology is ... a noumenology. N ot only is the phenomenon to be comprehended as the object in itself precisely as it appears, but flie phenomenon itself, in its immanence, is in itself, and, in its appearing, appears as it is: in itself Its being (in itself) is its appearing. The Kantian noumenon, by contrast, does not, and cannot, appear. It is wholly occluded by the very phenomenon to which it gives birth. Husserl’s intention, as Laycock points out, is that via a phenomenological method of approach, one is able to apprehend/com prehend the object totally as it is given us. Husserl introduces the epoché as tlie metliod whereby one reduces one’s view of reality (called a horizon), by means of bracketing (epochi), to its essential elements. This approach seeks to understand the lived world (Ixbenswelt) as opposed to the scientific world, by going to “the things diemselves” (Dmg an sich). Husserl’s reading of Descartes in his Cartesian Meditations saw instead of individual ego a transcendental subjectivity that included objectivity. He employed tlie term “transcendental phenomenology” and eventually “transcendental phenomenological idealism” to describe the subject that has performed the epoché on the horizons of the outer world. In effect, Husserl applies a phenomenological reduction on the outer world so tliat a now transcendental subjectivity is able to analyse the meaning behind what has presented itself as the outer world. He describes the transcendental “phenomenologizing” subject applying tlie reduction in tliis way: I deny myself the actions o f inquiry, of thematic experience, of judgement, o f axiological and practical projection, of deliberation, of decision, that insert into the horizon that pregives the world ... But with the inhibiting of tliis universal thematic domain, the possibility is opened of turning it around into a new kind o f tliematic arena. In unity with the epoche and as tlie one practicing it, I become precisely tlie “nonparticipant” onlooker of transcendental life in which the Laycock, Steven W., Mind as Mirror and the Mirroring of the Mind: Buddhist Reflections on Western Phenomenology, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1994, p. 53

132 acceptedness o f the horizon, as giving the basis for all natural tliemes, and these themes themselves course on/^^ Only tlirough this metliod o f phenomenological bracketing {epoche) are subjectivity and objectivity on equal ground, a transcendental ground. Phenomenology establishes our conscious as “transcendental consciousness” and the world as phenomena.^^^ This works to suspend tlie prejudices the normal conscious would carry around in every-day existence — this transcendental consciousness is a self-consciousness performing a careful and calculated mental process so as to make the LuehemweltvjçAcomç. as the meaning-laden phenomenal realm. In tliis readied state, the transcendental consciousness is prepared to encounter the phenomenal world as it is. Husserl writes in The Idea of Phenomenology, ... phenomenological reduction ... entails a limitation to the sphere of things that are purely self given, to tlie sphere o f tliose tilings which are not merely spoken about, meant, or perceived, but instead to the sphere of those tilings that are given in exactly tlie sense in which they are tliought of, and moreover are self-given in tlie strictest sense - in such a way that nothing which is meant fails to be given.^^^ Hiiitikka comments on Husserl’s statement by pointing out tliat what is “given” in his expression “self-given” is not the noumena, but the object itself. The phenomenological reduction is a bracketing of anything which is not given to us in immediate experience. In fact, as Hintikka points out, in Husserl’s words “to be capable of being given belongs to the essence o f being.” Thus, bracketing is the attempt to consider only what has been given, excluding all other things “merely spoken about, meant, or perceived.” This careful assessment of reality, and the caution against relying on the subject to produce a full account, or even an unbiased account, recalls the discussion earlier on prapaiïca. There is agreement that the subjective ego produces a screen of misinformation or skewed perception that in fact veils reality from view. This is called prapanca (conceptual Husserl, Edmund, Appendix 1 [to p. 42] in Fink, Eugen, Sixth Cartesian Meditation: The Idea of a TranscendentalTheory of Method, with textual notations by Edmund Husserl, translated with introduction by Ronald Bruzina, Bloomingdale & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995 (German published 1988), p. 163 Stroker, Elisabeth, “Phenomenology as First Philosophy: Reflections on Husserl,” itom Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition, ed. Robert Sokolowski, Washington D.C.: CUA Press, 1988, p. 257 Husserl, Edmund, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. W.P. Alston and George Nakhnikian, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964, pp. 48-49 as quoted in Jaakko Hintikka’s article, “The Phenomenological Dimension,” The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, ed. Charles B. Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 85 133 diffusion) by Nâgârjuna and his commentators. The phenomenological approach seeks to consider what is “self given” instead of what is brought out by the subjective ego. Heidegger will pick up the idea o f “self-given” in his discussion of the way in which what presences or is made manifest is given “Es gibf. Further, both Husserl and Heidegger differentiate between “appearances” and “essence.” Phenomenologists recognise the tendency for trutli or essence to remain hidden/obscured and the need for anotlier approach or activity on the part of the subject. Husserl maintains the necessity of reduction and pursues the avenue witli the subject until he has re-established tlie transcendental ego. Heidegger works more on attitude and openness o f the subject, recognising that no will is able to uncover or make appear trutli, that it is already “given.” Tugendhat offers the view tliat Heidegger does not discuss Husserl’s famous epoché for he is writing from “within” the epoché — he has performed the reduction before picking up the pen.^^'^ In other words, as Sukale explains, “as long as there is Dasein tliere are entities in the world because Dasein lives in experiences, the horizons o f which constitute things in the world.”^^^ The way in which tlie consciousness acts and thinks in regard to the world is described as “intentionality.” A valid encounter of the world and tlie meaning tliat is revealed requires the activity of intuition. Intuition is the vehicle for “datum.” When the consciousness thinks of an object, tliat object in the consciousness, although not identical with tlie physical object, never-the-less partakes in some o f the reality. Although an abstraction from the physical, die object in the perception o f die conscious still contains die reality of the experience. In fact, according to Husserl’s method, die only way communication is possible is for two consciousnesses to abstract through experience die physical reality, and in the case where diis experience is similar enough, communication can occur. Likewise, there are infinite possibilities for experience, which does not diminish from the reality o f either die perceived object, or die perception. Furthermore, on the basis of further perceptions, die consciousness is permitted to “revise” earlier perceptions so that full understanding is somediing which can be built. It can be seen, dien, that Husserl’s phenomenology is a mediod o f understanding the Eebensipelt humans bodi are a part of and experience externally to diems elves personally. Sukale, Michael, Comparative Studies in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff; The Hague, 1976, p. 101 Sukale, Michael, Comparative Studies in Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague, 1976, p. 119 134 This approach relies on an understanding of the intentionality o f the subjective consciousness, using a method of reduction in order to view the outer world as pure phenomena by the transcendental consciousness. This method, by undergoing such eidetic reduction, positions the transcendental subjective consciousness to gain the perspective necessary from which to view tlie Lebenswelt as it truly is, as it presents itself to the subjective consciousness. Husserl sent the searching subject back “to the tilings themselves” to reflect on tlie lived world as it is without imposing preconceptions on it — to let the world of objects speak for itself. However, Husserl evenually settles on the privileged activity of a transcendental subject who cannot but reinforce the artificial gap that Kant brought forward. As with tlie philosophers of tlie enlightenment before him, Husserl’s transcendental consciousness sets itself up to be tlie interpreter of all experience/phenomena. This belies a wariness toward the phenomenal that may be found even among the phenomenologists — tliere is yet unease and mistrust if one must apprehend by first isolating the phenomena and limiting the data to measurables. Furtlier, the problem o f the “gap” remains in this model. For Husserl, and in m ost of the Western phenomenological enterprise, to rely on the synthesising activity of human consciousness to interpret and introduce meaning to the world at large ensures a subjectobject relationship which cannot be bridged, tlie division of which causes tlie search for meaning to ever spiral on without any hope of touching it. Husserl’s method remains static and relies on a “seeing” which doesn’t necessarily involve active participation in the “objective” realm. This reserve keeps established the subjective-objective category of dualism that works so well within metaphysical structures. Heidegger and the phenomenological movement Martin Heidegger, although a student o f Husserl, saw Husserl’s project revert back to tlie problem of unreliability and essences only detected from the standpoint o f the transcendental ego — experience becomes reflective of tlie malce-up of the subject. So, Heidegger instead focuses on what most philosophers presuppose, tliat is being as a place to begin contemplating meaning. By presupposing being in our effort to understand the world around us, we allow tlie very key to it all, the fact that anytliing exists at all, to recede and vanish from our vision. The absence of true contemplation leaves us engaged in idle chatter, focused on the mundane, interacting with tlie world-at-hand as we would a tool. Heidegger’s seminal work Sein mid Zeit began with a call to remember being as it has been assumed and hence forgotten in our philosophical musings regarding meaning. 135 Wliat was called transcendental phenomenology with Husserl may now be called hermeneutical phenomenology as Heidegger takes it up/^^ Beginning with the intuition o f the subjective “self’ overly influences tlie relation the subject may have with the “objective.” Contemplating 'understanding/ Heidegger begins his search for meaning by questioning how the subject gains an understanding of meaning.^^® Thus, with Heidegger’s beginning point, tlie subject is as much in question as the “objective world”. Steffney notes that Heidegger initially locates Da-sein at the “heart o f the ontological difference”^^^ as a sort of medium by which Being is able to show itself. Da-sein is the authentically tuned consciousness/subject which allows Being its voice and via such a role is transformed in tlie process. This early priority brought Heidegger criticism for Sheehan, Thomas, “Husserl and Heide^er; The Making and Unmaking o f a Relationship,” in Edmund Husserl: Psychological and Transcendental Phenomenology and the Confrontation mith Heide^er (1927-1931f edited and translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer, Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, p. 15 Poggeler makes the observation that Heidegger has reversed Husserl’s priority o f ‘things’, or beings over being Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press (originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 54 In “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” Heidegger has the Inquirer say “ ... I dedicated Being and Time ... to Husserl, because phenomenology presented us with possibilities o f a way” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 6 Steffney, John, “Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 27 (July, 1977) p. 325 reason and logic. How is it that anything exists? How can one explain the multiplicity of beings which share in common being? In his 1919-20 lectures, Heidegger criticises Husserl’s beginning point of tlie subject’s intuition and suggests instead that one ought to begin to understand the factical life by beginning with understanding. Furthermore, Heidegger criticises Husserl’s reliance on tlie phenomenological method, what has become a burdensome theory-based approach. For Heidegger the theoretical orientation of the pure ego of Husserlian phenomenology sucks the blood out of the richly textured Umwelt, that “first-hand world” of lived experience in which one primarily exists and /carries out practical tasks. In this first-hand world, things are not just f “there,” and they do not primarily have “value”. They are not even just / “things.” They are “the significant — that’s what is primary ... When you A live in a first-hand world \fJmweli\, everything comes at you loaded witli meaning, all over tlie place and all tlie time, everytliing is enworlded, 'world happens’ ...” (p. 73) In this way of living, we do not know ourselves as egos who obseve the entities lying around us. Rather (this was Heidegger’s rereading of intentionality), we are the act of experientially A “living out unto something’ \ein “Leben auf etwas which has “absolutely nothing to do witli an ego.” (p. 68f)^^'^ 136 privileging substance over essence — the ground of being over what kind o f relationship Being and Da-sein might have together. Later, Heidegger speaks more o f tlie “event” (Ereignis) in which Da-sein is cleared and Being “shows” or comes forward. Heidegger ultimately abandons the term “phenomenology” as an appropriate descriptor for his philosophy. Mere methods for capturing and quantifying reality are ultimately im potent in approaching die essence of something or describing meaning. As he later explains in A Dialogue on Language o f ceasing to use either terms “hermeneutic” or “phenomenology”: “That was done, not — as it is often tiiought — in order to deny die significance of phenomenology, but in order to abandon my own path o f thinking to namelessness. However, before Heidegger abandons die term “phenomenology”, he describes and investigates die etymology o f the term in order to clarify it more than define it in Being and Time: As he writes, a “phenom enon” is “what shows itself in itself, what is m a n i f e s t , n o t to be confused with all the manifest “showings” which although do appear are not self-showings, but indicate something else entirely (e.g. the symptoms o f a sickness in which “redness” should indicate “fever” but may convey something else entirely, like “embarrassment”). “Logos” is the means by which something can be seen and therefore contains no truth-statement as such; it may voice trudi or falsity; it may facilitate uncovering or the covering up. Trudi is not be found in the statement but after die clearing, and Logos merely helps facilitate die communication o f Truth. Trudi, then is wrapped up with what is properly made manifest as a “self-showing”: The expression “phenomenology” can be formulated in Greek as legein ta phainomena. But legein [[[Wikipedia:logos|logos]]: spealts,voices] means apophainesthai [appearing]. Hence, phenomenology means: apophainesthai taphainomena — to let what shows itself be seen from itself, just as it shows itself from itself. That is die formal meaning o f the type of research diat calls itself “phenomenology”. But this expresses nothing other than the maxim formulated above: “To die things theniselves Here, instead o f Husserl’s understanding of phenomena as “things” Heidegger specifically indicates that die engagement o f phenomenology is the pursuit of the being of Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 29 Heidegger, Martin, Beifig and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 25 362 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 30 137 i& beings which is more often than not concealed, covered up or distorted in some kind of illusion/'^^ Thus, works in a hermeneutical way tlirough tlie existence {“E xistenfj of Da-sein, interpreting to Da-sein tlie very beifig of Da-sein. Da-sein itself becomes the hermeneutical key in glimpsing truth or essence. Heidegger relies on the Greek etymology of the word existence/existefuivrhich. conveys the meaning of “standing out or inside,” such that Olafson notes only tlie entities which have a world and uncover other entities other than themselves can be said to “exist” in tlie special way Heidegger means. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein and Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany; State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 31 Olafson, Frederick A., “The unity o f Heidegger’s thought,” The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 101 365 Heidegger, Martin, and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany; State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 202 The implications of Heidegger’s early definition of phenomenology are, in this study, the following: (1) Truth is often concealed, or only partially discernable. And rather than som ething/one causing its disclosure, it must participate in die moment o f truth with a self-disclosure; the transcendental ego is not fully in control o f die process. Indeed, as will become clearer after looking at Heidegger’s term Ereignis (event or truth event), the self-disclosing act is relational instead of one-sided. (2) The discernment o f truth is a hermeneutical problem more than an ontological or epistemological one. In other words, truth is evident and willing to “show” itself, but meaning needs a delivery, and Da-sein, in relationship to Being, provides that entry point for both the self-showing of Being and the validation/authentication of Da-sein. Existensg^ Da-sein’s unique participation in the world, is itself, part of die “hermeneutical key” in truth’s selfdisclosure. That there is meaning (at all) depends on the manifestation of being in die world — through Da-sein, as a part o f Da-sein. Da-sein “in the world” ( in der Well) Da-sein literally means “diere-being” from die German and is Heidegger’s unique way of expressing human existence in its individual, particular manifestation. Da-sein, in addition to being defined as partaking bodi o f the specific and die transcendent, must take into account diat the way it finds itself is “in the world” {in der Welfy, specifically, D asein finds itself “dirown” igwatfefi) into the world.^^^ This “throwness” reveals that Da138 sein is “in a definite world and together with a definite range o f innerworldly beings”^'^'^ and indicates die “disclosedness” o f Da-sein and of any other innerworldly being. Being “disclosed” is how one reveals the trudi of being (or die “unconcealment” for which Heidegger uses the Greek aletheif^j and indicates as well that Da-sein is also defined as Mit-seiii, that is, bound together with other beings in a relationship of care or concern (So/ge). How Da-sein positions itself in die world depends on whetiier Da-sein has chosen to be authentic or inauthentic — that is, Da-sein eidier treats the world-at-hand in an objectifying way, using tilings and others as one would a tool, or else Da-sein awakens to itself in its “potentialit}?'-of-being” diat is the “truth of existence"^’’^ and Da-sein’s attitude toward the world and those others in it is transformed. Heidegger’s expression “potentiality-of-being” refers to audientic Da-sein which is fully disclosed, cleared and resolute in its attunement. Heidegger identifies Afigst as a call which awakens Da-sein to its “potentiality-of-beiiig” by revealing die deadi that Da-sein inevitably faces, in which Da-sein “must absolutely “take itself back””.^'^^ This is in fact the mom ent o f trudi for Da-sein, for either Da-sein faces the certainty o f death, and thereby puts into action its “potentiality-of-being” or else Da-sein in fear turns away from diis certainty and slides back into an inauthentic mode of avoidance and ultimately, forgetfulness. Heidegger has grandly accused modern thought of “forgetfulness” in letting the reflection on “being” slip to lower concern. Heidegger is in effect calling for die re-attunement of our thinking. Regardless o f whether or not one chooses an audientic or inauthentic mode o f being, being is ultimately bound up in die question of temporality. Heidegger has introduced Da-sein as a being which is specific, temporally and spatially, and at die same time defined as partaking of being which is “the transcendens", thus Heidegger states: “PhenomenologciaL truth (disdosedness of being) is veritas transcendentalis" Heidegger’s use of transcendens is related to how he posits die existensy^ o f Dasein — Dasein can be said to be 366 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 203 3'’’^ Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State Universitjr o f New York Press, 1996, p. 202 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 204 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 284 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 34 139 transcendent not in the metaphysical sense, but in the way tliat Dasein’s experiences are temporal and yet ecstatically reach beyond the “m o m e n t . H e i d e g g e r explains. The ecstatic unity of temporality — tliat is, the unity of the “outside-itself ’ in the raptures of tlie future, the having-been, and the present — is the condition o f die possibility diat diere can be a being that exists as its “There.” [Da-sein as “there-being”] The being that bears die name D asein is “cleared” ... Wliat essentially clears this being, that is, makes it “open” as well as “bright” for itself, was defined as care, before any “temporal” interpretadon ... We understand the light of this clearedness only if we do not look for an innate, objectively present power, but rather question the whole constitution of being of Da-sein, care, as to the unified ground o f its existential possibility. Ecstatic temporality clears the Thereprimordially. It is die primary regulator of die possible unity o f all the essential existential structures of Da-sein.^^^ As Caputo notes, Heidegger returns to the word “ecstasy” in Was istMetaphysik seemingly emphasising its religious-mystical etymology, ek-stasis: “Da-sein’s existence is ek-static," it is “a standing out in {aus-steheii) the trudi o f Being, a standing open to the Open itself The transcendent nature of being is expressed, and can only be expressed, when a being is cleared in diis ecstatic unity o f temporality; when the being, from within, realises die ultimate “outside itself’ (ecstatic) mode which is defined by temporality. Da-sein lives into die temporal restriction of life itself and finds others diere, too. Later, this happening is called Ereignis, an “event” or “self-spectacle” or “appropriation.”^^'* Dasein’s existence and being depend on die ecstatic unity of temporality, what Heidegger describes as a horizon.^^^ Importandy, Young points out that Heidegger uses the horizon to expose modernity’s “siclaiess,” that is, metaphysics. For metaphysics, Young summarises, is the “absolutization of a horizon of disclosure” so diat instead of realising that there are many horizons, one chooses to focus singularly on a particular disclosure, neglecting the multiplicity o f horizons. This is part of what die phenomenologists sought to make clear — single perspectives can only yield partial truths. Young explains that metaphysics See Robert J. Dostal, “Time and phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger,” The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 156 372 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 321 Heidegger, Martin, Was ist Metapbjsik, translated and cited by John D. Caputo in The Mystical Element in Heidegger, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 179 These definitions from Steffiiey, John, “Transmetaphysical thhikingin Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East é r West, vol. 27, No. 3 (July 1977), p. 330 ^■^5 Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 333 Young, Juhan, Heidegger’s Eater Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 34 140 misses ... not the being of beings, not being, but ratlier the fact that that tliere are just these universal traits which have categorical status for us is dependent on tlie selection made from the smorgasbord o f attributes possessed by reality itself ... And missing that, missing, not our horizon of disclosure but ratlier its horisypntal character — the perspectival character of our basic perspective on things — it elevates its account o f the being of beings into the (one and only) categorical account of reality itself/^^ ' I One o f the most serious oversights o f such a single-minded approach is the loss o f depth or mystery, or in otlier words tlie “sublimity”^’® or “holiness” of Being. As Heidegger writes in The Question Concerning Technology, the effect of absolutizing a horizon is to “drive out every other possibility of revealing ... Above all, that revealing which, in the sense o f poiesis, lets what presences come forth into appearance”^’® And here. Young points out, by suppressing the revealing in tlie sense o fpoiesis, one further misses the “Es gibt” sense of the world as “g i v e n . S o , in absolutizing a horizon one misses the multiplicity in perspective, the depth and mystery tliat other perspectives bring, and the natural sense in which the World is given. i Because o f Da-sein’s constitution and the ecstatic unity of temporality, the world can never be conceived of as something “objectively present” for the world, Heidegger writes, ““is” “there” together with the outside-itself of the ecstasies. If no Da-sein exists, no world is “there” either.”^®* Self and world belong together in one being, Dasein. Self and world are not two beings, as subject and object, not as you and I, but are — in the unity o f the structure of Being-in-the-world — the fundamental determination of Dasein its elf. O r as Steffney makes clear, Heidegger’s Dasein is never a mere “self” but necessarily includes a world, and even Being. Steffney further interprets Dasein as tlie very bridge. Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 29 Young’s term in Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 20 Heidegger, Martin, The Question Concerning Technolo^, as cited by Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 29 Young cites Heidegger, “ ... poeisis is the Greek sense o f the manifest world as Tarought forth’, ‘granted’ to us in Being’s self-disclosmg act, the sense o f ‘nature’, in the broadest sense, as the jg^disclosure o f Being (What is Called Thinking p. 237) in Young, Juhan, Heide^er’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 29. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 334 Heidegger, Marlin, Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie as quoted by Zimmerman, Michael E., EcHpse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 27 141 I the “heart of the ontological difference, the link between Being and beings, the onto- " conscious dimension tliat transmits tlie revealment of Being.”^®^ Heidegger is often accused of single-minded concern for Da-sein and Da-sein’s potentiality-of-being, but it is important to note tliat Da-sein is cleared and ‘realised’ not in isolation but in the community o f others, that Da-sein in finding itself thrown into the S world, is there witli others in the same predicament so that ratlier than fending each for oneself, each self is defined by tlie givenness o f tlie otlier, mit-sein. The relations o f significance tliat determine the structure of the world are not a network of forms tliat is imposed upon some material by a worldless subject. Ratlier, factical Da-sein, ecstatically understanding itself and its world in tlie unity o f tlie There, comes back from these horizons to the beings encountered in tliem. Coming back to tliese beings understandingly is the existential meaning o f letting them be encountered in making them present; for this reason they are called innerworldly. The world is, so to speak, already “furtlier outside” tlian any object could ever be.""* The blending of subject and object comes when Da-sein retreats from the “horizon” of the ecstasy of time, and upon returning sees and understands itself and tlie world around more completely. The transcendent nature of being revealed in the ecstasy o f temporality comes to Da-sein in an epiphanal sense, but not because Da-sein has moved beyond or out o f itself. Instead, Da-sein comes back into tlie world of beings which reveals itself and Da-sein alike in opening fully in tlie present moment, like the rose opening in tlie fullness of time. O f course, “fullness” here is not ment to indicate linear, but die multidimentionality o f time. As Caputo notes of Heidegger’s later exposition, die rose is a model for Da-sein in that its blossoming arises “because” and not within the confines of external justification — “why” implies “time” (for Eckhart) and rational sciences (for Heidegger)."®" There is no inside or outside, no subject to encounter an object so to speak. Truth or essence is a self-revealing which does not depend on die objectifying mission o f gathering data; and viewed from this perspective, it acts out of its true nature. Steffney, John, “Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 27 Quly, 1977) p. 325 3®“' Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, Albany; State University o f New York Press, 1996, p. 335 ®®^ Caputo further explains; “Dasein must be without why, not in the sense o f that which lies forth o f itself {das VorUegendè), but in the sense o f letting the being lie forth (jZorliegen-lassefi). Dasein must suspend representational thinking in order to let Being arise, emerge, and stand forth. Otherwise Being becomes an object measured by the dimensions o f tlie human subject.” Caputo, John D., The Mystical Element in Heidegger, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 191 142 “without why.” Wliat Heidegger indicates by Da-sein “taking itself back” is the retrieval o f the objectifying subject who would impose itself on the world of beings to use those around as one would a tool, in order to re-orientate itself to its primary constitution of “care” {Sorge), Although not entirely clear, Heidegger seems to be suggesting that part of what enables Da-sein to revert back to itself, after the resounding call of Angst, and not be self-consumed, is tlie constituent part of Da-sein that cares for others. Heidegger will use the image of a hermeneutic circle and tautology to reinforce this doubling back on itself o f Da-sein and it is partly the assertion tliat Da-sein is defined by care that keeps the image from complete solipsism, egoism, or indeed Nietzschean will-to-power. Thus far, already in Heidegger’s early concerns, there is die attempt to posit Da-sein as one who is re-attuned to die depdi and breaddi of what it means to exit in die world. In time, and yet not fully defined by temporal concerns, Da-sein lives outwardly, and indeed is called out o f itself by die holy mystery diat eludes definition. But Da-sein is not alone — neither heroic nor desolate — Da-sein is because others are. Da-sein is wrapped up widi odiers intimately such diat to “be” is to care for others. Da-sein’s existence is not primarily a singular concern and secondarily concerned for odiers, but from the Ï ‘beginning’ defined by Sotge. This orientation of Da-sein is not given the attention t deserved. It is a mistake to place too much emphasis of Da-sein coming to a selfunderstanding in relation to Being when community is as “given” as the existence of D asein. As Caputo points out of H eid e^ er’s later emphasis in putting aside questioning “why” (which gives deference to reason) and looks more closely at “because” - Being is not an answer but a “gift”, a “favour.”"®" Heidegger’s project in Bemg and Time has justifiably been criticized for being far too preoccupied with the ontological grounding of being (in Da-sein at the horizon of the ecstasy o f time) and dius becoming as immobile as any predecessor’s Heidegger himself has criticized. He admits as much in discussing his famous “turning(s)” {Kehre). Further, speaking of “resoluteness” in the face of the certainty of death, or the historicity of Dasein’s “potentiality-of-being” as shaped by die National Socialist Party of Germany proved beyond any doubt diat diis particular mode of expression was more than ineffective, but dangerous in the wrong treatment. It is a grim example o f die tyranny of an absolutized horizon pursued with singular resoluteness. The “later” H eid e^er moved see Was is Metaphysik, 49/358, as noted by John D. Caputo, The Mystical Element in Heide^er, Athens; Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 164 143 May, Reinhard, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian influences on his work, trans by Graham Parkes, London and New York:Routledge Press, 1996, p. 2 see Graham Parkes’ essay “Rising sun over Black Forest,” in May, Reinhard, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian influences on his work, trans by Graham Parkes, London and New York:RouÜedge Press, 1996, pp. 79-117 away from some of tliis more ontologically grounded tliought Wliat can be seen in his early writing, however, is Heidegger’s desire to furtlier the collapse of tlie phenomenanoumena dualism that Husserl began, but did not follow through effectively. Heidegger locates the key to this collapse, in Being and Time, within Da-sein itself and this anthropological weighting has its own set of problems. However, as Heidegger continued to develop his understanding of Da-sein (to the point at which he nearly stopped using the term, “Da-sein”), he explores Das Nichts and the Abyss at the core of Da-sein and the issue of “grounding” becomes an “ungrounding”, a radical interpretation o f the ‘ontology’ of Da-sein. Heidegger’s latest writings keep the idea of Das Nichts A nearby as he explores tlie idea of “being on the way” and “thinking.” These later writings seem to want to make up tlie deficit o f movement tliat the earlier ontological grounding denied. Eastern Heidegger Reinhard May’s text, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources, attempts to bring to light the hardly dismissible, yet, curiously ignored, exposure Heidegger had with Chinese and Japanese texts and cultural emissaries in the form o f students and visitors. May patiently draws together (historically) the work Heidegger did regarding the “way” and “being on tlie way” with his conversations and work with Paul Hsiao in translating the first chapter of the Taofl such that Heidegger freely re-words the verses in chapter 15: “Who is able by 1 making tranquil to bring something into Being? The tao of heaven.”"®’ Ultimately, May concludes, Heidegger’s “Conversation” (elsewhere translated “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer”) in On the Way to Language is a Idnd of “confession” tliat Heidegger had real interchange with the Eastern non-metaphysical tradition and owes more recognition to this tradition tlian he has publicly admitted or freely stated, and that indeed his silence speaks loudly in the matter. Graham Parkes relates the historical encounters of Heidegger with Japanese philosophers in the 1920’s and 1930’s (e.g. N i s h i d a ’s student TAN ABE Hajime, the political thinker MiKI Kiyoshi, and Professor KUKI Shüzô who features in tlie “Dialogue”)."®® The meetings and sharing of , ideas preceded Heidegger’s own publishing of seminal turning points in his career (What " is Metaphysics, Origin of the Work of Art). Thus, many have speculated as to how much see Graliam Parkes’ essay “Rising sun over Black Forest,” in May, Reinhard, Heidegger’s Hidden Sources: East Asian influences on his work, trans by Graham Parkes, London and New York;Routledge Press, 1996, pp. 79-117 “Das Sein des Seienden ist aber überhaupt nur verstehbar — und darin liegt die tiefste Endlichkeit der Transzendenz — wenn das Dasein im Grunde seines Wesens sich in das Nichts hineinhalt,” Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik [Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1951], p. 214, as quoted by Steffiiey, John, “Transmetaphysical Tliinldng in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 27 (July, 1977) p. 327 144 I "A Heidegger was influenced in his meditations on Das Nichts, particularly by the Kyoto School of Philosophy as they were simultaneously wrestling witli tlie Buddhist concept o f mujsUfiyatd, emptiness, and likewise Heidegger’s meditations on the “way” in reference to the Chinese tao. Discussions surrounding an Eastern influence on Heidegger must remain speculative for Heidegger rarely spoke of these contacts and only occasionally remarked on tlie Zen and Chinese philosophical ideas to which he had been exposed."®® Instead, Heidegger was more apt to draw the reader back to early Greek or German A source material for his own thought It is not the purpose here to further substantiate A these influences except to agree that Heidegger had more meaningful exchange with | Eastern material than he cared to discuss or reveal and his reasons for leaving tlie Eastern philosophy to surface by itself are ponderous. Wliat is quite obvious, however, is that Heidegger’s thinking around tlie phenomenological exposé of Da-sein is filled out with greater deptli and meaning as he turns his attention to botli tlie aspects o f Das Nichts and ‘being on the way’. Wliat is more, tlie Eastern tradition that influenced Zen Buddhism (including tlie Mahâyâna concept of emptiness as discussed in earlier chapters) has viewed these issues as integral in defining meaningful existence. Da-sein and Das Nichts Pleidegger’s view o f Da-sein is deepened when he meditates on non-being, and his ontological emphasis lightens: The Being of beings, however, is comprehensible only - and in tliis lies the deepest finitude of transcendence — when Dasein by its very nature, plunges into Non-being."®® Transcendence and non-being come together in Da-sein so as to create paradoxical ontology: being defined by non-being. The transcendence o f Da-sein is only fully realised in Da-sein’s most serious limitation: the certainty of deatli. Heidegger proposes that Da-sein’s transcendental nature via an un-grounding in Das Nichts is tlie basis for authenticity in the world-at-hand, tlie world o f beings. Zimmerman states it tlius: 145 “Dasein is embodied openness to what is.”"®* Embodiment and the clearing, like the transcendent and immanent, ratlier than at odds or competition for dominance, become the ‘ground’ for tlie other. Heidegger finds meaning not located in idealistic transcendental planes of consciousness, but in openings, clearings where Being itself is brought to light in an occasion of self-showing. Heidegger speaks o f JJchtiing, the “clearing” which is also a “lighting” and tlie way in which phenomena show themselves as they are. Clearings, as tliose in the forest, have boundaries — they are simultaneously enclosures. Hence, the act of bringing to light is in the same instance covering up, concealing. And now what is exhibited is the “play” of Being and beings in the light of the clearing o f Da-sein, the consciousness that engages the world. Heidegger, in Was ist Metcp/ysik?, examines the ground of being and finds tliere “Das Nichts", not in the grounding sense of an absolute Nothing, for as he points out, speaking of “nothing is" is wholly ridiculous. Ratlier, Heidegger wishes to introduce the nothing of an abyss, which is also inextricably part of the being of Da-sein. Moreover, it is the act o f holding itself out into Das Nichts that characterises Da-sein’s experience in the world o f beings. That is to say, die facing towards transcendence in which Da-sein faces Das Nichts, simultaneously places Da-sein within a tme, in the sense o f “audientic”, relationship with the world o f beings. Because of its transcendental nature, Dasein must be thought of as comprising not merely a “self’ but, more inclusively, a world — even more inclusively, Being."®^ Heidegger refers to human and Da-sein’s existence as “ek-sistence” — diat which reaches beyond itself toward Being. “Standing in the light of Being is what I call the ek-sistence of man (sic).”"®" Heidegger finds die absolutism of modernity’s metaphysics a deadly trap and inaudientic to existence that finds not an ontological ground but the Abyss. However, Heidegger criticises Nietzsche’s Absolute Nothing which ultimately works polar to modernity’s substance as an equal absolute. Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 27 Steffiiey, John, “Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 27 (July, 1977) p. 324 Heidegger, Martin in Platos Eehre von der Wahrheit: M it einem Brief iiber den “Humanismus, ” |Bem: Francke, 1947] pp. 66-67, as quoted by John Steffney, “Transmetaphysical Thinking in Heidegger and Zen Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, 27 (July, 1977), p. 325 146 Da-sein on the way In his 1950 lecture entitled, “Language,” Heidegger begins his reflections with what a logician might call an “empty tautaulogy”: “Language itself is language.” Anticipating tlie criticism, he states. Merely to say the identical thing twice — language is language — how is tliat supposed to get us anywhere? But we do not want to get anywhere. We would like only, for once, to get just where we are already."®'* | Joan Stambaugh remarks tliat Heidegger speaks of a ‘way’ which is not a metliod, and which is no pre-subscribed route with beginning and end-point. She quotes from Heidegger’s essay, “O n the Way to Language” (translated by Peter D. Hertz, but witli Stambaugh’s minor changes): Thinking itself is a way. We respond to the way only by remaining underway ... We must get on the way, tliat is, must take the steps by which alone the way becomes a way. The way of thinking cannot be traced from somewhere to somewhere like a well-worn rut, nor does it at all exist as such in any place. Only when we walk it, and in no other fashion, only, tliat is, by tlioughtful questioning, are we on the move on the way. This movement is what allows the way to come forward."®" It is important to note that Heidegger would choose tautology and paradox in lectures/essays on “language”. This should re-enforce what was earlier stated in terms o f seeing around what is “merely spoken about, meant, or perceived”. Some have called Heidegger’s later writing “mystical” with tlie negative connotation indicating that it becomes obscure and even less comprehensible. Others have explored the “mystical elements” in Heidegger’s writing claiming that he is pointing beyond tlie cognitive to an experience that cannot be captured with language; to meaning that defies explanation."®" Heidegger’s use of motion in this passage recalls Meister Eckhart’s Gelassenheit and mirrors the “stillness in motion,” “acting witliout acting” or “a doing o f non-doing” that H eide^er, Martin, “Language: 1950,” Language: Hermeneutical Inquity, vol. 2, edited by David Klemm, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 42 Stambaugh, Joan, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question o f Metaphysics,” Heidegger and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes, Hawai’i: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1987, p. 82 35<5 Caputo quotes from Heidegger’s Habilitalionsschrift on Duns Scotus to point out H eide^ er’s early concern with the overly rationalistic view o f philosophy and thinking: “Philosophy as a rationalistic creation, detatched from Hfe, is powerless; mysticism as an irrationalist experience is purposeless” Caputo, John D., The Mystical Element in Heidegger, Athens: Ohio Umversity Press, 1978, p. 7 147 is described by N i s h i d a /®’ Heidegger speaks o f being underway without travelling to a pre-determined destination. It is one’s openness to the experience of being underway which “allows the way to come forward.” Stambaugh again quotes from “O n the Way to Language:” To clear a way, for instance across a snow-covered field. Is in the Alemannic-Swabian dialect still called wëge?f^^ even today. This verb, used trasitively, means: to form a way and forming it, to keep it ready. Waymaking understood in tliis sense no longer means to move somediing up or down a path that is already diere. It means to bring die way ... fordi first o f all, and thus to be the way. "®® Here Heidegger collapses the subject-object duality of walking a well-worn rut toward a destination into the non-dual understanding o f way-malting as being die way itself. Indeed, he has brought us back to a tautology. In an earlier essay (1947) Heidegger addresses die pathway, this time introducing die interplay of heaven and eardi in the formation of die one on the way: The oak itself spoke: Only in such growdi is grounded what lasts and fructifies. Growing means this: to open oneself up to the breadth of heaven and at the same time to sink roots into die darkness of the earth. Wliatever is genuine thrives only if man [sic] does justice to bodi: ready for die appeal of the highest heaven, and transformed [aufgehobefl in the protection of the sustaining eardi. (FW, 3/89)'*®° Ereignis: die event of belonging togedier o f being and Being The event of the way coming forward only while one is “underway” is very much in line with Heidegger’s discussion of the Appropriation (Ereignis) of Da-sein. Stambaugh explains that “way-making is how Appropriation (the belonging togedier of man [sic] and — . 1 357 Nishida, Kitaro, A n Inquiry into the Good, trans. Masao Abe & Christopher Ives, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990 (originally published by Iwanami Shoten, Tokyo, 1921), p. 34 358 The word Bewegung, without an umlaut, conveys the meaning o f movement. However, wëgen (‘way making’) is a word that Heidegger manipulates to better express his intention that the term carry both the transitive and intransitive connotations o f action and being acted upon. 355 Stambaugh, Joan, “Heidegger, Taoism, and the Question o f Metaphysics,” Heide^er and Asian Thought, ed. Graham Parkes, Hawai’i: University o f Hawai’i Press, 1987, p. 83. Similarly, Stambaugh also notes that Heidegger relates his usage o f call (heissen) to the New Testament Greek kelenein and the Sanskrit origins o f the term that indicate an invitation rather than a command. 400 Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 273 148 Being) a p p r o p r i a t e s . S h e also asserts that Appropriation is the '^primordial relation” which is “thought by Heidegger under botli aspects of identity and difference ... [to be] more fundamental than the “elements” in it. The elements, man and Being, don’t constitute the relation; the relation constitutes tlie e l e m e n t s . D a v i d F. Krell terms Breignis as “the propriative event” and ties it to disclosure (aletheia) while noting that the propriative event is always also “expropriative.”^^ Hofstadter makes the English clearer by explaining the etymology of the term “Ereigfiis” which contains the meaning of the verb eipien in which one makes sometliing one’s own as well as an earlier verb eraugnen which means to bring sometliing before ones eyes, or to show. Thus, das Breignis, “the event” is the playful dance in which beings botli reveal and appropriate each other in the “play o f eraugnen and ereignen” Zimmerman points out tliat the “ringing, circling play” that is Brelgnis, out of which the world malces itself manifest, is not a ground but an abyss {Ab-gnind) There is movement described in what Stambaugh calls a relationship, and Krell terms an event. The movement is not as from subject to object, beings to Being, nor understood in reverse, from Being to beings. The movement is rather what Heidegger describes in the excerpt above when he describes waying bringing forth the path. In human terms (which is how Heidegger treats tlie topic in Being and Time), opening or clearing “oneself’ audientically brings forth the other which is always already there, but often times concealed or obscured. The action of clearing oneself (alêtbeid), of opening oneself and o f letting be {Gelassenheii) so tliat tlie patli comes forth is what Stambaugh means by asserting that for Heidegger, the “relation constitutes tlie elements.” The movement described here is not o f one element asserting its will to force another into relationship. The movement is one o f both action and non-action — opening oneself authentically and letting anotlier be. Hence, waying is tlie patli. If Heidegger never achieved complete non-duality in Being and Time, it can be argued that in tliese later essays he moves in tliis direction. “I Stambaugh, Joan, Ths Forndess Self, New York Press: 1999, p. 83 Stambaugh, Joan, The Formless Self, New York Press: 1999, p. 82 Krell, David Farrell, Martin Heide^er: Basic Writings, Revised and Expanded Bersion, Routledge: London, 1993, p. 94. As cited by Michael E. Zimmerman in Eclipse of the Self: The Development ofHeide^er’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 236 '**’5 Zimmerman, Michael E., Eclipse of the Self The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity, rev. ed., Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981, p. 237 149 406 Heidegger, Martin, Letter on Humanism, cited in Caputo, John D., The Mystical Element in Heidegger, AÛitiw. Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 163. from Identity and Difference, 95/31, as cited in Caputo, John D., The Mystical Element in Heide^er, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 182-3 A: Heidegger’s description o f Etngnis as the event/relationship of Da-sein to Being as one o f disclosure {alêtheiâ) which at once authenticates Da-sein, but also reveals tlieir primordial relation — that they belong together and always already are appropriated, one to another, recalls Dogen’s efforts to explain Buddha-nature. The arguments appear circular: one’s Buddha-nature is autlienticated in an enlightenment experience; however, the Buddha-nature that is made manifest has never not been manifested. Heidegger states: Being itself is the relationship {Verhaltnis) insofar as it [—Being] holds (hall) ek-sistence (Ek-sislenf) in its existential, i.e., ex-static essence (IVesen) in itself and gadiers it [=Eksistenz] to itself as tlie dwelling place of the trutli o f Being in the midst of beings.'*”^ Wliat both Heidegger and Dogen would like the student/practitioner to recognize is tliat being in tlie world is at its essence a relationship — (transcendent) Being to/w itli (immanent) beings — and authentic existence opens to tliis truth in a self-relinquishing manner which at once is totally transformative. Heidegger understands Being and being interdependently: “Presencing (A.n-2veseîi) requires letting-be-present (An-msenfassetl), presencing needs the openness of a clearing in which it may be what it is.”'*^^ In his reflections on Heidegger’s Contrlhutions to Pbilosophj, Otto Foggier writes that for Heidegger, “the divine by definition needs being in order not to forget itself and its greatness,” that the divine condescends to participate in history and human language while at the same time human beings look beyond the historical to tlie many showings of the divine. And thus, the temporal and eternal come together through tlie fulfilment of experience: The temporality of human being is fulfilled in tlie moment o f insight, which is imagined in tlie Contributions as the play of space and time on the occasion of a moment of insight. On this occasion o f a mom ent of insight, time and space together flourish as one in eternity, though this eternity must be reimagined in the moment of insight as having the character o f the divine. Thus it becomes determined as “passing”: as tliat in which time is fulfilled in tlie experience of the divine, when the restless questioning of Dasein is stilled in a shattering unquestionability; then time wins its freedom, able to cede its position and to malie way for anotlier time. The accord of time, eternity, and the moment of insight can only 150 be grasped in repetition, which (beyond recollection) lets what has been repeat itself in another way. The divine, whose essence is passing, is given to Dasein in a sign, so diat the divine eliminates itself when it is given to human being — suddenly and fleetingly, not firmly and unalterably.'*”® Foggier sees here a parallel to Heidegger’s appreciation of Holderlin’s poetry as he voiced in his lectures o f 1934/5 in which he cites the hymn “The Festival of Peace” where heavenly tilings are described as “quickly past” and the eternity of the heavenly or divine as a “fleeting, scarcely graspable sign ... which can show everytliing blessed and everything terrible in the instant of its passing.”'*”^ Heidegger’s incorporation of Holderlin’s description o f tlie fleeting nature of eternity in relation to human existence resonates well with Nagarjuna’s description of nirvana and samsara and D ogen’s description o f the dynamic interdependence of Buddha-nature and living beings. Rather than seeing tliem as categorical states o f being, they must be treated and approached relationally, or in Buddhist terminology, from the standpoint o fpratttya-samutpada, that is, co-dependentiy arising in a repeatable pattern, yet always renewed. Thus Heidegger’s reluctance, as intimated at the beginning of this chapter, to express himself within the language norms o f tlieology become clearer. He himself states, “The holy cannot be expressed ‘theologically’ at all, for all ‘theology’ presupposes God with such certainty tliat everywhere tlieology looks, God has already taken flight.”'*^” Instead, Heidegger puts forward poetry as the “language” and profound or meditative thinking as two means which most effectively evoke the sacred, tlie divine. DichUn (poetry) and Denken (tliinking)

It has been suggested tliat what Heidegger calls meditative tliinking (Denken) approaches what the Zen practitioners describe as seated meditation (i^a^en). Elements that have caused some to see tliis parallel include Heidegger’s description of allowing the way to arise spontaneously by using tlie German mystical term favoured by Meister Eckhart, Gelassenehiet. Caputo notes “tliere is a strictness, a discipline, in Heidegger’s concept of Gelassenheit an ascetic overtone for thinking — it is a “persevering meditation” (ausdauernde ‘108 Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trails John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press (originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 330 409 Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press (originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 330 from his second Holderlin lecture as cited by Poggler, Otto, The Paths of Heidegger’s Life and Thought, trans John Bailiff, New Jersey: Humanities Press (originally published in German in 1992), 1997, p. 333 151 üesinmmg)T^ And for Caputo, dûs “speaks of effort, practice, care with thinking, more so than calculative thinking.”'*^^ Meditative diinking is distinctive from 'representational thinking’ as Young points out, in that representational thinking always occurs “witiiin a horizon o f disclosure” whereas meditative thinldng is “in a certain sense, 'horizonless’.”**^^ Likewise, whereas representational thinking establishes boundaries and categories, meditative diinldng allows die 'the mystery’ a presencing while it yet remains 'the mystery’ and thereby allows it “to remain 'nameless’.”'*^'* Meditative thinking is similar, then, to poetic thinking in that both “allow 'the holy enigma [RatseJf to come 'close’ to us 'as the enigma’”/^^ Heidegger states in What is Called Thinking “ ...when poesy is elevated and thinking profound” they think “the same.”'*^” It is Young’s conclusion that aldiough meditative thinking and great poetry share the same concern, yet, for Heidegger, diey are different modes that accomplish a different access. Meditative thinking is only able to bring one close or to die “brink of the mystical” — it is able to indicate the existence of die 'holy enigma’ but not to bring one into intimacy with die holy. Young considers Heidegger’s meditative thinking as that which indicates the holy, the mystery, negatively by showing die boundaries of cognitive expression. Poetry/art, on the other hand, brings the holy into “positive presence” by “thematizing” it.'*^’ Poetry/art allows humans a way to participate in the divine that cognitive and even meditative diinking cannot; poetry/art is immediate and intuitive. Interestingly, Young concludes that although it seems diat poetry/art is given privilege over thinking o f any kind, even meditative, still thinking has its definitive role in the “verification” of poetry/art by testing it.'*^® Young and others have noted that Heidegger’s later writing seems to want to merge philosophical writing with poetic utterance, what Young considers a “perfect marriage” and odiers consider greater chaos and obscurity in his meaning.

Heidegger, Martin, Gelassenheit, 15/49, Identity and Difference, 47/51, as cited by Caputo, John D., The Mystical Element in Heide^er, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 178 412 Heidegger, Martin, Gelassenheit, 15/47, as cited by Caputo, John D., in The Mystical Element in Tleide^er, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978, p. 178 413 Young, Julian, Heide^er’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 18 Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 19 Heidegger, Martin, Identity and Difference, pp. 34-5, as cited in Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 19 Heidegger, Martin, What is Called Thinking, trans. by Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray, New York: Harper & Row, 1972, p. 20 as cited in Young, Julian, Heide^er’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 19 Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 20 418 Young, Julian, Heidegger’s Later Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 21 152 Philosophical concepts as 'formal indication’ In The Fimdamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Tinitude, Solitude Heidegger argues that Dasein must question what it means to belong to the “wholeness” that is tlie world, what it means to be finite, and what is the individuation of Dasein itself. But tlie asking o f these questions must be undertaken in a way tliat makes them relevant in addressing the “need” of Dasein: “The question which continues to face us is simply whether or not we are capable of experiencing, or at least releasing, the liberating power harboured within tliese questions as questions.”'*^ One of Heidegger’s projects in tliis volume is to show tliat philosophical concepts themselves are not tlie location o f truth for Dasein regarding the world, but tliat they do (I) indicate that there is truth for Dasein, and (2) prepare Dasein for engaging that trutli. The honest or sincere questioning activity of Dasein brings Dasein to the brink of possibility, the possibility M restoring to Dasein its actuality, tliat is, its existenceT^^^ Really living is Dasein’s goal and philosophy is a “formal indication” to the truth and realisation o f diis goal. Heidegger says that “Philosophizing ... can only lead us to the brink and always remains something penultimate in this respect.” At the brink, one is left to make a “leap” for “[o]nly individual action itself can dislodge us from tliis brink o f possibility into actuality, and tliis is the moment of visionT"^^^ Heidegger writes tliat “[a]ll philosophical concepts are formally indicative, and only if they are taken in this way do they provide tlie genuine possibility of comprehending sometliing.”"*^^ Heidegger describes tlie “comprehending something” thus: “True understanding never proves its mettle in repeating sometliing after someone, but only in its power to lead understanding into genuine action, into objective achievement, which by no means primarily consists in the production of more philosophical literature.”'*^'* Here Heidegger sets up the moment of vision, the Augenblick, as tlie active realisation or comprehension o f Dasein — philosophising does not achieve its goal in the philosopher’s head. Moreover, Heidegger has also stated diat “Philosophizing is something living only Heidegger, Martin, TbeFmidamentd Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitnde, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 5 “'20 Heidegger, Martin, The Fimdamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitnde, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 170 '121 Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 173 422 Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 173 423 Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 294 Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 300

where it comes to language and expresses itself O f course, the m om ent philosophy “comes to language” it is immediately misinterpreted. This is entirely unavoidable given how we commonly approach meaning (i.e. like we do other objects in the world, as “something present at hand”), however, it should not be a discouragement from philosophy. We merely need to know how philosophising works, that is, it provides a person tlie space needed to engage in “genuine exposition and explication” o f the questions (what is world, what is finitude, what is individuation) that will allow one to free Dasein and “ .. .let the intrinsic relationships betineen world, individuation, and finitude emerge together.”'*^” Heidegger also warns against the “direct” approach, philosophical concepts do not “directly intend what tliey mean” and we should avoid that kind of direct correlative thinking for the relationship between Dasein and the essence of what it means to be in the world is one tliat is made clear in a moment of vision where such truths “emerge.” Thus, one should not expect to construct philosophical systems that contain, or in any way explain, the more essential elements of existence. At the same time, philosophising is an excellent patli of approach to authentic existence. A t tliis point, it is again perhaps clarifying to compare Heidegger’s direction to the Buddhist treatment of utterances and different modes o f expression. Nàgârjuna was not inclined to grant any utterance tlie privilege of being anytliing but an indicator of the mystery beyond. Words are vehicles whose scope is limited beyond which only silence reigns. Philosophical discourse has the sole purpose of frustrating cognitive paths so that the participant ceases to engage in such thinldng and eventually shuts it down - there is a rest, a stillness, beyond the work o f thinking. Once tliis is accomplished, tliere is notliing left but the full participation (practice) in Buddhist activity. True practice takes the place o f 'great' art. Dogen has perhaps a more complementary path to Heidegger in that he takes “expression” and turns it inside out so that it expresses tlie individual as much as it is expressive o f an individual. In tliis way, both individuals and expression share a reality in non-duality tliat may be where Heidegger would find affinity. As discussed in the Dogen chapter, koan normally are used as a tool, a verbal test, to shatter an individual’s pre-conceived outlook so that a flash of insight may provoke transformation in the practitioner. Plowever, Dogen makes the case tliat kOan are more than mere verbal tools ^^25 Heidegger, Martin, The Fimdavmtld Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 291 ‘^26 Heidegger, Martin, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude, trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker, Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 300

with which one utilizes and casts aside once the insight has been gained. By internalising the koan, as was indicated in the Dogen chapter, Dogen shows how even a verbal tool shares in the moment of insight, for the koan works existentially within the practitioner tlirough the transformation process and all aspects of the individual share the transformation. '^27' Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York; Harper & Row, 1971, p. 5 428 Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 41 "*29 Heidegger's description is strikingly similar to the Kione Greek term "LwyyèXioW or “gospel — bearing” whereby the nexus o f message and messenger is indistinguishable. See G. Strecker's reception definition o f Euocyyèkiov in Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament, volume 2, edited by Horst Balz and Gerhard Schneider, Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pubhshing Company, 1981, p. 70 Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 41 Heidegger’s Dialogue on Language provides a working exemplar of the way in which Heidegger and Dogen share a similar view o f language and its relationship to beings. First o f all, Heidegger chooses to express himself in the form of a “dialogue” instead o f a more linear philosophical presentation. A “dialogue” is naturally composed of different voices, and Heidegger emphasises this by juxtaposing his own voice (as the Inquirer) | with the voice of a foreigner (the Japanese). Heidegger reminds us in the course o f the dialogue of the gravity of such a move by recalling that he has considered different / language groups isolated “houses of being.”"*^’ He softens his earlier consideration by admitting that it was a “clumsy” designation and allowing the inquirer to remind him tliat exchange between the two “houses” is only “nearly” impossible, not totally impossible. Much later in the dialogue, the “Japanese” is allowed to say that tliere is a “deeply concealed kinship with our thinking, precisely because your patli o f tliinking and its language are so wholly other.”'*^® Furtlier, in discussing what Heidegger calls the “twofold” of “presence” and “present beings,” the admission of the “deeply concealed kinship” between their tliinldng is said to rest or depend on tlie “boundlessness which is shown to us in K u f that is, the Buddhist emptiness. Immediately upon this pronouncement, Heidegger defines the human being as “tlie message-bearer o f tlie message of tlie two-fold’s unconcealment”'*^” and also the one “who walks tlie boundary o f tlie boundless.”'*^” Thus, Heidegger again suggests tliat Da-sein is the hermeneutic key embodied. Humans, like language, contain limits but express or provide opportunity for tlie “boundary’s mystery” to take shape, make an appearance. Language is likened to a “trail” on which

an almost imperceptible promise announcing that we would be set free into the open, now dark and perplexing, now again lightning-sharp like a sudden insight, which then, in turn, eluded every effort to say it/^* Language and tliought are both pathways or trails tliat lead toward the mystery, yet the mystery is really expressed within tlie existence of Da-sein. Heidegger’s Dialogue is a meditation in some ways on the collapse of subject and object as expressed through the human. Heidegger warns that it is “treacherous” to think in terms o f subject and object. The collapse of the subject and object occurs when the essence sought arises not outside of the seeker but as a result o f the seeking and indeed because of the necessity o f seeking. Language is no simple tool and engaged in properly also participates in Heidegger’s “hermeneutical circle” as speaking comes “from out of language’s reality,” thus from the source o f itself which is ever “coming.”'*®^ Furthermore, true “saying” is characterised “witli more silence tlian talk” and presumably this introduces to the so-called houses of being a more common ground tlian they previously saw.'*^^ Heidegger chooses to describe the source of the saying as “stillness” and “a stilling” that “quiets the breath of the vastness into the structure of Saying which calls out to the messenger.”'*^'* One is reminded o f the “stilling” and “quieting” aspects of nirmt}a that Nagarjuna speaks about after the clutter o fprapanca (conceptual diffusion) has been cleared away. Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 41 “^^2 Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 52 4^2 Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 52 Heidegger, Martin, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” in On the Way to Language, trans. Peter Hertz, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 53

Conclusion

Sokolowski,, Robert, Jntrodtdction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 12 see Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 99-100 Abe, MasaOjH Study ofDôgen, ed. Steven Heine, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1992, p. 11 438 Abe, Masao, A Study ofDôgen, ed. Steven Heine, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1992, p. 11 There is within the Western phenomenological tradition a respect for the way truth speaks through the world and others in the world. And truth is understood as something / gained or experienced only within the Lehemwelt As Sokolowski points out, the -“intentionality” that describes the way a consciousness/ego approaches the world (i.e. through a manifold of intentionalities from pictures, ideas to words) serves to remind us that “the mind is a public thing, tliat it acts and manifests out in the open Moreover, Sokolowski maintains, phenomenology pushes back on the previous philosophy which would posit judgements and meaning itself as entities, either in the mind or transcendent to experience (as seen in Kant or Descartes) and suggests rather that judgements (and meaning) are a “dimension of presentation” and dependent upon the “propositional attitude” o f the subject. That is to say, truth is not detached from the phenomenal, but awaits a proper perspective from tlie consciousness which pursues it whereby it can be recognized or discovered, or in Heidegger’s terminology, an event of discovery (Ereignis). In tliis way, truth stands always available and immanently accessible within experience and not as a reified or transcendent ideal. Trutli is the event of discovery/ self-showing. However, as Abe has observed, the West sees religion and philosophy as two separate disciplines, engaging different methodologies and pursuing at times, different manifestations o f truth. Abe asserts tliat the West sees philosophy as a “human enterprise for understanding humans and the universe based on intelligence or reason, whereas [religion] is faith in divine revelation.”'*^’ In Eastern thought, particularly in Zen Buddhism, there is no such difference, for Abe writes, “(s)iiice Buddhism is originally not a religion of faith in a transcendent deity but a religion of awakening to the true nature of self and otliers, praxis and theoria, to use Western terms, are interfused and undifferentiated.”'*^® This thesis has considered seminal thinkers within the Mahâyâna/Zen tradition, Nagarjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu within the Yogâcâra School, and Dogen, as well as Western philosopher and thinker, Martin Heidegger, and

evaluated each in terms of a praxi-centric phenomenology. In other words, this thesis 1 has evaluated Abe’s statement by investigating the extent to which and more importantly, h-ow, praxis and theoria are brought togetlier in a universalis ed search for truth, reality, or die way things are (jathàhütani) . In discussing Nagarjuna, it becomes clear that he leads Madhyamika thinking in a similar direction as the Western school of phenomenology. Nagarjuna decries the reifying tendencies o f doctrinal Buddhism, and emphatically seeks to clear the practitioner’s mind of dogmatic teaching. However, one cannot leave die mundane realm to find the transcendent trudi elsewhere. One must instead prepare and cleanse one’s mind of die false perceptions and religious doctrines which would serve only to clutter one’s vision and further obscure true reality. When religious doctrine replaces genuine practice, dien truth is no where to be found. Likewise, botii Nagarjuna and die Western pheiiomenologists possess great scepticism in the human use of language to name or adequately describe truth. The phenomenologists would rather recognize language for its role in ascertaining a portion of identity — language works with intellect to show up and exhibit, to communicate, àifferânce (widi all of its dependencies on presence, absence, gaps) that prepares the consciousness/ego to make judgements.'*^*’ But it only goes this far. Meaning, or true identity lies beyond die realm o f language and witiiout this understanding, die consciousness cannot get beyond the fundamentals of differince. Nagarjuna, too, makes his case to severely limit the effectiveness of language to reveal or even discuss die realm o f paramartha-satya or ultimate truth. In his more shocking moments he has asserted that the Buddha has in no place and at no time ever taught the Dharma, the truth. Where Nagarjuna most clearly departs from especially Husserlian phenomenology, is the latter’s desire to locate (and hence “name”) the source of truth. Nagarjuna emphatically denies tiiis pursuit of an essence which bears and communicates meaning. Nâgârjuna’s attack o f svabhava, self-nature or essence, is to show that the pursuit of such essences — and ultimately The Essence, for this is where die search leads — is die very detriment to locating or better, experiencing, meaning. Wliat phenomenologists, like Husserl, propose 439 see Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 123 158 by clearing away the assumptions and making ready the transcendent ego for an ultimate encounter witli truth, is for Nagarjuna what the Buddhist scholars did in his time. That is, tliey exchanged one set o f categorical and short-reaching methods for another. If ever Buddhist rhetoric approaches indicating The Essence or Ultimate Reality, it is in relation to speaking o f the tathdgata, the tlius gone/com e one, the fully completed One, tlie Buddha, and in speaking of niruàna. Nàgârjuna dedicates a chapter in the MMK to unravelling tlie perceived foundationalism o f botli the tathàgata and nirumia in order to show how severely misleading a Buddhist doctrinal approach can be.'*'*” Prom pted by the ever-troublesome question o f time, Husserl theorises that we can identify three ways of dealing witli temporality: world or objective time which works according to worldly processes and is measured by worldly standards (clocks, etc); internal or subjective time which allows the ego consciousness to play out mental acts; and internal time consciousness which is botli the “core” or source of temporality, and at the same time which cannot be identified or considered independent o f either internal or world time.'*'** Husserl realises tlie problems resultant from the dichotomous presencing and absellcing which arise from objective-subjective treatment of time, and looks for the source o f the distinction. He finds it, ultimately, in tlie transcendent ego. Vdieii Nagarjuna approaches the troubling problem o f time and distinctions, his solution attempts to drive the seeker out o f tlie dead-end reasoning and perspective o f the samsark. Looking beyond the objective and subjective does not provide the source for botli, or rather, it does not provide tlie ontological ego-source, but instead Nagarjuna offers the opening o f sûnyatâ — emptiness which in away “supports” both samjàra2X\à. nirvana. Within the approach o f sünyatâ differences are irrelevant. The pursuit o f limits is absorbed by its own impossibility, logically, and Nàgârjuna offers instead of àifferânce, a reorientation toward tlie Lehenswelt, one transformed by tlie experience, rather than knowledge, of truth. Wliat has been described as Nàgàrjuna’s mysticism is partly his uncompromising stance toward the misleading aspects of phenomenal life, that is, the ego navigating and discovering tlie Lebenswelt. Altliough I would argue that Nàgârjuna ultimately has a 440 MMK 22 and MMK 25 444 see Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Pfmomenology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000,130-

. . positive stance toward to the Lebensivelt or samsaric reality in that he recognises it as a valid state, and further would perhaps take the recognised Buddhist stance that samsaric '■■existence is ripe or opportunity for enlightenment, still Nagarjuna is emphatic that what ; is given in samara (in the Lebensivelt) can only be taken as such. Attempts to speak, describe, to categorise, will never achieve the phenomenologist’s hope of testing and verifying truth perceptions. It can be argued that Nagarjuna clears tlie way for a praxi-centric phenomenology by aggressively destroying by means of logic, any false ground or foundation that would replace the ultimate patli of Buddhist practice. Although most of Nâgârjuna’s efforts are concentrated around clearing away reified images of Buddhist religion, he has penned simple documents describing and praising the Buddhist life and practice iSuhrkkha, Ratnavali, The Hymns of the Catuh-stavd). Wliat Nàgârjuna leaves us with, after his perceived negative attack on all truth assertions/statements, is the bodhisattva màrga\t^Hî\ that is, a relying not on the statements of truth eschewed in religious discourse, but the active pursuit tlirough daily practice of a bodhisattva, intent upon true realisation. Nàgârjuna pushed, via a negating logic, the consciousness beyond this phenomenal world, much like the stages of meditation train the consciousness in ever greater concentration until at some point the consciousness is simply beyond. In meditation practice, it is difficult to distinguish a living yogi in a deep trance from a dead corpse. Wliat prevents Nâgârjuna’s Buddhist practice from becoming yet another religious/ philosophical transcendentalism is the way mnjatd is utilised. Smryatd in Nâgârjuna’s tliought prevents botli tlie foundationalism of presence as well as tlie equally foundationalism o f the transcendent. Wlien the mind is finally finished constructing arguments {prapanca) instead of ascending simply beyond arguments and doctrinal statements, the mind has been prepared to partake in tlie activities of a bodhisattva. For Nàgârjuna, the most difficult achievement is this preparing the mind. Nàgârjuna achieves tlie preparation through negating tlie constructing (particularly of arguments) activity of the mind - tlie quieting of prapanca. A stilled mind is the achievement o f bliss (siva) and peace isdntâ) which is the way Nàgârjuna speaks of nirvdtia. It is die ultimate achievement.

To propose tliat Nagarjuna engages in a praxi-centric phenomenology, is not to attempt to systematise Nagarjuna tliought, but to recognise in his thought the necessity of practice, engaging directly the phenomenal mundane world. Without practice in the mundane realm, as recognised much earlier in Buddhist thought, there is no movement towards release. Furtlier, Nagarjuna argues, witli sûnyatà as the “base,” the Buddhist practice cannot evaporate into transcendence. Yogâcâra, emphasising meditation practice, further analyses the consciousness and takes the argument deep within tlie psyche. Ultimately, of course, the subject’s inner psyche must be released, however, on tlie way one might conceivably remain lost in the systematics of another Buddhist doctrine, this time one witliin the consciousness itself. Both Nàgârjuna and Yogâcâra lay out the method of overcoming the illusory existence in the mundane realm of samsara as a progressive path, ending in emptiness realised. Nâgârjuna’s logic carefully cuts away the base until one is able to logically let go. Practice is not secondary, but becomes at this point the focal point. Yogâcâra progressively follows tlie path o f illusion deep witliin tlie subjective consciousness so that once the primary or primordial creator o f illusion is identified then all grasping of self can at this point be relinquished, and 'no-self via 'no mind’ is realised. The efforts in Yogâcâra to unravel the constructing activity of the mind appears to be in the same vein as Nâgârjuna who also sought, through deconstructive means to destroy the rational arguments of the mind which bar one from autlientic religious experience. However, the crucial difference may be in the way that Nâgârjuna would push tlie practitioner to a position of sûnyatà and insist tliat, if the practitioner had truly gone beyond conceptualising, nothing further can be said; the experience speaks for itself and the best one can do at tliis point is say more clearly what such an experience is not. The Yogâcâra approach, in contrast, also seeks to drive the practitioner beyond tlie conceptualising mode of tlie mind, which is designated as the portion of the mind which creates tlie distinctions when there are really none. This “beyond” however, is not left to apophatic language or the realm of the inexpressible, but described in a multitude of ways, none of which are designed to be definitive in and of themselves. Furthermore, and most importantly as a distinction between Madhyamika and Yogâcâra, a bodhisattva’s mission of compassion in the Yogâcâra view depends on a skilful 161 employment o f language, for tlie bodhisattva is expected to lead otliers to liberation through efficacious teaching. Does “skilful means” provide the necessary room for both Madhyamika expression and the Yogâcâra approach? Possibly. However, the Yogâcâra allowance for positive statements o f the source for the ego and the “ultimate” also leave open the possibility for the grave error o f relegating practical insight to systematic processes and locating the ineffable within ontological or epistemological frameworks which cannot but fail as locations of release. Paradoxically, release is experienced — it is existential in nature — and thus, in one sense personal and individual. However, ultimate release is experienced as an expression of no-self, not the ego self. Yogâcâra teachings identify the ego-self as the mistaken activity o f the mind, a location personal and individual, fully linked to the Buddhist teaching of karma. The Yogâcâra mind is less a location, more an activity, which directs and forms the rest o f tlie individual. Convert the activity o f the mind from the detrimental actions o f producing duality and die mind is allowed to participate in the ultimate, which is neither dual nor non-dual.

The structured appearance of Yogâcâra teaching, its similarity to the Abhidharma dbarma matrices in form, is problematic. In the Yogâcâra understanding, convert the alaya and the rest of the world o f dhamms is largely irrelevant — tliey no longer disturb tlie dlaya or prom pt the dlaya into constructing activity. The dlaya, still and peaceful, fully transformed, can now “see” and “know” the world of sanisdra for what it is and despite it, can remain in it precisely because it, the dlaya, is fully transformed. This is the Yogâcâra explanation for how the bodhisattva, although enlightened, can maintain contact in and with die unenlightened world. The Yogâcâra explanation makes the hodisattva-mdrga out to be very personal in the way it is executed. And less mystical than die apophatic approach o f the Madhyamika, die Yogâcâra scholars are not dissuaded from providing an explanation for how the bodhisattva reconciles the otherwise dualistic and contradictory mission o f one who would delay ultimate freedom from the world of sanysdra in order to teach and encourage others along the padi of transformation. The Yogâcâra approach appears more readily based on practice dian even Nâgârjuna’s approach as the school is established and named based on the practice of yogic meditation. However, and not to de-emphasise the practice of meditation to the school’s doctrines, the Yogâcâra explanation o f illusory reality issuing from the d/gya-consciousness, die origin of the ego162 self, creates problems for the Yogâcâra approach. The jump from locating the dlaya and identifying the source of the illusory’s world’s creation to the empty mind, not creating and not participating in the mundane activities of illusory reality, is difficult to follow. Apparently, one achieves tlie insight in die rhythm of meditation and hodhisattva-mdrga activities. Also problematic for the school is the trajectory the Yogâcâra teaching took once it encountered Chinese thought in terms o f tathdgata-garhha and universal Buddha-mind. Chinese Taoism undeniably provided the inclination toward this doctrinal development; however, it was easy for Yogâcâra teaching to take on this foundational structure, largly because of the systematic appearance of Yogâcâra thought. Sûnyatà receded from its primary role o f freeing die practitioner to engage in the activity of release. By clarifying die question of die bodhisattva ideal, Yogâcâra seriously questions Buddhanature and its relation to human-nature, for the bodhisatL^a ideal is not restricted to monks but is understood and intended for all sentient beings. In this way, Yogâcâra prepares the ground for investigating “personal” liberation and the significance o f individual praxis. Consequendy, the way is opened for Dogen’s cosmological Buddhanature which links hum an/sentient b ein ^ with the vast universe/non-sentient phenomena, not particularly important to earlier schools of thought for considered either polluted (Abhidharma diought) or inconsequential to the interior landscape of transformation (Yogâcara thought). Yogâcâra conducted die positive investigation that Nâgârjuna spurned with mixed results. Nâgârjuna provided the conceptual key, sûnyatd (emptiness), by which to defeat conceptions. But Yogâcâra raised the issue of personal liberation and praxis, not directiy addressed or at least obvious in the Madhyamika approach. Consequently, Yogâcâra paved the way for the synthesising idealism of Chinese Fa-Hsiaiig School, but also widi the help of Madhyamika, helped secure die paradoxical approach of C han/Zen designed to both give teaching while simultaneously negating and transcending, it. It may be far too simplistic to assert diat Madhyamika and Yogâcâra and Dogen all insist, in their different approaches, on ego-less actualisation. However, despite the differences, dieir varied endeavours create striking contrast to the Western pre-occupation with freeing the “self’ which in the attempt to actualise the self, tends to create super-egos and solipsistic systems of self-reflection.

In contrast to Nâgârjuna’s and Yogâcâra apparently linear progression to tlie position of emptiness {sünyatâ} what Dogen and Heidegger propose is a kind o f circling back for an encounter with profound reality or truth. Dogen, in like vein witli the Yogâcâra stance, approaches tlie problem of true realisation from a personal standpoint. However, ratlier than purely psychological, Dogen’s approach does not bracket m ost o f the physical world but brings the cosmological and particular together in the mom ent of experience, that m om ent tliat brings together all conceptions of time - past, present and future — as well as all conceptions of duality, so that true experience of Buddha nature happens while flowers fall and weeds grow. Dogen’s actualised Buddha-nature pulls in the ontological reality o f the cosmos, enlightened at the moment no-self is realised, recognising the paradoxical situation in which time and space allow for the transcendental, in fact exist in and spring forth of the timeless and spaceless. Dogen’s portrayal o f tlie Buddhist doctrines of no-self, dependent co-origination, and liberation are more descriptive and personal than Nâgârjuna’s apophatic sûnyatà, yet Dogen models his datsuraku-datsuraku on Nâgârjuna’s teaching that sünyatâ relativises all reality. Dogen places this teaching squarely in the realm of Buddhist praxis by personalising sünyatâ to reflect the historical, autobiographical account of his own enlightenment experience. But unlike the personal/psychological approach suggested in Yogâcâra, Dogen’s concern is also comprehensive o f the phenomenal realm so that the merging of subject and object pursued in Dogen’s vision is one o f mutual dependence, the immanent and transcendent as exhibited concretely in the personal with cosmological. In keeping with what at first sounds like Yogâcâra paradox, self is actualised hence abandoned through true Buddhist practice which takes place within time and space, and located in a subject. In Dogen’s praxi-centric phenomenology, which he sign-posted with the title of his Shôbôgeniyp — seeing with a Buddha’s eye the worldly reality reflecting Buddha reality through t^ât^en practice — Dogen invites the individual to practice with every intention of seeing mundane everyday reality, botli sentient and non-sentient, participating in the very same activity. One’s flatten session is at once tlie efforts of an individual practicing in daily repetition as well as the grand turning of tlie universe in its recognition o f Buddha reality. The individual is not separated from any mundane reality and Buddha activity encompasses it all. But practice and activity are essential in tliis view for in this way.

Dôgen brings together the seemingly incompatible teachings o f original enlightenment and acquired enlightenment, seeing them acting in concordance with each other. The -paradox o f beginnings and the factor of time does not disturb Dôgen, for he sees time moving not uni-directionally, but inter-directionally, bringing together past, present and f future in a dynamic and significant expression of Buddha-nature. ■ For Dogen, practice or î^âiien, is the primary reason any sentient being participates in Buddha-reality, beyond tlie compassionate nature of Buddha-reality itself. Practice is tlie expression and the manifestation of Buddha reality consequently what is viewed as mere mundane reality from one perspective may be viewed as the Buddha Dharma itself should one be open to this revelation. Outside one’s direct experience, however, Buddha-nature cannot be sought or described or taught. Personal experience is not the key factor, however, although it is significantly part o f Dogen’s teaching. As he stated, using the whole body to look at forms and listen to sounds, “even though we are sensing tliem directly, it is not like a mirror’s reflection of an image ... Wliile we are experiencing one side, we are blind to tlie otlier side.” Experience and perception are always insufficient. One must see with the Buddha-eye in order for Buddha reality to show itself. The ego-self is never able to demand tliis showing or see properly enough. Only experience as characterised by sûnyatà, in which the ego-self is completely sloughed off, draws forth Buddha reality. Both Heidegger and Dôgen propose a transcendence away from beings: Dôgen via shinjin-datsuraku, letting cast off one’s body-mind, and Heidegger by placing Da-sein at the edge o f the abyss, facing death. Transcendence works to loosen one from the kind o f mundane view that covers and dulls reality. Dôgen further attempts a transcendence o f transcendence, or what can be called a “trans-descendence”. Dôgen’s datsurakudatsuraku encourages one to let go letting go so tliat one’s “traceless enlightenment” comes forth forever. Both Dôgen and Heidegger propose their phenomenology in terms o f a kind o f circling. Dôgen sees enlightenment in slumber and niruàna in sàmsara through tlie tautological teaching of datsuraku-datsuraku. Heidegger expresses the circling of Da-sein and Being between which tliere is dependence and revealing. Dôgen states in The Voicing of the Way fascicle (Dotokd)-. 165 ... at tlie very mom ent of falling away {fdatsurakff, tlie voicing of tlie Way arises, spontaneous and unexpected. It arises neither by strength of mind nor by strength o f body. It is the voicing of tlie Way, arising of itself. Furthermore, when this voicing o f the Way is being voiced, it is at once the non-voicing of the Way being non-voiced.'*'*^ Dogen’s words here recall Heidegger’s discussion of Waying which “allows die way to come forward.” Heidegger asserts diat die Way cannot be traced as a patii bound for a destination, and Dôgen writes that neither strengdi o f mind nor body, in odier words, no act o f will or force, can bring forth the Way. Heidegger’s circling, brought to view through his use o f tautology and his re-orienting Da-sein in relation to the Abyss or Das Nichts, attempts to clear Da-sein o f inauthentic concerns so that the event o f Being and die experiencing location o f Being in Da-sein can 'meet.’ Heidegger remains concerned widi authentic experience, although his language changes throughout his career of writing and thinking. Near die end of his life he writes more o f how the authentic experience can occur, or what it looks like in terms i o f wending one’s way through a forest, the experience of wandering (with purpose) which allows die way to make itself clear before one. Husserl and Heidegger both initially sought to challenge the notion that meaning be located outside the world of beings, what Husserl termed die lived-world (Lebens2Peli). The descriptor “phenomenology” which Husserl held to and Heidegger found wanting as it increasingly became the way to name a bygone school o f philosophy, remains meaningful when freed up from describing merely a mediod or school of thought. Heidegger declared that phenomenological philosophy is “over” because o f its cliche attribution. However, Heidegger also comments that ...in what is most its own, phenomenology is not a school. It is the possibility of thinking, at times challenging and only thus persisting, of corresponding to die claim o f what is to be diought,'*'*^ Heidegger viewed Husserl’s phenomenology as a “way o f doing” whereas a true phenomenological approach “makes extraordinary demands on the phenomenological 442 SAKAMOTO, Hiroshi, “The Voicing o f the Way; Dogen’s Shobogenzo Dotoku,” Eastern Buddhist, 16:1, (1983), p. 95 443 Dulie, Robin, “Does Phenomenology Have a Future?” Radical Philosophy, 113 (May/June 2002), p. 37 ^4 Durie, Robin, “Does Phenomenology Have a Future?” Radical Philosophy, 113 (May/June 2002), p. 37 166 % philosopher”'*'*'* by challenging the very being of tliat philosopher. Furthermore, what Heidegger prompts in his description o f the angst which acts as a wakening call to D asein is a personal, active participation in the development and discovery of meaning such as not to be encountered outside an engagement in the world of beings. Heidegger’s thought, often characterised by the Kehre, tlie turnings early and late in his career,

exemplify partly Heidegger’s life-long phenomenological bent which allows this re- y writing and re-visioning that defines living philosophy - what Heidegger ultimately calls Athinking (Denkefi). Husserl, conversely, in the very execution of his method of phenomenology puts into motion the mechanics by which his Lehensivelt loses life, ultimately abstracting from the phenomenal realm and retreating into a transcendent consciousness so that meaning, if it is to be understood as existing in the Lehenswelt\\s,CT and coming forth to meet the subject in some kind of genuine exchange, cannot express nor be expressed; meaning is rendered once again bodiless and voiceless. Fleidegger’s "in-der-Welf contains the action of “tlirowness” and demands a response from beings. Husserl’s term "l^benswelf suggests more the existential participation of one in the world. That Heidegger ignores this term may be his desire to distance himself from Husserl’s work, or perhaps his desire to re-define his terms, including that of existent^. Question o f Religious and Philosophical Pursuit Each of the Buddhist practitioners considered in this thesis, Nagarjuna, Asanga and Vasubandhu of the Yogâcâra school, and Dôgen, have written tlieir philosophical and religious treatises with the intention of leading their disciples closer to an experience of nirvana, or Buddha reality, through an experience of mnyatd. These practitioners wrote within the parameters of a particular Buddhist school or community, even when they were severely critical of tlie school or community. Although their methods can appear divergent, there is a similar active approach to tlie experience of profound reality which re-values all otlier (i.e. mundane) experience. The Buddhist practitioners considered here are singularly concerned witli a religious experience that ultimately cannot be named or described; it is mystical in its participation with tlie mundane reality tliat is seen through everyday perception. Theirs can be called a praxi-centric phenomenological approach to experience profound reality or authentic living. 167 3 Comparing this searching for a clearly religious ultimate concern with the pursuit of Western philosophers brings in the question of what the Western phenomenologists were attempting to uncover through tlieir investigation. Is Husserl’s attempt to confront ‘the things themselves’ infused widi the same type of ultimate concern as the Buddhist practitioner’s? As discussed above, Heidegger’s philosophical paths o f thinking clearly intersect to a certain degree with die kind of ultimate concern diat die Buddhist practioners were transparently attempting to identify: clearing away die clutter o f concern that obsucures from the eye/mind reality as it is; attuning oneself to the rythmn of authenticity. The Buddhist practitioner’s methods prepare one for diat land of engagement with reality that is transformative. Buddhist practitioners along with Heidegger allow the subject to remain in the tension that is experienced in practice and living which cannot be categorised. Accepting the tension and dissonance that pairs with experience is a readily accepted path for the Buddhist practioner in contrast with the Western phenomenologist. The Buddhist practitioner relates it to die authenticity of living/practicing while the Western phenomenologist is uneasy widi a tension diat cannot be explained. 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